The University of Manchester

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PUBLISHED WORK)

CROSS-DISCIPLINARY UNDERSTANDINGS OF PARTICIPATORY CHANGE: READING "DEVELOPMENT" FROM "MANAGEMENT" AND VICE-VERSA

August 2002

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The pleasure in presenting one's work as a collection is that those who have helped in its production can be thanked in a way which is not possible with individual articles and chapters. Thanks first, then to Hugh Willmott, who has acted as a quasi-supervisor during the writing of this work, and has done all one might ask of a supervisor and more. Thanks too to my colleagues at IDPM, particularly Uma Kothari, Phil Woodhouse, Willy McCourt, Bev Metcalfe, and Elisabeth Wilson who have all provided crucial ideas at crucial times. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the two directors of IDPM during my time there, namely David Hulme and Colin Kirkpatrick, who have supported my work not only through the odd bit of finance when it really helped, but in creating a lively intellectual culture at the Institute. Outside IDPM I am grateful to Charles Booth, John Hassard, Evangelina Holvino, Albert Mills, Jean Helms Mills, Anshuman Prasad, and Pushkala Prasad, all of whom have provided help and support the importance of which they may not have been aware.

My time at IDPM has been one of intellectual transformation for me. However, the biggest transformation has been the birth of my beautiful daughter Kitty, and my becoming a parent. Kitty's mother is Francesca Gains, who has also been of great intellectual and practical help in my production of the work here. This work is therefore dedicated to Francesca and Kitty, inspirations both.

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INTRODUCTION

This is the statement required in 5 (b) of the University's regulations for the degree of PhD (published work). It contains

(i) particulars of my degrees, other qualifications and research experience, including all particulars required to establish eligibility under Regulation 3, as a staff member;

(ii) a complete and numbered list of the publications submitted;

(iii) a substantial and detailed critique and commentary of the work, for which the publications submitted give evidence;

(iv) a declaration of the nature and extent of my own contribution and the contribution of co-authors and other collaborators to each of the publications presented;

(v) a declaration of what proportion of the work presented has been completed whilst the applicant has been a member of staff of this University;

(vi) a declaration that none of the work presented has been submitted in support of a successful or pending application for any other degree or qualification of this or any other University or of any professional or learned body.

(i) APPLICANT'S PARTICULARS

The applicant is William Michael Cooke. I publish under the name Bill Cooke[i]. I have been a full time member of staff of the Institute for Development Policy and Management University of Manchester since 1996. I currently hold the post of Lecturer, and was due to be promoted to Senior Lecturer in September 2002. I will join Manchester School of Management, University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology on September 1st. According to the relevant University of Manchester authorities so long as this PhD is submitted before September 1st the requirements of University regulations for University membership are met.

I teach organization development and change management in an international development context, and have been programme director of IDPM's MA Development Administration and Management and MSc Organisational Change and Development. I have a BA (hons) in Economics and Public Policy (1984: CNAA), an MSc (with

distinction) in Organization Development (1988: CNAA), a post-graduate certificate in teaching and learning in higher education (1994: Teesside), and am a Member of the Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development (MCIPD).

As my curriculum vitae shows, as well as the formal research outputs included here, I have substantial applied research experience. My work was returned under Business and Management Studies in the 2000 Research Assessment Exercise as part of the Manchester Business School return which achieved a "5" rating. Recent work in progress includes editing a forthcoming special edition of Journal of International Development, and a co-authored paper on Management and the Cold War which received an Honorable Mention at the Administrative Sciences Association of Canada 2002. I am a member of the Development Studies Association Council, and convene its Development Management Study Group.

(ii) COMPLETE AND NUMBERED LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

The sequence in which the publications are presented has been chosen to best support the the thesis subsequently outlined. The publications are as follows:

1. 'The case for participation as tyranny' (with U Kothari) in *Participation: The New Tyranny* (2001), (ed) B. Cooke and U. Kothari, 1- 15, Zed Books: London. (c 10,000 words).

2. 'Participation, 'process' and management: lessons for development in the history of Organization Development', *Journal of International Development* (1998), 10 (1) 35-54. (c 9,000 words)

3. 'The theory of institutional and organization development: A comparative review for practitioners', *IDPM Discussion Paper* (1998) 52 ; ISBN 1 900728842. Also reprinted as a set reading, Open University TU872 Institutional Development MA module (c 5,000 words).

4. 'The social-psychological limits of participation', in *Participation: The New Tyranny (2001),* (ed) B. Cooke and U. Kothari, Zed Books: London (c 7,000 words)

5. 'From process consultation to a clinical model of development practice', *Public Administration and Development* (1997)17, 3, 325 - 340. Awarded an Anbar citation of excellence as "outstanding contribution to the literature and body of knowledge". Initiated a debate in the journal to which three other authors responded. (c 6,000 words)

6. 'The deceptive illusion of multi-paradigm development practice', *Public Administration and Development* (1998) 18, 1, 479 – 486. Also awarded an Anbar citation of excellence. (c 4,500 words)

7. 'Writing the left out of management theory: the historiography of the management of change', *Organization* (1999) 6,1, 81 – 105. (c 11,000 words)

8. 'A foundation correspondence on action research: Ronald Lippitt and John Collier', *Management in Development Paper Series (2002) 4*, ISBN 1 904143 33 4. Also presented at (US) Academy of Management 2002 (refereed) as "Lewin's Action Research Peers" (c 12,000 words; c5,000 by Cooke)

9. 'The denial of slavery in management studies', IDPM Discussion Paper 68, ISBN 1 904143 29 6. Also to be published in *Journal of Management Studies* July 2004 (c 11,000 words)

10. 'From colonial administration to development management'; *IDPM Discussion Paper* (2001) 63, ISBN 1 90258420. Also refereed paper at 2001 Academy of Management; nominee for Carolyn Dexter Best International Paper Award. Revised (c 10,000 words). Revised and shortened version to be published *in Third World Quarterly*, April 2003

11. 'Managing the neo-liberalization of the Third World: the case of development administration and management' *Management in Development Papers*, 2002, ISBN 1 904143121. Revised and resubmitted to *Organization* as "Managing the (Third) World"; (c 10 000 words)

Note on the list:

The work submitted ranges from refereed journal articles, through book chapters to discussion/working papers. The last of these have ISBN's, and thus are catalogued as regulations require. They have also been through an internal refereeing process. Very importantly, all discussion papers have also been externally validated. One is now a set reading on the OU Development Management MA. Two others have been accepted as refereed papers at the (highly competitive) US Academy of Management. One of these was nominated for the Carolyn Dexter prize for best international paper, and subsequently accepted in revised and shortened form by *Third World Quarterly*. One other has been accepted by *Journal of Management Studies*; and the last has had positive reviews requesting revise and resubmit from *Organization.*

Also forthcoming, but not published in time for this PhD is 'Managing organizational culture and imperialism' in *Postcolonial Theory and Organizational Analysis* (2002) (ed) A. Prasad, New York: St. Martin's Press (c 8,500 words). This late publication is a disappointment. Although quantitatively there is more than enough here, according to advice received, the chapter would have made an interesting qualitative addition in support of the thesis.

iii CRITIQUE AND COMMENTARY

This critique and commentary covers four main areas. First, given the requirement that the publications presented here "tend towards a coherent thesis", I set out what that thesis is. Second, I present a brief summary of the content of each of the twelve publications, showing how each contributes to the thesis and its subtheses. Third, I reverse this process to look at how the thesis, and particularly the subtheses recur thematically through the publications. Fourth, I look at thematic similarity and variation in relation to theory and method, and argue that this adds coherence. Together these four sections provide the "guide to the nature, extent and importance of the publications, and explain how the work has progressed in the years [I] the applicant has been engaged in it" (regulation 5.(b) (iii) 2.).

The Thesis

The publications presented here spring from a single intention. On my appointment to IDPM in 1995, after a two year stint in a business school, but with a strong practice background, I wanted to try and understand how what I knew about management, and my specialism, organization development (OD) related to what my development studies colleagues understood by international development.

This, in short, it is what my thesis is about. How can management, particularly participatory approaches to management (mainly OD) be made sense of from

development studies? Conversely, how can development, particularly participatory development be made sense of from management and organization studies (MOS)? And how do understandings of both fields, and the relationships between them, change as a result of this sensemaking process ?

The main thesis and subtheses

Underpinning these questions was an assumption that the two fields – management and development - were not completely incommensurable, and that some sensemaking was possible. The thesis into which these questions and this assumption translate is:

> Re-representing management's approaches to participatory change from a development studies perspective, and those of development from a management and organisational studies (MOS) point of view provides alternatives to:
>
> i) received understandings of participatory change in both fields
>
> ii) broader received understandings of development and of management per se.

Underpinning this main thesis are six sub-theses.

i) Ideas intended for (a) developmental (b) political social change have been adapted and incorporated into managerialist approaches to participatory change.

ii) Some of these ideas have reemerged and been partially readapted back into international development theorizing and practice, along with these approaches more generally.

iii) There is therefore a pattern of overlap and difference in the histories, understandings and uses of these ideas, and the broader fields in which they are located (ie management and development).

iv) Exploring this pattern will challenge the development and management orthodoxies in general and in relation to the histories, understandings and uses of participatory change.

v) Not least the exploration will reveal the possibilities for alternative, particularly post-colonialist histories in both fields, and/or histories in which empire and colonialism provide an underlying narrative.

vi) Missing from MOS is any recognition of management's complicity in modernization (as opposed to modernity), and its privileging of

organization as a social process, which in turn conceals its complicity in global political change.

At the same time, I claim all the leeway that "tend towards" in the regulations affords. There is, for example, more to the publications individually and collectively that the thesis/theses identified; and the support that some of the publications give to the theses above are, as it were in passing rather than as part of their primary purpose.

How the publications support the thesis

The regulations require this critique and commentary "include reference to the work of the others in the applicant's field" (5 (b) (iii) 2.). The instruction is made, one suspects, with a PhD archetype in mind in which there is a field (eg development, or management) with a set of objects which are researched (eg countries, or organizations). In that model the work undertaken has to be explained, in terms of how what that research finds fits with, and moves forward, what is already known in the field. The research here is different, in that what is already known in the fields, of development and management, is what is researched. It by definition refers to the work of others.

The sequence

What follows is a summary of each of the publications in themselves, and of how each supports the main thesis. This is in turn summarized in Table 1 below. There are four overlapping ways of accounting for the order in which the publications are presented. First, as I have already said, the sequence was chosen as best supporting and following the claims and order of the thesis and subtheses. Second, the order reflects, more or less, in the first parts, an initial concern with what might be called "middle range" theories of practice. Latterly, the primary concerns shift to higher, meta level issues of, for examples, epistemologies of the past, and the disciplines, paradigms or discourses within which they are situated. Throughout, though, the distinction is not absolute. Early on, I am for example concerned to contextualize OD; and later on, I use middle range practice to explore development and management more generally. There are two assumptions here: that I can take the liberty I have with Merton's (1957) idea of middle range theories, which in his version are positivist, but are not here; and that the higher level can be thought of as discipline, paradigm, or discourse, of which more below.

The third way of explaining the sequence, contra Burrell (1997), is that there is actually some linearity here: this order, again more or less, follows the sequence in which the publications were initially researched or written , although this is not the same as the sequence in which they were published. Fourth, this linearity and shift in concern in some ways at least mirrors a change in my professional identity. On appointment I very much saw myself as an OD practitioner who was also an academic; over the years in

question that identity shifted to an academic who was also a practitioner; and now (I see myself, anyway) primarily as an academic, interested in practice, but not particularly concerned about practicing. My OD training had however socialized me into questioning any theory /practice dichotomy.

The publications themselves

The first publication can be seen as a preliminary literature review, which starts to set out received understandings of participatory change in management and development, although subsequent publications add substantially to this foundation.

1) The Case for Participation as Tyranny is an introductory chapter to an edited collection, but is much more than a summary of that collection's chapters. It sets out the participatory development orthodoxy, so is an introduction to the literature. It also, through a critique of that orthodoxy, supports the first and second parts of the main thesis, suggesting a need for an alternative understanding of participatory change in development, and of development itself.

"Middle Range" Comparisons.

The next four articles look at micro-level participatory practices and ideas, and the more "middle range" theoretical frameworks within which these practices and ideas are

embedded. These include the idea of group dynamics and small group processes through action research to OD.

2) Participation, "Process" and Management, is, in relation to the main thesis, a re-presentation of management's approaches to participatory change from a development studies perspective, and one which challenges received understandings in both fields, not least by demonstrating their debt to one another. It also is an exemplar for the first four subtheses.

The article presents a history of OD which identifies key individuals (Kurt Lewin, John Collier, Ronald Lippitt/ Saul Alinsky) and ideas (action research, planned change, group based attitude change) as primarily concerned with i social change interventions, and only latterly being applied in a managerial organizational context. It therefore identifies lessons in relation to management's debt to development. It also shows how the standard critique of change management approaches like OD, that they are concerned with the content of change but determinedly ignore its social and political context, also apply to accounts of their very invention. Overall, my purpose here is to try and contextualize, or perhaps better re-contextualize concepts of participatory change, in history. My primary concern here is those concepts though, rather than, say, an epistemology of the past (the article does not explicitly address this); and the idea of development is accepted uncritically.

3) The Theory of Institutional and Organization Development is a comparative review of concepts underpinning three forms of change intervention. In terms of the main thesis it is thus a cross-presentation of management's approaches to participatory change from a development point of view, and vice versa, and is a mapping of the patterns described in subthesis (iii), and acts as a quasi-literature review. From development, the interventions are institutional development (ID), and its version of organizational development (DOD; better, with hindsight, titled 'organizational capacity building'). From management, organization development (MOD, ie management's OD). These are compared using a normative framework (ie micro/macro focus, what is changed, example approaches, influences, defining models, position on strengths and weaknesses). Comparative instrumental strengths and weaknesses are also identified. The publication concludes by arguing for a practice model which synthesizes all three intervention types - ID, DOD and MOD. Though it does to some extent address the broader context in which these forms of interventions are situated, the primary concern is for them as interventions, evident not least in the proposal for a new, emergent, model of practice.

4) The Social Psychological Limits of Participation is, in terms of the main thesis, a re-reading of participatory development from a managerial point of view. It is an example of subthesis (iii) in terms of patterns of difference, and an exploration of the kind identified in (iv). It uses managerialist social psychology (group think, Abilene paradox, risky shift, and coercive persuasion) to identify limits to participatory development. Here the analysis might most clearly be seen to be at the micro-level – this is what management says can go wrong when face to face participation is operationalized. But even so, and

albeit briefly, the chapter does explicitly support the arguments of others who see participatory development as manipulative or co-opting. It aligns the problems identified with the broader issue of a (social) technology used in the Third World without First World safeguards; and also suggests, very briefly, a replication of colonialist processes and power relationships.

5) From Process Consultation to a Clinical Model of Development Practice is, with respect to the main thesis a re-presentation of a managerial approach to participatory change in order that it can be used in development. It is an actual embodiment of subthesis (ii). The article argues that development practice should go beyond its partial adoption of Schein's (managerial) model of process consultation to embrace his idea of the clinical perspective in fieldwork (Schein 1987). This would inter-alia provide some hitherto missing (in international development) practitioner reflexivity. Such reflexivity would not least acknowledge the financially and politically conditioned status of the archetypal First World interventionist paid by bi-/multi- lateral donors to work in the Third World (raising the important question, "who is the client ?"). In the conclusion the absence of any consideration of the clinical model in development studies was seen to exemplify a disciplinary and institutional separation between development and management. Its incorporation was likewise foreseen to be obstructed by institutional differences.

6) The Deceptive Illusion of Multi-Paradigm Development Practice is an important link between the consideration of micro and middle ground practice and meta level analysis. It is therefore where the strongest shift from part (i) to part (ii) of the main thesis can be seen, that is from a concern for participatory practice to a concern for development and management as such. It also pointed to analyses which were to follow in relation to subthesis (vi). The article is a rejoinder to Peter Blunt's (1998) critique of *From Process Consultation.....;* but for all my disagreement with him, Blunt did me, and this thesis a service by raising the debate to the meta- level. Blunt's critique was that the clinical perspective I advocated in *From Process Consultation...* was mono-paradigmatic. He argued instead for a Burrell and Morgan (1979) multi-paradigm approach. My response here was to correct Blunt on detail, and question his assertion that Schein's approach was necessarily, or at least unreflexively, mono-paradigmatic; and indeed whether it comprised a paradigm. I also questioned whether multi-paradigm, in Burrell and Morgan's sense, practice, as opposed to research was possible. More to the point I argued that the Burrell and Morgan paradigm debate ignores the existence of the development paradigm. Wherever Blunt and I were situated with respect to Burrell and Morgan, neither of us had hitherto acknowledged our position within the development paradigm, which had been widely identified and critiqued as such (eg in Rahnema and Bawtree's (1997) collection). This was an important move in terms of the overall argument presented in this PhD.

7) Writing the Left Out of Management Theory apparently leaves the development/ management comparison behind, in that it identifies change management's debt to the political left. However, in relation to the main thesis, it is an alternative to received understandings of participatory change. It also is key in revealing the possibilities for alternative histories in subthesis (v). There is also continuity, in that the article resulted from the work done for *Participation, "Process" and Management* and is a re-reading of much of the same conceptual ground (Lewin, Collier, Schein's use of Communist "brainwashing"). However its difference is not only in the way in which it choses to reconstruct history. Unlike *Participation "Process" and Management,* it pays explicit attention to the epistemology of the past, and so makes an important theoretical contribution to the thesis. It argues that what is often written and identified as "history", with its implications of a definitive representation of the past, is better called historiography, a partial reconstruction according to present social relations. This opens the way to subsequent re-readings of participatory change. It also problematizes Burrell and Morgan paradigmism, arguing that its 2 x2 taxonomizing is an historiographical act configuring the past according to a (1979) present. It also points, briefly, to John Collier's status as a colonial administrator, and consequently to the possibility of a (post) colonial understanding of participatory change.

8) A Foundation Correspondence on Action Research is the result of archival research. It brings into the public domain and provides a commentary on a correspondence (1946-1950) between John Collier and Ronald Lippitt. Both feature in previous publications

(*Participation Process and Management, Writing the Left).* In relation to the main thesis it can be read, pace these articles, as an encounter between founders of participatory change in development (or, as I argue subsequently, the colonialist version thereof) and management, and as an alternative to received understandings in both. This correspondence establishes the depth of the relationship between Lippitt (and by extension Kurt Lewin) and John Collier. Issues it addresses include the role of science and the scientist in action research, the role of the action researcher as social activist, whether the purpose of action research is to achieve content or process goals; and the strategic and tactical consequences of these for action research/researchers. Overall, the correspondence identifies a debate about the epistemology and methodology of action research, and the agency of the action researcher unacknowledged in present day histories of action research. Collier argues against claims for a value free science/scientific action researcher; but for those who agree with him there is a sting in the tail, in his advocacy of action research as a tool of colonial administration (see *From Colonial Administration…* below).

9) The Denial of Slavery in Management Studies argues that management studies has wrongfully excluded American, particularly US pre-Civil War slavery from its history. The reasons for this exclusion – that slavery pre-dated capitalism, that there was a lack of managerial sophistication (ie no management practice) and an absence of managers defined as such are identified, and then in turn challenged with data from a wide range of sources. Anti-African American white supremacist racism is seen as underpinning the early invention of the managerial identity. This is apparently removed from the

development/management theme. However, it is an alternative to broader received understanding of both development and management; in that it challenges management explicitly, but also tacitly the modernization economic development argument that underpins development thinking. It is also an example of sub-thesis (v), as it began as an attempt to recast the beginnings of management in terms of imperialism and colonialism inspired by the outcomes of some of the other work identified above. It was intended to be a postcolonialist reading of the start of management. I did however end up adopting a different historiographical position, arguing that this is one possible reading of the relationship between management and slavery; but that others (eg Marxist, Foucauldian) were also possible. This in turn suggests that the empirical reality of slavery per se rather than any a-priori theoretical framework is what justifies, and indeed requires its inclusion in management studies.

Towards a form of "conclusion"

The final two publications were written, as were the others, to stand alone, rather than with the primary aim of providing a PhD thesis with a conclusion. However, they do draw together a number of the themes, and the historical and micro- to meta- level analyses of the preceding publications. What they also develop is an analysis of development administration, latterly development management which otherwise has only had serious mention in *Participation, 'Process' and Management.*

10) From Colonial Administration to Development Management supports the main thesis, and certainly (v) and (vi) of the subtheses. It is pretty much as its title suggests, identifying continuities between colonial administration and development management in terms of institutions, ideas and practices. These have been written out of a development management discourse, in which its origin stories have it emerging in the post-1945 development era. These continuities remain notwithstanding the renaming of development administration as development management. Institutionally these are evident in the transition of colonial officers to the UN and places like IDPM. Conceptually they can be seen (inter-alia) in the ongoing concern for governance (the First World ruling the Third). Importantly here, and a significant part of the publication, this conceptual continuity is also identified in participatory development: and it is in the application of participation that continuation in practice can be seen. It also looks at micro level (ideas of small group participation) and middle range ideas (eg those of development management) and situates them within meta-level analyses of development and of management. For example it challenges claims that development management can use radical (eg Friere's) participatory change in terms of Burrell and Morgan's concept of (metaphorical) functionalist colonization; but it also points out to management that it has a colonial history.

11) Managing the Neo-Liberalization of the Third World ... can be seen to support all of the main thesis as it is set out, and all of the subtheses. It started out as a revision of *From Colonial Administration*, but on completion was substantially different. Its focus is not history, but the contemporary relationship between "management" and "development

administration and management" (DAM), mapping a pattern of simultaneous difference and similarity. Management's tacit situating of itself within modernity/postmodernity; and its explicit primary concern with organization are challenged. DAM, though still a version of management, about modernization (distinct from modernity); and what it manages, primarily, is to-be-modernized nation states (collectively, the Third World). This un-acknowledged differentiation in principle is further concealed by a back and forth switching of practitioners and ideas between (modernizing, inter/national) DAM and (post/modern, organizational) management. This difference and similarity serves to sustain a particular, neo-liberal, economic agenda, and (participatory) change management is complicity in this. The most significant example of this is identified in the World Bank's implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The paper challenges various representations of management as excluding the Third World, and as ignoring its role in neo-liberal modernization.

A Thematic Approach

A reverse engineered approach to the previous section is to look at which publications support which of the subtheses (they all support the main thesis), and thus to identify common themes across the work. Table One provides a starting point here. In passing, its distribution of ticks confirms the general, but by no means absolute, shift in emphasis from the middle ground through to metalevel concerns.

Table One – Which Articles Support Which Sub-Theses

Article Number	**Thesis and Subtheses**						
	Main Thesis	*Sub-Theses*					
		(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)
1	✔						
2	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	
3	✔			✔			
4	✔			✔	✔		
5	✔		✔	✔			
6	✔						✔
7	✔	✔			✔	✔	✔
8	✔			✔	✔	✔	
9	✔					✔	
10	✔		✔		✔	✔	✔
11	✔		✔	✔	✔	✔	✔

Theses and themes

From this the common themes/theses across the papers can be explored, in the sequence of subtheses originally listed.

(i) Management's incorporation of participatory ideas from development/politics

Participation, 'Process'..... sets this out most clearly from a development point of view, and, using the same ideas, *Writing the Left* does so with respect to left politics. A central idea which recurs throughout is action research, which appears first as an attempt by Collier to achieve proto-participatory development; then as a reflection of his and Lewin's left politics; and then as a product and manifestation of the form of colonial

administration known as indirect rule. *A Foundation Correspondence* is an interesting example of a transaction between the two fields, again in relation to action research, personified by John Collier and Ronald Lippitt, and is a visible example of their attempt to come to terms with one another's worldview.

(ii) The readaptation of some of these ideas back into international development

This readaptation takes several forms. Alan Thomas' (1996) seminal specification of development management needing to, inter-alia incorporate participatory management techniques is recognized in *Participation, 'Process' ...*, *From Colonial Administration...*, and *Managing the Neoliberalization...* These last two also recognize Brinkerhoff and Coston's (1999) claim that development management now incorporates the specific change management approaches of OD and process consultation; and in particular looks at how international development agencies now use participatory management to manage nation states. Cases identified are the UNDP's use of process consultation in public sector "reform", and World Bank's uses of "culturalist" (Kunda (1992)) participatory management processes like action learning. An earlier paper, "*From Process Consultation...*" both identifies the (then) contemporary uses of process consultation in development; and, in its advocacy of the application of Schein's (1987) clinical perspective, is an example of this readaptation.

(iii) The consequent pattern of overlap and difference in histories, understandings and uses of participatory change and in development/management more generally

The overlaps with respect to participatory change are set out in (i) and (ii) above. In addition, *The Theory of Institutional Development...*" maps both similarities and differences in relation to institutional/organizational change interventions in development and management according to normative criteria (summarized above). *The Social-Psychological Limits* explores how participatory development does and doesn't follow participatory management, particularly in relation to its recognition of potential social-psychological dysfunction. *From Process Consultation* actually argues for more overlap than there has been; and *A Foundation Correspondence* evidences both overlap (not least in its very existence, and the relationship between Collier, Lewin and Lippitt), and in its content, difference. *Managing the Neo-Liberalization* pulls a lot of the previous work together, and as I set out above, demonstrates patterns of similarity and difference in relation to modernity/modernization, and organization/nation state.

(iv) Exploring this pattern will challenge management/development orthodoxies in general and in relation to participatory change.

Thus, *Participation 'Process'...*, and *Writing the Left* challenge the management orthodoxy (Chandler 1977) (which also pertains quite heavily in the development orthodoxy too) that management ideas emerged in capitalist work organizations. For management, and OD, both also challenge orthodox accounts of who the inventor of change management was. This challenge is also supported by *A Foundation Correspondence...* . *Writing the Left...* also begins to point to a potential

colonialist/imperialist history of participatory change, and of development and management. *The Social Psychological...* questions development assumptions about the instrumental effectiveness of participation. The relationship between management generically and its manifestations in DAM are questioned in the final two articles , once again in relation to modernity/modernization, and organization/nation state, but with specific reference to participation.

(v) The exploration will reveal the possibilities for alternative, particularly post-colonialist, histories

Participation, Process... is the first such history; but not only is it a history in its own right but one which revealed the possibilities for others. Thus *Writing the Left, A Foundation Correspondence,* and *From Colonial Administration...* are actually a direct consequence, in my research programme, of that article. *Writing the Left* also, in addressing the epistemology of the past, opens the way for other representations of the history of change management and of management more generally; and also explicitly, in relation to Collier, points to the possibilities of a postcolonial account of change management. (Again, this was followed up in the not included *Managing Organizational Culture and Imperialism)* The possibilities of a postcolonialist history of management per se were what led to *Management's Denial...* although, interestingly I ended up arguing that it was the empirical reality of slavery which merited its consideration notwithstanding my position on the epistemology of the past. A historical continuity

between colonialism, management and development is also the main theme of *From Colonial Administration...*

(vi) Missing from MOS is management's complicity in modernization, privileging of organization as a social processes, concealing its complicity in global political change

This subthesis is mainly dealt with in Managing the Neoliberalization; so readers are referred back to the summary of that publication on page 23.

Themes in Theory and Method

As I noted above, archetypal PhDs typically set out and justify their theoretical and methodological framework early on. This is then applied, and some conclusions regarding the thesis are drawn. Things are different here. This section is not, it is strongly stressed, a substitute for a theory/method chapter in a "normal" PhD. The individual publications have all met the theoretical and methodological requirements of editors and/or reviewers; and I have already summarized how they can be taken collectively to tend towards a coherent thesis. I do want to say something about theory and method though. This is not, however, that underpinning the (tendency towards) a coherent thesis is a (tendency towards) a coherent methodology. Rather, it is the opposite. That is, it is the theoretical and consequently methodological variation that actually strengthens the arguments towards the thesis. It is possible to argue an extensive case supporting this

position on variation. What follows is but a summary of that case, recognizing that it is the published work which really matters here, and that space is limited.

As I have said, the work submitted begins (yet again, by and large) with a strong emphasis on the middle-ground, but then there is a shift to look at the meta- theory within which the theory of participatory change is situated. And as I have also already said, sometimes I consider development and management as paradigms, sometimes as discourses, and sometimes as disciplines; that is my work can be considered cross-paradigmatic, cross-discursive, and/or cross-disciplinary. The prefix *cross-* is used here over *inter-* because my concern is not how some research object is understood from two different positions; but how these two positions are understood in one another's terms. The particular cross the title of this submission bears is *cross-disciplinary*: and the next three sections will explain why I eventually made this choice.

Cross-paradigmatic ?

The paradigmatic framework I found myself using was Burrell and Morgan's (1979) version of paradigmism. This largely at Peter Blunt's (1998) prompting, as his critique of *From Process Consultation...* has its basis in their work, although tacit Burrell and Morganism can be seen in *Participation, 'Process'.....* There are two problems with the use of Burrell and Morgan in relation to my "middle range" theory work which were discussed in *The Deceptive Illusion...* The first was that the theory (of participatory change practice) was a not a paradigm in the Weltanschaung sense, but a (sub) theory in

Hassard's (1990) sense. Second there was the recognition that there is a development paradigm. Even if it was accepted that it was possible to research in and act from all of Burrell and Morgan's paradigms, to do this in development is still, for critics of development per se, mono-paradigmatic, in that the development paradigm is tacitly accepted (also *Managing the Neoliberalization...*). From a so called *post-development* (eg Rahneema and Bawtree 1997) position, Burrell and Morgan's arguably incommensurable categorizations are more remarkable for what they have in common. In this case they share a modernizing (which is not the same as modern) understanding of social science in relation to social change. A third problem emerges in *Writing the Left...* which sees Burrell and Morgan's 1979 taxonomizing as an historiographical act, reordering and privileging those aspects of past theorizing which enable it, and excludes those which do not.

Clearly a richer understanding of development and management has emerged as a result of contrasting their paradigmatic location. But there is little in the MOS or development literature on paradigms per se on cross-paradigmatic understandings. Hassard (1990) points to the possibility of communication between paradigms allowed both by the later work of Kuhn and of Wittgenstein, but this in itself does not provide methodological support for what I steamed ahead and did. Nor is it as helpful as some other metatheorizing in explaining the particular paradox evident in my work. This is the contradiction between the failure of development and management to even register one another's paradigmatic status and existence on the one hand, and the extent of the common history and cross appropriation of ideas on the other. It is however through

language that Hassard opens up the possibility of cross-paradigmatic understanding, and subsequently was to argue, with Mihaela Keleman (Hassard and Keleman 2002) for 'discursive' over 'paradigmatic' understandings.

Cross-discursive ?

In following Hassard and Keleman to discourse, we can cut to the chase straight away, and identify work which bears close similarity in methodology and content to my own here. Evangelina Holvino (1996) deploys "a feminist post-colonial 'marginal' reading" (1996:521) to present a new understanding – "a third reading" - (1996:522) of OD theory and practice. The re-understanding of OD Holvino presents in her doctoral thesis (1993), from which this article is drawn, is richer still (as is the parallel my work has with hers), in that she situates the development of OD in the 1960s, in a reading of history from the position of the radical left of that time (in some senses, *Writing the Left* did the same for earlier times). Holvino draws particularly on feminism, postmodernism and postcolonialism. Her work produces readings which, through identifying absences, reinterpreting, and resituating OD in relation to race, ethnicity, class and gender, and the political left[ii], shows how, for all its language of empowerment it is aligned with senior management, and its texts reproduces "gender-race-class structures and processes" (1996:525). Holvino claims, as might I, that "by presenting another reading I question and destabilize the 'received' readings, not merely to deconstruct, but to push and expand the boundaries of what can be said, explored and studies in OD, and how it can be said, studied and 'performed'" (1996: 528).

There are, of course, key differences. Holvino stays pretty close to language per se as constituting discourse; her work does take the actual language of OD texts, and re-read that. I do that to a limited extent, most evidently in relations to Schein's famous adaptation of Lewin's 3 stage unfreeze/change/refreeze model. This is read from development history *(Participation, 'Process' and Management*) and in terms of its debt to the political left (*Writing the Left...*). It also used when reading participatory development from managerialist social-psychology *(The Social-Psychological Limits...);* and there are other examples. However, to represent what I have considered as discursive would require a Foucauldian approach which sees discourse as reproduced in practices and institutions. In development Ferguson famously does this, identifying a development discourse with both a "conceptual apparatus" and an "institutional apparatus" (1990:13)

Moreover I do not read from a feminist or classed point of view; and where I do read from a postcolonialist perspective, it is more in terms of imperialism and colonialism as processes (eg *From Colonial Administration....)* than the specific perspectives of "race, a second language and political struggle" (Holvino 1996:522), though these are obviously there, albeit considered in their own right (*Writing the Left, The Denial of Slavery...).* Both management and development participatory change discourses are "read", however from an external position (eg postcolonialist) and from one another. There are also cross readings of development and management per se. For all the difference between my work

and that of Holvino, the similarities are such that an apt characterization of the publications presented here is in Holvino's citation of Anzaldúa:

> Necesitamos teorías [we need theories]....that cross borders, that blur boundaries – new kinds of theories with new theorizing methods. We need theories that will point out ways to maneuver between our particular experiences and the necessity of forming our own categories and theoretical models for the patterns we uncover...(in Holvino 1996: 528).

However, there is one more, and major departure between some of my work and that of Holvino, and discursive approaches more generally. Holvino says of her re-reading of OD "I do not claim to create a 'truer' text or a 'better' representation of OD, just a different meaning in order to open up the possibilities for it becoming something else". (1996:528). But in some of my other work I do claim truth, following Geras (1995) in arguing that, for all that the past is epistemologically fragile, there are/were nonetheless truths out there. This is most evidently in relation to slavery, where I argue its empirical former-reality makes its consideration by MOS, regardless of any a-priori theorization, a moral imperative. This is also the case in relation to 3rd World debt, and the consequences of IMF/World Bank participatory interventions. So, discourse goes some way to explaining what I have done, but not everything. That leaves a cross-disciplinary approach.

Cross disciplinary ?

Cross-disciplinary understanding was how I started thinking about what I was doing, and having considered my work as cross-paradigmatic and cross-discursive it is where I have ended up. I started, then, with discipline as a common sense understanding, but one which was close to that of Fabian (2000: 351): "*discipline* refers to the common focus of a set of researchers who might perform research in varied paradigms and/or theoretical perspectives." Fabian recognizes that inclusion within a discipline is a social and institutional function and that membership may be self attributed, or attributed by others through membership of subject associations, or of particular university departments. This social generation and validation of knowledge is a recurring theme in both paradigm and discourse meta-analyses. Hassard points out how Kuhn's first formulation of paradigms had them as socio-institutional-political phenomena: "the everyday reality of science is more akin to the lifecycle of the political community than to the dictates of formal logic" (1990: 220). When he went on to assess discourse with Keleman, they argued for a postmodern perspective, in which knowledge was viewed as "a set of cultural practices situated in and inextricably linked to the material and social circumstances in which it is consumed" (Hassard and Keleman 2002: 332)

Otherwise, though, the idea of discipline is not theorized within MOS or development, and it is perhaps the very vagueness of disciplinary boundaries, which serves to include rather than exclude which gives it virtue. A concern for disciplinary boundaries, and their

simultaneous integrity and transgression can however be found elsewhere, in the work of Galison (1997) [iii] on the sociology of scientific knowledge in physics. Galison offers an analysis of how cross-disciplinary communication happens which at the same time acknowledges both paradigm and discourse, and which provides some explanation of what was happening within the publications here.

Galison's work is grounded in a detailed account of the history of physics, in which he identifies patterns of similarity and difference over times which resemble those identified here. Within physics there are disciplines, discrete groups, with their own apparently incommensurable bodies of knowledge, research instruments, and lower level theories and ideas. Yet, his history portrays ongoing exchanges of instruments, theories and ideas. Galison states:

> " I will call this polycultural history of the development of physics *intercalated* because the many traditions coordinate with one another without homogenization. Different traditions meet....even transform one another – but for all that they do not lose their separate identities and practices." (1997: 782)

And so, might it be argued, on the basis of the publications here, social science is similarly intercalated, in relation to development and MOS. The challenge Galison faced, (as I do here), was to explain the exchange of ideas and practices amongst groups separated in a classic Kuhnian sense by social divides (ie as disciplines), and apparently irreconcilable belief systems. Different communities within physics had "....different

meetings, different preprint exchange, different journals", and apparently irreconcilable ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies: "experimenters and theorists often disagreed as to what entities there were, how they were classified and how one demonstrated their existence." (1997:783).

