

British Policy towards the Trucial Coast Emirates 1947-1955

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts

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Abstract


This thesis attempts to provide a comprehensive insight into British policy towards the Trucial Coast Emirates after the British Government granted independence to India in 1947 and the responsibility of the British Government of India shifted to the Foreign Office.

Chapter 1 introduces a review of the British historical connection that began with the first treaty between the British Government and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast in 1806. Then the impact of the British Government on various aspects of life in the Emirates is described. Chapter 2 investigates British policy and responsibility towards the Middle East in general and the Trucial Coast Emirates in particular, from 1947 to 1955. In Chapter 3 British policy towards the internal affairs of the Emirates is reviewed. Chapter 4 investigates British policy during oil-drilling agreements and its effect on the Emirates. Chapter 5 explores British policy regarding economic development in the Emirates from 1950 to 1955. In the final chapter there is an explanation in some detail of British policy in the Gulf in terms of settlement of boundaries.

The conclusion of the study highlights the ideas derived from this examination of the impact of British policy on the Emirates of the Trucial Coast.

Declaration

I declare that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

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
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List of Abbreviations Used

A.I.O.C.	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
A.P.O.C	Anglo-Persian Oil Company
A.R.A.M.C.O.	Arabian American Oil Company
B.B.M.E	British Bank of the Middle East
B.G.	British Government
B.G.I.	British Government of India
B.P.	British Policy
F.O.	Foreign Office
G.R.	the Gulf Region
I.O.R.	India Office Records
I.P.C.	Iraq Petroleum Company
M.D.	Ministry of Defence
M.E	the Middle East
N.A.R.	Native Agent Residency
P.A.	Political Agent
P.C.L.	Petroleum Company Limited
P.D.Q.L.	Petroleum Development Qatar Limited
P.D.T.C.L.	Petroleum Development Trucial Coast Limited
P.O.	Political Officer
P.R.	Political Resident
P.R.O.	Public Record Office
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force
S.O.C.	Superior Oil California
S.O.C.A.L.	Standard Oil California Company
T.C.E.	Trucial Coast Emirates
T.O.L.	Trucial Oman Levies
T.O.S.	Trucial Oman Scouts

T.P.C	Turkish Petroleum Company
T.S.C.	Trucial States Council
W.O.	War Office
W.W.II	World War Two

Dedication



I would like to dedicate this
humble effort to my parents who
never ceased encouraging and
supporting me to complete my
studies. My dedication is also to
my wife and children.

Acknowledgements

Thanks be to God above all others for aiding me throughout my studies.

It is reported by the Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him) that he who has not thanked the created ones (the people) has not thanked the Creator.

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It would have proved impossible to obtain the information necessary for the writing of this thesis without the help of so many people who gave me the opportunity to interview them. I here register my deepest appreciation to the British military officers and political representatives who served in the Gulf region and the Emirates in particular. Among these are Sir Bernard Burrows, Sir Michael Weir, Sir Donald Hawley, Sir David Stewart, Sir James Craig, G.P. Peter Tripp, Colonel Stewart Carter, Major Peter Clayton, Major Desmond Cosgrove, and Mr. Neville Green.

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Introduction

This study examines British policy towards the Emirates of the Trucial Coast between 1947 and 1955. The starting point of 1947 has been chosen as in that year Britain granted India her independence, as a result of which British responsibility for the Gulf region shifted from the British Government of India in Delhi to the Foreign Office in London. 1955 seemed a suitable cut-off point, being the year when the dispute over the Buraimi Oasis came to an end. That dispute had started in 1952 with the influx of oil companies to the region at a time when the boundaries of the various territories had not been clearly identified, and concerned the British Government, acting on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman on the one hand, and the Saudi Government on the other. Its settlement in 1955 was in favour of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. It should be taken into account that from 1955 until 1974 there was no dispute about the Buraimi Oasis. In 1974, an agreement was concluded in which Saudi Arabia renounced its right in Buraimi and at the same time the Emirates granted Saudi Arabia a gateway to the Gulf.

The significance of this study is the contribution it makes to the field of knowledge in relation to British policy towards the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, particularly between 1947 and 1955, which after World War II increasingly recognised the strategic importance of the Trucial Coast Emirates for its position in the Gulf and, resulting from it, its role as a protector and controller of the development of the rather disjointed sheikhdoms into a more cohesive state. Great Britain took on a much more

interventionist pro-active role than it had before the war. The study is based upon several different resources, particularly British documents, in addition to books in either English or Arabic and research studies. In order to achieve the objective of the present study, the researcher visited the Arab League in Cairo, the centres of Middle Eastern studies in Britain, such as the School of Oriental and African Studies in the University of London, the Universities of Exeter, Durham, and Leeds, together with St. Antony's College, Oxford, and used material from the Public Records Office (PRO) and the India Office (IO).

The English sources that have been consulted are the documentary publications made available by Archive Editions, such as *Records of the Emirates primary documents, 1820-1959*, in 11 volumes; *Arabian Gulf oil concessions, 1911-1953*, in 2 volumes; *Arabian boundaries primary documents, 1853-1957*, volumes 14, 16, 17, 19, and 20; and, in the PRO archive, FO 371, general correspondence for the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.

Regarding Arabic sources, the following have been used: the published papers of Jamal Zakriya Qasim on the Gulf States in the period from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries; Muhammad Mursi Abdullah's *Dawlat al-Imarat wa-jiranuha, 1892-1945*, (The Emirates and their neighbours, 1892-1945); and Abd al-Khawi Fahmi's *Mashyakhat al-sahil al-'Umani, 1892-1952* (The Omani coast Sheikhdoms, 1892-1952), an unpublished Ph.D. thesis presented to Ain Shams University, Cairo.

The researcher encountered a certain amount of difficulty owing to the sensitivity of the issue and the unavailability of some sources on British policy towards the Emirates. While most historical and political studies tackle the issue of British policy towards the Middle East, including the Gulf region, no particular emphasis is given in them to the Emirates. At the beginning, most of the material consulted is in the form of documents. However, several books have provided interesting additional material. Thus, for example, J.B. Kelly's *Eastern Arabian frontiers* discusses the boundary dispute between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. *The Trucial States*, by Donald Hawley, presents a historical background to the early history of the Emirates and the advent of European powers, the Omani Civil War, and economic activities in the Emirates, and so it is generally an interesting source on the Emirates, enhanced by the fact that the author was a Political Agent in Dubai from 1958 to 1961. Another useful book is that of Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The origins of the United Arab Emirates*. A treatment of the historical background of the Emirates from the eighteenth century to the present can also be found in Frauke Heard-Bey's *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*. Peter Clayton's *Two Alpha Lima* is an invaluable resource, particularly with regard to the Buraimi issue and Trucial Oman Levies.

The researcher has benefited from interviewing the officers who were in the Gulf region and the Emirates in particular. Among these are: Sir Bernard Burrows, a Political Resident in Bahrain (1953-1958); Sir Michael Weir, Political Agent in Sharjah and Dubai (1952-1954); G.P. Peter Tripp, Political Agent in Dubai (1955-

1958); Sir Donald Hawley, Political Agent in Dubai (1958-1961); Sir James Craig, Political Agent in Dubai (1961-1965); Colonel Stewart Carter, Leader of the Trucial Oman Scouts (1957-1961); Mr Easa Saleh al-Gurg, Commercial Assistant in the British Bank of the Middle East in Dubai in the 1950s; Sir David Stewart, Captain in the Trucial Oman Scouts (1957-1958); Major Peter Clayton, Captain in the Trucial Oman Levies (1954-1957); Mr Nevill Green, Manager of the branch of the Eastern Bank Limited in Sharjah (1957-1959); and Major Desmond Cosgrove, Captain in the Trucial Oman Scouts (1957-1961).

This thesis is basically historical and political; its structure is topical and chronological, and it is divided into seven chapters.

Chapter 1 studies the historical background to the British relationship with the Trucial Coast Emirates that goes back to 1806 and its development up to 1946.

Chapter 2 presents British policy and responsibility towards the Middle East in general and the Trucial Coast Emirates in particular from 1947 to 1955. Here we look at the policy of the British Government, through the Foreign Office, in the Middle East, particularly in the Trucial Coast Emirates. First, we consider the formation in 1951 of the initial small organized force, the Trucial Oman Levies, that was to become the Trucial Oman Scouts in 1957, and, second, the setting up of the first Trucial States Council in 1952. This Council was headed by the Political Agent in Sharjah and later in Dubai. It was scheduled to meet regularly, bringing together all the Rulers to

discuss economic, political, and social issues related to the Emirates, in an endeavour to find solutions.

British policy towards the internal affairs of the Emirates is tackled in Chapter 3 and here Britain's part in managing the internal affairs of the Emirates is highlighted. The solving of boundary disputes amongst the Emirates themselves necessitated a great deal of time and effort. Additionally, the way in which the British Government was involved in annexing one Emirate to its original mainland and acknowledging the independence of another Emirate is examined.

Chapter 4 considers British policy towards oil-drilling agreements and their effect on the Emirates. In this chapter Anglo-American competition to secure oil rights in the region is discussed. This was later to culminate in American companies' securing concessions in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and also a share in the oil of Kuwait. But British companies managed to negotiate exclusive rights in the oil fields of Qatar, Muscat, Oman, and the Trucial Coast Emirates.

Chapter 5 investigates British policy regarding economic development in the Emirates between 1950 and 1955, and the part the British Government played in developing the infrastructure of the Emirates. Several projects were undertaken, such as the establishment of a hospital and the introduction of modern banking in Dubai, water supply resources, and schools in the Emirates. Additionally, via the Political

Resident in Bahrain, the British Government supplied the budgets required for the implementation of the development plans that were drawn up.

Chapter 6 deals with the vital part Britain played in the Gulf in relation to the settlement of boundary disputes between the Emirates and their neighboring countries, drawing up the land and sea boundaries of the Emirates with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iran, and Qatar.

Chapter 7 forms the conclusion, where the findings of the study and the main points tackled in the previous chapters are discussed.

Chapter 1

**The British relationship with the
Trucial Coast Emirates and their
development up to 1946**

1.1. Description of the Emirates

The Trucial Coast Emirates, seven in number, as listed on the next page, are located in the south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.¹ Their Gulf coastline (about 430 miles in length) is more than 40% of the total of the Arab side of the Gulf. The Emirates' territory bisects the territory of Oman south of the Musandam Peninsula, giving the Trucial Coast Emirates an additional coastline of about 60 miles on the Gulf of Oman. Thus, the country forms a land bridge between the two bodies of water, south of the strategic Straits of Hurmuz, and that which Oman commands from the tip of the peninsula. The Trucial Coast Emirates share land borders with Qatar to the west, Saudi Arabia to the south-west, and the Sultanate of Oman to the south-east. Their territorial waters stretch into the Gulf.²

The total area of the United Arab Emirates is 32,050 square miles (83,000 km²), of which Abu Dhabi occupies 28,000 sq. m., Dubai 1,500 sq. m., Sharjah 1,000 sq. m., Ras al-Khaimah 650 sq. m., Fujairah 450 sq. m., Umm al-Qaiwain 300 sq. m., and Ajman 150 sq. m.³

¹ The western coast of the Gulf to the north of Oman has had several names in the modern era. The British called it 'the Pirate Coast'. After the Trucial Treaty was signed in 1835, it was known as 'Trucial Oman', but, since 2 December 1971, it has been known as 'the United Arab Emirates'. See Lorimer, J.G., *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, Hist., pt. 1A, Calcutta, 1915, p. 210-212; Qasim, J.Z., *al-Khalij al-'Arabi 1914-1945*, Cairo, 1973, p. 283; and Hawley, D., *The Trucial States*, New York, 1970, p. 18.


² Peck, M.C., *The United Arab Emirates*, London, 1983, p. 4. See also Fenelon, K.G., *The United Arab Emirates: an economic and social survey*, London, 1973, p. 1; El-Mallakh, R., 'The challenge of affluence: Abu Dhabi', *The Middle East journal*, 24 (1970), pp. 135-6; and al-Mutawa, M.A.J., *Social Change and political development in the Oman Coast 1934-1970*, Ph.D. thesis, Reading University, 1983, p.1

³ Peck, *The Arab Emirates*, p. 6; Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p. 21; Osborne, C., *The Gulf states and Oman*, London, 1977, p. 61; Centre for Research and Documentation, *The United Arab Emirates*, Abu Dhabi, 1972, p. 15; and al-Hamdani, A.H., *Dawlat al-Imarat al-Arabiyyah al-Mutthidah: Nash'atuha wa-tatawwuruha*, Kuwait, 1986, p. 9

In geographical order, from west to east, these eight Emirates are:

- **Abu Dhabi:** the largest in area, rich in oil.
- **Dubai:** active in trade and commerce, and the most densely populated. It has now become an exporter of crude oil.
- **Sharjah:** the third largest in both population and area. Sharjah also possesses important settlements on the Batinah Coast at Khor Fakkan, Kalba, and Diba.
- **Ras al-Khaimah:** the most northerly of the Emirates. It is the most fertile of them all, with a background of mountains and lush vegetation. It exports fruit, vegetables, fish, and some livestock.
- **Ajman:** the smallest of the seven, with an area of about 150 sq. m. It is surrounded on the landward side by Sharjah, but owns small fertile enclaves at Manama and Masfutin in Ajman.
- **Umm al-Qaiwain:** it is somewhat larger in area than Ajman. Like Ajman, it depends largely on its fisheries. It has an enclave of Falaj al-Mu'alla, which is a small fertile oasis.
- **Kalba:** it is located on the Oman coast, four miles from Fujairah. It was used by the British as an aviation base for emergency landing.
- **Fujairah:** together with Kalba, Fujairah is situated entirely on the Oman coast with no direct access of its own to the Gulf. Mountainous inland, it has a fertile coastal strip and excellent fishing.⁴

⁴ Fenelon, *Arab Emirates*, pp. 1-2. See also Chapter 3 of this thesis.



The map of the Trucial Coast Emirates

1.2. Population

The population of three of the Trucial Coast Emirates, namely Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah, was 35,000 in 1939. In 1957, the population of all seven Emirates was 80,000,⁵ compared to 2,377,453 in 1995.⁶

1.3. The British relationship with the Trucial Coast Emirates from 1806 to 1892

During the eighteenth century, the Arabs of the Persian Gulf superintended all activities in the Gulf area. They controlled the mercantile shipping between the various Gulf ports, in addition to the shipping between all the ports from there to India and East Africa. On occasions, they reached the islands off the coast of South Asia, even though the Arabs of Hadhramaut were more active in trade with South-East Asia than were those of the Gulf. In addition, the Gulf Arabs were also involved in shipbuilding and pearl-diving.⁷

Two of the tribes that controlled the mercantile shipping of the Trucial Coast Emirates were the Banu Ya'as and the Qawasim.⁸ The modern history of the Trucial Coast Emirates started in 1760, when the tribe of Banu Ya'as and their

⁵ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt.1A, p. 1437 and 1939; Zahlan, R.S., *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates*, New York, 1978, p. 4; al-Alkim, H.H., *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*, London, 1989, p. xx.

⁶ Ministry of Information and Culture, *Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah*, Abu Dhabi, 1996, p.41.

⁷ Al-'Aqqad, S., *al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyyah fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi*, Cairo, 1974, p. 19

⁸ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt.1A, pp. 1427-51. For more information, see Miles, S.B., *The countries and tribes of the Persian Gulf*, London, 1966, pp. 439-50.

allies, led by their sheikh, Diab bin Isa al-Nahayyan, dwelt first in the Liwa territory and then on the island of Abu Dhabi. In the meantime, other tribes, such as the Qawasim, moved into the northern part of the Trucial Coast Emirates, while different Arab tribes appeared in other Gulf emirates, such as the 'Utub and the Al Sabah in Kuwait, the Al Khalifah in Bahrain, and al-Muslim and al-Thani in Qatar⁹

After the French expedition was defeated in Egypt in 1801, there remained no power that the British Government of India (BGI) feared; therefore, the BGI switched its attention towards the Gulf area in order to dominate there, either diplomatically or by force.¹⁰ In 1802, the Qawasim allied themselves with the First Saudi State and strengthened their position on the Gulf coast. The BGI closely monitored the situation there, especially after the Qawasim had conquered Basidu on Qishm island.¹¹

The Qawasim are described in British sources as the strongest marine force in the area, even stronger than that of the Sultan of Muscat, with as many as 813 ships, 63 of which were very large. These sources add that one of the British Residents in the Gulf reported that the Qawasim used to sail in 70 large ships with 80 to 200 men aboard each one. They travelled as far east as the coast of India and

⁹ Al-Aidarus, M., *al-Tatawwurat al-Siyasiyyah fi al-Imarat*, al-Kuwait, 1983, p. 67.

¹⁰ Abdul-Ghani, I.A., *Baritanya wa-Mashyakhah al-sahil al-'Umani*, Cairo, 1977, p. 73.

¹¹ Al-Khasusi, B.A., *Dirasat fi tarikh al-Khalij al-Arabi al-Hadith wa-'L-Mu'sair*, 2,vols., Kuwait, 1984, p. 91.

the islands of the East Indies, and west to the Red Sea. By 1805, Qawasim's strength¹² had grown to such an extent that the tribe imposed a toll on the ships owned by the British East India Company before allowing them to sail into the Gulf. Of course, that was considered by the British as an insult.¹³

It should be noted that Qawasim's maritime activity was not just a matter of looting or piracy; rather, it became a confrontation with the new British challenge against their dominant position in the Gulf and, as such, against the British East India Company's ships.¹⁴ It was also a reply to the accusation made by the British Government in Bombay against the Qawasim and it became a major issue.¹⁵

What worried Britain most at that time was that after Sultan bin Ahmad, the Sultan of Muscat, had been killed in 1804, the Qawasim conquered Bandar `Abbas, which allowed them to control both sides of the entrance to the Gulf. This, of course, was considered by the British East India Company as an even greater threat to British navigation in the area¹⁶ and led to the BGI's decision to

¹² In 1805, Samuel Mancitti, one of the British military commanders, informed his government in Bombay that the Qawasim's threat to the interests of Britain had become stronger than that of their conventional enemy, the French. See al-`Aqqad, *al-Isti'mar fi al-Khalij al-Farisi*, Cairo, 1965, p. 74.

¹³ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt. 1A, pp. 181-2.

¹⁴ This is similar to what their predecessors did when they were under the rule of al-Yaaribah (1625-1744). They drove the Portuguese out of the Gulf area in 1650. See *ibid*, pp. 38-39.

¹⁵ Al-Qasimi, S.M., *The Myth of Arab piracy in the Gulf*, London, 1986, pp. 31-83.

¹⁶ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt.1A, p. 180. For more information, see Moyses-Bartlett, H. *The*

attack the Qawasim in the port of Bandar 'Abbas. Late in 1805, they sent an expedition led by Captain David Sutton to the Gulf, which defeated the Qawasim. Consequently, a treaty was signed on 6 February 1806 between Sultan bin Saqr, the Qawasim's sheikh, and the BGI.¹⁷

It may be noted here that the use of the title 'sheikh' in the treaty was evidence of the British recognition of this person's independence. It also seemed that the British victory over him was inconclusive. Thus, article 1 of the treaty stated that there should be equal treatment between Britain and Sultan bin Saqr, the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah. However, article 5 of the treaty stated that the Qawasim had to give three months' notice to the British Government if the Wahabbis compelled them to infringe the peace.¹⁸

The second British military expedition headed from Bombay to the Gulf at the end of October 1809, but it did not achieve its aims. Consequently, the Qawasim's maritime activities escalated, especially after the failure of the assault launched by Bruce-Taylor against Ras al-Khaimah in 1816.¹⁹ Therefore, the British Government in Bombay mustered all possible forces in order to put an end to the Qawasim's activities, which threatened its own interests in the Gulf. Fierce

Pirates of Trucial Oman, London, 1966, pp. 32-42.

¹⁷ Al-Baharna, H.M., *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States*, Manchester, 1968, p. 25.

¹⁸ Hawley, D., *The Trucial States*, p. 100.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 101-108.

battles, extending from the west coast of India to the Gulf area, took place between both sides in the period between 1816 and 1819.²⁰

At the beginning of 1819, the position of the BGI allowed it to launch a wide assault on the Gulf area. This came about as a result of widespread war in Europe, which led to Britain's obtaining more colonies in the East, which in turn meant her gaining increased maritime control over the routes leading to the Indian Ocean. Moreover, in India, the British forces had successfully overcome the fierce Maharata resistance movement.²¹ Therefore, after this victory, the BGI had for the first time forces available to defend its interests and those of its Indian agents outside India.²²

Previously, from 1810, the British Government in Bombay had always ignored requests made by the Sultan of Muscat, al-Sayyid Said, to protect him against the Wahabbis because it did not want to get involved in affairs within the Arabian Peninsula.²³ But after Muhammad `Ali Pasha brought to an end the first Saudi State, there were no other forces in the Arabian Peninsula except those of the Qawasim, who had not been attacked by Ibrahim Pasha's forces.

²⁰ Henderson, E., *This Strange Eventful History*, London, 1989, pp. 7-26.

²¹ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt. 1A, p. 197-198.

²² Kelly, J.B., *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1795-1880*, Oxford, 1968, p. 138.

²³ At that time, the British forces were unable to extend the battlefield to involve the Arabian Peninsula. That was because they did not know the area well and because they did not have strong infantry forces, since they almost completely relied on their marine forces. For more information,

As a result of these events, a large marine expedition, led by Major General Sir W. Grant Keir, consisting of six large ships as well as a number of smaller ones with three thousand men aboard, most of whom were Europeans, left Bombay on 3 November 1819 for the Gulf area. The convoy arrived at its first target, Ras al-Khaimah, at the beginning of December 1819. After conquering Ras al-Khaimah, the leader of the expedition signed many separate preliminary treaties, between 6 and 15 January 1820, with each of the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast Emirates. These treaties dealt with the guarantees these sheikhs would give to surrender all their ships, destroy their towers, fortified places, and cannons, and release all Indian captives in return for a promise from the British to let the sheikhs' people carry on diving for pearls and fishing.²⁴

The signing of the 1820 treaty reflects the extent of the victory of this British expedition as its terms were totally contrary to the Arabs' interests. The British were interested in having control of the area and tearing apart the Qawasim's power. This control was further boosted by making every sheikh sign the treaty separately, a procedure different from that accompanying the 1806 one, which Britain had concluded with sheikh Sultan bin Saqr only.

see Hamdan, J., *Istratijiyyat al-isti'mar wa-'l-tahrir*, Cairo 1983, p. 76.

²⁴ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt. 1A, pp. 198-199. See also Aitchison, C.U., *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, vol. XII, Calcutta, 1909, pp. 166-176.

After signing the 1820 Treaty, Britain started taking maritime measures aimed at maintaining her control of the area.²⁵ One of these measures was the sending of a British team to survey the coast from Ras Musandam to Qatar. It studied the coast and its islands, and drew a map of the region. The purpose of the survey was to make sure that the British fleet would not encounter any problems from the Qawasim's ships while sailing through the Gulf.²⁶

As regards the sheikhdoms' internal affairs after the treaty was signed, the period between 1824 and 1835 witnessed continuous conflicts between the Arab tribes in the Emirates, which extended to the sea and threatened British interests in the area once more. Sources mention that in 1824 there was a conflict between the Qawasim and Banu Ya'as when the former's sheikh wanted to build fortified towers in the Buraimi oasis. Consequently, the British Resident in the Gulf visited Sharjah in December 1824 and was successful in ending the conflict between the two sides, so that they agreed on destroying those fortified towers.²⁷

Later, however, the conflict between the two tribes started again despite the attempted mediation to end it of al-Sayyid Said, the Sultan of Muscat, and sheikh Muhammad, the sheikh of Lanjah. Fighting continued, especially in the diving seasons, but by the end of 1834 both sides were tired of the fighting, which

²⁵ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt. 1A, pp. 198-204.

²⁶ Fenelon, *Arab Emirates*, p. 10.

²⁷ Kelly, *Britain*, pp. 205-208, 354-360.

threatened their interests and livelihood, and showed interest in reconciliation. On 21 April 1835, the British Resident in the Gulf, Samuel Hennell, exploited this opportunity and invited a number of sheikhs of the Emirates to his residence on the island of Qusm (Basidu) to settle the conflict. During this meeting the sheikhs of Sharjah, Dubai, Ajman, and Abu Dhabi signed a treaty in which they gave guarantees before the British Resident to stick to a maritime truce for six months starting on 21 May 1835 and ending on 21 November of the same year. At the end of this period, the truce was renewed every six months until 1837.²⁸

In 1837, after the British Resident agreed, the truce was renewed on a yearly basis and, at the end of 1842, it was agreed to renew it every ten years, so the British Deputy-Resident, Lieutenant A.B. Kemball, went to the Trucial Coast Emirates to witness the signing of the treaty. This took place on 1 June 1843. The treaty stated that all sides should cease maritime aggression against each other for ten years and that, in the case of any party infringing the treaty, compensation must be paid to the side attacked. Moreover, in the event of any maritime aggression, all sides should wait until the British Resident in the Gulf was informed.²⁹

²⁸ Captain Samuel Hennell, Assistant in charge of the Residency in the Persian Gulf, to Government of India, 21 and 25 May 1835, with enclosures IOR: F/4/1596, Collection 64625.

²⁹ Lieutenant A.B. Kemball to Government of Bombay, 26 March 1843, IOR: F/4/2050, Collection 93534.

When the maritime truce treaty expired at the beginning of 1853, it was unanimously agreed to sign a new treaty known as "The Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity", which needed no renewal. On 4 May 1853, Captain Kemball arrived in Sharjah and with him the text of that treaty, which was signed by all five sheikhs of the Trucial Coast Emirates.³⁰

It should be noted that this treaty did not concern itself with any conflict over land in the Emirates. Therefore, Britain approved of this treaty, since the Gulf area would be disarmed, thereby safeguarding the passage of British ships in the Gulf. This treaty was the first one to have no renewal date.

In the same year, another treaty, supplementary to the first one, was also signed, which was called "The Supplementary Treaty for Telegraph Protection".³¹ This was followed in 1856 by another, "The Treaty for Ending the Slave Trade".³² It may be noted that, although the telegraph lines were there expressly to serve British interests in the area, Britain managed to convince the Emirates' sheikhs that they were indeed there for their own benefit.³³ The practical effect of this was that the British Government dominated the area through the various treaties it

³⁰ Printed copy of Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity agreed upon by the chiefs of the Arabian Coast on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, under the mediation of the Resident in the Persian Gulf, 4 May 1853, IOR: R/15/1/735.

³¹ Agreed to before Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Pelly, Acting British Political Resident, Persian Gulf, and appended to the treaty of Peace, 4 May, 1853, IOR:15/1/735.

³² Jones to the British Agents of Bahrain, Sharjah, and Lingah, 11 and 17 May 1856, For the more effectual suppression of the slave trade, 28 August 1856, IOR: L/P and S/5/488.

³³ Al-'Abid, F.S. *Siyasat Baritanyā fi al-Khalij al-Arabi*, 2,vols, Kuwait,1984, p. 79.

signed with the Emirates' sheikhs rather than through fighting or the handing over of any money.

In practice, the treaties were breached every now and then, the reason usually being the escape of some divers, indebted to one of the Emirate's sheikhs, to another Emirate. Such problems were tackled by capturing the escapees and returning them to their sheikh. However, this was a complicated matter, since the British Government was required to interfere to a great extent in the internal affairs of the Emirates, which might be seen as threatening their citizens' safety.³⁴

Consequently, a treaty regarding the escape of those who fell into debt was signed by all of the Trucial Coast Emirates on 24 June 1879, in the presence of Haji Abdal-Rahman, the British Government agent in the Gulf, and Haji Abdal-Qasim, who had been sent from the Bushire residency specially to convey the British Resident's demands to the sheikhs of the Emirates. He told them that the British Resident commanded that any escapee should be returned to the Emirate from which he had escaped.³⁵ If two sides disagreed about an escapee, a special council of referees would be formed to sort out the disagreement, but that council had no fine-imposing power prior to consulting the British Resident. The BGI was worried that such a system might encourage the Emirates' sheikhs to oppress their

³⁴ Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, Hist., pt. 1A, pp. 234-235.

³⁵ Should such an escapee be granted permission to enter the Emirate he escaped to, the sheikh of that Emirate would be liable to pay a fine of £50. Moreover, if he enabled that escapee to reach the pearl coasts, the fine would increase to £100 as well as liability to pay the debts of that escapee.

citizens, but Major Ross was successful in convincing it that the sheikhs would not do so and that the treaty would not be threatened.³⁶

As regards the external affairs of the Trucial Coast Emirates, in 1868 the ruler of Abu Dhabi, sheikh Zayid bin Khalifah, formed an alliance with the ruler of Bahrain, sheikh Muhammad bin Khalifah, and both launched an assault on Qatar. This assault so angered the British Government that it demanded payment of a large fine by the ruler of Abu Dhabi alone, because it felt that he was a threat to British influence in the area.³⁷

Between 1820 and 1879, the Emirates' sheikhs became bound in a series of agreements. But these agreements did not make them 'protectorates'; rather, they gave the British Government control over those activities of the respective sheikhs which affected British interests in the Gulf waters, such as those in trade and navigation.

However, being part of the whole Gulf area, the Emirates were thus part of the British Gulf-aid policy. By the end of the nineteenth century and, in particular, at a time of unity, both the BGI and HMG considered Gulf matters as a whole and in so far as there were events which displeased them locally, such as the Russian

³⁶ Mutual agreement entered into by the Trucial Chiefs of the Oman Coast through the medium of Haji Abul Cassim Munshi, especially deputed on this service, and Haji Abdur Rahman, Government Agent, Arab Coast, written on the 24 June 1879, IOR: 15/1/735.

³⁷ Government of Bombay to the Government of India, 9 October 1868, IOR : L/P and S/5/261.

presence in Persia, the French presence in Oman, the German-provoked Baghdad rivalry, and the Ottoman presence in the Arabian Peninsula. These are specialized topics, which are outside the scope of this thesis, but for the present purposes it may be noted that they had an important effect.³⁸

1.4. The British relationship with the Trucial Coast Emirates from 1892 to 1946

The main aim of Britain's domination in the Trucial Coast Emirates in this period was to safeguard her trade and navigation at the Gulf's entrance. This was because the British East India Company's activities were primarily concentrated on its agents' activities on the Persian side of the Gulf. But British dominance in the area was thwarted by the hostility from both Persia and the Ottoman State which appeared during the second half of the nineteenth century. Britain did not greatly trouble about that hostility, since these two states were weak. However, after 1890, when the Gulf became the arena for international competition, and with the upsurge of French, Russian, and German activities in it, the British realized the major challenge which was threatening their existence and dominance in the area.³⁹ Consequently, in November 1891, the BGI endorsed the proposal of

³⁸ Al-Sagri, S.H., *Britain and the Arab Emirates: 1820-1956*, Ph.D. thesis, Kent University, 1988, pp. 43-44.

³⁹ 'Abd Allah, M.M., *Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah wa-Jiraniha*, vol,1, Kuwait, 1981, p. 30.

the British Resident in the Gulf for the signing of a new treaty with the sheikhs of the Emirates.⁴⁰

This proposed treaty, known as the Preventive Treaty, was signed with the sheikhdoms in March 1892.⁴¹ For the first time it conferred on the British Government preferential rights in connection with the internal affairs of the Trucial sheikhdoms, a grant which later became a factor of some importance in questions arising between the British and foreign powers. It also limited the authority of the Trucial sheikhdoms within their own territories by dealing directly with matters which might expose them to the influence of foreign powers. The Emirates had the following two responsibilities:

- a) not to sign any agreement or enter into correspondence except through the British Government; and
- b) not to allow any foreign agent to reside in their territories without the consent of the British Government.⁴²

This treaty also contained a guarantee given by the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, his heirs and successors to the British Government. It was signed in the presence of the

⁴⁰ 'Abd al-Ghani, *Baritanya wa-'l-Mashyakhat*, p. 184.

⁴¹ Exclusive treaty between the British Government and the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Dubai, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Ras al-Khaimah, 8 March 1892, IOR: R/ 15/1/735.

⁴² Aitchison, *A collection of treaties*, p. 185.

British Resident in the Gulf, Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Talbot, and was later signed by the other Emirates' sheikhs.⁴³

As the political aim of these treaties was to prevent the sheikhs from signing any treaties except with Britain, this treaty was called "The Exclusive Treaty". Moreover, as these treaties had no expiry date, they were in effect permanent ones. Their aim was to dominate and control the Emirates, especially their external affairs. Consequently, the Emirates' sheikhs became totally convinced that submission to the British Government was inevitable; therefore, their approval was an important factor in the stability of that period.⁴⁴

As regards other great states, such as France, Russia, and Germany, Britain was troubled by their wish to acquire naval bases in the Gulf area. France tried to build a port in Muscat in 1898; Russia planned a naval base in Chahbar on the Iranian coast; and Germany planned to construct a railway line terminating in Kuwait or Basra in 1900. But Britain thwarted all those attempts by diplomatic means. France signed a treaty with Britain in 1904, Russia a similar one in 1907, and Germany followed in 1912. In these treaties, all these states officially recognized Britain's domination in the Gulf area. In 1913, the Ottomans also fell into line.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Sammur, Z.A., *Tarikh Sahil 'Uman*, Kuwait, 1985, p. 203.

⁴⁵ Busch, B.C., *Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-1914*, Berkeley, 1967, pp. 68, 117-118, 180-183, 189-190, 268, 336-9, 365.

As regards the Trucial Coast Emirates' internal affairs, they were somehow independent during the British mandatory rule. Every sheikh ruled over his Emirate according to the local traditions, and the British Government had no direct influence upon the way the Emirates were ruled. It was represented in these Emirates by an agent, who would receive orders from the British Resident in the Gulf, and act as the mediator between these sheikhs of the various Emirates and the British Government. He was available to advise the sheikhs in any matters when asked,⁴⁶ but as for internal problems, the situation remained as it had been before the Preventive Treaty.⁴⁷

In November 1902, the Political Resident in the Gulf, C.A. Kemball, met with the Emirates' sheikhs, and asked them to sign a treaty which would ban the buying or selling of weapons in the Emirates. This treaty was signed and put into force like all the previous ones.⁴⁸ The Political Resident was worried lest the weapon trade on the Trucial Coast of the Emirates should result in internal problems, and thus cause some damage to British interests in the Trucial Coast. Another reason for the signing of the treaty was that the Political Resident did not

⁴⁶ Rashid, A. M., *al-Ittifaqiyyat al-siyasiyyah wa-'l-Iqtisadiyyah bayn Imarat Sahil 'Uman wa-Baritaniya, Abu Dhabi*, p. 136.

⁴⁷ Fahmi, A. M., *Mashyakhat al-Sahil al-'Umani*, Ph.D. thesis, Ain Shams University, 1988, p. 26.

⁴⁸ Extract from Saldanha's précis of correspondence regarding the Trucial chiefs, 1854-1905, Agreement for the prohibition of the arms traffic, 1902, IOR: L/P and S/20/C248D.

want the Trucial Coast of the Emirates to be a marketplace for smuggled goods and for the trading of weapons to the neighbouring countries.

One of the most important events that took place in the Trucial Coast Emirates was the visit in 1903 of Lord Curzon, the King's representative in India, to the Gulf area in general and to the Trucial Coast Emirates in particular. During that visit, he met with the various sheikhs, and then delivered a famous speech at a reception given for him in Sharjah on 21 November 1903. In his address, he laid down the aims of British policy and asked each sheikh of the Trucial Coast Emirates to respect their agreements with the British Government and not to enter into relations with any other states.⁴⁹ It will be noticed that Lord Curzon was merely repeating the aim for which the 1892 treaty had been signed, and his focus on it reflects the fact that Britain was clearly benefiting from that treaty.

In 1911, the Trucial Coast sheikhs again promised to consult the British Resident before granting to any state concessions for pearl-diving.⁵⁰ Again we see how Britain continued to dictate relations with the Emirates by asking their sheikhs to sign treaties that ensured her own interests and security. Whenever one of the sheikhs tried to end his commitment under any of these treaties, the British

⁴⁹ Curzon's tour of the Gulf in 1903, and the Trucial chiefs of the Arab Coast, at a public Durbar held at Sharjah on 21 November 1903, IOR: L/P and S/18/B195.

⁵⁰ Letters relating to pearling concessions: British Resident to Trucial chiefs, 20 July 1911, IOR: R/ 15/1/736.

Government would remind him of the 1892 Treaty and Lord Curzon's visit to the area.

At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the British Resident in the Gulf sent two consecutive letters to the rulers of the Gulf area and those of the Emirates' sheikhs to inform them that Britain was fighting the war against the Ottomans and the Germans. The rulers' replies were positive, since none of them seemed intent on causing the British Government any problems.⁵¹

With the end of World War I, Britain, as the victor, became the greatest power in the world, and was known as the head of the "empire where the sun never sets", because her colonies were spread over the five continents of the world. Even before the war, Britain used to consider the Gulf as a British lake, but after the war it became even more so, since Britain reigned supreme and was the only power there. Her presence in the area was known as the British Peace.⁵² For decades to come, Britain controlled all her colonies with no other power competing against her and, in fact, British dominance in the Gulf continued until the end of World War II.⁵³

⁵¹ Notices on the war between Turkey and Great Britain to be sent to the ruling sheikhs in the Gulf, 11 November 1914, IOR: L/ P and S/10/463.

⁵² Al-'Aqqad, *al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyyah*, p. 172.

⁵³ Zahlan, *The origins*, p. xvi.

Regarding the affairs of the Trucial Coast Emirates, there were many problems between them before the start of World War I,⁵⁴ which continued until 1938.⁵⁵ Assassinations and many power struggles occurred, followed by frequent fraternal in-fighting in the ruling families or aggressive rivalry between one Emirate and another. In addition, there were Saudi threats and territorial occupation, which started in the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century.⁵⁶ The British Government knew about all these problems, but overlooked them most of the time, since they had little bearing on its own centres in the waters of the Gulf.

As we have seen, after World War I, Britain was keen to continue controlling the Gulf area alone with no other powers sharing her interests in the area. This was because of the importance of the oil discovered in the area. In 1922, the British Government forced the sheikhs of the Emirates to give guarantees that they would not grant any oil extraction concessions to any other state but Britain.⁵⁷ This was an important move, as these guarantees enabled Britain to close the door to American petroleum companies which were showing great interest in the Emirates. The British oil extraction concessions continued

⁵⁴ Internal political affairs, Residency Agent Sharjah to Political Resident, 26 May 1909, IOR: R/15/1/265.

⁵⁵ Political Resident to Secretary of State for India, 8 November 1938, enclosing letter to sheikh Said b. Maktum, 1 October 1938, and agreement between sheikh and members of the Al Bu Falasah, IOR: L/P and S/12/3827.

⁵⁶ Activities of Saudi *zakat* collectors, Muscat Agency news report, 20 June 1925, IOR: R/15/6/39.

⁵⁷ Government of India Foreign Department to Political Resident, Arab Coast oil concessions, 9

until the 1930s, and the Petroleum Development Trucial Coast Limited Company, which was backed by the British Government, signed treaties with the sheikhs of the Emirates individually.⁵⁸

It was also important for Britain not only to control the area by sea but also by air, as the war had given great impetus to the development of the aeroplane and access to India and the Far East would increasingly be made easier by the development of faster air travel, fuelled by oil.

Therefore, Britain focused on two issues which were of utmost importance for her presence and interests in the area. These were oil and air navigation facilities. In 1922, there was a clear need for an air route that would connect Egypt, Iraq, and India.⁵⁹ In addition, there was also a great need to build airports in the Gulf area, as the contract with the Iranian authorities for use of their airports would expire in 1929 (although in fact it was renewed until 1932). Consequently, the British authorities started looking for suitable places to build airports for their military and civil aircraft. Having searched the area for some time, British experts decided to build airports on the coast of the Trucial Coast Emirates for two reasons. First, topographical terraces occur naturally above sea level and, second,

February 1922, IOR: R/ 15/1/618.

⁵⁸ See Chapter 4 of this thesis.

⁵⁹ Zahlan, *The origins*, p. 92.

these terraces have small gulfs which are naturally protected by rocks, which would allow the building of ports for flying boats.⁶⁰

Accordingly, a treaty was signed by the British Government and the sheikh of Sharjah on 22 March 1932 allowing the British to build an airport in Sharjah. This treaty was to run for thirteen years. The British Government would pay all the costs, together with a sum of 500 rupees (= £27.7, 1 rupee = 1s.6d.) to be paid monthly to the sheikh of Sharjah for letting the land to the British Government, as well as 5 rupees (£0.27) for every plane that landed at the airport.⁶¹

The British Political Resident in Bushire usually received orders from two higher authorities. The first was the BGI, which employed him and paid his monthly salary, and the second was the British Foreign Office, since he was considered as a consul representing the British Embassy in Tehran.⁶² As previously mentioned, the British Government handled the Emirates' foreign affairs, according to the Preventive Treaty signed in 1892, but left the internal affairs for the sheikhs of each Emirate to handle. However, the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the 1930s had a dramatic effect on relationships all around. A conflict of opinions took place between the British Political Resident in the Gulf area, Fowle, and the British Ministry of Aviation. The former, who was supported by

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶¹ Agreement between sheikh Sultan b. Saqr, ruler of Sharjah, and the British Government for the establishment of an air station at Sharjah, 22 July 1932, IOR: L/P and S/18/B471.

⁶² 'Abd Allah, *Dawlat al-Imarat*, p. 34.

the BGI, thought that the British could achieve their aims in the area and use air routes between their colonies without recourse to interference in the Emirates' internal affairs unless the situation dictated otherwise,⁶³ while the latter thought that Britain should interfere directly in the Emirates. Air Vice-Marshal C.L. Courtney, the representative of the Ministry of Aviation, supported this approach in a letter to the Middle East Committee, which met on 24 September 1935 to discuss Britain's policy regarding the Trucial Coast Emirates' internal affairs,⁶⁴ but that meeting did not solve all the problems, because even the committee members were divided into factions of those who supported direct interference in the Emirates' internal affairs and others who were against it.

Those who supported interference were the representatives of the Ministry of Aviation and the Foreign Office, who argued that it was necessary to safeguard air routes between the British colonies and the British oil interests in the Gulf area. Moreover, the representative of the Ministry of Aviation used as an example the British authorities' role in the last Dubai incident,⁶⁵ which it considered as interference in the Emirates' internal affairs, since it was in conflict with Lord

⁶³ Political Resident Fowle to the Government of India, 10 July 1935, IOR: L/P and S/12/3747.

⁶⁴ Minute of 42nd meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense Standing Official Sub-Committee for questions concerning the Middle East, 24 September 1935, IOR: L/P and S/12/3747.

⁶⁵ Some opposition movements were started in Dubai in 1929 and 1934 against sheikh Sa'id bin Maktum by his cousins with the intent of seizing power. Britain interfered in both incidents to defend the sheikh against these movements. For more information, see Succession at Dubai: sheikh Sa'id b. Maktum's offer of resignation, 21 April 1929, IOR: R/15/1/241 and Unrest at Dubai:

Curzon's speech, which called for a maritime peace only. The Foreign Office supported the demand made by the Ministry of Aviation by asking the British Government to change its policy in the Emirates in order to stop the ambitions of other states in the area.⁶⁶

Those who were against interference in the Emirates were the representatives of the BGI, the Ministry for Indian Affairs, the Navy, and the British Resident in the Gulf area. They favoured a period of waiting, because they did not want the British Government to get involved in new treaties, which would affect the British budget. They would agree to direct interference only if the need arose.⁶⁷ While all members of the committee voiced their opinions in that meeting, they failed to reach a decision and had to arrange another meeting in order to find a way out.

This issue of whether or not to interfere in the Emirates' internal affairs was raised in the correspondence between officials in the BGI and their counterparts in London in the period between 1938 and 1939, but here again a solution was not found, because World War II had already started, which meant leaving that problem aside to concentrate instead on the war.⁶⁸

British Trucial Coast Policy, 1934-1935, IOR: R/15/1/285.

⁶⁶ Minute of 42nd meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense Standing Official Sub-Committee for questions concerning the Middle East, 24 September 1935, IOR: L/P and S/12/3747.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Hugh Weightman (Political Agent, Bahrain) to the Political Resident (Fowle), 22 March 1938,

It may be noted that the discussions which took place through correspondence between the British authorities and their agents in the Gulf ended in the same way as did their equivalents in the 1935 Middle East Committee meeting. Things remained as they were and the British Government supported the British Resident's opinion. From September 1939, when Britain became involved in the war with France against Germany, her policy in the Gulf area was dictated by the war situation.

As regards the oil treaties, these first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century and increased at the beginning of the twentieth century when the first concession to extract oil was signed in Iran in 1901 between the Iranian Government and a British citizen called William Darcy. After that, the ruler of Iran gave Darcy another concession to extract oil in some areas of Khuzistan in 1904. In 1914, the British Government bought 51% of the shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.⁶⁹

Despite the efforts exerted by Britain, she did not completely succeed in curtailing the activities of the American oil companies throughout the Gulf. Iraq was one of the areas over which Britain and the USA fought for oil, especially in

Fowle to India Office, 19 May 1938, Government of India to India Office (Ginson), 5 July 1938, Fowle to the Government of India, 17 March 1939, Government of India to Fowle, 11 April 1939, and reply, 27 April 1939, IOR: L/P and S/12/3747.

⁶⁹ Longgrigg, S.H., *Oil in the Middle East: its Discovery and Development*, London, 1968, pp. 17-

the first two decades of the twentieth century. The first concession to extract oil in Iraq dates back to 1914, when the Turkish Petroleum Company was established with Ottoman, German, and British capital. After Germany and the Ottomans had been defeated in the war, this company became part of the Iraqi Oil Company.⁷⁰

The period between the two world wars witnessed great American economic activity all over the world. Most American activities in the Middle East, however, were concentrated on oil⁷¹ and in this activity the Gulf area played a very important role. Realizing the extent of this growing danger, in 1935 Britain established an oil company in the Gulf, called Petroleum Development Trucial Coast Limited, in order to obtain concessions for oil extraction in the Gulf and to limit the activities of the American oil companies in the area. In the same year this company was established, Britain succeeded in obtaining a concession to extract oil for two years in Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai. In January 1936, the sheikh of Ajman granted the British company a concession to extract oil in his territory and the other Emirates' sheikhs followed him. At the beginning of World War II, this company stopped extracting oil, but resumed activities when the war was over in 1945.⁷²

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⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-32.

⁷¹ 'Abd Allah, M. *Dawlat al-Imarat*, p. 75.

⁷² See Chapter 4 of this thesis.