Although Galison ultimately takes the position that there is a reality beyond language, he nonetheless uses language, or a language metaphor to explain what he sees as going on. Galison's attempt to understand this pattern of profound difference but day to day interaction was to look "at local coordination rather than global meaning", and to use an anthropological concept of the "trading zone", in which peoples from entirely different cultures come together to exchange what they have, facilitated by spatial proximity. In that zone:

> [G]roups with very different systems of symbols and procedures for their manipulation ... can agree on rules of exchange even if they ascribe utterly different significance to the objects being exchanged; they may even disagree on the meaning of the exchange process itself. Nonetheless, the trading partners may hammer out a *local* coordination despite vast *global* differences. In an even more sophisticated way, cultures in interaction frequently establish contact languages, systems of discourse that vary from the most function-specific jargons, through semi-specific pidgins, to full-fledged creoles rich enough to support activities as complex as poetry

and metalinguistic reflection" (Galison 1997: 783, emphases original: also cited in Booth (2000: 16)).

This too fits what I describe in some of my publications, particularly those which explore the patterns of exchange between development and management *(eg Participation 'Process' and Management...,* and *From Process Consultation...*). Moreover particularly given my strong focus on the middle range (ie local rather than global in Galison's terms) throughout, this might be seen as another appropriate characterization of my work as a whole, which explores the patterns of jargons, pidgins and creoles, and perhaps extends these in their own right.

Of course, this version of meta-level analysis is not, and nor does Galison claim it to be, transcendent. It is for example consistent with Anzaldúa above, and it is after all metaphoric. Like paradigmatic and discursive analyses it gives my work as a whole more coherence, but is not absolutely adequate. Moreover, in my publications it is clear that sites of exchange are also sites of reproduction and reshaping of power relations, and of one culture dominating another. The New Orleans slave market in *The Denial of Slavery...* might appear to be the most obvious case; but so is action research, in for example *From Colonial Administration....*; and so by extrapolation is participatory change, in development and in management, itself. Indeed one might see a critique of Galison emerging out of this. What I have come to see and show, as I have mapped out what initially seems to be an actual and potential exchange of middle range ideas of pragmatic benefit, is that such ideas carry with them ideological associations, and are often local thin end of a global wedge.

Epilogue to a prologue

I hesitate to even call this the end of a beginning; the published work that comprises this PhD (published work) has still to follow, and within that there is, as I have indicated, a roughly defined beginning, a middle, and an end. It is worth stating a final epilogue to this prologue, though. My critique of my own theory and method has shown that it can be explained to a large extent from any one of three meta-level understandings of the knowledge and its production. That is, it can be seen as a cross-disciplinary, a cross-paradigmatic or as a cross discursive set of analyses. But although any one of these has its advantages, none is unproblematic intrinsically, or as they relate to my work. However, the problems themselves are not so evident in my work, precisely because it has not restricted itself to any one of these approaches, but used, and moved between all three. Paradoxically, then, what might be seen as an absence of overall methodological coherence, within a collection of work each piece of which has an internal coherence satisfying referees, was also a source of coherence in my outcomes, and it the support which is given to my main and subtheses. The choice of "cross-disciplinary" for the title results from a recognition that knowledge, however it is seen, is socially produced and consumed within communities, that is, within disciplines; and my reading of my work is, it is social processes which cause the cross exchange of ideas and practices, outwith and despite any meta-level incommensurability.

iv NATURE AND EXTENT OF MY OWN CONTRIBUTION.

All the work submitted is sole authored by myself, with the exception of "The Case for Participation as Tyranny". I wrote half of this chapter as did my co-author, Dr. Uma Kothari, who has signed the appropriate form accordingly.

v DECLARATION OF PROPORTION OF WORK COMPLETED WHILE A MEMBER OF STAFF

All publications were completed while I was a member of staff of the University of Manchester.

vi DECLARATION THAT WORK IS NOT SUBMITTED FOR ANY OTHER QUALIFICATION

None of the work here is being considered for any other academic or professional qualification.

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[i] There is already a William Cooke who publishes in a related field, industrial relations.
[ii] *Writing the left*...should have acknowledged this, but didn't.
[iii] I am grateful to Charles Booth for first explaining Galison's work to me, and for sharing his paper on him.

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Thomas A (1996) 'What is Development Management', *Journal of International Development*, 8 (1) 95 -110

BILL COOKE - CURRICULUM VITAE

1. Full Name.

William Michael Cooke

2. Date of Birth.

23.11.57

3. Education

1993 – 1994 University of Teesside (part-time)
1987 – 1988 Sheffield City Polytechnic
1981 – 1984 Leeds Polytechnic

4. Qualifications/Professional.

Post-graduate Certificate in Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, University of Teesside, 1994

MSc in Organisation Development (distinction), Sheffield Hallam University, 1989
Post-graduate Diploma in Organisation Development (distinction), Sheffield Hallam University, 1988

BA (Hons) Economic and Public Policy, Leeds Polytechnic, 1984

Member, Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (MCIPD) since 1994

Listed consultant DTI Enterprise Initiative, 1990 - 1992

Quality-assured consultant through nationwide TEC-assure scheme (1990- 1992)

5. Previous appointments held.

November 1992 - June 1995:

Senior Lecturer in Organisation Development and Organisational Behaviour, Teesside Business School, University of Teesside

Design and teaching of programmes in interactive skills, managing behavioural change, and developing organisations for practising managers on Certificate in Management, Diploma in Management Studies and MBA programmes; design of modules for innovative M.Sc. in

Organisational Change and Management Development. Consultancy for SME's, public, private and voluntary sector organisations on the Business School's behalf

November 1990 - November 1992: Partner, Cooke-Burton Management Consultants London/Hastings

Joint Chief Executive in my own business; setting up and running a small consultancy partnership with overall responsibility for every aspect of the business including marketing, product design, resources and project management. Design, delivery, implementation and evaluation of consultancy and development activities to meet the needs of a range of clients in a range of sectors

November 1988 - November 1990: Organisation Development Consultant, British Telecom (Western London)

Leading a team of OD, management development and training consultants in the design, delivery and evaluation of initiatives to meet Board Member and Organisational OD requirements in an organisation with over 5,000 employees and a turnover in the £hundreds of millions.

June 1985 - November 1988: Policy and Coordination Officer, Leeds City Council

Developing, reviewing, and planning for the implementation of policy, conducting research and advising elected members in Education and in Economic Development

June 1984 – June 1985: President, Leeds Polytechnic Students Union

(note: between 1975, when I left school, and 1981 when I became a mature student, I worked in the computer and the catering industries)

6. **Present appointment.**

Lecturer in Human Resource Development, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester

7. **Visiting appointments.**

Distance learning tutor, Managing Public Organisational Change, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 1999 –

B. TEACHING

1. Graduate teaching main contribution.

MA core Managing Public Organisational Change module 1999- now: 30 contact hours pa, c20 students last year

MSc/MA Organisation Development module 1997 – now: 60 contact hours, typically 2 groups of c30 students @ 30 hours each (90 contact hours 2000/2001)

MSc Organisational Behaviour module 1995 – 1998: 30 contact hours, c. 30 students

MSc Training and Development 1 and Training and Development 2 modules (30 hours each) in 1995 only

Plan and lead MA Development Administration and Management Fieldwork (compulsory course component) to Cuba (1998, 14 days) Gambia (1999, 7 days) Barbados (7 days)– during Christmas inter-semester break.

Individual lecture inputs on the Perspectives on Development MA core module 1997-now; Managing NGOs MA module 1999 – now;

2. Other teaching.

Various inputs to mid-career professionals on IDPM professional development courses (HRS, Senior management, Policy and Management for Development Practictioners, Social Policy, Project Planning and Management) on subject specialisms

3. Continuing education or extra-mural teaching.

(conducted as part of consultancies – see below)

4. Publications related to teaching.

(1999) *Managing Organisational Change*, MA Public Policy and Management Distance Learning Module, SOAS: University of London (with N Nmeterson), (8 x 15,000 word units, co-funded by University of Manchester CDCE)

5. Innovative work.

Currently authoring distance learning version of MD506 Organization Development module for new DL MSc in HRM.

Part of team responsible for design of new MSc in Organisational Change and Development 1999 (MSc OCD); specific responsibility for marketing the programme; and Co-director from launch.

Design of new Organisation Development and Managing Public Organisational Change modules (both cores for various Master's degrees).

Design of new professional development courses in Strategic Change for NGOs; Management and Policy for Development Practitioners

Design and initial course director, MSc in Organisation Change and Management Development, University of Teesside, 1994

(also see production of distance learning Master's module B4 above)

6. Examination responsibilities.

Internal examiner for all modules currently taught above, plus Organisational Behaviour and specific areas of Perspectives on Development and Managing NGOs modules

Examiner (1st or 2nd) for over 60 Master's dissertations since 1995

7. Results of assessment of teaching ability.

All IDPM modules are assessed by student feedback questionnaires which grade 10 criteria on a scale of 1- 4, where 1 = not at all satisfactory, 2 = only partially satisfactory, 3 = completely satisfactory 4 = excellent . My ratings are consistently 3 or above for all criteria, with positive qualitative feedback in addition

My teaching was assessed as part of a 1994 subject review at University of Teesside and rated as "excellent"

8. Appointments held as Course Director or Tutor.

Course Director, MA Development Administration and Management (1997 – 2001)

Course Director MSc Organisational Change and Development 1999 – now .

Course Director, Policy and Management for Development Practitioners Professional Development Course 1998 – 2000

Course Director, Strategic Change for NGOs Professional Development Course 1996, 1997

(Co) Course Director Human Resource Studies and Senior Management Professional Development Courses 1995, 1996

(Course Unit tutor for MSc/MA modules listed in 1 above)

C. Research and professional/academic standing

1. Publications

Edited books:

(2001) Participation: The New Tyranny ? (with U. Kothari) Zed Books, London

Edited Journals

Journal of International Development (2002) Special Issue: Different Policies, Different Poverties, with David Hulme

Recent Conference contributions, refereed:

(2002) Management Theory in Context: Exploring the Influence of the Cold War, Administrative Sciences Assocation of Canada (honorable mention)

(2002) Lewin's Action Research Peers: John Collier and Ronald Lippitt, Academy of Management (Refereed Paper, Main Programme), Denver Colorado

(2001) From Colonial Administration to Development Management, Academy of Management (Refereed Paper, Main Programme), Washington DC *(nominated for the Carolyn Dexter Award for Best International Paper)*

Departmental Working Papers:

(2002) The Denial of Slavery in Management Studies, IDPM Discussion Paper 68, IDPM: University of Manchester

(1998) 'The Theory of Institutional and Organisation Development', *IDPM Discussion Paper* 52, IDPM: University of Manchester *(Set reading on OU Development Management MA Programme)*

Edited Works: Contributions

(1992) "Culture, Quality and Local Government", in Saunders I (ed) *Managing Quality in Local Government,* Longman, 142 – 163

(2001) The Case for Tyranny (with U.Kothari) in *Participation: The New Tyranny ?, 1 -15*

(2001) "The Social Psychological Limits of Participation", in *Participation, the New Tyranny ? 102 - 121*

(forthcoming) Managing Organisational Culture and Imperialism, in Prasad A (ed) *Postcolonialism and Organisational Theory,* St. Martins Press New York
Academic Journal Papers

Refereed Journal Articles

(1997) 'From Process Consultation to a Clinical Model of Development Practice', *Public Administration and Development* 17 (3), pp325-340 *(received Anbar Citation of Excellence: Highest Quality Rating "outstanding contribution to the literature and body of knowledge")*

(1997) 'The Deceptive Illusion of Multi-Paradigm Development Practice', *Public Administration and Development* 17(5), pp479-486 *(also received Anbar Citation of Excellence: Highest Quality Rating "outstanding contribution to the literature and body of knowledge")*

(1998) 'Participation, "Process" and Management: Lessons for Development in the History of Organization Development', *Journal of International Development* 10(1), pp35-54

(1999) 'Writing the Left Out of Management Theory: the Historiography of the Management of Change', *Organization, 6,1,81-106*

Papers submitted

(2002) Management's Denial of Slavery, submitted to *Journal of Management Studies*, August (c 8,000 words)

(2002) The Management of the (Third) World : submitted to *Organization,* October (c9,000 words)

2. Other Publications: Research Equivalent:

(1996) ODA Small Enterprise Awards Scheme (Kenya) Output to Purpose Review, ODA/British Council (with D. Hulme and R. Gichira)

(1996) Tanzania ICTP Training for Local Councillors (Dodoma) Course Delivery Report, ODA/British Council

(1997) In-Country Training Programme: Evaluation and Planning Visit Induction Training for Local Councillors (with H. Taylor)

(1997) Strategic Management of SME Service Provision Organisations, ODA/British Council, Kenya (with Helena Kithinji)

(1998) Review of the Advisory Services Unit, Civil Service Training and Development Institute, Hong Kong SAR

(1999) UN Common Services: A Performance Evaluation Framework

(2000) UN Secretariat Procurement Division: Performance Management Report (with D. Burton)

3. Creative or innovative work.

The Tanzania and UN consultancies above all involved the design and implementation of training events/planning workshops etc

4. Promotion of research

Convenor of 2001 Development Studies Association Conference (c 300 participants)

Conference steering committees of IDPM Public Sector Management and DfID consultation conferences

Co-organiser (with U. Kothari) of "Participation: The New Tyranny Conference", University of Manchester 1999

5. Professional advisory or consultancy work.

See C2 above, in addition:

Design and delivery of seminars in TQM/service quality management in business schools in Morocco (ENCG) (1996)

Review of recruitment and selection in Nepal Civil Service/ Public Service Commission (1995) (with D.Hulme and W. McCourt)

Design and delivery of open seminars in leadership, team development and managing change for SME owner/managers in the UK via Teesside TEC (1993 -5) and Kosice and Velky Krtis, Slovakia via EU projects (1993)

Design and delivery of seminars and learning programmes for managers, consultants and academics in consultancy and change management theory and skills (1992-5) in Slovakia and Bulgaria. (Bulgarian work as part of TEMPUS project aimed at developing Bulgarian Universities capacity to deliver SME/Entrepreneurship programmes)

Consultancy projects with over 25 different SME's (1990 – 5, as partner in own consultancy firm and then business school academic which included strategic/business planning, and training programme design, implementation and evaluation

Design, implementation and evaluation of TQM strategies, initiatives, workshops and training for a range of public and voluntary (NGO) sector organisations (1990 - 1995)

Permanent "internal" OD consultant for British Telecom (1988 – 1990) leading team of OD and management development consultants delivering a range of OD, change management and TQM projects, including design and delivery of an internal consultant development programme.

6. Service as an external examiner or as a referee

External examiner, University of Birmingham MPA 1999 - now

External examiner, University of Bradford Pg. Dip in Project Planning 1996- 1999

External examiner, University of Lincoln and Humberside MBA 1996 –1998

Refereed research proposal for ESCOR, 2000;

Referee for the following academic journals: *Public Administration and Development, Journal of International Development, Human Resource Development International, Organization, Human Resource Management Journal* and *Management Learning.*

Referee for US Academy of Management, Washington D C 2001, Denver Colorado 2002

7. Holding of office

Member, Development Studies Association (DSA) Council

Convenor, DSA Development Management study group

8. Other public service in a professional capacity

Member of Executive Board and Trustee, Mines Advisory Group

Founder and list-owner, Development-Management JISCMAIL list

D. Administration

1. General responsibility

Course directorships for 13 week short courses (Human Resource Studies, Senior Management) and 4 week short courses (Strategic Change, Change for NGOs).

Course directorship for award bearing courses M.A. Development Administration and Management (1996 – 2001) MSc Organizational Change and Development

Also responsible for preparation of MA DAM five year review conducted in 1999; and for writing proposal for Pg. Diploma route in Organizational Change and Development.

Lead responsibility for Teaching, Learning and Assessment section of IDPM Subject Review 2000. Author of TLA strategy document, TLA link document, and compiler of required link files. First point of contact for review team on TLA.

Chair of IDPM Marketing Group, responsible, in conjunction with Institute Director. Responsible for oversight and coordination of all IDPM's extensive (as a self funding institute) marketing activity.

1

The Case for Participation as Tyranny

Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari

The Purpose of this Book

This book follows on from a conference with the same title held at the Institute for Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester, organized by the two editors of this book and our colleague Phil Woodhouse. At a very basic level the impetus for the conference came from our growing discomfort at the dissonance between a number of conversations we had been having, which we were aware were also taking place elsewhere, and the received wisdom about the overwhelming benefits of participation in development.

These private conversations were with other participatory practitioners and with 'participants', and with people outside or on the margins of development and Development Studies. The conversations with practitioners and participants were often characterized by a mildly humorous cynicism, with which tales were told of participatory processes undertaken ritualistically, which had turned out to be manipulative, or which had in fact harmed those who were supposed to be empowered. The conversations with disciplinary outsiders, on the other hand, were typified by an irritation, at times bordering on anger, at the way in which a conceptually isolationist participatory development establishment had chosen to ignore the challenges posed by their particular understandings and analyses of participatory orthodoxy.

Despite our participation in these conversations we found ourselves, in our roles as workers in the development industry, more often than not promoting and perpetuating the received wisdom. Of course, as academics, we claimed that our work was informed by a critical understanding of participatory development. However, the criticisms we raised were often at the level of problems of technique, or about how the practitioner should operate. We did not do justice to the scale or depth of the criticisms and concerns being voiced privately, nor could we see, in the practice of

participatory development, many others doing so (although there have been, as we note below, admirable exceptions). We came to realize that the very difference between private and public accounts of participatory development was in itself cause for concern.

Our primary aim with this book is to provide a set of more rigorous and critical insights into the participatory development discourse than has hitherto been the case, through a conceptual and ideological examination of its theory, methods and practices. There are four reasons for doing this through a book. First, we wanted to provide a stimulus that would help the conversations mentioned above develop as arguments in terms of depth and rigour. Second, we wanted these arguments to be put on the record. This is not just because they are of value in their own right, but because for all the rhetoric of 'handing over the stick', authority and the ability to have one's position taken seriously in participatory development appear to be closely related to the power to publish. Third, we wanted to provide an arena where the hitherto marginalized voices of practitioners and of those outside the orthodoxy could assemble and, it was hoped, in (metaphorically) speaking together, increase their chances of being heard. Fourth, while we knew that the chapters in the book reflected a diversity of authorial experiences and perspectives, we suspected that alongside this diversity and difference common themes would emerge. We wanted to demonstrate the different strands of the critique and at the same time show the ways in which together they provide a serious and fundamental challenge to participatory approaches and demand at best their rethinking, if not their abandonment.

This introduction will map out, on a chapter by chapter basis, how this diversity of perspectives on participation challenges the participatory development orthodoxy. It will also identify what for us, as editors, are the common and mutually reinforcing themes among the chapters (recognizing that there are others that other contributors and readers will identify). But before we do this, however, we want to explain – and justify – our use of the word 'tyranny' in the title. Building on this explanation we then want to acknowledge that the orthodoxy is not without its own reflexive self-criticism. This is, however, limited in scale and scope, and serves, perhaps unintentionally, to pre-empt more profound critique, as the contrast with the subsequent summary of the individual chapters demonstrates.

Why Tyranny?

Our choice of title was, in part, a sharp reaction to the humorous, almost light-hearted way in which we expressed our unease with participatory approaches to development. This, we came to feel, was serving as a release valve that enabled us, and perhaps other practitioners too, to articulate and share worries about participatory development, and at the same time minimize their significance. That we behaved in this way reflected, perhaps, a tacit anxiety about the consequences of having to challenge a set of practices to which the major development institutions, powerful individuals within them, and perhaps most importantly, people who are good friends of ours, are committed. These potential consequences may of course have been fantasized (we hope so), but it is with some trepidation, reinforced by supportive colleagues who nevertheless advised that we 'be careful', that we now publish this book.

Perhaps our title seems incongruous with this supposed uneasiness, and no doubt we might be accused of letting the irritation and anger we mentioned get the better of us. We are certainly aware that 'Participation: The New Tyranny?' has not endeared us to some in the development world. However, the term 'tyranny' is both necessary and accurate. It is necessary because the manner in which participation has been critiqued, and the language with which this has been done, has clearly thus far failed to affect, qualitatively or quantitatively, the apparently inexorable spread of participation in development. Clearly argued and quite profound analyses, exemplified in the work of Stirrat (1997) or Mosse (1994, 1996) have largely been ignored and have had little or no apparent impact on mainstream discourse and practice. We felt it necessary, therefore, to use language that would be harder to ignore. The accusation that has been levelled – that our use of the word tyranny is attention-seeking – is therefore not without truth. The attention we seek, though, is for the concerns that first led to the conference being set up, and for the arguments set out in the following chapters.

However, although reactions to our initial conference, supportive and otherwise, suggest that our choice of title worked in this respect, it was not used solely to get attention, nor is it simply rhetorical. The term 'tyranny' is also accurate. The arguments presented in this book collectively confirm that tyranny is both a real and a potential consequence of participatory development, counter-intuitive and contrary to its rhetoric of empowerment though this may be. Our choice of the word was influenced by Simon Bell's 1994 article 'Methods and Mindsets: Towards an Understanding of the

Tyranny of Methodology'. While Bell's focus was the transfer of methodologies in development practice generally, he did argue as a case in point (drawing on the work of a contributor to this volume, David Mosse) that rapid and participatory rural appraisals: 'are only as untyrannical ... as the context and the scientist [i.e. the practitioner] are prepared to be, and perhaps more meaningfully are able to be, given the limitations of their own culturally based view of their own methods' (Bell 1994: 332).

The second part of this quote hints at a premise that is central to this book. This is that participatory development's tyrannical potential is systemic, and not merely a matter of how the practitioner operates or the specificities of the techniques and tools employed. We wanted to move away from the methodological revisionism that characterizes the limited self-reflexivity within participatory development and to address more directly how the discourse itself, and not just the practice, embodies the potential for an unjustified exercise of power.

This brings us to what we mean by tyranny. In the *Collins English Dictionary* (1979: 1645), a tyrant is, among other things, 'a person who governs oppressively, unjustly, and arbitrarily ... anything that exercises tyrannical influence ... a ruler whose authority lacked the sanction of law or custom; usurper'; and tyranny 'government by a tyrant or tyrants; despotism ... similarly oppressive and unjust government by more than one person ... arbitrary, unreasonable, or despotic behaviour or use of authority ... any harsh discipline or oppression ... government by a usurper'. In sum, then, tyranny is the illegitimate and/or unjust exercise of power; this book is about how participatory development facilitates this.

The Limits of Internal Critiques

A number of the chapters in this book contain their own accounts of the spread of participatory development. Those of David Mosse (Chapter 2), Frances Cleaver (Chapter 3) and Bill Cooke (Chapter 7), for example, are derived from participatory development's accounts of itself; Paul Francis takes the case of a single institutional setting, the World Bank (Chapter 5); and Heiko Henkel and Roderick Stirrat (Chapter 11) and to a lesser extent John Hailey (Chapter 6) propose a genealogy and a history of participatory development that challenge the orthodox account. Given that this ground is covered, from a number of angles, in subsequent chapters, our consideration of the internal critiques of participatory development and the orthodox history here is brief, and serves to locate the arguments presented in the following chapters.

Participatory development is conventionally represented as emerging out of the recognition of the shortcomings of top-down development approaches. The ineffectiveness of externally imposed and expert-oriented forms of research and planning became increasingly evident in the 1980s, when major donors and development organizations began to adopt participatory research and planning methods. Particularly influential in this trend was the work of Robert Chambers (1983, 1992, 1994a, b, c, 1997), which built from an interest in participatory rural development, and an advocacy of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) to participatory development more generally.

The ostensible aim of participatory approaches to development was to make 'people' central to development by encouraging beneficiary involvement in interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control or influence. Thus, 'the broad aim of participatory development is to increase the involvement of socially and economically marginalized peoples in decision-making over their own lives' (Guijt 1998: 1). Similarly, the World Bank (1994) saw participation as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect their lives. This recognition and support for greater involvement of 'local' people's perspectives, knowledge, priorities and skills presented an alternative to donor-driven and outsider-led development and was rapidly and widely adopted by individuals and organizations. Participatory approaches to development, then, are justified in terms of sustainability, relevance and empowerment.

There have recently been a number of reviews and critiques of populist participatory approaches (Bastian and Bastian 1996; Mosse 1994; Nelson and Wright 1995; IIED 1995). These take two main forms: those that focus on the technical limitations of the approach and stress the need for a re-examination of the methodological tools used, for example in PRA, and those that pay more attention to the theoretical, political and conceptual limitations of participation.

From within the orthodoxy, there is an espousal of ongoing 'self-critical epistemological awareness', which for Chambers (1997: 32) is an essential component of participatory ideology and practice. As McGee (forthcoming) suggests, 'this generates an ongoing dialogue between practitioners on the quality, validity and ethics of what they are doing, which is intended to guard against slipping standards, poor practice, abuse or exploitation of the people involved'. Such continual reflexivity and self-critique by the practitioner do not represent a critique of participatory methodology *per se*, however, but are seen more as intrinsic facets of the approach itself. In

this way, the methodological and practical problems of the approach are supposed to be recognized, highlighted and subsequently addressed. Participatory approaches are presented as flexible and continuously evolving in the light of problems of application and adapting to specific contexts. This, it is claimed, has led to significant methodological adjustments being made to the approach, encouraged by the continual need for introspection.

These critiques focus primarily on definitional differences and debates over the objectives of participation, i.e. whether it is a means or an end, and the applicability and appropriateness of the techniques and tools used (see Nelson and Wright 1995). There are other critiques of participation, particularly focusing on PRA, which, rather than demanding greater reflexivity *per se*, require that it be cognizant of issues of diversity and differentiation. In their book *The Myth of Community* Guijt and Shah (1998) question the use of the term 'community' in PRA discourse, arguing that simplistic understandings of 'communities' see them as homogeneous, static and harmonious units within which people share common interests and needs. This articulation of the notion of 'community', they argue, conceals power relations within 'communities' and further masks biases in interests and needs based on, for example, age, class, caste, ethnicity, religion and gender. Andrea Cornwall also encourages practitioners to question their assumptions about gender differences in particular societies and to find out what categories of difference are appropriate and relevant to people and, more specifically, what it means to be a man or a woman in a given context (Cornwall 1998).

Further concerns and reflections of participatory techniques were highlighted in a special issue of *PLA Notes* on 'Critical Reflections from Practice' (IIED 1995). The editorial suggests that:

> We have come full circle. PRA started as a critical response to the inadequacy of existing research and planning processes. Yet many of the concerns discussed here focus precisely on the inadequacy of local participation in the process ... By reflecting critically on what we do, we can learn from our mistakes and move forward. (Guijt and Cornwall 1995: 7)

Much of the analysis presented in this issue of *PLA Notes* takes us to what might be seen as the border between the orthodoxy and more critical positions. So do some of the more infrequent conceptual and political challenges to the approach, which demonstrate how participation can result in political co-option, and can require contributions from participants in the form of labour, cash or kind and thus transfer some of the project costs on to beneficiaries, and those who challenge the rhetoric of participation,

arguing that it masks continued centralization in the name of decentralization (see Biggs and Smith 1998; Mosse 1994; Stirrat 1997).

We recognize, therefore, that distinguishing where critiques from within the orthodoxy end, and critiques of that orthodoxy *per se* begin, is difficult. Furthermore, not only is the boundary blurred, but we should be wary of the dichotomous thinking to which Henkel and Stirrat alert us in Chapter 11, which masks nuance, difference within, and exchanges between, the categories of ideas. It is certainly the case, and we are proud of the fact, that the contributions in this volume do not present a unified and singular challenge to participation. Opinions diverge, for example, on what fundamental flaws there are, the implications they have, and/or the extent to which they require a total revisioning of participatory development; to lump the contributors to this volume together as opposed to participation would be mistaken stereotyping.

However, we are also clear as editors that our objective for this volume as a whole is not simply to rehearse the methodological limitations of participation that have been addressed elsewhere. Indeed, for us the time has come to ask whether the constant methodological revisionism to which some of us have contributed (e.g. Cooke 1998), has obscured the more fundamental problems within the discourse, and whether internal critiques have served to legitimize the participatory project rather than present it with a real challenge. The aim here, therefore, is to move beyond an identification of technocratic limitations of, and adjustments to, the methodology to more fundamental critiques of the discourse of participation, and to recognize that some of these do emerge out of technocratic concerns. The question that stands out, however, is how many such concerns need to be raised before participatory development itself comes to be seen as the real problem? Essentially, our problem at this stage of the development of participatory approaches and their application lies not with the methodology and the techniques but with the politics of the discourse, and, as Henkel and Stirrat's final chapter states, with what participatory development does as much as what it does not do.

What the Book Says

Early on, when we were organizing the conference, three particular sets of tyrannies were identified. First was what we called 'the tyranny of decision-making and control', where we asked in the conference flyer 'Do participatory facilitators override existing legitimate decision-making processes?' Second was 'the tyranny of the group' – where the question posed

was 'Do group dynamics lead to participatory decisions that reinforce the interests of the already powerful?' Third, we raised the issue of the 'tyranny of method', asking 'Have participatory methods driven out others which have advantages participation cannot provide?' As we will go on to see, between them, the chapters in this book suggest that the answer to each of these questions is, or can be in some circumstances, 'Yes'. In this book, however, the first two of these questions are more strongly addressed, or at least more explicitly stated than the last, although John Hailey's Chapter 6 does explore how, and suggests reasons as to why, some NGOs have avoided the tyranny of the method. Together, however, the chapters show just how methodologically parochial the participatory development discourse is.

David Mosse in Chapter 2 challenges the populist assumption that attention to 'local knowledge' through participatory learning will redefine the relationship between local communities and development organizations. Using project-based illustrations, he shows that 'local knowledge', far from determining planning processes and outcomes, is often structured by them. For example, what in one case was expressed as a 'local need' was actually shaped by local perceptions of what the agency in question could legitimately and realistically be expected to deliver. Indeed, 'participatory planning' may, more accurately, be viewed as the acquisition and manipulation of a new 'planning knowledge' rather than the incorporation of 'people's knowledge' by projects.

Mosse then shows how participatory ideals are often operationally constrained by institutional contexts that require formal and informal bureaucratic goals to be met. Participation nevertheless remains important as part of a project as a 'system of representations'. As such, ideas of participation are oriented towards concerns that are external to project locations. These representations do not necessarily speak directly to local practice and provide little by way of guidance on project implementation, but they are important in negotiating relationships with donors, and more widely in underpinning positions within development policy debates.

In Chapter 3 Frances Cleaver also makes use of case studies, here in relation to water resource usage. The chapter begins by questioning 'the heroic claims made for development', and by presenting the case for understanding the role of social structure and of individual agency in shaping participation. Participatory development, Cleaver suggests, tends to conflate social structures with institutions, most commonly conceptualized as organizations, not least because such institutions apparently make social structures 'legible'. However, participatory development bureaucracies have

preferences for institutional arrangements that may not correspond with those of 'participants'. Problems identified include an espousal of the importance of informal institutions while actual concentration is on the formal; the varying forms of participation that different institutional types require; the questionable assumptions about 'community' upon which participatory institution-building is based; and the tendency towards foundationalism about local communities.

The chapter goes on to consider the inadequacy of participatory approaches' models of individual agency and the links between these and social structures. The argument presented here is that understandings of the motivations of individuals to participate, or not, are vague, and simplistic assumptions are made about the rationality inherent in participating, and the irresponsibility of not doing so. Furthermore, participatory approaches fail to recognize how the different, changing and multiple identities of individuals impact upon their choices about whether and how to participate, and overlook the potential links between inclusion in participatory processes and subordination.

Chapter 4, by Nicholas Hildyard, Pandurang Hegde, Paul Wolvekamp and Somasekhare Reddy, examines, in light of the increasing fashion for participatory forest management, conflicts over the meanings of 'participation' and 'forests'. It begins by suggesting that the failure by donors to implement policies on participation is institutionally deep-seated and structural, and that through participatory development grassroots organizations are in danger of becoming 'the human software through which investments can be made with least local opposition'. It then shows that while participatory forest management arose from institutional and political pressures resulting from popular unrest about the commercial exploitation of forests and local people's exclusion from forest resources, it nevertheless served to maintain that exploitation and exclusion. The chapter demonstrates the further marginalization, loss of livelihoods and increased hardship of already disadvantaged groups as the result of a participatory Joint Forest Management project in which the chapter authors were involved as local activists or staff of Northern-based solidarity groups. The authors conclude by arguing that unless participatory processes take into account the relative bargaining power of so-called stakeholders they are in danger of merely providing opportunities for the more powerful.

In Chapter 5 Paul Francis begins by summarizing the three main approaches to participation employed by the World Bank – Beneficiary Assessment, Social Analysis and PRA – before going on to focus on the last of these. Initially the chapter sets out PRA's methodological and

epistemological bases before questioning the relationship between 'the community' and 'the professional', suggesting *inter alia* that the importance of charismatic specialists, who claim a moral position combined with an inner-directedness and the symbolism of 'reversal', recalls the role of the shaman. Francis suggests that PRA is a rite of communion, the performance of which 'enacts an exorcism, of sorts, of the phantoms of "conventional" development practice', and analyses the *World Bank Participation Sourcebook* as 'part self-improvement manual and part mythical text'. At the same time, though, the reductionist simplifications of PRA techniques are noted. Next, Francis considers the uptake of participatory approaches at the Bank within the context of the new emphasis on 'the social' in terms of process, consultation and partnership. He argues that underlying structural determinants of well-being are given little attention and that this is reinforced by the individualist nature of PRA, and the absence of any real alternative vision of development leaves it vulnerable to opportunism and co-option.

In Chapter 6 John Hailey draws on a range of ideas to question the formulaic approaches to participatory decision-making promoted and even imposed by donors and other development actors. These include Hofstede's work on cross-cultural management, a Foucauldian analysis of power and the discourse of participation, and a recognition of the Cold War uses of community participation. Hailey begins by reviewing recent research into the development and growth of successful South Asian NGOs that suggested that NGO success resulted from the understandings of, and responses to, the needs of the local communities with which they worked. However, the research showed that this closeness to communities arose not from the application of the well-known formulaic approaches to participation – indeed, they were conspicuous by their absence. Rather, as case examples in the chapter illustrate, success was achieved by a long-term effort by NGO leaders to build close personal relationships with individuals and groups in the communities with which they worked, and with NGO staff. The chapter then offers three explanations for the absence of formulaic approaches to participation. The first is that they have real operational limitations, the second is that they are culturally inappropriate, and the third is that their history and the reality of their practice indicate that they might (legitimately) be seen as a means of imposing external control.

In Chapter 7 Bill Cooke uses four concepts from social psychology (risky shift, the Abilene paradox, groupthink and coercive persuasion) to demonstrate how individuals' thoughts, feelings and behaviours are influenced by the presence – real, imagined or implied – of others. These

concepts suggest that problems can arise as a consequence of the face-to-face interactions that are a defining feature of participatory development. Taken together the four concepts suggest that participatory processes can lead people to take, first, collective decisions that are more risky than those they would have taken individually (i.e. risky shift). Second, they can lead to people taking a decision that participants have second-guessed is what everyone else wants, when the opposite is the case (the Abilene paradox). Third, particular dynamics, the symptoms of which include a belief in the inherent morality of what is being done, self-censorship, and the existence of 'mindguards', can lead to evidently wrong decisions, which can be harmful to 'outgroup' members (groupthink). Fourth, the manipulation of group processes can lead to malign changes in ideological beliefs, or consciousness (coercive persuasion). All four challenge participatory development's claims for effectiveness and empowerment, and suggest a disciplinary bias that permits the use of a technology on the world's poor without the safeguards that the rich would expect.

In Chapter 8 Harry Taylor challenges Robert Chambers' positive spin on the parallels between participatory development and participatory management. Taylor argues that participation in both cases is part of a wider attempt to influence power relations between elite groups and the less powerful – be they individual project beneficiaries or the employees of organizations in the developed world. He makes his case by first drawing parallels between project beneficiaries and employees within organizations in terms of their relative dependency and powerlessness. Moving on to consider arguments for participation from mainstream management, he suggests that even on its own terms doubts about its feasibility and desirability exist. From a more critical management perspective he then draws on Foucauldian and labour process critiques, which suggest that participation is always constrained, and hides and at the same time perpetuates certain sets of power relations. Taylor rounds off his chapter by suggesting why there is a disillusionment with participation in both development and management arenas, and by speculating on the prospects for 'genuine' participation.

In Chapter 9 Uma Kothari challenges the truth claims made by participatory development. Like Harry Taylor and John Hailey she proposes a Foucauldian approach to the understanding of power, as something which circulates, rather than as something divided between those who have it and those who do not. This latter dichotomous approach typifies participatory development, and leads to practices based in conventional stratifications of power. These serve both to conceal daily oppressions in people's lives that

run through every aspect of everyday life and to ensure that participants remain the subject of development surveillance. Although PRA seeks to reveal the realities of this everyday life, paradoxically its public nature means that the more participatory it is, the more the power structure of the local community will be masked. The chapter continues by exploring how participatory research 'cleans up' local knowledge through mapping and codification, and marginalizes that which might challenge the status quo or is messy or unmanageable. The chapter concludes by drawing on the work of Goffman to consider how the ritual practices of PRA actually serve to subvert it, by producing front stage performances that conceal both the 'real' reality of the back stage, and come to be taken for that reality.

In Chapter 10 Giles Mohan has two major aims. The first is to critique participatory practices, in particular the ways in which local knowledge is supposedly produced as a reversal of 'top-down' approaches. This critique is made using the ideas associated with postcolonial studies, and argues that a subtle Eurocentrism pervades the interventions of non-local development workers. By supposedly focusing on the personal and the local as the sites of empowerment and knowledge, participatory approaches minimize the importance of the other places where power and knowledge are located, for example with 'us' in the Western development community, and with the state. The chapter then addresses its second aim, which is to explore the possibility of moving beyond these pitfalls, weaving theoretical observations with a discussion of the work of Village Aid. Mohan calls for a radicalized hybridity, beyond bounded notions of self/other and insider/outsider; and a scaling up of local interventions, linking them to the complex processes of democratization, anti-imperialism and feminism.

Heiko Henkel and Roderick Stirrat's Chapter 11 takes an anthropological approach. They are concerned with the practices, ideas and cosmologies of those who plan and practise 'development projects'. They begin by looking at genealogies of participation, which they identify as being primarily religious, noting that participation was a moral imperative of the Reformation, and tracing this imperative through nineteenth-century British nonconformism to the founding of British development NGOs. The chapter, like Chapter 5, then considers participation as a religious experience, but sees different parallels, particularly in the reversal of binary oppositions that characterize both the work of Robert Chambers and Christian traditions of 'the World turned upside down'. Henkel and Stirrat go on to address the notion of 'empowerment', which they claim may not be as liberating as the new orthodoxy suggests. The question that should

be asked, they argue, is not how much people are empowered, but for what. Their own answer to this question is that participatory approaches shape individual identities, 'empowering' participants 'to take part in the modern sector of developing societies'. This empowerment is therefore tantamount, in Foucauldian terms, to subjection.

Is Tyranny Inevitable?

Notwithstanding the critiques in this book, and its title, we would resist being labelled anti-participation. There are acts and processes of participation that we cannot oppose. Some of these, such as sharing knowledge and negotiating power relations, may be part of everyday life; others, such as political activism or engagement in social movements, are about challenges to day-to-day and structural (for want of a better word) oppressions and injustices within societies. But it is also the case that acts and processes of participation described in the same way – sharing knowledge, negotiating power relationships, political activism and so on – can both conceal and reinforce oppressions and injustices in their various manifestations. The chapters in this book demonstrate how this can happen with participatory development, and we have already argued that this is a systemic problem. The question that remains, though, is this: is participatory development inevitably tyrannical?

At the beginning of this Introduction we suggested that previous criticisms of participatory approaches to development have focused primarily on technical limitations of the method and/or on the workings of the practitioner. We did not feel that the depth of concerns being articulated privately were reflected in these earlier discussions and so our initial aim in putting together this volume was to provide a space within which more conceptual and ideological examinations of the theory, method and practices of participatory development could take place. From the vantage point afforded to us as editors, which readers will share having read the book, we are now able to see the way the arguments highlighted in the individual chapters in this volume appear as a whole, and thus what sort of challenge they present to participatory development.

In the individual chapters there are of course divergences in perspectives and differences in the focus; the danger in looking for common themes is that these are lost. However, those that do emerge suggest that there are more overarching and fundamental problems with participatory approaches to development than those reflected in earlier critiques. Without giving too much away, and not in any order of priority, those that are most

apparent to us are the naivety of assumptions about the authenticity of motivations and behaviour in participatory processes; how the language of empowerment masks a real concern for managerialist effectiveness; the quasi-religious associations of participatory rhetoric and practice; and how an emphasis on the micro level of intervention can obscure, and indeed sustain, broader macro-level inequalities and injustice.

Taken together, these themes (and there are others, which readers may identify) point to what for us is the fundamental concern. It becomes clear from a reading of the chapters in this book that the proponents of participatory development have generally been naive about the complexities of power and power relations. This is the case not only 'on the ground' between 'facilitators' and 'participants', between 'participants' and more widely between 'donors' and 'beneficiaries', but also historically and discursively in the construction of what constitutes knowledge and social norms. While analyses of power in participation are not new, what is evident here is that there are multiple and diverse ways in which this power is expressed; furthermore, articulations of power are very often less visible, being as they are embedded in social and cultural practices. Thus this book identifies a more nuanced set of understandings of the workings of power as being necessary, in order to uncover its varied and subtle manifestations in the very discourse of participation.

The genealogies and histories of development in general, and participatory practices in particular, that are found in some of these chapters further explicate how a misunderstanding of power underpins much of the participatory discourse. This identification of the (mis)interpretations of how and where power is expressed within participation compels us to reconsider the notion of empowerment, and the claims to empowerment made by many participatory practitioners. Since an understanding of the concept of 'empowerment' is based on particular realizations of its root concept, 'power', and since this, as some of the chapters in this book argue, has been simplified in the theory and practice of participation, the meanings ascribed to the condition of empowerment and the claims made for its attainment for those who have been marginalized must also be subjected to further scrutiny.

This confirms, for us, that we were right to discuss participation in terms of its tyrannical potential, remembering that tyranny is precisely about the illegitimate and/or unjust uses of power. The question that we will not answer here, however, is whether this potential can be overcome. What we do suggest, however, is a starting point for those who might try to redeem it. This is to build in a more sophisticated and genuinely reflexive

understanding of power and its manifestations and dynamics. Written into this understanding must be a recognition that participatory development does not have a reified existence 'out there', but is constructed by a cadre of development professionals, be they academics, practitioners or policy-makers, whose ability to create and sustain this discourse is indicative of the power they possess. This must be accompanied by an acknowledgement that questions such as 'Whose reality counts?' (Chambers 1997), which suggest that there are contrasting versions of reality, mask the extent to which these development professionals, in their applications of the ideas of participatory development, are actually still engaged in the construction of a particular reality – one that at root is amenable to, and justifies, their existence and intervention within it.

What we are calling for as a first step, therefore, is a genuine and rigorous reflexivity, one that acknowledges the processes and consequences of these constructions. This means going beyond the evident narrowness (verging on narcissism) of the existing self-acclaimed 'self-critical epistemological awareness' (Chambers 1997: 32) to draw on a deeper and more wide-ranging set of analyses than has hitherto been the case. This book has provided some of these analyses and, we hope, initiated this reflexivity. Ironically, though, authentic reflexivity requires a level of open-mindedness that accepts that participatory development may inevitably be tyrannical, and a preparedness to abandon it if this is the case. Thus any meaningful attempt to save participatory development requires a sincere acceptance of the possibility that it should not be saved.

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Journal of International Development: Vol. 10, No. 1, 35–54 (1998)

PARTICIPATION, 'PROCESS' AND MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE HISTORY OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract: Participatory and process-driven social interventions have a history that dates back to before 1945. Hitherto this history has been presented within management theory as that of Organization Development (OD). An alternative history of OD is presented in this paper, focusing on the contributions of John Collier, Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt and colleagues, and Edgar Schein. This reveals how OD has been constructed from methodologies invented for economic and social development, and summarizes the extensive and critical knowledge of intervention practice that OD provides. This history, and the exclusion of development from orthodox histories of OD is seen to have lessons for the contemporary uses of OD and of participatory interventions in development, and for the creation of a new model of development management. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

J. Int. Dev. **10:** 35–54 (1998)

NTRODUCTION

his paper presents a history of process and participative social interventions within /estern management, as embodied in the field of theory and practice called Organ-ation Development (OD).[1] This history reveals that some of the most important ontributions to this field have been made through theorists and practitioners work in ursuit of development, i.e. planned interventions that seek to promote the economic nd social development of poor and disadvantaged people.[2]

The relationship between development and OD is patchy. Participatory Rural ppraisal (PRA), another form of participatory social intervention, utilises none of e insights into, for example, small group processes (e.g. Cartwright and Zander,

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OD overlaps substantially with what is currently called 'change management' (Wilson, 1992; Pettigrew, 85).

Issues of defining development, which are addressed by Thomas (1966) are not entered into here.

CCC 0954–1748/98/010035–20$17.50

1960) or facilitator practice (e.g. Lippitt and Lippitt, 1978) associated with OD. PRA, PRA in organizations, and the relationship between PRA and management (Chambers, 1994a; 1994b; 1994c) are discussed without reference to OD as a body of practice derived knowledge about participatory interventions, albeit one with an intra-organizational focus.

Even those forms of development activity which have an overtly organizational focus make limited reference to OD. Reviews of institutional development through organizations (e.g. Moore *et al.*, 1995), and of organizational capacity building, even when called organization*al* development (e.g. Fowler, 1992) and abbreviated as 'OD' (though not elsewhere in this article), are proposed with no, or only passing mention of the management discipline of OD. Such presentations of organization*al* development, which emphasize formal, overt aspects of organization such as structures and systems seem restricted and naive in comparison to managerial OD, for which an additional understanding of, and a willingness to address, informal and covert aspects of organization—such as culture or power—are prerequisite. Grindle and Hindlebrand (1995) do recognize the primacy of informal aspects of organization (e.g. culture and communication) in building sustainable public sector capacity, but refer to none of the relevant management literature, including that on OD. Most importantly, there is nowhere any acknowledgement of the caveats and ethical conditions OD attaches to interventions (e.g. Mirvis and Berg, 1977; Greiner, 1979; Schein, 1995) in considerations of organizational capacity building in development, using PRA or not, or of other forms of participatory development intervention.

There have however been some attempts to integrate OD and development practice (e.g. Sahley, 1995). Moreover, theorists and practitioners associated with OD have continued to apply core methodologies in development initiatives, from, for example, Klein (1964) in 1961 to Weisbord (1992), both of whom worked on community development. Cummings and Worley's (1993, pp. 615–623) OD textbook has an eight page section on OD in 'DO's' (development organizations) in its chapter on international OD. OD concepts are suggested for social change organizations (Covey and Brown, 1989), and in development generally (Hage and Finsterbusch, 1987). Team-based approaches to development project planning and management draw from OD (e.g. Team Technologies, undated, p. 164; from Schein, 1987a, p. 50), though this is sometimes unacknowledged. The most thorough consideration of the uses of OD in development is by Srinivas (1995), who reviews both the empirical evidence of OD successes in developing countries and the theoretical literature on the application of OD in national development. While this review shows that OD has achieved mixed results, an out and out rejection of OD is argued against. Instead, Srinivas calls for indigenous culture specific adaptations which would make OD more effective, but may change its nature. Such adaptations, however, not only have to be grounded in an understanding of specific indigenous cultures and organizations. They also require a thorough and critical understanding of that which is being adapted.[3]

This paper seeks to provide that understanding, not only in support of Srinivas, but with the broader aim of providing an overview of OD for those development practitioners engaged in organizational interventions who are unfamiliar with OD and what it offers. However, the approach contrasts with those who have tried to show what OD can do for development. Instead, it shows what development has done

[3] This paper is written from the author's position as an OD consultant and sceptical proponent of OD.

'or the formation of OD. This allows a dynamic to become apparent which provides essons both for the adaptation of OD in development, and for the creation of new nodels of development management (Thomas, 1996). In order to make the argument broad understanding of 'development' is utilized. Although all the work examined ıere was carried out in the USA, it is nonetheless readily recognizable as addressing ınd encompassing the distinctive features of development tasks as identified by Thomas (1996, p. 106):

> ... external social goals rather than internal organizational ones; influencing or intervening in social processes rather than using resources to meet goals directly; goals subject to value based conflicts; and the importance of process ...

VHAT IS OD?

French and Bell, in their authoritative text, (1984, p. 17) define OD as:

> ... a top-management supported, long range effort to improve an organizations problem solving and renewal processes, particularly through a more effective and collaborative diagnosis and management of organizational culture—with special emphasis on formal work team, temporary team and inter-group culture—with the assistance of a consultant-facilitator and the use of the theory and technology of applied behavioral science, including action research.

They note that different authors and practitioners have different, though broadly imilar definitions, and that the field is evolving. Others record, and are comfortable vith, the existence of more than one definition. For example, Burke (1987) uses everal definitions of OD, and traces how such definitions have evolved, noting in particular the increasing emphasis on organizational culture from the mid 1980's onwards. Hanson and Lubin (1995, p. 30) also provide several definitions, including one which illustrates the sequential nature of textbook OD practice, and the nature of the relationship between client and consultant/change agent:

> In its broadest terms any attempt to improve the organisation through involving the clients in identifying problems, planning ways to deal with these problems, evaluating what was done, and assessing the extent to which new behaviours have been adopted and affect the culture is OD. OD is not therefore a one shot intervention by an outside consultant, but an on-going, long term repetitive process in which management and others are trained to diagnose their organisation or work unit, plan ways to bring about needed change, and evaluate results.

An alternative interpretation is provided by Pettigrew (1985), whose overview of OD summarizes a number of historical and research reviews of the field, and provides an extensive and critical contrast to the OD orthodoxy (e.g. French and Bell, 1984; Burke, 1987; Hanson and Lubin, 1995). For Pettigrew (1985, p. 3) there are almost as many definitions of OD as there are OD practitioners. His research demonstrates a divergence between OD as identified in its literature and OD as practised, the latter often involving the application of an incoherent set of conceptual frameworks of unproven scientific validity, with there being limited empirical evidence of its efficacy.

Pettigrew's review shows how any form of organizational intervention can come to be idealized as OD. This is notoriously the case with trainers and training, leading contemporary OD texts (Harvey and Brown, 1988; Hanson and Lubin, 1995) to go out of their way to refute claims—like those of Blunt and Collins (1994) on training and institutional development—that training is OD. A second converse implication of Pettigrew, which applies to this paper, is that analyses of OD are often based on an idealized model of what OD is. Part of the intention here is to explore an overlooked dynamic in the creation of this model; at the same time the relative nature of any conclusions about OD must be recognized.

Any understanding of OD would be incomplete without reference to its inevitably espoused humanistic 'values', articulated in terms of concerns for the empowerment of individuals, for democratic and participative managerial processes and for the mutually reinforcing nature of individual and organizational development, the one being required for the other. These so-called 'OD values' have led some to argue that OD only works in countries where there are shared positive assumptions about democracy and participation, that is, in democratic cultures (Blunt, 1995; Hanson and Lubin, 1995, p. 37; French and Bell, 1984, p. 4). This is disputed by Golembiewski (1992), who argues that cultures at the micro level—e.g. organizational cultures—may be conducive to OD, even within hostile macro (e.g. national) cultures. It has also been argued that OD values rest upon unitarist assumptions that there is an essential identity of interest and of goals between individuals, and between the individual and the organization. Dunphy and Stace (1988), writing from a pluralist perspective that acknowledges issues of power within organizations present a summary of the debate within management theory on OD and organizational democracy, participation and change. They then famously argue that there are cases where conflicts of interest can only be resolved through the use of authority or by coercion—through the imposition of a solution by a stronger party—and inter alia for a contingent approach to change management along a collaborative—coercive continuum. At the same time they deliberately avoid questions of the legitimacy of those doing the coercing. In more critical analyses of management, the espousal of principles of empowerment and participation are seen (at the risk of oversimplification) as a sophisticated form of managerial manipulation which seeks to ensure consent to the ideological hegemony of the powerful through a facade of democracy (e.g. McArdle *et al.*, 1995, re TQM). The issue of OD values is therefore contentious, and deserves more through consideration than it is intended to provide here. However, the historical contextualisation that this paper does provide is relevant, and arguably a prerequisite, to any such consideration, and the issue is returned to in the conclusion.

HISTORIES OF OD

French and Bell (1984) liken OD to a mangrove tree with three important trunk 'stems'—the action research stem; the survey research feedback stem;[4] and the laboratory training stem, all with origins in the early to mid 1940s. In parallel they

[4] The survey research stem is not addressed here. It cannot be argued that this area—based on the industrial use of attitude surveys (for which Likert invented his famous scale)—has development roots—although it does overlap with action research. See French and Bell (1984, p. 33).

also identify the systems work on socio-technical and socio-clinical approaches associated with the Tavistock Institute in the UK. This review initially focuses on the contributions to two of the stems—action research and laboratory training—of John Collier and of Kurt Lewin. It goes on to consider the work of Ronald Lippitt and his colleagues, and of Edgar Schein, which built on action research and laboratory training to make key contributions to OD in the areas of change agency and of personal and organizational change. This is a partial history, as much of the antecedents of OD as of OD itself. Quantitatively these represent a very small proportion of those who can be seen to have made a contribution to OD. However, qualitatively this work provided the foundation OD concepts and methodologies from which mainstream OD developed.[5]

JOHN COLLIER AND THE INVENTION OF ACTION RESEARCH

John Collier was Commissioner of the US Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) between 1933 and 1945. He is cited (French and Bell, 1984; Cummings and Worley, 1993; Burke, 1987) for his contribution to OD as the simultaneous but separate co-inventor (along with Kurt Lewin) of action research. Action research brings to OD five fundamental principles, and its presence or absence is a key indicator of whether an intervention is 'real' OD. The first principle is of all action being informed by research. The second is of a sequential and often iterative data collection/feedback/data analysis/action series of intervention steps. The third requires the relationship between the intervener/researcher and 'subjects' to be consciously addressed, with an espoused desire on the part of the researcher for a collaborative relationship. The fourth is the need for a shared understanding of the organizational issue to be arrived at, based on rigorously acquired data. Fifth is the view that real understanding of a social system can only be achieved by trying to change it (see Schein, 1987a).[6]

French and Bell (1984, p. 114) quote from a 1945 Collier article (1945, p. 275) in which he specifies the principles that guided the BIA during his Commissionership, illustrating his articulation of the multi-disciplinary approach to action research:

> Principle seven I would call the first and last; that research and then more research is essential to the program, that in the ethnic field research can be made a tool of action essential to all the other tools, indeed that it ought to be the master tool. But we had in mind a particular kind of research, or if you will, particular conditions. We had in mind research impelled from central areas of needed action. And since action is by nature not only specialized but also integrative to more than the specialties, our research must be of the integrative sort. Again, since the findings of the research must be carried into effect by the administrator and the layman, and must be criticised by them through their experience, the administrator and the layman must participate creatively in the research, impelled as it is from their own area of need.

[5] Some have been excluded by somewhat subjective judgements of the significance of their work for OD, notably A. K. Rice and his contribution to the development of systems theories in Ahmedabad, India (Rice, 1963). Examples of this mainstream include Argyris (1970; 1971), Beckhard (1969) and Bennis (1969).

[6] For a more extensive discussion of action research in OD see French and Bell (1984, ch. 8).

Collier's work is described in the OD texts, if at all, as being about race or ethnic relations and no more. However there is much more to it, as the continuation of the section quoted by French and Bell in Collier's original article suggests:

> Through such integrative research in 1933, the Soil Conservation service originated directly in the ecological and economic problems of the Navajo Indian tribe.

A radical (for the time) 'New Dealer', appointed by President Roosevelt to the BIA as an Indian rights activist, Collier tried to replace the historic US government policy of assimilation with one that encouraged self government and autonomy. Although ultimately unsuccessful (Philp, 1977) he was arguably at the BIA the head of, to use our earlier term, a 'DO', a development organization, international albeit within the borders of the USA. In the same 1945 article, Collier claims that the post-Columbian history of what he called the Indians of the Americas was the longest colonial period in the modern world, in which the colonists record was at times as genocidal as that of the Nazis. He then lists the six principles which precede 'principle seven' cited by French and Bell, which guided the BIA during his office. Summarized, they include working with established and regenerating new communities with democratic responsibility and power, rather than seeking assimilation; giving such communities control over land use; sustaining civil, cultural and religious liberties including the right to organize; and support which passes responsibility to tribes, in organization, education, the provision of co-operative credit, and the conservation of natural resources. Action research is proposed by Collier not just for its instrumental effectiveness but the ability it offers to engage with, but not obliterate existing tribal cultures. One action research success Collier (1945, p. 285) identifies is a soil conservation project[7] with the people of Acoma where:

> ... no divorce was created between the old lasting life, its consecrations and its hopes, and the new life; instead the old life created the new, and no dichotomy arose at all, no split in the community organisation, no conflict between fundamentalism and science, and no conflict between world views.

Of contemporary resonance is the contrast of such successes with the failure of the BIA's 'Technical Cooperation' department. Set up in 1935, it contained soil and water specialists, agronomists, and anthropologists, who assembled a lot of data (at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars) but did nothing with it. According to Collier this was because though the Technical Cooperation administrators were keen to adopt a participative action research approach ... their budget demanded quantity production and had to be spent in a limited time... (Collier, 1945, p. 294).

One immediate lesson for development is that it can be seen to have a hitherto unacknowledged pre-1945 prehistory. Of more relevance to our eventual conclusion, though, is the point that restricted though this coverage of Collier's work is, it is nonetheless is clear that, when referred to at all, it is only partly represented by OD writers. Technique has been abstracted from context. The development and advocacy of action research is separated from the relatively radical analyses of historical and social change in which Collier grounded his work, and presented purely in terms of its generic applicability to the management of organizational change.

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[7] Collier takes care to point out that this initiative had a woman BIA administrator.

KURT LEWIN—ACTION RESEARCH AND THE DISCOVERY OF 'PROCESS'

Kurt Lewin was a psychologist of established standing by the time he had, as a Jew, to leave Germany for the USA for an appointment at Cornell University in 1934. (Marrow, 1969; Lewin, 1992) He moved to the University of Iowa in 1935, where his work included a social psychology experiment, directed by Margaret Mead, to change households' meat eating habits (Marrow, 1969). He moved again in 1945 to MIT to establish and become Director of the Research Centre for Group Dynamics. Lewin died in 1947. Lewin's contribution to OD is more widely acknowledged than that of Collier; indeed he is probably the most important single individual in OD's history: '...there is little doubt that the intellectual father of contemporary theories of applied behavioral science, action research and planned change is Kurt Lewin' (Schein, 1980, p. 239).

At a popular level, Lewin is probably best known for his invention of 'Force Field Analysis'—a mechanism for analysing the dynamics in change processes through identifying the drivers for and resistances to change, and for the 'Unfreeze, move (or change), refreeze' three phase model of the change process (both Lewin, 1947). This model argues that change has to be preceded by the development of a readiness to change ('unfreezing'), and followed by an embedding of the change ('refreezing'). Both continue to be cited as of contemporary relevance in sometimes simplified but still clearly recognizable form in contemporary OD, organizational behaviour, and general management texts (e.g. Blunt *et al.*, 1993). Lewin also conducted, along with Lippitt (see below) and White experiments into group leadership which sought to compare democratic, *laissez faire* and autocratic leadership styles (Lewin *et al.*, 1939). The democratic values associated with OD, and a commitment to using democratic processes at all social levels to make democracy work pervade Lewin's work, a reflection, it has been suggested, of Lewin's experience of fascism. Both his mother and his sister were murdered in Nazi death camps (Lewin, 1992).

At a methodological level, Lewin's contribution to OD is seen as a co-inventor of action research, and to the 'laboratory training stem'[8] as the inventor of the term 'group dynamics' (Marrow, 1969) and, at the risk of being too simplistic, as the discoverer of 'process', or at least, the insight that the analysis of 'the here and now' (a popular OD term—see Coghlan, 1988, p. 28; Hanson and Lubin, 1996, p. 9) processes in a group is a significant way of learning. Whilst the contributions of others to the laboratory training stem of OD should be acknowledged, notably argues Greiner (1977) that of Carl Rogers in the early 1940s, Lewin is widely recognized as the pioneer (Harvey and Brown, 1988). At a famous training workshop in 1946 organized by Lewin in New Britain, Connecticut the learning and change potential of providing feedback on processes within groups, in terms of intrapersonal, interpersonal and group processes and dynamics became apparent. Others running the workshop with Lewin came to be well known in their own right, as psychologists or social psychologists, or for their subsequent involvement in OD (e.g. Festinger, Lippitt, Bradford, and Benne).

[8] The term 'laboratory' arises from Lewin's call for adherence to the scientific method in the design and conduct of group process experiments, in laboratory conditions (see Lewin, 1946; 1947; Marrow, 1969).

The experience of the New Britain workshop led to the establishment in Summer 1947, soon after Lewin's death, of what became the National Training Laboratory (NTL) which initiated what it called Basic Skill Training. These developed generically into Training, or T-groups (Benne, 1964), otherwise known as sensitivity training. These were unstructured events with a process orientation where the data for learning was provided by the behaviour of group members within the group, and facilitated by the trainer's drawing attention to, that is providing feedback on, aspects of that behaviour. The strong commitment to T-groups evident in early OD (e.g. in Benne, 1964) faded during the late 1960's as researchers and practitioners began to question their efficacy (see Dyer, 1987). However, a strong focus on group and team processes remains in OD, and as Hanson and Lubin (1995, p. 8) point out its team building and team development processes draw out their focus on group dynamics and group leadership from T-group methods.

However the New Britain workshop was about more than the here and now of group process. From a development perspective it was about social and community development. Most OD texts do not mention the actual purpose of the workshop (e.g. French and Bell, 1984), or do so in passing as being about race relations (Cummings and Worley, 1993). But Morton Deutsch, on the staff at New Britain, points out the workshop was a result of Lewin's establishing the Commission on Community Inter-relations of the American Jewish Congress (CCI), again with the involvement of Margaret Mead (Marrow, 1969) and claims (Deutsch, 1992, p. 41):

> CCI did many innovative things. It developed 'action research'; 'sensitivity training' and 'T-groups' emerged from a workshop conducted in New Britain ...under the auspices of the CCI...; it produced procedures for handling bigots; its research helped break down legal segregation in the United States.

Of the 41 community activist delegates at New Britain 29 per cent were African-Americans, 25 per cent Jewish-American, 23 per cent English-American, 13 per cent Irish-American, 5 per cent Canadian-American and 5 per cent Italian American (Lippitt, 1949, p. 32); this at a time, as Deutsch has pointed out, when segregation was still legal in the USA. The significance Lewin attached to the workshop was as an action-research project to help achieve societal change, implied in the title of the paper in which he provides his account, 'Action research and minority problems'. In it he argues that overcoming 'minority problems', recognizing that '...so called minority problems are in fact majority problems...' (1946, p. 44) required a shift away from generalities to an approach which allowed those whom such problems affected to specify what the current situation is and what is to be done:

> How is social and economic discrimination to be attacked if we think not in terms of generalities but in terms of the inhabitants of that particular main street and those side and end streets which make up that small or large town in which the individual group worker is supposed to do his job? (1946, p. 34).

Lewin answers his own question by suggesting first, a need for objective measures by which to define problems and measure progress. Such measures can only be made through rigorous social research, social research predicated on consequent social action. Hence action-research, which had to include cross disciplinary (drawing on psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology) laboratory and field experiments in social change. The article concludes not with final comments on what can be achieved

through group processes, or even through action research. Rather, there is a statement in United States colonial policy, which alludes to its effect on inter (ethnic) group relations within the US and calls for it to reflect Collier's approach at the BIA.

Once again, the theme for those looking at lessons for development is the abstraction of technique from context. Collier's belief in action research was in its utility in mediating between the worldviews of science and of other cultures. Lewin's was the modernist's belief in the ability of science to solve social problems. While Lewin sought solutions grounded in immediate here and now experiences of such problems, he was a social activist, and located his work within broader social analyses. Lewin was arguably a radical. Besides founding the CCI, he was a founder and president of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI), which had close associations with the left (Harris, 1986).

Nonetheless, as with Collier, Lewin's work in its presentation in OD has been abstracted from the societal change, that is, development, context in which it was deliberately located, and no mention is made of Lewin's radical associations. To state that Lewin's seminal work was part of 'an effort to change consumer behaviour' as does Schein (1980, p. 239) is to misrepresent him. In the contemporary Western OD literature Wells and Jennings are an exemplary exception, claiming that contemporary US organizations are 'neo-pigmentocracies' with 'quasi-Herrenvolk democratic cultures' (1989, p. 108), and contrasting Lewin's focus on race with OD's failure to address, or even its overt avoidance of, the issue of racism.

RONALD LIPPITT AND COLLEAGUES—CHANGE AGENCY AND THE DYNAMICS OF PLANNED CHANGE

Ronald Lippitt, as we have already noted was one of Lewin's early collaborators, and one of those who went on to work with the National Training Laboratory. His first book was a detailed account of the New Britain workshop, its title alone, *Training in Community Relations* (1949), locating it in development more than it does management or OD. Indeed Lippitt himself remained involved in community development until his death in 1986 (see Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt, 1992). From an OD perspective Lippitt's most significant, but by no means only contribution is seen as the book written with Jeanne Watson and Bruce Westley, *The Dynamics of Planned Change* (1958). It is widely cited in some detail in the canon of OD and can be seen as making at least two key contributions, in its identification and exploration of the concept of the change agent (Ottaway, 1983) and its development from Lewin of a phased approach to planned change.

Lippitt *et al.* (1958: p. 10) define the type of change they want to discuss in the book as: '... the planned change that originates in a decision to make a deliberate effort to improve the system and to obtain the help of an outside agent in making this improvement. We call this outside agent a change agent'. They were not the first to use the term change agent; Lippitt *et al.* note it was adopted by NTL staff in 1947 to describe a diversity of professional helpers. Examples are provided of change agents at four different levels of 'client system'—those working to help change at the individual level, the group level, and the organizational level and the community level. This distinction between levels of client system is repeated in the structure of OD textbooks, and in taxonomies of OD and change processes (see Huczynski, 1987,

pp. 5–16 for a summary); none of these however, include a level of analysis beyond the organizational level.

The objective of their work was through secondary comparative research into cases of planned change at each of these levels to come up with a general framework within which the range of change agent techniques and methods could be conceptualized, leading to, inter alia, ideas about how change agent practice can be developed. Lippitt *et al.* (1958: p. 15) make the limits of their work clear, stating first that they are concentrating on change in '... psychological process, social relations, inter-personal processes, problem solving procedures, and processes of social alignment of structure', excluding for example, technological change, or changing modes of economic behaviour. Second, they only consider change where an external change agent is involved, excluding internally generated change. Third, they claim that they consider only cases where a voluntary relationship between client system and change agent exists, omitting any consideration of coercive or authoritarian change agency.

The framework proposed by Lippitt *et al.* has seven phases approach to the management of change, explicitly building on Lewin's model, and is shown in Box 1. The consideration of development in Lippitt *et al.*'s work is in their consideration of change at the community level, from which, along with changes at the other three levels, they abstract their framework, and develop insights into change agent practice. Examples of the many cases reviewed at community level include that of Alinsky[9] in Chicago trying to set up grassroots 'People's Organizations', the use of community

Box 1

Lippitt, Watson and Westley's phases of planned change

1. Development of a need to change — the desire to change and to seek help from outside to do so.
2. The establishment of a change relationship — establishing a working relationship between change agent and client.
3. The clarification or diagnosis of the client system's problem — gathering and analysing data about the client system.
4. Examination of alternatives and establishing goals — translating diagnostic insights into alternative means of action and then into definite intentions to change in specific ways.
5. Transformation of intentions into actual change efforts — turning specified intentions into achievements.
6. Generalization and stabilization of change — making the change remain a permanent and stable part of system.
7. Achieving a terminal relationship — leaving the client system non-dependent on the change agent.

(adapted from Lippitt, Watson and Westley, 1958, pp. 129–143.)

[9] Alinsky was a source of inspiration to many development workers in the 1960s and 1970s, especially in NGOs (Elliot, 1987). However, the 'back of the yards' grassroots organizations Alinsky helped set up in Polish communities in 1950s Chicago took a racist segrationist stance (Fisher, 1990).

self surveys to address problems of racism and a Commonwealth Government community action programme in Puerto Rico.

Lippitt *et al.* distinguish between different aspects of change agent practice at different levels, noting for example that those who work with community systems seemed more inclined than others to conceptualize their work in terms of internal power conflicts. But while they use the distribution of power within the client system to partly explain change agents' diagnostic orientations, there is no consideration of power relationships between the client systems and their external environment, or how broader societal power relationships impact on power within the client systems. Lippitt *et al.* make the psychologistic assumption that the measure of client system health is an alignment between the environment as it objectively exists and the perceptions of it within the client system. Lippitt *et al.* claim that there is little work that suggests any misalignment between community and environment. This may be, they suggest, because larger systems create their own environment, because the numbers of people in them mean that shared delusions cannot be sustained, or because '... when alienation does occur on a large scale it is solved by some form of power struggle, not by the more rational means of consultation with a change agent' (1958, p. 55). Yet one of their key sources on community change, Alinsky has unequivocal things to say about power struggles, not least that the purpose of grassroots organizations is to engage in them. Distinguishing himself as a radical of the left, Alinsky sets out an agenda in the book Lippitt *et al.* cite which calls at one stage for the common ownership of means of production, and at another critiques the US labour movement for its racist collusion with monopoly capital (Alinsky, 1969, pp. 25, 29).

Lippitt *et al.*, however, avoid consideration of such analyses. Early in the book when discussing their methodology, they state (1958: p. 31):

> our conception of the role of the change agent obliges us to omit a great deal of material about the kind of change which results in active participation in a power struggle. We have committed ourselves to a study of the ways in which a change agent can help a client to help himself, and hence we have arbitrarily excluded any analysis of the ways in which a client may seek to help himself solely through the competitive use of power.

Change agency is, then, more rational than and alternative to participation in any kind of power struggle. There is thus a dichotomy in Lippitt *et al.*'s work. On the one hand, the distribution of power within the system is seen as a legitimate consideration. The change agent is provided with guidance and choices with respect to how he (sic) might address power relationships within the client system, allowed on occasion to be coercive (1958, p. 76), advised to select allies (1958, p. 119) and to be wary of vested interests. All this is justified because the change agent's role is assumed to be benevolent. On the other hand, broader frames of analysis, which might explain power relationships within the system in terms of external forces, or inform who the change agent seeks as allies, or which interests he or she acts for are excised or excluded, and replaced by allusion to the change agent's sense of right and wrong, codes of professional ethics and the 'Judeo-Christian democratic ethic' (1958, p. 98).

In the discussion of Collier and of Lewin a dynamic was identified whereby elements of their work which could be applied in the management of change are abstracted from the broader context in which they were developed, which it is possible

to construe as a development context. The very methodology of the Dynamics of Planned Change presents the same dynamic in one volume, this time abstracting generalized approaches to the management of change at least in significant part from development processes, and at the same time precluding any critical consideration of the societal context in which such change is conducted.