After Britain and France declared war on Germany, at the end of September 1939, Britain always sent detailed updated reports to its residents and agents in all her colonies, asking them to fight against German propaganda and counteract it. This was because many patriotic movements were appearing in Egypt, Iraq, and other Arab states which supported Germany against Britain. However, there were some who supported Britain against Germany, perhaps because of their fear of the British authorities.⁷³

Consequently, there was clear influence of the propaganda against Britain in the Emirates, since the Political Official in Sharjah told the Political Agent in Bahrain that Sharjah's sheikh did not seriously question his men about the propaganda, which was virtually provoked by himself. This was because Abdal-Aziz bin Sayf al-Midfa, the son of Sharjah's judge, had written a poem in which he had praised the Allies and denigrated Germany, while Sharjah's sheikh himself had written another poem in which he had praised the Germans and denigrated Britain. The Native Agent Resident in Sharjah concluded that he had managed to obtain copies of those poems by his own private means.⁷⁴ Moreover, some anti-British graffiti, such as "Long live Germany, down with Britain", were found on a wall in Sharjah, which were promptly erased by some British citizens.⁷⁵ In fact, British authorities in the area did not take these incidents too seriously, since they were busy with the war and the expansion of the battlefield as other states, such as

⁷³ 'Abd al-Ghani, 'Abd al-'Aziz, *al-Salam al-Baritani fi al-Khalij*, Riyadh, 1981, p. 299.

⁷⁴ Political Officer in Sharjah to the Political Agent in Bahrain, 6 July 1940, IOR: R/15/2/694.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

the USA and the USSR, had joined the war to support the Allies, while Italy and Japan had become active on Germany's side.

During the war, the British authorities wrote to the sheikh of Sharjah through the Political Official, Trucial Coast about their wish to expand the airport in Sharjah, build two camps, erect sixty-six tents, expand the area of the airforce bomb depot, and put a squadron of aircraft on the alert in Sharjah. The sheikh agreed to all these demands and wished Britain the best of luck in winning the war.⁷⁶

In spite of the fact that enthusiasm for the war in the Emirates fluctuated between support for Britain and support for Germany, it was the British authorities who succeeded in completely controlling the Gulf area both during and after the war.

In September 1946, the British Cabinet decided that the conduct of relations with the Gulf states should be taken over from the Government of India, but they did not decide which department of His Majesty's Government should assume this responsibility. The choice lay between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. In January 1947, the Cabinet agreed that the India Office (which was shortly afterwards merged into the Commonwealth Relations Office) should take responsibility as an interim measure from 1 April 1947 and that this

⁷⁶ Exchange of letters with the rulers of Sharjah and Dubai relating to Royal Air Force facilities

responsibility should be transferred to the Foreign Office when the latter was ready to take it over, the aim being to achieve this by 1 April 1947.⁷⁷ Subsequently, the Foreign Office alone was to handle relations with the Emirates, especially after the neutralizing of the role of the BGI after independence in 1947. All correspondence was to be sent through the Foreign Office to the Political Resident in Bahrain, who would be the link between the Foreign Office in London and the British representatives and agents in the Gulf area in general.

for the duration of the war, 6-11 February 1942, IOR: L/P and S/12/2042.

⁷⁷ The Residency, general policy with regard to the sheikhdoms; the Trucial states, 1947, IOR: R/15/1/731.

Chapter 2

**British Policy and Responsibility
towards the Middle East in
General and the Trucial Coast
Emirates in Particular from 1947
to 1955**

2. 1 Introduction

After World War II and with India gaining independence, Britain realized that it was the Middle East that held the key to preventing the Soviet Union gaining a foothold in the Gulf or Indian Ocean. There was an awareness that if Britain dominated the area, she would safeguard the East-West passage of oil to Europe.¹ The Middle East had vital strategic and economic resources, and the Suez base was the linchpin for the defence of the entire area, "touching on three continents."²

In Clement Attlee's first Labour government after the war (1945-51), Ernest Bevin became Foreign Secretary. As a figure of special charisma who became a very dominant character in British foreign policy, he was firmly convinced that the Middle East was important to British national interests; consequently, a British presence of some sort had to be maintained there. This, of course, was prompted by suspicion about Soviet influence in the region.³ Bevin told the House of Commons in 1946:

There must not be a vacuum. If the Egyptian government try to force a situation in which there is a vacuum--meaning that we have gone and there is nothing there for security, regional defence or other organisation--to that I can never agree.⁴

In January 1947, when Attlee's Cabinet decided to refer the Palestine problem to the United Nations, British strategic plans for Palestine had to be altered, and British

¹ Monroe, E., *Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956*, London, 1963, p. 11.

² Deveroux, D.R., *The Formulation of British Defence Policy towards the Middle East 1948-56*, London, 1990, p.2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁴ Quoted in Frankel, J., *British Foreign Policy 1945-73*, Oxford, 1975, p. 129.

armed forces were moved to Egypt. Moreover, the involvement of the USA in the Middle East, especially after the United Nation became involved in the Palestine question, was irritating to the British, who saw America developing a greater influence there through her involvement in the oil explorations and other interests in the region, particularly in Saudi Arabia.⁵

Nevertheless, in 1947, Bevin suggested a review of Britain's policy in the Middle East with his American counterparts, which meant that he was obliged, in a way, to alter his general policies of strict maintenance of Britain's dominant position in the region. However, Bevin asserted that Britain was ready to enter into partnership with the USA, though without any military role for the latter to play, as Bevin was not recommending the military influence of the USA in the region. His main aim was to prevent a vacuum by keeping the British in the Middle East.⁶

W.R. Louis quotes the words of D. Busk, an official in the British Embassy in Baghdad in June 1947, to Garran, who worked in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. Busk stated,

It seems to me that our strategic and security interests throughout the world will be best safeguarded by the establishment in suitable spots of "police stations" fully equipped to deal with emergencies within a large radius. Kuwait is one such spot from which Iraq, South Persia, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf could be controlled. It will be well worth while to go to considerable trouble and expense to establish and man a police station there.⁷

⁵ Deveroux, D.R, *The Formulation of British Defence Policy*, p. 9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁷ Louis, W.R., *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Post-War Imperialism*, Oxford, 1984, p. 327.

Between 1946 and 1948, Britain was preoccupied with the Palestine question,⁸ in addition to being beset by post-war financial difficulties which forced the Labour government to review its colonial policies, "because many colonies and dependencies had ceased to pay their own way and had thus become a direct burden on the British budget."⁹ However, Ernest Bevin advocated a permanent involvement in the Middle East, because of its significance for British interests.¹⁰

The British endeavoured to secure communication and air transit from Trans-Jordan to the Persian Gulf, in addition to protecting the oil fields there. "Habbaniyah fulfilled this requirement for Northern Iraq while Shaiba protected the Southern oil field and the head of the Persian Gulf."¹¹ Moreover, as Louis stated, the exploitation of Middle Eastern oil was vital to the prosperity and defence of the Empire and Commonwealth. British policy in and plans for the region were essentially prompted by the will to defend British interests.¹² Consequently, for the British Government, the Middle East was of vital strategic significance, and so it endeavoured to maintain indirect client relationships with moderate nationalists in Iraq, Iran, and elsewhere in the region. Britain was also ready to keep a military presence in the Middle East even at the expense of her social demands and economic needs at home.¹³

⁸ Hail, J.H., *Britain's Foreign Policy in Egypt and Sudan 1947-1956*, Reading, 1996, p. ix.

⁹ Abadi, J., *Britain's Withdrawal from the Middle East, 1947-1971: the Economic and Strategic Imperatives*, Princeton, 1982, p. xvi. See also Reynolds, D., *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century*, London, 1991, pp. 178-185.

¹⁰ Morgan, K., *Labour in Power, 1945-51*, Oxford, 1984, p. 235.

¹¹ Louis, *The British Empire*, p. 325.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 325.

¹³ Morgan, *Labour in Power*, p. 278.

Gupta has argued that the Middle East was considered by Great Britain as a treasure house whose oil would be significant for British livelihood and standard of living. As far as Bevin was concerned, dominating the Middle East was his absolute foreign priority; he was determined not to allow any outside interference with British interests in the Gulf.¹⁴ Of course, the British presence in the monarchies and sheikhdoms of the Middle East was partly because Great Britain did not want to create a power vacuum and allow Soviet expansion southwards.¹⁵

Thus, the British government founded its policies in the Gulf on the basis of combating the pressure of Soviet influence and protecting Britain's own interests. Great Britain described the Gulf states as independent states with special treaty relations with herself, except Muscat, since the latter was then a sovereign state linked by treaties to the USA, France, Holland, and Great Britain. Moreover, all the Gulf states were bound not to sell or dispose of any part of their territory except to the British. The government in London also realized that it had to exercise some form of control over the administrative and governmental policies of those states, but at the same time felt the danger of appointing British subjects to the offices it wanted to control, lest it should be accused of colonization. Great Britain also felt uneasy about making other Arab countries aware of her plans in the Gulf, because she felt that such a move might lead directly to a policy tilting towards Arab unity, free from British interference. Above all, British officials feared that since all the Gulf states were small compared to other Arab

¹⁴ Gupta, P.S., *Imperialism and the British Labour Movement 1914-64*, London, 1975, p.287.

¹⁵ Louis, *The British Empire*, p.659.

countries, eventually they would be integrated into those big countries and hence lose their identities. Any move of the Gulf states towards freeing themselves from British influence might culminate in the danger of Soviet domination in the region. It was for the above reasons that the British Government did not want to put British interests in the Gulf states in danger, and so opted for a policy of appointing British administrators even at the expense of being accused of colonisation. Eventually, British officials convinced the rulers of the Gulf states to appoint British administrators to the posts they wanted to control.¹⁶

2.2. The Role of the British towards the Emirates after World War II

After World War II, British colonial policy involved a general reassessment of the Trucial Coast Emirates in particular. This assessment was made within the context of the wave of new oil explorations started during and after the war. Furthermore, in the following years, Britain's political responsibility towards those Emirates, the protection of her own interests there, and the level of administrative supervision or even the level of interference in the Emirates' domestic affairs underwent a general review.¹⁷

The British Government had started to take a serious interest in the Trucial Coast Emirates before World War II, and this continued after it shifted its focus from the Iranian to the Arabian coast of the Gulf. The transfer of the British Residency from Bushire to Bahrain in 1946 undoubtedly reflected this change in British policy.¹⁸

¹⁶ Foreign Office Confidential, Memorandum by A.C. Stewart, May 1948.

¹⁷ British colonial policy towards the Trucial States after Indian independence, 1948, FO 371/63843.

¹⁸ Mann, M.C., *Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil sheikhdom*, Beirut, 1964, pp.87-88.

As far as law and order were concerned, the rulers of the Trucial Coast Emirates were in charge of administration laws in the internal affairs of their Emirates, governing in accordance with their tribal norms and sometimes religious beliefs. They solved cases of dispute among tribes or even internal affairs of a tribe in order to gain more authority. However, since 1939, a considerable number of British subjects had been living in the Emirates and they were steadily increasing, many working in the British oil companies which were steadily expanding their activities.¹⁹ Consequently, Foreign Office officials in the sheikhdoms felt the need for a British law-enforcing authority to protect British subjects and interests, as the application of the tribal norms and the authority of the rulers were deemed inadequate. The authority that they wanted to establish in the Trucial Coast Emirates was similar to that which already existed in Bahrain (1909), Muscat (1913), Kuwait (1925), and Qatar (1945).²⁰

In May 1939, the Government of India proposed to the India Office to establish an authority in the Trucial Coast Emirates and a copy of the proposal was sent to T. Fowle, the Political Resident in Bushire.²¹ But the discussion stopped for the duration of the war, only to be resumed after the war ended. In 1945, after consultation between G. Prior, the Political Resident in Bushire, the Government of India, and the India Office, the pledge was renewed to establish some kind of a policing authority in the

¹⁹ India Office . London to Political Resident in Bushire, 17 April 1939, IOR: R/15/1/289.

²⁰ Abdul Ghani, A., *Hukumat al-Hind al-Baritaniya wa-Idarahu fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi*, Riyadh, 1981, p. 248.

²¹ Government of India Simla to India Office . in London and a copy to Political Resident Fowle in Bushire, 17 May, 1939, IOR: R/15/1/289.

Trucial Coast Emirates. A.C. Gallaway, the Political Agent in Bahrain, accordingly informed the rulers of the Trucial Coast that the British Government wished to have its own law-enforcing authority in order to police and protect its subjects.²² As expected, the rulers only reluctantly agreed to this, but made it clear this force would not have any authority over their own subjects.²³ On 21 December 1946, a royal declaration was issued outlining the internal borders of the seven Trucial Coast Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaima, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Kalba). Although the British law-enforcing authority applied to all the Emirates, its authority was only concerned with British subjects and foreigners in the Trucial Coast.²⁴ After long delays, the authority was actually implemented on 21 April 1947.²⁵

As far as British policy in 1939 was concerned, Fowle, the Political Resident in Bushire, had suggested to the Government of India three strategies for dealing with the situation in the Gulf states. These were, first, that the rulers and their people should be given guidance and advice to manage their own affairs in the way they themselves preferred. Second, as far as air facilities were concerned, the people in the Trucial States should be given a patient hearing. Last, the rulers and the people should realize that it was only His Majesty's Government that could protect them from being absorbed by their stronger neighbours.²⁶ This situation was to witness some change in the light of the independence of India in 1947 and the changes seen by the region in general.

²² *Ibid.*, Political Agent in Bahrain to rulers of the Trucial Coast, 10 July 1945.

²³ *Ibid.*, Political Agent in Bahrain to Political Resident in Bushire, 10 July 1945.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, India Office to Government of India, 14 February 1947.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, the Political Resident in Bahrain to Government of India, 21 April 1947.

²⁶ Foreign Office Confidential, 1948, IOR: R/ 15/1/ 731.

As a consequence, the Residency in Bahrain and its subordinate offices in the Gulf were reorganized in 1948, so as to conform to the Foreign Office pattern. Moreover, Indian Political Service Officers were replaced by Foreign Service Officers, and Indian Staff by British. The position of the Political Resident, however, did not undergo any change and his responsibility remained the same.²⁷

The Indian Government had a policy of intervening as little as possible. However, the Indian Government was not just a Government department but, through various agencies had direct or indirect representation in the southern part of the Gulf. This changed with the transfer of responsibilities for British interests in the area from the Indian Government to the British Foreign Office after Indian independence. Before this transfer, however, the Indian government had to decide which policy it should follow vis-à-vis the Trucial Coast of the Emirates, which were then a rather underdeveloped in this part of the Arabian Peninsula but, with the independence of India gained, were strategic importance for the British presence east of Suez after World War II.

In 1948, after it had taken over responsibility for the Gulf states, the British Government resolved that the main authority for affairs in the Gulf was the Foreign Office, which had to decide whether

- a) to continue the policy of not intervening except when compelled,
- b) to introduce a policy of more direct administration approaching the colonial model, or
- c) without introducing colonial methods, to intensify their efforts to promote good administration, social progress, and economic development through the existing rulers and administrative machinery, largely by means of British advisers and technicians in

²⁷ *Ibid.*

the service of the rulers.²⁸

The Foreign Office chose the last course. Such a policy was not only a reflection of the increased strategic value of the Trucial Coast of Emirates, but also echoed the official concern about the unsolved border issues amongst the Emirates themselves and between the Emirates and other neighbouring countries. A further complication was the increasing involvement in internal affairs of companies which were developing the oil resources in the region. As well as the lack of security in the Emirates, the border problem became a serious issue for the oil companies. The Foreign Office therefore felt that it had to take matters in hand by defining the borders, thus reinforcing security there as well. In doing so, Britain gave up its previous policy of non-interference; instead, she adopted a new policy that was based on supporting the rulers and supervising the affairs of each Emirate separately through the British Political Officer in Sharjah and, later, the British Political Agent in Dubai and his assistant in Abu Dhabi.²⁹ This system seemed to put vastly increased responsibility into the hands of the Political Resident, who acted as the judge in the courts of the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, as there was no Political Officer to supervise such matters continuously. However, in 1949, a permanent Political Officer was appointed. In the same year an experienced judge was also assigned to relieve the Political Resident of most of his judicial work.³⁰

This new approach was not without some problems as it gave a dual function to the

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Al-Saigh, F., *al-Imarat al-'Arabiyah wa-'l-Khatt al-Jawwi al-Baritani ila al-Sharq 1929-1952*, Abu Dhabi, 1995, pp. 328-329.

British officials in the Gulf, namely to be the political representation and, at the same time, to be the administrator of the new emerging system in the Trucial Coast Emirates. It was an irony that the Indian Government had tried to avoid just that approach and that now, a department which was responsible for diplomatic and consular representation of the crown took on duties which normally belonged to other departments of the government. This might be the reason why HMG left most of the making of policy and its execution to the officers on the spot, mainly to the Political Resident.

In 1950, W.R. Hay, the Political Resident in Bahrain,³¹ noted in a letter to the Foreign Office in London that most Foreign Office officials who came to the Gulf did not have sufficient experience to deal with the semi-independent rulers of the region, with the exception of the ruler of Muscat. It is interesting to note that the officials who came to the Gulf region, particularly to the Trucial Coast Emirates, had the most comprehensive instructions that were issued for the guidance of Political Officers in the Gulf region.³² The reason behind this was that these officers did not have the experience of dealing with semi-independent rulers, contrary to the officers from India, who had gained much experience when working for the Government of India.

As a consequence, the British government's policy in the Emirates had to be assessed and reassessed from time to time. For instance, the policy for dealing with

³⁰ Foreign Office Confidential, 1949, IOR: R/ 15/1/ 731.

³¹ The Political Resident dealt with the eleven states (i.e. the seven Trucial Coast Emirates plus Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Muscat) via the Political Agencies at Bahrain, Kuwait, and Dubai on the Trucial Coast, Dohah in Qatar, and a Consulate General at Muscat, W. Rupert Hay, *The Persian Gulf States*. p. 25.

³² Instructions for Political Officers in the Persian Gulf, 1950, FO 371/82033. See Appendix 1.

the sheikhdoms, as expressed in 1951, was based on the assertion that the possibility was remote of achieving any form of a general political federation of the sheikhdoms. However, rulers should be encouraged to act together on matters of regional concern such as health and education. At the same time, it was suggested that attempts to bring the sheikhdoms together were not to be highly recommended. It was also emphasized that in cases where maladministration in the Emirates occurred, His Majesty's Government had a right to intervene in order to prevent it, and to work towards developing the administrative system. Although complete independence of the Emirates was not yet envisaged, the Foreign Office acknowledged that the policy of His Majesty's Government should ultimately lead to it. And lastly, His Majesty's Government committed itself to encouraging necessary reforms in the Emirates.³³

The above views, that shaped the policy of the British Government, were later crystallized in the instructions issued by the Foreign Office to the newly appointed Political Resident in Bahrain, Bernard Burrows, in 1953. These were as follows:

- i. Her Majesty's Government should maintain the traditional position of Great Britain in the Gulf and continue to fulfil the obligations which they have assumed in that area.
- ii. Her Majesty's Government should exert sufficient influence in the sheikhdoms to ensure that there is no conflict between the policies of the rulers and their own policies.
- iii. Where appropriate Her Majesty's Government will endeavour to advance the internal independence of the sheikhdoms.
- iv. Her Majesty's Government will not oppose any political or economic association between the sheikhdoms provided it is consistent with the policies defined under (i) and (ii) above. In the Trucial States a common administration would appear to be highly desirable.
- v. It is essential to foster the closest relations between British officials and the members of the ruling families. Special efforts must also be made to keep in touch with opinion in all cases of society.
- vi. The expenditure and investment of the rulers' income is a matter of direct interest to Her Majesty's Government.
- vii. The standard of administration and justice in the sheikhdoms must be constantly improved. In particular an advance must be made in the Trucial States.

³³ Foreign Office Confidential, 1951, IOR: R/ 15/1/ 731.

viii. The oil companies must be free to develop their concessions. Their relations with the States must be kept under close review at all times.

ix. The facilities enjoyed by Her Majesty's forces must be maintained.³⁴

Broadly speaking, the points mentioned above encompassed British lines of policy adopted and developed by the Foreign Office in dealing with the Gulf area, particularly the Emirates of the Trucial Coast. Outstanding amongst these points are the recommendations that British officials should endeavour to keep direct contact with the rulers of the Gulf, and also to work closer with all classes of society and manage to elicit their opinions and be aware of their problems. The other point was that the British officers should monitor the expenses and investment of the rulers' incomes. This may have been because of the development plans that the British Government was implementing at that time and also in view of future development plans. Moreover, there was an emphasis on protecting the Emirates, developing their infrastructure and administration, and at the same time maintaining British interests there.

It remains to be mentioned in this context that in the past the Political Resident at Bushire had had the direct responsibility for exerting British influence in the area. He was the superior British officials in the Gulf and was standing under the direct control of the Foreign Office, which issued instructions through the Foreign Secretary. The Trucial Coast Emirates were represented by an Arab Residency Agent at Sharjah from 1823 to 1934. Later, the Political Resident was no longer able to deal with his increasing responsibility in the Trucial States, because of the establishment of air communications through them and the negotiation of oil concessions with their rulers. Therefore, the responsibility for supervising them was transferred to the Political Agent

at Bahrain. In 1939, the Government of India appointed a British Political Officer to Sharjah. This post was not so effective, as it was usually left vacant, particularly in summer, during the hot weather, when the Native Agent in Sharjah acted on behalf of the Political Officer.³⁵

After World War II, the Trucial Coast Emirates became increasingly important for the British presence in the Gulf. However, the Political Resident was no longer able to deal on his own with the monitoring and guiding of affairs there, in particular, when a British airforce base had been established in Sharjah and negotiation about oil exploration and exploitation made the much closer presence of British officers increasingly necessary. Therefore in 1948, a British Political Officer was appointed to take up permanent residence in the Trucial Coast Emirates. The post of the Native Residency Agent was therefore abolished in 1949. The Political Officer came under the direct control of the Political Resident in 1952, and the status of the post was raised to that of a Political Agency in Dubai in 1953.³⁶ When in 1955, a branch was opened in Abu Dhabi, the assistant of the political agent, M.S. Buckmaster, was sent there.³⁷ Through it British policy took on a closer monitoring role which increasingly expanded into overall political and administrative control. The role of the agents can be summed up as ensuring that the Emirates remained peaceful and internal problems avoided as

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1953.

³⁵ The Native Agent was chosen from amongst the Trucial Coast citizens or the people of the Gulf, or the Irania traders. They sometimes held the post for life (al-Saigh, F, *al-Wakil al-Watani wa-Dawruhu fi Suni' al-Qarar al-Baritani fi al-Sahil al-Muttasalih*, Kuwait, 1993, p. 114.

³⁶ Foreign Office Confidential, 1953, IOR R/15/1/731,. (See Appendixes 2 listing Political Residents in the Gulf, Political Agents in Bahrain, Native Agents and Political Officers and Agents in the Trucial Coast. See also the list of the rulers of the Trucial Coast of the Emirates in Appendix 3.)

much as possible. In addition, the agents represented the interests of the Trucial Coast of the Emirates on the foreign scene, and, above all, were supervising the development projects of the infrastructure of the Emirates.

The officials had to report all their activities in the region, minor events or otherwise, to the authorities in London. This arrangement remained until Great Britain withdrew from the region at the end of 1971.

2.3. The Trucial Oman Levies, 1951

There was no significant military force in the Trucial Coast Emirates before 1947. The idea of establishing a military force in the Emirates emerged only in 1948. By then, Western oil companies had arrived in the area, but had no protective forces of their own. Consequently, they felt the need to have some small police force stationed there. The Petroleum Company Limited (PCL), stationed at Bahrain, with its tributary at Sharjah, Petroleum Development Trucial Coast Limited (PDTCL), which had extended into other Trucial states and Muscat, remained the main company working in that area.

B.A.B. Burrows, a Consultant at the Foreign Office from 1945 to 1950, revealed in a letter to W.R. Hay, the Political Resident, that the representatives of the PCL had indicated to him that they would not be able to carry out their exploration work in future unless there were some kind of force to protect them. The PCL had become uneasy as a result of two recent incidents. Government officers and oil company personnel had

³⁷ Foreign Office London to Political Resident Bahrain, 19 April 1955, FO 1016/402.

been attacked in the border areas of the Emirates. Though the incidents were more in the nature of demonstrations and there did not appear to have been any serious attempt to kill anybody, it was felt that some kind of a protective force was needed. The Sultan of Muscat, however, was not prepared to give his consent to raising such a force, as its creation in the Buraimi area would inevitably bring him into conflict with Ibn Saud.³⁸ The alternative was to ask the PCL to raise and train its own forces from the tribes in the hope that the British could obtain the consent of the Sultan. This was similar to the policy adopted by the Iraqi Petroleum Company, which paid the Arab Legion in Trans-Jordan for such purposes. Thus, it would be better both politically and financially for the British Government if the PCL raised and trained a small local tribal force instead of depending on British forces having to be brought in.³⁹

However, Brigadier M. Rogers, the Commander in Chief of the Middle East Land Forces, Cairo, did not concur. He explained to the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office that, since the trouble and incidents in the Trucial Coast were not paramount, he felt that there was no need for such a force to be created at that time. Nevertheless, he did agree that the expansion of the work of the PCL in the Trucial Coast would require a police guard raised by the companies themselves either from local people, or from other parts of the Middle East, or from among the Somalis. If, however, an emergency arose, the British armed forces could send about 300 men to Sharjah, to be stationed there.⁴⁰ The War Office recommended the findings of its Chiefs of Staff and

³⁸ For more information about the Buraimi issue, see Chapter 6 of this thesis.

³⁹ W. R. Hay to B. A. B. Burrows, 30 December 1948, FO 371/75018.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Commander, GHQ Middle East Land Forces to Ministry of Defence, 12 January 1949. Copy to

correspondingly informed the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence of its approval.⁴¹

Brigadier S. Longrigg, the Director of the PCL, was also of the opinion that a proper military force raised, trained, and armed by the company was not needed at that time, since he had arranged with the Sultan to raise a force of between 25 and 30 men under a tribal leader appointed by the Sultan. However, he envisaged that, for drilling them, an extra force would be required.⁴² T.E. Rogers, First Secretary in the Middle Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, agreed in principle with Longrigg's suggestion, that the present force was adequate, although he added that more discussion between the Foreign Office and Longrigg on this issue was necessary.⁴³

The Ministry of Defence was completely opposed to the idea of raising such a force after having consulted the Commanders-in-Chief. It relayed their opinion to the Foreign Office. Establishing such a force was seen to be impracticable for the following reasons:

- a) Any emergency in Kuwait, Qatar, or Bahrain can be met by flying in small parties of troops to threatened areas. Assistance for Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain could also be provided by H. M. ships stationed in the Gulf.
- b) A central levy force would, through lack of mobility, be incapable of reinforcing any threatened area quickly. However, the transfer of forces from one area to another would raise political difficulties.
- c) Owing to lack of suitable manpower locally, the raising of a small levy force in each

the Foreign Office .

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Chiefs-of-Staff Committee: Note by War Office, 23 February 1949.

⁴² *Ibid.*, W. R. Hay to B.A.B. Burrows, 25 January 1949.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Minute by T.E. Rogers, 14 February 1949.

of the three northern sheikhdoms is considered impracticable.

d) As regards the Trucial Coast, the commanders-in-chief have pointed out that our main interest is the airfield at Sharjah which is not threatened by minor tribal disputes. They therefore considered that no levy force will be needed until such time as our oil interests in this area are considerably expanded.⁴⁴

Above all, the Ministry of Defence considered that any force raised locally would not be effective unless it were trained and officered by British personnel. However, the Ministry of Defence did suggest that local protection could be provided if the oil companies raised and maintained their own police force, and, further, that the standard of the local security forces should be improved with the assistance of the British. Furthermore, in the places where these forces did not exist, the oil companies had to raise their own to provide immediate protection. The Ministry of Defence was aware that raising a levy force of some description could have political repercussions in the future, although the British had shown their readiness to consider any military assistance needed.⁴⁵

The Foreign Office did not accept the recommendations of the War Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East Land-Forces. It insisted that such a force had to be established. The British officials in the Gulf region were kept informed of the intention of the Foreign Office.

Consequently, the Political Resident sought the views of the Political Agent in

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, the Ministry of Defence to Foreign Office , 1 March 1949.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Bahrain on such a force.⁴⁶ C.J. Pelly, the Political Agent in Bahrain, was much in favour of establishing some kind of policing force but felt that, since the oil companies paid large sums in royalties to the rulers, they were bound to protect themselves. He therefore suggested that a force of 200-300 men should be recruited from either local Arabs, Indians, or Pakistanis and stationed at the Sharjah base, at a cost of not more than £200 per head a year including transport, so that the total cost of the force with two British officers would come to somewhere in the region of £40,000 to £50,000. In his view, establishing such a force would give a political advantage to the British throughout the whole of the Gulf.⁴⁷ Broadly speaking, some of the comments that were made, outlined above, were later implemented when establishing the levy force.

It appeared that the Foreign Office intended to form a force similar to that found in Trans-Jordan. Thus, at a meeting in the Foreign Office between Brigadier J.B. Glubb, the Commander of the Arab Legion, and Colonel R. Melville, also from the Arab Legion, and, as representatives of the Foreign Office, G. Chadwick, R. Walker, and T.C. Rogers, the formation of a locally recruited levy force in the Trucial Coast was discussed in detail. The Foreign Office envisaged a similarity between the bedouin of the Trucial Coast Emirates and those of Trans-Jordan. Thus, the Foreign Office met Brigadier Glubb. In his opinion the building up of an effective force in the Trucial Coast was not problematic; it could be recruited from among the local bedouin, who, he observed, were ideal people to be depended upon, as had been demonstrated by past experience in employing them in the RAF, where they had served reasonably well.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Political Agent, 20 March 1949.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Agent to Political Resident, 22 March 1949.

Rogers suggested that training those bedouin would make them even more reliable, and he foresaw no hint of any difficulty in recruiting them because, in principle, they did not show any hostility towards the British.⁴⁸

Although Brigadier Glubb agreed to the above suggestion, he added that the local levy force would have considerable advantage over the troops who had to be flown from the Sharjah base to deal with incidents, thereby attracting public attention, whereas the local force would not have such a disadvantage. This latter suggestion was also agreed among the representatives of the Foreign Office and the Arab Legion. Glubb went further in suggesting that a carefully balanced selection of men from the sheikhdoms would be ideal for the British Government's purposes there, because striking such a balance would cancel out tribal loyalties. The cost of the force was also considered in that meeting; the suggestion of £200 per man per year was recommended, and Glubb envisaged that 200 men would be adequate for the purpose. Therefore, the cost would not exceed £40,000 per year.⁴⁹

When the above financial matter was put to the Treasury, R.A. Clough, an official of the Treasury, wrote to B.A.B. Burrows, a Consultant at the Foreign Office, stating that the Treasury did not object to the establishment of armed personnel in the Trucial Coast, but was of the opinion that the cost of this force had to be more economical and borne by the Foreign Office (Grants and Services) and not the War Office, since the proposed armed police were few in number. The final request was that the cost itself

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Record of the Foreign Office meeting, 6 May 1949.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

should not exceed £30,000, and the Treasury included this amount in the provision of the 1950/1951 estimates of the Foreign Office.⁵⁰

The remaining problem was how to explain the whole project to the rulers themselves. W.R. Hay suggested to C.M. Rose of the Foreign Office three main reasons, which should be conveyed to the sheikhs, for the establishment of this force: 1) to protect political officers touring the areas outside the sheikhs' control; 2) to assist the sheikhs in maintaining law and order; and 3) to help them with regard to the slave trade.⁵¹

These two officials also recommended that the setting up of such a force should not be delayed beyond the end of October 1950, so that the Order in Council could be issued by then. Without such an order the force would have no legislation and would not be in a position to operate. Prior to that, the Establishment and Organization Department had to discuss the financial terms with Major Hankin-Turvin, the Commander of the Trucial Oman Levies. Once the financial regulations had been agreed, the Foreign Office approved.⁵² It was also the plan that recruitment should start, equipment should be ordered, and accommodation should be arranged. At the same time, the Trucial Coast sheikhs should be informed, and the amendment to the Order in Council and King's Regulations should be issued.⁵³ An advance party should go to Sharjah sometime before September 1950 to prepare the accommodation for the

⁵⁰ R.A. Clough, Treasury, to B.A.B. Burrows, Foreign Office, 24 January 1950, FO 371/82172.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Note by C.M. Rose, Foreign Office, of a discussion with Sir R. Hay, Political Resident, 30 June. For more information about slavery, see the Trucial States Council, 1952, in this thesis.

⁵² See Appendix 4, Commanding Officers of the Trucial Oman Levies, from 1951 to 1975. Pay Scales for the Trucial Oman Levies, January 1951.

⁵³ See Appendix 5, King's Regulations, 1951.

recruits.⁵⁴

In January 1951, in his directive to Major Hankin-Turvin, W.R. Hay again outlined the main duties of the force: maintaining peace and good order in the Trucial Coast States and providing escort for British Political Representatives. The directive also enumerated the several duties of the force: operating on request of the Political Officer or his representative; not operating in the capital and palaces of the rulers of the Trucial Coast Emirates unless asked to do so; charging people arrested by the force under King's Regulations, and bringing them to the Political Officer without delay.

It seems that the force had no direct authority over the capital and palaces of the rulers of the Emirates. However, in case of an attack on the RAF, this force could be put under the order of the RAF's Commanding Officer, and the expenditure of the force was covered in the budget of the British Forces in the Gulf region.⁵⁵ These regulations had major implications as they meant taking over sovereign rights, judicial functions, and internal and border affairs.

In general, the force was warmly welcomed by the rulers of the Emirates, except for the ruler of Dubai, who felt that it might interfere in his own affairs and the trade of Dubai.⁵⁶ However, he was reassured that the force had the sole task of protecting the

⁵⁴ Note by C.M.Rose, Foreign Office, of a discussion with Sir R. Hay, Political Resident, 30 June 1950, FO 371/82172.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, the directive to the Commandment of the Trucial Oman Levies, the Political Resident, W.R. Hay, January, 1951.

⁵⁶ The Residency, General Policy with regard to the sheikhdoms of the Trucial States, 1951, IOR,

internal security of the Trucial Coast Emirates.

On 27 February 1951, the main part of the force travelled from the Arab Legion in Amman to Sharjah, where they were stationed at the RAF base. The December 1951 Progress Report No. 1 on the Trucial Oman Levies stated that there were then 50 local recruits, and it estimated that by 1 December 1952 all general duty personnel up to and including the rank of corporal would be locally enlisted.⁵⁷

The new troops were soon facing their first challenge in the dangerous situation created by the Saudi Government, which had appointed a Saudi amir, Turki bin Utaishan, in the Buraimi Oasis on 31 August 1952. Thus, in January 1953, troops from the Aden Protectorate Levies were brought in for six months to strengthen the force up to the requisite strength of 300 men, for the Trucial Oman Levies had to be quickly prepared to guard the Trucial States' border against further Saudi encroachments. By August 1953, the desired number of recruits had been obtained and part of the Aden Protectorate Levies were released. However, in November, there were serious breaches of discipline in one of the squadrons recruited from Aden and an attempt to arrest some of the offenders resulted in the murder of two British officers and one Jordanian Warrant Officer. The culprits were arrested and the whole squadron was sent back to Aden and disbanded.⁵⁸

The above action led to the creation of a vacuum in the force there. In its attempt

R/15/1/731.

⁵⁷Clayton, P., *Two Alpha Lima*, London, 1994, pp. 17, 21.

to replace the force, the Foreign Office asked the Ministry of Defence about the possibility of providing an RAF squadron for the Trucial Coast Emirates. The Ministry provisionally agreed to this for a period of three months, although together with the War Office it had originally objected to the existence of such a force there. Accordingly, in November 1953, a squadron of the RAF was sent from Iraq to Sharjah in place of the disbanded squadron.⁵⁹

After the arrival of the squadron in Sharjah, a number of events took place, including the refusal by the Saudi forces stationed in Buraimi to move out, in response to which the British forces present in the region felt compelled to stay. The Ministry of Defence had demanded the final return of this detachment to Iraq before March 1954, but the Foreign Office insisted that the force should remain as long as possible.

As the differences between both Ministries could not be settled, the issue was raised in Cabinet, as was the recommendation of the Foreign Office. H.R.L.G. Alexander, the Secretary of State for Defence, argued as follows. 1) There was no military reason to keep the squadron at Sharjah. But there was possibly also the question of the force's military viability and cost. The Ministry of Defence probably thought about a more economical way of providing protection to the area, without the involvement of a British force. 2) There was no hot weather accommodation there and British troops could not stay in Sharjah after the end of March. This point indicated more clearly the true commitment of the Ministry of Defence. The problem of hot

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.29.

⁵⁹ Note for the Secretary of State's use at the Cabinet meeting, by L.A.C. Fry, Foreign Office, 10

weather accommodation could have been solved earlier, as there were already a British Political Agent and other officials stationed there. Moreover, the Trucial Oman Levies were already established and contained a number of British officers. 3) The stationing of British ground forces at Sharjah should not in any case be regarded as a permanent commitment. This point expressed clearly the objective of the Ministry of Defence; it did not want to transfer a squadron of the RAF which had to be brought from Iraq.⁶⁰

However, the Foreign Office did not give in. It stated firmly the reasons for maintaining a squadron there, *viz*: 1) There was a clear political reason so long as the Saudis' arbitration squadron had to be stationed there. However, even in the event of arbitration taking place, the Foreign Office did not know if it could guarantee that the Saudis would accept it. For that reason the Saudi occupation of Buraimi was dangerous. It meant that a squadron of the RAF had to remain there.⁶¹ The Foreign Office had also thought that decreasing the force would encourage the Saudis to continue their occupation of Buraimi and to reject any proposal of the Foreign Office for arbitration. At the same time, depleting the force would also discourage the supporters of the Foreign Office among the tribes. 2) The Foreign Office, on the other hand, felt that if British soldiers could not cope with living in Sharjah after 1 April, then they should leave, but not without ensuring that the Trucial Oman Levies were up to standard, as far as training, equipment, and officers were concerned. The Foreign Office did not want to encounter troubles again with the force it intended to keep in place of the disbanded squadron, insisting that three months were not sufficient to make

March 1954, FO 371 / 109881.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

a squadron fully effective. 3) The Foreign Office reiterated that it did not intend to ask for the permanent presence of an RAF squadron. However, it conceded that, as the Trucial Coast Emirates were politically a very important area, British troops might be required there at any time of year, regardless of the season.⁶² Although the Foreign Office accepted the fact that the stationing of a British force would involve a higher cost and therefore a financial burden for Great Britain, it thought that such expense would be for a worthwhile purpose and wisely spent.

On the proposal, Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and H.R.L.G. Alexander, the Secretary of State for Defence, decided in Cabinet that the RAF squadron had to remain at Sharjah until further notice and that the Ministry of Defence had the task of arranging what troops were necessary to carry out that duty.⁶³ The Ministry of Defence did not give in without asserting to the Foreign Office that, although it accepted that the squadron had to remain at Sharjah for a limited time, because of the Saudi presence in the Buraimi Oasis, it was still of the opinion that the situation had to be solved as soon as possible--there was no crucial need for the squadron to remain there indefinitely.⁶⁴

The Foreign Office remained firm. It reiterated the problem posed by the Saudi occupation of the Buraimi Oasis and stated that, until the Saudi response to the arbitration proposal was received, the presence of the squadron was needed there as it

⁶¹For more information, see Chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁶²Cabinet Defence Committee, 15 February 1954, FO 371/109881.

⁶³*Ibid.*, H. Lovegrove, Secretary of Chief-of-Staff Committee, to L.A.C. Fry, Foreign Office, 10 March 1954.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, Ministry of Defence to Foreign Office, 5 July 1954.

had to be able to intervene effectively in case it had to protect British interests in the Emirates.⁶⁵

C.A.E. Shuckburgh, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, felt that the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee were against a military presence in Sharjah. Therefore, he had to instruct B.A.B. Burrows, the Political Resident in Bahrain, to consult with the Local Defence Committee in Bahrain (representatives of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, and military advisers, chaired by B.A.B. Burrows⁶⁶) and to report to the Foreign Office his views about the presence of the squadron there.⁶⁷

Burrows did not recommend the permanent stationing of a squadron in Sharjah as the living conditions there were worse than anywhere in the Middle East. It did not provide the facilities for naval and aircraft forces that existed in other places in the Middle East. He added that unless that force was substantial, its presence there would not be exercising any useful influence and it would not be known in the Gulf as a significant base, compared with other major bases in the area, such as Habbaniyya in Iraq. Furthermore, he felt that the Local Defence Committee preferred the squadron to be elsewhere in the Middle East and not in Sharjah.⁶⁸

In the meantime, the Arbitration Agreement between Saudi Arabia and the British

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Ministry of Defence, 12 July 1954.

⁶⁶ Personal information obtained by the researcher from B.A.B. Burrows, June 1998.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office, C.A.E. Shuckburgh, to B.A.B. Burrows, 14 July 1954.

Government about the Buraimi issue had been signed on 30 July 1954. The British then felt that they could reduce their force in the Gulf region, as soon as Turki withdrew from Buraimi.⁶⁹ As a consequence of the development of the situation in the Gulf region, the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee concluded the following points in a meeting in August of 1954:

(a) After a satisfactory settlement of our current difficulties with Saudi Arabia in the Buraimi area, it will be possible to maintain our prestige and protect our interests in the Persian Gulf without the permanent stationing of British troops in the area provided that the following measures are taken:

1. the continuing presence in the area of Her Majesty's ships;
2. the institution of exercises involving the flying in of troops for short periods; and
3. an occasional show of force by ground attack aircraft.

(b) Both before and after redeployment:

1. troops could be flown into the area so as to arrive within, at the latest, forty-eight hours of the origination of a request for assistance;
2. DF/GA aircraft could operate from Sharjah within forty-eight hours but certain administrative preparations would have to be made before they could operate from Bahrain or Shaiba.⁷⁰

From the above meeting, it was clear that the Chiefs-of-Staff were satisfied with the *status quo* and thought that there was no further need for the presence of a force in Sharjah, now that the incident had passed. Their only concern was that Royal Naval vessels had to keep a foothold in the Gulf and that troops had to be flown regularly to and from the Gulf, in addition to an occasional display of military aircraft. Above all,

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Foreign Office, 7 August 1954.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Note by A.C.I. Samuel, Foreign Office, 9 August 1954. For more information, see Chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Note of the Chiefs-of-Staff meeting, 11 August 1954.

they had to ensure that troops could reach the area within forty-eight hours in cases of emergency. As the Chiefs-of-Staff pointed out, before aircraft could operate from Bahrain and Shaiba in Iraq, aircraft from Sharjah had to be able to operate within forty-eight hours as well, which meant maintaining a satisfactory state of readiness at the base.

On 13 August 1954, Turki and most of his force left Buraimi for Saudi Arabia.⁷¹ Shuckburgh instructed Burrows, the Political Resident, to prepare for the withdrawal of the RAF squadron from Sharjah.⁷² In the end the force withdrew from Sharjah in September 1954.⁷³

From the discussion that took place about the stationing of the RAF squadron in Sharjah, it seems clear that the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence had different views about the presence of British troops in Sharjah. The Foreign Office was concerned about the threat of Saudi occupation of Buraimi. It was able to persuade the Cabinet Defence Committee that the force had to remain in Sharjah until the threat of the Saudi amir had disappeared, i.e. by withdrawing from Buraimi. It was only after this matter was resolved that the Foreign Office agreed that the force could leave.

It is worth mentioning that the Trucial Oman Levies, a rather simple force, were stationed across all the Emirates. They soon commanded the respect of both the rulers and the population, as they managed to maintain security in the region and protect oil

⁷¹ Clayton, *Two Alpha*, p. 58. For more information, see Chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁷² Foreign Office to Political Resident, 23 August 1954, FO 371/109881.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Ministry of Defence to Middle East Land Forces and reply, 11, 27 August 1954. See also

companies, rulers, and British officials in the best way possible. In his book *The Trucial Oman Scouts*, M. Mann pointed out that such a force had responsibility for providing security for oil company parties and also internal security for the Trucial Coast Emirates in order to ensure the safety of aircraft, to protect the Trucial States from external aggression, to control gunning in the area, in addition to preventing the trespassing of pilgrims for the purpose of engaging in the slave trade.⁷⁴ Above all, the force had to provide an escort for British political officials.

The force also played a prominent and effective role in the Buraimi Oasis dispute, which had erupted in 1952 as a border dispute between Muscat and Abu Dhabi on the one hand and between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia on the other. This matter was settled in favour of Abu Dhabi and Muscat in 1955. In March 1956, the force's name was officially changed to the Trucial Oman Scouts, and its role was amended as follows:

1. The force may be employed in any part of the Trucial States:
 - a) For the maintenance of peace and good order in the Trucial States;
 - b) To provide an escort for British political representatives.
2. The Political Resident shall have the power to require members of the force to proceed and serve outside the limits of the Trucial States Order of 1956.⁷⁵

Paragraph 2 of this Amendment gave the Political Resident the authority to sanction the force that would be used as a substitute for British troops and made ready

Foreign Office to Political Resident, 11 December 1954.

⁷⁴ M. Mann, *The Trucial Oman Scouts: the Story of a Bedouin Force*, London, 1994, p.23.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.90.

to operate throughout the Gulf region.⁷⁶ The Political Resident, however, could foresee that in two or three years the stationing of more permanent troops in the Gulf would be back on the agenda, as one could not count on the availability of British troops from the bases in the Gulf after that time.⁷⁷

The force continued to develop under the supervision of the British officials until the Emirates gained independence from Great Britain on 30 November 1971, when it became the nucleus of the armed forces of the United Arab Emirates.

2.4. The Trucial States Council, May 1952

The British Government felt the need for somebody who could unify decision-making in the Trucial States Emirates, for its experience with the individual Trucial States, particularly regarding the oil concessions in each Emirate, caused some unease when it came to concluding a separate agreement with each ruler. Thus, with the establishment of the Arab League in 1945 in Cairo, Britain realized that the sense of Arab nationalism could infiltrate the Trucial States Emirates. In *The Persian Gulf in the twentieth century*, Marlowe ascribes the establishment of such a council to the fact that Great Britain's aim was to develop the Trucial Coast Emirates, particularly after the decline in the pearl market that was inflicted upon them.⁷⁸ Another point to be considered was HMG's clash with Musaddiq's nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951. This made Britain adamant in her determination to create a council that combined the Trucial States Emirates together under British supervision in the region. It seemed

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 7 August 1954, FO 371/109881.

necessary to take this step in order to ensure that British interests were maintained in the Emirates and that the situation in Iran was not copied there.