EDGAR SCHEIN—FROM COERCIVE PERSUASION TO PROCESS CONSULTATION

The final person considered in this selective history is the organizational psychologist Edgar H. Schein. His work includes standard texts on organizational psychology, organizational socialization and career development, and organizational culture and leadership (Schein, 1980; 1988; summaries in Sashkin, 1968; Coghlan, 1988). The last is important in OD, as is our focus here, Schein's concept of process consultation. For Coghlan (1988, p. 27), Schein's book *Process Consultation* (1988), first published in 1969 'is standard text and a classic in the field of organizational processes'. It was followed by *Process Consultation volume 2* (Schein, 1987a). As Coghlan points out, the term process consultation does not for Schein primarily describe the consultant's work with group processes, as some OD writers imply (e.g. Harvey and Brown, 1988), although this is covered in much of both volumes. Rather it describes a particular mode of consultancy practice, which Schein contrasts with expert and doctor–patient consultancy.

As an expert the consultant is paid by the client to use his or her expertise to fix a particular problem. For expert consultancy to work there is first, a requirement that the client has diagnosed his or her own problems and their root cause correctly in the first place, and second the client has to accept the experts diagnosis. If the client does not he or she will have no desire to implement the recommendations. The doctor–patient mode involves some consultant–client interchange in arriving at a diagnosis. The consultant will collect data from the client organization, and thus to some extent involve individuals in the client organization in arriving at a solution. However, the power and responsibility of diagnosis and of prescribing remedies rest with the consultant. Doctor–patient consultancy still relies on the consultant's ability to arrive at a full and thorough understanding of the organization and its problems, sufficient to decide what is best in terms of management action. Moreover, there is still the issue of acceptance of consultancy findings.

Process consultation recognizes three principles, according to Schein. First, clients know as much or more about their own organizations as the consultant ever will. Second, the consultancy process needs to engender psychological ownership of the activities which result from it on the part of the client. Third, the consultant should seek to develop clients capabilities to solve their own problems. Process consultation is thus defined by Schein (1987a, p. 34) as: '...a set of activities on the part of the consultant that help the client to perceive, understand and act upon the process events that occur in the clients environment'.

Blunt (1995) suggests that although process consultation might appear to be an appropriate *modus operandi* for development assistance, it has cultural limitations. He states that process consultation appears to have been 'made in America', and uses China as an example of where it is culturally inapplicable. This is ironic, because

hough process consultation was manufactured in the USA, Chinese components re used. Schein's early work was on China; during his time as a US army ychologist in 1950s, he researched into the ability of the Chinese Communist Party CP) to achieve attitudinal and behavioral change using persuasion. His particular erest was the so called brainwashing of Western prisoners during the Korean war. . that is, the cases of genuine ideological conversion seemingly accomplished by ercive means' (Schein, 1961, p. 9). The resulting book, *Coercive Persuasion* chein[10] 1961), and articles (e.g. Schein, 1968; Schein *et al.*, 1968) are rarely cited her than by Schein himself, or in reviews of Schein's work as a whole (Sashkin, 68; Coghlan, 1988).

Schein (Sashkin, 1968) himself made the continuity explicit between this early work d his subsequent work on organizational socialization, in which he identifies nilar processes of indoctrination. The linkage between *Coercive Persuasion* and the *ocess Consultation* volumes is harder to identify, but it exists. Although Schein has ted that his interest has 'always been in inter-personal relations, in influence' ashkin, 1968, p. 409) he also implied that his work on process and in OD was fluenced, among other things, by his post Coercive Persuasion experiences as an TL T-group participant and trainer, by Goffman's dramaturgical concepts, and by les and the Chicago School frameworks for the analysis of inter-personal processes ashkin, 1968; p. 409). All are evident in the two volumes of *Process Consultation*, ongside and integrated with explanations of the practice of process consultation.

Nonetheless, there are significant theoretical similarities between both volumes of *ocess Consultation* and *Coercive Persuasion*. The latter conducts an analysis which cludes consideration of intrapsychic and interpersonal processes using language miliar from any consideration of OD. Schein (1961, p. 12) considers '... the sorts of erson who are the change agents in the day to day business of producing ideological hange', and the application of theory from the behavioural sciences '... psychology, sychiatry, sociological and other theories which pertain to the change process or the fluence process...'. He evaluates a range of theories including, from psychology, avlovian conditioning and psycho-analytical frameworks, and from social sychology/sociology the work of Goffman and of Festinger, in terms of their dequacy of explanation of brainwashing processes. Each, Schein suggests, provides a artial understanding. But they only supplement the closest theoretical model Schein n find for the coercive persuasion process, a development of Lewin's unfreeze/ hange/refreeze model. In *Process Consultation volume 2*, the chapter on initiating and anaging change presents a very similar model, which Schein makes clear was eveloped for his brainwashing work (Schein, 1987a, p. 92). The model, which can be een as incorporating elements of Goffman's and of Festinger's concepts, and an llusion to force field analysis, is quoted from *Process Consultation volume 2* in Box 2, nd explained thus in *Coercive Persuasion*:

> it is a basic assumption of the model that beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviour patterns of an individual tend to be integrated with each other and tend to be organised around the individuals self image or self concept. This integration, even if imperfect, gives continuity and stability to the person, and

[10] *Coercive Persuasion* was written 'with' I. Schneier and C. Baker. Schein only ever cites himself as author n references in his own later work.

Box 2

Schein's Three-Stage Model of the Change Process

Stage 1
Unfreezing: creating motivation and readiness to change through:

a disconfirmation or lack of confirmation;
b creation of guilt or anxiety;
c provision of psychological safety.

Stage 2
Changing through cognitive restructuring: Helping the client to see things, judge things, feel things, and react to things based on a new point of view obtained through:

a identifying with a new role model, mentor, etc.;
b scanning the environment for new relevant information.

Stage 3
Refreezing: helping the client to integrate the new point of view into:

a the total personality and the self concept;
b significant relationships.

(Source: Schein, 1987a, p. 93, table 6.1.)

> hence operates as a force against being influenced, unless the change which the influence implies is seen to be a change in the direction of greater integration (Schein, 1961, p. 118).

Schein's method of attitudinal and behavioural change is one of social disintegration (unfreezing), social reconstruction (change) and social reintegration (refreezing) of individuals' cognitive frameworks. It is proposed in a context of culture change in his later work, having been developed in a context of coerced ideological change in the earlier. In *Process Consultation* the method—the disconfirming information that important expected outcomes are not going to be achieved, the consequent creation of guilt, the provision of security that unfreeze, the provision of new relevant information, the role modelling that make the change, is applied, by implication, with benevolent intention by change agents with a correct understanding of the need for change and of the nature of change required.

In contrast, *Coercive Persuasion* identifies an overtly ideological intent on the part of the change agent and an explicitly coercive context, which included physical maltreatment. Yet such persuasion was still achieved through group processes, and more, through participatory group processes. This offers two important overlapping insights. First, the link between participation and democracy is broken. Even though the situation was far from democratic for the prisoners, participative processes, and importantly, the appearance of participation were still required. Second, the link between the use of group processes and benevolent ends is also broken. Schein demonstrates in detail how group methods are used non democratically to achieve malign ends.

The overarching factor that distinguishes the China era of Schein's work from his wn later work, and from OD as a whole, is not however merely the context of the titudinal change sought through coercive persuasion. Rather, it is the sophistication nd depth of the analysis of the context, which justifies its identification as development work. In contrast to the two pages of change as modernization—jet travel, accines, the conquest of nature, the ever increasing rate of change—in Lippitt *et al.*'s troduction (1958, pp. 4–5), that typifies the OD genre, Schein provides an 110-page storical exploration. This notes the importance of group discussion in the cells hich hallmarked Leninist revolutionary organization, and argues that the theoretical roblems of creating an agrarian class consciousness and the practical problems of a erilla war requiring a hospitable and protective peasantry combined to require the evelopment of persuasive methods in which CCP cadres were given pragmatic cence to adapt ideological tenets to local conditions. Post 1945 there was seen to be a eed for the CCP to find mechanisms of social control mainly through so called hought reform', one of the implicit aims of which was seen to be the creation of eological unanimity, Schein suggests, in a chapter entitled 'The passion for nanimity' (echoes of Peters and Austin's (1985) *A Passion for Excellence*) that this as built around the notion of an anti-Western Asian way (Schein, 1961; p. 109), and e need to elicit motivation for rapid social and economic change (Schein, 1961, p. 82–84). No summary can do justice to the completeness of Schein's analysis. In a eneral sense his argument is that methodologies developed to address these historical peratives were then applied in dealing with prisoners.

In some ways *Coercive Persuasion* aligns most closely with Willmott's (1993) nalysis of contemporary participatory management approaches as a means to talitarian managerialist ideological ends, with Schein showing in detail how it is one at the personal, interpersonal and group level. Consideration of Schein's work emonstrates yet again the dynamic whereby change methods are identified within a evelopment context, within a context of social change, and radical analyses therof, nd abstracted from that context to be applied supposedly context free in management and in OD. This time the dynamic is evident not only in the use to which OD has t Schein's analyses, but within Schein's body of work as a whole.

ONCLUSION

his paper has a broad historical scope, and has addressed the literature, that is the eory, of OD. As such it might be seen as abstract, as about theory rather than ractice. However, OD for all its faults, is distinct from other forms of organizational eory precisely because it is about *the theory of practice*. From an OD perspective, ot only is the theory–practice dichotomy false, but questions are begged about the otives of those who would sustain it. The three main lessons of this article are about eory, practice and the relationship between the two. As such they are relevant to ose of us engaged in organizational interventions for development, in other nonrganizational forms of participatory intervention, and who share Srinivas' (1995) nd Thomas' (1996) commitment to the creation of distinctive models of OD and evelopment management respectively.

The first lesson is the most obvious, namely that there is a history of participatory rocess approaches beyond that usually cited within contemporary development

texts, associated with which is a wealth of literature on theory and practice. Although found within management it is a history to which development has some claim, and a literature for which development has a use, from guiding day-to-day practice, to providing a framework for the construction of practitioner training programmes. Indeed, given the extent of development's contribution to OD, there is some irony in the advocacy and selling of OD, or components thereof, to development as a new method which can improve development practice. At the same time, development practitioners who have been prepared to engage in organizational interventions without a critical awareness of OD, should perhaps reflect on why this is so, particularly given OD's development roots, and on what the source of their legitimacy is, in terms of training, qualification and technical expertise.

The second lesson is about the relationship between structural forces and the agency of the change agent or manager, and the potential for bias in practice and accounts thereof towards the latter. In one way, all this article's identification of the exclusion of societal analyses from OD has done is bring us to a well established destination in critiques of OD. This is that OD is ahistorical and acontextual (Pettigrew, 1985, p. 23), being wholly about the management of change and hardly about the analysis of any of the historical and immediate contexts of change (Wilson, 1992, p. 120). The route in arriving at this destination, is however new. Its implication is that even overt attempts to ground change agent practice in analyses of structural forces — which, it can be argued is an important defining component of Thomas' development management — are subject to a powerful contrary excluding dynamic. That dynamic is sustained, as again Wilson (1992, p. 122) notes, and as representations of the 1946 New Britain workshop epitomize, by the immediacy, indeed the here and now, of the 'here and now'. Priority is likely to be given to means of addressing present, observable and supposedly addressable individual, group and organizational behaviour rather than to understanding those equally present, but less evidently observable and addressable extra-organizational societal forces. Moreover this is true of management generally as it is of change management. Practitioners therefore need, first a strong development grounding, as Thomas suggests (with respect to development management syllabuses: and *pace* Wilson (1992)) to provide a broader cross-disciplinary analysis of change and of management. Second, their training needs to create a reflexive awareness of pressures to create a here and now, instrumental justification of their own role, which excludes broader understandings, including that of their own part in creating and sustaining a particular managerialist discourse.

The immediacy of the managerial or change agent task is however in itself a here and now explanation of these pressures. There is another explanation provided by the critical analyses previously cited (Willmott, 1993; McArdle, 1995), which see the maintenance of managerial legitimacy underpinned by a delimited and constrained form of organizational democracy and participation which excludes dissenting views. This brings us to the third lesson, which is about the relationship between values and participatory practice. OD's espoused humanist values closely resemble the style suggested by Thomas (1996) for development management. There are further significant similarities in the emphasis on participation and empowerment, and on process. Development management's approach is distanced by Thomas from that of conventional management by stressing its derivation from a different, more radical participative tradition — that of Freire (1992), and of Participative Action Research (Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991) — of working against existing power structures.

lowever, as is demonstrated by the examples of Collier, Alinsky and even Lewin, all f whom can be said to have worked against existing power structures, radical articipative traditions can be appropriated for less radical purposes. This, and chein's China work showing how supposedly participative processes can be used for ercive, consciousness changing, ideological ends behoves a specification of how dical traditions of participation and empowerment are different from the anagerial tradition, and, crucially, of how they will remain so, particularly when corporated into development management. One response may be that the eaningful difference is in the context, that is in the ends for which participation is sed, more than it is in the participatory processes themselves. This reduces such rocesses to technique, or to use the language sometimes used by OD of itself, echnology (Tichy, 1983, pp. 291–329) or social technology (Burke and Hornstein, 971). Like other technologies, participatory processes are never value free or neutral n their application, but also not necessarily value or interest specific. That is, these echnologies can be used to promote values or interests other than those for which hey were invented. Thus, from a radical perspective, participatory processes may still e necessary, but they are no longer sufficient in themselves to identify what is appening as radical. Participatory interventionists—whether they currently see hemselves as managerial, radical or both—would consequently have to be prepared o recognize themselves as essentially technocratic, and the use of the vocabulary of mpowerment as potentially deceptive, and even self-deceptive.

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The theory of ID and OD: A comparative review for practitioners

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Introduction

The purpose of this article is to improve intervention practice in three overlapping fields:

- Institutional development (ID) for social and economic development
- Organisational development for social and economic development (development's OD – DOD)
- Organizational development as a western managerial discipline (managerialist OD – MOD)

The overview is deliberately brief in its main text. The essence is in the diagrams and tables. No apologies are made for making extensive references to the theory associated with each area of practice. The author's belief – derived from his own discipline bias – (MOD) – is that all interventions are informed by theory. Some of this theory may seem abstract, some of it of direct practical relevance. In either case, better, and safer interventions require this theory to be made conscious and overt. More, interventionists improve their practice by understanding the range, assumptions, and limitations of theory.

References to books and articles can be found in the main text, although there has been an effort to keep them to a minimum. Appendix 2 provides a table of references which is cross-referenced with other tables in this overview. All references are presented like this – Cooke (1996) – and point to where further details can be found in the bibliography at the end. This indicates where further information on particular points can be found. It is also indicative of another of the author's beliefs – that a practitioner orientation still requires claims to be substantiated.

Three basic premises

There are three basic premises:

- In the theory and practice of ID, DOD, and MOD there are distinctions and overlaps
- Clarifying these distinctions and overlaps enables informed choices to be made about conducting specific ID, MOD, and DOD interventions
- Practice in each of ID, MOD, and DOD can be improved by understanding the distinctive contribution of the other two.

Three warnings

There are three warnings:

- Some of this improvement through understanding what each of ID, MOD and DOD offers arises, paradoxically, from an awareness of the limitations of each, and the carry over of these limitations to other forms of intervention.

Some of these limitations would remain even if all three fields of practice were integrated, and are quite serious. These are addressed in the conclusion.

This is a "snapshot". While it attempts to be thorough, it is not exhaustive; and new and innovative material on practice in all three areas continues to be produced.

finitions

claims that MOD and DOD are distinctive is new. (However, attention is vn to Eastern African Support Unit For NGOs, based in Tanzania, who talk Developmental OD" (EASUN undated:10)). Seeing significance in this nctiveness is therefore in opposition to those who see differences in inology on ID and OD as "word games" (Moore et al 1994). At the same it must be accepted that we are talking about archetypes which, to use ler et al's point, are not 'watertight' (1992: 15). More, a number of writers Gill 1995, Pettigrew 1985) have pointed out that there are a variety of nings ...[that have] been attributed to the terms institutional development organisation (sometimes organisational) development.

t follows is a two fold definition of ID, MOD, and DOD. First, an existing nition which seems representative of the archetypal representation of ID, D or DOD is presented. Then a further, comparative definition, of what es the purpose of ID, MOD, or DOD distinctive from one another is ided.

titutional Development (ID)

chosen definition of ID is provided by Fowler et al (1992: 14)

> "*we will use 'institutional development' to refer to changes that are intended to occur outside any single organisation, in patterns and arrangements of society: for example it is applicable to changing the structure of relations between local level organisations and state agencies*"

se interested in the theory of institutions are directed toward the work of WR tt (1995). The distinctive purpose of ID is:

> *social and economic development (distinct from MOD) through better institutions (distinct from DOD)*

velopment's OD (DOD)

chosen definition of DOD is Fowler et al's:

> "*An ongoing process that optimises an organisation's performance in relation to its goals, resources and environments*" (1992: 18)

ding an archetypal definition for DOD was the hardest of the three; not least ause the archetypal representation seems to have changed rapidly in the last years, shifting to incorporate some of the approaches to informal aspects of anisation (defined below in MOD as "human and social processes") ociated with MOD. Formal definitions of OD can more and more be found in elopment tests which are taken directly from MOD.

ile there might be some justification in the claim that the definition above is ed, and that MOD and OD are moving closer together, DOD still has a tinctive purpose i.e.

> *social and economic development (distinct from MOD) through improved organisational capacity (distinct from ID)*

Managerialist OD (MOD)

The chosen definition of MOD is French and Bells (1984: xiv) of OD (which we are defining as MOD) from their standard text:

> "*the applied behavioural science discipline that seeks to improve organisations through planned, systematic, long range processes focused on the organisations culture and its human and social processes*"

Blunt and Collins claim (1994) that the training provided in donor countries for other nationals is OD (in the MOD sense), and its failure is thus a failure of OD. The view here is that such training has not in any way come near the requirements of the above definition, and its failure does not justify the rejection of MOD.

The distinctive purpose of MOD is:

> *improving any (distinct from ID and DOD) organisation's (distinct from ID) effectiveness by integrating formal and informal aspects of organisation.*

The first draft of this paper suggested the last phrase – "integrating formal and informal aspects ..." suggests that this too distinguished MOD from DOD; however subsequent evidence suggests that this view is no longer tenable.

How they are compared

ID, MOD, and DOD are compared on the following nine criteria. They have been pragmatically selected, but again, no doubt a reflection of the author bias:

1. **Macro-micro**: the relationship between the approach to macro level issues i.e. groups of organisations, sectors, and the micro level i.e. the individual organisation and its parts
2. **What gets changed**: the levels and/or forms of social activity the intervention tries directly to change
3. **Example approaches**: examples of the form interventions take
4. **Influences**: the historical, institutional and conceptual factors which have shaped this area of practice
5. **Defining models**: conceptual models which taken together present an encapsulating picture of the field
6. **Theory-practice**: the relationship between underpinning theory and practice, particularly the extent to which there can be seen to be a "theory of practice"
7. **Position on practicioners**: what the theory has to say about the agent of intervention, for example in terms of qualifications and training, and whether reality reflects this
8. **Comparative advantages**: what it could be claimed that this particular form of intervention does well, generally and in relation to the two other forms
9. **Comparative disadvantages**: what is missing from this particular form of intervention, what it may be seen as being poor at, generally and in relation to the other forms of intervention.

A comparative overview

Table 1 shows the comparison for each of the above criteria, with an extra set of pointers on starter readings. It is intended that, given this is an overview, that it is as self explanatory as possible. Appendix 2 provides cross referenced references.

	ID	MOD	DOD
:ro-macro	macro change through macro and micro (e.g. institutions that are organisations) – interventions[1]	micro level interventions[1] often justified through (simplistic?[2]) analyses of macro ("environment"[3]) change	micro level interventions in an organisation, (sometimes groups of organisations)[1] overtly grounded in macro analyses[2]
ınges to	formal and informal institutional norms; national institutional frameworks, and central/local, public/private formal/informal components – structure, sectors and organisations[1]	any conducive organisation's[1] organisational strategy, culture/norms, structure, technology[2]; leadership processes[3]; team processes[4]; job design[5]	organisations which contribute to economic and social development[1]; historically the formal aspects – e.g. structure, task skills;[2] emerging attention to "soft" aspects[3]
ımple roaches	project based interventions – in structures and norms (e.g. Good Government)[1]; economic policy and management capability (e.g. revenue collection)[2]; development of economic and social sectors (e.g. enterprise, health, agriculture)	action research[1], historically (1960/70s) applied to individuals and group/team processes[2], techno-structural[3] interventions, more recently whole organisation and culture change interventions[4]; much contemporary "change management" is OD renamed[5]	project based interventions building capacity in organisations, including institutions (see ID); historically through training[1]; setting up formal management systems[2]; recent attention to indigenous organisational forms[3] and reconciling with/transcending western approaches[4]
luences	"the project" and "technical cooperation" as modus operandii[1]; historical emphasis on training[2]; top down–market[3]/neo-classical?[4]) views of economic institutions; bottom up – social development – participatory and empowering principles[5] ad-hoc (and sometimes uncredited) uses of management theories[6]	managerialism; cognitive psychology in models of change[1]; social psychology – group processes and dynamics[2]; organisational psychology/organisational behaviour – in models of leadership motivation, job design[3], systems theory, organisational sociology in techno-structural[4] and cultural approaches[5]	"the project" and "technical cooperation" as modus operandii; historical emphasis training[2], development values influence targets[3]; development sociology, rural development – participative approaches and the concepts of sustainability[4]; ad-hoc borrowings from management theory[5]
fining dels	Alston's[1] institutions – economic development links; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith's sustainability of development institutions[2]; Dia's civil service reform to reconcile the state and civil society[3]; Chambers participatory rural appraisal[4]; "Logical Framework (aka LogFrame)" as intervention planning method[5]	Schein's process consultation and cognitive version of Lewin's unfreeze/change/refreeze[1]; Beckhard and Harris current to future state "gap" framework[2]; French and Bell's of action research MOD[3]; Lippett and Lippett expert-facilitator consultancy styles continuum[4]; Nadler and Tushman's systems approach[5]	Fowler et al's – OD needs for African NGOs[1]; Sahley's characteristics of effective OD[2]; Boler and Sulzers more traditional approach[3], see also organisational forms of ID[4]
sition on ıcticioners	consideration of institutional recipient/agent – but not individual practitioner – requirements of ID practice[1]; ongoing debate about role of development professionals, their practice[2], and consequent purpose of development studies[3]	Extensive body of practice derived theory; extensive theories of reflexive empowering practice (for individual practitioners) often drawn from therapeutic approaches[1]; guidelines on practitioner training, ethical codes[2], but does reality match the theory[3]?	discussions of institutional requirements to deliver MOD[1] but none of what it takes to be a practitioner, until Kaplan synthesis of development and OD practice[4]; otherwise same debate as ID re development practice[2, 3]
arter adings	Moore et al (1994) – overview and helpful appendices. McGill (1995) – over-view. Uphoff (1986) – sourcebook for local ID; Dia (1996) – the state of the art	Schein (1987a, 1987b) for Process Consultation. French and Bell (1984) for the orthodoxy, Hanson and Lubin (1995) for an accessible introduction. Pettigrew (1986) for a critical review	Fowler et al (1992) on DOD and ID together; Collins and Blunt (eds) special edition of Public Administration and Development on ID through organisations; Korten (1980) on Community Organisation

Overlaps

Having differentiated in some detail, it is important to point out where there are overlaps between the three areas.

- Between ID and MOD. There are overlaps in the work which considers the contribution of MOD to national development – e.g. Srinivas 1995
- Between ID and DOD. There are significant overlaps in the conduct of ID with institutions which are organisations – what the UK's ODA calls institution strengthening (Austin 1994)
- between MOD and DOD. There is a clear overlap in focus on organisational effectiveness, and an increasing adaptation and exploitation of MOD by DOD; perhaps the most recent example being Kaplan 1996
- Between ID, MOD and DOD. All three forms of social intervention; and there are ID interventions in organisations which apply MOD (see Mann 1995, 1996a, 1996b)

Comparative advantages and disadvantages

Before we go on to consider how each of ID, MOD and DOD might contribute to the practice of the other, a consideration of each form of interventions's limitations, or comparative weaknesses, show what might be sought from one or both of the other two. Likewise a consideration of comparative advantages will show what might be brought to the other forms of intervention. Table 2 shows what is missing from [a] particular form of intervention, what it may be seen as poor at – and the strengths – that is, what it could be claimed that each particular form of intervention does well. Both weaknesses and strengths are expressed in general terms and in relation to the other two forms.

	ID	MOD	DOD
Comparative strengths	commitment to social and economic development; primacy of macro issues; consideration of macro-micro relationships; range of disciplinary analyses, possible moves towards their integration (or transcendence); practitioner expertise in, critical literature on, managing ID processes internationally[1]	always addressed both formal and informal organisation; acknowledgement of practitioner's cultural biases; choice of intervention strategies; case materials; warnings/ethical constraints from within the field, critiques from outside paradoxically improve practice by making limits clear[1]	alternative to western managerialism in social values, primary commitment to social and economic development, appreciation of non-business organisational forms, indigenous organisations and management; burgeoning case literature on doing DOD in non-western countries[1]
Comparative weaknesses	breadth causes confusion (can anything be ID?)[1]; antipathy to management disciplines at micro level[2]; limited (but emerging) recognition of cultural/behavioural/ cognitive contexts and consequences of ID[3]; no models of practitioner training and development[4]; overwillingness to blur institutional/organisation boundary[5, 6]	simplistic macro analyses[1]; accepts managerialist agenda[2]; assumes universalist western organisational forms; empirical evidence of success mixed[3, 4]; transferability questioned[5] (western managerial hegemony?[6]); managerial literature itself contains critiques[7]; espoused empowerment seen as deceptive manipulation by some[8]	is MOD always justifiable in macro/institutional terms[1]; theory on reflexive intervention practice limited[2] ; no evaluated repertoire of interventions, few models of practitioner training and development[4]; overwillingness to jump institutional/organisation boundary[5, 6]; yet to consider whether MOD critiques and reservations also apply[7]

wards a complementary model of intervention actice

: thrust of Dia's book for the World Bank is that there should be an approach D – in his case in Africa – "reconciling indigenous and transplanted itutions" (the subtitle of the book). His approach also seeks to reconcile :ro- and micro-level analyses and interventions. The analysis in this paper gests another process of reconciliation, at the intervention level, which brings ther the strengths of the three forms – ID, MOD, and DOD – to help rcome their respective weaknesses. Table 3 summarises the contributions ı of the three forms of practice can make to one another, in terms of what ı "gives" and "gets".

	GETS		
	ID	MOD	DOD
ID		1 Location of MOD within macro analyses and strategies – a "context of change management" 2. Non behavioural science disciplines in change management 3. Extensive intervention experience in non-western cultures 4. Alternative "process" approaches	1. Location of DOD within macro analyses and strategies, e.g. "get the governance right first" 2. Evaluation yardstick – "the real institutional consequences of this DOD intervention are ..."
MOD	1. Generic intervention theory 2. Models of culture sensitive practice and practitioner development 3. Methodologies for cultural and behavioural analysis and change		1. Generic intervention theory 2. Models of culture sensitive reflexive practice and practitioner development 3. Integration of formal and informal processes 4. Catalogue of process approaches to organisational change 5. Critiques of MOD from without and caveats from within transfer too?
DOD	1. Extensive experience of micro-level interventions 2. Bottom up commitment to participative and empowering change	1. A contrasting more developmental, stronger value led approach to organisational change 2. Commitment to diversity of organisational forms beyond univeralist models 3. Extensive intervention experience in non-Western culture 4. Alternative "process" approaches	

Using the tables in practice

Intervention analysis and review

Although it has been possible to construct quite significantly distinctive models of the three forms of practice from the literature, it is not suggested that the reality of intervention practice is this different. More, it is not intended to imply that any given intervention will, or should fall easily into one of the three archetypes thus analysed. Indeed, given that each of the three is seen as having clear weaknesses as well as strengths, it is hoped that this is not the case.

At the same time, the tables above can be put to use in the analysis and evaluation of any given intervention, at any stage of its progress, in order to identify the potentially problematic consequences of conscious or otherwise switching between approaches, not least of losing the strengths and /or gaining the weaknesses. From the literature such switching seems to be most common in the case of a shift from ID to DOD, sometimes combined with MOD. This is often justified by Uphoff's (1986: 8) position that there are institutions which are not organisations, institutions which are organisations, and organisations which are not institutions. Such analyses subsequently go on to claim they are therefore focusing on the second of these, namely an individual institution/organisations.

Such a switch may or may not be justified in its own right; but it is not necessarily justified by Uphoff, whose own analysis looks at groups or sectors of organisations. In this context it should be noted that in organisation theory one finds a distinction between individual organisational approaches (e.g. MOD) and those which look at sectors or groups (e.g. organisational ecology approaches). The danger of so doing is that macro-analyses that ID should be providing, and which set it apart from MOD and DOD – of the actual institutional context and justification for making the intervention – are lost. Anecdotally, one is aware of ID interventions which have failed because there were institutional problems, for example of corruption or ministerial incompetence. Here, then, the institutional development had failed because institutions weren't developed. From an MOD perspective, this is simply bad intervention practice, in MOD terms trying to bring about change without a previously established readiness for it, nor a coherent change strategy.

Analyses of institutions which are organisations which talk about their "environment", taking the term from management theory, exacerbate this tendency. The importance of institutions is that they are the environment, and they continue to shape it; although, again, according to some organisational analysts this is generally true of organisations, and the significance of the environment is more than something given "out there"?.

However the tables are intended to be of use to practitioners, in planning new interventions, in reviewing ongoing interventions, and evaluating completed interventions. The sort of questions to be asked in putting the tables to use are:

- Which of the archetypes does the intervention claim to resemble ?
- Which of the archetypes does the intervention actually resemble ?
- Specifically, for each of the comparative categories, what form does the intervention actually most resemble ?
- Do any differences between the general and the specific resemblances have implications for the likely success of the intervention ?
- Do the resemblances identified reflect conscious choice, or default ?
- Has the intervention compensated for the potential weaknesses of each archetype?

ınclusions: the limitations that remain

ıough a complementary approach to MOD/ID/DOD interventions may lead to improvements all round, there are, as has been noted, problems which still remain, three of which are:

The macro-micro distinction used here can mislead. What is defined as macro and micro has different meanings in different disciplines. More, there is no reference in the model to analyses based on groups of organisations (see Astley and Van de Ven 1983) - e.g. population ecology models which look at how certain sectors of organisations grow under what conditions. Thus in the discussion so far, there is no means of addressing issues of the institutional consequences of the presence of donors and of the strategies they use - in, for example, in fostering the growth of NGOs as opposed to other forms of organisation.

Although an advantage of a complementary approach is that institutional assumptions and goals are made overt. This does not mean that these goals are, however right, or that they are seen by all parties as right. What is missing from any of the paper so far is the consideration of the choices that there are with respect to the overall institutional framework, or of issue of power with respect to how such choices are made. In some senses, these are taken as given, for example by Dia (1996). Notwithstanding his call for institutional reconciliation one wonders how much of his framework is ultimately negotiable; yet there are alternatives to, and priorities and choices within, the institutional framework he presents. Martin (1995), has also noted what she calls the "isomorphism" of institutionalist perspectives – the institutional level of analysis by implication focuses on consistency and similarity – and thus loses sight of issues to do with difference. Martin makes the point with respect to gender, but acknowledges that this is also the case for, inter alia, class and ethnicity.

A major critique of managerial OD is that it is manipulative, using participatory approaches for managerialist ends. The complementary approach suggested here is open to these charges.

Appendix 2

	ID	MOD	DOD
Micro-macro	1. Moore et al (1994: 57) summarise ID interventions according to micro/meso/macro categories: Austin evaluates UK Ode's ID through organisations	1. e.g. the US array () 2. Wilson (1992:120) 3. e.g. Nadler and Tushman (1977)	1. Israels (1987) analysis include groups of organisation 2. Much of what is called ID in the literature, is in our terms DOD: see Moore et al (1994: part I): e.g. Blunt and Collins (eds) (1994)
Changes to	1. Summarised from Dia (1996): Ostrom et al (1988: Ch 16) provide an economistic rationale; see also McGill (1995), Buyck (1991), and Uphoff (1986) for local ID	1. see Golembiewski (1991) for discussion of "third world" conduciveness: Blunt (1995) 2. see Huczynski (1987:1-16) for an overview 3. Blake and Mouton's (1985) "Grid" is a classic e.g. 4. e.g. Dyer (1987) 5. Huczcyski (1984: 148)	1. see Rage and Finsterbush (1987): although it overlaps with MOD 2. e.g. Fowler et al (1992: section 5.2) 3. e.g. in Dia(1996): Bolay and Sulzer (1992), Covey and Brown (1989)
Example approaches	1. ODA/GID Technical Note 10 gives overview and specific e.g.'s 2. see Moore et al (1994: 10 footnote 6): Dia (1996: 46-47) 3. see Uphoff(1986) chapters 4, 5, 6 for local e.g.'s	1. see French and Bell (1984: ch 8) 2. e.g. Schein and Bennis (1964) 3. derived from the work of the Tavistock Institute - (e.g. Rice 1963) 4. e.g. Burke (1987) 5. Wilson (1992), Cooke (1992)	1. e.g. Hulme (1992): Blunt and Collins (1994: introduction) 2. see Grindle and Hildebrand(1995) 3. notably Blunt and Warren (1996) 4. this is the thrust of Dia (1996)
Influences	1. see Israel (1987:18-20) and Bolay and Sulzer for e.g.'s: Korten (1980) critiques 2. e.g. Hulme (1992); Blunt and Collins (1994: Introduction) 3. e.g. Grindle and Hildebrand (1995: 443) 4. see Moore et al (1994: 14 footnote 13) 5. e.g. Korten (1980), Chambers (1994a, b, c) 6. e.g. ODA/GID Technical Note 14 uses Porter's "PEST" and Peters "7-S" models	1. e.g. Schein (1987: ch 6) 2. e.g. Cartwright and Zander (1960) 3. e.g. Schein (1980) 4. see Morgan (1986 ch 3) 5. e.g. Schein (1990)	1. see Israel(1987: 18-20) and Bolay and Sulzer for e.g.'s: Korten (1980) famously critiques 2. e.g. Hulme (1992): Blunt and Collins (1994) 3. e.g. even in the World Bank's mission statement 4. e.g. Korten (1980), Chambers (1994a, b, c) 5. exemplified in ODA's Technical Note 14
Defining models	1. Alston (1994) 2. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 3. Dia (1996: appendix C) 4. Chambers (1994 a, b, c) 5. Team Technologies (undated) for integration of Logframe and participation; Viswanath (1995) for an e.g. application	1. Schein (1987 ch 6) 2. Beckhard and Harris (1987) 3. French and Bell (1984:109) 4. Lippitt and Lippitt (1978) 5. Nadler and Tushman (1977)	1. Fowler et al (1992) 2. Sahley 1994 3. See ID column 1
Position on practitioner	1. e.g. Fowler et al (1992), Sulzer 1991 2. e.g. Uphoff (1992), Edwards (1996) 3. Edwards (1989), (1994)	1. again, see Schein (1987a), Lippitt and Lippitt (1978): Argyris 2. e.g. Schein (1987b) 3. Again, McLean et al, Pettigrew (1985)	1. e.g. Fowler et al (1992), Sulzer 1991 2. e.g. Uphoff (1992), Edwards (1996) 3. Edwards (1989), (1994)
Strengths	1. this is an analysis drawn from the other headings	1. this is an analysis drawn from the other headings: but 2. see Griener (1979), Mirvis and Berg (1977)	1. this is an analysis drawn from the other headings

aknesses	1. Moore et al (1994: part I) 2. Moore et al (1994:11) 3. e.g. argued by Eldridge and Nisar (1995), Grindle and Hindlebrand (1995) 4. but see "position on practitioners" above 5. e.g. in Israel (1987). Blunt and Collins (1994) 6. the theory behind this view is summarised by Scott (1995)	1 .see Wilson (1992), Pettigrew (1985) 2. e.g. Dunphy and Stace (1988) 3. again Pettigrew (1985) summarises research 4. e.g. Srinivas (1995), Kiggundu (1986) 5. e.g. Kiggundu (1986), Blunt (1995) 6. e.g. Bailey et al (1993) 7. e.g. Dunphy and Stace (1988) 8. see Wilmott (1993)	1. A transferred critique of MOD (e.g. Wilson 1992): but tenor of Edwards and Ilulme (eds) (1995) is thus 2. e.g. Cooke (1996a) 3. and 4. i.e. compare with MOD refs: 5. Esman is often used as a justification. e.g. by Blunt and Collins (1994) 6. summarised in Scott (1995) 7. e.g. those of Wilson (1992), Dunphy and Stace (1988)

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7

The Social Psychological Limits of Participation?

Bill Cooke

Introduction: Social Psychology and Participatory Development

Social psychological analyses of what happens when people work together in groups suggest that the very processes of participation can restrict the ability of participatory development to deliver what is claimed for it. Specifically, participation can cause decisions to be made that are more risky, with which no one really agrees, or that rationalize harm to others, and it can be used consciously or otherwise to manipulate group members' ideological beliefs. According to Allport (1968: 3) social psychology is concerned with 'how the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined and implied presence of others'. Social psychology is therefore about the relationship between individuals' cognitive processes (thoughts), affective processes (feelings, e.g. anger, fear) and what they do on the one hand, and the interaction between these and other people on the other.

In that it calls for attention to 'irrational' affective processes, this chapter gives no succour to those who critique participation from the perspective of disciplines based on assumptions of rationality (e.g. economics). But it does argue that unless well-documented (outside development) limitations of participation are acknowledged, it will continue to contain within it the seeds of its own destruction, and, worse, harm those it would claim to help. It also raises a question about development's willingness to visit participatory processes on the Third World without mention of the reservations and critiques applied to participation in the First.

The focus of the chapter is what social psychology tells us about interactions within groups of people, drawing on the subset of social psychology theory typically described as being concerned with 'group processes' or 'group dynamics'. In particular, it will consider how group interactions manifest themselves in four different ways that are problematic

for the proponents of participatory development. These are, first, *risky shift*, second, the *Abilene paradox*, third, *groupthink*, and, fourth, *coercive persuasion*.

Group process theory is of relevance given the almost definitional use of what Mosse, speaking of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), calls 'public social events' (1994: 497), that is, face-to-face interactions between a group of people in participatory development. Such events are not limited to PRA, however; they are equally prevalent in development projects in a range of sectors (e.g. public sector reform), where they might be called 'workshops' (see for example, Joy and Bennett n.d.), and ostensibly more radical Participatory Action Research (PAR) processes, as in PRA with rural communities (e.g. Fals-Borda and Rahman 1991). Thus the group in question may consist of a group of ministers and/or civil servants, a project team, or 'a community' of the rural poor and dispossessed. What they have in common, and what gives them their status as a group, is their shared and face-to-face involvement in a participatory process. There is also typically an outsider present, often labelled a researcher, facilitator, consultant, animator or change agent.

An event with this outsider presence is, from a social psychological perspective, known as a participatory 'intervention', the point being that it would not have happened without the outsider (or those she or he represents), and that the very presence of the interventionist changes things. For Argyris, 'to intervene is to enter into an ongoing system of relationship, to come between or among persons, groups or objects for the purpose of helping them' (1970: 15). Argyris' work is part of a literature on intervention practice *per se*, which this chapter does not address directly, and which is by and large ignored by the participatory development literature (but see Cooke 1997; Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999). However, this chapter does have implications for how the interventionist works.

Claims made for participation Social psychology challenges the claims made for participation both as a means and as an end (Nelson and Wright 1995: 1). Claims for participation as a means focus on its ability to deliver more effective development. Here it is seen to lead to better planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, investigation and training and action (e.g. Chambers 1994: 961), and indeed evaluation (e.g. Acharya et al. 1998). Participatory analysis is seen to be better informed, because the data on which it is based have been generated collectively between interventionist and participants. The methods that are used also enable the generation of data that are particularly rich in comparison to data collected

by other means. Participatory action builds a sense of commitment, and again allows local knowledge to contribute to how the plan is implemented. Participatory evaluation gives 'beneficiaries' themselves the chance to comment on the effectiveness of a given development intervention.

Advocates of participation as an end in itself see it as delivering empowerment. At one end of the scale this means giving people control over development processes from which they had traditionally been excluded, through their very participation in analysis, planning and action (e.g. Chambers 1997). At the other, participation is seen as leading to empowerment by transforming consciousness. Thus engaging in PAR will, it is claimed, enable the poor and oppressed to become aware both of the structural sources of their own oppression and of how their own views of the world and thought processes (for example, with respect to gender relations) – that is, their consciousness – sustain this oppression. Once this awareness is achieved the group in question will be in a position collectively to challenge the causes of their oppression (again, see Fals-Borda and Rahman 1991).

Of course it is recognized that proponents of participatory development do identify potential problems with it. However, descriptions of such problems are almost invariably grounded in the worldview of development and/or in the light of problems that have manifested themselves in participatory practice, and do not lead to any questioning of the legitimacy of participatory development *per se*. Examples include the acknowledgement of the problems in assuming the homogeneity of community, the contradictions of top-down donor-led participation and inappropriate behaviour, attitudes and training among practitioners (e.g. Guijt amd Cornwall 1995). Co-optation of participation, by and for those who do not have the interests of the poor and oppressed at heart, is also identified as a potential problem by both Chambers (1997) and Rahman (1991).

There have also been more critical analyses of participation, which both extend some of these points and add new criticisms. For example, Craig and Porter (1997) argue that participation in the hands of development professionals can become an instrument for control. White (1996) suggests that there has been a failure to address the political dynamics of participation, not least the complex conflicts of interests between those driving it 'top-down' and those involved from 'bottom-up'. Mosse (1994) suggests that existing social relationships influence the way knowledge is constructed in participatory public social events. Stirrat (1997: 70) identifies 'the new orthodoxy' of participation as neocolonialist, noting for example its usage of terms like 'community', 'village', 'local people', which

arose from colonial anthropology, and all of which are elements in colonial and postcolonial discourses that depict the world in terms of a distinction between 'them' and 'us'. He also argues that the seductive yet ultimately vague rhetoric of 'empowerment' associated with participation serves to justify the activity (or interventions, in Argyris' terms) of outside agencies, ignoring autonomous organization, resistance and self-empowerment.

We will return to these problems and critiques in the conclusion, having considered risky shift, the Abilene paradox, groupthink and coercive persuasion. What we will find, first, is that these social psychological analyses suggest that the problems faced by the proponents of participation are greater than they surmise. Second, while all of the four analyses are individually within the social psychological (and managerialist) orthodoxy, contrasting this orthodoxy with that of participatory development reveals a gap between the two. This gap reinforces the arguments of those who are more critical of participation.

Conceptual underpinnings There is an extensive range of different approaches to the study of groups to be found in social psychology. The field is often depicted as arising from a seminal workshop in 1945 run by Kurt Lewin and his associates. In passing, that workshop is also often cited as the birthplace of action research (Lewin 1946), and, ironically, its purpose was community development (Cooke 1998), the resulting account entitled *Training in Community Relations* (Lippitt 1949). The study of group processes continues to thrive, and be documented, for example in journals like *Group and Organization Management* and *Journal of Applied Behavioural Science*. Within this field there is, it should be recognized, research that recognizes value in group processes. Shaw (1971) summarizes a range of research that suggests that, among other things, there is evidence that group membership motivates individuals, that groups usually produce more and better solutions than those working alone, and that they learn faster than individuals.

But against this has to be set a concern about what can go wrong in groups – so-called *group dysfunction*. The four analyses considered here have been selected because they offer particular insights into the limitations of participatory development. They are, however, also some of the most widely cited and reproduced, particularly in managerial texts and readings aimed at practitioners working participatively on behalf of senior managers in organizations in the North (see, for example, Dyer 1987; Kolb et al. 1991; Robbins 1998). Taking each in turn:

1. *Risky shift* is an example of an empirical approach to the study of group processes. Here a hypothesis about individual and group behaviour has been identified and tested, with further replication studies to check whether initial findings are generalizable.
2. The *Abilene paradox* is at the opposite end of the methodological and conceptual spectrum. Its basis is in theory rather than experimentation. It derives from a psychodynamic view of human behaviour, which suggests that unconscious psychological process shape how we think, feel and act.
3. *Groupthink* is developed from a grounded approach to understanding group processes. That is, the theory of groupthink arose from an attempt to construct a theoretical framework that explained how a particular type of group process came about. In this case the concern is with processes leading to decisions that to an outsider are obviously wrong.
4. *Coercive persuasion* also tried to provide a conceptual explanation of a particular type of group process – that which led to 'brainwashing' – as its starting point. However, its approach was to use and adapt existing psychological and social psychological theory to construct this explanation.

It is not claimed that these analyses are representative of group dynamics/processes as a field, conceptually or methodologically. The Abilene paradox, with its psychodynamic foundation, is on the fringes of group dynamics theory. There are also other group process approaches that provide insights into the conduct of participatory development. There are, for example, studies that have considered the impact of a range of different variables – e.g. group size, physical location and circumstances, member diversity – on group functioning (summarized in Handy 1985). Another is that associated with group interaction analysis (starting in the 1950s; see, for example, Bales 1950), which provides us with straightforward, established and tested methodologies for addressing questions like 'who participates' in participatory development. Interaction analysis suggests we address this question by using the group process and its interactions as a source of data. Thus we record who participates (and who does not), how often, who addresses whom, in what sequence, and what (in broad categories) they say.

Risky Shift

Risky shift defined Studies of group decision-making have found that group discussion leads group members to take more risky decisions than

they would have taken as individuals – hence risky shift. The phenomenon was originally suggested by Ziller in 1957, and subsequently confirmed by Stoner in 1961 (see Stoner 1968). Stoner's experiment, and the work of those who followed him, was based on asking subjects to decide between two courses of action that varied in riskiness and reward for a range of hypothetical situations, with the greater reward for successfully taking a greater risk. They were first asked to make and record the decisions on their own, and then to make the same decisions again following group discussion. In a significant number of cases the latter decisions were more risky.

Researchers following on from Stoner attempted to find out how far his results were shaped by his research design. For example, Stoner's original work had used only male graduate students studying management, so attempts were made to see whether risk-taking was associated with gender and management roles. However, risky shift was found in groups of women and of liberal arts students, and has been widely replicated. Among the explanations for risky shift the following three recur:

1. Risk-taking is a cultural value, the argument being that in US society risk is valued, 'and that in the group situation most individuals want to appear to be willing to take greater risks than the average person in order to enhance their status in the group' (Shaw 1971: 73). Reviewing this research, Shaw suggests that there is some research evidence that suggests that cultural attitudes towards risk 'probably' have some determining effect, but cannot explain every incidence of risky shift.
2. The risky individual is the most influential. Shaw argues that this has been a difficult hypothesis to test, with studies producing less than definitive findings. Moreover, while there may be a link between the presence of individuals with a propensity to take risks and overall group riskiness, cause and effect is hard to prove. Shaw suggests that this means that at best the risky individual is not the only cause of risky shift, and perhaps not even an important one. He also suggests that high risk-takers have the opportunity to use more colourful, and thus more persuasive, rhetoric than that open to the risk averse, which is inherently conservative.
3. Diffusion of responsibility. The actual sharing of responsibility means that individual accountability for a given decision is blurred. Again, Shaw's review of the research literature suggests that this is one of the most likely explanations of risky shift, but that again, this does not explain every occurrence of risky shift.

Risky shift and participatory development It is not that difficult to identify circumstances within participatory development where any of the three potential causal factors can be present, in, for example, a project management process or a community-based participatory development programme. The language of participatory development is in itself often colourful and persuasive, as can be the individual behaviours of its proponents, who often find their way into the influential role of facilitator. At a community level, getting participation in the first place requires facilitator persuasiveness. In a project-planning process participation may be formalized, for example, in the development of a logframe. But even though logframes require participants to identify assumptions, and by implication consider risk factors, this still inevitably involves group judgement and thus the danger of risky shift.

We should also note that risky shift is not completely explained by the presence of the three factors listed above, and by implication that it can occur in their absence. More generally, in both project management and community development scenarios we might also anticipate individual and collective decision-making processes to be shaped by individual assumptions about other group members that are never articulated or tested. These could be about what powers (e.g. in terms of resources and capabilities) and responsibilities members have – and where responsibilities lie. Again, the interventionist, by acting in that role, sends out a message about his or her own level of power and responsibility.

Risky shift is an empirically supported example of how the very processes of participation can influence outcomes, in this case leading to group decisions that are more risky than those that would have been taken by members of the group as individuals. The probability of risky shift occurring therefore has to be set against claims made for participation as a means, particularly for its effectiveness and rigour in analysis, planning and action. It also has to be set against claims for participation as empowerment, in the sense of giving participants control over their own development. Is participants' control increased when they are put into a situation leading them to commit to more risky decisions than otherwise would have been the case?

The Abilene Paradox

The Abilene paradox described 'The Abilene paradox' is the title of what can only be described as a parable, written by Harvey (1979) about unconscious collusion to produce false agreement. The story, quite simply,

is of a family spending an agreeable afternoon at home in Coleman, Texas, when it is suggested that a trip is made to Abilene. Everyone agrees to go. On returning after a gruelling, uncomfortable four-hour trip, one family member ventures that they hadn't really wanted to go, and had only agreed because everyone else was so enthusiastic about going. At this the family bursts into argument, each member claiming they hadn't wanted to go either, and had only agreed to keep everyone else happy.

The Abilene paradox in organizational terms is 'that organizations frequently take actions in contradiction to what they really want to do and therefore defeat the very purposes they are trying to achieve' (Harvey 1979: 127). In a development context we can easily substitute 'communities' or 'project teams' for organizations. The six symptoms of the paradox (summarized from Harvey 1979: 130–1) are:

1. The agreement, at a private level, on the nature of the situation being faced.
2. Agreement on what is to be done to deal with it (in the Abilene parable, this was 'nothing').
3. Group members fail to communicate accurately their actual desires, and indeed they do exactly the opposite, leading 'one another into misperceiving the collective reality'.
4. On the basis of this misperception actions are taken by the group that are actually contrary to what everyone wants to do.
5. This leads to anxiety, frustration, anger, and the search for someone to blame.
6. If 'the generic issue – the inability to manage agreement' is not dealt with the cycle is likely to repeat itself.

The Abilene paradox and participatory development Harvey illustrates the paradox with cases from corporate and political decision-making, and analyses the causal dynamics at increasing levels of depth using an individual psychoanalytical framework. However, it is fairly straightforward to transpose these cases to a participatory development context. We can use a hypothetical public sector reform planning workshop to illustrate. Actors in this hypothetical workshop would include an interventionist paid by the bilateral donor concerned; local representatives of the donor; ministerial and civil service representatives of the government department concerned; and a locally based project manager and other stakeholders, for example those with professional expertise.

Each actor could well assume that, contrary to their own personal belief,

everyone else wants the project to go ahead, that its outputs should be of a certain kind, and that its processes should take a certain form. In such a scenario, it can be envisaged that a least some of the causal dynamics Harvey proposes are likely to be present, beginning with 'action anxiety', which occurs as each one present struggles to find a compromise between what one thinks should be done and what one assumes others want to be done. To illustrate, Harvey relocates Hamlet to a corporate context; but the president and V.P. he mentions might equally be heads of state or any other perceived superior (1979: 135):

> To maintain my sense of integrity and self worth, or compromise it, that is the question. Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer the ignominy that comes from managing a nonsensical ... project, or the fear and anxiety that comes from making a report that the president and V.P. might not like to hear.

According to Harvey, action anxiety arises from a combination of there being genuine, 'real' risk to the individual who confronts consensus, and risk that is imagined. Harvey calls imagined risk 'negative fantasies' about what will happen if one acts according to one's true beliefs. These include, for example, 'loss of face, prestige, position, and even health' and 'being made scapegoats, branded as disloyal, or ostracized as non team players' (ibid.: 135). But these fantasies have an important purpose for those who have them. They provide absolution, specifically 'the excuse that releases him (*sic*), both in his (*sic*) own eyes and frequently in the eyes of others from the responsibility of having to act to solve ... problems' (ibid.: 135).

Harvey describes living with the consequences of risk in psychodynamic terms. He claims that risk aversion arises specifically from the fear of separation, of being excluded from others, and from an unwillingness to accept risk-taking as a condition of being human ('existential risk'). This leads to what Harvey calls a paradox within a paradox, that negative fantasies about imagined risk can lead people into paths where we take wrong decisions (perhaps meaning greater real risk) and consequently suffer greater real adverse consequences than those imagined.

Harvey's prescriptions for avoiding the trip to Abilene include avoiding blaming and fault-finding behaviour, and at the same time challenging collusion in risk avoidance. Each individual, in their 'own collusive manner, shares responsibility for the trip, so searching for a locus of blame outside oneself serves no useful purpose. What is required is that assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge are confronted' (ibid.: 138). Later he continues: 'change and effectiveness may be facilitated as much

by confronting the organization with what it knows and agrees upon as by confronting it with what it does not know or disagrees about' (ibid.: 140). For Harvey, anyone in the group is able to play this confronting, risk-taking role, and should be prepared to take the risk involved. We may get plaudits if this works out, we may find ourselves disliked, we may get fired if it doesn't. But whatever happens, our self-esteem remains intact, and this is what matters.

There is a range of explanations for people not wanting to take risks. In the case of our participatory workshop it might be because of real concerns about jobs and careers. In community-based participation it may be because participants do not want to lose the resources they assume the interventionist has under his or her control, or because they do not want to antagonize elders, family members or neighbours who have the power to visit real (or imagined) consequences on them. Given this, it is tempting to argue that we can accept that false consensus in the form of the Abilene paradox can arise in participatory processes, and even that risk aversion is its cause, without necessarily having to accept Harvey's psychodynamic explanations for it. There are those for whom psychodynamic explanations of behavioural processes are inherently unsound, given that they derive from a paradigm that does not see the need nor offer the opportunity for empirical testing (see, for example, Blunt 1995).

Accepting the paradox without its psychodynamics would still undermine participation's claims as a means. Clearly, we do not have more effective planning, analysis and evaluation, nor do we have commitment if people subconsciously collude to make decisions they know are wrong. Chambers does of course acknowledge the potential for practitioner and beneficiary to engage in 'mutual deception' (1997: 89). However, the Abilene paradox suggests that participation is not necessarily a remedy; indeed, it suggests that face-to-face interaction can make things worse. Likewise, people are not empowered in the sense of being given control over their own development if they come to decisions with which they disagree, but which they feel unable to publicly contest. The implication of the Abilene paradox for those who see empowerment as consciousness-raising is that participatory processes may lead a group to say what it is they think you and everyone else want to hear, rather than what they truly believe.

Furthermore, we should be wary of writing off psychodynamic understandings of what happens in group processes, and their insights for the practitioner. Psychodynamics is, as we have said, about the relationship between the unconscious mind and how we think and feel. As such, they

pose important questions for participatory interventionists. For example, what psychodynamic processes make people want to be interventionists in the first place? How do psychodynamic processes affect how the interventionist thinks of and interacts with participants? And what does psychodynamics tell believers in participation as consciousness-raising empowerment about how consciousness is shaped?

Groupthink

Groupthink described Harvey does acknowledge that there are other valuable accounts of dysfunctional group consensus – what he calls group tyranny. In particular he cites Janis' concept of groupthink. Groupthink is the term for a set of group dynamics that leads to evidently bad or wrong decisions being taken. Groupthink is perhaps the best known of the three concepts discussed here, and is used in political science as well as in management and organization studies as an explanation of how bad decisions are taken in the face of strong contrary evidence. The concept centres on there being an *ingroup* and an *outgroup*, and its main principle is:

> The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among a policy making ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions against outgroups. (Janis 1991: 262)

Janis' arrival at the concept was based on his analysis of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, but he went on to analyse the USA's entry into the Korean War, Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War and Watergate on the same terms (ibid.). The eight symptoms of groupthink are described in Box 7.1. Of these, symptoms 6 and 7 parallel the Abilene paradox.

Groupthink and participatory development The development of the concept came about from Janis' research into high-level policy-making, and it is tempting to point to evidence of groupthink at the policy level of the development process. It is also possible to identify symptoms of groupthink in the very discourse surrounding participatory development (and, anticipating, in the reactions of the participatory development community to the book in which this chapter appears). The point here, though, is that groupthink can occur in participatory processes at the micro level, in the participatory project management process described above, or even in community-based participatory processes in which donors are supposedly not directly involved. In either circumstance there are likely to be

Box 7.1 Janis' eight symptoms of groupthink

1. *The illusion of invulnerability* An over-optimism about the power of the group and the lack of any real threat to the prevailing status quo ('laughing together at a danger signal, which labels it as purely a laughing matter, is a characteristic manifestation of groupthink') (1991: 262).

2. *Rationalization* Along with the collective ignoring of warning signals there is a collective construction of rationalizations that allow any negative feedback to be discounted, so that assumptions never need to be reconsidered each time decisions are recommitted to.

3. *Morality* Ingroup members 'believe unquestioningly in the inherent morality of their ingroup', inclining 'members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions' (ibid.: 263).

4. *Stereotypes* Group members hold stereotypical views about 'enemy groups', which lead to the assumption that they must be eliminated rather than compromised with. Such stereotypes often focus on the inherent badness or evil nature of 'the enemy' (ibid.: 264).

5. *Pressure* This is directly applied to anyone who momentarily expresses doubts about the group's shared illusions. Such pressure often is masked as amiability, in an attempt to 'domesticate' the dissenter, so long as doubts are not expressed outside the ingroup, and fundamental assumptions are not challenged.

6. *Self-censorship* 'Individuals keep silent about their misgivings, and even minimize to themselves the importance of their doubts' (ibid.: 265).

7. *Unanimity* An illusion of unanimity exists with the group, with silence assumed as concurrence with the majority view.

8. *Mindguards* 'Individuals sometimes appoint themselves as mindguards to protect the leader and fellow members from adverse information' (ibid.: 266) that might confront complacency about the effectiveness and morality of decisions, to the extent of taking it upon themselves to exclude dissenters from the group.

ingroups and outgroups, and the eight symptoms of groupthink may well occur.

Thus, taking our project planning workshop example, let us go on to depict it as being about 'employment reform' in the civil service (i.e. about downsizing, rightsizing or retrenchment). The ingroup – the same actors as before – diverse as it is, might positively stereotype itself as *the modernizers*, and equally, share all sorts of negative stereotypes of the outgroup (e.g. the civil service in general) it is seeking to reform (words like bureaucratic, corrupt, inefficient, or self-seeking, flowing freely and uncritically). The illusion of invulnerability is sustained by the actual power that results from being within the ingroup, and the surrounding trappings of hotels, chauffeurs and high salaries/fees. That rationalization occurs is evident in the (implicit or explicit) belief that there is no alternative, and in the virtual ignoring of the substantial data that suggest that retrenchment might not work, that money is often not saved, and that organizational effectiveness is often impaired (summarized by McCourt 1998). The morality of development is often seen as unquestionable, particularly when associated with intentions that few could criticize – poverty alleviation, sustainable development or, indeed, empowerment.

So deep are the professional and disciplinary socialization processes that precede entry into the group that dissenting views are rarely expressed. The assumptions that dissent is never insurmountable, and that consensus can always be achieved, are implicit in the very use of participatory processes. These processes themselves also often provide the mechanism for the domestication of dissenters in which group members are permitted to express concerns in a way which does not challenge fundamental aims.

Chambers suggests that in PRA games or exercises can be used with names like 'saboteur or dominator which then lodge as words, often used jokingly by participants' (1997: 215). This apparently amiable labelling of dissenters is, from Janis' (1982: 115) position, an indicator of domestication processes at work:

> The non-conformist can feel that he (*sic*) is still accepted as a member in good standing. If on occasion he goes too far, he is warned about his deviation, in an affectionate or joking way and is reminded only indirectly of his potentially precarious status by the labels others give him ... The others in the group ... can even pat themselves on the back for being so democratic about tolerating open dissent. Nevertheless, the domesticated dissenter repeatedly gets the message that there is only a very small piece of critical territory he can tread safely and still remain a member in good standing.

Thus while the group as a whole may feel invulnerable, individual feelings of vulnerability – not least to exclusion from the group – are high.

This in turn points to the need to consider whether groupthink can occur in so-called community-based approaches to participation. Chambers himself is not beyond stereotyping (e.g. his 'uppers' and 'lowers'). Moreover, once we acknowledge Mosse's point that communities are not one homogeneous group, we must also recognize that ingroups and outgroups may exist of which the interventionist is not even aware. These in/outgroups might be differentiated on the bases of gender, age, ethnicity, tribe, caste, class, sexuality, occupation, location, nationality, and so on. Once again, 'developmental' purposes and the rhetoric of empowerment sustain a belief in the inherent morality of what is being done. Power actually derives from being a member of the participatory community group – one's voice is heard. All sorts of actual and potential benefits may be ascribed to being a member of the group; fear of their loss may lead to self-censorship, and a desire to present unanimity. Likewise, there may be a fear of presenting what the interventionist may perceive as adverse information (Chambers' mutual deception again). The extent to which the illusion of group invulnerability might occur is open to question, and perhaps the least likely of the symptoms of groupthink to occur. However, an ingroup that is seen as invulnerable in a community – for example, elders or men – is likely to have that sense of invulnerability reinforced if it is the focus or gatekeeper of a participatory intervention.

The potential presence of groupthink undermines claims for participation as a means and as an end. End-wise, groupthink is defined by processes and decisions that lack rigour and are worse than ineffective, in that they can cause harm. As a concept it also reveals some of the subtle and unwitting processes that can occur within supposedly empowering group activities that have a disempowering effect. Real control is removed from individual 'ingroup' members, who are loath to lose that status, and of course outgroup members can be left with real cause for concern. Groupthink is not inevitable, and unlike risky shift we cannot point to empirical studies that tell us the statistical likelihood of it occurring. However, as the Bay of Pigs and the decision to escalate the US war on Vietnam show, one-off occurrences can cause harm enough.

Janis' antidotes to groupthink are less reliant than Harvey's on individual heroism, and depend more on structural arrangements. They include the setting up of more than one decision-making group to counterbalance each other, the assignment of someone to the devil's advocate role, individual group members checking with non-group members for their

opinions, having subgroups meet separately, and the removal of time pressures on decisions to allow for reflection. Janis also suggests that outside interventionists be called in. These are not mere facilitators, but trained behavioural science experts who have both the legitimacy and the expertise to confront groupthink. In sum, groupthink poses three questions for proponents of participatory development. First, is its potential recognized anywhere in the vast literature on participatory development? Second, to what extent are the antidotes built in to participatory development? Third, to what extent are the antidotes – for example, the need for highly trained interventionists – actually counter to the anti-professionalism espoused by participatory development (e.g. Chambers 1993)?

Coercive Persuasion

Coercive persuasion described Both the Abilene paradox and groupthink are presentations of how underlying psychological or group dynamics lead members unintentionally to shape group processes, which in turn ultimately lead to 'bad' or 'wrong' decisions. Schein's analysis of coercive persuasion works the other way round. It shows how group processes can intentionally be shaped to set up specific psycho- and group dynamics to achieve a particular outcome. This particular aspect of Schein's work has been dealt with in depth elsewhere (Cooke 1998), so is summarized in brief here. Schein is a respected mainstream managerial/organization psychologist, who has written standard texts on organizational culture (1990), and can claim to be the inventor of process consultation, widely used as a term in development, albeit with little reference to Schein's principles (Schein 1988; Joy and Bennett n.d.). I have also argued elsewhere that development practitioners should learn from Schein's concept of 'the clinical perspective' (Cooke 1997). The particular concern here, though, is his early work funded by the US military on the 'ideological conversion', or so-called brainwashing of US prisoners by the Chinese. Schein's purpose was to explain how US forces personnel came to make public statements, while prisoners, in which they apologized for atrocities they had perpetrated, and denounced US imperialism in pursuing the Korean War.

Schein's method was to take a range of psychological and social psychological theories, and analyse the extent to which they were able to account for the so-called brainwashing process. What he came up with was a synthesis of Goffman's ideas on face work and presentation of self, and Festinger's work on the importance of self-image and the need for an attractive, coherent picture of oneself as a prerequisite for social existence,

constructed around Lewin's three-stage model of the change process. Box 7.2 is Schein's presentation of the model in *Process Consultation Volume 2* (1987). He describes the model thus in *Coercive Persuasion* (1961: 118):

> it is a basic assumption of the model that beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviour patterns of an individual tend to be integrated with each other and tend to be organized around the individual's self image or self concept. This integration, even if imperfect, gives continuity and stability to the person, and hence operates as a force against being influenced, unless the change which the influence implies is seen to be a change in the direction of greater integration

Thus I have described Schein's method of attitudinal and behavioural change as 'one of social disintegration (unfreezing), social reconstruction (change) and social reintegration (refreezing) of individuals' cognitive frameworks' (Cooke 1998: 48). 'Participatory' group processes are used by

Box 7.2 Schein's three-stage model of the change process

Stage 1

Unfreezing: Creating motivation and readiness to change through:

a) Disconfirmation or lack of confirmation
b) Creation of guilt or anxiety
c) Provision of psychological safety

Stage 2

Changing: Through cognitive restructuring: helping the client to see things, judge things, feel things, and react to things based on a new point of view obtained through:

a) Identifying with a new role model, mentor, etc.
b) Scanning the environment for new relevant information

Stage 3

Refreezing: Helping the client to integrate the new point of view into:

a) The total personality and the self concept
b) Significant relationships

(*Source*: Schein 1987: 93, Table 6.1)

'change agents in the day to day business of producing ideological change' (Schein 1961: 12) in order, first, to unfreeze. Guilt or anxiety are produced – in the case of prisoners of war, by, for example, producing and collectively discussing the evidence of the consequences of US bombing raids; this in turn disconfirms individuals' feeling of self-worth; at the same time some psychological safety is produced by group members being all in the same boat; and the so-called 'lenient policy' of Chinese captors in which understanding and re-education rather than punishment appear to be the primary motives (although, at the same time, the alternative to participating in these group discussions clearly was severe punishment). The 'change' process was facilitated by encouraging prisoners to identify with their captors, by the introduction of fellow prisoners who had had already recanted, and the ongoing provision of information, for example, through news media. Refreezing was encouraged by rewarding captors with privileges, reinforcing the perception that what they had done was the right thing to do.

Coercive persuasion and participatory development It was Schein who labelled and described the change process in this way. The captors, although, Schein suggests, relying heavily on Maoist traditions of thought reform, did not see or describe themselves as going through a process of unfreezing, changing and refreezing; nor indeed is there any evidence that they saw what they were doing as brainwashing. From the evidence that Schein provided so-called brainwashers can equally be represented as doing what they believed was right to bring prisoners round to what they perceived was an objectively correct analysis of the situation, and to get them to act accordingly. Of course, in participatory development we have participants rather than prisoners. However, it is not necessarily safe to assume that participants participate completely out of free will. Schein himself went on to argue soon after his initial work that his three-stage process could and should be used managerially, the safeguard being the benign intent of a highly trained practitioner. His model of change was to become a generic model in his own work, and one that was explicitly and implicitly to underpin other models of, and approaches to, the management of change.

Let us take our participatory project workshop once more. In this one workshop the unfreezing is brought about by all sorts of 'evidence' that things cannot go on as they are – the state must be reformed or bad things will occur (disconfirmation); donors will withdraw funding, development will be impeded (creation of anxiety); however, there is a way out if

we follow certain prescriptions and processes of good government (provision of psychological safety). The logframe becomes a talisman that will ensure our survival. Changing is brought about by providing examples of how other people have done it – we look at the case examples of New Zealand, the UK, Chile. We identify real and fictional organizational and individual models of what we want to look like (identifying with new role models), and set up research programmes into the functioning of our and other civil services (gathering new information).

Refreezing perhaps only begins within the first workshop, which is why there is a strong managerialist emphasis on change as an iterative process. However, within that initial workshop, there may start to be a realignment of how people see themselves – for example, from bureaucrat to reformer, from academic to consultant – all which begin to change the self-concept. Those whom one identifies as important begin to change as other workshop participants come to be seen as more significant, and some of our absent colleagues less so. This is reinforced by the actual and potential rewards of being associated with the change process that become apparent at an early stage.

The work of the community facilitator can be described in the same way. Indeed, the very presence of a facilitator can begin the unfreezing process, and be seen as suggesting that things will not carry on as before. Unfreezing is also achieved through the use of data collection processes that reveal things – to interventionist and participants collectively – that have hitherto been concealed or unspoken. This in itself can create anxiety or insecurity. A counterbalancing sense of security is provided by the very presence of the interventionist, and indeed by the language of helping and of development that is likely to be used. The role models upon which change is to be based are often provided by the interventionists' descriptions of how things will be different, and examples of communities that have already changed through participatory processes. Refreezing is fostered by rewards for acting/behaving in a different way – at a collective level, by funding further development, individually, by providing further career opportunities (e.g. the chance to become a 'local' facilitator).

Schein's work undermines claims made for participation as a value-free or benign means, suggesting that participatory processes never take place in an ideological vacuum. What is seen as a positive outcome from a participatory process, indeed what effectiveness means, will depend on an ideological position. But the more profound challenge is offered to claims for participation as a consciousness-raising end. This is, paradoxically, because Schein shows participation to be no more than a technique or

technology, or a means, for consciousness-changing. There is nothing in participatory processes themselves that brings about a particular state of consciousness; rather, that state is shaped by the interventionist.

PAR facilitators seeking to empower through changing consciousness can equally and legitimately be described in the same terms as Maoist cadres, as 'in the day to day business of producing ideological change' (1961: 12). As Schein puts it:

> on the level of social process, I saw many parallels between what the Chinese Communists were doing and what we do every day ... the goals are different but the methods are remarkably similar. When we disapprove we call it a cult and deplore it; when we approve, we call it an effective indoctrination programme. (ibid.: 234)

or, we might add, an effective consciousness-raising activity.

Finally, there was a development agenda that underpinned the Chinese use of thought reform processes on the broader Chinese population that has resonances with that of contemporary participatory development. Hence there was a strong emphasis on the creation of social and economic change to benefit the poor and oppressed, the creation of a non-Western, indigenous, anti-capital 'Asian way' (see ibid.: 82–4) and a grassroots, participatory, peasant-orientated rhetoric. Schein argues that what was created as a consequence was an ideological unanimity that facilitated Maoist oppression and, it can be argued with hindsight, development programmes that led to devastating famine and authoritarian oppression (see, for example, MacFarquhar and Fairbank 1987; Chang 1991; Yang 1998).

Conclusion

Whether considered on their own or collectively, the four analyses suggest that there are social psychological limits to what can be achieved through participatory development. Moreover, each can reinforce and be reinforced by the other problems with participatory development acknowledged by its proponents. To illustrate, an assumption of community homogeneity on the part of the interventionist is likely to mask even further the false nature of an 'Abilene' consensus; and any tendency to false consensus is in itself likely to conceal difference and heterogeneity from the interventionist. Coercive persuasion suggests that participation can indeed be co-opted for a range of agendas other than those with the needs of the poor and oppressed at heart – hence the co-optation of

Maoist brainwashing processes for managerial ends in Western work organizations. However, it also suggests that participatory development with an espoused and genuine commitment to meeting the needs of the poor and oppressed and to raising their consciousness on the part of the change agent are not in themselves, if we take the Maoist illustrations, a safeguard against disastrous outcomes from participatory development.

The four analyses discussed here also lend strength to the more critical analyses of participation. Craig and Porter's (1997) view of participation as an instrument for control is almost provided with a practical 'how to do it' guide by Schein. The political dynamics and complex conflicts of interests identified by White (1996) can now be seen as source of, for example, groupthink, and as potentially manifesting themselves in any of risky shift, Abilene paradox, groupthink and coercive persuasion. Likewise, construction of knowledge in participatory public social events, which Mosse (1994) argues is shaped by existing social relationships, can now also be seen to be shaped by the social psychological processes of participation itself.