It was for these reasons, among others, that the need was felt to assemble the Trucial States together under the British umbrella. Therefore, on 25 November 1950, W.R. Hay, the Political Resident, proposed the formation of the Council of the Trucial States rulers to the Foreign Office.⁷⁹ The Foreign Office accepted his suggestion and recommended that, although “the practical possibility of achieving any form of general political federation of the sheikhdoms (as opposed to a local federation of the Trucial States) is remote, the rulers should, however, be encouraged to consult together on matters of regional concern such as education and health.” It felt that “it is undesirable to attempt to bring the sheikhdoms more closely under the control of His Majesty’s Government” in the climate of decolonization, although relinquishing control was not actually contemplated at that stage.⁸⁰ It was stressed that:

His Majesty’s Government being responsible for the foreign relations of the sheikhdoms has both the right to intervene to prevent serious maladministration and to ensure that their international commitments are carried out, and the obligation to assist generally in the development of their administration systems.⁸¹

A further point that the Foreign Office highlighted related to the internal independence of the sheikhdoms as that had to be fostered as much as possible, although there was no indication that their complete independence was contemplated

⁷⁸ Marlowe, J., *The Persian Gulf in the 20th Century*, London, 1962, p.197.

⁷⁹ Political Resident to Foreign Office , 25 November 1950, FO 371/ 63843.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Political Resident, 2 April 1951.

for the near future. Additionally, the Foreign Office stated that His Majesty's Government had the responsibility for encouraging the reforms needed in response to a probable demand for them when the development of those sheikhdoms did start in earnest.⁸²

It is clear that the Foreign Office did not envisage a form of federation amongst the emirates themselves at that time, but more a body that could co-ordinate amongst themselves and consult in matters related to health and education yet not get involved in political decision-making, in particular foreign affairs. Conversely, it was not considered a good strategy to exert pressure on the Trucial States Emirates to bring them closer under the control of the British Government. However, it was stressed that Britain should maintain the right to represent the Trucial States Emirates on the international scene, in addition to ensuring that their internal administration was satisfactory.

From the above points proposed by the Foreign Office, it can be seen that it was still considered very early for the Emirates to contemplate their complete independence from Great Britain. At the same time, there was a feeling that the British Government did not regard this as a far-fetched idea and, indeed, such a line of policy was proven true, as the Emirates were granted full independence almost twenty years later, in 1971.

It is to Britain's credit that she also insisted on making the reforms necessary to

⁸¹ *Ibid*

⁸² *Ibid.*

enable the Trucial States to function properly, without the need to rely on other states for development. This might also have been taken as an intention on the part of Britain to remain in the Emirates and not to encourage an immediate unified Trucial State, as she was convinced that there were still several different issues to be worked out before the independence of the Emirates could be discussed.

So the Trucial States Council was established to encourage the sheikhs to discuss matters about general problems they might encounter. However, the present writer was informed by the Political Agent in Dubai from 1958 to 1961, D. Hawley, that, as the Council had no written constitution, and no executive and policy-making powers, it was merely a consultative and advisory body.⁸³ The Council used to discuss matters of common interest to the Trucial States and the British Government, under the chairmanship of the Political Agent, Trucial Coast, M.C Weir. The meetings were attended by the representatives of the seven Emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, and Fujairah.⁸⁴

In the first two meetings, held in 1952, the Trucial States Council discussed such subjects as Kalba's and Fujairah's affairs, locust control, cultured pearls, nationality law, and travel documents.

⁸³ Personal information from Sir Donald Hawley, the Political Agent in Dubai from 1958 to 1961, in a meeting on 20 May 1998. See also, Hawley's, *The Trucial States*, London, 1970, pp. 176-178.

⁸⁴ Minutes of first and second meetings of the Trucial States Council, 23 March and 1 May 1952, FO 1016/168.

As regards Kalba, it had been experiencing problems since the British Government had recognized it as an independent state from 1936 until 1952. The rulers were reminded of Britain's refusal to recognize Saqr bin Sultan bin Salim as ruler of Kalba, since Britain was convinced that he had murdered Hamad bin Said, the previous ruler of Kalba. The Political Agent stressed that the British Government did not accept that any murderer or an assassin should be entitled to succeed in reigning in any sheikhdom. The rulers were also asked for their views on the Kalba succession problem, but they felt that it had to be solved by Great Britain as they did not wish to interfere in such matters. As a consequence, the British Government decided to return Kalba to Sharjah. All rulers agreed and Kalba again became part of Sharjah as it previously had been.⁸⁵

The issue of Fujairah was also brought up for discussion by the Political Agent, who informed the rulers that the British Government had recognized sheikh Muhammad bin Hamad as ruler of Fujairah on 21 March 1952. He was therefore duly admitted to the Trucial States Council. This angered sheikh Rashid of Dubai, but the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah kept silent, for they considered Fujairah as a part of Sharjah. In fact, the ruler of Dubai obviously had some sympathy with them.⁸⁶ Again, the majority of the sheikhs did not want to become involved in sensitive issues.

However, the outstanding issue that the Political Agent had to discuss with the rulers was the problem of locust control that was threatening the livelihood of the

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* For more information, see Chapter 3 of this thesis.

⁸⁶ For more information, see Chapter 3 of this thesis.

people of the Trucial Coast Emirates at that time. It was essential that a solution be reached before they did more damage to the crops. The Political Agent drew the attention of the rulers to the current menace from locust infestation and to the consequences which would follow from the refusal of the bedouin to allow the use of poisonous bait because they were not accustomed to using such poison, convinced that it would harm them. As time was running out before the hoppers became mobile after breeding, the Political Agent put pressure on the assembled sheikhs. They agreed to confer with their bedouin, requesting them not to interfere with the work and to send guards to accompany the locust control squads. They were reminded that their own date gardens and plantations would be the first victims, as indeed the gardens of the rulers of Umm al-Qaiwain at Falaj al-Ali, of Ras al-Khaimah at Khatt, and of Ajman at Manama had already been infected. However, the bedouin refused to allow the squads to use the bait, because they were still not assured of its safe use.

The Political Agent expressed his disappointment that no progress had been made on locust control, but the rulers were evasive in their answers because their bedouin were against using it. The Political Agent pointed out that the bait was used all over the world and especially in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Buraimi without harm. Thus, the rulers were also reminded that the arsenic bait, of which complaint had been made four years previously, had all been burned at Sharjah in April 1948. Despite the evidence presented to the rulers by the Political Agent, they were not convinced. However, constant pressure on the part of the Political Agent and the rulers finally induced the bedouin to alter their stand, as a great deal of evidence was presented to them to indicate the safety of the locust bait used to get rid of the locust scourge. Ultimately,

then, the bedouin allowed the squad to use the bait to prevent the swarms of locusts from damaging their cultivations.

Another issue which came up in the agenda was that of cultured pearls, following their discovery in Bombay in a consignment destined for Dubai. The Political Agent requested the application of deterrent penalties to those who were guilty of smuggling cultured pearls into the Trucial States, to stop them arriving in quantities which would have an adverse effect on the livelihood of the people who worked in the pearl fisheries. In the meeting, both the Political Agent and the rulers agreed on fighting the infiltration of cultured pearls from abroad. Thus, it was clear that the Political Agent supported the rulers in their attitude towards cultured pearls, since the Trucial Coast Emirates were in a difficult economic situation, as the pearl fisheries were their main source of income and employment.

The same unanimity was called for in discussing the issue of extradition. The Political Agent urged the rulers to give a similar undertaking in the case of all robbers and bandits, as they had a common interest in fighting crimes and criminals. Hence, all agreed to do so.

Concerning the travel of Trucial Coast subjects, this was to be regulated in accordance with the tribal norms that prevailed in the Arabian Peninsula. For instance, people were accustomed to visit Saudi Arabia to perform the pilgrimage or, indeed, to travel to or any part of the Arabian Peninsula, being recommended by an introduction from the sheikh of one tribe to the sheikh of another, as sometimes a tribe might have

some roots in other places in Arabia. Such travel customs persisted from days when there were no formal borders between different states in Arabia.

With regard to the issue of travel documents by the Trucial States' rulers, this also was discussed in this meeting and the rulers were notified that the British Government had no objection to the issue of temporary travel documents to the rulers' subjects for local use or in the Gulf region generally. The rulers felt that, as the Saudis were exacting heavy fees from the rulers' subjects who went to perform their pilgrimage, they themselves ought to start issuing travel documents for their own subjects in 1952. The visas were issued by the Political Agent in Sharjah. All the rulers had British passports.⁸⁷ This, in turn, led to a discussion of what constituted "Trucial nationality". After debating this matter, the rulers were informed by the Political Agent that, for the purpose of international recognition and legality, it would be necessary for the members of the Trucial States Council to eventually publish nationality laws stating the precise conditions on which their nationality was to be acquired, and they were invited to consider the problem and consult further with the British officials if they wished to pursue the matter.⁸⁸

After the first two meetings, Kalba, Fujairah, and locust control were the only issues that seemed to have been settled. As for the other subjects, although they were tackled and some measures were agreed upon, nothing practical was implemented.

⁸⁷ Foreign Office Confidential, 1952, IOR/ R/ 15/1/731.

Between 1953 and 1954, three further meetings of the Council were held between the Political Agent and the rulers of the Emirates.⁸⁹ By this time the Political Agent was preoccupied by the Saudi occupation of Buraimi Oasis and brought the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi up for discussion in an attempt to discern what the attitude of the other rulers towards it might be, assuring them that the issue would be referred to international arbitration--something which had been rejected twice by the Saudi Government.⁹⁰ Obviously, Buraimi was of concern to them as they considered it as part of the Trucial Coast.

As a second matter of concern, the demarcation of the internal borders of the Emirates was discussed, which the Political Agent requested without any further delay, urging the rulers to seek a compromise settlement on this issue. Should they fail, he pointed out, the British Government would act as an arbiter. Such an internal matter had not hitherto been of much concern, but focused minds when oil was actually produced in the region.

Third, regarding the slave trade, the Political Agent reminded the Council of the consistent efforts which had been made by the British Government to put an end to the slave trade since it had first become engaged in the Gulf region. He explained that for someone to control and dispose of the body of another is an abhorrent and loathsome practice that ran contrary to all modern concepts. All the rulers agreed that the slave

⁸⁸Minute of the second meeting of the Trucial States Council, 1 May 1952, FO 1016/168.

⁸⁹Minutes of the third, fourth, and fifth meetings, 25 April and 17 November 1953, and 25 June 1954, FO 371/104261.

trade should disappear, but only gradually. In fact, there was some action on this as the slave trade started to dwindle.

Fourth, the financial position of the hospital at Dubai was discussed. The Political Agent stated that although the finance of the hospital was improving, it was not yet adequate and that the British Government had allocated a grant to help the hospital with its upkeep for that year.⁹¹ Additionally, the rulers were asked to provide financial assistance amounting to rupees.105,062 (approximately £7,600), so that the hospital could maintain its medical services.⁹² The needs of the hospital were considered seriously by the rulers, who tried to collect sums of money, in addition to the British grant allocated to the hospital, to help keep its services running.

Fifth, a whole bundle of infrastructure measures were tabled, amongst which the water supply was of particular importance. The rulers requested the British Government to accelerate the development of water resources.⁹³

A sixth point of concern was roads. The Political Agent requested that action should be taken promptly to regulate traffic.

A seventh discussion point was nationality. The Political Agent recommended to

⁹⁰For more information, see Chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁹¹For more information, see Chapter 5 of this thesis.

⁹² Al-Maktum Hospital, Dubai, 1952-1953, FO 371/104434. For more information, see Chapter 5 of this thesis.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

the rulers the developing of standards for the issuing of passports for the people of the Emirates. All agreed that those standards should be uniform.⁹⁴ In fact, the rulers started in due course to issue travel documents to their subjects, which were recognized in the Gulf region, India and Pakistan, which meant that people from the Trucial Coast could travel anywhere in those areas provided that they had valid visas.⁹⁵

The next and final three meetings of the Trucial States Council took place between the end of 1954 and the end of 1955. These were presided over by the new Political Agent in Dubai, M.P. Gordon. The new subjects on the agenda in those meetings related to the reform of administration in the Trucial States. The Political Agent observed that, owing to the complexity of government, no one ruler could cope with the responsibilities of his state alone. Moreover, the Political Agent realized that reforming the Trucial States would make them better placed to cope with the situation which the discovery of oil and sudden wealth would bring about. Thus, certain administrative measures had to be put in place. Consequently, the Political Agent asked the rulers not to concentrate power in their hands, but to delegate more and share it with those whom they trusted in their Emirates. After long discussions, it was agreed that priority should be given to education, health, and agriculture. It was also agreed that the Political Agent should examine problems with each ruler individually when he visited them in their Emirates.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Minutes of the third, fourth, and fifth meetings, 25 April and 17 November 1953, and 25 June 1954, FO 371/104261.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Minutes of the sixth, seventh, and eighth meetings, 23 December 1954, and 23/24 August and 8 November 1955, FO 1016/ 399.

In order to discuss education with the rulers of the Trucial States, the Political Agent introduced J.G. Muir, the Representative of the British Council in the Gulf region. Muir suggested to them that education was of paramount importance. He advised the rulers to encourage their subjects to acquire education, since it would develop and qualify them to be better citizens. He assured the rulers that he was ready to help them in this matter. The Political Agent requested the construction of primary and secondary schools, explaining the benefits that would accrue from these to the generations to come. This issue was then put into action after a feasibility study had been conducted. The importance of education for girls was also hinted at. The Political Agent made so bold as to state that girls should be given the same education as boys.⁹⁷ In 1956, the Political Agent suggested that co-ordination between the Council and Kuwait should start, as he had already written to the Kuwaiti authorities requesting their help with the Trucial States in matters related to education, particularly in terms of teachers.⁹⁸ As a result of these efforts, education started to flourish in the Trucial Coast from the start of the 1960s.

Another issue for deliberation by the Council was arms sales. It was revealed that two bedouin had traded in arms that were smuggled from Oman to the Trucial Coast Emirates. After discussing this new incident, the Political Agent reminded the rulers of the agreement concluded in November 1902 between C.A. Kemball, the Political

⁹⁷ *Ibid*

⁹⁸ Hawley, *Trucial States*, p.234

Resident in Bushire at that time, and the rulers of the Emirates regarding the prohibition of arms traffic in the Emirates. He suggested that a registration system for arms should be put in place. However, it was agreed that the Political Agent should discuss the implementation of an arms registry with individual rulers in his separate meetings with them. Later, the rulers agreed with the Political Agent to stop such trade and apply the terms of the above agreement.⁹⁹ The British concern was that arms would lead to more assaults and, more dangerously, they might lead some tribesmen to engage with the Saudis, then occupying Buraimi, or encourage them to use arms against their own rulers or even British personnel. Hence, the Political Agent warned the rulers of the threat posed by arms sales in the region.

A new subject, narcotics, was put on the agenda, provoked by the cannabis that had been smuggled from India to the Emirates of the Trucial Coast. The rulers requested the drafting of a law by the British officials that would incriminate narcotics users who were under the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government.¹⁰⁰ On 12 June 1955, a Queen's Regulation was made law. It stated that it was an offence for persons subject to the Trucial States Order in Council to procure, be in possession of, sell, or otherwise supply narcotics unless a licence had previously been obtained from the Political Agent.¹⁰¹ The rulers turned their attention to an investigation of drugs use amongst their subjects. With the exception of the ruler of Sharjah, who reported two cases of people

⁹⁹Agreement of the prohibition of the arms traffic, 1902, IOR: L/P and S/20/C 248D. For more information, see Chapter 1 of this thesis.

¹⁰⁰Minutes of the sixth, seventh, and eighth meetings, 23 December 1954, and 23/24 August and 8 November 1955, FO 1016/ 399.

caught using drugs and who were convicted and heavily fined, the other rulers were not able to report any drug-related offences in their Emirates.¹⁰²

It appears that the Council had only limited power. The discussions in the Council concentrated on current issues that the rulers encountered at that time. Thus, although discussions and deliberations continued in the meetings held from time to time, no real action was taken to implement all the matters discussed. This may be attributed to two main causes:

- a) The shortage of cash on the part of the rulers, since the region remained poor before the discovery of oil.
- b) The illiteracy and diseases that were widespread in the region at that time.

The factor underlying both these causes was the general poverty of the people of the Emirates, who mostly depended for their livelihood on fishing and simple trade. They did not comprehend or they under-estimated the reforms that the British Government wanted to introduce to the Emirates. As a result, it was not surprising that they could not foresee the importance of creating a sound infrastructure. Such a situation lasted until 1965, when the authority of the Political Agent started to dwindle and the chairmanship of the Council was later transferred to one of the rulers.

Until 1965, Her Majesty's Government did not attempt to create a federation of the Emirates. Later, the ruler of Abu Dhabi promised to contribute 4% of his revenue from

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*

any oil found in his territory to finance the Council and help the Trucial States as a whole, and the Council took over responsibility for the administration of this fund.¹⁰³

Thus, we can see from the review of British policy in the Emirates in this chapter that the Trucial Oman Levies, which were established by Great Britain in 1951, remained in the hands of the British officials until 1971, when they became the core of the army of the United Arab Emirates. As far as the Council was concerned, there was no proper political or economic structure to it when British officials left; neither was it a collusive state organization, but more like a club to discuss issues related to the Emirates. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, from 1965 onwards, the rulers assumed the chairmanship of the Council in turns. This gave them the impetus to work towards the Federation of the Emirates into one unified state that was finally created as the United Arab Emirates on the second of December 1971. One might wonder if the United Arab Emirates would have found the structure and unity which it gained after 1971, without the previous existence of the Council.

However, after the Emirates gained independence, the Council was put in a position to pursue an extensive programme of modernization, owing to the oil revenues that had become available, as by then oil was being exported in great quantities. On 2 December 1971, the Council became the legislative and executive body of the federation of the United Arab Emirates. The Federation of the Emirates became internationally recognized as a sovereign state and represented in the United Nations

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

and the Arab League, headed by sheikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi.

¹⁰³ Hawley, *The Trucial Coast*, pp.177-178.

Chapter 3

**The Internal Affairs between the
Trucial Coast Emirates**

3.1 Introduction

As mentioned in Chapter 1, during the years 1938-1939, there was a lengthy correspondence between the civil servants in charge of the Gulf region, the British Government of India, and the British Government in London about their interference in the internal affairs of the Emirates—such a right was not conceded to the British in the Treaty of 1892. With the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait in the 1930s, the British Government realized that some discussion ought to take place on whether or not Britain had a right to get involved in the internal affairs of the Emirates.

Some of the officials advocated the interference of the British there, while others did not. Nevertheless, the various conferences between the British Government in India and His Majesty's Government stopped prior to reaching a final conclusion on this matter. The reason for this was the outbreak of World War II, in which Great Britain was a key player. When the war ended in victory for the Allies, there was a movement towards change and the dawning of a new era, one in which imperial rule was considered out of favour.

It should be mentioned that the interest of the British in the Gulf region, especially after the war, was primarily because of its oil. Even with the threat of nationalist movements, such as that led by Musaddiq in Iran in 1951,¹ Great Britain

¹ Louis, *The British Empire*, pp. 651-657.

still insisted on a kind of permanent presence in the Gulf region, especially after she had granted independence to India in 1947.²

In January 1947, the Cabinet decided that the Government in London should assume the responsibility for conducting relations with the Gulf States. It was proposed that the India Office should take responsibility for this in the interim, until it had facilitated a transfer to the Foreign Office in April 1948.³

In spite of the fact that Great Britain had loosened her grip, both politically and economically, on the countries that it had dominated in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf region, she nevertheless decided to follow a new policy of closer relations with the rulers of the Emirates. The justification was of course the oil of the region and its impact on the economy of Great Britain; in the same way the resources of India had been significant to the economy of Great Britain in the days of the Empire.⁴

The British representatives in the Gulf region, previously aided by the Government of India and the Foreign Office, established the Trucial States Order-in-Council in 1948. Later, in 1949, P.D. Stobart, a Political Officer, was appointed as a Permanent Resident in the Trucial Coast at Sharjah and, in 1951, the first small levy force was stationed at Sharjah. Then, in 1952, the Trucial States Council was formally set up, followed in 1953 by the appointment of a permanent Political Agent in Dubai.⁵

² Al-Sayegh, F., *al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah*, p. 325.

³ For more information, see Chapter 2 of this thesis.

⁴ Louis, *The British Empire*, p.4.

⁵ For more information, see Chapter 2 of this thesis.

In line with the above-mentioned matters, which were explained in more detail in Chapter 2, Great Britain was able to interfere in the internal affairs of the Emirates on the grounds of reconciliation between the rulers of the Emirates, and indeed sometimes helped to chart a new Emirate out of existing ones.⁶ In the coming section, the thesis will focus on the impact of Great Britain upon the internal affairs of some of the Emirates in the hope of clarifying British policy towards the Emirates of the Trucial Coast.

3.2. The Abu Dhabi-Dubai War and Boundary, 1947-1952

In 1833 sheikh Khalifa bin Shakhbut had become ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi after assassinating his brother Tahnun bin Shakhbut, following personal differences between them.⁷ The consequence of this was the emergence of the Bufalasa tribe, who emigrated to Dubai and settled there, where they were recognized by Great Britain as rulers of the independent Emirate of Dubai. In fact, they were relatives of the tribe of al-Bufalah, the rulers of Abu Dhabi.⁸

Consequently, the Emirate of Dubai had very close ties with the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. This continued until 1924, when both Emirates became involved in

⁶ Hay, S.R., *The Persian Gulf*, pp.115-129.

⁷ On the assassination of sheikh Tahnun bin Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi by his brother Khalifa in April 1833, see the letter of D.A. Blane, British Resident, Bushire, to the Government of Bombay, 4 June 1833, IOR: P/387/47.

⁸ Mulla Husain, Native Agent, Sharjah, to Lieutenant Samuel Hennell, Acting British Resident, Bushire, 5 September 1833, IOR: P387/51.

battles against the bedouin, who were in the habit of invading the territory and possessions belonging to Abu Dhabi.⁹ The bedouin launched their attacks from the Buraimi Oasis. In 1931, there was a tribal dispute between the sheikh of Buraimi and the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, in consequence of the support the former had lent to the bedouin.¹⁰ Captain R.G. Alban, the Political Agent in Muscat, reported to the Political Resident, Lt. Col. T.C. Fowle, that owing to a previous attack by the sheikh of Buraimi on the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, the latter had armed himself with 1,000 men and had gone to attack Buraimi. The sheikh of Dubai was approached for help and met both sheikhs in Sharjah. This meeting was supervised by 'Isa bin 'Abd al-Latif, the Native Agent, on behalf of the Political Resident.¹¹ The outcome of the meeting was the settlement of the dispute between the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Buraimi.¹²

However, in 1937, a dispute between the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai was the result of the concession that the latter had granted to PDTCL in that year, for the concession had included some territory in the boundary areas between Abu Dhabi and Dubai and this had irritated the ruler of Abu Dhabi, sheikh Shakhbut.¹³ Yet nothing substantial came of it, since no oil had been discovered. From 1939 to 1945, owing to World War II, PDTCL ceased its activities, and so any discord between Abu Dhabi and Dubai seemed to have come to a halt. This state of affairs continued until 1946, when the oil company resumed its activities in the Trucial Coast Emirates.

⁹ Fighting between Abu Dhabi and Bedouins of Interior, 1924-1925, IOR: R/15/1/250.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Political Agent, Muscat, 11 June 1931.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Senior Naval Officer to Political Resident, Bushire, 10-29 June 1931.

¹² *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bushire to Commanding Air Headquarters, Baghdad, 23 July 1931.

¹³ Dubai Oil Concession, 22 May 1937, IOR/L and S/18/B 458.

On 26 August 1946, the conflict between Abu Dhabi and Dubai resurfaced. It can be traced in the correspondence between the Political Agent Bahrain, H.D.H. Rance, and the Political Resident, Bahrain, W.R. Hay. The sheikh of Dubai had complained to Rance that 125 camels have been stolen in a fight between tribesmen from Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The Political Agent felt that, as the fight had taken place between tribes of Abu Dhabi and Bani Qitab,¹⁴ the British should not get involved. Thus, Rance suggested to Hay that the recovery of the camels should be effected directly between them in the normal tribal manner.¹⁵ The Political Resident supported this solution, which was duly brought about.¹⁶ Although British representatives in the Gulf wanted to stay aloof from the day-to-day minor affairs of the sheikhdoms, the conflict between the two rulers surfaced again and again and forced them to enter into political decisions leading in the final stage to their direct involvement and interference in home affairs.

The sheikh of Dubai continued to interfere between the tribes of Abu Dhabi and Bani Qitab. By contrast, the ruler of Abu Dhabi was calling for a peaceful settlement of the dispute between his tribes and the tribes of Dubai and Bani Qitab. Faced with such opposing stances, the British officials thought that it was time to interfere and exercise some pressure on the sheikh of Dubai to draw him to a peaceful

¹⁴ Bani Qitab were allies of the sheikh of Dubai who supports them in their stance against the sheikh of Abu Dhabi and interferes between them, in spite of the fact that Bani Qitab were subjects of Sharjah.

¹⁵ Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 26 August 1946, IOR/R/15/1/292.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agent, Bahrain, 30 August 1946.

settlement of the dispute with the sheikh of Abu Dhabi.¹⁷ Consequently, A. C. Galloway, on behalf of the Political Resident, Hay, agreed to the suggestions of the Political Agent and asked him that in case further encroachment were made by the sheikh of Dubai, sanctions would be imposed. These could amount to six months' closing of the port and diverting of ships.¹⁸

Following such warnings, the sheikh of Dubai became more inclined to a peaceful solution with the sheikh of Abu Dhabi. However, after these incidents, C. J. Pelly, the new Political Agent in Bahrain, tried to bring about a rapprochement the two conflicting parties, as he felt that the dispute had become augmented and grown into a dispute on boundary issues. In January 1947, correspondence between Hay and Pelly, in the conflict between Abu Dhabi and Dubai concerning the ownership of Khour Ghanadha, indicated that, as far as Pelly was concerned, the case had been thoroughly investigated and solved; in his view there was no doubt that Khour Ghanadha was part of the territories of Abu Dhabi, but this conclusion should not be revealed to either sheikh. The Political Agent went on to suggest that for tactical reasons the situation had to remain undecided and, in the event of either of them enquiring about it, the reply should be to each one individually that Khour Ghanadha was part of their own territories. But this was only a holding measure since, as Pelly pointed out, the situation would remain as it was only until oil was discovered in one

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 20 October 1946.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agent, Bahrain, 12 November 1946.

area or another, thus rendering it more significant and more important to the British.¹⁹ Hay also agreed with this as a provisional measure.²⁰

Later, the two Emirates were seemingly on the verge of a clash as each had stationed its forces on the border between the two. What made the situation still more serious was the visit that Galloway, on behalf of Hay, and G.N. Jackson, the Political Officer in Sharjah, paid to the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai in February 1947 to establish a peaceful settlement between them, as on their way back from Abu Dhabi to Dubai, Galloway and Jackson had been fired on by a servant of sheikh Juma, the brother of the sheikh of Dubai. Both British officials were slightly hurt by splinters from the windscreen of the car in which they were travelling. The response of the sheikh of Dubai was positive, as he undertook to provide a new car for them and, at the same time, expelled to Bahrain his brother, sheikh Juma, who was instigating the trouble between Dubai and Abu Dhabi.²¹ As a result of the efforts of the British officials in the tribal and boundary conflict between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, attempts toward a peaceful solution seemed promising. For instance, in March 1947, in the presence of the Political Agent in Bahrain, C.J. Pelly, both sides signed a settlement providing as follows:

1. all hostile acts such as raids, plunder, murder and trespass by either side should cease forthwith.
2. all claims on account of loss of life or property by either side arising only out of the hostilities now being concluded should be dropped.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 17 January 1947.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agent, Bahrain, 22 January 1947.

²¹ *Political Diaries of the Persian Gulf*, Volume 17, 1946-1947, Archive Editions, London, 1990, p. 323.

3. subjects of each sheikh should be free to move in the territory of the other and should continue to enjoy unaltered the rights which they enjoyed before the start of hostilities.
4. each sheikh should extend this settlement to the tribes who have joined in hostility against the other.²²

As a result of this agreement, concluded to protect the two Emirates equally, the conflict between them subsided for a while.

However, skirmishes were soon rekindled when some members of the Manasir tribe who belonged to Abu Dhabi launched an attack against and began looting Dubai. Major efforts were made to calm the situation, leading to another agreement between Abu Dhabi, which considered itself the protector of the Manasir, and Dubai. This agreement stated that:

1. sheikh Shakhbut will not be responsible for the Manasir or for anything they may do against Dubai.
2. sheikh Shakhbut, however, accepts responsibility for the following of the Manasir who are in his employ: Hamad bin Mubarak, Ali bin Mubarak and Taib.
3. sheikh Shakhbut will be responsible for any other of the Manasir whom he employs and for anything they may do against Dubai while they are in his employ.
4. If sheikh Sai'd asks sheikh Shakhbut for details of the Manasir who are in his employ, sheikh Shakhbut will supply them. If later there should be any change in the men employed or if sheikh Shakhbut employs additional men or dismisses any of those employed by him, sheikh Shakhbut will keep sheikh Sai'd informed without further reference from sheikh Sai'd.
5. sheikh Shakhbut may allow (neighbours) and *Rafiq* from the Manasir to live in his territory provided he accepts responsibility for them. Should Dubai cause them any injury sheikh Shakhbut is entitled to take up the question with Dubai.²³

Clearly, this agreement was to deter the Manasir from attacking Dubai. sheikh Shakhbut signed the agreement and thus committed himself to preventing the Manasir

²² *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 6 March 1947.

²³ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 4 May 1948.

from exhibiting aggressive behaviour. Obviously, British officials strongly exerted their influence to sort out differences and get both parties to settle the boundary dispute between the two Emirates. This situation meant that sheikh Shakhbut, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, finally made an important concession when he accepted the interference of the British Government in the boundary dispute with Dubai.²⁴ Later, the sheikh of Dubai accepted the British suggestion of arbitration between himself and the ruler of Abu Dhabi.²⁵

In the period from 1949 to 1952, relations between the two sheikhdoms were still rather fraught. It was not until July 1952 that, after extensive negotiation with both rulers, Great Britain finally managed to resolve the conflict.²⁶

Although the sheikh of Abu Dhabi had accepted the Agreement of 1948 that bound him to prevent the Manasir from attacking Dubai, the war between the two Emirates officially ceased only when sheikh Zaid bin Sultan became the ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1966. Nevertheless, skirmishes continued until 1968, when sheikh Zaid bin Sultan launched an initiative between the two Emirates, leading to the al-Samih Agreement. According to this agreement, Dubai gained territory ten miles west of Hasian.²⁷

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 7 June 1948.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, sheikh of Dubai to Native Agent, Sharjah, 17 July 1948.

²⁶ Political Agent, Bahrain to Native Agent, Sharjah, 8 June 1949; and Political Resident, Bahrain to Acting Political Officer, Sharjah, 21 July 1952, FO 371/74974, 91286 & FO 1016/195.

²⁷ *Ibid.*; & FO 1016/195. See also al-Sayyar, A., *al-Usul al-tarikhyyah wa-'l-tatawwurat al-mu'asirah li-'l-wahdah bayna al-Imarat*, Ain Shams University, 1983, p.25.

3.3. Affairs in Ras al-Khaimah, 1948-1950

Ras al-Khaimah was declared independent from the Emirate of Sharjah on 7 June 1921, when Lt. Col. A.P. Trevor, the Political Resident in Bushire, informed the Native Agent in Sharjah, Khan Bahadur 'Isa bin 'Abdal-Latif, that the British Government of India would recognize sheikh Sultan bin Salim as ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, the sixth Trucial sheikh, provided that he consented to all the agreements concluded between the British Government of India and his predecessors,²⁸ which he duly did.²⁹

Between 1921 and 1925, Great Britain and sheikh Sultan bin Salim had been on good terms. However, from 1926 onwards, tension crept into this relationship, because the sheikh refused to hand over 'Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad, the leader of Hirah, to the commander of the British Naval Forces, which had arrived in Ras al-Khaimah to deport him to Aden. Sultan bin Salim openly criticized the ruler of Sharjah, sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, for agreeing to banish 'Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad, considering it giving in to pressure from the British.³⁰

²⁸ Political Resident, Bushire to Native Agent, in Sharjah, and Sultan bin Salim (ruler of Ras al-Khaimah), 5 June 1921, IOR R/15/1/244.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, sheikh Sultan bin Salim to Political Resident, 20 July 1921.

³⁰ Hirah is situated between Sharjah and Ajman and was administered by Sharjah. The majority of its population are the Shamsi tribe. The leader of Hirah was Abd al-Rahman bin Muhammad, who had been accused of assaulting the Native Agent in Sharjah, and was therefore temporarily banished to Ras al-Khaimah to await deportation to Aden for four years. See R.S. Zahlan, *The Origins*, pp. 46-48.

Within his own domains, Sultan bin Salim enjoyed a mixed reputation. He was admired for his clear policy and stand against Great Britain, especially amongst the younger generation,³¹ but his internal policy in the Emirate was not up to the same standard, particularly with regard to his relatives, who complained bitterly about him. He stopped the annual grants which were given to their old people, and relationships seemed to deteriorate to such an extent that in 1927 one of them asked the Native Agent, Khan Bahadur 'Isa bin Abdal-Latif, in Ras al-Khaimah, to protect him from Sultan bin Salim. This relative later sought refuge in Sharjah. These incidents produced a feeling of uneasiness among the British representatives and the sheikh of Sharjah, Sultan bin Saqr, towards the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah, Sultan bin Salim.³²

Owing to his uneasiness and his attitude towards British policy in the Gulf, together with his constant conflict with the representatives of Great Britain, Sultan bin Salim did not himself turn up to welcome any British ship that reached the coast of Ras al-Khaimah, as was the custom. He also refused to take part in the general meeting, held by Lt. Col. T. Fowle, the Political Resident in Bushire, on board one of the ships off the coast of Dubai in December 1933. That meeting was considered by the British representatives in the Gulf as a revival of the one held in honour of the visit of Lord Curzon to the Gulf area in 1903.³³

³¹ Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Resident, Bushire, 26 June 1926, IOR R/15/1/244.

³² *Ibid.*, 15 June 1927.

³³ Persian Gulf: Political Control, 1933, IOR: L/P& S/10/1268 & 1273.

British recognition of the separation of Kalba from Sharjah on 8 December 1936 was an additional event that provoked sheikh Sultan's fury with the British. He insisted that Kalba's affairs were private, internal matters pertaining only to the Qawasim family, and the British had no right to interfere in them according to the agreements with the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast.³⁴ On 22 March 1938, the Political Agent in Bahrain, H. Weightman, informed the Political Resident in Bushire, Fowle, that the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah had refused to call on one of the sloops or to apologize afterwards for his failure in courtesy.³⁵

Such constant tension between the sheikh and the British authorities made him very reluctant to sign any oil concession with a British oil company; instead he showed more interest in dealing with an American company in Dahrán, Saudi Arabia. However, as we have seen, the British authorities which then controlled the Gulf area did not allow the rulers of the Emirates to deal with any oil company from the USA. Consequently, all the rulers of the Emirates had to resign themselves to accepting that the oil concession in Ras al-Khaimah should go to the British company PDTCL on 7 December 1938, for two and a half years.³⁶

Throughout World War II, British agents in the Gulf were faced with an unsettled situation. After the war had ended, a conflict developed between sheikh

³⁴ Kalba Succession and Affairs, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 4 May 1937, and reply, 4 May 1937, IOR R/15/1/287.

³⁵ Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bushire, 22 March 1938, IOR: L/P&S/12/3747.

³⁶ Exploration permit granted by the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah to PDTCL, 7 December 1938, IOR: R/15/1/2013.

Sultan bin Salim and his brother Muhammad, which was to have important repercussions for the Emirates. On 3 September 1946, J.E. Hudson, the Assistant to the Political Agent in Bahrain, reported to Hay that shooting had been heard in Ras al-Khaimah and that, although the ruler had heard an exchange of bullets in his Emirate, he allowed civilians to move freely, i.e. he was not particularly worried, since the shooting seemed to be restricted. It became clear that the two brothers did not want the British to interfere. However, as there were 12 British subjects in Ras al-Khaimah, the newly appointed Native Agent in Sharjah, Jasem bin M. Kadmari, was instructed to warn both parties that they would be held responsible for the Britons' safety and security and for their property. Hudson came to the conclusion that British intervention was not needed at this stage and that it would be best to leave both parties to solve their conflicts in their own ways.³⁷

A few days later, the situation became more complicated, as the ruler insisted that his brother and his nephews should leave Ras al-Khaimah and live elsewhere, but his brother refused to comply. Although the rulers of both Sharjah and Ajman were called in to mediate between these two members of the ruling family of Ras al-Khaimah, they failed to reach a satisfactory solution.³⁸

On 11 September 1946, sheikh Muhammad bin Salim and his elder son, Hamid, went to Sharjah to inform Kadmari that there was no prospect of solving the

³⁷ Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 8 September 1946, IOR: R/15/1/286.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 8 September 1946.

problem with his brother, sheikh Sultan bin Salim, since the sheikh still continued to press ahead with the demand that he and his nephews leave Ras al-Khaimah. He made it clear that there would be war between them if sheikh Sultan bin Salim did not change his mind.³⁹

Captain H. Dunstan, the British Political Officer in Sharjah, was clearly concerned. He stressed to the British authorities that, although sheikh Muhammad bin Salim was not asking for any help in solving the problem and although the ruler of Sharjah, sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, intended to go to Ras al-Khaimah to reconcile the two conflicting parties, he nevertheless felt that, if the British Government did not intervene immediately, there would be bloodshed in Ras al-Khaimah.⁴⁰

Despite all this, Hudson considered that British interference in the above conflict was unnecessary, because it was a matter that had to be solved within the tribe itself as far as was possible. He also requested Kadmari to remind again both conflicting parties that they had to be held responsible for the security of the British subjects and their possessions. In addition, he asked that a warship be stationed near Ras al-Khaimah to evacuate any British subject if war started there and further requested that this ship should be accompanied by the Residency Agent in Sharjah.⁴¹

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 11 September 1946.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

On 30 September 1946, Dunstan (now promoted to major) reported in a memorandum to H.D.H. Rance, the Political Agent in Bahrain, that discussions had been held in Sharjah with the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah, sheikh Sultan bin Salim, and his brother, Muhammad bin Salim, in an attempt to find a solution to their conflict that had flared up again later in the month. This time the ruler accused his brother and two nephews of three issues: firing at Major Holmes, a British subject, an incident which went back probably ten years; beating local merchants; and plotting to murder the ruler at the end of Ramadan.⁴²

Major Dunstan clearly felt that the whole affair had been trumped up by the sheikh and queried why he himself had not acted when faced with such disturbances and offences or even informed the Political Officer's Office. The sheikh admitted he had no concrete evidence against his brother but professed to want peace, which, he said, was why he had prevented his brother and his nephews from entering *al-Mu'ayrid*, in Ras al-Khaimah. When Dunstan met sheikh Muhammad bin Salim and his sons, they all strongly denied sheikh Sultan's allegations. They also stated that they would not contemplate leaving Ras al-Khaimah since it was their birth-place and all their property was there. At this point, sheikh Muhammad bin Salim asked the British Government for intervention in order to ensure that justice prevailed, but he was informed that the British Government had no authority to interfere in the internal

⁴² *Ibid.*, note by Political Officer, Sharjah, on Ras al- Khaimah affairs, 30 September 1946.

affairs of the tribes. Major Dunstan continued his efforts to reconcile the two brothers.

He met sheikh Sultan bin Salim again on 26 September 1946 and pointed out:

- a) that the situation had been brought about largely by his own neglect of affairs in the past and weakness of control in not checking at the time the people responsible for the offences;
- b) that his action in suddenly manning the town, in opening fire and banning entry into the town had been hasty and ill-considered;
- c) that by expelling his brother and nephews from his territory he would not achieve a real answer to the problem as they would remain his enemies and undoubtedly try to obtain their revenge.⁴³

Still sheikh Sultan bin Salim did not change his mind, insisting that his brother and his nephews should leave Ras al-Khaimah. Although Muhammad bin Salim felt that it was only the British Government that could prevent bloodshed and destruction in Ras al-Khaimah, in such a deadlock he turned to the rulers of Sharjah, Ajman, and Kalba, who themselves tried to mediate in the dispute in the presence of Major Dunstan, endeavouring to agree terms upon which sheikh Sultan of Ras al-Khaimah could agree to his brother's return. As a result of this meeting, Dunstan suggested to Rance, the Political Agent in Bahrain, that:

- i. (the British) Government order sheikh Sultan bin Salim to allow the return of sheikh Muhammad bin Salim and his family to Ras al-Khaimah and to live there.
- ii. Government get a guarantee of good behaviour and loyalty to the ruler from sheikh Muhammad bin Salim, which if ever broken meant his expulsion together with his family, by the Government from Ras al-Khaimah.⁴⁴

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Dunstan added that, in case the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah disagreed with the above suggestions, sanctions of food and supplies would be enforced on his Emirate.⁴⁵ The problem remained unresolved until the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah felt the pressure of opposition, which prompted him to write to Hay in January 1947 pleading for Hay's intervention between himself and his brother lest the conflict should augment.⁴⁶ Hay finally requested A.C. Galloway, the Political Agent in Bahrain, to try to resolve the conflict.⁴⁷

Galloway replied that the situation had been discussed at length with Sultan bin Salim, who wanted him to witness the signing of the agreement that had been suggested by Dunstan, convinced that this would guarantee the peaceful return of Muhammad and his nephews to Ras al-Khaimah. Galloway felt that he could not do more than witness the signing of the agreement and punish those who violated its implementation. Sheikh Sultan bin Salim realized that his brother would have the full support of the British and so he withdrew the draft of the agreement, asking for some time in order to negotiate with his brother certain terms within it, to which Galloway agreed, provided that he would be a witness at its eventual signing in order to review its terms.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Sheikh Sultan bin Salim to Political Resident, 21 January 1947.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Political Agent, 22 February 1947.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Agent to Political Resident, 1 March 1947.

Finally, on 9 May 1947, Dunstan reported that Sultan bin Salim agreed to the return of his brother and his nephews to Ras al-Khaimah, without consulting the British authorities there and without any conditions. It seemed that the ruler was very much against any interference in his affairs, yet, on the other hand, there was no indication that he felt the British were on the side of his brother against him. Hay felt that Sultan bin Salim had given in as he was afraid that some of his people might have sided with his brother, thus neutralizing any opposition. Both Hay and Galloway therefore discarded the draft of the agreement that was supposed to be signed in the presence of Galloway. Hence, Dunstan considered a visit of the Political Agent as unnecessary.⁴⁹

Although Muhammad and his nephews assumed their previous roles and duties, normal peace did not return to the sheikhdom. Dunstan foresaw another conflict due to take place in June, when Sultan bin Salim received the revenues from the oil concession that were paid in advance by PDTCL. The nephews demanded their share from that money as members of the family which was responsible for granting the concession and the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah found himself confronted with a situation whereby either he consented to their demands or risked being attacked by them.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, Political Officer, Trucial Coast, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 9 May 1947.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

Indeed, the conflict was rekindled, which culminated in the overthrow of sheikh Sultan bin Salim by Saqr, the third son of his brother Muhammad, who seized the fort of Ras al-Khaimah in his absence and declared himself ruler in place of his uncle.⁵¹

The British were not at all unhappy with this development, as the complicated situation had been solved for them without their personal involvement. But before sheikh Saqr was formally acknowledged as ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, as was customary, he was asked to sign all the agreements which had previously been concluded with his predecessors and the rulers of the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, and only after he had agreed to do so, was he declared ruler.⁵² Because he had been openly against Great Britain, the British Government had agreed to replace sheikh Sultan, who protested strongly at what had happened and tried to reassume authority. The British authorities were consulted again at the headquarters of the British Political Agency at Sharjah, when the deposed sheikh met Galloway, who tried to convince him to settle in Bahrain for a short time, to allow his nephew, the new ruler, a peaceful period of transition. However, sheikh Sultan bin Salim refused to stay in Bahrain, stating that he needed time to put his private affairs in order. Shortly afterwards he escaped from the Political Agency at Sharjah. The force guarding the Agency could not catch him. After hiding in a house for approximately twenty hours, with the help of the ruler of Sharjah he left for the desert.⁵³

⁵¹ Foreign Office Confidential, 1948; IOR: R/15/1/731.

⁵² Political Agent, Bahrain to sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad, 11 May 1948, FO 371/68352.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 28 July 1948.

He settled at Wadi al-Qur, which belonged to the Emirate of Sharjah. As the wadi was fortified all around and Sultan bin Salim was accompanied by thirty of his guards, it became clear to Kadmari, the Native Agent, that the case had become more complicated.⁵⁴

Although Hay had realized that Sultan bin Salim was temperamental, he had not somehow expected him to escape. The series of incidents in Ras al-Khaimah had indeed filled Hay with frustration. He considered what punishment could be meted out to Sultan bin Salim. The situation became even more complicated as Saqr, the new ruler of Sharjah, refused to arrest Sultan bin Salim in Sharjah, thereby darkening his character by failing to co-operate. Kadmari also felt helpless and so asked Pelly to discuss with Hay some appropriate punishment for Saqr for his connivance with Sultan bin Salim.⁵⁵

Pelly arranged a meeting with sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, the ruler of Sharjah, and his brother, Muhammad bin Saqr, together with the son of the ruler of Dubai, Rashid bin Sa'id, to communicate to them the disapproval of the British Government at their lack of co-operation. When they denied helping Sultan bin Salim and expressed a readiness to comply with the Political Resident's wishes, Pelly requested them to arrest Sultan bin Salim and hand him over to Kadmari in Sharjah. Even so, Pelly was

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 3 August 1948.

not sure that Sultan bin Saqr would comply. In order to put pressure upon him, he suggested to Hay that the following measures be taken:

- (a) Stoppage of grant of travel facilities for his subjects.
- (b) Stoppage of the calls of B.I. steamers at Sharjah.
- (c) A partial stoppage of quotas of food and cloth.⁵⁶

Pelly felt that as long as the British authorities continued to exert pressure, Sultan bin Saqr might help them to find Sultan bin Salim and arrest him. However, it was not clear whether he was still in hiding at Wadi al-Qur or whether he had gone to Muscat. Stobart, the Political Agent in Muscat, was requested to arrest Sultan bin Salim if he was found there.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Hay communicated to Pelly his displeasure with the sheikh of Sharjah for not co-operating with the British authorities in the Gulf in the matter relating to Sultan bin Salim. As he said, they could not punish the ruler of Sharjah, but they could stop collaborating with him. This would be in accordance with terms (a) and (c) in the measures outlined above. Term (b) was concerned with the B.I. steamers and proposed a measure which could be brought into play at the appropriate time. In fact, Hay was against implementing this measure unless Sultan bin Saqr showed signs of resistance and stubbornness in the conflict. In addition, Hay thought that the British Government should retain their B.I. steamers and, if negotiations about the

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 12 August 1948.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

Sharjah Aviation Agreement proved to be a hard nut to crack, (b) could then be implemented.⁵⁸

Hay added that the British Foreign Office had requested that the normal mail ships should visit Sharjah as a gesture of goodwill to its ruler and to conclude the first Civil Aviation Agreement with the Government of Britain.⁵⁹

At this point, Pelly suggested stopping the import of sugar and textiles to Sharjah, as per (c), and later wheat could also be added to the embargo. Such measures would have a severe impact on Sharjah.⁶⁰ The Political Resident agreed to this suggestion.⁶¹

These measures were taken to guarantee that British terms for handling affairs in the Emirates were followed. The British Government claimed that it wanted peace and security in the Emirates. Nevertheless, its attitude was regulated by its interests there. It did not allow the ruler of Sharjah to act, unless it was in its own interests.