But it is by building on Stirrat's (1997) identification of 'the new orthodoxy' of participation as neocolonialist that we arrive at our most important concluding point. This chapter suggests that the poor of the world, particularly but not exclusively those in 'developing countries', are the victims of a disciplinary bias: put simply, the rich get social psychology, the poor get participatory development. Chambers' claim that, while 'group dynamics can present problems', 'how best to convene and facilitate groups remains an area for learning and invention' (1994: 148) ignores the substantial amount about groups that has already been learned and invented since 1945. As we have noted, the four analyses here represent but a small sample of this work, but they are standard fare in texts aimed at practitioners working for First World work organizations.

The absence of social psychology from participatory development therefore identifies it as yet another technology used with the Third World without the care and concern that would be expected elsewhere. Those of us who are participation's technocrats should reflect on why this is the case, what it tells us about the limitations of our own practice, and how that practice should change. A starting point might be to counter the proselytizing euphoria that surrounds participatory development with a more mundane but clearly essential understanding of when participatory processes must not be used.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 17, 325–340 (1997)

From process consultation to a clinical model of development practice

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SUMMARY

his article argues that two related concepts, process consultation and, in particular, the inical perspective, developed by the organizational psychologist Edgar Schein, can improve e understanding, teaching and conduct of development practice. Process consultation, which more than just the application of so-called process approaches, and the clinical perspective e described, and the case for them is put, in relation to contrasts with ethnography and tion research and in the light of contemporary debates about the relationship between velopment studies and development practice. Five particular aspects of the clinical model— e primacy of the 'helpful intervention', the subservience of science to helping, its client ntredness, its recognition of interventionists' financial and political status, and its overt rmativeness—are seen as particularly relevant to development practice. In conclusion, the inical model is seen to pose four challenges for development studies: the creation of velopment's own theory of practice, the establishment of rigorous practitioner training rogrammes, the consequent institutional change, and an acknowledgement of the plications of development studies' disciplinary biases. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

ublic Admin. Dev. Vol. **17**, 325–340 (1997).
o. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 0. No. of Refs: 48.

> We cannot understand the world fully unless we are involved in some way with the processes that change it (M. Edwards, 1989, *The Irrelevance of Development Studies*).

> One cannot understand a human system without trying to change it (E. H. Schein, 1987, *The Clinical Perspective in Fieldwork*).

INTRODUCTION—A GENERAL THEORY OF HELPING?

he initial impetus for this article comes from the similarity of Edwards's and chein's claims about understanding and change. The purpose is to argue that chein's conceptions of the clinical perspective and process consultation provide a odel for development practice, and the training of development practitioners. Now rofessor Emeritus at the Sloan School of Management at MIT, Schein is also uthor of classic texts on organizational psychology (1980) and on organizational

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CC 0271–2075/97/030325–16$17.50

culture and leadership (1990). He has already been the subject of two retrospective journal articles (Sashkin, 1979; Coghlan, 1988).

Support for this case is provided by Edwards's recent statement (1996b, p. 19), after Uphoff (1992), that there is a new paradigm of reflexive, post-Newtonian development practice emerging. Process consultation and the clinical perspective are presented as long-standing, relatively sophisticated, and institutionally established examples of that reflexive post-Newtonian practice. Like the work of Bennis, which Uphoff cites, the clinical perspective and process consultation have been developed within the management field of Organization Development (OD). However, while much development activity has an organizational focus, e.g. in institutional development and capacity building (Fowler, 1992; Moore *et al.*, 1995), process consultation and the clinical perspective are seen here as more generally applicable.

Process consultation is more than the application of what in development are called 'process approaches'. Together the clinical perspective and process consultation provide a general theory of practice; Schein talks of the assumptions of process consultation underlying any 'general theory of "helping" regardless of the context' (1987a, p. 21). In this theory, every social researcher is assumed through his or her action, whatever the intent, to make a difference to, and to *intervene* in, that being researched. A clinical practitioner is assumed to have helpful intent towards the human system in which she or he is intervening, to know how to help, and conversely how not to harm. A clinician is a practitioner first, for whom knowledge about how to research is but a sub-set of this knowledge of how to help.

It has to be recognized straight away that the term 'clinical' has associations and connotations with which those in development may not be comfortable. It must be stressed, therefore, that the use of the term has a psychological and therapeutic rather than a medical derivation, and recognized that the language of the clinical perspective reflects this. Schein states (1987b, p. 11):

> 'What do I mean by clinical? . . . I mean those helping professionals who get involved with individuals, groups, communities, or organizations in a "helping role". This would include clinical and counseling psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, organizational development consultants, process consultants, and others who work explicitly with human systems'.

It will not be argued that the clinical approach is perfect. As Blunt (1995) pointed out, it emerges from a Eurocentric tradition. There are justifiable critiques, it needs enhancement, and it complements, not replaces, the work of others. Nor is it suggested that the approach should completely subsume what currently takes place in development studies. The principles behind Hulme's argument (1994) in response to Edwards, that the research component of development studies has informed, and transformed development practice, are acknowledged as crucial. Fundamentally, the grounding of practice in macro-level understandings provided by development research and policy analysis compensates for an acknowledged weakness of OD and, by implication, of the clinical approach. This weakness is that OD emphasizes micro-levels of analyses and action, i.e. individual, group, and organizational behaviour, to the exclusion of any consideration of broader perspectives, for example those at a societal or policy level (Wilson, 1992; Cooke, forthcoming).

The article explains and puts the case for the clinical perspective and process onsultation. This is done in the light of contemporary practice issues to be found in he development literature, and the distinctions Schein makes from ethnography and rom forms of action research. It will, in passing, provide a contrasting view to those vho imply that process consultation (e.g. Blunt, 1995) or OD (e.g. Bailey *et al.*, 1993) n development are *necessarily* a vehicle for western managerialist hegemony. This is nore than a defensive response. Rather the suggestion is that while adaptation is equired, as Kiggundu (1986) and Srinivas (1995) argue in relation to cultural biases n OD, the clinical model positively improves (but, it should be reiterated, by no neans makes perfect) the way we think of, teach and conduct development practice. 'his is not because it provides direct answers to immediate practice problems, but ecause it forces a reflexive openness and honesty about how they are addressed.

In the next section, the article reviews process consultation, alluding to work arried out applying the concept in development, and outlines the relationship etween process consultation and the clinical perspective. The section following that lustrates the contrast between the clinical perspective and ethnography, and etween the clinical perspective and action research. The application of the clinical erspective in development is reviewed in the fourth section in the light of five key haracteristics. The conclusion then outlines four challenges that the clinical erspective and process consultation pose to development studies.

REVIEWING PROCESS CONSULTATION

rocess consultation and development

)espite anecdotal evidence from a number of people working in development aiming to be process consultants, there are few documented accounts of process onsultation, in Schein's sense, for development. Mbise and Shirima (1993) identified rocess consultation as more appropriate than a 'consultant engineering' mode of peration within the Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI), ut did not go into depth. The UNDP's Management Development Programme has roduced a substantial process consultation-based approach to the systematic nprovement of the public sector (Joy and Bennett, undated), but while their pproach has many overt parallels with Schein's model of process consultation, it oes not explicitly draw on it. Murrell (1994) provided the most detailed onsideration of Schein's approach to process consultation in a development ontext, presenting a description of its application in his work with the UNDP. He id not, however, set out to explore the relationship between the clinical perspective nd process consultation, nor link the two together to general development practice.

Process consultation as defined by Schein does not merely describe interventions ddressing group dynamic processes (see Coghlan, 1988), despite this implication in ome OD texts. Hence the earlier point, that using what are called 'process pproaches' in development does not make one a process consultant either. Process onsultation describes a particular mode of practice, its major distinction being in e way the relationship with the client is structured by the consultant (Schein, 987a, p. 29).

As with the word 'clinical', the use of the word 'client' may be problematic for those approaching it from a development perspective, for whom there may be associations with the creation of dependency. It should therefore be stressed that its clinical perspective/process consultation use is intended to convey a different, more honest message about the relationship between the consultant/researcher and the client. That relationship is explored below, but as a starting point it should be noted that the creation of dependency is the very opposite of the intention of process consultation. Other attractions are that, first, it is an avowedly 'more developmental' (Schein, 1987a, p. 9) approach, seeking to empower people to solve their own problems. Second, it seeks to achieve sustainable change. Third, paralleling Hamdi's (1996, p. 7) same point with respect to development practice, it respects the depth of indigenous (emic) client knowledge, and the profound limitations of the outsider consultant's (etic) knowledge (Schein, 1987a, p. 9).

Process consultation recognizes three principles. First, clients know more about their own situation than the consultant ever will. Second, a consultancy process needs to engender psychological ownership of the activities that result from it on the part of the client. Third, the consultant should seek to develop clients' capabilities to solve their own problems. Process consultation is thus defined by Schein (1987a, p. 34) as:

> '. . . a set of activities on the part of the consultant that help the client to perceive, understand and act upon the process events that occur in the client's environment'.

Its focus is human processes, including face to face relationships, communication, group and inter-group processes, and broader organizational issues such as values, culture and norms. As a matter of course it addresses the role of emotion in understanding problems (Schein, 1987a, p. 7), which Edwards raises in relation to development practice (1989, p. 21). For example, Schein analyses the anxiety, frustration, and tension when groups meet for the first time (1987a, p. 41).

Process consultation as an embodiment of the clinical perspective

Schein's description of the relationship between the clinical perspective and process consultation is that they are 'essentially the same' (1995, p. 19). However, process consultation is usually described by Schein (i.e. in Schein, 1987a, 1988) as an intra-organizational form of intervention. More helpful, particularly from the point of view of development practice in extra-organizational contexts, is Schein's distinction between the clinical perspective as the 'conceptual underpinning' and process consultation as the 'day to day routine' of clinical work (1995, p. 18), and his description of process consultation as an 'embodiment' of the clinical perspective.

Process consultation versus expert and doctor–patient consultancy

Process consultation is described through contrasts with expert and doctor–patient modes of consultancy. As an expert the consultant is paid by the client to use his or

er expertise to fix a particular problem. For expert consultancy to work there is a equirement that the client initially diagnoses the root cause of the problem correctly, elects the right consultant, communicates needs to the consultant accurately, and ccepts the expert's subsequent diagnosis and prescription (or recommendations).

The doctor–patient mode involves some consultant–client interchange in arriving t a diagnosis. The consultant will collect data from the client, and thus to some xtent involve the client organization in arriving at a solution. However, the power nd responsibility of diagnosis and of prescribing remedies rest with the consultant. n an organizational context, successful doctor–patient consultancy still relies on the ient's ability to select the right doctor, and the consultant's ability to arrive at a full nd thorough understanding of the organization and its problems, sufficient to ecide what is best in terms of management action. Moreover, there is still the issue f acceptance of consultancy findings.

Eliding these two approaches to strengthen the contrast with process consultation, Iurrell provides a useful translation into the development context, where the expert/ octor becomes 'the engineer, the economist or the management consultant . . .', too equently with no locally relevant expertise, insensitive to indigenous culture and norant of existing institutional and managerial capacity (1994, p. 3). This is ontrasted with a process consultation approach, which does not assume that the evelopment expert, or development agency, knows the conditions and needs of any ven country well enough to describe a project or programme (1994, p. 2).

INTRODUCING THE CLINICAL PERSPECTIVE

he clinical perspective versus ethnography

The Clinical Perspective in Fieldwork (1987b), Schein uses another contrast as a euristic device, this time between clinical and ethnographic perspectives. In so doing recognizes that exaggerated archetypes are being used, and both are more omplex than the analysis allows, so much so that the clinical and the ethnographic ten blend into one another.

Yet at the same time Schein believes (1987b, p. 12) that the distinction between inical and ethnographic is more profound than that between quantitative and ualitative inquiry. This is notwithstanding a recognition of the importance of the tter, which in a development setting Copestake and Moris have illustrated quite oroughly with respect to rural development (1993). Nonetheless, it is stressed that is crucial for the fieldworker to be clear throughout whether she or he is working in e *general role* of a clinician in a relationship with the client or a *general role* of an hnographer in relation to the subject.

This role clarity is required, for example, with respect to choices to be made about hat is best for the client/subject, and what is best for the inquirer or researcher. The ient/subject is typically unaware of such choices, so the choices must be made by e clinician/ethnographer applying ethical professional standards that protect rious organizational constituencies (Schein, 1987b, p. 20). The principle of formed consent is seen as an illusion in this context; early on client/subjects do t know enough to make an informed consent choice. The researcher/consultant

has to apply professional standards unilaterally, and make the client aware as quickly as possible of what they have committed themselves to. Such standards are seen as ultimately being about client vulnerability, a distinction being seen between how this is perceived and acted upon clinically and ethnographically. Hence the significance of the general role adopted.

The clinician, through formal training, learns to think in terms of client protection, i.e. the avoidance of interventions that are 'unscrupulous, wasteful or harmful . . .' and to think of the need to create an environment enabling the elucidation of 'whatever information is needed to make a good diagnosis on the basis of which to give a valid and helpful prescription' (Schein, 1987b, p. 21). Such an approach would not preclude operation in the doctor–patient mode however; so it is also made clear that process consultation further enjoins the consultant to avoid dependency and enhance the client's own problem-solving capacity.

The ethnographer's clients are seen ultimately as academics (Schein, 1987b, p. 20). The ethnographer's primary goal is to obtain valid data for 'science', and not usually to change or help the system being studied. Indeed the ethnographer often seeks to obtain information with the overt intention of not changing, influencing, or disturbing the subject. Even when there is an intention to help, this is subservient to the need for scientific rigour. Both clinical and ethnographic roles demand that no harm comes to the subject/client as a result of the clinician/researcher's presence. But otherwise they are quite different.

An illustration of the difference between the clinical and the qualitative (if not purely ethnographic) research ethos is provided by considering the constraints to the applications of qualitative enquiry in rural development identified by Copestake and Moris (1993; pp. 87–92). These include the use of language accessible to non-specialists in conducting qualitative enquiry, practitioner and senior management ignorance of, and consequent adversity to, qualitative enquiry, and bureaucratic and institutional constraints. The clinical practitioner does not have work constrained by problems like these. Rather, addressing problems like these is the clinician's real work. A clinician citing bureaucratic obstruction of an intervention (archetypally in a case conference) might be asked, inter alia, to reflect on whether he or she is blaming the client, whether there had been a failure to diagnose the readiness for change, and whether the intervention had caused harm by raising expectations that could not have been met in the overall context.

The clinical perspective versus action research?

The clinical perspective is explicitly developed from the action research tradition of Kurt Lewin, and clinical practitioners archetypally use an action research model (Schein, 1987b, p. 29). However, the distinction between clinical approaches and some, but not all, approaches to action research is important. Only action research that is client initiated can be considered as clinical inquiry, and not that where a researcher or change agent decides the problem to research and/or the goals of the inquiry. Action research that the client is involved in, or participates in the researcher's agenda, even if ultimately the beneficiary (as is the case in some development interventions), is not clinical inquiry, or process consultation (Schein,

995). Again, this principle parallels Edwards's initial call for participatory research ıot as an efficacy improving technique but 'as a means for facilitating people's own levelopment efforts' (1989, p. 29).

THE CLINICAL PERSPECTIVE IN DEVELOPMENT

ather than précis Schein's text, the clinical perspective is examined in the light of ve features that underline its relevance to development practice. Explaining that elevance means, however, that some of the detail of the clinical model is lost. It hould be noted that Schein's own précis identifies 15 components (1987b, p. 68).

he foundation construct is the helpful intervention

he clinical-process model calls for a reconfiguration of the meaning that is attached) 'research'. That new meaning is provided by understanding research through the ɔundation construct of *helpful intervention*. The clinical perspective requires esearch as part of the requirement to help, carried out as part of what is often ılled a 'diagnosis'. The mechanisms by which this is done are prescribed by the need) avoid entering into expert or doctor–patient modes. As we have already noted, all esearch activity is seen as an intervention, but not all interventions are assumed to e helpful. The very presence of a consultant, and even mere data gathering, changes ıings for the client/subject, and/or their stakeholders. For Schein this cannot be ressed too strongly. Although the fact that data collection is an intervention has lip ervice paid to it, the real damage that inappropriate data collection can cause has to e seriously acknowledged and reflected in practice. From the very first interaction verything the consultant does is an intervention (Schein, 1995, p. 18). The clinical erspective therefore requires researchers to predict the possible positive and egative consequence of all of their actions. Researchers must also be able to defend ıch actions as helpful, which in turn requires the recognition, discussed below, that ıch defences arise from the practitioner's normative assumptions about what is and not helpful.

Morsse (1984) provides an illustration of the damage caused by the very existence f interventionists in Malawi, Lesotho and Zambia, with the number of donor rojects causing institutional destruction through their consumption of the resources f indigenous organizations and distortion of their objectives. More, from the inical perspective, it is unequivocally clear that certain forms of development ractice are interventions before they are research. The most obvious example is articipatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). Clinically speaking, the description of PRA as search, or even as a combination of research and communication techniques (e.g. resswell, 1996, p. 17) is misleading and unacceptable, lending a false cloak of gitimacy, objectivity and neutrality to a process that is about effecting change.

But the obviousness of the PRA parallel itself misleads. If any form of evelopment assistance is provided, an intervention is made. This is the case hatever the level and form of assistance, even if it transcends specific organizations, nd (for example) instead addresses policy systems and processes. From this

position, the response to Blunt's (1995) claims of cultural limitations of process consultation in development assistance is to accept, first, that process consultation is culturally biased, but second to ask what, other than its overt acknowledgement of this bias, makes process consultation different in this respect to any other form of development assistance. But more than this, if all research is seen to be an intervention, it is not just development assistance, but most of the activity carried out in the name of development studies, whatever its ideological and methodological tenets, which has to be reexamined in terms of the difference it makes for its 'subjects'.

'Science' is subservient to helping

The clinical practitioner has a responsibility to be clear about the consequences of the research approaches used. Scientific validity does not legitimize the practitioner's activity, but its helpfulness does. If not used carefully, science will not help, but harm. Adherence to an allegedly scientific model can relieve the consultant from feeling a need to predict the consequences of, for example, a research process for the client system as a whole. Intentionally or not, an espoused need for scientific purity can cause client and consultant to collude in creating a dependency on the scientist, i.e. expert, consultant.

Schein illustrates with an example of a survey of organizational morale, where the surveyor gathers scientifically valid data from the workforce at the behest of senior managers, to whom results are reported, and on the basis of which an intervention is designed. This approach is wrong from a clinical perspective. It assumes that senior managers have the right to ask subordinates to participate in this form of inquiry, reinforcing a hierarchy and feeling of powerlessness that may be the root cause of the problem, potentially distorting the diagnosis, by generating a token response, or by creating an unanticipated and damaging (for all parties) revolt. Fundamentally this data-gathering collection is an intervention mandated by the powerful—in this case senior management—where there is no genuine choice for the non-powerful about whether or not to participate and reveal themselves, in 'what becomes a non-negotiable intervention in their lives with unknown consequences' (1995, p. 15). Bell's discussion of 'the tyranny of methodology' (1994, p. 317) provides an articulation of the development parallel to this position in relation to the transfer of knowledge and technologies relating to farming systems research. He critiques the 'western scientific mindset', and argues that PRA is only as untyrannical or locally sympathetic as the individual practitioner allows.

Despite the subservience of science to helping, clinical research is rigorous, and clinical data are valid. But clinical perspective produces a different kind of knowledge, and the true knowledge, as our introductory quotations argue, arising from change. Schein shares Edwards's (1989, p. 122) concern for the nature of the truths field research reveals, and argues that clinical experience reveals richer truths than those found through traditional academic research and disseminated by publication. Unlike Edwards, though, this richness is seen to derive in part from the access the consultant has to the powerful (discussed below in the section on politics and interventions). In addition, most is learned about the client system through

vitnessing and analysing how it interacts with the interventionist. Data result from he very visibility of the interventionist, in direct contrast to the unobtrusive thnographer.

For the clinician the key test of validity is whether the results of a given ntervention are accurately predicted, and whether there is improvement. If npredicted outcomes occur—be it failure to improve or different improvements those expected—the clinician is expected to reflect on and modify models of client ystem 'pathology' and wellbeing. This is often the only form of validation there is vailable to clinicians, and it is accepted that:

> 'simply imposing the traditional scientific criteria will always find clinical data wanting. Yet given the amount of faith we apparently put in data obtained first hand in this manner, there must be a way to legitimise such data . . . the ability to predict the outcomes of interventions is the best direction to pursue' (Schein, 1987b, p. 54).

he clinician meets client-defined needs

he clinical intervention is client driven. It is the client who decides that there is a roblem that needs addressing; it is the client for whom the consultant works; it is e client who ultimately decides whether or not the intervention is successful. The ient always has the initiative. More, as we have already noted, the clinician is quired, unlike the ethnographer, not only to do no harm, but rather he or she has actually make things better for the client, from the client's perspective.

Data are therefore generated from client, not researcher, needs. It is always kept in nfidence, and seen as belonging to the client, and the consultant is expected to ake the meeting of his or her needs subservient to meeting those of the client. resswell (1996, p. 17) makes exactly the same point in relation to the practice of RA. For the clinical practitioner who is also an academic there are three hurdles to crossed before data generated from an intervention, or even accounts of terventions, enter the public domain of journal articles. First, the client has to ovide freely given informed consent. Second, the clinician has to be absolutely sure at no harmful consequences arise, informed consent or not. Third, the clinician is bliged to reflect on whether the whole intervention has, consciously or otherwise, en distorted by the desire to get into print.

An illustration of these issues is presented in response to Bailey *et al.*'s critique of D as western development hegemony. This draws on a daily log of interviews, bservations, and 'inspired learnings' from a 'visit to Ghana'. A contrasting account provided of the work of 'Dr Imani' ('although Dr Imani's intentions were noble . . . became readily apparent he was operating from the tacit assumptions of the odernist development paradigm') and 'Dr Katche' ('the oasis of postmodern inking and action in Ghana' (Bailey *et al.*, 1993, pp. 43–4)). The clinical reply ould start from belief in the profound limitations of what could be known about ose with whom one is working over any timescale, let alone a visit. Client-wise, it ould ask whose needs an article published in an expensive western journal met. It ould pose questions about the potential identifiability of individuals, perhaps in ntrast with Murrell's (1994) refusal to identify even the country where his case

activity was conducted. Other issues would include the researchers' assumptions about who information about the doctors belonged to, whether the doctors were shown the accounts of them that were in the article, and whether they had freely consented to their appearance, irrespective of any real or imagined need to keep donors and other stakeholders happy.

However, an espoused client centredness still begs the question of who is the client. Schein identifies contact clients, who make the initial approach to the consultant, intermediate clients who contribute to the planning, the primary client whose budget the fee comes from and with whom the consultant primarily works, and the ultimate client, who is the broader stakeholder whose interests are to be protected (which from an OD point of view is the whole organization) and at a higher level the community and society (Schein, 1987a, p. 125). The consultant has to apply professional criteria and his or her own values in deciding who the primary client is and how to balance the requirements of different clients, who in development are more extensive in number and have more complex relationships. It also has to be recognized that client centredness does mean that the practitioner is taking the client's side, and that there are implications with respect to power, as the next section shows.

Interventionists are paid and political

The clinical perspective openly accepts that money conditions the relationship between the change agent and the client. At a practice level this requires the consultant to recognize the dynamics that could lead to a trading off of what should be done with what the paying client expects to be done. A common issue is that of divulging information gained by the consultant in confidence from within the client system. The competent clinician should make clear from the start that no such information will be revealed, and give up the job rather than divulge such information. The other frequent expectation is that the consultant will act in an expert, scientist mode, which, although initially more familiar and more comfortable for the client, making for easier marketing for the consultant, is ultimately less helpful and potentially more damaging.

This openness about fees also demonstrates the difference in assumed power relationships in clinical, as opposed to ethnographic, practice. The clinician clearly works *for* the fee payer, who has control over the clinical practitioner's economic well-being, and has the expectation that the practitioner will be working for him or her. This implies that the practitioner has to accept that the decision to hire him or her is the reflection of, and requires a willingness to engage, but not collude with, the realpolitik of the client system. Critics of OD (e.g. Dunphy and Stace, 1988), and by implication of process consultation, argue that in practice it embodies the unitarist assumption that there is a commonality of interest throughout the system as a whole. An alternative view is that there may be, or inevitably are, differences of interest within any system, between managers and workers, men and women, ethnic groups and so on, and that only the powerful among these have the resources to hire the consultant and permit ongoing access. The consultant will, willingly or not, consciously or not, perpetuate the interests of the powerful, and would not be hired

otherwise. Moreover in the consultant's day to day activity, implicitly political choices are made, in who is given credence, who is asked to express a view, and whose experience and reality is seen as mattering.

Schein does at the very least acknowledge this issue, in his warnings about top down action research processes, when he states:

> '. . . any time we help someone we are in effect allying ourselves with the goals and values they represent. We cannot later abdicate responsibility for the help we may have provided if that help turns out to have had bad effects . . . on other groups' (1987a, p. 127).

However, the criticism that there is not within OD generally (except notably in McLean *et al.*, 1982), or in Schein's work in particular, a detailed examination of the political choices the consultant makes in choosing a client, and subsequently from day to day, is accepted. Chambers's call for a new professionalism which 'puts people first and poor people first of all' (1993, p. 1) provides a particularly relevant starting position from development as to the side the clinical practitioner should take. But to get into a position to take this side, and to act in its interests usually requires the practitioner to be sanctioned by, and engage with, the powerful, not least with donors and with governments. Moreover, there are still the day to day practice issues. For example, Mosse (1994) suggests that the way that knowledge is generated and constructed even by PRA is influenced strongly by existing social power relationships, citing cases where women's participation is consequently limited. Nonetheless, the argument here is that although understandings of the politics of intervention practice need to be developed to a more sophisticated level, this does not in itself justify the complete rejection of all the clinical model has to offer, not least because it allows the articulation of the issue, and provides a framework where the consideration of political practice issues can be addressed.

Interventions and interventionists are avowedly normative

The helpful, or problem-solving orientation of the clinical perspective, and the use of the words 'diagnosis', 'pathology' and 'health', despite the eschewal of the doctor–patient mode, all point to the existence of normative assumptions on the part of the practitioner. However, these assumptions are not hidden behind claims of scientific rigour (although the clinical practitioner must be so rigorous). Rather, clinical practice requires an honest and open admission, to oneself as a practitioner and to one's clients, of its normative nature, which can be seen at three levels.

The first is in the practitioner's model of what healthiness or well-being on the client's part is. The language of the clinical perspective, including the very word clinical, points to the predominance of Morgan's (1986) organismic metaphor, that is, of theories that use an analogy between social organization and biological organisms. Organizationally, socio-technical, or systems theory is most influential. Systems theory is powerful in the comprehensiveness of the analysis that it allows, enabling understandings (or diagnoses) that integrate organizational culture, the technology of work, organizational structure, leadership styles, motivation, and the relationship between all of these and the external environment.

Where such analyses are recognized as being week (Morgan 1986, p. 71) is in their failure to encompass the distribution of power, in their diagnosis of conflict as pathologically problematic, and their simplistic analysis of organization–environment relationships. Kiggundu (1986) has also found their success on the evidence of 25 cases in developing countries to be limited, and argues that this results from the short termism of the western change agents involved (i.e. poor clinical practice) and the incompatibility of the general environment to socio-technical systems approaches. However, use of organismic models is not compulsory. Other models can be and are used in clinical consultation, including those that draw on psycho-analytical, psychodynamic, social psychological, political, feminist and anthropological concepts. There is no reason why others applicable to, or arising from, development theories and practice cannot be used.

The second level of normativeness is in the prescription of the process to be used in interventions. The very advocacy of process consultation above doctor–patient and expert consultancy is normative, and accepted as such. For Schein, the normativeness of the clinical perspective is evident in prescription of client-driven action research. From an OD and a clinical perspective, then, the distinction between 'process' and 'blueprint' approaches is not only non-existent, but deceiving. Recommending a process approach per se, and/or a particular process to follow are both stipulating blueprints, or to use the clinical term, prescriptive. There are debates about the level of prescriptiveness, and Schein is one who has distanced himself from the methodology and technique-specific approaches that were popular in the 1970s (Coghlan, 1988, p. 30).

Nonetheless, for Bailey *et al.* (1993, p. 54):

> 'The prescriptive character of OD is Western expert imperialism as it is outside in and anti-dialogical in nature. Because it is a "normative discipline" OD imposes its values about "planned change" for "improvement" . . .'

Written from Ohio, USA, in an article about Ghana and Ghanaians this anti-imperialist view is based on the quotation of French and Bell's standard definition of OD, which incorporates an explicit acknowledgement of its normativeness and prescriptiveness in undertaking planned change for organizational improvement. The clinical response is to argue that there are no forms of engagement that are not interventions, which are not to some extent 'outside-in', and which do not reflect interventionist norms and values about making things better, not least in the very choice to act in one arena and not another, and to pretend otherwise is dishonest. OD is being attacked for its honest admission that this is so for itself, from a position where Bailey *et al.*'s own prescriptiveness (of 'inter-being') and normativeness are hidden by an assumed but unacknowledged belief in the universality of post-modernism.

The third level of normativeness is evident in the so called 'OD values', which are articulated in organizational terms of concerns for the empowerment of individuals, for democratic and participative managerial processes, and the mutually reinforcing nature of individual and organizational development. Blunt (1995) sees these values as the source of process consultation's cultural limitations, citing China as an example of a country with contrary values where process consultation is inapplicable. An out and out rebuttal of this view is not justified. It is supported within OD (French and Bell, 1984, p. 4); moreover, there is also evidence that the use of participative

processes and an espoused democracy can be used for concealed or unacknowledged deological ends, not least in Schein's own early work on China. The clinical practitioner therefore has to continually examine his or her work activity for nanipulative behaviour; and reflect on whether he or she should work in situations where the perspective is inapplicable, that is, where it is at variance with these values.

Again, though, the argument is that the value-specific nature of the clinical erspective and process consultation is not in itself sufficient to reject the whole oncept. The commitment to empowerment and participation is after all in common vith that found in areas of development practice. The commitment to espoused alues is also no more than that found and debated elsewhere in development, e.g. ccording to Edwards (1994, p. 283), in relation to nongovernmental organizations NGOs) in respect of their alleged 'cultural imperialism'.

CONCLUSION—FOUR CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

mongst the intervention strategies open to clinical practitioners is that of onfrontive inquiry (Schein, 1987a, p. 58). This involves the clinician confronting e client with data that might be seen as challenging, leading to a change in self-erceptions. Clinically, it is ultimately for the client to make sense of the data, and anslate them into an articulation of the challenges being faced. This conclusion is in e confrontive spirit, but moves into prescriptive mode, specifying four challenges r development studies as conducted in academia, posed by this discussion of the inical-process approach. It is based on two clinical assumptions. First, practitioners o not emerge, but have to be trained. Second, given that much done in its name ounts as an intervention (even 'pure' research), development studies have, like it or ot, responsibility for this training.

The first challenge is for development to create its own 'theories of practice' to be sed in training. The clinical practitioner is trained in 'theories that focus on models of athology and health, effectiveness, coping, dynamics, and intervention' (Schein, 987b, p. 56). These are typically drawn from psychiatry, clinical psychology, applied sychology, sociology, anthropology, OD and social work. These must all be added to, nd then subsumed within development's own existing, and valuable, knowledge of ractice. The managerial classics provide a starting point in terms of the provision of leas, and in the methodologies they use to construct theoretical models. Argyris (1970) nthesized from a range of behavioural science theories. Lippitt and Lippitt (1978), ke Schein, merged existing theory with reflection from their own practice. Lippitt *et al.* 958) conducted an extensive literature-based review of the work of change agents at ndividual, group, organizational and societal levels to construct a general approach to lanned change and change agent practice. This is but a sample of the standard, some ould say modernist, fare. However, the literature is extensive, and continues to reflect roader theoretical debates, for example with respect to the development of reflexive ractice in collaborative research (e.g. Reason, 1994). Heron (1996) provides a good xample of the sophistication of the contemporary state of the art.

The second challenge for development studies is for it to incorporate existing and ew theories of practice into its training activities. McAuley's (1985) discussion of ermeneutics as a practical research methodology for students of OD at Masters

level brings out three points. The first is that the clinical practitioner does just not learn about theories in the abstract, but how to apply and adapt them. Second, learning has to start with the acquisition and maintenance of a reflexive self awareness, and third, this must, and can, be done within the rigour of a formal academic award programme. Clinical training for Schein should be at Masters or PhD level, and should incorporate 'internships', some form of residency, or supervised practice. There should be some form of credentialing process by the institution and the wider community, which leads to a 'licence' to practise (Schein, 1987b, p. 58). There is, therefore, a requirement to change development studies curricula not just in terms of content, so that the learning of development practice is more than the teaching of 'skills', but also in terms of programme design, approaches to learning, and assessment methodologies.

This brings us to the third challenge, which is for the departments in which development studies are taught to be prepared to undergo the institutional change that these changes in programme content and design require. First, there is the need for faculty who are able and willing to bring about these changes. Second, there is the need for institutional commitment to the research required to develop theories of development practice. Third, there is the need to set up the new approaches to training that will allow supervised and reflective practice to be incorporated into formal award programmes without loss of rigour. Mann (1995, 1996a, 1996b) provides an example of how this has been achieved in a graduate OD programme with South African NGOs, but argues that universities have problems in adapting away from traditional methods of teaching and assessment. At the same time, however, many universities, including those where development studies departments are located, have long-standing programmes that have addressed the creation of reflexive practitioners while maintaining academic rigour, in medicine, social work, clinical psychology, education and of course in change management and OD. The problem belongs to development studies, not to universities as a whole.

This brings us to the fourth challenge. Not only are there these long-standing, institutionally established, academically rigorous practitioner development programmes. But it appears that they are also often conducted within yards of development studies departments, sharing the same libraries, with academic staff sharing the same common rooms. We have seen that there is an extensive literature of general theories of intervention. Schein himself is not an obscure academic. More, what Edwards talks about as a new paradigm of reflective practice is not new; in fact it is at least as old as development itself (Cooke, forthcoming). From 1945 onwards clients in the 'north' have increasingly benefited from insights associated with clinical theory and practice. It appears that these insights have not been shared, by and large, with the rest of the world. The final challenge, then, is for development studies to reflect upon what this failure tells it about itself, and about the costs its own disciplinary biases have imposed upon those it would claim to help.

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 17, 479–486 (1997)

he deceptive illusion of multi-paradigm development practice

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is article responds to commentaries by Blunt, Bell and Joy on Cooke's 'From process sultation to a clinical model of development practice' in the August 1997 issue of *Public ministration and Development*. Following the paradigmatic analyses those commentaries roduce, it begins by trying to clarify the range of meanings attributed to the term 'paradigm'. hen argues, that Blunt's critique does actually derive from a particular single (i.e. mono-) adigm, the application of which causes my initial arguments to be mis-represented, and mplifies the limits of that paradigm in practice. It goes on to agree that generic process proaches do have some cultural limitations, and that they can be used for ideological nipulation, although not inevitably in the pursuit of so-called democratic values. The ical-process model is, however, distinct from these generic approaches and actually provides he safeguard against these problems. The article moves on to demonstrate that a multi-adigm approach to practice, as opposed to analysis, is illusory, because it is impossible, and eptive, as claims for multi-paradigm practice conceal the practitioner's inescapable adigmatic assumptions. In conclusion it argues that until we recognize that 'development' se is a ruling paradigm we are all imprisoned within it. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

blic Admin. Dev. Vol. 17, 479–486 (1997).
. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 1. No. of Refs: 15.

INTRODUCTION

gether, the commentaries of Blunt (1997), Bell (1997) and Joy (1997) on my ginal proposal (Cooke, 1997) for a 'clinical-process' approach to development ctice are substantial. It is not therefore possible to respond (positively or erwise) to every point they raise. Rather, my intention here is to restrict myself the two aims of:

Discussing what for me is the most important theme in all three commentaries, namely the use of the concept of paradigm in relation to practice.
Addressing some of the specific critiques of my original piece.

I should, however, state in summary that I consider Joy's article a very important nsideration of development practice in its own right, with which I am largely in reement. Likewise, I agree with Bell's call for a reflexivity in practice. Blunt's plicit warning that such reflexivity can slide into practitioner narcissism, where ans rather than ends is all that matters, is also accepted, but unlike Blunt, I see it a question of degree.

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CCC 0271–2075/97/050479–18$17.50

This response is structured largely around Blunt's piece, which is the most critical of me. As might be anticipated, I disagree with Blunt's representations of process consultation and the clinical perspective (which are substantially rebutted by Joy) and of my initial piece. Nonetheless, I do accept Blunt's argument, which Bell also seems to acknowledge, for a paradigmatic analysis of practice that recognizes that it has its basis in fundamental sets of assumptions '*which govern the thinking and practice of development practitioners*' (Blunt, 1997, p. 343).

However, I do not believe that any single model of practice is a paradigm in itself in the sense intended by Kuhn, or by the sources upon which Blunt bases his call for a multi-paradigm approach. As Hassard (1990, p. 219) puts it, '*This concept, originally the centrepiece of Kuhn's argument, has become progressively devalued so much so that a once powerful concept . . . is now being employed at all levels of analysis, being substituted freely for terms such as perspective, theory, discipline, and method*'. My use of the term paradigm in my original article was an example of its use at a lower rather than an overarching level, and as such, is an example of how it has, in Hassard's terms, been devalued. But Blunt demonstrates even more clearly the adverse consequences of muddling what McCourt (1997) describes as 'macro' and 'micro' levels of analysis when using the term 'paradigm'. The multi-paradigm 'pragmatic' approach as Blunt espouses it is, I shall argue, illusory in the sense that it can never really be achieved, and deceptive, in that it actually conceals the cultural and ideological paradigmatic agenda of which the practitioner is inevitably part.

My view, after Hassard, is that the clinical-process practice model I propose is in comparison to Kuhnian definitions of 'paradigm', no more than a theory, or more accurately, a theory of practice. All such theories do however have a basis, in their construction and their application, in more fundamental paradigmatic assumptions. Joy, while not using the language of paradigms, makes this crucial point clear at the start of his piece, (e.g. '. . . *any theory of practice is theory of intervention in a system about whose workings there must be a theory to which the theory of intervention relates* . . .'). Thus, although I make it clear my original article is about more than organizational practice, I would agree with Blunt's cited, but not quoted source, upon which he bases much of his argument, that '*all theories of organization* . . .' [and, I would argue, of practice] '. . . *are based upon a philosophy of science and theory of society*' (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 1). They continue '*all social scientists approach their subject via explicit or implicit assumptions about the nature of the social world and the way in which it may be investigated*'.[1]

Note the word '*all*' in both quotations. The clinical-process model does ultimately derive from particular fundamental, macro-level, paradigmatic assumptions. But the same is true for all theories of practice, whether they are explicitly defined as such, as is the case in my article, or implicit in the way certain forms of practice are assumed to be valid, as is the case of almost every other article that has appeared in *Public Administration and Development*.

[1] Burrell and Morgan do differ from Kuhn, however, in that while he saw, as McCourt (1997, p. 513) puts it '*one paradigm supplanting another*' over time, they see different paradigms existing simultaneously, at least in organization theory.

MULTI-PARADIGM PREACHING, MONO-PARADIGM PRACTICE?

Yet it is solely my argument for Schein's approach to process consultation and linical practice that causes Blunt to invoke a paradigmatic critique. However, espite his espousal of a multi-paradigm approach, that critique is founded on a 'opperian mono-paradigm. Popper's are a particular, and controversial set of ssumptions about the nature of scientific knowledge and indeed of society. Blunt nay claim that the Popper provides a '*severe and effective*' critique of Kuhn's ociology of science (while feeling free to use that Kuhnian paradigmatic sociology hen it suits). There is, however, a commonly held contrary view. Thus Jary and ary's mainstream dictionary of sociology states: '*In recent years Popper's position n science and social science has been subject to a number of damaging critiques, otably . . . the falsifications model . . .*' and '*suggestions that part of the undoubted ide appeal of Popper is ideological*'. (1986, p. 482). Hence '*contrary to the position hat can be termed naive falsificationism, it turns out that a single refutation is rely decisive, the rejection and replacement of theories being a matter of a more verall judgement of the cogency and effectiveness of theories*' (1986, p. 218). Blunt nplies that his critique is derived from unarguably legitimate assumptions about cience and an incontrovertibly valid methodology, while my article is not. This is ot justifiable in any circumstances, let alone when arguing for the benefits of *nalyses conducted from a number of paradigmatic perspectives*' (Blunt 1997, . 343).

In order to make my case for the clinical model amenable to naive Popperian lsificationism, Blunt's whole critique requires him to continually '*recast*' what I ave to say. Table 1 illustrates some (but by no means all) of Blunt's choicest ecastings' of my argument. In sum these recastings, and those parts of my rgument Blunt chooses to ignore (e.g. the institutional absence of reflexive practice om development compared to other fields) amount to Blunt critiquing no more han his own unrecognizable caricature of my article.

In so doing he provides the clearest illustration of the problem there is with ractitioners' use of 'science', and exemplifies Bell's tyranny of methodology. Blunt resents his chosen philosophy of science and its related methodology as the only alid approach, when it clearly is not. In order for this methodology to be applied, he reality it claims to address has to be recast, or distorted, hence the ignoring of ubtleties, the altering of significance, the attribution to me of extraneous arguments do not make (e.g. Beer and Eisenstadt on p. 345), and the ignoring of that which is nconvenient to a predetermined conclusion to be arrived at no matter what. Of ourse, it matters to me professionally and personally to demonstrate that that which lunt attributes to me, often in quotation marks, is frequently not what I actually aid, and to provide but a few examples of this.

But more importantly, it provides a case example of the failings of an allegedly cientific' approach. If this is what happens when Popperian science is applied to a here text then one worries about the consequences of its applications to the shifting omplexities of real development practice. In these real world circumstances the '. . . *retreat to probability, that because it has worked once and on many subsequent ccasions it will probably work in the future*', which Blunt overtly rejects, seems a far nfer (but never cast iron) bet. The continuing emergence of good practice models ased on experience, in development and in management, suggests I am not alone in

'able 1. Illustrative examples of Cooke verbatim versus Blunt's representations of Cooke

:ooke verbatim	Blunt's representation of Cooke
. . . the clinical approach is not perfect . . . t needs enhancement . . . and it :omplements, not replaces the work of ›thers. Nor is it suggested that the ıpproach should completely subsume vhat currently takes place . . . in levelopment studies'.	'Cooke's . . . following inductive reasoning "(1) all interventions that have a positive outcome have been guided by the clinical models and therefore (2) no positive outcomes can be achieved using other methods or models and (3) the clinical model never produces negative (unhelpful) outcomes"'
while adaptation is required . . . in elation to cultural biases . . . the clinical nodel positively improves (but it should be reiterated, by no means makes perfect) . . development practice'	'The dominant paradigm supports the universal application of process consultation and the clinical model for ideological reasons. Clinical practitioners are prisoners of this paradigm'
science is subservient to helping' despite the subservience of science to helping clinical research is rigorous, and clinical data are valid . . .'	'science versus "helping"'
illustration—the clinical critique of a managerial morale survey]: 'This . . . is wrong . . . fundamentally this is an intervention mandated by the powerful in which there is no choice for the non-powerful about whether or not to participate and reveal themselves in "what becomes a non-negotiable intervention in their lives with unknown consequences"'	[Cooke subscribes] 'to the dominant view concerning the necessity for the open exchange of ideas and confrontation of issues'
. . . although understanding of the politics of intervention practice need to be developed to a more sophisticated level, this does not in itself justify the rejection of all the clinical model has to offer, *not least because it allows the articulation of the issue, and provides a framework where the consideration of political practice issues can be addressed*' [emphasis added]	'Cooke adds that "the politics of intervention practice need to be developed to a more sophisticated level", but in the meantime the absence of such sophistication "does not justify the rejection of all the clinical model has to offer". In this respect at least, therefore, clinical practitioners are no better or worse than anyone else . . .'

this view. [As does Blunt's own use of probabilistic sources (e.g. Hofstede) and logic (e.g. '*pragmatics*', '*commonsense*')].

Blunt argues that '*the great variety of organizational issues in developing countries will benefit most from analyses conducted from a number of paradigmatic perspectives (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan, 1993)—this allows for the application of different methods of consulting and development practice according to the circumstances which attach to any given development problem*'.

Again, my article is about all forms of development practice, and not just those working with organizations. But, again accepting Blunt's narrower focus, he, and his sources—Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Morgan (1993)—actually talk about multi-paradigm *analysis*, which may be feasible. Translating that into multi-paradigm *practice* is problematic, as I demonstrate below. On analytical terms alone, however,

y article manifests the very spirit that Morgan argues a multi-paradigm approach quires. It is demonstrably written from the very position of the '*constructive, rhaps cautious, opportunist*, [who] *seeks to emphasize the possibilities and lvantages of exploring the new*' (Morgan, 1993, p. 14). Thus, though I do put the se for a process-clinical approach to development practice, it is hedged throughout th acknowledgements of its weaknesses and limitations (as Table 1 shows). Despite this, Blunt appears determined to reject any consideration of the process-clinical odel, and not even on his own terms allow it to be part of the practitioner's multi-radigm tool kit.

CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS?

why is Blunt so keen to reject the clinical-process approach? He seems to have o major concerns, to do with cultural limitations and ideological manipulation. those concerns are really about what are generically called 'process' approaches development, with their associated language of empowerment, and claims for a ver truly achievable participation, rather than the specifics of Schein's theories, en they are concerns I generally share. Development agencies have clearly stered the use of participatory methods, in project management, and particularly PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal), while ignoring the US and European idence of the damage they can inflict. Where this has happened it is no more an the old story of dumping dangerous and outdated technologies (or as Blunt ys, social technologies) on the world's poor in the name of development. owever, far from being a particular example of generic process approaches, the nical-process model is quite distinctive in that it is an attempt to safeguard ainst damage, and Joy is surely accurate in his claim that less than 1% of chnical assistance work uses this safeguard.

Blunt is right about the cultural limitations of western managerial theories. eneric process approaches are one such set of theories (but then so is the ntingency theory that underpins his analysis). But there is counterbalancing idence, in addition to that provided by Joy, that process approaches can work here Blunt implies they might not. Two contemporary examples are provided by e work of PRIA (Society for Participatory Research in Asia; see examples in ndon, 1994) in Asia and CDRA (Community Development Resource Association; e Kaplan, 1996) in South Africa. Joy's comments on the applicability of process nsultation in China are also supported by Schein himself. China, specifically the hinese Communist Party (CCP), provided, through Schein, an important spiration for the development of generic process approaches in the US and rope (Cooke, forthcoming). In his early work as a social psychologist, Schein 961) investigated 'brainwashing' during the Korean War. He found that the rticipative techniques developed by the CCP for use with Chinese citizens in its volutionary struggle from 1925 onwards were then applied to U. S. prisoners of ar (obviously, there were no cultural limitations to the CCP's use of process). These chniques originated in the group discussions in the cells that hallmarked Leninist volutionary organization, and in the development of persuasive participatory

methods needed to create a class conscious peasantry that would sustain the fighting of a guerrilla war.

But to reiterate Joy's point, to argue about the cultural applicability or otherwise of generic process approaches is to seriously miss the point about the specifics of the clinical process model. That model's *raison d'être* is to propose a mode of practice that recognizes that every time that the practitioner intervenes there are peculiar, and unique cultural and political conditions, which the practitioner is never likely to fully understand in the time available. While practitioners may believe themselves competent to intervene, as Blunt puts it as a '*knowledgeable, insightful outsider*' (1997, p. 346), the failure of development practitioners who have worked on this basis, and the by-now detailed range of evidence of the harm they have caused [from Hancock (1989) onwards] suggests another approach is needed. This approach needs to recognize that those insights, the value that is attached to them, and the ends to which they are applied are all derived from the interventionists' own cultural and political assumptions. The clinical model argues that this is inevitably the case, and that the practitioner's actions should always recognize this. As such it is freely admitted to be a 'one best way' of practice.

With respect to ideological manipulation, the very title of Schein's brainwashing book (*Coercive Persuasion*), its focus—'. . . *cases of genuine ideological conversion seemingly accomplished by coercive means*' (Schein *et al.*, 1961, p. 9), and its finding that such conversion is achieved through the orchestration of participatory group processes, suggest that Blunt's warnings in this case have some validity. However, *Coercive Persuasion* also suggests that manipulation is not inevitably for democratic ends. Practitioners should also recognize that the very use of participation in a process does not guarantee that it is empowering, in the long run; indeed the reverse may be true. The question is, though, whether the potential for ideological manipulation justifies the outright rejection of participatory approaches. Given the benefits that are claimed for them (not least for the very poor), my view is that participatory approaches should be investigated and used with a caution that safeguards against manipulation, conscious or otherwise, and acknowledges their limitations in general. That caution has hitherto been missing, by and large, in development. The clinical perspective begins to provide some (but, I feel obliged to reiterate, by no means all) of the safeguards required.

THE LIMITS OF MULTI-PARADIGMISM

Multi-paradigm practice, if we define 'paradigm' in the over-arching, macro-level sense, is not feasible. We have already seen that the key theorists who have called for a multi-paradigm approach have done so in reference to analysis, rather than practice (e.g. Morgan), and it is possible to imagine analyses of a given social situation conducted by the same person from two different paradigms, say for example, from Marxian and neo-liberal perspectives. The insights thus afforded may be beneficial to the practitioner. However, paradigms are, in a practice sense, incommensurable. Paradigmatic assumptions are fundamental and distinctive assumptions about, for example, the nature of society, and the nature of reality (ontology) and how it can be known (epistemology). One cannot act as practitioner

cording to different paradigmatic assumptions at the same time, nor switch tween them according to the circumstances of the particular issues being dressed, because the sets of assumptions are essentially contradictory.

Some marginal transfer between paradigms is possible. Theories and methods veloped in one paradigm can be incorporated into another, as Schein has done th respect to the work of the Chinese Communist Party. Different paradigms can d to similar things being done in practice. 'Marxist' China helps build roads in pal; 'liberal' Japan helps build roads in Tanzania. The micro-politics of a given velopment project may provide the practitioner with the opportunity to act cording to paradigmatic assumptions different to those upon which the project lf is based.

However, that ability to act is always constrained by the project's underpinning radigmatic assumptions. These are evident, for example, in the very existence of s project rather than another or none at all, in choice of countries in which the ject is located, and the issues that the project chose to address and not address. re, paradigmatic assumptions, about the meaning, nature, and possibility of velopment are evident in the very existence of development projects per se. ewise, the acceptance of the practitioner as a legitimate actor in that role, and the inition of others as clients or beneficiaries have their foundation in particular radigmatic assumptions.

Not only is the claim for multi-paradigm practice illusory, it is deceptive. Casting development expert as being in a legitimate position to choose between radigms (or indeed theories or methods) according to circumstances is to suggest t he or she is able to transcend paradigmatic assumptions. It is to represent the ctitioner as an all knowing technocrat. Yet how does the practitioner assume the e of practitioner, decide that a certain situation is worthy of his or her attention, t certain approaches (paradigms/methods) should be applied and not others, to a rticular situation and not others, without using fundamental paradigmatic umptions that determine his or her decision making? The claim of objectivity in se circumstances only serves to conceal the existence of practitioner assumptions, ich are typically far from contested. Again, the clinical perspective, in its formal knowledgement of the practitioner's normativeness, is one of the few models of ctice to recognize this.

CONCLUSION—NEW PARADIGMS OF DEVELOPMENT?

haps the most relevant set of paradigmatic assumptions here, presented as plicitly uncontested by Blunt and myself (but not by Joy), are those associated h 'development' per se. This 'development paradigm', is seen by some as rocentric and grounded in modernist assumptions of rationality and progress g. Kothari, 1997), to have failed on its own terms (see Hancock), and to have cealed harm, exploitation, and ideological manipulation (not least in the pursuit cold-war goals) behind a claimed intent to help, with the conscious or otherwise nplicity of its academics and practitioners.

From this position, insofar as neither of our articles even admit to the existence of development paradigm, let alone challenge it, Blunt and I are cell-mates, both

prisoners of a paradigm. For all the obvious differences between us, we both engage in the 'puzzle solving' activity for which Blunt critiques me alone. Our articles are both about how best to operate within the development paradigm. As such, given our academic positions, we are worse than prisoners. We are both 'trusties'. We are the prisoners who can be relied upon to help run the paradigm prison, to help keep others imprisoned, and who are given privileges in return. Liberation—our own and others—requires us first to recognize our own paradigmatic imprisonment—hence the importance of Bell's call for reflexivity. If we then accept that there is some validity in the critiques, we can do either of two things. First, we can accept the alternative paradigm, and retreat from development practice to the sheltered institutional comfort of academic critique. Alternatively, we can follow the example of Kaplan, whose recent *Development Practitioners Handbook* (1996) sets out the basis for a macro-level paradigm shift in development, and describes the implications of that shift for a more facilitative, autonomy-respecting practice. My own view is that the clinical-process model is, by and large, consistent with that shift as a method.

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

articles

Writing the Left out of Management Theory: The Historiography of the Management of Change

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Abstract. *The change management discourse has appropriated central ideas of action research, group dynamics, and the management of attitude change from the political left. This has been concealed by the way that that discourse has written its own history, that is, its historiography. Managerialist accounts of the lives of Kurt Lewin and John Collier (in relation to group dynamics and action research), and of the work of Edgar Schein (in relation to the management of attitude change), are compared with those found in non-managerialist sources. The latter alone reveal Lewin's left activism, his working relationship with the radical John Collier, and the likelihood that Collier invented action research before Lewin. They also show how Schein's theory of attitude change was derived from the Chinese Communist Party. Change management's very construction has been a political process which has written the left out, and shaped an understanding of the field as technocratic and ideologically neutral. However, it is not only managerialist historiographies, but also supposedly more critical approaches to organizational theory which have a historiographical shaping effect.*

'Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.' George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-four* (1949)

Introduction

This article analyses managerialist representations of the theory and practice of the management of organizational change ('the change man-

1350-5084[199902]6:1;81-105;006901

agement discourse'). It demonstrates how ideas developed by or for the political left have been incorporated as central concepts in that discourse. It also reveals how this debt to the left has continued to be excluded from the managerialist history of the field. The article is therefore about how this history is written, that is, the historiography of change management. Its two aims are, first, to provide new insights into the political status and provenance of change management, and, second, to argue, on the basis of these insights, that *all* understandings of management and organizational theory are shaped by historiographical processes, whether or not they are acknowledged as such.

Three specific, but overlapping, sets of ideas are considered. These are action research, theories of group dynamics, and the management of attitude change. Their central importance to change management is discussed in the section after next, which reviews the nature of historiography. Following on from that, the article considers in turn the lives of Kurt Lewin, in relation to action research and group dynamics, and John Collier in relation to action research, and the work of Edgar Schein in relation to group dynamics and the management of attitude change. The consideration of Lewin and Collier argues that, as individuals, they were on the left. The claim for Schein is that his influential approach to attitude change was derived from the activity of others on the left (the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)). No claim is made with respect to Schein's own politics.

All of those discussed—Lewin, Collier, the CCP—meet enough of the criteria required by reference sources to be identified as of the left. For example, they all demonstrate a belief in egalitarianism and the working class, an opposition to hierarchy (specified in McLean, 1996), a belief in democracy (though its form varies), a desire for social justice, and a belief in progress through reform or revolution (specified in Scruton, 1996). However, it is at least equally important to recognize Pimlott's argument that, first, the main value of the term 'left' is 'positional' (1988: 80), its value is in defining a position opposed to the non-left. Second, the left is a 'mental attitude best summed up as rebellion' against the status quo, against authority. This almost invariably leads to problems in maintaining left credentials should power be achieved. But, Pimlott argues, given the left's primary existence as 'both topographical and as a state of mind the role of specific beliefs may be less crucial' (1988: 81), although still important.

Thus, for the purposes of this article, the leftness of the sources of the ideas considered is evident in alignment, and in opposition to the status quo as much as it is in adherence to a stated set of beliefs. It can nonetheless reasonably be assumed, on the evidence provided here, that the individuals and the movement concerned would have identified themselves as of the left. More importantly for the analysis which is to follow, those concerned would have been seen as of the left by those outside it. But, it should be noted, the substantially positional under-

standing of the left upon which this article is based embraces both revolutionary and reformist perspectives. As such, when compared to Burrell and Morgan's (1979) historic radical change/regulation categorizations of organization theory, this understanding emphatically is not equivalent to their 'radical' category. Indeed Burrell and Morgan, implicitly accepting the adequacy of managerialist representations of Lewin, locate him within the sociology of regulation, not radical change. That this article would not therefore have been possible on the basis of Burrell and Morgan's categorizations supports the argument that it is not just managerialist orthodoxy which shapes understandings of theory historiographically, a point which is returned to in the conclusion.

Why Historiography?

The article concurs with Jenkins' (1991) position that history is inevitably interpretive, with a distinction to be drawn between 'the past' and 'history'. The past comprises an infinity of events, which because of its vastness and its pastness cannot ever be fully known (never mind whether anything can, epistemologically speaking). History, our knowing of the past, is constructed by identifying some of these events as significant, and, by implication, others as not, and by giving these events particular meanings. As such, history can never be definitive or objective; its meanings are 'not intrinsic in the past ... but meanings given to the past from outsid(ers)'. Moreover, 'History is never for itself. It is always for someone' (Jenkins, 1991: 17). Historiographical processes, the way that history comes to be written, the choices made in selecting and ignoring past events, are shaped by prevailing, albeit competing, societal power relations and their associated ideologies.

A pertinent illustration is provided by comparing the histories of OD (organization development, which overlaps significantly with change management—see below) in the 1984 and the revised 1996 editions of French and Bell's standard text. Both contain sub-sections discussing pioneering contributions of named individuals to the development of OD. In the 1984 edition these individuals are all men. In the 1996 version, the sub-section entitled 'Robert Blake' in 1984 (p. 29) has been retitled 'Robert Blake and Jane Mouton' (1996: 43), and a further sub-section added entitled 'Eva Schindler-Rainman' (1996: 45). The latter describes Schindler-Rainman's links with NTL (National Training Laboratory), a central OD institution, in 1959 and 1966, and names other women with whom she worked, including Edith Seashore. The pioneering contributions of Mouton, Schindler-Rainman, and Seashore had already happened when the 1984 history was written. In that history they were not deemed significant. In the 1996 history they were.

There are two contrasting historiographical explanations of this difference. The first is suggested by Jenkins' argument that history is being continually re-worked and re-presented to reflect changes in power

relations between societal formations, between the dominant and the dominated. In this case the change is in power relations between women and men in the USA. Hence the male history of 1984 is rewritten in 1996 to acknowledge the role of women hitherto, to use Rowbotham's (1977) phrase, 'hidden from history'. The second explanation provides a contrasting conclusion. Citing the Orwell quotation that begins this article, Jenkins continues that these continually re-worked and re-presented histories serve to legitimate the activity of those on whose behalf they are written. In this light the rewriting of the history of OD is an attempt to sustain its legitimacy, the inclusion of women in 1996 concealing OD's status as a discourse in which women have, historically, been marginalized. This view is sustained by the citation of Eva Schindler-Rainman only once (and then for her work with Ronald Lippitt) in the rest of the 1996 French and Bell, elsewhere by Kleiner (1996), and indeed by the reliance on men's accounts of men's work in what follows.

Although superficial this illustration does show the value of historiographical analyses. Our ability to consider the past only through hindsight does invalidate claims to definitiveness and objectivity, and means that our histories are inevitably socially constructed. But hindsight also allows us in that construction to identify patterns and processes which emerge over time, and which are not necessarily immediately apparent as events occur. The pattern identified in this article is one where in the writing of history itself 'dominant voices can silence others' not only by 'overt power', but by 'covert incorporation' (Jenkins, 1991: 19). The silencing that this article seeks to redress, then, is of the left in change management's own accounts of its past. Of course, in so doing, this article constructs its own re-presented and re-worked history, and it is important to be clear about what activity it does, and does not, seek to legitimate. Thus, one purpose of this article is to demonstrate the importance of, and thus to implicitly legitimate, historiographical analyses per se. The other is de-legitimating rather than legitimating, and is, to reiterate, to challenge the managerial orthodoxy's technocratic representation of itself as politically and ideologically neutral. This is done by showing that that orthodoxy's very construction has been a political process which has written the left out.

However, the suggestion that revealing this process consequently legitimizes the left's use of ideas which have been appropriated from it is historiographically naive. It implies, falsely, that the left in the past is the same as the left now. But, as we shall see, and discuss briefly in the conclusion, both Lewin and Collier were involved in colonializing processes with which many parts of the contemporary left would not want to be associated. Moreover, 'the left' was not, and is not, monolithic. The broad representation of 'the left' here includes philosophies, analyses and programmes, for example those of the CCP, from which others on the left would want to distance themselves. Indeed, the Maoist provenance of managerial approaches to attitudinal change, on the one hand, and the

colonialist roots of managerial action research, on the other, are, from this author's position on the left, reason enough to treat them with extreme caution, whatever the espoused politics of those using them.

The analysis is carried out simply enough by contrasting historical accounts of individuals and events found in the managerial literature, and in that on which it heavily relies, with those produced for non-managerial audiences. Managerial historiography tends to take the form of brief historical contextualizations (e.g. in Hanson and Lubin, 1995). Exceptions can be found in chapters in French and Bell (1984, 1996), and particularly in Kleiner (1996) which is a history of the field per se. The contribution to change management from those he presents as radical, but not of the left, is an important theme for Kleiner. He differs fundamentally from this article, however, in that he does not recognize the process of appropriation from, and silencing of, the left. More, in that he presents the left as critical of the ideas considered here, and does not mention the evidence of Lewin's left politics, the contribution of John Collier to action research, and the extent of the influence of the CCP on Schein's theorizing, he might be seen as inadvertently sustaining that process. Marrow's (1969) biography of Lewin is also seen as part of that managerialist mainstream, as discussed below.

The contrasting non-managerialist sources are all already in the public domain. They include the writings of Lewin, Collier and early Schein (e.g. Lewin, 1946; Collier, 1945; Schein, 1961); biographies and autobiographies (Philp, 1977; Collier, 1963); and histories produced for a non-managerialist audience. The latter include accounts of the US left (particularly in Buhle et al., 1990), histories of psychologists' organizations (e.g. Finison, 1976, 1977, 1983, 1986), and of psychological thought (Van Elteren and Luck, 1990; Van Elteren, 1992). In one case only, Parman's (1976) account of the Navajos and the New Deal, is a history of the subjects of the work of those named used.

The Place of Action Research, Group Dynamics, and Attitude Change in Change Management

The three core ideas might at one stage have been primarily associated with the managerial field of organization development (OD). However, OD is in some quarters seen as overtaken by other approaches and, by implication, as a subset of a broader change management discourse (e.g. Burnes, 1996), although it continues to be taught, researched, and critiqued (e.g. Holvino, 1996). The argument here, though, is that the ideas discussed in this article are still central components of that broader discourse, irrespective of the current status of OD.

Action research brings change management four principles. The first, of action being informed by data collection and analysis (i.e. research) is evident in OD and total quality management (TQM) implementation processes (French and Bell, 1996; Cooke, 1992). The second principle, of a

sequential and often iterative series of intervention steps, manifests itself in models of planned change, including those of OD and TQM (Burke, 1987), and the consultancy process (Kubr, 1986). The third principle requires a collaborative relationship between the change agent (i.e. researcher) and client (i.e. subject), the fourth a need for a shared change-agent/client understanding of the need for and method of change. Both are evident in the literature on change agency and consultancy styles (e.g. Lippitt and Lippitt, 1978), process consultation (Schein, 1987) and the need to engender so called 'psychological ownership'.

Theories of group dynamics address the social-psychological processes within small groups of people. They consider, for example, the social processes the group goes through at each stage of its existence from initial formation onwards (e.g. Tuckman, 1965), the inter-relationship between group and individual behaviour (e.g. Schein, 1988), and between these factors and effective decision making and performance (e.g. Janis, 1982). In the 1950s and 1960s managerial uses of group dynamics were associated with T-(training) groups, also known as laboratory or sensitivity training. Here trainees' analyses of group dynamics as they happened, 'facilitated' by a trainer, provided insights into personal and group social behaviour. T-groups are now depicted as unfashionable (Pettigrew, 1985; Kleiner, 1996). But from the 1950s onwards there has been a permanent managerial interest in improving performance through better teamwork, evident for example in both TQM (Wilkinson, 1990) and business process re-engineering (Grint, 1994). And, as Kleiner (1996), Hanson and Lubin (1995) and others argue, managerial team building and team development processes are built on theories of group dynamics.

The management of attitude change has its contemporary manifestation in, and is in some senses now synonymous with, the management of organizational culture. While definitions are diverse and plentiful, the interest in culture reflects a single managerial assumption that the behaviour of individuals at work is significantly determined by the values, or attitudes, or beliefs, that they hold, and that they share with others. The behaviour of the workforce can therefore be changed to managerial ends by changing their underpinning shared attitudes. Approaches to the management of organizational culture, whether they are described as such (e.g. Deal and Kennedy, 1982), or are a component of other initiatives (again, TQM—see Foster and Whittle, 1990), are fundamentally about managing attitude change.

The central position that these three sets of core ideas have within the change management discourse is mutually reinforcing. They are represented in that discourse as having been developed in tandem, and are equally often applied together. Thus group theories also address the relationship between group and individual attitudes, and so overlap with the management of attitude change; and in the use of group processes to achieve that change action research methods are often used. Taken together, then, the applications of theories of action research, group

dynamics, and attitude change provide the current means for what Alvesson and Willmott (1996: 31) have called 'the strategic re-engineering of employee norms and values', which, they continue, are those 'identified by top management or their consultants and legitimized by academics'.

Kurt Lewin: American Zionist or Psychological Insurgent?

Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) is typically presented as the most important individual in the history of change management. To Burke he is 'the theorist among theorists' (1987: 37). Kleiner (1996: 30) claims 'nearly every sincere effort to improve organizations from within can be traced back to him'. For Schein (1980: 238) 'there is little question that the intellectual father of contemporary theories of applied behavioral science, action research and planned change is Kurt Lewin'. Jeffcutt (1996: 173) critiques 'mainstream' change management, which he describes as 'following Lewin'.

Lewin's intellectual contribution to change management is seen as twofold. First, he is described as the inventor (and rarely, the co-inventor (e.g. French and Bell, 1996)) of action research—'this term was coined by Lewin (1946) in an article called "Action Research and Minority Problem"' (Burnes, 1996: 180). Second, he is seen as the originator of 'group dynamics', the architect of 'laboratory training',[1] and indeed as the inventor of both terms (Marrow, 1969; French and Bell, 1996; Cummings and Worley, 1993).

Lewin is also popularly known for his invention of 'force field analysis', a method for analysing the dynamics in change processes through identifying the drivers for and resistances to change, and for the 'unfreeze/move (or change)/refreeze' three phase model of the change process (both Lewin, 1947). Both continue to be cited as contemporary in management texts (e.g. Cummings and Worley, 1993; Burnes, 1996). Lewin also worked in the 1930s with White and Lippitt on the famous experiments on democratic, authoritarian and laissez-faire leadership styles (Lewin et al., 1939). Lewin's particular contribution was to identify and name the dysfunctional 'laissez-faire' style (White, 1990).

However, much of Lewin's extensive oeuvre is not touched upon by the managerial literature, and that which is is represented in highly simplified form, to the extent that his documented theorizing alone can account only partly for the significance attributed to him. Other stated reasons for Lewin's importance are, first, his determination to apply research rigours to the real world, embodied in his aphorism 'there's nothing so practical as a good theory', (cited in Marrow, 1969: ix) and consequently in the title of Marrow's biography, *The Practical Theorist*. Further, as the tenor of some the quotes at the start of this section suggests, Lewin is seen as being personally inspirational. For example, Lippitt et al. (1958) claim to have been 'greatly stimulated by the ideas and the example of Kurt Lewin' in the introduction to their change management classic *The Dynamics of*

Planned Change, which is dedicated to him. More recently Argyris, interviewed in Pickard (1997), has also claimed Lewin as an important influence.

With Lewin depicted as the founding father of change management, the single defining event in the change management literature (e.g. French and Bell, 1996; Hanson and Lubin, 1995) is the 1946 workshop Lewin organised in New Britain, Connecticut. Here, it is claimed, the learning and change management potential of reflective feedback on intra-personal, inter-personal and group processes and dynamics became apparent. According to Burke (1987: 26), quoting Carl Rogers 'this ... innovative mode of learning, which had its beginnings that summer in Connecticut was to become "perhaps the most significant social invention of the century"'.

The experience of the New Britain workshop is represented as leading to the establishment, soon after Lewin's death in 1947, of what became the National Training Laboratory (NTL). NTL developed the T-groups from which the managerial applications of group dynamics theory sprang. However the actual purpose of New Britain, which many managerial texts do not mention (e.g. French and Bell, 1996), was not to discover new group dynamics theory. On occasion it is described as being about 'race relations', and no more (e.g. Cummings and Worley, 1993; Hanson and Lubin, 1995). With two exceptions (Kleiner, 1996 and Marrow, 1969) the point is never made that the workshop was about the relationships between ethnic groups at a time of high levels of inter-ethnic conflict. Of the 41 community activist delegates at New Britain 29 percent were African-Americans, 25 percent Jewish-American, 23 percent English-American, 13 percent Irish-American, 5 percent Canadian-American and 5 percent Italian-American (Lippitt, 1949: 32). Not even Kleiner or Marrow acknowledge that this was at a time when the US was to all intents and purposes an apartheid state where segregation was still legalized, a substantial proportion of the African-American population was denied the vote, and lynchings were prevalent (see Patterson, 1996).

Marrow's 1969 biography of Lewin is heavily relied on and commended by the management canon (e.g. Kleiner, 1996; French and Bell, 1996; Burke, 1987; Schein, 1980), to the extent that it is a de facto managerial text itself. Marrow does provide a relatively extensive account of the New Britain workshop, and tells us it resulted from Lewin's establishing the Commission on Community Inter-relations of the American Jewish Congress ('the CCI'). Lewin's creation of the CCI is depicted as a consequence of his commitment to Zionism, presented by Marrow (a fellow Zionist) as the central political theme in Lewin's life.

However, there are other aspects of Lewin's political life which Marrow excludes. Marrow recognizes that Lewin had an international reputation by the time of his exile to the US from Germany in 1934, and does cover the pre-US period of his life. According to Marrow, several of Lewin's students in Germany in the 1920s came from 'Russia' (i.e. the then Soviet

Union). More, we learn from Marrow that after a pre-exile visit to the USA in 1933 Lewin travelled home via Moscow. There, we are told that he met his friend, the Russian (i.e. Soviet) psychologist Alexander Luria. It is Van Elteren and Luck's account of Lewin's Berlin film-making work, however, which tells us that it was through Luria that Lewin had previously met the director Eisenstein, of *Battleship Potemkin* fame. Eisenstein, they argue, was to subsequently use Lewinian terminology in analyses of dramatic forms. More specifically, they state '... Kurt Lewin's social thoughts at this time were clearly leftist—in this he was mainly influenced by his friend and collaborator the marxist philosopher Karl Korsch and the current left-wing social democratic conceptions ...' (1990: 54).

Van Elteren and Luck suggest that left politics were not as evident in Lewin's work as they were in that of some of his peers. Nonetheless, of the Lewin film on child development they analyse in detail (*Das Kind und die Welt*—the child and the world), made for the general public, they state 'Because of his political ideas he wanted to accentuate the social relevance of his intellectual work for the daily life of the working classes ...' (1990: 56). Thus the fifth act of the film shows the everyday life and labour of children in a poor working class district of Berlin, and concludes with a voiceover speaking of a coming 'Neu Zeit'[2] ('new time and future') and children singing '"When we stride side by side", which had its roots in the Socialist Workers Youth' (1990: 58).