⁵⁸ An agreement between the British Government and the ruler of Sharjah about the establishment of a military air base for British planes was concluded in 1932 for a period of 11 years, which expired in 1943. This agreement was renewed until 1948. However, the ruler of Sharjah sent a letter to the Native Agent in Sharjah before signing the renewal, complaining that the ships had ceased to call at Sharjah. He also mentioned that ships used to come to Sharjah, even *The Virginia* on its first voyage from Karachi on 25 August 1942. Later, ships ceased to call at Sharjah without any apparent reason. Many traders were forced to leave Sharjah. Moreover, the ruler of Sharjah demanded an increase in the monthly rent pertaining to the air station. The British Government agreed to an increase in rent as they wished to renew the agreement and, above all, because World War II had not ended at that time. See also the Agreement between sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, ruler of Sharjah, and the British Government for the establishment of an air station, 22 July 1932, IOR, L/P and S/B 471; and also, Political Agent, Bahrain, to Political Resident, Bushire, 1 August 1943, IOR, L/P and S/12/2042.

⁵⁹ Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agent, Bahrain, 19 August 1948. IOR, L/P and S/12/2042.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 23 August 1948.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agent, Bahrain, 2 September 1948.

This is an example of Britain's policy in the Emirates, a policy based on curbing anyone who disagreed with her.

However, none of the suggested actions was put into practice, because Sultan bin Salim was arrested and banished to Muscat for one year, from April 1949 to April 1950.⁶²

3.4. Affairs in Kalba, 1948-1952

Kalba's move towards independence began in May 1932, when it was part of Sharjah. There was an agreement between the British and sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, the ruler of Sharjah, to establish an airport in Sharjah. Then, the British Aviation Authority raised the possibility of an air station at Kalba with its sheikh, Sa'id bin Hamad. Both the Political Agent Captain T. Hickinbotham in Bahrain, and the Political Resident, Fowle in Bushire, thought that the Aviation Ministry should have waited before making such a request, because the sheikh of Kalba was refusing to permit it on the grounds that, in granting aviation facilities to the British, the airport would be at risk from attack by the sheikh of Fujairah, something for which the British would hold him responsible and which would therefore create problems for him.⁶³ It should be mentioned that the sheikh of Fujairah was not against Britain, but his problems were solely a frontier problem with Kalba.

⁶² *Foreign Office Annual Report from Arabia, 1930-1960*, vol. 3, Archive Editions, London, 1993, p. 391.

⁶³ Air Communication in the Persian Gulf communicated by the Air Ministry, 23 August 1928, IOR: L/P and S/18/B414; see also Agreement between sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, ruler of Sharjah, and the British Government for the establishment of an air station at Sharjah, 22 July 1932, IOR: L/P and S/18/B471.

sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, as Fowle later realized, was unable to persuade the sheikh of Kalba to grant the British landing facilities. Eventually, however, the British Government did manage to conclude an agreement with the sheikh of Kalba without any mediator.⁶⁴ As a result, sheikh Sa'id bin Hamad was recognized as the rightful ruler of Kalba on 8 December 1936 and the British were satisfied that Kalba should be recognized as an independent sovereign state, the seventh state of the Emirates.⁶⁵

However, further difficulties arose in April 1937, when sheikh Sa'id bin Hamad died. Owing to the fact that his son Hamad was only seven, so not old enough to replace his father, the sheikhs of Qawasim in Diba, Ras al-Khaimah, and Sharjah were ready to interfere in Kalba's affairs, but the tribes of Naqbiyin and Zaab were quick to appoint Barut, a former head-slave and general factotum of his father, as patron or chief adviser for young Hamad as sheikh of Kalba. The tribes also informed the Native Agent in Sharjah of their decision. He, in turn, informed the Political Agent in Bahrain of that appointment, as it was necessary to keep the British authorities in the Gulf aware of such significant administrative decisions.⁶⁶

Later, after sheikh Sultan bin Salim, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, had interfered in Kalba's affairs in June 1937, Fowle, the Political Resident, was satisfied

⁶⁴ Agreement between HM Government and the ruler of Kalba, sheikh Sai'd bin Hamad, for providing facilities for aeroplanes at Kalba, 28 August 1936, IOR: L/P and S/18/B476.

⁶⁵ Kalba succession and affairs, 1937, IOR: R/15/1/287.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 4 May 1937; and reply, 4 May 1937.

that keeping Barut as patron was not a good idea, since it invoked the interference of the Qawasim family,⁶⁷ who wanted one of their members to rule Kalba. Thus, Fowle and Weightman, the Political Agent in Bahrain, agreed that the best solution was to appoint sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad, the eldest of the Qawasim and therefore the man with the highest authority among the Qawasim, as a regent in Kalba.⁶⁸ Upon his formal appointment by His Majesty's Government, sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad committed himself to abide by all the treaties that had been concluded between Great Britain and his predecessors.⁶⁹

sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad was the regent until 1948, when strong opposition arose over his reoccupying Khor Fakkan, in Sharjah, by force. As a consequence, Great Britain began to contemplate seriously replacing him by sheikh Humaid bin Muhammad, because he was the brother of the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah.⁷⁰

However, in 1950, the other matter to be considered was the request of Hamad bin Sa'id, then twenty years of age, to be recognized as fit to take over power from the regent. Hamad bin Sa'id had told P.D. Stobart, the Political Officer in Sharjah, that the money paid by PDTCL to the regent was squandered with no benefit to Kalba.⁷¹ Pelly, the Political Agent in Bahrain, suggested to Hay that it was time for sheikh

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bushire to sheikh Sultan bin Salim, 10 August 1937.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, telegram between Political Agent, Bahrain and Political Resident, Bushire, 20-30 August 1937.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, sheikh Khalid bin Ahmad to Political Resident, 24 February 1938.

⁷⁰ Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 16 July 1948, FO 371/68358.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 28 January 1950.

Hamad bin Sa'id to assume power from the regent.⁷² Thus, the idea of appointing sheikh Humaid bin Muhammad, the brother of the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah, was dropped.

Hay discussed this issue with the Foreign Office, proposing the recognition of sheikh Hamad bin Sa'id as ruler of Kalba, subject to his acceptance of the usual conditions, i.e. agreeing to all the treaties that were concluded with his predecessors.⁷³ Thus, after his unconditional acceptance of these terms, sheikh Hamad was officially recognized as ruler of Kalba on 21 May 1950. The Political Officer in Sharjah, A.J. Wilton, wrote to all the rulers of the Trucial Coast informing them of the British Government's decision.⁷⁴

sheikh Hamad, however, enjoyed his rule only for a short period. On 4 July 1951, almost fourteen months after his recognition by Great Britain, he was assassinated by Saqr bin Sultan, the son of sheikh Sultan bin Salim, who had ruled Ras al-Khaimah from 1921 to 1948, and declared himself ruler of Kalba.⁷⁵ This assassination may have been motivated by Saqr bin Sultan's contention that his father had been unfairly dislodged, so that his sons wanted their father to regain authority.⁷⁶

⁷² *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 14 February 1950.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 25 February 1950.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Political Officer, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 21 May 1950.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, sheikh bin Sultan bin Salim, Kalba to Native Agent, Sharjah, 12 July 1951.

⁷⁶ For more information, see Affairs in Ras al-Khaimah, in this Chapter.

The British had long felt that Sultan bin Salim and his nephews were trouble-makers and that was why, on 19 July 1951, Wilton, the British Political Officer in Sharjah, requested the Political Agent in Bahrain to expel them from the Trucial Coast. In addition, Saqr bin Sultan detained sheikh Hamad's sisters in the fort, to prevent himself being bombarded.⁷⁷

Wilton considered action against Saqr bin Sultan bin Salim to be a priority and suggested boycotting him and stopping financial supplies, namely oil concessions previously paid to the ruler of Kalba. He further contemplated the possibility of an alternative ruler in case Saqr could be deposed.⁷⁸ He proposed to Hay that a manned vessel should be stationed at Kalba in order to expedite Saqr's removal from there, although he was wary of using physical force to achieve that end.⁷⁹ This was merely a measure which he hoped would make Saqr bin Sultan feel threatened. Eventually, Hay informed Wilton that he had discussed with Pelly the issue of expelling Saqr from Kalba by force and then adding Kalba to Sharjah.⁸⁰

Hay took up the case with Antony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, on 12 March 1952, suggesting the following proposals:

(a) We could leave Saqr where he is and eventually recognize him as ruler. This course would almost have certainly been followed twenty five years ago when it was our policy not to interfere on land on the Trucial Coast and to accept any *de facto* situation that arose. The present ruler of Abu Dhabi was for instance promptly

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Officer, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 19 July 1951.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 22 July 1951.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Political Officer, Sharjah to Political Resident, Bahrain, 20 October 1951.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 24 January 1952.

recognized as such, although he was placed in power by a relative who committed three murders to achieve his object. It is true, however, that Shakhbut was not himself the murderer, like Saqr. I do not think that we can follow this policy in these more enlightened days especially now that we have established ourselves at Sharjah and that we are beginning to interfere more and more to maintain law and order on the Trucial Coast. This policy would also be distasteful to the other Trucial Coast rulers as their relations would be encouraged by it to follow Saqr's example.

(b) Another course is to announce that with the extinction of the Kalba branch of the Qawasim family we regard Kalba as having reverted to Sharjah. Kalba was regarded as part of Sharjah until 1936 although it is true that Sharjah was able to exercise very little or any control over it. Now that the Kalba branch has disappeared it is reasonable to argue that Kalba has automatically reverted to Sharjah. Ras al-Khaimah has similarly been independent of Sharjah and at times subject to it. Sheikh Saqr of Sharjah is, in my opinion, the most enlightened and most promising member of the Qawasim family. He is also the one we can most easily influence owing to our being constantly in touch with him. This is the course which both Wilton and I recommend should be followed.⁸¹

The main point of interest here is the way British policy was conducted at that time.

When the British Government decided Kalba was useful, particularly for air facilities in 1936, it realized that it had to be given independence from Sharjah in order to serve British interests. However, by 1952, when the dispute arose over who should rule Kalba, as a consequence of the assassination of Hamd bin Sa'id by Saqr bin Sultan, Hay recommended to Eden that it should be annexed to Sharjah again as it had been before 1936.

Meanwhile, Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan bin Salim had withdrawn from Kalba on 13 May 1952 to Murair in Muscat territory, and Kalba had been taken over by Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah.⁸²

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Antony Eden, Foreign Office, 12 March 1952.

⁸² *Ibid.*, Political Officer, Sharjah to Political Resident, Bahrain, 17 May 1952.

The Foreign Office expressed satisfaction in the expulsion of “the usurper”, i.e. Saqr, from Kalba and the annexation of Kalba by the sheikh of Sharjah.⁸³ Later, the rulers of the Trucial Coast Emirates, in addition to those of the other Gulf states, were informed of this matter.⁸⁴

3.5. Affairs in Fujairah, 1950-1952

As Great Britain had granted independence to Kalba in 1936, Fujairah, still under the control of the Qawasim chiefs, the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, saw that it was time to demand its independence too from the British. Sheikh Muhammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi of Fujairah formally requested from the British Agency in Sharjah the right to be recognized as an independent sheikh, the same as the other sheikhs of the Trucial Coast.⁸⁵

The Political Agent in Bahrain, then A.C. Galloway, saw no reason to accept this request, as Fujairah was of little or no importance for the British, whereas Kalba was granted independence in order to facilitate landing facilities.⁸⁶

However, the sheikh of Fujairah continued to demand his independence, for he had in view oil concessions in his territory to be paid by PDTCL. This, he thought, would make the British more inclined to recognize him.⁸⁷ But Galloway was not

⁸³ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Political Resident, Bahrain, 24 May 1952.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agents, Bahrain and Kuwait, and Her Majesty's Consul-General, Muscat, 24 May 1952.

⁸⁵ Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 10 April 1941, IOR:R/15/2/623.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Native Agent, Sharjah, 14 June 1941.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 26 July 1941.

prepared to consider the case at that time, requesting the Political Resident in "Camp Bahrain", Lt. Col. C. Prior, to put on hold the case of the sheikh of Fujairah.⁸⁸

Moreover, Prior was convinced that the question of Fujairah's independence was premature. In principle, he was against increasing the number of minor independent rulers, although he instructed G.N. Jackson, the Political Officer in Sharjah, to study the case on the spot and report to him later.⁸⁹ The reason for this might well have been that Great Britain was then involved in World War II. Although the sheikh of Fujairah tried to avail himself of Great Britain's involvement in the war, it appeared he was not successful.

On a visit to Lermite, the Manager of PDTCL in Bahrain, the sheikh of Fujairah asked for oil concessions in his territory, but he was told that none were to be granted until after the war.⁹⁰ Galloway reiterated that as far as the recognition of the sheikh of Fujairah was concerned, nothing had been done, but if Prior wanted to consider the case, then instructions would have to be given for that from London.⁹¹

Correspondence between the Political Agent in Bahrain, the Native Agent (later Political Officer) in Sharjah, the sheikh of Fujairah, the Manager of PDTCL, the Political Resident in Bushire, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, "Camp Bahrain", 6 September 1941.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bushire to Political Agent, Bahrain, 28 October 1941.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, "Camp Bahrain", 10 August 1942.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bushire, 4 April, 1946.

London about granting oil concessions to the sheikh of Fujairah and recognizing him as an independent sheikh continued until 6 May 1950.⁹²

In the course of this correspondence, Pelly informed Jackson that it was not the appropriate time to deal either with Fujairah's independence or with granting oil concessions to the sheikh of Fujairah.⁹³

As mentioned earlier, the Political Resident, Lt. Col. C. Prior, had instructed G.N. Jackson to study the situation in Fujairah and report back, which he duly did. After considering Fujairah's relationship to the neighbouring states of Kalba, Muscat, and Oman, Jackson did indeed recommend that Fujairah be recognized as an independent sheikhdom, otherwise the Sultan of Muscat could still claim his authority over it.⁹⁴ The consequence of this was that an intermediary solution was reached, whereby oil concessions had to be given to the sheikh of Fujairah via the Regent of Kalba.⁹⁵ This step was also approved by Hay.⁹⁶ The situation remained as it was until March 1950, when P.D. Stobart, the new Political Officer in the Trucial Coast (1949-1951), informed Pelly and Hay that, although there was some prospect of recognizing Fujairah as an independent state and granting it its own independent oil concessions,

⁹² *Ibid.*, Correspondence among the above-mentioned people about recognizing the sheikh of Fujairah continued from 20 March 1947 to 6 May 1950.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Officer, Sharjah, 20 March 1947.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 8 June 1948.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 17 June 1948.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agent, Bahrain, 24 June 1948.

owing to the British Government's minor interest in Fujairah at that time, it was proposed to shelve the whole question for another year.⁹⁷

In turn, Hay informed the Foreign Office, sending considerable facts about Fujairah and sheikh Muhammad, the sheikh of Fujairah, expressing the view that the sheikh was always friendly with British officials and had a strong influence over local tribesmen. Additionally, as he pointed out, Fujairah amounted to 650 square miles and thus was larger than some of the existing sheikhdoms. Consequently, Hay thought it was not satisfactory that the substantial area of Fujairah was not recognized as a sheikhdom. However, he thought that it was unlikely that the oil companies would show an immediate interest in it, as it was not a promising oil site.⁹⁸ Thus, he was in favour of delaying the question of the independence of Fujairah for as long as possible, as he was against increasing the number of independent tiny sheikhdoms in the area, in accordance with the view of his predecessor, C. Prior.⁹⁹ The sense of inconsistency in the view of Hay about the independence of Fujairah had prompted the Foreign Office to ask Hay to provide a clearer insight about it.

However, the following month, H.A. Hanky, representative of the Foreign Office, asked Hay for more clarification on the status of Fujairah, as their information about the area of Fujairah that it was about 12 square miles, in complete contrast to Hay's information that Fujairah was about 650 square miles and larger than some of

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Officer, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain and Political Resident, Bahrain, 28 March 1950.

⁹⁸ See Chapter 4 of this thesis, Fujairah Oil Concession 1953.

⁹⁹ Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 6 May 1950, IOR:R/15/2/623.

the existing sheikhdoms. If the information of Hay proved to be true, then, as Hanky stated, the recognition of Fujairah as an independent sheikhdom would be fully considered. Furthermore, Hanky requested Hay to further study whether the relations with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Qawasim would suffer if His Majesty's Government recognized Fujairah as an independent sheikhdom.¹⁰⁰

Consequently, the matter was now put into the hands of Stobart, after the discussions between Hay and Hanky. Stobart's brief was to investigate the extent to which it would be possible to recognize Fujairah as an independent sheikhdom. Stobart concluded by identifying two grounds for that recognition. The long-term view was that the sheikh of Sharjah would not be able to claim any possession in the territory of Fujairah, should Fujairah be recognized as a sheikhdom. Moreover, with regard to the location and size of Fujairah, as it had a particular significance for Allied naval forces in time of war, he further thought that in Fujairah there were considerable areas of flat land on which it was possible to construct airfields of unlimited capacity. In the short term, the sheikh of Fujairah was a man of authority and could be depended upon to help Great Britain combat banditry and kidnapping along Fujairah's borders with Oman. Stobart contemplated the disintegration of Kalba, which might lead it to ask for protection from the sheikh of Fujairah. Thus, Fujairah would have a significant role to play as an independent Emirate.¹⁰¹ This information was accordingly conveyed to the Resident, L.A. Pinhey, on behalf of Hay, with regard to

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office, to Political Resident, Bahrain, 20 June 1950.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Political Officer, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 8 July 1950.

the Political Officer's very strong evidence about the recognition of Fujairah. However, Pelly stated that in the case of recognizing Fujairah, he did not foresee that there would be any objection from the Sultan of Muscat.¹⁰²

Hay thought that Stobart and Pelly had made a strong case for the recognition of Fujairah as an independent Emirate. Thus, in August of the same year, the correspondence between Hay and Hanky in the Foreign Office stated that the officials were seriously thinking of signing a treaty with the sheikh of Fujairah.¹⁰³ Eventually, the sheikh of Fujairah was informed that the British representatives in the Gulf region were willing to enter into negotiations with him, assuring him that their recognition of him as head of an independent state would go ahead.¹⁰⁴

The sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah were dismayed on hearing of Great Britain's decision to recognize the sheikh of Fujairah as ruler of his territory, because they considered Fujairah as a part of Sharjah, under the control of the Qawasim chiefs. Both sheikhs put forward these views and protested to the British representatives in the Gulf.¹⁰⁵

However, Hay informed R.F.G. Sarell, the representative of the Foreign Office in the Eastern Department, that as there was no serious objection from the Sultan of

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bahrain, 18 July 1950.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 21 August 1950.

¹⁰⁴ Political Agent, Sharjah to Political Resident, Bahrain, 12 February 1952, FO. 371/82032.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

Muscat and Oman and the sheikh of Sharjah when they were told that the British Government was planning to recognize Fujairah as an independent Emirate, Hay had instructed Wilton to inform the sheikh of Fujairah, Muhammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi, that the British Government was willing to recognize him as ruler, provided that he agreed to observe the agreements signed between Great Britain and the Trucial Coast rulers,¹⁰⁶ which Wilton did on 19 March 1952.¹⁰⁷

Two weeks later, on 2 April 1952, Hay informed Anthony Eden that the ruler of Fujairah was recognized as the eighth Trucial Coast ruler. Finally, at the meeting of the Trucial Council on 21 March 1952, Wilton officially introduced sheikh Muhammad of Fujairah to the other rulers of the Trucial Coast Emirates, informing them of the British Government's decision, in addition to sending letters to all concerned on the above decision.¹⁰⁸

However, the Trucial Coast Emirates existed as eight independent Emirates for only sixty-six days, i.e. the period between the recognition of Fujairah and the annexing of Kalba by Sharjah. It might be worth mentioning that when the British officials recognized Kalba as no longer of great significance yet wanted to recognize Fujairah as an independent Emirate, they thought that Kalba was a village too small to remain an independent Emirate, whereas, when they themselves had made it an

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 20 February 1952.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Sharjah to sheikh Muhammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi, 19 March 1952.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Antony Eden, Foreign Office, 2 April, 1952.

Emirate, it was perhaps to serve their own interests. On the other hand, Fujairah was recognized as an independent Emirate, as the sheikh had wished, only when the British officials were satisfied that it had several advantages for them.

Thus, through her representatives in the Gulf, Great Britain exerted considerable influence over the internal affairs of the Emirates, owing to the policies it followed after World War II, particularly when oil was discovered in the region and the oil companies resumed work. Moreover, by virtue of her policies, Great Britain endeavoured to assuage the internal conflict in the Emirates, so as to ensure that her interests there were protected at all times, even to the extent of creating a new Emirate and annexing one Emirate to another when Britain envisaged it had no further interests in it.

Chapter 4

British policy during oil-drilling agreements and its effect on the Emirates

4.1 Introduction

Since the Arab countries could not have developed their oil resources themselves because of their poverty and lack of technical know-how, the British convinced the rulers of those countries that they could render the necessary services so badly needed there--finance, economic assistance, health, education, etc.--in return for having the privilege of drilling for oil.¹

Thus the Middle East was considered a vital area to the British and their policies world-wide, and any threat of penetration to the British Empire was to be averted at all costs. Most noteworthy here was the clash between Great Britain and Russia.

By maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, England kept both France and Russia from breaking through into the Middle East.²

However, after World War I, with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the defeat of Germany, and the elimination of Russia for a while from the region, Great Britain and France were left as sole foreign occupiers of the area.³ Furthermore, because of the developments in India, British policy considered the Middle East as the lifeline to its remaining Empire, especially as far as its naval force was concerned. All possible

¹ Shwadran, B., *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers*, New York, 1959, p.145.

² Ibid., p.9.

³ Ibid.,p.10.

efforts were made to control the area and prevent the penetration of other great powers to it. Nevertheless, Great Britain reluctantly agreed to allow France to participate in the exploration for oil in part of the region and, particularly, to obtain a share in Iraqi oil.⁴

The first oil-producing country in the Middle East was Iran. In 1913, the British Admiralty decided to convert from coal to oil as fuel for the Royal Navy, and thus it envisaged that Iranian oilfields would have a specific significance for them.⁵

It should be noted that by 1914 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was producing 25,000 tons of oil products a month from its refinery in Abadan.⁶ However, after their victory in the war, the British and the French Governments concluded the San Remo Oil Agreement of 1920, which divided up joint oil rights in the territories under their control. Consequently, the French obtained 25%, APOC received 47.5%, Shell 22.5%, and Gulbenkian 5% from the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). It was noted that the Americans did not receive any share of the TPC, although they were advocating the "Open Door" policy in the Middle East.⁷

Oil enterprises were developed in Iraq by APOC. Drilling for oil on the frontier at Naftkhanah culminated in the production of oil in 1923. This was "the first glimpse

⁴ Ibid., pp. 9,12.

⁵ Lenczowski, G., *Oil and State in the Middle East*, New York, 1960, p.11.

⁶ Longrigg, S.H., *Oil in the Middle East its Discovery and Development*, London, 1968, p.34.

⁷ Heard,G.David, *Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited (ADPC) Handbook*, Abu Dhabi, 1998, p.1.

of potential commercial production in Iraq.” Meanwhile, on the other side of the frontier in Iran, another oil-well, Nafti-Shah, was discovered.⁸ Consequently, the British Admiralty decided to convert oil production in Persia from a private commercial enterprise into a quasi-public venture.⁹

In 1925, in order to cater for the American interests and claims, supported by the “Open Door” policy, TPC decided to apply for a limited number of plots, namely 24 in Iraq, on the basis that the American interest of 25% in TPC would be met, provided that APOC’s 47.5% was compensated by a 10% royalty on all TPC production. This royalty was to become 7.5% in 1927 since, as the concession was enlarged, D’Arcy’s royalty was reduced.¹⁰

In 1927, American companies acquired half of the share (47.5%) of APOC in the TPC. Thus, the share in TPC was reduced to 23.75% for each of the following companies: APOC, the Royal Dutch-Shell Company, *la Compagnie Francaise des Petroles*, and the American group, which was composed of five companies: the Near East Development Corporation, the Gulf Oil Company, the Atlantic Oil Company, the Mexican Oil Company, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Standard Oil of New York, as they were organized in February 1928. The participation and investment of S.C.

⁸ Ibid., pp.98-100.

⁹ Stocking, G. W., *Middle East Oil: a Study in Political and Economic Controversy*, London, 1970, p.12.

¹⁰ Heard, *Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company*, p.2.

Gulbenkian was limited to 5%. In 1928, the Red Line Agreement was signed among the shareholders in TPC, according to which all parties agreed not to acquire any interest in oil concessions within that area other than through TPC. In the same year TPC changed its name to the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).¹¹ Likewise, in 1935, APOC was renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), in line with the change in name of the country from Persia to Iran.¹²

It was stressed that IPC had the right to search for oil in twenty-four plots in Iraq, each constituting eight square miles; the other plots were given to competitors. This agreement was modified in 1931, when the British Government insisted that IPC should be the sole owner of the petroleum concessions in Iraq.¹³

Moreover, the activities of IPC were extended to include building pipelines leading to Tripoli, with another to Haifa in 1932. These were built in order to find outlets for Kirkuk oil to the world markets. The lines were finished in 1934, and, in July of that year, Kirkuk oil reached the Mediterranean coast. In 1936, a refinery for Kirkuk crude oil was erected in Kirkuk. Production was estimated at four million tons a year, though this decreased during World War II.¹⁴

¹¹ Shwadran, *The Middle East*, pp.246-247. See also Heard, *Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company*, p.2. For a clearer view of the Red Line Agreement, see maps at the end of the thesis.

¹² Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, p. 60.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.247.

¹⁴ Heard, *Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company*, p. 3.

In view of what has just been said, it can be seen that between the two World Wars, British policies in Iran and Iraq in relation to oil concessions in Iraq were of great significance. Through APOC, Great Britain controlled 47.5% of oil production in addition to the 10% royalty between 1920 and 1925. In 1927, however, when the British Government could no longer ignore the "Open Door" policy, it invited the USA, France, and Holland to share with it the oil concessions of APOC in the Middle East.¹⁵

It is worth mentioning that APOC had secured oil concessions in the Gulf region, i.e. in Saudi Arabia (1923) and in Qatar (1935). However, APOC lost the Saudi Arabian concession to the Standard Oil California Company (SOCAL) in 1932, and handed over the concession in Qatar to IPC in 1936. However, it still kept a minority interest through its above-mentioned share in TPC. At the same time, IPC proved to be more active after TPC was incorporated into it, eventually securing oil concessions in the majority of states in the Gulf region (the Trucial Coast Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman).¹⁶

The whole emphasis of the policy was to initiate a strong foothold in those countries. For instance, in Iraq, Great Britain at first shared oil concessions with other

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 1-3.

nationals, but eventually dispensed with them and assumed sole ownership of the concessions.

In relation to the Arab countries, there is no evidence to show that between 1918 and 1922 oil companies were interested in securing oil rights in the Arabian Peninsula. This was because political stability there was not yet established. However, in 1923, the American and British Governments commenced surveying in areas such as al-Hasa district in north-eastern Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Bahrain group of islands (particularly al-Manama), Qatar (particularly in Doha), and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast.¹⁷

In August 1923, the APOC obtained oil concessions in Saudi Arabia. However, problems arose with Ibn Saud, who was demanding an annual rental of £2,000. He went on to warn the company that unless arrears of £6,000 in 1928 were paid immediately, he had the right to cancel the concession granted to the company. As the company ignored that warning, when Ibn Saud was approached by SOCAL in 1932, he discovered he had access to a greater source of financial revenues and, as a consequence, he granted them oil concessions.¹⁸

The concessions in Kuwait were acquired in 1934 by APOC and the Gulf Oil Corporation of America. In the case of Bahrain, there was an agreement between

¹⁷ Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, pp.98-99.

¹⁸ Shwadran, *The Middle East*, pp.287-88.

SOCAL and the Texas Corporation in 1936. Qatar, meanwhile, granted concessions to AIOC in 1935, which was incorporated with IPC in 1936. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman also granted concessions to IPC in 1937.¹⁹

From this one can see that both Great Britain and the USA divided the oil concessions in the region amongst themselves. While the latter secured concessions in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, they shared the concessions in Kuwait. However, Great Britain secured the concessions in Muscat and Oman together with those in the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, which will be the subject of the coming discussion.

4.2 The beginnings of Britain's interest in the oil of the Emirates

By the 1920s, Great Britain faced competition from only one competing party left in the Gulf region: American oil companies. These sent representatives to the region to search for oil. Great Britain felt obliged to do something to contain the American companies who were pressing the British officials in the Gulf to permit their representatives to visit some Emirates to secure oil concessions from them. They attempted to persuade the American companies to settle for a small share, while the British themselves, of course, wanted to keep the lion's share. So Great Britain did all in her power to block their path, opting for forging agreements with the region's rulers in

¹⁹ Note on Petroleum Developments in the Arabian Peninsula, May 1938, FO 371/21833.

general and with those of the Trucial Coast Emirates in particular.²⁰ In 1922, in an effort to stop the feverish activities of the American oil companies, Great Britain stipulated in her agreements with the native rulers that, as far as searching for oil was concerned, the region's rulers were not allowed to deal with any other country before consultation with British officials in the Gulf region.²¹

The Political Resident in the Gulf, Lt. Col. Trenchard Craven Fowle, sent instructions to his assistants in the Gulf on this matter. When it became evident that the Americans were using the missions of their doctors in Bahrain to attain their goals, the British officials decided to bar those doctors from visiting the Trucial Coast and to replace them with British ones.²² This revealed that the British officials' desire to win the friendship of the local residents was not really genuine, merely economically and politically motivated.

The British officials sent their first doctors to the Emirates in December 1934, after the American ones had arrived. Assistant Surgeon R. Holmes accompanied the Political Resident on a trip to carry out medical duties. In the following year, a Royal Air

²⁰ Government of India Foreign Department to the Political Resident, Arab Coast Oil Concessions, 9 February 1922, IOR: R/15/1/618.

²¹ Abdallah, M. *Dawlat al Imarat*, p.62.

²² Wahim, T.M., *al-Tanafus al-Baritani al-Amiriki 'ala Naft al-Khalij al-'Arabi wa-mawqif al-'Arab fi al-Khalij min 1928-1939*, Baghdad, 1982, p. 312.

Force doctor came with Holmes on his last visit. These visits continued until the British Government established a permanent clinic in Dubai in June 1936.²³

However, SOCAL, which in 1939 was to become the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO),²⁴ requested permission to enter the Trucial Coast Emirates for the purpose of searching for oil, but was refused by the British officials in the Gulf for fear that it might gain a grip on oil concessions there. This refusal only helped to increase the company's resolve. As a last resort, in 1935, SOCAL made an attempt to obtain access to the rulers of the Emirates via F. Holmes, SOCAL's representative in Saudi Arabia.²⁵

Holmes sent letters to sheikh Sa'id, the Ruler of Dubai, and sheikh Shakhbut, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, but, prompted by the Residency Agent, sheikh Sa'id ignored the letter, whereas sheikh Shakhbut encouraged Holmes to come to Abu Dhabi for negotiations.²⁶ However, his attempt ended in failure because the British officials refused to issue entry visas to Dubai and Abu Dhabi for all non-British citizens. The British Government representatives were well aware that the real objective of the visit

²³ The Persian Gulf Administration Reports 1873 - 1957, vol. IX, 1931-1940, p. 36.

²⁴ Shaddad, I., *Tatawwur al-'alaqah bayna Sharikat al-Naft wa-Duwal al- Khalij*, Doha, 1973, p. 109.

²⁵ Zahan, R., *The Origin of the United Arab Emirates*, p.110.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.110.

was to establish contact with the rulers for the sake of oil, as seemed clearly indicated by SOCAL's business activities in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait.²⁷

In response to SOCAL's persistent endeavours to secure concessions for oil excavation in the Emirates, together with the interest of the Emirates' rulers in extracting oil from their territories, as well as their desire to offer concessions to SOCAL, which had managed to produce oil in commercial quantities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, supported by the British Government, IPC began to intensify its activities in the Gulf. In October 1935, it established a new subsidiary, called Petroleum Concessions Limited (PCL), which was based in Bahrain, with Major Stephen Longrigg appointed as its manager. In September 1936, a branch of PCL, called Petroleum Development Trucial Coast Limited (PDTCL), was founded in the Emirates of the Trucial Coast. As Longrigg once admitted, the goal of these two companies was to defend British interests against the activities of the American companies in the Gulf region.²⁸

4.3 Oil Concession Agreements in the Emirates

In November 1935, PCL managed to secure exploration rights for two years in Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Ajman, and Dubai. Two months later, in January 1936, the

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 109-110.

²⁸ Heard, *Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company*, p.4. See also Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East*, pp.115-116.

sheikh of Abu Dhabi concluded a similar agreement with PCL but for three years. It should be mentioned that Umm al-Qaiwain was not included among the Emirates in which PCL, as the mother company, had secured concessions to PDTCL, which considered the area as too small for business.²⁹

Immediately, PCL secured concessions in the Trucial Coast Emirates and a geological expedition started to search for oil.³⁰ This expedition was led by Abdullah Williamson, through whom in future Great Britain would be able to secure further concessions for oil exploration rights in the Gulf.³¹

The India Government forced British companies wishing to secure oil concessions in the Trucial Coast Emirates to meet a number of conditions. Therefore, all staff of PCL had to be British subjects, the group conducting the geological survey had to comply with the instructions of the Political Native Agent in the Emirates, the approval of the British Government had to be obtained before entering into any oil negotiations with the sheikhs, and any concession obtained by the company was subject to the approval of the British Government.³²

²⁹ Longrigg, S., *Oil in the Middle East*, pp. 231-232; see also Zahlan, *The Origins*, p. 112.

³⁰ *The Persian Gulf Administration Reports 1873-1957*, vol. IX, 1931-1940, p. 49.

³¹ Petroleum Concessions, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 15 January 1936, IOR: R/15/1/675.

³² Zahlan, R., *The Origins*, p. 112.

The situation became more difficult for the British Government when the concession period came to an end, for the rulers of the Emirates were actually not too keen to have British oil companies in their territories. When the previous agreements concluded between PCL and the rulers of the Emirates were about to expire, the company offered to negotiate with the rulers in order to renew its rights in the Emirates and at the same time to ask for longer periods of time for oil exploration rights.

On 31 March 1937, the Native Agent of the Residency in Sharjah, Khan Sahib Sayyid 'Abd al-Razzaq, revealed that a drive, spearheaded by the sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, was in progress to convince the sheikh of Dubai not to sign another oil concession agreement with PCL once the exploration right had expired. Their underlying intention was to secure an agreement with SOCAL, which had made a better offer. The sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah stressed the need for unity and pledges between the rulers never to conclude any agreements without first consulting each other to safeguard their common interests. He managed to persuade the sheikh of Dubai not to sign the agreement, stating that the sheikh of Sharjah had promised to motivate and urge his cousin, the sheikh of Ajman, to adhere to this unity as well.³³

Consequently, the sheikh of Dubai refused to sign the agreement when asked to do so. This prompted T.C. Fowle, the Political Resident, to request Lt. Col. G. Loch, the

³³ Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 31 March 1937, IOR: R/15/1/675.

Political Agent in Bahrain, to visit the sheikh in an attempt to persuade him to change his mind. Meanwhile, the Political Agent in Bahrain wrote to the Native Agent in Sharjah, 'Abd al-Razzaq, requesting him to remind the sheikh of Dubai of his promise to sign the agreement made at the last meeting in April 1937.³⁴

'Abd al-Razzaq duly met the Ruler of Dubai on 18 May 1937 and reminded him of his promise, warning him also against breaching it. The British officials in the Gulf were aware that unless the sheikh of Dubai, Sa'id bin Maktum al-Hashar, concluded the agreement with them, there was a good chance that SOCAL would replace PCL.³⁵ After consulting with the members of his family, the sheikh expressed willingness to sign the agreement. He also promised the Agent to confirm a signing date and to inform the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah that he would keep his promise to the British officials.³⁶

The Political Resident in Bushire and the Political Agent in Bahrain thus managed to convince the rulers of the region to make agreements with PCL on an individual basis. In an agreement concluded on 22 May 1937, the Ruler of Dubai eventually granted a concession to PCL whereby the company was granted the right to search for oil in Dubai for a period of seventy-five years in return for 60,000 rupees (£4,500—then 1 Indian rupee = 7.5 pence) payable upon signing and 200,000 rupees

³⁴ Ibid., Political Resident, Bushire to Native Agent, Sharjah, 16 May 1937.

³⁵ Ibid., Political Resident, Bushire to Political Agent, Bahrain, 18 May 1937.

³⁶ Ibid., Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 18 May 1937.

(£15,000) as a further payment to be made within 60 days after the extraction of oil in commercial quantities. Some 30,000 rupees (£2,250) were to be paid as an annual rent, in addition to no less than 90,000 rupees (£6,750) to be paid annually upon finding oil. In cases where oil was produced in quantities less than commercial, the company had to pay an extra 50,000 rupees (£3,750) annually, or 3 rupees (22.5pence) per English ton (2,240 lbs.).³⁷

This robust policy on the part of the British officials in the Gulf made it quite clear to the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast Emirates that the British Government was going to insist on opposing any American concession in the region. The rulers had also realized that the expiry of the two-year exploration right would not help them to gain access to the American companies. Given these considerations, the rulers had to go along gradually with PCL, which enjoyed full freedom under the protection and support of the British Government. It is clear that the British officials approved of the concessions granted to PCL, but “[they] were not prepared to consider permitting the sheikhs to negotiate with any other company.”³⁸

In this context, it is interesting to note the policy Great Britain followed concerning oil concessions with the sheikhdoms. The British Government ensured that it remained in control of the whole subject of oil concessions in the Trucial Coast

³⁷ Dubai Oil Concession, 22 May 1937, IOR: L/P+ S/ 18/ B 458. See Appendix no.7.

³⁸ M.J.Clauson, India Office, to C.Warner, Foreign Office, 4 August, 1937, IOR: R/15/1/678.

Emirates by allowing the company to conclude a commercial agreement with the sheikh of an Emirate, while at the same time tying the hands of that company by signing a political agreement with him.³⁹

The sheikh of Sharjah, Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, had shown some reservation in concluding an agreement with PCL on the grounds that it would have politically bound him. He asked for an alteration of the term "political" in the agreement before he could accept it. Although it was to be contracted between the British Government and PCL, it was directly related to the oil concession in Sharjah. However, the term "political" was interpreted by him as meaning "controlled". The representative of PCL, B.H. Lermite, informed him in no uncertain terms that the sheikhs of Qatar, Kuwait, and Dubai had accepted the political agreement. Above all, sheikh Sultan was told that the company was not going to deal with him unless he accepted the political agreement,⁴⁰ as it had to be concluded between the British Government and PCL, whereas the sheikh had to conclude the commercial agreement with the company only.

The controversy between the sheikh of Sharjah and Lermite was, on the one hand, because the sheikh thought that a "political" agreement would interfere with his

³⁹ For more information about the items of both agreements, see Appendices No.6 and 7.

⁴⁰ Report on oil activities on the Trucial Coast, 22 August 1937. IOR: R/15/1/678. See also a letter from Captain T. Hickinbotham, Political Agent, Bahrain to Lt. Col. T.C. Fowle, Political Resident, Bushire, 10 September 1937.

sovereignty over Sharjah and, on the other, because Lermite felt that unless the agreement was a "political" one, the British Government would not have been able to interfere if the need arose to protect its interests and those of the company-- particularly at a time when competition for securing oil concessions among companies of different nationalities was very high.⁴¹

After lengthy negotiations between the sheikh and Lermite, the former expressed his approval of the "Political Agreement" as it stood. So the way was free for the commercial agreement and both were finally concluded and signed on 17 September 1937. The terms of the agreement were the same as those of the one concluded with the sheikh of Dubai.⁴² However, as oil was not yet found in commercial quantities, the agreement had no importance in economic terms except that it secured for the British any future exploration rights. The British did not stop here. In March 1938, negotiations between sheikh Sultan bin Salim, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, and PCL started. There was an initial refusal, as in the previous case, of the terms of the Political Agreement on the part of the sheikh, who asked for more concessions to be made to him, but PCL stated that he had to agree to the same terms that had already been accepted by the sheikhs of Dubai and Sharjah. But it should be mentioned in this context that the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah, who tried to travel to Kuwait and Iraq to

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., Commercial Agreement between the ruler of Sharjah and PCL, 17 September 1937. See e.g. Appendix No. 6 and 7: Dubai Political and Commercial Agreement.

procure a better offer than the one made by PCL, was not allowed to travel, basically because his travel document had been withdrawn as he was deemed to have been discourteous to a senior naval officer.⁴³

Both the India Office and the Political Resident were determined not to allow the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah to go to Iraq to meet there with Abdullah Williamson, the representative of SOCAL, who himself was prevented by the British from coming to the Trucial Coast.⁴⁴

Eventually, the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah agreed to issue an exploration permit on 7 December 1938, granting PCL a two-and-a-half-years exploration concession with a possibility of extending it into a further year.⁴⁵ So, in 1941, when World War II had started, preventing any kind of activities by PCL in Ras al-Khaimah, the company asked for one year's extension. Until the end of World War II, no further developments occurred. A long-term agreement could only be negotiated after the war had ended and normal conditions had returned to the Trucial Coast Emirates.⁴⁶ Consequently, a Commercial Agreement was concluded between the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah and PCL

⁴³ Lermite to Packer, General Manager, PCL, 19 April 1938, IOR: R/1/15/702 & R/15/2/2013. See also a letter from Political Resident, Bushire to Secretary of State for India, London, 11 April 1938.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Political Resident Bushire to the Secretary of State for India, London, 29 October 1937.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Exploration Permit granted by the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah to PCL, Bushire, 7 December 1938.

⁴⁶ Ibid., E.V. Packer to Major R.G. Alban, Political Agent, in Bahrain, and to sheikh Sultan bin Salim, ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, 4 March 1941.

on 21 June 1945 in exactly the same terms that the sheikhs of Dubai and Sharjah had agreed to in 1937.⁴⁷

The only sheikhdom in which PCL showed no interest was Kalba. However, the death of the ruler of Kalba, Sa'id bin Hamad, and the accession of Khalid bin Ahmad as regent changed the situation.⁴⁸ The qualities and personality of the regent prompted PCL to approach him and secure an oil concession in Kalba.⁴⁹

The oil exploration concession with Khalid bin Ahmed was signed on 20 December 1938, for a period of seventy-five years. The sheikh also promised the company to help it in its relations with other Qawasim rulers.⁵⁰

Compared with the standards set in the case of Dubai's Oil Concession Agreement and applied to the agreements for oil concessions in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, the oil concession concluded with the Ruler of Kalba was less comprehensive. It had only 24 articles, as opposed to 27 articles in Dubai's oil concession agreement. The agreement with the Ruler of Kalba was also less generous, compared to the agreements with other sheikhs, both in financial terms and with regard to any assistance which the company might give to the sheikh. So, Article 5 in

⁴⁷ Ibid., Ras al-Khaimah Oil Concession Agreement, 21 June 1945.

⁴⁸ For more information, see Chapter 3, on the affairs of Kalba.

⁴⁹ Longrigg, PCL, London to R.T Peel, India Office, 25 July 1938, IOR: R/15/2/2014.

⁵⁰ Ibid., agreement between the Regent of Kalba and PCL, 20 December 1938.

the Dubai agreement stated that, until the discovery of oil, the Ruler was granted 30,000 rupees (£2,250), while in the case of Kalba this amount was only 24,000 rupees (£1,800). Further, according to Article 11 in the Dubai agreement, the company's harbours could be used by its Ruler, while in the case of Kalba no such arrangement was mentioned.

Articles 20 and 21 were quite interesting as they clearly laid down that only the concessionaire had the right to exploit crude petroleum, asphalt, natural gas, and ozokerite, while other minerals, such as gold or silver, which might be discovered by the company, should not be worked by it. Other companies which might obtain concessions for these substances should be required to abstain from impeding or interfering with the property and operations of the petroleum company. PCL was allowed to transfer its rights to another British company called PDTCL or to any other company registered within the British Empire. PDTCL was of course a subsidiary of PCL. It may be observed that the mother company did not stop to sign agreements with other sheikhs and, in addition, that the daughter company had been founded to deal with some of the Trucial States, for example Abu Dhabi in 1939 and Fujairah in 1953.⁵¹

⁵¹ There are also the agreements between PCL and (1) the sheikh of Umm al-Qaiwain in 1945, (2) Ras al-Khaimah in 1945, and (3) Ajman in 1951. It is not absolutely clear when the mother and when the daughter companies became active in the Trucial Coast Emirates. For more information, see PCL agreement for exploration permit with the sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah, PRO/FO 371/23182, 8 December 1938, see also Agreement between PDTCL and the sheikh of Abu Dhabi attached to the letter sent to J.P. Gibson, India Office, PRO/FO 371/23182, 23 January 1939; D. Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p.21; Heard-Bey, F., *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 295-297, 300-301.

Article 25 of the Dubai Agreement stated that the company had to pay the outstanding money into the sheikh's account at the Eastern Bank of Bahrain, a British bank which had established a branch in 1920 in Bahrain.⁵² Additionally, Article 27 of Dubai's agreement stated that the English text should prevail. Moreover, the signature of the Dubai agreement was witnessed by the Political Agent in Bahrain, T. Hickinbotham, while in the case of Kalba the agreement was signed between a representative of PCL and the sheikh.

Thus, the absence of several articles of importance in Kalba's agreement may have expressed the way PCL viewed Kalba, i.e. the agreement was not completely influenced by Kalba's oil. This was clearly stated in the relevant correspondence.⁵³ The India Office instructed Longrigg to negotiate with the Regent of Kalba about oil concessions there, not so much for the sake of oil as for securing his friendship as he was known to have control over the Shumaliyah. The India Office might also have been thinking of the strategic location of Kalba, where it wanted to establish an air base.⁵⁴

⁵² Jones, G., *Banking and Oil, The History of the British Bank of the Middle East*, 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.8.

⁵³ Longrigg, PCL, London to R.T. Peel, India Office, 25 July 1938. See also a letter from India Office to PCL, 28 September 1938, IOR R/15/1/679.

⁵⁴ For more information, see Chapter 3, "Affairs in Kalba" in this thesis.

After PCL and PDTCL had secured oil concessions in four of the Trucial Coast Emirates (Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Kalba), PDTCL approached sheikh Shakhbut, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, to secure an oil concession there. PDTCL was very keen on this venture, but sheikh Shakhbut adopted a mixed approach in dealing with PDTCL. First, he made it known to the company that he was interested in dealing with SOCAL; second, if he dealt with PDTCL, then he wanted to be treated in the same way as Ibn Saud by the former, so he did not sign immediately.⁵⁵

Obviously such an attitude on the part of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi was not well received by the British Government and its representatives in the Gulf. No sooner had his aspirations become known than the British officials in the Gulf accused him of being involved in the slave trade and, as a consequence of that, his travel documents were detained. This had been Fowle's suggestion to the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, and the India Office, who all agreed, even at a time when evidence against Shakhbut was "lacking precision," as J.P. Gibson, Principal of the Political Department in the India Office, conceded.⁵⁶ The British authorities were clearly annoyed about the obstinate behaviour of the sheikh.

⁵⁵ H. Weightman (Deputy Political Resident, Bushire) to R. T. Peel, India Office, 3 September 1938, IOR: R/15/1/679. See also Zahlan, *The Origins*, pp.120-123.

⁵⁶ Zahlan, *The Origins*, pp.122-123.

Continuous negotiations between Longrigg (PDTCL's Representative) and Shakhbut had initially proved futile. However, Longrigg was not prepared to give up. He threatened the sheikh that unless he accepted the Agreement with PDTCL, while Longrigg was there, the sheikh would never have a second chance to sign the Agreement.⁵⁷

The India Office was not prepared to allow the sheikh to become involved in negotiations with any non-British company and gave its full support to PDTCL. The family of Shakhbut intervened in order to reach a conciliation between him and PDTCL. It seems that Longrigg had put pressure on the family to make the sheikh reach an agreement with PDTCL with the promise of a reward⁵⁸ for the sheikh of 475,000 rupees (£3,462) as an annual rental. On 11 January 1939, the Concession Agreement between PDTCL and sheikh Shakhbut was finally signed.⁵⁹

Fowle, the Political Resident in Bushire, was delighted about the outcome and informed the India Office that the policy of "take it or leave it", adopted by Longrigg in making the sheikh accept and sign the Agreement, had been successful. Consequently, Fowle commented, it would not be a wise decision to consider punishment of Shakhbut for his implication in the slave trade.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ PCL, London to Political Resident, Bushire, 13 January 1939, FO 371/23182.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ The Abu Dhabi Commercial Agreement signed, 11 January 1939, IOR: R/15/1/680.

⁶⁰ Ibid., Political Resident, Bushire to the Government of India, 26 January 1939.

This agreement with Abu Dhabi was for a period of seventy-five years. The company had been very keen to get access to Abu Dhabi because the area had already been surveyed and the preliminary indications of the existence of cracks in the land showed beyond doubt the existence of oil there. Thus, the terms of the agreement were different from those of agreement concluded with the other Emirates. The sheikh could also be quite satisfied with his negotiation tactics, besides the inducement of 475,000 rupees.

PDTCL committed itself to paying the sheikh a sum of 300,000 rupees (£22,500) upon the signing of the agreement, and an extra 100,000 rupees (£7,500) annually until oil was discovered in commercial quantities, whereupon he would receive a lump sum of 200,000 rupees (£15,000). After oil was discovered, the company would replace the previous 100,000 rupees (£7,500) with a royalty of 3 rupees (22.5 pence) per ton of oil extracted; and, in the first two years of the production of oil in commercial quantities, if the amount paid at the end of the year was less than 250,000 rupees (£18,750), the royalty would be increased to 250,000 rupees in that year. Further, in the years that followed the two years' interim after the production of oil in commercial quantities, the company committed itself to paying 500,000 rupees (£37,500) annually.

Regarding the last two Emirates (Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain), PCL showed no interest in them at that time. It is clear from a letter from Longrigg to H. Weightman, the Political Agent in Bahrain, that PCL was not trying to secure oil concessions in those two Emirates. Longrigg stated:

I do not propose to take any action with regard to the tiny principalities of Ajman and Umm Al Qaiwain. They have an independent personal position, but no territory of any possible interest to the Company; while it is certain they would refuse to accept less than was paid to the rulers of Sharjah or Dubai. They had therefore better be left alone.⁶¹

Nevertheless, in March 1939, PCL did sign an exploration permit for a period of five years with the Ruler of Ajman.⁶² That permit allowed an extension of one more year. Thus, by 1939, PCL and PDTCL had managed to secure agreements with six Emirates that seemed very likely to possess oil, although before that time oil had not been discovered in the Emirates. It seemed obvious among British officials that the sheikhs of the Emirates were, in most cases, pushed to conclude the concession agreements.

4.4 Oil Agreements with the Emirates after World War II

Throughout World War II, there was no active oil exploration, but towards the end of the war, on 20 March 1945, PCL resumed its activities and concluded a

⁶¹ Ibid., S. Longrigg, PCL, to H. Weightman, Political Agent in Bahrain, 13 January 1939.

⁶² Ajman Exploration Permit, 23 March 1939, IOR: R/15/1/680.

commercial agreement with Umm al-Qaiwain for seventy-five years, followed by a political agreement between the British Government and PCL on 29 January 1946, in connection with that oil concession.⁶³ This agreement was the same as the agreement signed between PCL and Dubai in 1937.

As usual, the British Government insisted on concluding political agreements with PCL and PDTCL. An exception was the agreement on the Abu Dhabi seabed, which was signed between the British Government and the Superior Oil California Corporation (SOC).⁶⁴

It remains to be said that oil in the period of 1947-1955 was very important to the British Government, as it was the period that coincided with the aftermath of the war and its consequences, such as heavy debts and restructuring of its economy. As a result of that, the British Government was adamant to protect its interests in the oil of the region, due to its urgent need to it. Furthermore, the future of the British oil interests in Iran looked rather uncertain in the light of the nationalization policy of Iranian governments after 1945.

⁶³ Umm al-Qaiwain Concession Agreement, 20 March 1945 and 29 January 1946, IOR: R/15/1/701 and R/15/2/2012.

⁶⁴ For the financial aspects of this Agreement, see the comparison with the other Emirates which concluded oil concession agreements with PCL, at the end of this chapter.

We will review British policy towards these oil concession agreements with Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman, and Fujairah through a consideration of the following concessions after World War II.

4.5 The Abu Dhabi Oil Concession, 1950

During World War II, the work of PDTCL came to a halt but was immediately taken up again in 1945. In the following years, however, it was still not successful in finding oil. By 1949, it was drilling a well at Ras Sadr, which reached a depth of 13,000 feet, "the deepest hole to have been drilled in the Middle East at that time,"⁶⁵ but all the company's endeavours were in vain. Therefore, at the end of 1949, it abandoned the well and started drilling at Jabal Ali in Dubai and other places in the Emirates.⁶⁶

The Ruler of Abu Dhabi, sheikh Shakhbut, thought it was high time to invite another company. He turned to SOC to take over the responsibility and resume oil-drilling in the Abu Dhabi seabed. He assumed that he was acting legitimately since PDTCL had abandoned its commitment to resume drilling on his territory and had gone to drill elsewhere. However, the British company confronted the Ruler and

⁶⁵ *Persian Gulf, Administration Reports 1873-1957, vol. XI 1948-1957*, Archive Editions, London, 1989, p. 225.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

accused him of breaching the Agreement signed between them. As the conflict escalated, the need for arbitrators to mediate between the Ruler and PDTCL became an urgent matter.

In the arbitration in Paris, attended by Shakhbut himself and the representative of PDTCL, the company claimed that the concession made to SOC on 2 December 1950 to drill in the seabed of Abu Dhabi was invalid, as PDTCL had the rights over all the area of Abu Dhabi. The sheikh contested the claim of the company that concessions included rights in the seabed. Moreover, he thought that since PDTCL had abandoned drilling in Abu Dhabi for exploration elsewhere, he had the right to ask SOC to take over operations in the hope that oil would finally be discovered there.⁶⁷

On 22 November 1951, the arbitration reached a decision in favour of the sheikh. SOC was now permitted to carry out survey operations on the Abu Dhabi seabed,⁶⁸ but at the same time the Oil Concession Agreement between the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and PDTCL was reinstated and the company resumed work in the territory of Abu Dhabi, excluding the seabed.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ W.P. Cranston, Foreign Office, to J.E.Jackson, British Embassy, Paris, 17 August 1951, FO 371/91333.

⁶⁸ *Foreign Office Annual Reports from Arabia, 1930-1960*, vol. 3, Archive Editions, London, 1994, pp. 413,449.

It should be mentioned that the Abu Dhabi Oil Concession with the US company was also based on two agreements, both supervised by the British Government. The first of these was again a Political Agreement, signed on 15 April 1950, between His Majesty's Government, as the first party, and SOC, acting as an agent for a company to be formed by it, as the second party.⁷⁰ The second agreement was a Commercial Agreement signed between the sheikh of Abu Dhabi and SOC on 2 December 1950. However, this agreement placed more responsibilities on SOC than did those concluded with PDTCL.⁷¹

It covered the whole of the seabed and the area submerged beneath the Gulf waters adjacent to and bordering the coastal waters of Abu Dhabi. The duration and validity of the agreement was for sixty-five years. The agreement also protected the company even in the case of it failing to fulfil the conditions, so that the Ruler had no right to terminate the activities of the company when there was a breach in the agreement if the cause was a *force majeure* such as war, rebellion, riot, civil disturbance, fire, earthquake, or any other fatal incident that could not be handled or overcome by the officials of Abu Dhabi.⁷²

⁶⁹ V.G.A. Baker, PCL, London, to C.M. Rose, FO, 23 November 1951, FO 371/91332.

⁷⁰ Political Agreement between Great Britain and SOC regarding the oil concession agreement with the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 15 April 1950, FO 371/82084.

⁷¹ Concession Agreement between the ruler of Abu-Dhabi and SOC, 2 December 1950, FO 1016/83.

⁷² Ibid.

However, most of the articles in the Political Agreement were not in favour of SOC, so that one may wonder why the company approved of the terms at all. Two reasons seem to have been possible:

a) The agreement was in the company's favour, owing to the long duration of the concession, i.e. sixty-five years, the Emirate's huge area of seabed, the potentially lucrative business there, and what the company considered paying to the Ruler, whether for exploration for crude oil or after its commercial extraction.⁷³

b) The company accepted all the British Government's conditions because it was in its favour to do so and competition was severe between several companies, especially in the Gulf, particularly after explorations for oil in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain had yielded promising results.

Finally, it should be mentioned that there were some points of difference between the two political agreements concerning Abu Dhabi oil concessions. The first was signed between the British Government and PDTCL in 1940 and the second

⁷³ Compare the annual sum that PDTCL paid the sheikh (100,000 rupees) and the annual sum that SOC paid the sheikh (1,000,000 rupees). Moreover, the sum of money PDTCL paid the sheikh upon signing the Agreement was 300,000 rupees, compared with 1,000,000 rupees. Also, upon producing oil in commercial quantities, PDTCL paid the sheikh 3 rupees per ton of oil extracted and, if the amount paid annually was less than the 250,000 rupees the company had to pay, the royalty would be increased to 250,000 rupees, compared to the lump sum as a royalty of one fifth of the oil sold. However, although SOC paid more than PDTCL, yet the agreement was also in favour of the former. For more information, see Articles 4,5,8 in the Agreement between the sheikh of Abu Dhabi and SOC in the Appendix, No.10.

between the British Government and SOC in 1950. The 1940 agreement included 11 articles, whereas the 1950 one had 16 articles.

Although there were similarities between the two, there were two articles in the agreement between the British Government and PDTCL that were not mentioned in the one between the British Government and SOC (Articles 9 and 11). Similarly, in the agreement between the British Government and SOC, there were seven articles that were not mentioned in the first one (Articles 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 16).⁷⁴

One of the two articles of the agreement between the British Government and PDTCL concerned the opening of a bank for the company in Abu Dhabi. The British Government stipulated that the company should consult and gain acceptance from it, whether the company informed the sheikh or not. The second article related to the possibility that if the sheikh of Abu Dhabi tried to interfere in the activities and movement of the company's personnel, the company had to refer to the British Government representatives in the Gulf for mediation between the sheikh and the company.

In the second agreement, these seven articles were mainly incorporated into the agreement to emphasize British domain and interests in Abu Dhabi. Adding them to the agreement, the British Government restrained the activities of the company and

also obliged it to seek the permission of the British Government with regard to any activities in which it might want to engage. Such assurances on the part of the British Government were set to reflect British control over the affairs of Abu Dhabi.

4.6 The Sharjah Oil Concession, 1951

On 17 September 1937, an Oil Concession Agreement was signed between the sheikh of Sharjah, Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, and PCL, supervised by the British Government. The duration of the concession was seventy-five years. The Agreement stipulated that within the first nine years, commencing on the date it was signed, the company should start drilling and extracting oil; if that did not take place, the Agreement would be annulled.⁷⁵

However, the outbreak of World War II meant that the company could not continue its geological work; thus it was not able to drill for oil.⁷⁶ Until 1946, the company still had not complied with its obligations towards Sharjah. On 12 February 1946, E.V. Packer, the branch manager of PCL, asked the Political Agent in Bahrain,

⁷⁴ See Appendices, No. 8 and 9.

⁷⁵ Sharjah Oil Concession and Connected Documents, 17 September 1937-26 February 1946, IOR: L/P & S/18/B 467

⁷⁶ Ibid., E.V. Packer, PCL, to sheikh Sultan bin Saqr, ruler of Sharjah, 12 February 1946.

H.D.H. Rance, to intervene and contact the sheikh of Sharjah to request an extension of the agreement, but in fact he did not wait for the outcome of the negotiations. Instead, he sent a message to the sheikh asking him to extend the period for six more years, to end in 1952.⁷⁷ The Ruler of Sharjah responded by agreeing to this extension on 26 February 1946, requesting the company to exert its utmost efforts in order to extract crude oil, which he was keen to see initiated, in the Emirate of Sharjah.⁷⁸ The immediate response of the sheikh might have been prompted by the fact that oil in the Emirates had not yet been discovered, but it might also have underlined his urgent need for financial resources.

The amendment to the Agreement in terms of the period within which drilling should commence was expressed as follows:

The period allowed within which drilling shall begin is that of 15 calendar years from the date of signature of the concession Agreement [1937]. If the period of 15 years stipulated above expires and the company has not done geological examination and field work, etc., constantly with every diligence and activity then the Agreement shall be annulled.⁷⁹

The situation remained as it was. Thus, in December 1950, the manager of a branch of PCL in Bahrain, Packer, made it clear in a letter to the Political Agent, A.C. Gallaway, in Bahrain, that the company was not able to drill for oil until the definition of the

⁷⁷ E.V. Packer to Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, 12 February 1946, IOR: R/15/1/703.

⁷⁸ Ibid., Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi to Packer, 26 February 1946.

⁷⁹ Ibid., Amendment dated 26 February 1946 to Sharjah Oil Agreement dated 17 September 1937.

boundaries of the Emirate had been satisfactorily solved.⁸⁰ On the same subject the Political Agent informed the Political Resident of the complexity of the situation in Sharjah.⁸¹

For that reason, until 1951, PCL was not able to drill for oil as boundaries were not yet defined, and so the company asked the sheikh for an extension of five more years, from September 1952 to September 1957. In the end, the concession was further extended again by five years.

The period allowed within which drilling shall begin is that of 20 calendar years from the date of the signature of the concession agreement. If the period of 20 years stipulated above expires and the company has not done geological examination and field work, etc., constantly with every diligence and activity, then the agreement shall be annulled.

The ruler agrees that all obligations of the Company under the amendment dated 26 February 1946 shall now be cancelled with effect from the date of this amendment dated 7 February 1951 to the Sharjah oil Agreement of 1937.⁸²

In return, PCL offered a gift of £7,500 to the Ruler of Sharjah to pay towards his medical treatment in London.⁸³

The British Government, on the other hand, reacted to such an amendment when the Foreign Office admitted that, although it was not necessary for the British

⁸⁰ Ibid., E.V. Packer, PCL, to Political Agent, A.C. Gallaway, 10 December 1950.

⁸¹ Ibid., Political Agent, Bahrain to PR, Bahrain, 14 December 1950.

⁸² Amendment to Sharjah Oil Agreement, 7 February 1951, FO 1016/53.

⁸³ Political Resident, Bahrain, W.R. Hay, to L.A.C. Fry, Eastern Dept. Foreign Office, London, 24 February 1951, FO 371/91329.

Government to interfere in the amendment to the Agreement between the sheikh and PCL, nevertheless it thought that it would be the right way to send a letter to PCL mentioning that the British Government did not object to the amendment of the Agreement. This reminded all concerned that it was the British Government that was in control of all oil-concession agreements together with all their amendments.⁸⁴

Eventually, neither the Agreement nor its amendments motivated the company to start actual drilling, as it was waiting for a satisfactory definition of the boundaries of Sharjah. Up until 1952, there is no evidence to indicate that the company had actually started drilling for oil in Sharjah. The Agreement and its amendments were not able to bring about positive results until 1952, the main reason for this being uncertainty concerning the internal boundaries between the Emirates.⁸⁵

4.7 The Ajman Oil Concession, 1951

As was mentioned earlier, before World War II, PCL had not shown any great interest in securing oil concession agreements with Ajman, mainly because it felt that if concessions were granted, the Ruler of Ajman, sheikh Rashid bin Hamid, would not

⁸⁴ W.R. Hay, Political Resident Bahrain to L.A. Pinhey, Political Agent Bahrain, 12 March 1951, FO 1016/53.

⁸⁵ Arabian Boundaries, Primary Documents, 1853-1957, vol. 14, Trucial Coast: Internal Boundaries, Archive Editions, London, 1988.

be willing to accept less than what was paid to the rulers of other Emirates for securing their oil concessions.⁸⁶

Nevertheless, in March 1939, PCL obtained an exploration permit from the Ruler of Ajman for a period of five years, which could be extended by one more year.⁸⁷ This permit was however doomed as, no sooner had it been concluded, than the British Government became involved in World War II. Later, in 1951, PCL asked the British Government for permission to negotiate a long-term oil concession with the Ruler of Ajman. Following this request, two agreements in the Ajman Oil Concession, supervised by the British Government, were signed. As in previous cases, two separate agreements were signed. The first was a Commercial Agreement, signed on 31 January 1951;⁸⁸ the second was a political one, signed on 17 July 1951.⁸⁹

In the first agreement, between the Ruler of Ajman and PCL, there were included the Ajman Emirate, all the islands with their waters, the seabed, and the earth beneath the water. Its duration was for a period of seventy-five years.⁹⁰

Comparing the Commercial Agreements between SOC and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi in 1950 on the one hand, and between PCL and the Ruler of Ajman in 1951 on the other, we notice that the oil concession agreement relating to the Abu Dhabi

⁸⁶ Ibid., S. Longrigg, PCL, to H. Weightman, Political Agent, Bahrain, 13 January 1939.

⁸⁷ Ajman Exploration Permit, 23 March 1939, IOR: R/15/1/680.

⁸⁸ Ajman Commercial Agreement, 31 January 1951, FO 371/ 104409.

⁸⁹ Ajman Political Agreement, 17 July 1951, F O 1016/76.

seabed contained thirty articles while Ajman's concession relating to the seabed and land contained twenty-seven articles. This may have been because SOC was expecting oil to be found in the seabed of Abu Dhabi in commercial quantities. In general, since the American companies had a great deal of experience in the area, having already discovered oil in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain, they could be quite optimistic about their venture and offer enough inducements to the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, which the British did not have to match for their concession on land. Moreover, the inclusion of articles 7, 8, and 26 in the Agreement demonstrated that SOC offered some advantages to Abu Dhabi.

So, Article 7 stated that when oil was discovered in commercial quantities, the company had then to fully develop the whole concession area in accordance with good oilfield practices, after which it had to continue its efforts to sell the oil at prices representing a fair deal profit according to normal standards governing the world oil trade.

According to Article 8, the company committed itself to paying the Ruler of Abu Dhabi one fifth of the proceeds of the sales of crude oil as a royalty. On the other hand, if the oil was sold to one of the branches of SOC, then an independent expert, agreed on between the parties, should be appointed to determine the price. In case both parties

⁹⁰ Ajman Commercial Agreement, 31 January 1951, FO 371/104409.

could not agree on an expert within sixty days, then the case of settling a price was to be referred to independent arbitration.

Article 26 mentioned that in case the company assigned any agent or party, the Ruler had to be kept informed of any such moves. The company, however, had to be committed to fulfil all its obligations. The agreement gave the company the right to form other companies when there was a need to do so, particularly for purposes of refinery and transportation. SOC was allowed to offer participation to its subsidiary, the Central Mining and Investment Corporation, without referring to the Ruler.⁹¹

Thus, it is clear that SOC contemplated success in its search for oil in Abu Dhabi. Additionally, unlike the agreement relating to Ajman, signed between PCL and the Ruler, the agreement between SOC and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi stated that in the case of any discrepancy, the Arabic translation as much as the English one had to be consulted, while, by contrast, the English text was the only basis of reference in the Ajman agreement.

It should be mentioned that there was also a political agreement concluded between SOC and the British Government about an oil concession in the Abu Dhabi seabed. This was similar to the political agreement concluded between PCL and the British Government in relation to Ajman's oil concessions. The only difference was that

there was an article about the possibility of setting up an oil refinery in Abu Dhabi, whereas such an article was not contained in the Agreement between PCL and the British Government in the case of the Ajman oil concessions.⁹²

4.8 The Fujairah Oil Concession, 1953

As was mentioned in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Fujairah achieved independence in 1952. Then it was that efforts towards securing oil concessions there started in earnest. In 1953, the British Residency in Bahrain sent a message to the Foreign Office in London informing it that PDTCL had offered 40,000 rupees (£3,000) to the Emirate of Fujairah in return for obtaining a concession there for three years (renewable for three more years).⁹³

The company confirmed that it had made this offer, sending two copies of the agreement concluded between it and the Ruler of Fujairah to the Foreign Office in London, informing it about what had happened.⁹⁴

The agreement between the Ruler of Fujairah and PDTCL was noticeably somewhat different from other agreements that had been concluded by the company with some other Emirates, as the period was for only three years, renewable for a further

⁹¹ Concession Agreement between the sheikh of Abu Dhabi and SOC, 2 December 1950, FO 1016/83.

⁹² Political Agreement between Great Britain and SOC regarding the Oil Concession Agreement with the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 15 April 1950, FO 371/82084.

⁹³ Telegram Bahrain to Foreign Office, 24 April 1953, FO 371/104401.

three years, whereas the other agreements were for sixty-five or seventy-five years. It was also noticeable that for termination of the contract before the expiry of the third year, the sheikh should be informed three months prior to actual cancellation.⁹⁵

Moreover, the company stated in Article 14 that in the case of any dispute arising between both parties (the company and the Ruler of Fujairah) during this agreement, or after renewing it, each party would be entitled to select a suitable arbitrator and that if they could not reach agreement on arbitrators, they should consider the Political Resident in the Gulf as a suitable person to act in this capacity.⁹⁶

It appears that the British officials were not very much interested in an agreement with Fujairah, contrary to their evident interest in previous agreements concluded with the other Emirates. On previous occasions, the British officials in the Gulf had confined the company to certain conditions and concluded an agreement with the company illustrating each party's obligations, whereas in the agreement between the Ruler of Fujairah and the company, the British officials did not cover any particular concerns. There may have been two possible reasons for this, *viz*:

a) Until March 1952, the British officials in the Gulf did not recognize Fujairah as the eighth Emirate, separate from Sharjah.

⁹⁴ PDTCL to Foreign Office, 21 September 1953, FO 371/104401.

⁹⁵ See Article 2 of Fujairah Agreement in Appendix (11).

⁹⁶ A Commercial Agreement between PDTCL and sheikh Mohammad bin Hamad Al-Sharqi, sheikh of Fujairah, 18 August 1953, F O 371/104401. See also Article 14 of Fujairah Agreement in Appendix (11).

b) It is likely that the company had found in its geological surveys that there was no oil in exploitable commercial quantities there. This would also explain why the agreement was confined to three years.⁹⁷

In general, one could say that throughout the 1930s, competition was rife between the American oil companies and the British officials in the region. However, this competition came to an end following agreements concluded between the British officials in the region and the rulers of the Emirates, which in effect prohibited the latter from concluding any petroleum agreements with any foreign company or any foreign state before they had discussed it with the British officials.

Moreover, the approach that the British officials adopted in handling their country's policies concerning oil concession agreements had the aim of exercising a close control over both parties, the Ruler and the company. Thus, each company had to conclude an agreement with the British Government and a second agreement with the Ruler of the Emirate in question. Even the oil concession agreement that was concluded between SOC and the Ruler of Abu Dhabi was first concluded between the British authorities and the company. In turn, the British Government guaranteed protection to the oil companies working in the Gulf.

Accordingly, only a limited number of petroleum agreements were concluded and these, for the most part, were with British oil companies. By the start of World

⁹⁷ Political Officer Trucial Coast to sheikh Mohammad bin Hamad Al-Sharqi, 19 March 1952, FO

War II, the oil companies had halted their explorations. However, at the end of the war, these petroleum companies renewed their interest and operations in the region, pursuing oil exploration in the Emirates throughout the 1950s. However, oil was not extracted in commercial quantities. It was not until 1962 that oil was exported from Abu Dhabi, 1969 from Dubai, 1974 from Sharjah, and 1984 from Ras al-Khaimah.⁹⁸

371/82032.

⁹⁸ Heard, *Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company*, p.1-7.

Table 1. Financial terms paid to the Emirates following the granting of oil concessions to the oil companies.

Emirates	Date of Concession And company concerned	Approx. length of coastline	PAYMENTS				
			Rupees paid on signature	Payments to be made within 60 days (rupees)	Payments to be made annually until the discovery of oil in commercial quantities (rupees)	Minimum royalty (in rupees)	Royalty (in rupees)
Ajman	1951, PCL		150,000	200,000	50,000	90,000	3 per ton
Umm al-Qaiwain	1945, PCL		60,000	200,000	24,000	90,000	3 per ton
Ras al-Khaimah	1945, PCL		60,000	200,000	60,000	90,000	3 per ton
Abu Dhabi	1939, PDTCL		300,000	200,000	100,000	250,000-500,000	3 per ton
Abu Dhabi Seabed	1950, SOC	300	1,000,000	1,000,000		1,000,000	20% of proceeds of sale
Kalba	1938, PCL		60,000	200,000	24,000	90,000	3 per ton
Sharjah	1937, PCL		60,000	200,000	30,000	90,000	3 per ton
Dubai	1937, PCL		60,000	200,000	30,000	90,000	3 per ton

Source: *Arabian Gulf oil concessions, 1911-1953, vol.3 (The Trucial States), Archive Editions, 1989, pp. 611-612.*

Chapter 5

**British Policy Regarding Economic
Development in the Emirates,
1950 to 1955**

5.1 Introduction

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the relationship between Great Britain and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast was strong and reinforced by the agreements that culminated in the Exclusive Treaty concluded in 1892 between the Political Resident in Bushire (representing the Government of British India) and the rulers of the Trucial Coast Emirates. Moreover, as has also been mentioned in Chapter 4, it was not until oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1962 that the British administration realized that there was a need to open up the country. This necessitated contributing to a large extent towards the financing of the envisaged development projects.

Until the advent of oil, the inhabitants of the Gulf, whose livelihood was dependent on the resources of the sea, had not been able to find a substitute means of earning a living, even after Britain had destroyed a number of Arab ships at the beginning of the nineteenth century in an attempt to abolish piracy. This had a knock-on effect on the commercial activities in which the Arabs of the Gulf engaged. Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain continued the harassment of vessels along the Trucial Coast and thus shackled the movements of the marine life of the people by continuous inspection and censorship. In addition, Britain was anxious to prevent the building of trading vessels which might be used in the slave and weapon trades.¹

Nevertheless, the local inhabitants continued to practise their pearl fishing, the

¹ Al-Qasimi, N. *al-Wujud al-Hindi fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi, 1820-1947*, unpublished M.A. thesis, Ain Shams University, Cairo, 1984, p.63.

occupation that prevailed throughout the region in general, but was especially important in the Trucial Coast Emirates. In the 1930s, however, artificial pearls were produced in Japan in great quantities, leading to the decline of the trade in natural pearls in the Gulf, a situation that inflicted a great economic crisis on the region,² from which only the discovery of oil rescued it.³ Despite all these difficulties, the economy of the Emirates still continued successful to some extent, as a result of commerce and trade, and the financial support which the rulers obtained from the oil companies.

5.2 Trade in the Trucial Coast Emirates

The Emirate of Dubai was the marketplace for tribesmen from the whole region, the northern part of Oman down to coastal Oman, who were trading with Iran, as well as the rest of the Gulf, India, and even as far afield as East Africa. Tea and sugar and other consumables that were purchased from Europe and India were exported to eastern neighbours. In return, Dubai imported poultry, nuts, fresh and dried fruits, and other products from those places. Both imports and exports through Dubai were taxed. During World War II and after, this commercial activity increased greatly.⁴ Since the turn of the twentieth century, the port of Dubai itself had been of significant value as far as economic development in the Trucial Coast Emirates was concerned, and subsequently emerged as the main market for the traders of the Trucial Coast and the northern part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.⁵

² Fenelone, K.G., *The United Arab Emirates: an economic and social survey*, London, 1973, p.56.

³ Al-Rumayhi, M., *al-Bitrul wa-'l-taghayyur al-ijtima' i fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi*, Cairo, 1975, p. 23.

⁴ Hay, *The Persian Gulf*, p. 121.

⁵ Heard-Bey, F., *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, London, 1984. pp. 238-239.

Internal trading in the Emirates was of secondary importance.⁶ Although it was not as important as the trade with Iran, there was, however, a certain amount of internal commerce within the Emirates as the local population had sufficient resources. The Buraimi Oasis was probably the largest internal trade centre, although Daba, Khour Fakkan, and Kalba also had some activity, mainly in the hands of Indian or Persian traders settled there. Generally speaking, the local population was not attracted to the trading profession on a large scale.⁷

By 1920, pearls still formed 80% of the exports of the Trucial Coast Emirates, while the other 20% were made up of citron fruits and fishing products.⁸ Imports were mostly food products, household products, and other basic equipment for daily use, besides wood and spices from India, dates from Iraq, and coffee from Yemen.⁹

5.3 Taxation

Taxes were one of the most important sources of funding for the individual Emirates.¹⁰ In addition to the duties that were imposed on the pearl trade, imported and exported goods were taxed. The taxes that were collected went to the rulers at that time. Fiscal policy vis-à-vis the tribes was more complex. Some tribes paid their taxes, while others were never expected to pay taxes owing to their financial problems

⁶ Fahmi, A., *Mashyakhat al-sahil*, p.348.

⁷ Al-Qasimi, N., *al-Wujud al-Hindi*, p. 113.

⁸ Al-Otibah, M.S., *al-Bitrul wa-iqtisadiyyati al-Imarat al-Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah*, Abu Dhabi, 1990, p.53.

⁹ Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States*, p.190.

¹⁰ Fahmi, A., *Mashyakhat al-sahil*, p. 357.

or their personal relationships to the ruler.¹¹

In this context, it is worth mentioning that the system of taxation was not strictly fixed, nor was the sheikh in a strong enough position always to enforce the payment of taxes. This situation continued until the end of World War II, when the enterprises that were set up in the Trucial Coast Emirates following the advent of the discovery of oil changed the financial position of the tribes. Additionally, custom duties were imposed at major ports by the rulers, but not on overland trade. From the late 1930s until the end of the 1950s, dues were 2.5 %.¹² The importers in the Trucial Coast Emirates were trading in a market that contained 70 shops. 40 of these traders were Iranians, 19 Hindus, and 11 Arabs.¹³

5.4 The Economy of Dubai and Sharjah, 1950

The role Britain played in the Trucial Coast was in part focused on the economic development of the area intended to maintain and guarantee its stability. Driven by the need to secure a supply of oil, Britain's assistance in the economic development of the Trucial Coast was "fairly accurately tailored to match whatever benefit she could hope to derive in return for maintaining her influence over this area."¹⁴

As far as Dubai was concerned, there was a particular British interest in it.

¹¹ Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States*, pp.112-118.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

Apart from its prospect as a source of oil (as was the case in the other Emirates), Dubai was singled out as being the central strategic city for trade in the region. It was to become the administrative and political centre of the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, for, as one of the sources mentions, the ruler of Dubai was intent on modernization and endeavoured to develop the Emirate into an important commercial centre and expand the port.¹⁵

From 1950, the correspondence between C.J. Pelly, the Deputy Political Resident in Bahrain, and C.M. Rose, the First Secretary in the Middle East Department of the Foreign Office, it becomes clear that Dubai itself was seen as an economic focal point for the Trucial Coast. This was on account of its sheltered harbour and administrative infrastructure. However, the same report stressed the urgent need to further expand the administrative system of Dubai so that with the discovery of oil, it could cope with all matters of economic and financial concern.¹⁶

...our immediate proposals (a) for an inexpensive administration and (b) for some social services, beginning with education. The urgent need is that we should take these steps before the discovery of oil; afterwards it may be too late, for the ruler will have no thought beyond his own domain.¹⁷

In view of the acknowledged importance of Dubai, Pelly suggested to Rose in the Foreign Office that the welfare of the people and the status of Dubai should be improved. The idea that was most highlighted was to propose to the sheikh of Dubai

¹⁵ Taryam, A.O., *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-1985*, London, 1987, pp 20-22.

¹⁶ C.J. Pelly, Political Agent, Bahrain, to C.M. Rose, Foreign Office, 26 June 1950, FO 371/82047.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 24 June 1950.

that the British officials would run the administrative affairs of Dubai in an “inexpensive” way so as to be able to improve the Emirate and the welfare of its people, starting with education.¹⁸

At a meeting of the British Middle East Office held in Cairo between 5 and 12 July 1950, the affairs of Dubai were dealt with.

Its general conclusions were accepted: viz. that we should from now onwards identify ourselves much more closely with the finances of this sheikhdom and assume some responsibility in shaping its budget; so that if oil is discovered we shall be in a better position to get control of the royalties from the start.¹⁹

Thus, it is clear that the British officials insisted on controlling the finances of Dubai, so that when oil was discovered, royalties should not be squandered by the sheikh and the resources should be used for the administrative, educational, and social services as planned by the British authorities.²⁰

As far as public works in Dubai were concerned, the British representatives in the Trucial Coast felt the need for a broad road along each side of the creek to form arteries for future development, particularly after the production of oil.²¹

On the other hand, as far as Sharjah was concerned, the British administrators in the Trucial Coast thought that there was no point in accrediting it with the concern that was attributed to Dubai, the reason being that there seemed little chance then of

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Record of Discussion at British Middle East Office, Cairo 5-12 July 1950.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5-12 July 1950.

²¹ P.D. Stobart, Political Officer, Sharjah to C.J. Pelly, Political Agent, Bahrain, 16 October 1950, FO

oil being discovered there; besides, they were not very pleased with the way Sharjah was run.

Furthermore, Gulf traders were primarily attracted to Dubai harbour, owing to the facilities and services it possessed, such as a bank, a hospital, and a post office. Such factors contributed to an increased interest in Dubai at the expense of Sharjah.²²

5.5 Dubai Hospital, 1952-1953

In 1939, the British Government established a dispensary in Dubai and appointed an Indian doctor for it. It became a hospital in 1949, when Dr. Muhammad Yasin, a practising doctor in Dubai who was in charge of the dispensary, was replaced by the British Colonel, D. McCaully. McCaully was appointed by the British Government to run the hospital of thirty-eight beds, which was named in 1952 al-Maktum Hospital, funded by the British, while the cost of running it was shared among the rulers.²³

In the minutes of the second meeting of the Dubai Hospital Committee, M.S. Weir, the Political Officer in Sharjah, reported to W.R. Hay, the Political Resident in Bahrain, on the status of the Dubai Hospital and its financial affairs. In the same meeting it became clear that the British Government intended to build schools and promote agricultural development along the Trucial Coast. This was seen as a gesture

371/82059.

²² *Ibid.*, C.J. Pelly, Political Agent, Bahrain to C.M. Rose, Foreign Office, 12 August 1950.

²³ El-Mallakh, R., *The Economic development of the United Arab Emirates*, London, 1981, p.21. See also Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States*, p.266.

of good will and was meant to demonstrate British concern for the welfare of the people there. Thus, the British Government supervised the planning of Dubai Hospital and further development.²⁴

The hospital was established for the welfare of the people of the Emirates and was the first of its kind that treated patients from all over the Emirates. The British Government undertook to monitor the work of the hospital. The data in the Table below indicate that whereas people were not previously used to seeking hospital treatment, gradually, after the establishment of the hospital, people did start to frequent it.

Table 2 The number of attendants at Al-Maktum Hospital (Dubai) from 1948 to 1952.

Year	New cases	Annual number of attendants	Average number of attendants daily
1948	4,201	6,306	20.1
1949	3,741	6,360	21.5
1950	4,234	6,685	22.2
1951	5,946	9,014	29.8
1952	6,511	10,245	33.8

Source: Al-Maktum Hospital, Dubai: Annual report and returns, 1952, FO 371/104434.

²⁴ Minutes of the second meeting of Dubai Hospital Committee, 15 December 1952, FO 371/104434.

Hospital records show that numbers attending increased year by year. In 1948, the number of new patients was 4,201, while in 1952 it was 6,511.²⁵ People were apparently becoming more inclined to seek hospital attention when needed rather than be treated at home by traditional medicine, if at all.

Moreover, the annual report of al-Maktum Hospital, Dubai, for the year 1952 shows the progress made on all fronts. It outlines what had been achieved till the end of the year and what further equipment, like X-ray equipment, was desperately needed. The report also lists the causes of diseases and types of patients who were treated by the hospital, as well as the causes of death among in-patients. Other work done by the hospital is also mentioned in the report, including surgical operations, vaccinations against smallpox, and cholera and tuberculosis inoculations.²⁶

Continued British Government support of Dubai Hospital was considered a matter of some importance. In a letter dated 14 January 1953, Hay, the Political Resident, wrote to D.A. Greenhill in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, requesting the British Government to give funding to the hospital.²⁷ The Foreign Office agreed to contribute to the development of Dubai Hospital and therefore requested the Treasury to allocate a sum of £2,100 to the Political Resident to be contributed towards the expenses of the hospital.²⁸ The Treasury provided the

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Al-Maktum Hospital, Dubai: Annual report and returns, 1952.

²⁶ *Ibid.*.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Foreign Office, 14 January 1953.

²⁸ Foreign Office to Treasury, 10 November 1953, FO 371/ 109859.

Political Resident in his budget of 1954/1955 with the requested sum.²⁹

Above all, the opening of the hospital was perceived as a great success on account of the services that it rendered to the local people. The organization and management of the hospital were impeccable, which enabled it to produce good results.

5.6 Banking in 1946 and 1953

From the 1930s until the mid 1950s, Dubai attracted a certain amount of foreign investment.³⁰ Before the oil boom, Dubai was a significant centre of trade and finance relating to the gold trade, particularly in the re-exporting of gold to India.³¹ However, when dealing and trading increased, in December 1945 the British officials in the Gulf area felt the necessity of establishing a bank in Dubai supervised by themselves. As a consequence fierce competition developed between the India and Persian Gulf Bank on the one hand and the Imperial Bank of Iran on the other, to establish a branch. The banks approached the Secretary of State for India, who in turn contacted the Political Resident, G. Prior, to negotiate with him on that matter.³² It should be mentioned that Prior was responsible for persuading the Imperial Bank of Iran to open a branch in Dubai. He also tried hard to persuade the Government of India to permit the Bank to open a branch in Dubai.³³ Thus, it can be said that Prior

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Treasury to the Foreign Office, 24 January 1954.

³⁰ Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States*, p.250.

³¹ Presley, J.R. & Wilson, Rodney, *Banking in the Arab Gulf*, Houndhills, 1991, p.112.

³² The Secretary of State for India to Political Resident, Bushire, 1 December 1945, IOR: R/15/1/555.

³³ Jones, G., *Banking and oil*, Cambridge, 1987, p.13; see also idem, "Banking in the Gulf before the

eagerly supported the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank of Iran in Dubai for the following reasons:

- a) The desirability of early action to keep out undesirable mushroom concerns such as the proposed "India and Persian Gulf Bank", which has been the subject of recent correspondence with the Government of India.
- b) The Imperial Bank of Iran's familiarity with trade on both sides of the Gulf. (There is an appreciable volume of trade between Dubai and the Persian ports).
- c) Their success at Kuwait and Bahrain.
- d) The advantage of having branches of the same concern along the Arab side.
- e) The fact that due to their experience in Persia the staff of this bank are equipped with more than usual political acumen for dealing in an area like the Trucial Coast.³⁴

The above points reveal the positive attitude of Prior towards the establishment of a branch of the Bank in Dubai. Hence, the India Office gave its blessing for the bank to open a branch in Dubai.³⁵ After the Political Resident had agreed to this, the Political Agent in Bahrain, C.J. Pelly, submitted the matter to the ruler of Dubai, Sa'id bin Maktum, who also agreed to it.³⁶

Thus, an agreement, supervised by the British officials in the region, was signed between the two parties, the ruler of Dubai, and the representative of the Imperial Bank of Iran, F. Johnson.³⁷

It should be mentioned that the only article that was originally rejected by the sheikh was Article 11, which stated that the agreement was for a period of twenty-five

1960s", in *The Gulf in the early 20th century: foreign institutions and local responses*, Durham, 1986, pp. 7-24.

³⁴ Political Resident, Bushire, to Secretary of State for India, 2 December 1945, IOR: R/15/1/555.

³⁵ Jones, G., *Banking and oil*, p.13.

³⁶ Political Agent, Bahrain, to Political Resident, Bushire, 20 December 1945, IOR: R/15/1/555.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bushire, to Political Agent, Bahrain, 21 December 1945.

years. However, after much deliberation when the sheikh consulted the traders in Dubai, he insisted on reducing the period of the agreement (that bound him not to open any other bank) to 15 years. This in turn was rejected by the British officials there, represented by the Political Resident and F. Johnson, acting for the Imperial Bank of Iran, on the basis that fifteen years was too short a time for a bank to establish its standing and become profitable. However, the sheikh remained unmoved and finally a settlement was reached when the British officials accepted a reduction of five years. Thus, the agreement was signed for a twenty-year period. Article 11 of this agreement was modified to include:

- a). This payment holds good for a period of 20 years and is subject to renewal after that period.
- b). No permission will be given by the ruler of Dubai during that period to any other bank to open a Branch at Dubai.
- c). It is agreed that the Bank has the right to withdraw from Dubai at any time during the period of this agreement. Such withdrawal shall be considered to terminate this agreement.³⁸

From Article 11 of the agreement, it is clear that the ruler was placed in a situation whereby he did not have the right to contact any bank to open a branch in Dubai, although the Bank of Dubai was free to withdraw at any time. This was obviously not in favour of the ruler of Dubai.

This agreement gave the Bank not only a monopoly in all dealings with the branch but lifted it into a position of a quasi-establishment or house branch of the

³⁸ *Ibid.*, *Banking agreement between the sheikh of Dubai and the Imperial Bank of Iran*, 5 January 1946. It should be noted that this Bank had established several branches in Kuwait (1942) and Bahrain (1944). However, the bank changed its name to the British Bank of Iran and the Middle East in July 1949; later, in 1952, the bank dropped the phrase "Iran and" to become the BBME in July 1952. See

sheikh, although the sums involved were not large at that stage.

In 1946, the Dubai branch of the Bank started operating. Merchants had to pay for imports from India via this branch in rupees. The branch cleared all documents concerned with the import of goods. From 1947 to 1965, in terms of loans, for instance, the Branch maintained a liquid position and managers usually had to keep around 25% of their deposits in cash.³⁹

In 1953, the Political Resident in Bahrain, W.R. Hay, wrote to the Foreign Office suggesting that the British Bank of the Middle East (BBME) open a small branch at Sharjah similar to that in Dubai.⁴⁰ The Foreign Office agreed, provided the Oil Agreement of 1937, revised in 1951, was adhered to.⁴¹ Article 25 of the Sharjah Oil Agreement stated the following:

The Company shall make all payments that become due to the sheikh under this Agreement into the sheikh's account at the Eastern Bank Ltd., Bahrain, and the Bank's receipt shall be a full discharge for the Company in respect to the payment of the sum stated in the Bank's receipt.

Should the sheikh decide to grant permission for a bank to open a branch or Agency in Sharjah the sheikh shall consult with the Company as to which Bank shall be given the permission.

The sheikh may from time to time designate in writing another Bank or Banks for the purpose of this Article.⁴²

also Jones, *Banking and oil*, p.7.

³⁹ Jones, G., *Banking and oil*, p.152.

⁴⁰ Bahrain telegram to Foreign Office, 26 January 1953, FO 371/104342.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Bahrain (undated).

⁴² Sharjah Oil Concession, 17 September 1937, IOR: L/P&S/18/B457.

According to the Agreement, it was a prerequisite that the bank should not open a branch unless the oil company was consulted. However, after the sheikh of Sharjah had approved it, the General Manager of BBME obtained the approval of the Petroleum Concession Limited.⁴³

Thus, an Agreement was concluded in which the Sharjah branch was considered a sub-bank undertaking normal banking duties there. The branch opened two days a week in the *souq* until the Eastern Bank Limited opened a branch in the town in 1957.⁴⁴ Therefore, BBME opened daily. It should be mentioned that the Eastern Bank opened in town in Sharjah, as the sheikh had an account in the Eastern Bank Branch in Bahrain, as mentioned in Article 25 above.

The situation in Sharjah was stagnant, as trade there was not active. Thus, it was hard for BBME's branch to collect deposits from merchants there. The total amount of public deposit collected in 1959 was £83,000. However, by 1961, the branch was upgraded to a main branch.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Ibid.*, General Manager, British Bank of the Middle East, to Secretary, Petroleum Concession Limited, 26 January 1953.

⁴⁴ In a meeting in London on 10 June 1999 with Easa Saleh Al-Gurg, the Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates, who had been the Dubai Commercial Assistant in the 1950s, the present writer was told that BBME's Sharjah branch was established in 1953, and the Eastern Bank Limited was established in 1957, as a result of the mistreatment by BBME's Dubai branch of an Indian merchant, who, in turn, lobbied with other compatriots to open another branch with another bank in the region. Consequently, the branch of the Eastern Bank was opened in Sharjah, after obtaining the agreement of the ruler of Sharjah. For more details, see al-Gurg's *The Wells of memory: an autobiography*, London, 1998, p.59. The present writer was also informed on 12 June 1999, by Neville Green, who had been Manager of a branch of the Eastern Bank Limited in Sharjah from 1957 to 1959, that BBME was operating on the basis of commission and charged very high interest on the services that it was offering at that time. The Eastern Bank Limited offered much better rates for customers than did BBME.

⁴⁵ Jones, *Banking and oil*, pp. 46, 182.

5.7 Water Supply, 1953-1954

As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Britain began to assist the Emirates of the Trucial Coast in their economic development. As far as water supply was concerned, water was available though inadequate to the population and cultivation there. British officials in the area realized the need for necessary water supply, as an increasing number of British officials and forces, part of the Trucial Oman Levies, were stationed in Sharjah. Thus, through the meetings of the Trucial State Council, which started in 1952, it was recommended that a water resources survey should be conducted.⁴⁶

The presence of British-supported troops raised the problem of a sufficient water supply. In April 1953, Hay, the Political Resident, approached the Foreign Office to discuss the issue of improving the quality of drinking water in the Trucial Coast Emirates. The Foreign Office had given this responsibility to Col. K.W. Merrylees, who was already in the area and found that suitable wells existed at Dubai, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, Dhaid, and Tarif. In a report to the Foreign Office via Hay, Merrylees expressed his opinion that the military should assist in this issue and inquired about the possibility of military forces being employed to help in drilling, as the estimated costs were about £3-4 per foot for drilling 6,000 feet, added to which was the cost of transporting the rig.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ For more information, see Chapter 2 of this thesis. See also Fenelon, K.G., *The United Arab Emirates*, p 25.

⁴⁷ Political Resident to Foreign Office, 18 April 1953, Report on Development of subsoil water, Trucial Coast, by Colonel K.W. Merrylees, 15 April 1953, FO 371/104382.

The response of the Foreign Office was that the prospect of the development of water supply in the Trucial Coast was promising as drinking water was of paramount importance for the following reasons:

1. For her Majesty's forces and for operational purposes;
2. For her Majesty's officials in the new accommodation being provided;
3. For the civilian population, for water supplies in the town and for irrigation purposes.⁴⁸

The Foreign Office allocated a sum of £1,500 in the budget of 1953-1954 for a water survey along the Trucial Coast with a possibility of increasing that amount if needed. It was also proposed that the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah should contribute to the costs of a water supply, basically because their subjects would be the main beneficiaries.⁴⁹ It seems that the Foreign Office officials strongly supported the development of a water supply in the area.

Hay did not fully agree with the decision of the Foreign Office. He mooted the suggestion that if the military helped in providing a water supply, then British servicemen stationed in the Trucial Coast should be the main beneficiaries. Furthermore, he doubted that the rulers would contribute toward the water supplies, although he agreed to approach them on the subject, but only when the actual cost of supplying was known.⁵⁰ This was not well received by A.D.M. Rose of the Middle Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, who indicated that the whole object of the

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Political Resident, 18 May 1953.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Foreign Office, 30 May 1953.

exercise was to provide a reliable water supply for the whole population of the Trucial Coast Emirates. Rose added that the local inhabitants would be disposed not in favour of the British Government and officials there. Thus, the British officials in the Trucial Coast were instructed accordingly.⁵¹

In a communication sent by the Foreign Office to the Political Resident in Bahrain on 3 February 1954, it insisted on providing drinking water supplies in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah first, and hoped that sites could also be found in Ajman and Umm al-Qaiwain, that were known to suffer every summer from a water shortage. The Foreign Office also requested to search for drinking water in the territory of Fujairah as well, because water resources there were declining and if the British found a suitable well there, it would convey to the ruler of Fujairah the good will of the British towards him.⁵² Thus, the Foreign Office expressed the will to support financially the drilling of between five and eight wells in the Trucial Coast Emirates. A sum of £20,000 was allocated by the Treasury in the budget of 1954/1955 for the following purposes:

- i. £4,000 for the improvement of water channels to the Buraimi oasis,
- ii. £1,000 for the construction of two windmills to improve irrigation on the Trucial Coast.
- iii. £2,000 payment for a prolonged visit by Colonel Merrylees, the "dowser", for the purpose of locating water supplies on the Trucial Coast.
- iv. £13,000 to be allotted to the drilling of between five and eight wells in the area. (Each well would cost between £1,750 and £2,500, depending on the type of installation needed).⁵³

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Political Resident, 22 June 1953.

⁵² *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Political Resident, 3 February 1954.

⁵³ Foreign Office to Treasury, 15 January 1954, FO 371/109859.

5.8 Development Projects, 1954-1955

The actual involvement of Great Britain in the development of the Trucial Coast, although started just before World War II, recommenced in earnest with the implementation of the development plans in 1945 with, as we have mentioned previously, the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank of Iran in Dubai, followed by the Dubai Hospital in 1949, and, from 1952 onwards, money was allotted to providing drinking water resources in the Emirates. Additionally, a modern school was built in Sharjah. Then, two more schools - an Agricultural School near Ras al-Khaima and a Trade school at Sharjah - were established and opened in 1956.⁵⁴

Accordingly, in the budget of 1954-1955, as mentioned earlier, a sum of £20,000 was allocated to water supplies, as well as a further £5,000: £2,100 for the Dubai Hospital, and £2,900 for improvement of the creeks at Sharjah and Dubai, which were becoming silted up. Thus, in a meeting of the Trucial States Council, the Political Resident informed the sheikhs that Her Majesty's Government had allocated £25,000 in total in the budget of 1954/1955. The sheikhs were very grateful for this help.⁵⁵

However, it was stressed that no part of this money should be used as payment for salaries.⁵⁶ Above all, as the Treasury emphasized, financial support should not be

⁵⁴ Hawley, *The Trucial States*, pp.226-227.

⁵⁵ Foreign Office to Treasury, 15 January 1954, FO 371/109859. See also on the Trucial States Council in Chapter 2 of this thesis.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Treasury to Foreign Office, 24 January 1954.

deemed permanent, and salaries for the employees had to be collected locally from the sheikhdoms themselves.⁵⁷

In April 1954, the actual execution of the development projects started. £3,000 was spent on the Sharjah school, while £339 went on X-ray equipment in the Dubai Hospital. Estimates and quotas for water creek survey work were undertaken.⁵⁸

Thus, development projects went ahead although extra finances were needed to bring them to fruition. For instance, Bernard Burrows, the new Political Resident in Bahrain, asked the Foreign Office to allot £29,750 in the financial year 1955-56, of which £21,450 was for well-drilling, £5,000 for a school at Ras al-Khaimah; £1,000 for *falaj* (tunnel) development; and £2,300 for modifications of the electrical scheme at Dubai Hospital. In addition, the British Residency asked for £1,250 as a reserve thus, the total sum would be £31,000.⁵⁹ In another instance, Burrows insisted that if there was difficulty or uncertainty about a particular project, such as well-digging, then the money allocated for that project could be transferred to other projects, i.e. it would not be lost.⁶⁰

The Foreign Office agreed to allot £30,000 in the 1955/1956 budget towards the Trucial Coast Emirates' development programmes. However, it recommended that if any project proved unsatisfactory, Burrows had to send the Foreign Office an

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to British Residency, Bahrain, 3 February 1954.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, British Residency, Bahrain, to Foreign Office, 17 April 1954.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Foreign Office, 6 November 1954.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Foreign Office, 14 December 1954.

outline for any new project the money was going to finance.⁶¹

In fact, these projects were to lead to Britain's greater involvement in the development of the Trucial Coast Emirates in the years to come, all of which necessitated much financial outlay by the British Government. For instance, by 1959, the financial budget for education, health, agriculture, water supplies, and soil conservation in the Emirates was estimated at £97,414, compared to £25,000 in the budget of 1954-1955.⁶²

The British administration had foreseen that the Emirates of the Trucial Coast were sooner or later going to produce oil in commercial quantities, similar to the neighbouring states. It was for this reason that the British initiated the development programme of infrastructure for the region, in the hope that oil revenues would soon be available to continue the needed development work with the help of their own funds.

With its administrative services and financial help to the Trucial Coast Emirates, the British Government established the modern basis upon which this area has greatly depended. Additionally, when oil was produced in great quantities, the infrastructure of the Trucial Coast Emirates was ready to receive the oil revenues in an organised manner that helped the people there to benefit greatly from them.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Political Resident, 15 January 1955.

⁶² Trucial States Development Budget Proposals for 1959, PRO: FO 371/140142.

Chapter 6

**British Policy in the Gulf:
Settlement of Boundary Disputes**

6.1 Introduction

Historically, disputes about the boundaries of the Gulf region and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast had occurred at various stages, but, by the turn of the twentieth century, had become a matter of some importance, particularly when excavation for oil had started and oil was discovered in Iran. Thus, the Gulf area began to attract companies all looking for “the black gold”, and seeking to contract oil concessions with those states. That being the case, it was inevitable that boundary delineations and disputes would increase.

The British were the actual authorities who had to administer the situation throughout the Gulf states as they were in full control of the foreign affairs of the Emirates (sheikhdoms) by virtue of the 1892 Agreement that was concluded between the British Government and their rulers. Thus, in order to settle the disputes over boundaries among those sheikhdoms, Britain had to search for diplomatic solutions to many of the problems concerned.

This chapter will deal with the attitude of the British Government towards the states of the region: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Qatar, and Iran on the one hand, and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast on the other.

6.2 The Boundaries between the Trucial Coast Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The conflict between the British Government and the Government of Saudi Arabia about its south-eastern boundaries goes back to 1913 when the south-eastern boundaries of the Ottoman Empire had included Hijaz, Hasa, Najd, 'Asir, and Yemen, outlined in accordance with the Anglo-Turkish agreements of 29 July 1913 and 9 March 1914. Under these agreements, the south-eastern boundaries were called the blue and lilac lines. The blue line started from an area in the Gulf called Zahnuna and extended to the southern part of Bahrain and al-Rub` al-Khali, whereas, the lilac line ran from Luqmat al-Sha`b in the north-east and extended about 75 miles to the north of Aden, where the lilac line and blue lines met. Luqmat al-Sha`b is situated at the far end of the eastern boundaries of Aden. These boundaries had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire since 1903, as the truce of 9 March 1914 stated. At the end of the eastern boundaries they met in the sea near the strait of Bab al-Mandab opposite Perim Island.¹

In accordance with these agreements, the boundaries of the Ottoman domain in the south-western part of the Arabian Peninsula were drawn. The agreements also referred to the blue line previously mentioned. Only weeks after the Anglo-Turkish agreements, Ibn Saud, ruler of Saudi Arabia, concluded an agreement with the Ottoman Government; thus, he had to abide by this agreement and accept the

¹ Eastern Arabian Frontiers, India Office memorandum, 1934, IOR: L/P and S/18/B437.

legitimacy of the blue line.²

In these agreements concluded with the Ottoman Empire, Britain did not go into detail about the boundaries again. The reason for this was that the British Government was then concerned with securing the marine routes in the Gulf area, since Ibn Saud had granted oil concessions to the American company SOCAL in the eastern part of his Kingdom without identification of the boundaries. A few months afterwards, in April 1934, SOCAL had to ask the Turkish Government and then the British Government about the actual location of the boundaries included in the oil concession.³

It was on 24 April 1934 that the British Foreign Office informed the American Embassy that the Eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia, set out in the agreements of 1913-1914 on the basis of transfer of authority from the Government of the Ottoman Empire to Ibn Saud, were to be handed to Ibn Saud. Further boundaries were to the west and north-west of the blue line. The American Government was satisfied by this answer and therefore did not raise the point again. It should be mentioned that in accordance with the treaty of 1915, the British Government recognized Ibn Saud as the independent ruler of Najd, Hasa, Qatif, and Jubail⁴

² *Ibid*, see also, Scholfield, R. *Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States*, University College London, 1994, pp. 19-24.

³ Murad, K. 'A., *Tatawwur al-siyasah al-amirikiyyah fi mintaqat al-Khalij al-'Arabi, 1941-1947*, Ph.D. thesis, Baghdad University, 1979, p. 24.

⁴ Anglo-Saudi Frontier Negotiations, 1934, IOR: R/15/1/603; see also Kelly, J.B., *Eastern Arabian frontiers*, London, 1964, pp. 122-124.

Nevertheless, the Saudi Government was not prepared to commit itself to the agreement concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, since it had not been a party to it. This dispute led to negotiations in London between Fuad Hamza, the Saudi representative, and the British Foreign Office in 1934.⁵

Such negotiations did not achieve substantial results since the Saudi representative did not have definite instructions from his government. He also mentioned that Ibn Saud wanted to reintegrate the tribal areas that had previously belonged to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Mention was made in particular of the two tribes of al-Murrah and al-Manasir.⁶ In relation to al-Murrah, the British Government replied that they might have been Saudi subjects, but it maintained that al-Manasir were generally subjects of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.⁷

In April 1935, Faud Hamza handed the British Ambassador in Jeddah a memorandum suggesting the drawing up of the boundaries of Saudi Arabia with Qatar and the Emirates of the sheikhdoms, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, in addition to the patronage of Eastern Aden. In this memorandum, it was stated that the boundary line started at a point 25 kms. to the south and south-east beyond the territories called al-Majan, Sabakhat Mati, and Liwa, which were singled out as

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

belonging to Abu Dhabi, while the territories to the west of Liwa belonged to Saudi Arabia. In accordance with the placing of this line, the regions of Khur al-'Adid and al-'Aql were reported as Saudi territories. This line was known as the red line, or Hamza line.⁸

On 9 April 1935, A. Ryan, the British Ambassador in Jeddah, presented a draft of the agreement to the Saudi Government which suggested replacing the Fuad Hamza line with another, called the green line, as a boundary. However, the Saudi Government refused to accept it. Later, in the summer of 1935, negotiations resumed between the two parties in London, when Britain suggested a slight modification to the green line, which was later to be known as the brown line. In spite of all these efforts, however, no solution was found to the question of boundaries. Nevertheless, the British authorities promised to conduct a fresh survey of the positions of the tribes in the various territories situated to the north of the blue line, which the Saudis were claiming, particularly in the al-Rub' al-Khali.⁹

On 5 November 1935, A. Ryan handed to Hamza in Riyadh a memorandum on possible boundaries that favoured Saudi Arabia more than those boundaries outlined by the green line. This line was modified in 1937 and called the Riyadh line. However, it was suggested that boundaries should start from Ras Dawhat Salwa in the

⁸ Saudi Arabian Frontiers, Foreign Office Memorandum, 1935, IOR: R/15/2/465.

⁹ *Ibid.* See also map at the end of the thesis.

south-east and extend along the northern end of the al-Rub' al-Khali.¹⁰

Again there was a negative outcome and talks did not resume until March 1937, when G.W. Rendel, Head of the Eastern Affairs Department in the Foreign Office, paid a visit to Jeddah to meet the Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister, Yusuf Yasin, and negotiate with him about the territories of Khur al-'Adid and Jabal Nakhsh.¹¹ During the discussions, Rendel mentioned that the Khur al-'Adid region had been considered part of Abu Dhabi since the 1770s and that Saudi Arabia's claim to it was therefore unfounded. It was also considered crucial that Abu Dhabi had access to the coast so as to connect it with the adjacent sheikhdom of Qatar. In addition, the memorandum also mentioned that the region to the south of Khur al-'Adid was considered part of Abu Dhabi's territory, referring to the memorandum of the Saudi Government dated 3 April 1935 in which Saudi Arabia admitted that Sabkhat Matti was part of the territories of Abu Dhabi.¹²

Al-Sufuf also came under scrutiny in the discussions between sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Rendel, the former claiming that it belonged to the tribes of al-Murrah, but Rendel utterly rejecting this claim on the grounds that if Saudi Arabia claimed a right in a land that was as remote as al-Murrah and in the event that it was conceded to her on the basis of being inhabited by al-Murrah, then Saudi Arabia might even be

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Record made by G.W. Rendel, 20 March 1937, IOR: R/15/1/607.

¹² *Ibid.*

encouraged to claim Muscat as hers.¹³

In spite of such discrepancies, the Foreign Office made great efforts to find a solution to the problem. On 18 February 1938, the British Secretary of State for India sent a circular memorandum to all administrative departments who had a representative on the Middle East Branch Committee with the aim of sounding out the possibility of making a concession in relation to the two contrasted regions of conflict-- Khur al-'Adid and Jabal Nakhsh. After the geographical and historical facts were established in relation to Khur al-'Adid and the interests of the British and the Saudis were clearly spelt out, the British memorandum concluded that; for political reasons, if Ibn Saud's demands were fulfilled in return for reaching a final settlement to the boundaries problem, in general it would be necessary to urge the sheikh of Abu Dhabi to relinquish his rights to those areas.¹⁴

The Foreign Office made a further move by suggesting some financial compensation to the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, in return for his approval, provided by the Saudis or the British Government, in case the Saudi Government might not be able to find the necessary funds. But the difficulty was that the British Government could not exert pressure on the sheikh of Abu Dhabi to accept its proposal.¹⁵ Consequently, the India Office advised the British officials to accept that decision reached with regard to

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Telegram of Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, 18 February 1938, IOR: R/15/1/608.

Saudi boundaries, as long as it was legally established. In other correspondence, dated 30 August 1938, between the India Office and the officials in the Gulf, the India Office voiced its concerns about this matter. Together with the Political Resident in the Gulf, its officials did not see any point in insisting on negotiating about resolving the boundaries conflict between the Saudis and the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, since the India Office had the suspicion that Ibn Saud was ready to accept its offer. Besides, the case of Khur al-'Adid would shake the status of the British Government in the eyes of the people and the rulers of the Gulf.¹⁶

The negotiations between the two parties did not achieve a clear result acceptable to all. With the start of World War II in September 1939, negotiations were suspended, to resume immediately after the war.¹⁷ The resumption of oil excavation by Petroleum Concessions Limited in the Emirates of the Trucial Coast and Oman, particularly the survey of Buraimi between 1947-1948, was a serious blow to the Saudi claim for the area between the eastern part of Jafurah, after more than a decade of dispute over it.¹⁸ As a result, the Saudis put forward their claim to other new areas.

The problem of boundaries resurfaced between 1947 and 1948, when ARAMCO employees who were excavating for oil penetrated the lands of al-'Aql, al-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to the Under Secretary of State, India Office, 1 July 1938.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Secretary of State for India to Government of India, 30 August 1938.

¹⁷ PCL to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 30 November 1945, IOR: R/15/2/465.

¹⁸ PCL to Foreign Office, 29 April 1947, 19 April 1948.

Majan, and Baynuna in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. This move angered the ruler of Abu Dhabi, sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan, who protested to the British.¹⁹ Hence, the British Government adopted the stance that had been previously taken, outlined by the blue line.

In April 1949, P.D. Stobart, the Political Officer in Sharjah, and the brother of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Haza' bin Sultan went to investigate the problem in the lands there. They discovered an ARAMCO camp in the region of `Ayn Baywa, two miles and a half to the south of Ras Sallah, and another camp with a runway twelve miles away from Khur al-Duwayhin, with one Saudi official and twenty armed Saudi guards. When they were asked what they were doing there, their answer was that they had been commanded to be present by Prince Saud bin Jalawi, the ruler of Hasa. One of the surveyors of ARAMCO admitted that he knew about the company's plan to send him into the territories of Abu Dhabi. At this point, Stobart handed the leader of the group a written protest (on 22 April 1949) in which he stated that the sheikh of Abu Dhabi considered the presence of the mission at any part to the north of Sufuf as exploitation of his land, particularly as armed Saudi soldiers accompanied it.²⁰

Stobart therefore ordered the Saudi official to withdraw his platoon from the territory that belonged to Abu Dhabi, before any confrontation between the two sides

¹⁹ British Agency, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 27 April 1949, FO 1016/58.

²⁰ Stobart Political Officer Sharjah to Pelly, Political Agent Bahrain, 27 April 1949.

might take place. The Saudi official refused to comply and, at the same time, he disarmed the guards who accompanied the Political Officer. The arms were later handed over to Abu Dhabi officials. After that incident, the Saudi guards withdrew and returned to Saudi Arabia, followed by the representatives of the ARAMCO and the surveyors. On 27 April 1949, ARAMCO answered the memorandum of the British Political Officer, saying that the protest should be sent directly to the Saudi Government because, as a company, ARAMCO was not concerned with the political side of the boundary problem.²¹

Therefore, the Saudi Government protested to the British Embassy in Jeddah over Stobart's attitude, but the British officials refused to accept the Saudi protest and emphasized the right of Abu Dhabi to exercise control over the area.²²

The Saudi Government, however, was not impressed by the attitude adopted by the British Government, but felt that they should start discussions. Therefore, on 14 October 1949, it again presented a new definition of boundaries to the British Government, a definition, as the Saudis claimed, that was the result of thorough investigation of the places of the tribes and the actual situation as it stood, suggesting that the Buraimi frontiers were a matter to be solved between the independent sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia alone.²³ The British Government did not agree to the

²¹ *Ibid.* See also Kelly *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, pp. 145-146.

²² Kelly, *Eastern Arabian frontiers*, pp. 142-143.

²³ Saudi Arabia, *Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia*, vol. 2, Cairo, 1955, p. 72.

above Saudi proposal and wrote back informing the Saudis that the British Government was abiding by the frontiers drawn in the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913.²⁴ In that Convention, Buraimi was divided between Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, whose foreign relations are the responsibility of the British Government.²⁵

6.2.1 The Buraimi Oasis

The Buraimi Oasis, which is situated in al-Dhahira region, consists of nine villages, the largest of which is also called Buraimi. The other villages are Hili, Mas'udi, Jimi, Qattarah, Muwajja'i, Mu'tarid, Hamasa, and Sa'ra. The Buraimi Oasis is situated 90 miles to the south-east of the city of Abu Dhabi, to the north of Hafit mountain, and 10 miles to the al-Hajr mountains, which separate al-Dhahira from al-Batina and from the Sultanate of Muscat.²⁶ The population of the Buraimi was estimated at 10,000 in 1953.²⁷

As mentioned earlier, the consequence of the Saudi Government's refusal to stick to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 was its claim to sovereignty over a number of lands in Abu Dhabi's territory. These were places which the Saudis had already acknowledged in 1935 to belong to the Trucial Coast Emirates, among them

²⁴ Albaharna, H.M., *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States*, Manchester, 1968, pp. 200-201.

²⁵ Kelly, J.B., *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, p. 147.

²⁶ *Aramco reports on Al Hasa and Oman, 1950-1955*, vol. 4, Farnham Common, 1990, p 199.

²⁷ Albaharna, *The Legal Status*, p. 208. See maps at the end of the thesis.

Buraimi. The British Government refuted the 1949 Saudi claims²⁸ and, in consequence, the dispute over the boundaries of Buraimi emerged.

The confrontation between subjects of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Saudis about the collection of *zakat* in Buraimi in 1950 made the situation even more tense.²⁹ The Saudi Government claimed that the land was its own as it had been collecting *zakat* in that area since 1913. The British Government replied on 25 July 1950 to the Saudis reminding them that they had been subjects of the Turkish Government, with whom the British Government had concluded the Convention of 1913-1914. That agreement asserted the blue line as the furthest limit of the Turkish sovereignty in Eastern Arabia, i.e., the borders of the future Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the British Government thought that collecting *zakat* from the people of that area was not a proof in international law of their sovereign rights.³⁰

From July 1950, the new negotiations between the British Government and Saudi Arabia about the Buraimi Oasis remained as they were, with no progress being achieved. In August 1951, the London Agreement stipulated that both sides should exclude troops and oil company personnel from the disputed areas until the settlement of the boundary question was reached.³¹

²⁸ Kelly, *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, p. 146.

²⁹ A.J. Wilton, British Agency, Doha to C.J. Pelly, Political Agent, Bahrain, 10 April 1950, IOR: R/15/2/466.

³⁰ Kelly, *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, p. 148.

³¹ Hawley, D., *The Trucial States*, p. 189. More information about the Buraimi Oasis case was collected from Hawley, who was the Political Agent in Dubai from 1958 to 1961, in a meeting on 18

Later, in January and February 1952, a conference was held in Dammam in Saudi Arabia to discuss the issue of Buraimi. The conference was attended by Prince Faisal, Saudi Foreign Minister, sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan, ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sir R. Hay, the Political Resident in the Gulf, and M. Wier, the Political Officer. The Conference did not achieve any substantial results, because the Saudi Government insisted on its claim to Buraimi, so that no agreement was reached, save for continuing to abide by the London Agreement.

Not long after this Conference had finished, on 31 August 1952, Rashid bin Hamad, the chief of al-Bushams tribe in Hamasa, coming back from his pilgrimage to Mecca, was accompanied by Turki bin 'Utaishan and 40 of his men, representing the Saudi Arabian Government. In Hamasa, Turki declared himself in command of the place and raised the flag of Saudi Arabia there. This action caused the situation to erupt in the area. Naturally, the Sultan of Muscat considered that act as one of occupation. He gathered a force at Suhar and, in addition, a Trucial Oman Levies force assembled at al-Jahili fort in al-'Ain. Shaikh Zaid, the brother of sheikh Shakhbut, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, represented his brother at al-'Ain. However, sheikh

May 1998. He explained to the present writer that in the light of the agreement concluded between the Government of Great Britain and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast in 1892, Britain assumed the custody of the Emirates and had a principal role in defending and protecting Abu Dhabi's territory and that of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman against the claims of the Government of Saudi Arabia, particularly in relation to the Buraimi Oasis. According to him, the dispute about the rightful ownership of the Buraimi Oasis lasted from 1949 until 1955.

Zaid adopted a cautious attitude toward this incident.³²

The intervention of the British Government in London in the turbulent situation of Hamasa was decisive. The correspondence between the Foreign Office, the Political Resident in Bahrain, and the Consul-General in Muscat revealed that the British Government wanted to help the Sultan of Oman to establish his authority over his territories. But to avoid a military confrontation between the representatives of the conflicting parties, negotiations continued and led to not more than a Standstill Agreement in Jedda on 26 October 1952.³³

Immediately after the Standstill Agreement was agreed upon, the British Government proposed to the Saudi Government the possibility of solving the situation via an independent arbitrator, upon whose decision the Saudi claims would be established or refuted. The Saudi Government refused this suggestion and instead offered to settle the dispute by:

- a) A plebiscite in the Buraimi under the supervision of a tripartite Commission (U.K., U.S.A., and Saudi).
- b) Direct negotiations on other disputed areas by a fact finding commission.³⁴

³² Information from Sir Michael Weir, who was the Political Agent at Sharjah and Dubai between 1952 and 1954. As the representative of the British Government in the Trucial Coast Emirates, he attended the Dammam Conference and visited the Buraimi Oasis immediately after Turki bin 'Utaishan had established himself at Hamasa. See also Kelly, *Eastern Arabian frontiers*, p. 159.

³³ Information from Sir Bernard Burrows, who was the Head of the Middle Eastern Department in the Foreign Office in London from 1949 to 1953 and became the Political Resident in Bahrain from 1953 to 1958. See also Burrows, *Footnotes in the sand: the Gulf in transition, 1953-1958*, London, 1990, pp. 87-111.

³⁴ Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, London, 7 January 1953, FO 1016/303.

The British officials in the Gulf took an even harder position. The Political Resident in Bahrain told the Foreign Office in London that "our experience has shown that direct negotiations with the Saudis, without some element of compulsion are unlikely to produce reasonable settlement."³⁵ Moreover, the Political Resident added that the Saudis were interfering in the affairs of the Buraimi Oasis using

bribery and intimidation tampering with traditional allegiance not only to Muscat tribes but to the tribes indisputably belonging to the rulers of the Trucial sheikhdoms. Protests to the Saudi Government have been of no avail.³⁶

Thus, the British Government's reaction was to denounce the Saudi violation of the Standstill Agreement of 1952. However, the Foreign Office in London renewed its offer of arbitration about the disputed areas. It maintained its right to a part of the area, namely Sabakhat Muti, Baynuna, Liwa, Umm al-Zumul, and some villages of Buraimi which belonged to the Abu Dhabi territory. Added to this, the British Government envisaged controlling Saudi access to the areas mentioned above, besides depriving Turki of the supplies and reinforcements coming into Hamasa.³⁷

Obviously, the Saudi Government felt obliged to reconsider its stance in its relations with the British Government. Thus, a change of policy was expressed in a letter sent by `Abd al-`Aziz al-Saud, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, to the British Prime

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, on 11 May 1953. In this letter he welcomed the British Government's proposal of arbitration about the disputed areas, although he asked the British Government to treat equally the parties involved in the dispute, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. By this `Abd al-`Aziz al-Saud wanted Britain to acknowledge the rights of Saudi Arabia in Buraimi, which he claimed Britain had accepted in the Standstill Agreement.³⁸

Pending the outcome of the arbitration, the next measure the British Government adopted was to prepare a draft of an arbitration on settlement of the boundary dispute. This draft was a twenty-article document, sent by Sir Winston Churchill to G.C. Pelham, the British Ambassador in Jedda, on 21 May 1953.³⁹

The death of `Abd al-`Aziz al-Saud in November 1953 further delayed the solution of the problem. The new ruler, Saud bin `Abd al-`Aziz, ordered his brother, Crown Prince Faisal, to take over the responsibility for seeking a satisfactory outcome to the Buraimi dispute. Faisal promised to continue the work his father had started yet had been unable to finish.⁴⁰ Hence, lengthy negotiations about finding a solution to the boundary dispute resumed. The negotiations culminated in the agreement of all parties to refer their dispute to arbitration by a special tribunal.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office in London, to Political Resident, Bahrain, 1 April 1953.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Ibn Saud to Sir Winston Churchill, 11 May 1953.

³⁹ Winston Churchill to G.C. Pelham, British Ambassador, Jeddah, 21 May 1953, FO 1016/304.

6.2.2 The Buraimi dispute and attempts at a settlement, 1954-1955

After long negotiations, the British Government suggested arbitration. On that basis, the arbitration agreement was eventually signed on 30 July 1954. It settled the boundary dispute between the British Government, representing the British-protected sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and the Saudi Arabian Government. This tribunal aimed at locating a common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi in relation to the Buraimi Oasis. It was on 20 July 1954 that the tribunal was formed. Its members consisted of the president, Dr. Charles de Visscher (Belgium), a former judge of the International Court of Justice; Sir Reader W. Bullard (Britain), a retired member of the Foreign Office; sheikh Yusuf Yasin, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia; Dr. Ernesto de Dihigo (Cuba); and Mr. Mahmud Hassan (Pakistan).⁴¹

The outcome of this agreement was the withdrawal of Turki bin 'Utaishan and his men from Buraimi on 13 August 1954. Two groups of forces from each party were assigned to police and protect the villages of Buraimi, consisting of fifteen Saudi policemen and fifteen policemen from the Trucial Oman Levies. The Trucial Oman

⁴⁰ Prince Faisal in Jeddah to the Foreign Office in London, 15 December 1953, FO 1016/305.

Levies were commanded by Captain P. Clayton, while the Saudi Arabian troops were commanded by 'Abd Allah bin Nami.⁴²

After these events, apart from the Buraimi Oasis dispute, the British Government recorded several complaints about Saudi interference with the arbitration. Such interference mounted to suborning and tampering with witnesses. From late 1954 until the first session of the Buraimi Arbitration Tribunal held in Nice in January 1955, both parties submitted claims against each other, but it proved impossible to reach any major decision towards solving the dispute.⁴³

However, in March 1955, the president of the tribunal, Dr. C. de Visscher, set September 1955 as a deadline by which proposals were to be submitted by Britain and Saudi Arabia. As a result, negotiations and efforts were stepped up by both parties to find a solution. In April, Saudi Arabia complained to the tribunal about the actions of the British Government's official in the Buraimi Oasis. In May 1955, Britain presented to the tribunal several counter claims about Saudi exploitation of the conditions of arbitration.⁴⁴

The incident of the fire which broke out in Hamasa in July 1955 and destroyed

⁴¹ *Arabian boundaries: primary documents, 1853-1957*, vol. 20 (Buraimi), Farnham Common, 1988, p. 18. See also Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p. 190.

⁴² Clayton, *Two Alpha Lima*, p. 58. See also Kelly, *Eastern Arabian frontiers*, p. 175.

⁴³ Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, London, 25 January 1955, FO 1016/411.

⁴⁴ Foreign Office, London to Political Resident, Bahrain, 3, 18, 24 March 1955, FO 1016/414.

a large part of the town was an occasion for both parties to accuse each other of deliberately exploiting the conditions of arbitration.⁴⁵ Furthermore, in August 1955, the British Government submitted to the tribunal all its claims about Saudi breaches of the conditions of arbitration. Among the claims of the British Government were that the Saudis were sending arms and ammunition into the disputed area and that they were preventing the distribution of relief supplies to destitute people following the fire at Hamasa.⁴⁶ The Saudi Government also prepared a list of counter-claims and submitted them to the tribunal. Among the Saudi claims were that the tribes inhabiting these areas bore allegiance to Saudi Arabia; that Saudi Arabia possessed a historical title to these areas; and that Saudi Arabia collected *zakat* from tribes in these areas, which constituted an acknowledgement of the allegiance of those tribes to it.⁴⁷

The meeting of the arbitration tribunal was held in Geneva in September 1955. Britain started accusing Saudi representatives of bribery and other subversive activities, as well as breaching the terms of arbitration both inside and outside the disputed zone. However, the tribunal dismissed these claims on the ground of their denial by Saudi representatives. The immediate outcome of this was the resignation of Sir R.W. Bullard, the British member of the tribunal, as Shaikh Yusuf Yasin was appalled by the accusations of his Saudi counterpart in the tribunal. Thus, the

⁴⁵ Political Agent, Dubai to Political Resident, Bahrain, 13 July 1955, FO 1016/409.

⁴⁶ Buraimi Arbitration Tribunal, 25 August 1955, FO 1016/ 418.

⁴⁷ Kelly, *Eastern Arabian frontiers*, p. 209

arbitration proceedings broke down and Dr. Visscher tendered his resignation.⁴⁸

The settlement of the boundary dispute was to come on 25 October 1955, when a squadron under a British military force invaded the neutral zone, where the joint Buraimi police were located, and arrested the Saudi policemen in Hamasa after an exchange of fire. On 26 October 1955, Hamasa was formally occupied by the Trucial Oman Levies. By the end of October, all the villages of Buraimi were in the hands of the Trucial Oman Levies.⁴⁹

Consequently, of the nine villages of the Buraimi Oasis, Hili, Mas'udi, Jimi, Qattarah, Muwaija'i, and Mu'tarid were formally acknowledged as part of Abu Dhabi's territory, while Buraimi, Hamasa, and Sa`ra were established as part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.

In the official statement on the Buraimi dispute issued by the Foreign Office in October 1955, it is stated that the Saudis had been "engaged in a deliberate systematic, and persistent policy of large scale bribery calculated to subvert the people in the disputed areas from their allegiance to the ruler of Abu Dhabi or the Sultan of Muscat."⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Clayton, *Two Alpha Lima*, p. 70. See also *The Times*, Wednesday, 14 September 1955, p. 6 and Thursday 27 October 1955, p. 10.

⁴⁹ Clayton, *Two Alpha Lima*, pp. 71-76.

⁵⁰ Foreign Office to Political Resident, 7,11,19 October 1955, FO 1016/419. See also Clayton, *Two Alpha Lima*, pp. 171-174.

Thus, in a statement to the House of Commons on the failure of arbitration in the Buraimi dispute, Sir Antony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, asserted that the attempts of the British Government to maintain friendly relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia had proved to be futile. He added that repeated negotiations to reach an agreement with the Saudi Government had merely led to increased Saudi claims against the territories of two Arab rulers, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman.⁵¹

The British Government then set about protecting the interests of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat. Hence, Sir Antony Eden declared to the House of Commons that the Riyadh line, which had been agreed upon by the Saudis in the Agreement of 1935 and modified in 1937, which also included concessions to the Saudis, was to be the only line that the British Government had agreed upon and fully informed the Saudi Government of, as the Saudi frontier on the one hand and the frontiers of both Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman on the other hand.⁵²

6.2.3 Further Developments in and Final Resolution of the Buraimi Dispute, 1956-1971

Following the Suez crisis, the Saudi Government took the substantial step of

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 19 October 1955.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 21 October 1955. See also *The Times*, Friday, 25 November 1955, p. 10.

breaking off diplomatic relations with the British Government in November 1956,⁵³ which further hampered a satisfactory outcome of the Buraimi dispute. Until 1959, there was no communication between the two countries. Early in 1960, attempts were made by the United Nations to intervene in order to bring about a resumption of diplomatic relations between the two governments, but the Saudi Government was adamant that the British Government had to give assurances that its stance over the Buraimi Oasis would be reconsidered.⁵⁴

In August 1960, both governments agreed on the appointment of a fact-finding mission to Buraimi supervised by the United Nations. But in spite of the situation regarding the Buraimi Oasis, the relations between the governments of the two countries remained virtually unchanged. In 1962, events in Yemen influenced the Government of Saudi Arabia to such an extent that it was ready to resume relations with the British Government, yet even then the Buraimi dispute, as far as the Saudis were concerned, had not been satisfactorily concluded. Nevertheless, in May 1963, relations between the two governments were reinstated. This was because Saudi Arabia supported the monarchy in Yemen, against the republicans who were supported by Egypt after September 1962. Additionally, Britain was protecting the Aden colony and its protectorates. It was in consequence of this relationship that

⁵³ 'Abd Allah, M. M., *The United Arab Emirates*, London, 1978, p. 211. For more information, see also, al-Shamsi, S.M., *The Al-Buraimi Dispute: A case study in inter-Arab politics*, PH.D thesis, the American University, Washington, D.C, 1986, pp. 135-137.

⁵⁴ Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p. 192.

Saudi Arabia and Britain came together.⁵⁵

Following that event, fostered by the British Government, direct contacts between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi were made. Finally, in 1968, after the British Government had decided to withdraw from the Gulf, it stepped up its efforts to urge the two countries to find a lasting settlement to the dispute over the Buraimi Oasis.⁵⁶

In 1971, the British Government withdrew from the Gulf region and the United Arab Emirates was established, which included the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. However, the dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi ground on until 1974, when an agreement was finally reached. According to this agreement, Saudi Arabia renounced its claim for rights in Buraimi; in return, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi conceded al-Majan to the Saudis. In addition, a corridor between Saudi Arabia and Khur 'Adid was established, in return for which Saudi Arabia conceded the oil wells located between the boundaries of the Emirates and Qatar. As a result of this, Saudi Arabia secured another gateway to the Gulf states.⁵⁷

6.3 The Boundaries between the Trucial Coast Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman

The issue of boundaries between the Emirates of the Trucial Coast and the

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*; see also Albaharana, *The Legal status*, pp. 206-207.

⁵⁶ 'Abd Allah, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 212. See also, Bin-Abood, S.M.O., *Britain's Withdrawal from the Gulf: With Particular Reference to the Emirates*, PH.D thesis, University of Durham, 1992, pp. 363,364.

⁵⁷ Al-Ash'al, 'A.A., *Qadiyat al-hudud fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi*, Cairo, 1978, p. 56. See also Litwak, R.,

Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is deeply rooted within a history extending back to the nineteenth century, when the broad lines of the boundaries were established on the basis of decisions made by the then British Government of India, reacting to arguments between the Trucial Coast and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. In so doing, the British Government of India relied on neither historical considerations nor geographical or legislative ones. In fact, it was British interests and dominion that influenced those decisions to a large extent.⁵⁸

It should be mentioned that relations between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Qawasim tribe were tarnished and cautionary, contrary to those between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Bani Ya'as rulers of Abu Dhabi. The reason might have been that the Qawasim belonged to the Ghafri alliance, which was in conflict with the Hana'i alliance, to which the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Bani Ya`as rulers of Abu Dhabi belonged.⁵⁹

However, historically relations between Albu Sa'id, the Sultans of Oman, and the Qawasim were a chronicle of aggression and continuous war, although the constant threat posed by the Saudis was a good enough reason for the reconciliation between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Oman. The conflict between the Qawasim and Oman was apparent in the problems relating to boundaries between the two sides.

Security in the Persian Gulf, vol. 2: Sources of inter-state conflict, Totowa, NJ, 1981, pp. 51-55.

⁵⁸ 'Abd Allah, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 291.

⁵⁹ The Ghafri alliance comprised the Adnani tribes, while the Hana'i alliance comprised the Qahtani tribes. These alliances appeared after the fall of the Ya`riba State in the seventeenth century.

The origin of the conflict was that the Sultan of Oman had interfered in the affairs of Fujairah in 1903, when Fujairah was controlled by the Qawasim.⁶⁰

In 1939 an incident which brought up the border issue occurred. When the sultan of Muscat and Oman, Sa'id bin Taimur, sent a message to the Political Agent in Muscat explaining that as the sheikh of Fujairah, Muhammad bin Hamad bin 'Abd Allah al-Sharqi, whom he considered as one of his subjects, wanted to travel to Bahrain, he had no objections to the British authorities issuing a visa for him to go there.⁶¹

The Political Resident could not agree to grant the sheikh of Fujairah a visa for Bahrain stamped in his passport, which the sheikh of Fujairah would also refuse to use as it implied an acknowledgement that he was a subject of the Sultan of Muscat, as the passport was issued from Muscat. Thus, the Political Resident clearly realized that if he granted the sheikh a visa, then this would be a clear admission by the British authorities that he was a subject of the Sultan of Muscat. Moreover, according to a letter of the India Office, addressed to the Political Resident, dated 30 April 1903, it appeared that Fujairah belonged to the leaders of the Qawasim; however, they had been content not to interfere to any great extent in the affairs of Fujairah, particularly in its external conflict with Muscat.

⁶⁰ Foreign Office to India Office, 14 February 1903, IOR: R/15/6/239. See also Chapter 3 of this thesis.

⁶¹ Sayyid Sa'id bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat to Political Agent, Muscat, 12 March 1939, IOR: R/15/1/290.

The Political Resident felt that if the whole issue of the relations between Muscat and Fujairah were brought up through the passport request, this was an unfortunate moment just prior to World War II and, therefore, if the Sultan brought up that matter again, the Political Agent should explain to the sheikh of Fujairah that a visa could not be granted as it would be an acknowledgement on the part of the British Government that Fujairah was indeed subject to Muscat. In addition, the Political Resident requested the Political Agent to press the Sultan of Muscat on the subject of which area of Fujairah he claimed to be his. He was, however, of the opinion that Fujairah should never be subject to Muscat.⁶²

From the above correspondence, it is clear that the Political Resident tried to put off a decision in the case of Fujairah. Great Britain was disinclined to get involved in this controversy at that time because of the threat of war hanging over Europe.

The problems of boundaries did not concern Fujairah alone. In fact, at a later stage, Diba was at the centre of a conflict between the Qawasim and the rulers of Muscat and Oman.

The region around the settlement of Diba extended along the Gulf of Oman to

⁶² *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bushire to Political Agent, Muscat, 5 July 1939. For more information, see Chapter 3 of this thesis: Fujairah Affairs.

the north towards Ras Musandam, surrounded by palm groves and fertile land, and its boundaries were the high and arid mountains of Oman. Diba was divided into three parts: the northern part, called Diba al-Bi'ah, which was a part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman; the southern part, called Diba al-Husn, which had belonged to the Emirate of Kalba when it had independence from 1936 to 1952 but had thereafter been annexed by Sharjah;⁶³ and the middle part, which was Diba al-Ghurfa, to the south of Diba al-Husn and belonging to the Emirate of Fujairah, which became an independent Emirate in 1952. It should be mentioned that the northern and southern parts were separated by two small dry valleys irrigated by water coming down from the mountains in the rainy season. The people who settled in those areas were the tribes of Shihuh, Matarish, Sharqiyyin, and Qawasim. Each group of families in those tribes was loyal to the ruler that best served its interests.⁶⁴

In May 1934, Sa'id bin Taimur, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, informed sheikh Rashid bin Ahmad al-Qasimi, the sheikh of Diba, that he was sending a new *wali* to govern the district called Wilayat Khasab and the territories that belonged to it. He made it clear that he not only expected the sheikh to obey the new *wali*, but also to advise him when necessary.⁶⁵

When sheikh Rashid received the above message on 24 May 1934, he informed the ruler of Sharjah, sheikh Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, as he was subject to

⁶³ For more information, see Chapter 3 of this thesis.

⁶⁴ Political Agent, Muscat to Political Resident, Bushire, 14 June 1933, IOR: R/15/1/284.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Sa'id bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat and Oman to sheikh Rashid b. Ahmed, sheikh of Diba, 19 May 1934. (It should be noted that *wali* was a title given to the Omani leaders.)

him, of the content of the Sultan's letter.⁶⁶

The ruler of Sharjah informed the Political Resident of this matter and telling him that sheikh Ahmad bin Rashid was still being attacked by the Shihuh tribesmen, who were subject to the ruler of Oman. He also reminded the British that he had addressed the Sultan, but to no avail.⁶⁷

Such exchanges of letters and attempts at arbitration between the two conflicting sides were very much part of the Gulf scenario in which Britain played a role of encouragement and support. At the start of 1940, a dispute was raging in Diba between the Qawasim and the Shihuh, who were subjects of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The Shihuh had exploited the weakness of the Qawasim and run havoc in Diba, to such an extent that the prisoners in Diba's fort were released, while the *wali* of Khasab was unable to control them. When one of the sheikhs of the Qawasim, Hamid bin `Abd Allah, tried to stop them, impose security, and protect the part that was subject to the Qawasim in Diba against the Shihuh, it led to a major conflict between the two sides in November of that year.⁶⁸

Ill feeling between the two sides became again apparent when the inhabitants of Wadi Madha, consisting of the three villages of Madha, Ghana, and Hayr Bani Hamid, which belonged to the city of Diba, asked sheikh Hamid bin `Abd Allah to

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, sheikh Rashid bin. Ahmed, sheikh of Dibba to the ruler of Sharjah, 24 May 1934.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, the ruler of Sharjah to Political Resident, Bushire, 10 June 1934.

send reinforcements to help them against the repeated attacks of the Shihuh. This happened while the sheikh was on his way to Kalba in March 1941. A number of men were later sent to each village in Wadi Madha to impose the control of the Qawasim over the land, which in fact for many years had been under the domination of the Shihuh, at a time when the Qawasim were weak and going through a period of disintegration in their tribal solidarity.⁶⁹

The confrontation between the two sides did not come to an end until the sheikh of Fujairah and the *wali* of Shinas intervened and managed to secure a provisional truce for two months. A final agreement had to follow when the Sultan of Muscat returned from India.⁷⁰

When the situation had calmed down, the Qawasim set about the construction of a tower in their territories, facing that of the Shihuh. The regent of Kalba, sheikh Khalid, supported its building and considered such a measure necessary to protect the inhabitants there. He thought that it was the right of the Qawasim to build a number of towers inside their Emirate for the security of their subjects, without interfering in the affairs of Muscat, whose people had absolute freedom to do whatever they liked in their own territory.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Political Agent, Muscat to sheikh Hasan Rahmah, Diba, 17 November 1914, IOR: R/15/6/220.

⁶⁹ sheikh Khalid b. Ahmad, Regent of Kalba to Native Agent, Sharjah, 12 March 1941, IOR: R/15/1/291.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Bahrain, 22 April 1941.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 22 April 1941.

However, the Shihuh objected to the building of such a tower and asked the Government of Muscat and Oman to make the Qawasim demolish the tower or allow them to build one opposite. The Sultan objected to this request, but instead negotiated with the Qawasim to remove their tower, assuring them that he would undertake to control the Shihuh, his subjects, and that he was to be held responsible for their actions. Sheikh Khalid, the regent of Kalba, initially agreed to remove the tower of al-Murabba' and there was an agreement signed on 22 April 1941, which provided that both sides had to keep the terms agreed upon throughout that interim period.⁷²

In view of the Sultan's undertaking, the Political Agent in Bahrain suggested that the Sultan appoint his representative in Diba, because unless the Shihuh were kept under observation, they would continue to provoke people and create problems. However, the Qawasim in Diba were reluctant to demolish the tower until they were sure that the Government of Muscat and Oman was capable of exercising some control over the Shihuh.⁷³ Meanwhile, the Political Resident in Bushire was advocating a calming down as, in 1941, the British had other, more pressing matters on their mind.⁷⁴

Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur requested a meeting in Muscat with Sheikh Khalid,

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, Bushire, 12 June 1941.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bushire to Political Agent, Bahrain, 27 June 1941.

the regent of Kalba. When the regent arrived there in August 1941, he met Ahmad bin Ibrahim, the adviser to the Sultan, and had discussions with him, but no positive results were achieved. However, Ahmad bin Ibrahim asked sheikh Khalid to convey to the Sultan his readiness to comply with the Sultan's wishes over the tower and the Madha valley, hoping that this would induce him to concur with any request that he might later make of him. sheikh Khalid felt it would be unwise to go any further since, if the Sultan refused his requests, he would not be able to withdraw his acceptance or put forward any further request.⁷⁵

Thus, when the meeting eventually took place, the Sultan of Muscat asked sheikh Khalid to demolish the tower and leave Madha valley to the Shihuh. The sheikh declined to do so until the Sultan appointed sheikh Muhammad bin Ahmad as *wali* of the land occupied by the Shihuh. sheikh Khalid maintained that sheikh Muhammad would stand with his tribe and, concerning Madha village, the Sultan insisted that it should be left to the Shihuh and, for that reason, discussions were not decisive. However, it was agreed that the discussion would have to be settled in two months' time, after the end of the month of Ramadan. Thus, both parties agreed on a truce for two months.⁷⁶

Finally, on 31 December 1941, a compromise was achieved about the affairs

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 27 June 1941.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Memorandum by Native Agent, Sharjah, 26 September 1941.

of Diba and the demolition of the tower, in return for 600 rupees (£42) and a pledge to prevent the Qawasim and Shihuh from building more towers, fortresses, or other constructions that could be used in war, although they were allowed to keep any previous constructions if they pledged to stop their raids on the Qawasim. Moreover, it was agreed that the affairs of the Shihuh were to be controlled by the *wali* of Khasab.⁷⁷

Although the same agreement had seemingly been concluded, it did not represent the end of the dispute between the conflicting parties. The Political Agent in Bahrain, in a message to the Political Resident, expressed his concern that the Shihuh were still not content with what they had achieved and that the Qawasim had many internal problems. Thus, there seemed no prospect of peace in relation to these two parties, unless the Sultan chose a representative to control the Shihuh who lived in Diba and who did not belong to that tribe. That matter caused continuous concern to the British authorities in the region, who feared they might have to use force at some point to control the Shihuh.⁷⁸

The boundary dispute between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Trucial Coast Emirates remained relatively calm in the last two years of World War II, but, by the beginning of the 1950s, it resurfaced. The British Residency in Bahrain

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Native Agent, Sharjah to Political Agent, Dubai, 28 December 1941.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Bahrain to Political Resident, January 1944.

and the British officials in Muscat and Oman and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi were adamant that the frontiers between the two parties had to be defined. Between 1953 and 1954, the oil companies in the Trucial Coast requested the British Government officials in the Gulf to speed up their efforts to intervene and concentrate the minds of the parties involved in this matter of territorial boundaries. Finally, in 1954, the British Foreign Office delegated J. Walker to draw up detailed boundaries between the separate Emirates and also between them and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.⁷⁹

As has been shown, according to the settlement of the Buraimi dispute, which ended in 1955, six villages of Buraimi were annexed to the Abu Dhabi territory and three to that of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The dispute about Buraimi prompted the British officials in the Trucial Coast Emirates, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and the oil companies to ask both parties to define their boundaries clearly so as to enable the oil companies to work in security. Thus, in 1959, a frontier agreement was reached between the Sultan of Oman, Sa'id bin Taimur, and the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Shakhbut bin Sultan. This agreement finally settled the boundaries between the two states.⁸⁰

On another front, the British Government's officials were also involved in the

⁷⁹ C.M. Pirie-Gordon, Political Agent, Sharjah to C.M. Le Quesne, British Residency, Bahrain, 18 July 1953, FO 1016/306; and Minute on Shaikh Saqr of Buraimi's frontiers, 25 March 1954, FO 1016/378.

⁸⁰ Abd Allah, M.M., *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 307.

boundary dispute that had arisen between the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman and the Emirates of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. This dispute escalated when the officials of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman imposed customs levies on goods coming from Sharjah to Kalba crossing at the Omani customs post of al-Aswad, situated between Sharjah and Kalba, as Kalba was part of the Emirate of Sharjah.⁸¹

In 1956, the above dispute with Sharjah had also extended to the territory of Wadi Madha, previously mentioned as part of the dispute in 1941. This caused the intervention of British officials. They suggested that sheikh Saqr bin Sultan, the sheikh of Sharjah, write to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman protesting that Wadi Madha had been part of the territories of Sharjah since the nineteenth century. The British Resident in Bahrain was of the opinion that if the Sultan of Muscat and Oman did not react positively to the sheikh of Sharjah's protest, then the matter had to be settled via arbitration.⁸²

However, no arbitration was held and the dispute remained virtually unsettled until 1963. In fact, the final solution of the unsettled areas came after Britain sent a Foreign Office representative, M.S. Buckmaster, to negotiate and reconcile the two parties. His efforts continued from 1963 to 1967, when an agreement was drawn up

⁸¹ R. Tristram, British Council, Muscat to Saiyid Ahmad bin Ibrahim, Minister of Interior, Muscat, 1 September 1954, FO 1016/380. For more information about Kalba's location and affairs, see Chapter 3 of this thesis.

⁸² F.B. Richards, Acting Political Resident to J.M. Edes, Acting Political Agent, Dubai, 19 July 1956, FO 371/120602; see also British hegemony on the Trucial Coast: Exclusive Treaty, 1892, IOR: L/P and

between the Trucial Coast sheikhs and the Sultan of Oman, supervised by the British authorities before their withdrawal from the Gulf region.⁸³

6.4 The Boundaries between the Trucial Coast Emirates and Iran

Iran was the biggest regional force bordering the Gulf--an area which the Iranians envisaged as vital to their expansion of interests. This was possibly owing to the weakness and disintegration of the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, in addition to the existence of Iranian minorities there. Moreover, the Iranians found out that their attempts to invade the islands of the Trucial Coast were not militarily costly, and they were further encouraged in their aggressive adventurism by the fact that the British, the authority responsible for foreign affairs in the sheikhdoms, in accordance with the Agreement of 1892, were advocating diplomatic solutions to the problems there.⁸⁴

The main points of conflict between Iran and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast dated back to 1887, when the Persians occupied Lingah and then Sirri island. In order to facilitate negotiations with the Persian Government, in August 1887, the British Government decided to accept implicitly the Persian occupation of Sirri, although it did not withdraw its original protest against the Persian claim to the island. Therefore, the Persians revived their claim to rights in the islands of Abu Musa and the two

S /20/ C248D.

⁸³ 'Abd Allah, M.M., *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 295.

Tunbs.⁸⁵

Referral to the records of the British Political Resident in Bushire in 1904 shows that the sheikhs of the Qawasim did not relinquish their right to the island of Sirri; they were, in fact repeatedly concerned with its affairs. They reiterated this right in 1895, more vociferously than they emphasized their ownership of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.⁸⁶ However, the situation developed to such an extent that the Persian Government extended its claims to more territories, after Sirri fell under their control at the beginning the twentieth century.

In April 1904, a Belgian official working for the Iranian Customs visited the three islands, lowered the flag of Sharjah, and raised the flag of Persia, appointing guards there to protect it. The consequence of this was a protest made by the Political Agent in Bahrain on behalf of the sheikh of Sharjah, but the Persian Government denied any knowledge of the incident and ordered the guards to withdraw and lower the Persian flag. In May 1904, the flag of Sharjah was raised again.⁸⁷

The islands that were at the centre of the controversy between Iran and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast are situated at the gateway to the Gulf. In spite of their size, they are of strategic importance because of the following reasons:

⁸⁴ British hegemony on the Trucial Coast: Exclusive Treaty, 1892, IOR: L/P and S/20/C284D.

⁸⁵ Political Resident to Government of India, 27 September 1887, FO 371/13009.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, A Note of 23 April, 1904.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, India Office to Foreign Office, 4 May 1904.

1. The deep sea channel of the Gulf was between these islands and the Iranian coast.
2. These islands can be used as shelter for ships when necessary, particularly in storms.
3. The sheikhs of al-Qawasim used them in the past as pastures for their cattle, particularly in spring.⁸⁸

Let us consider these islands in some more detail.

6.4.1 Abu Musa Island

The island of Abu Musa is situated at the gateway to the Gulf, about 68 miles from the Strait of Hurmuz, 44 miles from the coast of Sharjah, and 64 miles from the Iranian coast. It is the largest of the three islands and is especially important for being a haven for shipping, particularly in stormy weather.

The significance of Abu Musa island stems from its location in an area near to the Strait of Hurmuz half way between Iran and the Arabian coast. Thus, it was seen as a station from which to monitor the route of oil tankers passing along the coast. In number these often averaged one tanker every 12 minutes, particularly after oil began to be exported in large quantities.⁸⁹ In addition, there were very significant deposits of iron ore present, about which there was lively competition between Britain and Germany. The Robert Wonckhaus company wanted to set up a settlement and mine on Abu Musa in 1906. However, on 10 October 1907, the ruler of Sharjah, sheikh

⁸⁸ 'Abd Allah, M.M., *Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidah wa-jiranuha*, Kuwait, 1981, p. 321. See also, Scholfield, *Territorial Foundations*, pp.34 -41.

⁸⁹ Ghunaym, 'Abd al-Hamid, *Mushkilat al-hudud al-siyasiyyah fi al-sahil al-gharbi li-'l-Khalij al-'Arabi*, MA thesis, Cairo University, 1975, p.129.

Saqr bin Khalid bin Sultan, at the request of the British officials in the Gulf, issued a writ to cancel the concession given to the German company within ten days. Later, a British company, Stick, managed to secure a concession to excavate for bauxite, also found on Abu Musa.⁹⁰

6.4.2 Great Tunb

This island is situated 17 miles to the south-west of the Iranian island of Qishm and 46 miles to the north-east of the Arabian coast. It is ring-shaped, with a diameter of about 2.25 miles. In 1912, after consulting the ruler of Sharjah, the British officials in the area built a lighthouse at this island to help ships sailing in the area.⁹¹ The island was inhabited by a number of Arabs and Iranians, although, fresh water is not widely available there.⁹²

6.4.3 Little Tunb

Eight miles south-west of Great Tunb is the 35-metre high rock of Little Tunb.⁹³ This island is one mile long and three quarters of a mile wide. It is sparsely inhabited as it has no fresh water at all.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Lieutenant C.H. Gabriel, Assistant Resident, Bushire to Louis W. Dame, Secretary to the

Government of India, 25 October 1907, IOR:R/15/1/254. For more information, see also, Busch, B.C., *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914*, Berkeley, 1967, pp. 369-372.

⁹¹ Political Resident to sheikh of Sharjah, 28 September 1912, FO 371/13009.

⁹² Al-Adhami, W.H, *Al-Niza' bayna dawlat al-Imarat wa-Iran hawla juzur Abu Musa, wa-Tunb al-Kubra wa-al-Sughra*, London, 1993, p. 23.

⁹³ Mojtahed-zadeh, P., *The Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa*, School of Oriental and African Studies, Occasional Papers 15, July 1995, p. 27.

⁹⁴ Al-Adhami, W. H., *Al-Niza' bayna dawlat al-Imarat wa-Iran*, p. 23.

Both Great Tunb and Little Tunb became part of Ras al-Khaimah when it split from Sharjah and became an independent Emirate in 1921.⁹⁵

The decade of the 1920s was characterized by Persian insistence in claiming the islands of Abu Musa, Great Tunb, and Little Tunb on account of the iron (red oxide) mines, particularly on Abu Musa island. The British Government, through its Minister Delegate in Tehran, exerted constant pressure upon the Iranian Government to relinquish its claims and cease its threats to occupy the islands, reminding it of the stance of the British Government in 1904, when London threatened to use armed force and the navy to stop the Persian invasion of these islands, an act which obliged the Persians to evacuate them.⁹⁶

By the 1930s, the Persian Government had stepped up its intent to occupy the three islands and, in fact, in 1933, it sent an armed steamer to Great Tunb. This action hampered the British-Persian negotiations that were underway attempting to solve the problems between the two countries in connection with a number of issues. Britain suggested various solutions and alternatives regarding the islands, among which was the attempt to convince the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah to sell or rent those islands to the Persian Government.⁹⁷

⁹⁵For more information, see Chapter 3 of this thesis.

⁹⁶Minutes, Status of Islands of Tunb, Abu Musa and Sirri, 30 May 1929, FO 371/13721.

⁹⁷Headquarters, British Forces, Iraq, to Air Ministry, 19 September 1934, FO 371/17827. See also

This was the last ditch in a series of negotiations aimed at avoiding a complete breakdown between the two parties. However, the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah utterly refused this last proposal. Following this, the British Government realized that the only solution was to ask the Persian Government to relinquish its claims to the islands, as a prerequisite for achieving a mutually conclusive settlement. At the same time the British expressed their commitment to protect the islands and prevent their occupation by the Persians, even if they were obliged to use force to do so, in the event of the Iranians' continuing to set their sights on the islands.⁹⁸

In April 1935, the Iranian Foreign Minister expressed his wish to resume negotiations with his British counterpart at the United Nations Headquarters in Geneva about the disputed islands of Tunb and Abu Musa. However, the British Government was not keen on renegotiating this matter, owing to the commitments it had already pledged to the rulers of the Emirates. In these circumstances the Iranians maintained their claim that the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa were part of Iranian territory; meanwhile, the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah also upheld their claims to the islands and continued to impose their rights and control over the islands.⁹⁹

From the end of the 1930s until the end of World War II, the conflict over the

Political Resident to Secretary of State for India, 2 January 1935, FO 371/18901.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2 January 1935.

⁹⁹ The Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, 30 April 1935, IOR: R/15/1/263.

islands remained stagnant. Together, the British Government and that of the Soviet Union dislodged Riza, Shah of Iran in 1941, after accusing him of supporting Nazi Germany. They installed the Shah's son, Muhammad Riza Pahlavi, on the throne in 1941. This heralded the start of the Iranians' reiteration of their claim to the islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa through their Ambassador in London. The bases of their plea at that time was that they needed to stop the smuggling of goods into Iran via those islands.¹⁰⁰

This resulted in the Iranian Ambassador in London being summoned to the Foreign Office to receive the British response regarding his government's claim to rights in the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa, after having consulted the British Minister Delegate in Tehran and the Political Resident in Bahrain. The reply was that the islands' affairs had been settled fifteen years previously, when Iran had been informed that they were controlled by the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah. It was likely that the Government of Iran then accepted this reply and did not try to deny the rulers the right to impose their continuing authority over those islands.¹⁰¹

However, since the Iranian Government was polite in its request, the British Government seemed willing to look into the matter again to see if there were any grounds for a change of attitude, but eventually decided none existed. Thus, the rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah were deemed to be the rightful owners of all the

islands, under the protection of the British Government. In a communique, the British Government did make mention of its appreciation of the peaceful way that the Iranians had repeated their claim to the islands.¹⁰²

Nevertheless, the Iranian Government was very reluctant to relinquish its hope of regaining the islands. A memorandum was sent to the British Ambassador in Tehran claiming that those islands were historically Iranian, part of the municipality of Lingah.¹⁰³ It should be noted that even Lingah had been an Arabian Emirate, ruled by the Qawasim until 1887, when the Iranians occupied it and expelled the Arabs.¹⁰⁴

The reply sent by the British Ambassador in Tehran merely reiterated the previous one dated 30 April 1935. It gave no credence at all to the Iranian claim that the islands were part of the municipality of Lingah. Therefore, the British Government could not acknowledge the right of the Iranian Government to the islands and so it expressed its view as follows:¹⁰⁵

The British Government hopes that the Iranian Government will be convinced, instead of repeating their claims at any time and under any circumstances, that the islands were not part of the domain of the Iranian Government. Additionally, the British Government, on their part, will try to facilitate the measures towards solving the problem, while they were not ready to accept a possibility of changing their attitude

¹⁰⁰ Abu Musa and Tunb Islands, 8 December 1948, FO 371/68329.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Foreign Office to the British Ambassador, Tehran, 1 March 1949, FO 371/74968.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador, Tehran, 11 April 1949.

¹⁰⁴ Political Resident to Government of India, 27 September 1887, FO 371/13009.

¹⁰⁵ Foreign Office to the British Ambassador, Tehran, 7 July 1949, FO 371/74968.

towards the status of the islands nor deprive the current rulers of the islands from their control over the islands as these had been under their control over a very long period of time.¹⁰⁶

The memorandum also pointed out that the Iranian Government should be reminded that it was aware that, since 1905, reclaiming Iranian rights in the Tunb islands would inevitably lead the British Government, on behalf of the ruler of Sharjah, to reopen its old claim of rights over the island of Sirri.¹⁰⁷

On 23 September 1949, the Iranians raised the Iranian flag on the Tunb islands, but the British Navy immediately lowered it.¹⁰⁸

On 29 January 1951, the British Ambassador to Tehran sent a secret telegram to the British Government informing it of news in the Iranian mass media, particularly the press, that the Iranian Government had issued instructions to the Iranian authorities in the south of the country to delegate a committee to the island of Abu Musa to take a census and issue identity cards to the people there.¹⁰⁹

Consequently, vessels from the Iranian Navy visited Abu Musa on 25 February 1951 and put in on the western coast of the island for two hours. A group of Iranian sailors questioned an owner of a village store on the question of to whom he

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 7 July 1949.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 28 September 1949, IOR: R/15/2/625.

¹⁰⁹ British Embassy in Tehran to Foreign Office, 29 January 1951, FO 371/91284.

thought the island belonged, and about the kind of employment opportunities and rates of pay that existed there. However, they did not cause any serious problems.¹¹⁰

As a consequence of this event, in March 1951, R.W. Hay, the Political Resident in Bahrain, with the leader of the naval force in the Gulf, sent *HMS Flamingo* to accompany the deputy ruler of Sharjah on a visit to Abu Musa. However, the Political Resident advised the British Foreign Office to send a severely worded protest to the Iranian authorities reminding them, in case it was needed, of the content of previous correspondence on this matter.¹¹¹

In June 1951, however, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah was told that the Iranians had again raised their flag on the island of Great Tunb. He immediately sent his men to pull it down. At the same time, the news reached the Political Resident in Bahrain, who again despatched *HMS Flamingo* to investigate. The captain noticed graffiti on the rocks— for example, “Iranian territory”—and had them erased.¹¹²

However, from July 1951 until July 1953, there was no correspondence on this matter as a result of the aftermath of the nationalization by Musaddiq in 1951 of the Petroleum Oil Company as part of a nationalist policy favouring the involvement of Iranians in their own internal affairs. Nevertheless, by 20 August 1953, the Iranian

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 1 March 1951.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 10 March 1951.

Government had turned again to an investigation of the disputed sovereignty of the Gulf islands and sent a protest to the Swiss legation, who were at that point the custodians of British interests in Tehran, about its rights to the Tunb islands and Abu Musa, which was passed on to London.¹¹³

As a result of this, the Foreign Office in London replied that, as far as it was concerned, the situation remained as previously: these islands were under the control of the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah.¹¹⁴ However, shortly afterwards, the Foreign Office summoned the British Ambassador in Tehran to discuss further the ownership of the islands. The content of the memorandum, sent by him to the Foreign Office in London on 31 January 1955, suggested reopening a dialogue on ownership of the islands with the Iranian Government, particularly with the new Iranian Foreign Minister (Entezam), who was an advocate of peaceful settlement between the two countries.¹¹⁵

The same day a memorandum was sent to the Secretary of the Admiralty to inform him that Sir Anthony Eden, in the Foreign Office, was studying a possible peaceful solution to the regional disputes in the Gulf with the Iranian Government. It stated that the Committee of Lords in the Ministry of Navy were aware that the

¹¹² Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 20 June 1951, FO 371/91285.

¹¹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Swiss legation, custodian of British interests in Iran, 20 August 1953, FO 371/109852.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to British Embassy, Tehran, 29 October 1954.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, British Embassy, Tehran, to Foreign Office, 18 December 1954.

Iranians claimed ownership of the islands of Bahrain, Great and Little Tunb islands, in addition to Abu Musa. At the same time, the ruler of Sharjah had claims on the island of Sirri, which the Iranian Government had occupied seventy years previously. Such a situation meant that the British Government wanted to solve the outstanding disputes with the Iranian Government, if possible without damaging British interests or the interests of the rulers of the Gulf states, who were under the patronage of the British.

The Foreign Office proposed the following measures towards a solution:

- a) The ruler of Ras al-Khaimah should sell to Persia the islands of Tunb and Little Tunb at a price to be negotiated.
- b) The ruler of Sharjah should relinquish his *de jure* claim to the island of Sirri; and
- c) Persia should relinquish her claim to the island of Abu Musa and, if she could be brought to do so, to the island of Bahrain.¹¹⁶

Through such correspondence and exchange of memoranda amongst the British officials in the Gulf and in London, the ruler of Sharjah, sheikh Saqr bin Sultan, conceded his claim to Sirri in return for the Iranians' agreeing to give up their rights over Abu Musa. However, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad, did not agree to sell the islands; instead he agreed to rent them out.¹¹⁷

The Political Resident in the Gulf felt that Iran had to concede her claims to Bahrain and Abu Musa before being granted any concessions in relation to the rest of

¹¹⁶ Foreign Office to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 31 January 1955, FO 371/114640.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Dubai to Political Resident, Bushire, 25 March 1955.

the disputed islands.¹¹⁸

At this point, Entezam objected to the British manner of completely disregarding Iranian claims to Bahrain, which he felt was severely threatening Anglo-Persian relations.

The Iranians' attitude was conveyed to Yvonne Kirkpatrick, from the British Foreign Office. Their attitude was summed up by Entezam, who stated that they wanted to put Anglo-Iranian relations on a durable basis of friendship. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Iranian Parliament was that the three islands (Great Tunb, Little Tunb and Abu Musa), belonged to Iran. However, the British Government pointed out that owing to the patronage agreements made at the end of the nineteenth century, it supported the sheikhs of the Gulf states and the British Government had every right to defend the islands against any external threats.¹¹⁹

On top of that, the British Government strongly defended its position, stating that Entezam had acknowledged that the small islands had more of an emotional significance for Iran. Kirkpatrick suggested referring the matter to a tribunal, but this was refused by Entezam — unless the remit of the tribunal included negotiating the island of Bahrain as well. If the population of Bahrain decided that they did not wish to be part of Iran, then Iran would concede her claim to the ownership of Bahrain with

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bushire to Foreign Office, 6 April 1955.

honour and dignity.¹²⁰

At this, the Foreign Office put forward the following points to its ambassador in Tehran, D.A.H. Wright:

- a) There is no question of our discussing the unrealistic claim to Bahrain.
- b) A possible package deal would be for Iran to lease, or buy, the Tunbs; the ruler of Sharjah to renounce his claim to Sirri; and Iran to renounce her claim to Abu Musa.
- c) Would that produce a final settlement (involving, as it inevitably would, renunciation of Iran's claim to Bahrain)? If so, the proposition at (b) would naturally be more attractive to us; if not, we should have to think again. But even if we decided to proceed, Bahrain would be absolutely excluded from any discussion of the smaller islands.¹²¹

However, negotiations dragged on between the British and Iranian Governments about the rights of ownership of Bahrain and the three islands: Abu Musa, Great and Little Tumb. The decade of the 1950s passed by without any decisive solution being reached.

In the 1960s, Iranian military activities in the Gulf were such that British authority there was threatened. The Iranians rekindled their claims in respect of the ownership of the islands of Abu Musa, Great Tunb, and Little Tunb. The Iranian Navy started sending reconnaissance missions there. Military aeroplanes landed on the islands, took photographs, and investigated the identities of the people who lived there.¹²²

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

¹²⁰ Foreign Office to British Embassy, Tehran, 19 August 1955, FO 371/114641.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 19 August 1955.

The *status quo* remained until 1968, when the British Government declared its intention to withdraw from the Gulf. Three years later, Muhammad Riza Shah (1941-1979) ordered his troops to invade the three islands and occupy them. The occupation of Great Tunb and Little Tunb happened on 30 November 1971, and there was an agreement between the Government of Iran and the ruler of Sharjah about dividing the island of Abu Musa amongst themselves.¹²³

The assertion by Iran of historical rights to the three islands is not substantiated, as is shown by the relevant British documents; indeed, Iran has not practised any form of sovereignty over the islands. Thus, the Iranian claim seems to be political and strategic rather than legal.¹²⁴

Furthermore, it is clear in the correspondence between the British Minister in Tehran, R. Clive, and the Foreign Office in August 1929 that in one of his meetings with the Crown Minister, Timurtash, the former expressed the opinion of the British Government that the Iranian claim to have rights over the Tunbs was very weak and merely substantiated by their geographical location, nearer to the Persian coast than the Arabian one. He mused that if such a claim were to stand, the French could apply

¹²² Foreign Office to British Embassy, Tehran, 24 August, 5 September 1961, FO 371/15731.

¹²³ Kelly, J.B., *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*, London, 1980, pp 88-97. See also, al-Otaibi, F.A., *Britain and the United States in the Gulf: roles and responsibilities, 1892-1979*, Ph.D thesis, University of Wales, 1996, pp. 153-156; Ramazani, R.K., *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations*, University of Virginia, 1975, pp. 424-425.

¹²⁴ Al-Naqbi, Yousuf, *The Sovereignty dispute over the Gulf islands: Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs*, Ph.D. thesis, School of Law, University of Glasgow, 1998, pp.142-143.

the same principle and claim the British Channel Islands as theirs.¹²⁵

However, on the brink of withdrawing from the Gulf, the British tried to come up with the best way of solving the boundary dispute between Iran and Bahrain: agreeing to grant Iran the three islands in return for forfeiting her claim to Bahrain. The situation as a whole constitutes a contradiction of the earlier British assertion that the three islands belonged to the Emirates and that the Iranians had no right over them whatsoever, as they had never resided there.¹²⁶

The Iranian attitude towards the Tunbs and Abu Musa is based upon ethnic, political, historical, and geographical factors, whereas the British documents, as illustrated earlier, show that the basis of the Iranian attitude had no support from these factors. The Iranian rejection of any rights of the Emirates over the islands culminated in the occupation in 1992 of that part of Abu Musa island which belonged to Sharjah in spite of the agreement between the two parties over the island, as previously mentioned.¹²⁷

In order to solve the dispute peacefully, the United Arab Emirates tried to refer the case of the three islands to the International Court of Justice. The Iranians refused

¹²⁵ R. Clive, Tehran to A. Henderson, London, 31 August 1929, FO 371/13721. See also Amirahmadi, H., (ed.), *Small islands, big politics: the Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Gulf*, London, 1996, p. 118.

¹²⁶ Al-Naqbi, *The Sovereignty dispute*, pp. 53-54.

¹²⁷ Mojtahed-zadeh, P., *The Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa*, p. 59. See also Al-Naqbi, *The Sovereignty*

and so continue to occupy them to the present day. The current position of the islands is that Iran has occupied the three islands, Great Tumb, Little Tumb, and Abu Musa. This is basically due to the strategic importance of the islands. And the fact that the shipping lines, which pass to the islands, are vital for the transport of oil. However, the islands are also important for monitoring movements on both sides of the Gulf. Finally there is also another more general question involved, and that is defining the borders on the sea shelf. The Government of the United Arab Emirates is still adamant about keeping its rights to the Islands, calling on the Arab League and the United Nations to solve the sea border dispute between the two governments.

6.5 The Boundaries between the Trucial Coast Emirates and Qatar

A number of islands between western Abu Dhabi and the eastern coast of Qatar - Halul, Das, Shira'uh, Dayyinah, Arzanah, Dalma, Sir Bani Yas, al-Yasat, Ghaghah, al-Qaffay, Mihayyimat, Maksaib, and al-Ashat - were inhabited, particularly during the era of pearl fishing. Thus, with the granting of oil concessions in the region, the maritime boundaries had to be drawn up for the ownership of these islands. Previously, people were allowed to dive for pearls anywhere, as the sea was collectively owned by all neighbouring states.¹²⁸ However, when the British opened the Imperial Airline along the Arabian coast in 1934, the island of Sir Bani Yas was chosen as a provisional base on which the planes could land and take on their supplies

dispute, pp. 222-227.

¹²⁸ 'Abd Allah, M.M., *The United Arab Emirates*, p.212.

of oil.¹²⁹

After World War II, when oil excavation really took off in the region, the ownership of both the land and the sea and to whom each part of it belonged became a very significant matter. In 1949, PCL sent an expedition accompanied by guards provided by sheikh Shakhbut, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, to the islands south of Halul and west of Abu Abyad. The guards erected markers on all the islands including Halul. The sheikh of Qatar made no protest at this.¹³⁰

In a letter from the British Residency to A.C.I. Samuel in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, commenting on the claim that Khur al-'Adid was part of Qatar, B.A. Burrows, the Political Resident, strongly refuted the claim after a thorough investigation of all the historical evidence and a survey of the people who had resided and were still residing in Khur al-'Adid. His conclusion was that Khur al-'Adid was and should be part of Abu Dhabi and not Qatar.¹³¹

In August 1954, the maritime boundary dispute between Qatar and Abu Dhabi continued. Regarding the island of Halul, the British Government's position was voiced in a letter sent by the Political Resident in Bahrain to the Political Agent, C.M. Pirie-Gordon, in Dubai. It stressed that the evidence that was available to the

¹²⁹ Air facilities at Yas Island and Abu Dhabi, 1934-1935, IOR/L/P& S/12/1990.

¹³⁰ Note of Status of Halul, 22 April 1954, FO 1016/376.

British Government indicated that Halul belonged to Abu Dhabi rather than to Qatar. However, the British Government was not ready to settle the matter at that time. Instead, there was a sense of compromise over the status of Halul between the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the ruler of Qatar. Hence, The Political Agent was told not to assert the above stance unless the ruler of Abu Dhabi committed himself not to interfere in the work of the SHELL oil company on the island, and also to allow all people from all nationalities to use the island's water and other facilities.¹³²

The Political Agent in Dubai discussed with sheikh Shakhbut the duration that SHELL had for its activities on the island of Halul. Originally, the sheikh had been told that SHELL was to use the island for a period of six months starting from 8 March 1953, but, when this period had ended, they had stayed on there without formal permission. The Political Agent stressed the fact that the British Government's stance meant that Halul belonged to Abu Dhabi and that he could not deny that all the evidence pointed to that fact.¹³³

On the other hand, Ali al-Thani, the sheikh of Qatar, felt that he had a claim to the island of Halul since it lay only sixty miles from his territory, while it was one hundred and thirty miles distant from Abu Dhabi. He also claimed that his men had used the island since time immemorial for fishing and capturing hawks, while the

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 15 June 1954.

¹³² *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Political Agent, Dubai, 27 August, 1954.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Dubai to Political Resident, Bahrain, 31 August and 26 September 1954.

people of Abu Dhabi had neither stayed there nor had their rulers, past and present, even tried to lay hold of the island.¹³⁴ Moreover, the sheikh claimed that the then Political Officer in Doha, Jacomb, had told him that Halul belonged to Qatar.¹³⁵

The claims of the sheikh of Qatar put the British Government officials in a difficult position as they had asserted that their evidence indicated that Halul was part of Abu Dhabi. However, the officials thought in the first place that Jacomb's words to the sheikh of Qatar were taken out of context, because it had been an attempt on his part to convince the sheikh of Qatar to abide by the policies and decisions of the British Government. Thus, the sheikh of Qatar's failure to do so rendered his claim void.¹³⁶

Later, the British Officials suggested settling the matter by arbitration, but in this the ruler of Abu Dhabi refused to take part, while the ruler of Qatar agreed. The whole affair had embarrassed the British Government, which felt that it had to change tack in relation to Halul, which was difficult to do as nothing substantial had happened since the ownership of Halul had first been assigned to Abu Dhabi.¹³⁷

The next step, according to the British officials, was to convince the ruler of

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, the ruler of Qatar to Political Resident, Bahrain, 26 September 1954.

¹³⁵ B. Burrows, Political Resident, Bahrain to L.A.C. Fry, Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 2 March 1955, FO 1016/457.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, Political Agent, Dubai to Political Resident, Bahrain, 11 March 1955.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 11 March 1955.

Abu Dhabi to agree to arbitration about Halul.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, the SHELL Petroleum Company also wanted the situation of Halul to be settled before stepping up its operations there, as Halul was a promising oil resource. This had led the British Government officials to try to mediate and convince the sheikh of Abu Dhabi about giving up his claim to Halul in an arbitration. The British Government officials thought this would be a conciliatory solution for both parties.¹³⁹

The Treasury then approved finance for the appointment of referees to decide the Halul dispute.¹⁴⁰ It took the arbitrators a long time to reach a final decision but, in 1961, Halul was formally declared as belonging to Qatar. This decision was based on the reports of Charles Gault and Professor Norman Anderson from the Foreign Office. In 1969, a decision about the islands of Dayyinah, al-Ashat, and Shirauh was reached in the Maritime Frontiers Treaty between Qatar and Abu Dhabi: Dayyinah was considered as part of Abu Dhabi and al-Ashat and Shirauh as belonging to Qatar.¹⁴¹

Throughout the whole chapter it has been noted that the regional territorial boundaries between the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar were to become an issue of dispute after the discovery of oil in the region. We have seen how the British Government, the authority directly involved in the discovery and exploration

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, Political Resident to Foreign Office, 3 May 1955; the reply of the Foreign Office to Political Resident, 23 May 1955.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, Political Resident, Bahrain to Foreign Office, 6 September 1955.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Foreign Office to Political Resident, Bahrain, 7 October 1955.

¹⁴¹ 'Abd Allah, M.M., *The United Arab Emirates*, p.213.

for oil in the region, in addition to protecting her aviation and marine interests throughout the region, played a great part in the boundary dispute between the states of the Gulf. Sometimes the British Government solved disputes peacefully, as with Oman and Qatar, while at other times the British used force to dictate their terms, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, when they were anxious as well to ensure that American oil companies did not penetrate and greatly influence oil exploration in their sphere of influence.

On the other hand, the dispute between the British and Iran in relation to the off-shore boundaries between the Emirates and Iran was settled, as the British were acting on behalf of the Emirates in line with the Agreement of 1892.

It is worth mentioning that the relationship with the Trucial Coast of the Emirates became rather important for the British Government in the later part of the period under consideration. Iran and Saudi Arabia the other important states in the southern Gulf region were fully independent and pursued policies which were not always conducive to British interests in the area. Diplomatic relations between Iran and Great Britain stopped between 1951 and 1953 and then the USA started to play the major role in the Kingdom of the Shah. The border issues between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial Coast Emirates had again started to strain relations between the former and Great Britain after World War II and led to the partial breakdown of diplomatic relations over the Buraimi issue in 1955. These relations were only

resumed again in 1963. During the intervening years, the relationship between the British Government and the Trucial Coast of Emirates was continuously improving, as the Emirates were essentially semi-protectorates of the British Government, and therefore its only fully dependent support in the Gulf until 1971, when the Emirates were given their independence.

It remains to be said that British involvement in the boundary disputes amongst the states of the region was to a great extent provoked by a wish to protect British interests there. The status of the region remained as it was until 1971, when the Gulf states (the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain) achieved independence.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Conclusion

Throughout this research, we have been conscious of the fact that during the late nineteenth century, after the Industrial Revolution in Europe, competition amongst colonial powers to occupy the strategic locations in the world increased. The British Government did not allow non-British powers to interfere in the places where it had a strong foothold, such as the Gulf region, particularly the Emirates of the Trucial Coast.

Moreover, in March 1892, the British Government concluded the Exclusive Treaty with the sheikhs of the Emirates. Under this Treaty, the sheikhs of the Emirates were committed not to involve themselves in any agreement with any other foreign government, except that of Great Britain. Consequently, the Emirates were completely controlled by the British Government. A series of agreements were signed. However, after oil was discovered in Iran in the first decade of the twentieth century, the Gulf States attracted the attention of the great powers in the world. Consequently, Britain acted speedily to prevent the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast Emirates from concluding any agreement pertaining to oil explorations on their territories. Thus, in 1922, Britain concluded with the sheikhs an agreement which prevented them from making any oil exploration deals with any other foreign country unless they referred the matter to the British Government, as the patron of those Emirates. Through the 1930s, oil discoveries were made in some of the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia); thus, the British Government committed the sheikhs of the Emirates to several oil exploration treaties. However, the outbreak of World War II meant that the whole policy had to be shaped by the exigencies of the war.

Basically, the British Government was convinced that the Middle East was important to British national interests, so a British presence of some sort had to be maintained there. This was because the exploitation of Middle Eastern oil was vital to the prosperity and defence of the British Empire. Thus, British policy and plans for the region were prompted by the will to defend British interests. Moreover, the British interests in the Gulf meant that the British prevented any foreign presence in the Gulf States.

After World War II, British policy towards the Emirates of the Trucial Coast underwent a complete change. Several measures were adopted towards ensuring a strong British control in the region. There was the transfer of the British residency from Bushire to Bahrain in 1946. This transfer reflected a shift in the focus of British policy from Iran to the Arabian coast, i.e. Bahrain. Later, when India gained independence in 1947, the affairs of the Emirates were taken over by the Foreign Office, which alone had the responsibility for handling relations with the Emirates. All correspondence was to be sent through the Foreign Office to the Political Resident in Bahrain, who was the link between the Foreign Office in London and the British representatives and agents in the Gulf region.

The Political Resident acted as the judge in the courts of the Emirates of the Trucial Coast, as there was no Political Officer to supervise such matters continuously. However, in 1949, a permanent Political Officer was appointed in the Trucial Coast to help the Political Resident in managing the affairs in the Emirates, and at the same time the post of Native Agent was abolished. Thus, the relationship between the

Political Officer and the rulers of the Emirates strengthened, as only the latter could influence their tribes.

Later, in 1951, a small levy force was stationed at Sharjah. In 1952, the Trucial States Council was established to follow up and direct the social, economic, and welfare affairs of the Emirates. This Council was headed by the Political Agent at that time until 1965, after which the rulers of the Emirates in turn headed this Council until 1971, when the independence of the Emirates was granted.

Additionally, in 1953, the post of the Political Officer was promoted to the post of permanent Political Agent. Thus, British policy in the Emirates of the Trucial Coast assumed another role, that of interfering in the internal affairs of the Emirates, on such occasions as, for example, when it was necessary to make efforts to reconcile the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai following skirmishes over the boundary dispute between them. The British also granted Fujairah independence to become an independent Emirate. Following, however, a contrary move, they annexed the Emirate of Kalba to Sharjah. These measures were taken so as to enable the British Government to protect its interests in the long term.

Regarding British policy in connection with oil concessions in the Trucial Coast Emirates, as mentioned earlier, the British Government changed its policy after World War II, as it then realized that competition for securing oil rights in the region was growing, particularly when oil was produced in Qatar in 1949 by the British company, Petroleum Development Qatar Limited (PDQL). Consequently, the British Government focused on the Emirates as a potential source of oil. Thus, the company

known as Petroleum Development Trucial Coast Limited and Petroleum Concession Limited exerted much effort attempting to extract oil from the Trucial Coast Emirates in the 1950s. However, it was not until the 1960s that oil was produced there.

It seems that the efforts the British Government exerted towards extracting oil in the region were generally in line with the development plans that the British initiated in the Trucial Coast Emirates in terms of banking, commerce, taxation, education, health, water supplies, and development projects, all under their control, while the major issue remained border disputes.

The British Government did not succeed in solving the boundary disputes amongst the Emirates, and those with their neighbouring states (Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and Qatar). Some of these territorial disputes, for instance that between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, continued even after the independence of the Emirates in 1971. This dispute was finally solved only in 1974. The boundary dispute between the Emirates and Iran remained a difficult issue when Britain withdrew from the Emirates. Immediately after the British withdrawal, the disputed islands between the two countries were occupied by the Iranians and this situation has continued until the present time. On the other hand, the British Government did manage to solve other boundary disputes, first, that between the Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman and Muscat in 1967, and, second, that with Qatar in 1969. The success of the British in the boundary questions may have been helped by the fact that Qatar was a British Protectorate and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was a semi-protectorate of the British Government, but the British Government could not control Iran or Saudi Arabia.

It can be concluded that British policy before World War II was cautious and wary of direct interference in the Emirates. The India Office was not prepared to get involved in the quagmire of tribal disputes which were closely linked with the personalities of the sheikhs. However, after the war, British policy became much more proactive, moving from the role of patriarchal umpires to strict controllers of all activities as the Government in London took on the responsibilities associated with producing the oil of the Emirates and launching development projects there. This meant expansion of its service, with much more responsibility being placed in the hands of local agents, the men on the spot, but the office of the Political Resident continued to serve a filter for all the political decision-making in London. In addition, the British Government stationed a force in the Emirates, and assigned a Political Agent in Dubai to 1954 and an Assistant Political Agent to Abu Dhabi in 1955.


It should be stated that the Political Resident in the Gulf used to make suggestions to the Foreign Office and, at the same time, implement the Foreign Office instructions with regard to the Gulf states. On the other hand, the Foreign Office followed an administrative pattern which had been used in India in the nineteenth century, but many external factors influenced the methods of the decision-making process. Nevertheless, these were only minor matters compared to the overriding importance of oil exploration and exploitation.

At the conclusion of this discussion of British policy in the Trucial Coast Emirates, it may with some justification be said that British policy in the period investigated throughout this thesis was motivated in the first place by a desire to


accommodate British interests in the region. British policy continued to pursue the same line until independence was finally granted to the Gulf states in 1971.




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
Map No. 1 Chapter 1




Map No. 2 Chapter 2




Map No. 3 Chapter 3




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The Red Line Agreement 1928
 Map No. 6 Chapter 4



Middle Eastern Oil 1951
 Map No.7 Chapter 4



Map No.8 Chapter 6

Appendices

Appendices

Appendix 1

Instructions for Political Officers in the Gulf, 1950.

1. The first duty of a Political Officer is to cultivate direct, friendly, personal relations with the ruler with whom he works.
2. A Political Officer, as a representative of His Majesty's Government has a dual function. He is the mouthpiece of the Government and the custodian of Government policy, and at the same time he is the interpreter of the sentiments and aspirations of the ruler.
3. He should assume an identity of interest between His Majesty's Government and the rulers and discuss questions freely in conversation. Written correspondence with the ruler should be reduced as far as possible and all letters except on purely routine subjects should be drafted by the Political Officer in a punctiliously courteous style. He should avoid employing intermediaries. It is particularly desirable that when any objection is being taken to a course of action adopted or proposed by a ruler the matter should be discussed with him orally and if possible some satisfactory understanding reached before he is addressed in writing. Acrimonious correspondence remains on record and may lead to lasting resentment.
4. He should always endeavour to place himself in the position of a ruler and to realise the ruler's point of view.
5. He should be careful to uphold the dignity of the ruler and should not interfere between the ruler and his subjects and should not encourage petitions from the latter against the former nor should he inspect state offices and institutions except at the wish or invitation of the ruler. He should make himself fully acquainted with all treaties and engagements between His Majesty's Government and the ruler and should avoid doing anything which could violate or abate any pledge or engagement given by the British Government or a British Officer.
6. He should cultivate frankness, courtesy, patience, tact and care in matters of ceremonial.
7. The general policy of His Majesty's Government is not to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the Sheikhdoms, but since they have guaranteed their internal independence and have undertaken their protection against external aggression they cannot absolve themselves of all responsibility for the maintenance of order and a fairly efficient government in them. Action must therefore be taken:
 - i) To deal with serious cases of misrule in all Sheikhdoms, and
 - ii) in the case of Sheikhdoms which are enjoying large revenues from oil to

ensure that the ruler devotes a reasonable proportion of his revenue to improving the administration of his state and developing its resources. The methods to be employed to achieve these ends will vary with circumstances and, generally speaking, violent demands to enforce reform are likely to do more harm than good. When a Political Officer cannot persuade a ruler to mend his ways by his own personal influence and arguments, he should refer to superior authority for instructions.

8. Copies of letters received from or addressed from the Foreign Office and the Political Residency should not ordinarily be sent or shown to rulers but the substance of the letter containing instructions should, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, be communicated in sufficient fullness to enable the ruler to understand the reasons embodied in the letter and, as far as may be, the language used in it.
9. When any matter touching the interest or feelings of a ruler forms the subject of a communication by a Political Officer to superior authority, it is important that the views and sentiments of the ruler should be fully stated. But no recommendation involving important questions of principle which Political Officers wish to make on behalf of a ruler should be communicated to or discussed with him without the previous sanction of superior authority.
10. Telegraphic reports should be made to the Political Residency about personal incidents of interest or importance which affect rulers when it is considered that the occasion calls for some message of congratulations, condolence, etc.
11. All letters of any kind addressed to His Majesty the King, members of the Royal Family, or to high officials in England should be transmitted through the Political Residency. Such letters, if they are received in closed covers, should be opened and perused by the Officer to whom they have been sent for transmission and should be forwarded with any remarks which he may have to make.
12. Reports of the death of any member of an order of chivalry should be made to the Political Residency with particulars regarding place and date of death, and where the Rules of the order prescribe that the insignia should be returned on the death of the holder every effort should be made to recover these as soon as possible after the period of mourning has ended.
13. Generally speaking, in the Gulf Sheikhdoms it is not the local practice nor the policy of His Majesty's Government to recognise any person as heir apparent or presumptive during the life time of a ruler. Further, amongst the Arabs it is usually considered ill-omened to speak to a ruler about his possible successor. Unless therefor a ruler brings up this subject himself a political officer should not approach him about it without instructions from superior authority. He should, however, from time to time consider the probable course of events on a ruler's death and when occasion arises submit an appreciation on the subject to superior authority.
14. Uniform if possessed by a Political Officer should ordinarily be worn on his first call on a ruler and when calls are made by him on the two 'IDS' and when received by him on His Majesty's birthday and New Year's Day. When informal calls are paid or received or when meeting a ruler at parties, etc., lounge suits should be worn

with ties. Hats should be worn whenever a ruler is met or seen off out of doors. Shorts are considered indecent by respectable Arabs and should not be worn in the presence of a ruler.

15. A Political Officer should make sure that commanding officers of warships and particularly of foreign warships are aware of the protocol to be observed during the exchange of calls with a ruler, and particularly on the number of guns to which a ruler is entitled. Generally speaking they would shepherd such commanding officers and other distinguished visitors in order that nothing may be done which would cause offence to a ruler or give him ideas above his station.
16. Friday is observed as a holiday in all the Sheikhdoms and formal calls by or on a ruler should not be arranged for that day of the week. Informal calls of a social nature can however be paid outside the time of mid-day prayers when a ruler agrees. There is no objection on religious grounds to the firing of gun salutes on a Friday.
17. Visits by more important Gulf rulers to other Sheikhdoms are of rare occurrence and there is no fixed protocol to be observed on such occasions. When a ruler with a salute of seven guns or more proposes to visit another ruler, the Political Officers concerned should consult both each other and, if considered necessary, the two rulers and determine the procedure to be followed regarding the exchange of rallies between the visiting Sheikh and the Political Officer of the Sheikhdome that is being visited.
18. Rulers of the Gulf Sheikhdoms and their subjects can only be admitted to honorary membership of the British orders. Awards are made as occasion arises and not in the New Year or King's birthday lists. Recommendations can accordingly be made at any time.
19. The Gulf rulers have all undertaken not to grant concessions for minerals without the consent of His Majesty's government. A Political Officer should keep himself and superior authority fully informed of all negotiations for such concessions, should ensure that all drafts of concessions are approved by His Majesty's Government before they are signed and should witness their execution. Apart from this he should interfere in the negotiations as little as possible, and except on very good grounds and with the approval of superior authority should not endeavour to influence the ruler in favour of one competitor as against another.
20. All the oil companies who have obtained concessions in the Persian Gulf are bound by Political Agreements with His Majesty's Government to conduct their relations with the ruler from whom they hold the concession through a chief local Representative and the local Political Officer except in routine commercial matters. Some companies, especially those with ex-Political Officers in their employ, are too much inclined to conduct their own relations with rulers and care should be taken to ensure that they comply strictly with their obligations. Many commercial transactions have a political aspect and it is only business of a purely routine nature that companies should be allowed to conduct directly with local rulers.
21. In general commercial matters a Political Officer should do his best to promote British trade and British interests, but as other powers generally speaking are not

represented in the Gulf States he should enter into negotiation with a ruler for any kind of concession or monopoly. He should be careful to watch the interests of the latter and interfere with advice if it is clear they are likely to be adversely affected.

Appendix 2**Political Residents in the Gulf 1932-1958**

Lt Col Trenchard Craven Fowl	Jul 1932 Aug 1939 (acting to Sep 1932)
Lt Col Percy Gordon Loch	Apr 1933 May 1933 Jul 1933-Oct 1933 Jul 1934-Oct 1934 Jul 1935-Oct 1935 Jul 1936-Oct 1936 (acting)
Olaf Kirkpatrick Caroe	Aug 1937- Nov 1937 (acting)
Hugh Weightman	Aug 1938 -Sep 1938 (acting)
Lt Col Charles Geoffrey Prior	Sep 1939- May 1946
Lt Col William Rupert Hay	Oct 1941- Sep 1942 (offg)
Lt Col Arnold Crawshaw Galloway	May 1945- Nov 1945
Lt Col William Rupert Hay	May 1946- 1953
Lt Col Arnold Crawshaw Galloway	June 1947- Oct 1947 (offg)
Bernard A. B. Burrows	1953- 1958

Political Agent in Bahrain 1932—1959

Lt. Col. P.G. Loch (later Dalill of the Binns)	1932-1937
Maj. Hugh Wheightman	1937-1940
Maj. R.G.E.W. Alban	1940-1942
E.B. Wakefield	1942-1943
Maj. Tom Hickenbotham	1943-1945
Lt. Col. A.C. Galloway	1945-1947
C.J. Pelly	1947-1951
W.S. Laver	1951-1952
J.W. Wall	1952-1954
C.A. Gault	1954-1959

Native Agents Trucial Coast (Sharjah), c.1825-1949

Ruzza 'Ali Khan	c.1825
Mullah Husain	c.1825-1849
Muhammad b. Mullah	1849-1850
Ahmad b. Mullah Husain	c.1850
Haji Ya'quh	c.1850-1866
Haji Muhammad	1866
Haji 'Abd al-Rahm'an	May 1866-Jun 1880
Haji 'Abd al-Qasim	Jun 1880-Aug 1890
Khan Bahadur 'Abd al Latif b. 'Abdal-Rahman	1890-Aug 1919
Khan Bahadur 'Isa b. 'Abd al-Latif	Aug 1919-Sep 1935
Khan Sahib Husain b. Hasan 'Amad	Sep 1935-May 1936 (offg)
Khan Sahib Saiyid 'Abd al-Razzaq	May 1936-Feb 1945
Jasim b. Muhammad Kadmari	Mar 1945-1949

Political Officers and Agents Trucial Coast, 1939-1958

Sharjah:

Cpt John Baron Howes	Oct 1939- Oct 1940
Cpt Roy douglas Metcalfe	Oct 1940- Mar 1941
Cornelius James Pelly	Mar 1941- Apr 1942
Post Vacant	Apr 1942- Mar 1943
Cpt Maurice O'Connor Tandy	Mar 1943- Aug 1943
Post Vacant	Aug 1943- Oct 1943
Cpt Maurice O'Connor Tandy	Oct 1943- Apr 1944
Reginald Michael Hadow	May 1944- Oct 1944
Cpt Richard Ernest Bird	Oct 1944- Apr 1945
Cpt Raymond Clive Murphy	Apr 1945- Apr 1946
Cpt Hugh Dunstan Rance	May 1946- Jan 1947
Gordon Noel Jackson	Jan 1947- May 1947
Maj Hugh Dunstan Rance	May 1947- Jun 1947

Cornelius James Pelly	Jun 1947- Jul 1947
Gordon Noel Jackson	Jul 1947- Feb 1949
Patrick Desmond Stobart	1949-1951
Arthur John Wilton	Mar 1951- 1952
Michael Scott Weir	Aug 1952- 1953

Dubai:

Christopher Martin Pine Gordon	Mar 1953- 1955
John Peter Tripp	May 1955- 1958

Ahu Dhabi:

The Hon. Martin Stanley Buckmaster	1955- 1958
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Appendix 3**Rulers of Abu Dhabi**

Dhiyab bin Isa.	Murdered 1793
Shakhbut bin Dhiyab.	1793-1816
Muhammad bin Shakhbut.	1816-1818
Tahnun bin Shakhbut.	1818-1833
Khalifah bin Shakhbut.	1833 1845
Said bin Tahnun.	1845-1855
Zaid bin Khalifah	1855-1909
Tahnun bin Zaid	1909-1912
Sultan bin Zaid	1912-1926
Saqr bin Zaid	1926-1928
Shakhbut bin Sultan	1928-1966
Zaid bin Sultan.	Since 1966

Rulers of Dubai

Maktum bin Buty.	1833-1852
Said bin Buti.	1852-1859
Hashar bin Maktum.	1859-1886
Rashid binMaktum.	1886-1894
Maktum bin Hashar.	1894-1906
Buti bin Suhail.	1906-1912
Said bin Maktum.	1912-1958
Rashid bin Sa'id.	1958-1988
Maktum bin Rashid.	Since 1988

Rulers of Shajah

Sultan bin Saqr.	1803-1866
Khalid bin Sultan.	1866-1868
Salim bin Sultan.	1868-1883
Saqr bin Khalid.	1883-1914
Khalid bin Ahmed.	1914-1924
Sultan bin Saqr.	1924-1951
Saqr bin Sultan.	1951-1965
Khalid bin Muhammed.	1965-1972
Sultan bin Muhammed.	Since 1972

Rulers of Umm al-Qawain

Abdullah bin Rashid.	1820-1854
Ali bin Abdullah.	1854-1872
Ahmad bin Abdullah.	1872-1904
Rashid bin Ahmad.	1904-1929
Ahmad bin Rashid.	1929-1981
Rashid bin Ahmad.	Since 1981

Rulers of Ajman

Rashid bin Humaid.	1820-1838
Humaid bin Rashid.	1838-1841
Adul Aziz bin Rashid.	1841-1848
Humaid bin Rashid (again).	1848-1872
Rashid bin Humaid.	1873-1891
Humaid bin Rashid.	1891-1900
Abdul Aziz bin Humaid.	1900-1908
Humaid bin Abdul Aziz.	1908-1928
Rashid bin Humaid.	1928-1982
Humaid bin Rashid.	Since 1982

Rulers of Ras al-Khaimah

Sultan bin Salim	1921-1948
Saqr bin Muhammad.	Since 1948

Rulers of Kalbah

Said bin Hamad.	1936-1937
Khalid bin Ahmad, (Regent).	1937-1948
Hamad bin Said.	1948-1951

Rulers of Fujairah

Muhammad bin Hamad.	1952-1974
Hamad bin Muhammad.	Since 1974

Appendix 4

Commanding Officers of the TOL and TOS and British Commanders of the Union Defence Force from 1951 to 1975

1	Major J M Hankin-Turvin (Arab Legion on FO contract)	Jan. 1951 to Aug. 1953
2	Lieutenant-Colonel W J Martin OBE (Suffolk Regiment)	Aug. 1953 to Nov. 1954
3	Lieutenant-Colonel E F Johnson OBE MC (South Lancashire Regiment)	Nov. 1954 to May 1957
4	Colonel S L A Carter OBE MC (Sherwood Foresters)	May 1957 to Mar. 1961
5	Colonel H J Bartholomew OBE (King's Own Border Regiment)	Mar. 1961 to Mar. 1964
6	Colonel F M de Butts CMG OBE (Somerset and Cornwall Light Infantry)	Mar. 1964 to Feb. 1967
7	Colonel K P G Ive OBE (17th/21st Lancers)	Feb. 1967 to May 1970
8	Colonel H R C Watson MBE (Queen's Regiment) Commander Union Defence Force	May 1970 to Dec. 1971 Dec. 1971 to Mar. 1974
9	Colonel K Wilson NIBE (Royal Scots) Commander Union Defence Force	March 1974 to 1975

Pay Scales for the Trucial Oman Levies, January 1951

Basic pay		Rs	60/= per month*
plus dearness allowance of 1/3		Rs	20/= †
Private Soldier (Jundi) total		Rs	80/= per month
Lance Corporal (Jundi Awwal) plus		Rs	10/=
Corporal (Arif)		Rs	15/=
Sergeant (Naib)		Rs	25/=
Warrant Officer (Wakil)	From	Rs	50/=
	To	Rs	100/=
Arab officers - 2nd Lieutenant (Mulazim Thani) rising by Rs 10/= per month per year		Rs	200/=
Stoppages for all ranks		Rs	5/=

Trade Pay

Driver 1st class		Rs	30/=
Driver 2nd class		Rs	20/=
Driver 3rd class		Rs	10/=
Signaller 1st class		Rs	30/=
Signaller 2nd class		Rs	20/=
Signaller 3rd class		Rs	10/=
Medical orderly 1st class		Rs	30/=
Medical orderly 2nd class		Rs	20/=
Medical orderly 3rd class		Rs	10/=

There was an additional rate of trade pay for drivers and mechanics of Rupees 50/= to 60/= during the first six months to equate to the civilian drivers etc initially recruited.

* One Indian Rupee was worth 1s. 6d.

† The 'dearness allowance' was a means of increasing the total pay by one third to bring it close to oil-company-labourer rates.

Rates of Additional Pay for British Ranks seconded to the TOL

The additional daily rates of pay were agreed in May 1953:

Local Overseas Allowance

Lieutenant-Colonel	2/7d	(two shillings and sevenpence)
Other officers	2/3d	(two shillings and threepence)
Warrant Officer I	2/9d	(two shillings and ninepence)
Warrant Officer II and Staff Sergeant	2/7d	(two shillings and sevenpence)
Sergeant	2/5d	(two shillings and fivepence)
Corporal	2/3d	(two shillings and threepence)

Additional Class C (inducement pay) allowance

Lieutenant-colonel	11/=	(eleven shillings)
Major	8/6d	(eight shillings and sixpence)
Captain	6/=	(six shillings)
Lieutenants	4/6d	(four shillings and sixpence)

Warrant Officers	3/6d	(three shillings and sixpence)
Staff Sergeants and below	3/=	(three shillings)

Ration Allowance (payable when away from Sharjah)

All ranks	7/6d	(seven shillings and sixpence)
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Language Qualification Pay (awarded after examination)

Colloquial	2/=	(two shillings)
Interpreter	4/=	(four shillings)

Appendix 5

KING'S REGULATIONS 1951

1. There shall be established and maintained in the Trucial States a Levy Force which shall be under the control and order of the political Resident in the Persian Gulf. The force shall be known as the "Trucial Omen Levisé"
2. The Force shall be employed in any part of the territory the Trucial States
 - (a) For the maintenance of peace and good order in the Trucial States,
 - (b) In providing an escort for British Political representatives.
3. The Force shall consist of such officers and non-commissioned officers and men, and such special supernumerary and additional members as the Political Resident, with the approval of the Secretary of State, may direct, and shall be under the control of a Commandant appointed by the Political Resident with the approval of the Secretary of State.
4. Any member of the said Force may, if necessary in the execution of the duties of the Force, arrest without a warrant
 - (a) any person who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence punishable by death or imprisonment for more than twelve months;
 - (b) any person who has committed in his presence an offence punishable by imprisonment for more than six months;
 - (c) any person who has committed or attempted to commit in his presence an offence against the person or property of a British Government officer or against the Ruler of any Trucial Sheikhdome;
 - (d) any person who is causing or likely to cause a breach of the peace;
 - (e) any person engaged in, or who is reasonably suspected of engaging in, traffic in slaves.
5. The Force shall, when requested by any of His Britannic Majesty's Courts for the Trucial States, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar or Muscat
 - (a) execute the warrants, orders and judgments issued by the Court, and
 - (b) serve any summonses or notices issuing out of the said Courts.
6. Any person arrested by a member of the Force in the exercising of his powers under Articles 4 and 5 of these Regulations shall be brought before the Political Agent or his representative with the least possible delay, who will, subject to any special or general directions of the Political Resident, give the necessary instructions for the disposal of the arrested person.
7. Any member of the Force may, if necessary in the execution of the duties of the Force, enter and search any place without a warrant
 - (a) if there is reasonable cause to believe that any offence punishable by death or

- by imprisonment for more than twelve months is being committed, or has recently been committed, in that place;
- (b) if there is reasonable cause to believe that there is in that place any person being a victim of the slave trade, or any property which constitutes the evidence of an offence punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than twelve months;
 - (c) if the occupier of the place calls for the assistance of the Force;
 - (d) if any person in the place calls for the assistance of the Force and there is reason to believe that an offence has been or is being committed in the place;
 - (e) in pursuing a person evading arrest or escaping from lawful custody.
8. Except in the case of extreme urgency no member of the Force shall enter any house or building, with or without a warrant, unless accompanied by two respectable persons who are not members of the Force. A list of all things seized and the places in which they were found shall be drawn up by the member of the Force in charge of the search and shall be signed or sealed by an eye-witness. The occupier of any place searched shall be permitted to be present during the search and shall receive a copy of the list.
9. Any member of the Force may, if necessary in the execution of the duties of the Force, search any person.
- (a) if there is reason to suspect that he is in possession of any property which constitutes the evidence of an offence punishable by death or by imprisonment;
 - (b) if he is found in any place which is being searched and who is reasonably suspected of concealing about his person any article for which a search is made;
 - (c) on arrest, for any of the above mentioned reasons, or if there is reason to suspect that he is in possession of instruments of violence or if he so conducts himself that it is prudent to search him either for his own protection or for that of other persons.
10. A suspected person shall whenever practicable be searched in the presence of two witnesses. In all cases if anything is taken from the person searched a receipt shall be given.
11. Any member of the Force may in the execution of his duty use such force, including the discharge of firearms, as is reasonably necessary in the circumstances.
12. The Political Resident may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, prescribe rules for the discipline of members of the Force and for the trial and punishment of any offences against discipline. Any punishment duly awarded in accordance with these rules shall have the force of law and if any sentence is awarded it shall be lawful to detain the convicted person in accordance with the said sentence.
13. If any person subject to the Order under which this Regulation is made:-
- (i) by threat, bribe, gift or other consideration induces or attempts to induce any

member of the Levy Force to do or to forbear to do any act in relation to his duty, to do any act in relation to his duty.

- (ii) not being a member of the Levy Force wears any uniform, clothing or equipment or accoutrements resembling those prescribed for the use of the Levy Force and likely to cause the public to believe that such person is a member of the Levy Force,
- (iii) falsely pretends to be a member of the Levy Force,
- (iv) by any means procures or persuades any member of the Levy Force to desert, or aids, abets or is accessory to the desertion of any member of the Levy Force, or harbours such a deserter or aids him in concealing himself or assist in his rescue from lawful custody,
- (v) knowingly buys or exchanges or receives from any member of or deserter from the Levy Force any arms, clothing, equipment or accoutrements furnished for the use of or belonging to the Levy Force, or has in his possession such arms, clothing, equipment or accoutrements and fails to give a satisfactory account of how he came by them,
- (vi) obstructs or assaults or wilfully misleads nay member of the Levy Force in the performance of his duty,
- (vii) assists the escape of any person about to be arrested or being lawfully detained, he shall be guilty of an offence and, on conviction thereof, be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding 1,500 rupees or to both.

Appendix 6

Political Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Petroleum Concessions Limited relating to the Dubai Oil Concession on 5th. February 1937.

THIS AGREEMENT dated the Fifth day of February One Thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven is made BETWEEN His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom (hereinafter called "His Majesty's Government") of the one part and Petroleum Concessions Limited (hereinafter called "the Company" which expression shall where the context so admits be deemed to include its successors and/or assignees and shall also be deemed to include any subsidiary Company) of the other part.

Whereas petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. is a subsidiary Company of Petroleum Concessions Limited. And whereas in the event of the Company obtaining a concession from the Sheikh of Dubai (hereinafter called "the Sheikh") certain responsibilities will devolve on His Majesty's Government, the Company has agreed with His Majesty's Government as follows: -

1. Petroleum Concessions Limited and any subsidiary company shall be and remain a British company registered in Great Britain and having its principal place of business in Great Britain, and its Chairman shall at all times be a British subject.
2. The Agreement between the Company and the Sheikh shall not be transferred to any other company without the prior consent in writing of His Majesty's Government and any other company to which that Agreement may be transferred shall be and remain a British company registered in Great Britain and having its principal place of business in Great Britain, and its Chairman shall at all times be a British subject.
3. The employees of the Company in Dubai shall at all times be British subjects or subjects of the Sheikh, provided that, with the consent of His Majesty's Government, such persons of other nationality as are required for the efficient carrying on of the undertaking may be employed.

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Agreement between the Company and the Sheikh, the importation of foreign native labour shall be subject to the approval of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

4. The Company in all except unimportant or routine matters shall deal with the Dubai authorities through a Chief Local Representative in the Persian Gulf, who shall be a British subject. The approval of His Majesty's Government shall be required for the person so designated. He will be ordinarily resident in Dubai or Bahrain and will be responsible of the Company's local relations with the Dubai authorities, which shall, except in routine or unimportant matters, be conducted through the political representative of His Majesty's Government in Bahrain or through any other person whom the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf may from time to time designate.

5. Subject to the terms of the Agreement between the Company and the Sheikh the Company undertakes at all times to pay due deference to the wishes of the Sheikh and to the advice of the political Resident in the Persian Gulf and of the Political Officers subordinate to him.
6. Any right given to the Company under its Agreement with the Sheikh to utilise means of transportation by air shall be subject to any general regulations for civil aircraft made by the Sheikh on the advice of His Majesty's Government, and to any instructions which may be issued by the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.
7. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Agreement between the Company and the Sheikh the Company shall not have the right to use or occupy, and shall not include in the areas to be acquired or utilised for the purposes of its operations, any sites which may have been selected by or on behalf of the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government for defence purposes, for aerodromes, aeroplane or seaplane bases or for wireless and telegraph installations or in connection with the development of harbours, provided that with the consent of His Majesty's Government which shall not be unreasonably withheld the Company shall have the right to use for the purposes of its operations such harbours as may be developed by the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government if there is not reasonable harbour accommodation available elsewhere. Subject to the terms of the Agreement between the Company and the Sheikh harbours developed by the Company shall be under its complete and exclusive control.
8. Telegraph, wireless and telephone installations, if any, maintained by the Company shall be for use only in its business and as provided in the concession, and shall be so constructed and operated that their operations shall not interfere with the operations of such wireless, telegraph or telephone installations as may be established by the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government, or their agent.
9. In the event of a state of national emergency or war (of the existence of either of which His Majesty's Government shall be the sole judge) His Majesty's Government shall have the right of pre-emption of all the oil produced in Dubai in accordance with the terms of the Schedule hereto.
10. The Company shall obtain the prior permission of the Sheikh before working in any particular area, in order that the Sheikh may be in a position to fulfil his responsibilities for the protection of the Company. The Sheikh shall not unreasonably withhold such permission, and in any case in which the Company feels that the free movement of its personnel within the concession area is being unnecessarily restricted the matter shall be referred for decision to the Political Resident.
11. In the event of notice of termination of the Agreement between the Company and the Sheikh being given on the ground that the Company has failed to observe any of the terms of the present Agreement between the Company and His Majesty's Government, the arbitration provisions of the said Agreement between the Company and the Sheikh shall apply if the Company considers that notice of termination on such grounds is not justified, and in that event the Sheikh shall not cancel the said Agreement until arbitration takes place in accordance with the said

provisions and unless the Company fails to comply with the award of the arbitrators within the reasonable time which shall be fixed by the arbitrators for so doing.

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said John Charles Walton on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the presence of –

}

J.C. WALTON (L.S.)

H.S. PAINTER,
India Office.

The Common Seal of Petroleum Concessions Limited was hereunto affixed in the presence of –

}

(SEAL)

JOHN CADMAN, *Director.*

E.J. BROWN, *Secretary.*

Appendix 7

Agreement between the Sheikh of Dubai and Petroleum Concessions Limited on 22 May 1937.

IN THE NAME OF GOD THE MERCIFUL

This is an agreement made at Dubai, Arabia, on the twenty-second day of May 1937 corresponding to the eleventh day of Rabi-Awwal 1356 between HIS EXCELLENCY SHEIKH SAID BIN MAKTUM AL-HAZHER in the exercise of his powers as RULER OF DUBAI, ARABIA, on his behalf and on behalf of and in the name of his heirs and successors in whom is or shall be vested for the time being the responsibility for the control and government of the State of Dubai (hereinafter called "the Sheikh") of the one part and Petroleum Concessions Limited, a Company registered in Great Britain under the Companies Act, 1929, its successors and assignees (hereinafter called "the Company") of the second part.

Article 1

- (a) The area to which this agreement applies is the State of Dubai including all islands and territorial waters appertaining thereto (hereinafter referred to as "the State") being all that territory included in the sheikhdom of Dubai.

The Sheikh agrees that when the territorial limits of the State of Dubai have been determined the area covered by the Concession will be coterminous with the limits so determined.

- (b) But the Company shall refrain from working or entering for the present into the area upon which the town named Hatta al Jabaliyah is located until the Sheikh grants the company permission to do so.
- (c) The area in the Dubai Khor surveyed by Imperial Airways Limited and all concerned with that area is entirely excluded for the purposes of this Agreement.

Article 2

The period of this Agreement shall be 75 calendar years from the date of signature.

The expressions year, month and day used in this Agreement shall mean what is consistent with the English solar calendar and with any other. Further, the weights mentioned in this Agreement shall be reckoned on the English ton of 2, 240lbs.

Article 3

The Sheikh hereby grants to the company the exclusive right to explore search for drill for produce and win natural gas asphalt ozokerite crude petroleum and their products and cognate substances (hereinafter referred to as "the substances") within the State, the exclusive ownership of all the substances so produced and won, the right to refine transport sell for use within or without the State or for export to export or otherwise deal with or dispose of the substances, and the right to import export pump ship or otherwise transport the substances across or to any country or place at the Company's discretion and the right to do all things necessary of the purpose of these operations.

Article 4

If hereafter any neutral zone is created adjacent to the territory of the State, whereas the Sheikh shall have a co-equal and joint interest, the Sheikh hereby agrees to grant to the Company an oil concession over such neutral zone on terms to be agreed between the Sheikh, the Company and the joint ruler of such neutral zone.

Article 5

In consideration of the rights granted by the Sheikh by the Agreement the Company shall pay to the Sheikh

- (a) on signature of the agreement Rupees 60,000 (Sixty thousand).
- (a) Rupees 200,000 (Two hundred thousand) within a period of sixty (60) days from the date upon which the Company declares in writing to the Sheikh that substances have been discovered in commercial quantities. If the Company should fail to declare so sooner, then the date of discovery of substances in commercial quantities shall be that date upon which the Company has completed and tested a well or wells capable of producing in accordance with first class oil practice not less than Two thousand (2,000) English tons of clean substances per day for a period of thirty (30) consecutive days.
- (c) Rupees 30,000 (Thirty thousand) at the end of each year from the date of signature hereof until the Company declares in writing to the Sheikh that substances have been discovered in commercial quantities in accordance with the sub-clause (b) of this Article 5, or until the company commences production from quantities less than commercial quantities. In the event of such production by the Company from quantities less than commercial quantities either Rupees 50,000 (Fifty thousand) per year or Rupees 3 (Three) per English ton of 2,240lbs in respect of the substances so won and saved shall be payable, whichever is the greater.
- (d) At the end of every year from the date upon which the Company makes in writing to the Sheikh the declaration that the substances have been discovered in commercial quantities Rupees 90,000 (Ninety thousand) or Rupees 3 (Three) per English ton of 2,240 lbs in respect of the substances other than natural gas, won and saved during the preceding calendar year, whichever is the greater.
- (e) Annas 2 (Two) per 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas produced and sold.

In calculating royalty for the purposes of this article account shall not be taken of any of the substances used by the Company in its operation or used by the Company's employees within the State, necessary for their use, nor of any water or foreign matter which may be produced with the substances.

Article 6

The Company shall not carry on any operations within areas occupied by or devoted to the purposes of mosques, sacred buildings or graveyards.

Article 7

The Company shall conduct its operations in a workmanlike manner and by appropriate scientific methods and shall take all reasonable measures to prevent the ingress of water to any petroleum-bearing strata and shall duly close any

unproductive holes drilled by it and subsequently abandoned. The Company shall keep the Sheikh informed generally as to the progress and result of its drilling operations but such information shall be treated as confidential.

Article 8

Within three months after the expiry of each calendar year, the Company shall deliver to the Sheikh a statement of the amount of the substances won and saved and in the case of natural gas produced and sold during the said calendar year and of the royalty which is or might have been payable under Article 5, together with a report of its operations during the said year. The Sheikh or his representative shall have the right to check such returns and statements and all such returns and statements and the reports of the Company's operations shall be treated as confidential by the Sheikh.

Article 9

- (a) The Company shall have the right to import water, the substances, fuel, machinery, motor-cars and lorries, aircraft, equipment, plant, timber, utensils, iron or building materials, food supplies, medicines, medical supplies, office equipment and household furniture and other materials, equipment and goods of whatsoever nature required by the Company and its employees for the purpose of its operations hereunder and to export the substances and articles previously imported by the Company free of customs or export duty and taxes or other charges, but it shall pay on all personal goods, clothing and general merchandise imported by the Company for the personal use of its employees or for resale to them the ordinary duty in force for the time being in the state. Saving as in Article 5 and in this Article provided, the Company, its personnel, its operations, income, profits and property including the substances shall be exempt and free during the period of the Agreement from all present or future harbour duties, import duties, export duties, taxes, imposts and charges of any kind whether State or local, tolls and land surface rent of whatever nature.

In consideration of the right herein granted the Company shall pay – in addition to the royalty per ton of Rupees Three (3) as provided in Article 5 – to the Sheikh within three (3) months after the close of each calendar year the sum of Four (4) annas per English ton of 2,240 lbs in respect of the substances won and saved during the said calendar year.

- (b) The importation by the Company of firearms and other weapons is prohibited except with the written permission of the Sheikh.
- (c) The Company may import such alcoholic drinks and liquors as the Company may require for the use of their foreign employees but only with the written permission of the Sheikh, and the Political Agent, Bahrain, or any authority deputed by them, but the Company shall not sell or give alcoholic drinks or liquors to the subjects of the Sheikh or to the subjects of adjoining rulers who may be employed within the State.

Article 10

The employees of the Company shall be allowed to enter into and to leave the State at all times without let or hindrance and free of all charges, and the Sheikh shall

grant to the Company's employees every facility required for the purpose of the Company's operations hereunder.

But the Company's employees shall not interfere or by their actions cause any disturbance or cause opposition to the Sheikh's authority within the State of Dubai and the employees shall not go beyond the limit of their duties when employed within or when leaving the confines of the State of Dubai for the purpose of this Agreement.

Further in the event of any of the Company's employees - whether he be a senior or a junior employee - committing an offence which may cause disorder or interfere with the moral or religious laws or interfere with the politics or subjects of the State of Dubai or excite them to sedition, then the Sheikh may apply to the Political Agent, Bahrain, to send the person concerned - if a foreigner - out of the State of Dubai, but if a subject of the Sheikh then the Sheikh may arrest the culprit and deal with him according to the laws of the State of Dubai.

Article 11

- (a) For the purpose of its operations hereunder the Company shall have the right without hindrance to construct, maintain and operate power stations, refineries, pipelines and storage tanks, facilities for water supply including boring for water, telegraph and telephone lines and installations and wireless installations, roads, railways, tramways, buildings, ports, harbours, harbour works, aircraft, buildings and landing places for aircraft, wharves and jetties, oil and coaling stations, with such lighting as may be requisite and any other facilities or works which the Company may consider necessary and for such purposes to use free of all payments any stone, sand, gravel, gypsum, lime, clay or similar materials or water which may be available provided always that the inhabitants of the State are not prevented from taking their usual requirements of these materials and that the water supply of the local inhabitants and nomad population who may be dependent on the same is not endangered. The Company at its discretion may select the position of any such works. The Company may likewise install and operate without hindrance all such means of transportation by land, air and water as may be necessary for the effective conduct of its operations hereunder provided it is for the purposes of the Agreement.
- (b) The Company shall under normal conditions accept and transmit free of charge on its wireless and telegraph installations such of the Sheikh's messages as will not interfere with the Company's business, and in times of national emergency the Sheikh shall have the necessary use free of charge of the Company's wireless and telegraph installations and railways for governmental purposes.
- (c) The Sheikh's ships shall have the right to use harbours utilised or constructed by the Company provided that such use in no way hampers the Company or interferes in any way with the safety of its operation of which the Company shall be the sole judge. Any wharves or appurtenances constructed by the Company shall be for its exclusive use. The Company may use for the purpose of its operations the harbours along the Coast of the State, but the Company shall not impede or interfere with the subjects of the Sheikh or their right to continue the use of existing harbours, anchorages, wharves and docks

along the Coast of the State at present utilised by them for their sailing craft and fishing boats.

Article 12

The Company shall have the right and be given the necessary facilities (a) for the import of the substances into the State from any adjoining territory by pipelines or otherwise for the purpose of operating any refinery which the Company may decide to erect within the State; and

- (b) for the transport of the substances by pipelines or otherwise over and across the State from and to any adjoining territory to any point suitable for the refining or shipping of the substances.

And no duties, taxes, charges or dues of any nature whatsoever shall be levied in respect of such import or transport.

Article 13

- (a) The Company shall have free of cost the unrestricted use and occupation of any surface rights over all uncultivated lands of the State which the Company may need for the purpose of its operations and in particular the Company shall have the right to select an area or areas of land chosen by the Company with exclusive surface rights upon which to erect drilling rigs, pump stations, oil refineries, storage, terminal shipping and aircraft facilities and any other works required for the Company's operations; and the Company may use for such purposes any lands, houses or buildings with the consent of and conditions to be arranged with the proprietors thereof, but the terms of such use shall not be in excess of those ordinarily current in their respective localities.
- (b) The Company shall acquire only such lands, houses and buildings as are necessary for its operations under this Agreement. The Company shall inform the Sheikh from time to time of the land, houses and buildings which it requires to occupy for its operations; and land, houses and buildings previously acquired by the Company from the Sheikh but found no longer necessary for its operations shall be returned by the Company to the Sheikh free of cost.

Article 14

- (a) The Company shall have the right to purchase at current market rates fuel, water, food, buildings and constructional materials and other supplies of every kind in connection with its operations hereunder; further the Sheikh grants to the Company the right to construct new roads for motor and general traffic and to make use of all existing roads or tracks free of charge or taxes of any kind whatever.
- (b) The Company shall employ subjects of the Sheikh as far as possible for all work for which they are suited under the supervision of the Company's skilled employees, but if the local supply of labour should in the judgement of the Company be inadequate or unsuitable the Company shall have the right to import labour preference being given to labourers from neighbouring Arab countries who will obey the local laws. The Company shall also have the right to import skilled and technical employees. The Company shall pay to the

workmen it employs a fair wage, such wage to be decided and stated by the Company at the time the workmen are engaged.

Further, the fact of the Company employing subjects of the Sheikh shall not in any way whatever alter the status of such employees in respect of their rights, privileges and duties as subjects of the Sheikh, and such employees will remain in all ways subject to the jurisdiction of the laws and under the legal authority of the Sheikh in his capacity as the Ruler of the State of Dubai.

Article 15

The Sheikh shall give to the Company and its employees and property all protection in his power from theft, highway robbery, assault, wilful damage and destruction and the Company may appoint in consultation with the Sheikh and itself pay trustworthy guards who shall at all times be subjects of the Sheikh unless the Sheikh permits otherwise to assist in protecting the property of the Company and its employees. The Company shall erect at its own expense suitable buildings for the accommodation of such guards at such places as the Company shall decide.

Article 16

In measuring the substances for the purposes of royalty the factor for conversions of the volume of oil into weight shall be such figure as may be determined and agreed upon between the Sheikh and the Company after the discovery of oil and the ascertainment of its specific gravity.

The Company shall measure the substances by a method customarily used in good technical practice and the Sheikh by his representative duly authorised by him shall have the right to observe such measuring and to examine and test whatever appliances may be used for such measuring. Such representative shall comply with all necessary and usual safeguards for the prevention of fire and other accident; and shall make all examinations and tests at such times and in such manner as will cause the minimum of interference with the Company operations. If upon such examination or testing any such appliance shall be found to be out of order the Company will cause the same to be put in order at its own expense within a reasonable time, and if upon any such examination aforesaid any error shall be so discovered in any such appliance, such error shall if the Sheikh so decides after hearing the Company's explanation be considered to have existed for three (3) calendar months previous to the discovery thereof or from the last occasion of examining the same in case such occasion shall be within such period of three calendar months and the royalty shall be adjusted accordingly. If the Company should find it necessary to alter, repair or replace any measuring appliance it shall give reasonable notice to the Sheikh or his representative to enable a representative of the Sheikh to be present during such alteration, repair or replacement.

The Company shall keep full and correct records of all measurements as aforesaid and the said representative of the Sheikh shall have access at all reasonable times to such records and shall be at liberty to make extracts from them. Such records shall be treated as confidential by the Sheikh and his representative.

Article 17

- (a) The Company shall have the right at any time after the expiry of three years from the date of signature of this Agreement to give the Sheikh six months' notice in writing of its intention to terminate this Agreement and this

Agreement shall absolutely determine on the date fixed for such termination in such notice.

- (b) If such notice be given not later than 30 years after the date of such signature the Company shall be entitled on such determination to remove free of all taxes and duties all plant buildings stores material and property of every sort provided that for a period of three months from the receipt of such notice the Sheikh may purchase - should he so desire - the same at a price equal to the replacement value at the date less depreciation which price shall be agreed or failing agreement settled under Article 24 hereof.
- (c) If such notice be given later than 30 years after the date of such signature all the property aforesaid shall become the property of the Sheikh free of all cost.

Article 18

On the expiry of this Agreement at the end of the period of 75 years provided in Article 2 or any extension or renewal of that period all the movable and immovable property of the Company in the State shall be handed over to the Sheikh free of cost. Producing wells or borings at the time of such expiry shall be handed over in reasonably good order and repair.

Article 19

Subject to the provisions of Article 22 hereof the Sheikh shall have the right to terminate this Agreement and to take without payment all the property of the Company in the state if

- (a) the Company shall fail to make any of the payments prescribed in this Agreement within six months of the date on which they fall due; or
- (b) the Company shall be in default in respect of an arbitration award under Article 24 hereof.

Article 20

Nothing in this Agreement shall be read as restricting in any way the right of the Sheikh to grant to other parties concessions or permits for materials other than the substances as defined in Article 3 provided that the operations and rights of the Company hereunder are not thereby injuriously affected.

If the Sheikh should at any date subsequent to the date of signature of this Agreement grant to any other parties concessions or permits as aforesaid the Sheikh undertakes that such concessions shall contain provisions requiring the holders thereof to abstain from damaging, impeding or interfering with the property, operations and interests of the Company.

Deposits of minerals such as gold, silver, copper, lead, potash, sulphur and salt or the like which may be discovered by the Company shall be reported to the Sheikh and shall not be worked by the Company except under special concession or permit from the Sheikh.

Further, the Company shall instruct geologists to mark carefully and report to the Company any area and its location which appears to them to give promise of yielding minerals or fresh water from a borehole and the Company undertakes to keep the Sheikh informed of all such minerals and water reports and the sites of the area or areas.

Article 21

The Sheikh hereby agrees that the Company may transfer the obligations and benefits of this Agreement to a British Company to be called "Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited" or to any other Company registered within the British Empire.

Article 22

Failure on the part of the Company to fulfil any of the conditions of this Agreement shall not give the Sheikh any claim against the Company or be deemed a breach of this Agreement in so far as such failure arises from force majeure, and if through force majeure the fulfilment by the Company of any of the conditions of this agreement be delayed, the period of such delay shall be added to the periods fixed by this Agreement.

Force majeure as used in this Agreement includes the Act of God, war, insurrection, riot, civil commotion, tide, storm, tidal wave, flood, lightning, explosion, fire, earthquakes and any other happening which the Company could not reasonably prevent or control.

Article 23

The Sheikh shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative measures or by any other act whatever annul this Agreement except as provided in Article 19.

No alterations shall be made in the terms of this Agreement by either the Sheikh or the Company except in the event of the Sheikh and the Company jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interests of both parties to make certain alterations, deletions or additions to this Agreement.

Article 24

- (a) If at any time during the currency of this Agreement any difference or dispute shall arise between the parties hereto concerning the interpretation or execution hereof, or anything herein contained or in connection herewith, or the rights or liabilities of either party hereunder, the same shall, failing any agreement to settle it in any other way, be referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by each party and a referee, who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration.
- (b) Each party shall nominate its own arbitrator within 60 days after delivery of a request so to do by the other party, failing which its arbitrator may at the request of the other party be designated by the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. In the event of the arbitrators failing to agree within 60 days after being chosen or designated the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf may appoint a referee at the request of the arbitrators or of either of them.
- (c) The decision of the arbitrators, or in a case of a difference of opinion between them, the decision of the referee, shall be final and binding upon both parties.
- (d) In giving a decision the arbitrators or the referee shall specify an adequate period of delay, during which the party against whom the decision is given shall conform to the decision and that party shall be in default only if that party has failed to conform to the decision prior to the expiry of that period and not otherwise.

- (e) The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed by the parties and in default of agreement shall be London.

Article 25

The Company shall make all payments that become due to the Sheikh under this Agreement into the Sheikh's account at the Eastern Bank, Ltd. Bahrain and the Bank's receipt shall be full discharge for the Company in respect of the payment of the sum stated in the Bank's receipt.

Should the Sheikh decide to grant permission for a Bank to open a branch or Agency in Dubai the Sheikh shall consult with the Company as to which Bank shall be given the permission.

The Sheikh may from time to time designate in writing another Bank or Banks for the purpose of this Article.

Article 26

The Sheikh may select in consultation with the Local Representative of the Company, a local man - conversant with the English language - to act as a confidential person as between the Sheikh and the Company's Representative and to assist in procuring the labour that the Company may require. The salary of the Sheikh's confidential person to be appointed shall be paid by the Company through the Sheikh in Dubai and shall be at the rate of Rupees Four hundred (400) per month.

Article 27

This Agreement is written in English and translated into Arabic. If there should at any time be disagreement as to the meaning or interpretation of any clause in this Agreement the English text shall prevail.

IN WITNESS whereof the parties to this Agreement have set their hands the day and year first above written.

And God is Gracious

The Company
FRANK HOLMES

The Sheikh
SAID BIN MAKTUM AL HASHER
(Signed in Arabic)

In the presence of
T HICKINBOTHAM

22nd May 1937.

Political Agent, Bahrain.

Appendix 8

Political Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast Limited relating to the Abu Dhabi Oil Concession on 11th. April 1940.

9. The company, whether they shall have been consulted by the Sheikh or not, will not tender him any advice in the matter of the opening of a branch of a bank in Abu Dhabi without previous consultation with His Majesty's Government.

11. The Company shall obtain the prior permission of the Sheikh before working in any particular area, in order that the Sheikh may be in a position to fulfil his responsibilities for the protection of the Company. In any case in which the Company feels that the free movement of its personnel within the concession area is being unnecessarily restricted the matter shall be referred for decision to the Political Resident.

Appendix 9

Political Agreement between His Majesty's And the Superior Oil Company Regarding the Oil Concession Agreement with the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi On 15th. April 1950.

7. The Company shall not construct any landing-ground without the prior consent of His Majesty's Government and the Sheikh and except in accordance with the terms and conditions of such consent which shall not be unreasonable and any landing-ground so constructed shall be used only in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be laid down by His Majesty's Government and the Sheikh which shall not be unreasonable.
10. If and when the Company considers that it is desirable to erect a refinery at Abu Dhabi, it will examine with His Majesty's Government the question of the type and capacity of the refinery.
11. The Company undertakes to do nothing to prejudice the fixing of the exterior boundaries of the sea-bed area appertaining to Abu Dhabi and not to dispute with the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government regarding these boundaries. Until the fixing of the sea-bed boundaries the Company will refrain from drilling operations or other works permanently affecting the sea-bed or sub-soil in any area or areas which the Sheikh or His Majesty's Government may define.
12. The Company undertakes to comply with all reasonable requirements of His Majesty's Government affecting navigation, fishing and pearling in the waters of the Persian Gulf.
14. The Company acknowledges the special treaty relations now existing between His Majesty's Government and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the rights and obligations devolving therefrom with regard to the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi.
15. The persons and companies designated as agents in the preamble of this Agreement are hereby given the right to assign their rights privileges and obligations under this Agreement to the Company; and they shall inform His Majesty's Government accordingly. The Company shall specifically assume all these same rights, privileges and obligations. Upon such assignment the persons and companies aforesaid designated as agents shall be discharged from all liability hereunder.
16. The concession may, at the request of His Majesty's Government, be terminated by the Sheikh on the ground that the Company has failed to observe any of the terms of this Agreement between the Company and His Majesty's Government, and in the event of notice of such termination being given the arbitration provisions of the concession shall apply if the Company considers that termination is not justified.

Appendix 10

Agreement between the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and the Superior Oil Company on 22nd. December 1950.

Article 4

On the date of signature of this Agreement, the Company shall pay to the ruler the sum of Rupees 1,500,000. The sum of rupees 1,000,000 as paid on signature shall not be returnable under any circumstances whatever. The sum of Rupees 500,000 being the balance of the total sum paid on signature of this Agreement, shall represent an advance payment on royalties and shall be returnable to the Company in the manner provided in Article 5 hereof.

Article 5

The Company shall pay to the ruler annually the sum of 1,000,000 rupees. The first payment to be made one year after the date of signature of this Agreement.

Upon discovery of oil in commercial quantities this annual rental shall cease, but the amount payable thereafter to the ruler as royalty under the terms of Article 8 hereof shall in no circumstances be less than the sum of Rupees 1,000,000 annually. For this purpose calculations shall be made on the expiry of each period of twelve months from the date of signature of this Agreement.

The Company will pay to the Ruler annually as advance payments on royalty provided for under Article 8 of this Agreement, the sum of 500,000 Rupees. The first payment will be made on the date of signature of this Agreement and will constitute a part of the total sum of 1,500,000 Rupees payable on signature as hereinbefore provided. Subsequent payments will be made annually until oil is exported from the concession area, whereupon such payments shall cease. From and after the export of oil from the concession area, the Company shall have the right to recover all such advance payments on royalty theretofore made by deduction from all royalties accruing to the ruler over and above the sum of Rupees 1,000, 000 per year; it being understood that the amount paid the ruler in any one year shall not, as a consequence of such deduction, be reduced below the sum of rupees 1,000,000 as provided elsewhere in this Agreement.

Article 8

The Company will pay to the ruler on all net crude oil produced, saved and sold a royalty of one fifth of the proceeds of such sales. The term "proceeds of sales" means the field storage prices of crude oil sold by the Company. If sales are made at a place other than field storage the price for the purpose of royalty shall be appropriately adjusted to arrive at a field storage price.

If sales of crude oil are made to either of the parent companies (The Superior Oil Company and The Central Mining and Investment Corporation, Ltd., it it acquires an interest under article 26 below) or to any company owned or controlled by the Company or by either of its parent companies, or to a refinery owned or controlled by any such company as aforesaid or by the Company, then the "proceeds of sales" shall be calculated by reference to the average price during the three months

accounting period on all other kilos by the Company of crude oil produced by it from the Persian Gulf of similar quality and gravity and in comparable quantities. In the absence of such other sales in comparable quantities the Company shall agree as and when necessary with the Ruler in a fair value for such oil and in the event of disagreement the question shall be referred to an independent expert to be agreed between the parties. If they shall fail within 60 days to agree upon the selection of such expert then the said question of value shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 hereunder.

Appendix 11**Agreement between the Sheikh of Fujaira and the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited on 18th. August 1953.****Article 2**

The period of this Agreement shall be three English Calendar years but the Company shall have the right by giving notice in writing three months before the expiry of the third year to an extension of this period for another three years.

Article 14

If at any time during the currency of its Agreement or any extension thereof any difference or dispute shall arise between the parties concerning the interpretation or execution thereof, or anything herein contained in connection herewith or the rights or liabilities of either party hereto, the same shall, failing any agreement to settle it in any other way, be referred to one arbitrator who shall be selected by mutual agreement between the Sheikh and the Company. In the even to failure to agree upon an arbitrator both parties shall accept one nominated by the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

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