Lewin's close relationship with Korsch, then a leading Marxist theoretician, is only alluded to very much in passing by Marrow, with no mention of Lewin's politics at that time. Marrow was an American colleague of Lewin's, and it might be expected that his account of Lewin's Berlin years would be less than complete. However, in 1966 Marrow did interview and correspond with Korsch's wife Hedda, who was a close friend of Lewin's first wife, about the biography (Van Elteren, 1992); and Marrow, in citing (and no more) a 1939 Lewin and Korsch paper, must have been aware that they did work together in the US too. Moreover, Marrow also fails to acknowledge any of Lewin's left activity post-exile, to the extent that he can only be seen as writing it out of history. This is epitomized in Marrow's account of a visit to the 1939 Worlds Fair in New York with Lewin, which is accompanied by a photograph of them there with Monette Marrow, eating hotdogs. Marrow doesn't mention the stand at that Worlds Fair which attempted 'to educate the public about the evils of war, fascism and monopoly capital ... directly rather than use the allegedly reactionary mass media ...' (Harris, 1986: 9), nor whether he and Lewin visited it or not. This is odd, given that the stand was organized by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI),[3] of which Lewin was a founder, and in 1939 a member of its national committee.

The SPSSI was part of what Finison, who has produced a series of accounts of organized psychology in the US in the 1930s and 1940s (Finison, 1976, 1977, 1983, 1986), has called 'the psychological insur-

gency', and one of the organizations which 'owed their form, timing, and existences to various leftist political groups and their development to energies unleashed by the Popular Front' (Finison, 1986: 22). The Popular Front era followed the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, held in Moscow in 1935, where a decision was taken by the Communist Party (CP) to build alliances with non-communist left forces (hitherto reviled as 'social fascists'), and lasted until the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939.

According to Sylvers (1990) a particularly important US Popular Front umbrella organization, which campaigned for support for domestic New Deal policies, and international anti-fascist solidarity, was the American League for Peace and Democracy. In one of Finison's footnotes we find Kurt Lewin listed as a member of its Psychologists Committee (Finison, 1983: 1251), and of its predecessor, the pro-republican, anti-fascist Psychologists Committee of the Medical Bureau to Aid Spanish Democracy. Marrow, and the managerial texts tell us nothing of this. Lewin's association and work with the SPSSI, to which one in six members of the American Psychological Association belonged in 1937, is acknowledged in two lines in Marrow's epilogue (1969: 227) which tell us that he was a founder and its President in 1941–2. During that presidency, SPSSI activist Goodwin Watson was accused with two others by Representative Dies, of the House Un-American Activities Committee, 'of being federal employees whose activities were proven to have been interwoven with communist front organizations' (Sargent and Harris, 1986: 49) The SPSSI decided not to lobby on Watson's behalf during his appeal against the subsequent blocking of his salary, because it thought doing so would do him more harm than good. Rather, SPSSI council members signed statements of support as individuals. Sargent and Harris cite a Lewin letter to the SPSSI, and an FBI internal memo as their source. When the Supreme Court ruled in Watson's favour, Congress abolished his post in retaliation. Watson then went to work for the CCI in New York.

Van Elteren (1992) sees a distinction between Lewin's politics pre- and post-exile, but doesn't refer to the information Finison provides. Van Elteren cites the 1940s' accusations of Karl Korsch, then also in exile, and who had been expelled from the German CP in 1926 (John et al., 1989), that Lewin had too eagerly and completely embraced American values and institutions, not least by working for the US Government during the War. Yet, for most of the period in which Lewin lived in the USA (i.e. 1934–47), nationalism and a commitment to American democracy were both compatible with and typical of a position on the left (Diggins, 1973). The Popular Front manifested itself in the CP-USA's identification of itself within the American democratic tradition ('At CP meetings the stars –and stripes could be seen above the red flag' (Diggins, 1973: 129), and alliances with and between others on the left or seen as progressive, who were part of that tradition, including representatives of Roosevelt's New Deal administration. While the Popular Front waned after 1939, there was still a strong left concern for anti-fascist class solidarity, with which the

New Britain workshop is consistent (see Buhle et al., 1990). The left also continued, largely, to commit itself to the US war effort, and Lewin's work for the US Government does not in itself damage his left credentials. Lewin did indeed research into de-nazification for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), predecessor of the CIA (Marrow, 1969). But then so did his fellow exile Herbert Marcuse (Breines, 1990).[4]

By 1969, the year of Marrow's biography, however, the pre-1945 relationships between the left and American nationalism had not so much disappeared as reversed. The war in which the American state was then engaged, in Vietnam, was against the left, not fascism. Domestically, the rhetoric of US nationalism was counterposed against the left in its opposition to that war (Diggins, 1997). It is in this context that Marrow does tell us of the significance of his and Lewin's 1939 Worlds Fair visit. It is that it demonstrates that Lewin's:

> ... own identification with his adopted homeland was a true example of his theory of group belongingness. From his first days in the United States Lewin was an American ... [at the 1939 Worlds Fair] ... we were growing hungry but the Fair's restaurants were already crowded with dinner patrons. 'Lets have a couple of hotdogs', Lewin said. 'That's what we Americans eat on Sunday evenings in the summer!' (Marrow, 1969: 171)

Thus Kurt Lewin is claimed for the 1969 version of American nationalism. The source upon which change management has chosen to rely for its representations of its chosen founder has constructed 'Lewin the American Zionist' and concealed the leftist 'Lewin the psychological insurgent'. This concealment has to some extent been facilitated by the limited extent to which Lewin's politics found their way into his theorizing, notwithstanding his close working relationship with Korsch (see Van Elteren, 1992). For Goodwin Watson, it was only later in Lewin's life that he began to realize the limits of his psychologistic analyses. Watson recounts, tantalizingly, that Lewin visited him very shortly before his death excited by an insight about the social shaping of individual consciousness which, according to Watson (1978: 178), led Lewin to state 'Freud was wrong and Marx was right'.

But is important to recall that Lewin is seen as important for his belief in the application of theory. It is here that his politics are more evident, not least in this belief per se. It is an obvious point, but 'laissez-faire', the term which Lewin chose to identify a type of dysfunctional leadership behaviour, was, and is, also used to name the neo-classical approach to economic and social policy which had prevailed in the US until it was challenged by Roosevelt's interventionist New Deal. Lewin's opposition to a laissez-faire approach is evident not only in his work on leadership, but in his commitment to the application of research. Action research per se, as we shall see, was to be identified as by definition 'political' by one arm of the US state while Lewin was alive. Lewin's commitment to it, contra laissez faire, and the particular applications he chooses are evi-

dence of a belief that it was right, proper and possible to intervene to effect social change on behalf of the disadvantaged.

One last example of this belief is Lewin's conclusion to 'Action Research and Minority Problems' (1946), which is actually about the New Britain workshop. Rather than discussing the future of action research or group dynamics, Lewin criticizes US policy towards its colonial dependencies. Alluding to its effect on inter (ethnic) group relations, Lewin calls for US policy to reflect the philosophy which one John Collier had developed in 'regard to American Indians and which the Institute for Ethnic Affairs is proposing for American dependencies' (1946: 44).

John Collier: Radical Inventor of Action Research?

John Collier (1884–1969) was the 'New Deal' Commissioner at the US Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) between 1933 and 1945. For Parman (1976: 19) Collier is evidence of Roosevelt's 'willingness to appoint men of unconventional ideas'. Collier's son states 'his documented background reveals his open alliance with revolutionary causes', and 'his close bond with many radicals, including John Reed'[5] (Collier, 1983: xviii). Collier is the subject of two biographies (Kelly, 1983; Philp, 1977), and a number of other books and articles (e.g. Kunitz, 1971; Parman, 1976), none of which are cited in the managerial literature. Collier wrote prolifically himself producing, inter-alia, an autobiography (1963) in which Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid* is cited as his major influence. In 1947 the UK Labour Party affiliated Fabian Society published Collier's critique of US policy towards its colonial dependencies (Collier, 1947).

As we have noted, it is usual for Kurt Lewin to be credited (e.g. Burnes, 1996) as the inventor of action research. The few references to John Collier in change management texts, in discussions of the origins of action research, can be tracked back to French and Bell. They claim 'the origin of action research can be traced back to two independent sources' (1996: 144). There is no immediate evidence that the two collaborated directly in the invention of action research. However, their work was far from independent, as Lewin's 1946 quote begins to suggest. More, there is evidence that Collier, and his colleagues, invented action research first.

In the only managerial quotation of Collier, French and Bell (1996: 144) cite a paragraph of Collier's account of his time as Commissioner. This was published in 1945, the year before Lewin's first article on action research. It can be argued that Lewin's publications on action research were preceded by action research projects in 1944 (Marrow, 1969). However, Collier describes action research as a key organizing principle at the BIA from 1933 onwards, that is, the year before Lewin made his home in the USA and 13 years before its earliest published mention by Lewin. Evidence which supports this claim is found in Philp (1977) and Parman (1976), whose critical account of the Navajos and the New Deal describes action research principles in the BIA's work in the 1930s, but

doesn't name them as such. Parman (1976) also suggests that BIA researcher Eshref Shevky was influential in shaping the methodologies used, and Kelly (1980) describes the BIA's use of applied and participatory anthropology.

Collier was writing as early as 1917 of the need for social science to inform action in the New York People's Institute where he was working as a community development activist,[6] adding that 'The Institute's role is action, not talk; experimental sociology is action . . .' (Kelly, 1983: 73). The very title of Collier's 1945 article, 'United States Indian Administration as a laboratory of ethnic relations', appears now to use Lewinian language. Yet, in 1918, Collier wrote of the model community centres set up by the People's Institute as 'laboratories of method' (Kelly, 1983: 86), and in 1933 of the Indians and their lands becoming 'pioneers and laboratories in the supreme new American adventure now being tried under the leadership of the President' (Philp, 1977: 187).

In his 1963 autobiography, Collier saw parallels with his New York work and the ideas of Lewin, and commended Lewin's leadership experiments.[7] However, contrary to French and Bell's claim of Collier's and Lewin's independence, this was not admiration from a distance. Collier's autobiography includes not only a photograph of Lewin, but also the statement (1963: 233) that before Lewin died he had '. . . become one of my own intimate friends . . .', which continued: 'his human insights and principles faltered at the hands of somewhat lesser men'.

Collier and Lewin were collaborators as well as friends. In July 1945 Collier established and became President of the Institute for Ethnic Affairs, its charter proposing that social scientists engage in 'action research' (quoted by Philp, 1977: 214) to address inter-ethnic relationships internationally. Collier (1963: 316) tells us that Lewin was a member of its directorate. In the biographical details found in Likert's (1947), and Lippitt's (1947) obituaries of Lewin we are told that he was a Vice-President of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, but nothing else of his involvement. This is the closest and only indication of the existence of the Lewin–Collier relationship to be found in the work of those who were to be presented as Lewin's peers in the change management literature. Yet the focus of Lewin's 'Action Research and Minority Problems' fits within that of Collier's Institute. Collier also tells us (1963: 332) that at his home he and Lewin planned a similar institute in Palestine/Israel shortly before Lewin's death.

Collier's departure from the BIA, and his establishment of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs was almost immediately followed by Roosevelt's death and replacement by Truman. The early experiences of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, while Lewin was still alive, were a harbinger of what was to follow in the 1950s as the New Deal order was dismantled and replaced by that of the Cold War. The Institute had successfully lobbied against the colonialist practices of the US Navy, although (ambivalently) still conducting research on its behalf. Collier claims that Secretary for the Navy

Forrestal[8] was consequently determined to destroy the Institute (1963: 330), and that on his order the US Internal Revenue removed tax privileges to which it had been entitled. On appeal, the Institute was told, in 1946, it was: 'oriented to *action-research* [Collier's emphasis]. Research which involved action was by definition (Internal Revenue's definition) political, and the tax privilege must be denied' (Collier, 1963: 333).

When Collier reached retirement age in 1954, by which time he was working at the City College of New York, conservative members of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology submitted a confidential memorandum stating that he should not be rehired on political grounds, including that he had involved students in research at the 'radical' Institute of Ethnic Affairs. Collier was forced to leave as a consequence (Philp, 1977). The 1950s was the decade in which McCarthyism was at its peak. Academics, including SPSSI members, were blacklisted and fired for their refusal to take loyalty oaths, and for their politics generally (Harris, 1980; Sargent and Harris, 1986).

In its historiography, then, change management has consistently denied the contribution of the persistently leftist (and until 1969, living) John Collier to the invention of action research. It has also denied any relationship between him and the conveniently dead and de-politicized Kurt Lewin, whose mythic status as the father of change management is compromised by a fuller acknowledgement of this relationship. Of course, Collier was primarily a practitioner—an administrator and activist—rather than a theoretician, and his writings reflected this. But this does not explain the denial of Collier. The little he left on the record about the development of action research is not greatly exceeded by that left by Lewin; and equally Lewin's status derives in some significant part from his being a practitioner too. The fear of McCarthyism is a more likely early driver of the denial, the psychologists (largely) responsible for change management's emergence possibly being unwilling to risk acknowledging its, and their, debt to the left. This view is sustained by Harris's (1980) account of FBI surveillance of psychologists in the 1950s. He argues that as a profession they were vulnerable to 'anticipatory ideological compliance' (Jahoda and Cook, 1954), the restriction of personal and professional activity to avoid any possible attention from McCarthyite inquisitors, although there were brave exceptions (Cook, 1986).

The Work of Edgar Schein—Managerial Attitude Change as Maoist Brainwashing

1950s' US anticommunism also figures in this next section of the article. As the introduction states, while it considers the work of Edgar Schein, no statement is made about his politics. Rather, it examines how Schein incorporated ideas from the Maoist left from his research on the Korean War into the managerial mainstream.

Schein's managerial work is widely cited (see below) and includes

standard texts on organizational psychology (1980), organizational socialization and career development (1978), and organizational culture (1990). He also co-authored a text on personal and organizational change using 'the laboratory approach', i.e. T-groups, with Warren Bennis (Schein and Bennis, 1965). For Coghlan (1988: 27), Schein's *Process Consultation* (1988), first published in 1969, and followed in 1987 by Volume 2, is a '... classic in the field of organisational processes'.

The left's contribution first becomes apparent in Schein's earlier publications, however. During his time as a US army psychologist in the 1950s, Schein researched into the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) ability to achieve attitudinal and behavioural change. His particular interest was the so called brainwashing of western prisoners during the Korean war, '... that is, the cases of genuine ideological conversion seemingly accomplished by coercive means' (Schein, 1961: 9). The resulting book, *Coercive Persuasion* (Schein,[9] 1961), and articles (e.g. Schein, 1968; Schein et al., 1968) are rarely cited in the managerial texts, other than by Schein himself.

It is the sophistication and depth of the analysis of the context (over 95 pages), rather than the context alone, which sets *Coercive Persuasion* apart from Schein's later work, and from the change management genre. In a general sense the argument is that techniques developed by the CCP in its revolutionary struggle from 1925 onwards were then applied to prisoners of war. Thus Schein notes the importance of group discussion in the cells which hallmarked Leninist revolutionary organization. He also argues that the problems of creating an agrarian class consciousness, while fighting a guerrilla war sustained by a hospitable and protective peasantry, required the development of persuasive methods in which CCP cadres were given pragmatic licence to adapt ideological tenets to local conditions. Post 1945, once the CCP had assumed control, there is seen to be a need for it to find mechanisms of social control, including the creation of ideological unanimity through so called 'thought reform'.[10]

Kleiner (1996) introduces Schein's work on brainwashing only in order to claim that T-groups were not coercive. Schein, the coercion expert, but also NTL member, is claimed to have exonerated T-groups from the charge of resembling Maoist brainwashing. However, Schein himself reads more ambivalently. *Coercive Persuasion* itself contains a chapter on how the CCP's brainwashing approaches parallel those used in the USA in therapeutic settings. In 1962, comparing CCP brainwashing to 'mental hospital rehabilitation, training for certain professional roles, the induction of a novice into a convent, the indoctrination of a businessman into a corporation ...' (1962: 91), he concludes '... I am not drawing these parallels in order to condemn some of our own approaches, rather my aim is just the opposite. I am trying to show that Chinese methods are not so mysterious, not so different and not so awful, once we separate the awfulness of the Communist ideology and look simply at the methods' (1962: 97).

The parallel Schein is drawing is in the management of attitude change, a key theme throughout Schein's work (and throughout change management). In the same article (1962: 96) Schein suggests that the CCP's brainwashing methods have implications for a 'general theory of attitude change', and, indeed, the de facto general theory that was to recur throughout the body of Schein's work is that first described in *Coercive Persuasion*. There the analysis of intra-psychic and inter-personal processes uses what would now be seen as the language of change management. Thus Schein (1961: 12) considers '... the sorts of person who are the change agents in the day to day business of producing ideological change', and the application of theory from the behavioural sciences: '... psychology, psychiatry, sociological and other theories which pertain to the change process or the influence process ...'.

Schein evaluates a range of theories for their adequacy in explaining brainwashing, before deciding on an adaptation of Lewin's unfreeze/change/refreeze as the closest model he can find for the coercive persuasion process. This adaptation, Schein's 'general theory of attitude change', is presented in Schein and Bennis' 1965 guide to T-groups, in his book *Professional Education* (1972), in his 1980 edition of *Organizational Psychology*, and in *Process Consultation (Volume 2)*. It is explained thus in *Coercive Persuasion*:

> ... it is a basic assumption of the model that beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviour patterns of an individual tend to be integrated with each other and tend to be organised around the individual's self image or self concept. This integration, even if imperfect, gives continuity and stability to the person, and hence operates as a force against being influenced, unless the change which the influence implies is seen to be a change in the direction of greater integration. (Schein, 1961: 118)

Schein's general theory of attitude change, derived from the CCP, is therefore one of social disintegration (unfreezing), social reconstruction (change) and social reintegration (refreezing) of individuals' cognitive frameworks, particularly as they relate to self-perception. The unfreezing stage consists of 'disconfirmation or lack of confirmation ... the creation of guilt or anxiety ... and the provision of psychological safety'. The change stage incorporates '... scanning the environment for new information ...' and 'identifying new role models', and refreezing 'helping the client to integrate the new point of view into the total personality and the self concept' (Schein, 1988: 93).

In his 1962 brainwashing article Schein states the general theory requires that '[social] supports for attitudes have to be undermined and destroyed if change is to take place, and supports for new attitudes have to be found if change is to be lasting'. He continues 'What is cruel and coercive about this process is the control which the agent of change exerts over the individual in the process of undermining and destroying his social supports' (1962: 97). However, neither cruelty nor coercion are

recognized as present in the theory's later managerial applications. Here the assumption is benevolent, intent on the part of change agents who have an objectively correct understanding of the need for change and of who the subjects of the change are to be. The right of those controlling the process to generate guilt and anxiety is not questioned.

This induction of guilt and anxiety distinguishes Schein's version of unfreeze/change/refreeze from that of Lewin, and from other adaptations (e.g. Lippitt et al., 1958). In the change management literature Schein's version is often commended (e.g. in French and Bell, 1984; Burke, 1987). In other cases the version presented, while actually attributed to Lewin, closely resembles that of Schein in its implicit or explicit call for the generation of anxiety. For example, when Goodstein and Burke (1993: 167) claim that '... the first step in unfreezing involved a massive reduction in the ... workforce' at privatizing British Airways, it is clear that the importance of this reduction is its effect on individual psychology.

Furthermore, several of the same texts map a direct equivalence between the data collection, feedback, and diagnosis components of action research and Lewin's unfreezing stage. They go on to discuss the unfreezing significance of these components in Scheinian guilt/anxiety induction terms, for example 'the unfreezing step might be ... data feedback from a survey that showed serious problems in the managerial process ...' (Burke, 1987: 56). TQM implementation processes also closely resemble managerial action research, and the very language of the diagnostic processes used (e.g. 'identification of the cost of poor quality' (Cooke, 1992)) again points to a managed induction of guilt and anxiety. Or, as Mao puts it 'the first method in reasoning is to give the patients a powerful stimulus, yell at them "you're sick", so the patients will have a fright ... then they can be treated' (cited in Schein, 1961: 37)

The evidence here suggests that these change management processes have a debt to the Chinese liberation struggle, or, if one prefers, Maoist brainwashing. This debt has not been acknowledged (except by Schein himself), and has been excluded from managerial history. Once again, ideas from the left have been abstracted from their context, and used in conditions claimed to be ideology and coercion free. Once this claim is challenged *Coercive Persuasion* aligns most closely with Willmott's (1993) analysis of contemporary participatory management approaches as a means to totalitarian managerialist ideological ends, with Schein providing the how to do it guide.[11]

Discussion and Conclusion

The previous three sections have, hopefully, met the first aim of this article, which was to provide new insights into the political status and provenance of change management. A well established criticism of change management is that it is ahistorical and acontextual, being wholly about the management of change, with no corresponding analysis of the

historical and immediate contexts of change (e.g. Pettigrew, 1985; Wilson, 1992). This critique has hitherto been about change management's willingness to adopt a position where the social, political and ideological circumstances in which it is applied are assumed to be uncontested and as objectively given. This determined acceptance of context is seen to actually help sustain and reproduce these circumstances.

The alternative history constructed in this article suggests this criticism can now be applied with justification to change management's representation of itself, in which the social, political and ideological circumstances in which it was developed are likewise determinedly presented as uncontested and objectively given. It is an example of a 'so called science of management abstracted from the cultural and historical contexts of its conception ...' so that 'teachers and practitioners of management are spared the unsettling realization that the very formulation of "scientific" management theories ... occurs within politically charged value-laden, contexts' (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996: 26). In that this article reveals this abstraction, it can be claimed that it carries out the 'reconstruction' element of critical reflection which Alvesson and Willmott call for in their applications of Habermasian Critical Theory to the understanding of management:

> Reconstruction mobilizes critical reason to diagnose prevailing conditions. For example, reconstruction identifies and analyses the presence of social elements (e.g. class, patriarchy) within the formulation and application of the functional rationalism which supposedly governs the disciplines and techniques of management. (1996: 15)

However, for Alvesson and Willmott, critical reflection also requires 'critique', whereby responsibility is taken for problems which are identified (in this case the de-politicization and technocratization of management theory), and there is a commitment to participating in changing the conditions which permit these problems to arise. That responsibility is taken here by arguing for far greater historical and historiographical awareness in the construction of representations of management and organizational theory than has hitherto been the case. This in turn will bring us to the second aim of this article, which is to argue that *all* understandings of management and organization theory are shaped by historiographical processes.

Grint (1994) is one exception who has shown this greater historical awareness. His analysis of a particular contemporary approach to change management, business process re-engineering, suggests that, while none of its individual components is new, its fashionability as a package of measures is explained by its resonances with the contemporary zeitgeist, the spirit of the times, rather than its supposedly inherent rationality. He subsequently argues that, if zeitgeist matters now, then it always has. From this point of view, and in the light of the preceding sections in this article, representations of the development of management of change as a

body of theory and practice should be grounded within understandings of the zeitgeists of the Popular Front era, the Second World War, the Cold War and McCarthyism, and so on until the present day. Of course, we must go on to address the implications of Jenkin's (1991) position that these understandings are themselves constructions which are never definitive or objective. But beyond Grint, and also Kleiner (1996), considerations of history, never mind historiography, are rare or perfunctory, begging the question as to whether it is not just the managerialist orthodoxy but broader and allegedly more critically rigorous analyses of management and organization theory which are ahistorical, themselves part of a late 20th century zeitgeist in which 'the destruction of the past, or rather the social mechanisms that link one's contemporary experience to that of earlier generations, is one of the most characteristic and eerie phenomena' (Hobsbawm, 1994: 3).

A case illustration of this absence of historical awareness is provided by Burrell and Morgan (1979) to whom we return as promised in the introduction. Their work is chosen for discussion here as a landmark in organization theory, but also as one which is now nearly 20 years old, enabling it to be considered in retrospect (i.e. historically). As the introduction noted, the work of Lewin is located by Burrell and Morgan (1979) within their functionalist paradigm. But this 1979 theory-of-society identification of the psychologist Lewin with the 'sociology of regulation' is made without acknowledging that Lewin's, and the world's, immediate alternative between 1933–45 was not Burrell and Morgan's broadly Marxian 'sociology of radical change', it was fascism. Fascism was defeated only by the combination of the most powerful earthly representatives of Burrell and Morgan's two incommensurable sociologies 'the temporary and bizarre alliance of liberal capitalism and communism' (Hobsbawm, 1994: 7). Lewin, the anti-fascist refugee, whose mother and sister were murdered by the Nazis, personifies that alliance of the incommensurable.

Thus Burrell and Morgan are ahistorical, as the case of Lewin suggests, in their disregard of the zeitgeist within which the theory they analyse was produced. Such ahistoricism reinforces the elimination of 'ambiguity about the political impulse and impacts of particular forms of organization analysis' which Willmott (1990: 7) argues is caused by Burrell and Morgan's absolute regulation/radical change duality. With Lewin this ambiguity exists, on Burrell and Morgan's terms, within the one (i.e. functionalist) paradigm. Likewise Burrell and Morgan's acontextual categorizations of theory preclude the identification of Schein's appropriation of ideas developed by the radical structuralist CCP, that is, identification of this ambiguity across paradigms. Schein's incorporation of 'radical' ideas into the functionalist orthodoxy, and their subsequent use by others, is an illustration of the dynamic whereby '... other approaches will be used to strengthen [functionalism's] dominance ...' (Willmott, 1990: 49). To be fair, Burrell and Morgan do recognize that this dynamic exists; but

what must also be acknowledged is that their particular once and for all approach to the meta-categorization of organization theory actually serves to conceal it.

This dynamic is also evident with respect to Collier, whose espousal of Kropotkin suggests his location, on Burrell and Morgan's terms, within the radical humanist paradigm. Collier's exclusion from managerialist historiography, and the simultaneous appropriation of his ideas by the change management discourse, is, then, an example of 'colonization by the dominant functionalist orthodoxy' (Willmott, 1990: 49). But it is literal rather than metaphorical colonization which brings us to the argument that *all* understandings of management and organization theory and practice (i.e. the second aim of this article) are shaped by historiographical processes. This, it should be stressed, is not just the case for analyses (e.g. Burrell and Morgan) which are evidently ahistorical. This shaping also occurs even when attempts are overtly made to locate our considerations of theory within understandings of history (e.g. this article). As we have already acknowledged, these understandings themselves are particular and contestable meanings that we choose to attribute to the past. Locating theory within these understandings is to privilege them, and to disadvantage alternatives.

To illustrate, to identify John Collier primarily as 'radical humanist' (on Burrell and Morgan's terms) or on 'the left' (in my terms) is to privilege an understanding of him and his work on these bases, and to ignore equally tenable, and quite distinctive, accounts that might be constructed which analyse Collier's work in terms of its relationship to modernity, and particularly to colonialism. Collier's relationship with both is at best ambivalent, and changed over his life. With respect to colonialism, Hauptman (1986) produces evidence that at the BIA Collier was strongly influenced by the British 'liberal imperialist' Julian Huxley, and British colonial administration's principle of 'indirect rule'. The implication can be drawn that this principle was the stimulus for the development of action research. Later in his life Collier became more critical of both colonialism and modernity. This led 1970s' commentators to accuse Collier of naivety for his failure to recognize the centrality of class, and of utopianism or romanticism in his arguments against modernity (Philp, 1977; Kunitz, 1971). At the same time, however, they acknowledged difficulties in trying to categorize his work, because these two main concerns of Collier were hard to fit within what we can now see as the meta-theory then available. However, the meta-theory available now, in 1998, of post-colonialism and of post-modernism provides for a more comprehensive, very critical analysis of his work than had previously been possible, and one which is quite different to that presented in this article.

Thus we are ahistorical in our analyses of management and organization theory not only when we ignore history, but when we fail to acknowledge the historically transient and contested nature of the meta-

theory upon which these analyses are based, be it on, for example, radical change/regulation or left/right dichotomies. Historiographical awareness requires that our analyses recognize that the primacy assumed for our chosen meta-theory frameworks has not always prevailed in the past, may not prevail in the future, and indeed may not prevail unquestioned now. The categorization and analysis of theory and theorists from decades before according to meta-theoretical distinctions which prevailed in 1979 (in the case of Burrell and Morgan) or 1998 (in the case of this article) is an historiographical act which should be acknowledged as such. In the choice of which theory and theorists are considered and which are not, which aspects of them are seen as significant or not, and the actual significance which is identified, be it according to, inter-alia, a deliberately imprecise definition of 'the left' or a 2 × 2 model, the past is shaped according to a particular present.[12]

To conclude, then, in the spirit of historiographical reflexivity, it must be accepted that in this discussion of the role of the left in the history of the change management discourse, and of the role of historiography another theme has been identified about which a different, post-colonialist historiography might be constructed. Central to it would be, not only Collier's ambivalence as a 'high handed and paternalistic' (Patterson, 1996: 376) anti-colonialist colonial administrator, but also, inter alia, Lewin's Zionism, and Schein's representations of an oriental 'other' on behalf of a US military opposing a liberation struggle. It would therefore depict change management as arising from colonialist and imperialist drives to make their 'subjects', whose voices are never represented, manageable (see Cooke, forthcoming). The earlier warning to those on the left who might see this article as legitimizing their use of change management processes is therefore reinforced.

Notes

1 So called because of the 'scientific' (i.e. laboratory) conditions in which it was conducted.
2 *Neu Zeit* was the title of the theoretical Journal of the marxist German SPD (Social Democratic Party), edited by Karl Kautsky (see Keleman, 1996).
3 The SPSSI's journal, *The Journal of Social Issues*, is, in its socio-political concerns, more in the Lewinian tradition than *Human Relations*, with which Lewin is more often associated, but which only emerged after his death.
4 Marcuse was also an intended contributor to a planned but never published 1940 SPSSI yearbook on social change (Finison, 1983).
5 Author of *Ten Days That Shook the World*.
6 One of Collier's allies in national community organization politics was Mary Parker Follett (Kelly, 1983).
7 Collier doesn't credit White or Lippitt.
8 Collier also tells us that Forrestal, subsequently Secretary for Defence, died by his own hand a few years after, 'leaping to his death with the cry, it was widely reported, that the Russians were coming' (Collier, 1963: 333).

9 *Coercive Persuasion* was written 'with' I. Schneier and C. Baker. Schein cites himself as sole author in references in his own later work (e.g. Schein, 1990).
10 Discussed in a chapter entitled 'The Passion for Unanimity', to be echoed by Peters and Austin's (1985) *A Passion for Excellence*.
11 Although, it must be said, that Schein, more than most, has had a concern for the micro-politics and ethics of change interventions (see Cooke, 1997a).
12 In that Burrell and Morgan's 2 × 2 model has been applied since 1979 it has also shaped its future—see, for example, Jackson, 1985; Arndt, 1985; Blunt, 1997 and Cooke, 1997b.

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MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT GROUP WORKING PAPER SERIES

Paper No 6

A FOUNDATION CORRESPONDENCE ON ACTION RESEARCH: RONALD LIPPITT AND JOHN COLLIER

by

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July 2002

ISBN: 1 904143 33 4
Published by: Institute for Development Policy and Management
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ABSTRACT

A substantial part of this paper is not written by the author, but consists of a correspondence between Ronald Lippitt and John Collier about action research. Lippitt is recognized as a close associate of the supposed inventor of action research, Kurt Lewin. Collier was Commissioner for the US Bureau of Indian Affairs 1933 - 1945, and architect of the "Indian New Deal"; and he too played a role in the invention of action research. Indeed his early action research projects predated similar work by Lewin, with whom Collier collaborated, although this is rarely acknowledged. Lewin himself famously wrote very little about action research. This correspondence followed shortly after Lewin's death, so has slightly later than contemporary significance. Its significance, as of 2002 can be seen four areas. First, there is a discussion of the role of science and the scientist in action research. Second there is a debate around the role of the scientist action researcher as social activist. Third there is the question of whether the purpose of action research is to achieve content or process goals. Fourth there is a consideration of the strategic and tactical consequences for the action researcher/action research institute of adopting/not adopting the scientist identity. These are all current concerns for action research; this article shows how they have been from its start. In the correspondence Collier argues against the action researcher as value free process only technocratic expert; however those who sympathise with this position will find a sting in the tail.

INTRODUCTION

The most important, and substantial part of this paper is not written by the named author, and is included here as an annex. This annex consists of excerpts from a correspondence between Ronald Lippitt and John Collier. This starts in 1945, but that in the annex dates from 1948. Ronald Lippitt's correspondence is reproduced with the kind permission of Dr Larry Lippitt. John Collier's correspondence is reproduced with the kind permission of Mrs Grace Collier. It is to be found on reel 38/452 of the *Collier Microfilm Archive of the John Collier Papers 1922-1968.*

The correspondence relates to action research, and it is, it is argued here of historical and contemporary significance. In assessing that significance it is important first to address the question of historiographical epistemology. Jenkins (1991) sees the past as epistemologically fragile. The past consists of an infinity of events. History, our knowing of the past, is constructed by selecting some of those events as significant and some not, and giving meaning, ie interpreting those which are selected. This of course leads to a possible problem of post-modern relativism, and the danger of a process of reasoning which leads to a conclusion that there are no absolute truths in history. Without getting too far into historiographical philosophy, that is not the view held here. At the same time it is accepted that our understandings of the past are constructions, albeit with certain events at their core which are, or can, or must be taken as objective givens.

Moreover, Jenkin's (1991:17) claim that "history is never for itself, it is always for someone" is given some credence here. If this is true for orthodox histories, though, then it is also the case for the revised fragment that is presented here. The significance claimed in this paper therefore should at the very least be read with an understanding of its author's own sympathies. These are a generally favourable disposal towards Critical Management approaches which critique presentations of management as ideologically neutral; and a general scepticism toward the uses of

participatory methodologies like action research and OD (eg Cooke and Kothari 2001 is endorsed). This certainly influenced the decision to research Collier (who, Cooke 1999 also points out, was on the political left), the author's recognition of the correspondence as important, and choices about which parts thereof were included and excluded here. However, readers following this paper through to its end are not obliged to agree with me, or with one or either of the positions set out by Collier and Lippitt. Particularly important to note here is that those who initially sympathized more with Collier, and/or with my more general position will find a discomforting sting in the tail of this paper.

THE PLAYERS AND THEIR IDEAS

Kurt Lewin and Action Research

Kurt Lewin is identified by the OD/Change management orthodoxy as its founding father (eg according to Schein 1980: 283 "there is little question that the intellectual father of contemporary theories of applied behavioral science, action research and planned change is Kurt Lewin"). Lewin is renowned for his development of force field analysis, the three stage unfreeze/move/refreeze model of planned change, and more generally his determination to integrate theory and practice. This was embodied in the title of Marrow's (1969) biography of Lewin, "The Practical Theorist". Lewin was also one of the founders of the journal *Human Relations*, although its publication coincided with his untimely death in 1947. Amongst his other achievements are the invention of "group dynamics" (both the idea and the term), which is described as developing from the first group process workshop in New Britain, Connecticut, in 1946 (see Cooke 1999). Particularly important for this paper is Lewin's development of action research. Although Lewin only wrote two articles on action research, one of which was also about the New Britain workshop (*Action Research and Minority Problems*), he is nonetheless widely, with an exception discussed below, seen as the inventor (eg Raelin 1999).

Action research is important as a methodology in its own right, with many internal debates and differences over the detail which are not addressed here. Although first written about in the mid-1940s, new and substantial work on the field continues to emerge, not least Reason and Bradbury's (2001b) 45 chapter *Action Research Handbook. Human Relations* (Elden and Chisholm 1993) and *Management Learning* (Raelin 1999) have had special issues on Action Research, both emerging from Academy of Management symposia.

Action research also contributes four key ideas to OD, and to change management more generally. First, the understanding evident in its name, and Lewin's aphorism "no action without research, no research without action", is that all organizational interventions (ie action) should be informed by research. Conversely, research should not be for its own sake, but to lead to organizational change. Second, there is the idea of collaboration between researcher and researched, which translates in OD terms to consultant and client. This is supposed to lead to a greater ownership of the organizational problem being addressed, in that the client and consultant reach a shared understanding of the root cause and subsequently what is to be done. It is also assumed that the client has a level of understanding and expertise which they can bring to the intervention, that the action researcher/consultant will not be able to match. Finally, action research suggests a series of steps - building an agreement between consultant and client, data collection, data analysis, action planning, action, evaluation, and so on, which underpin OD/change management process in their own right. These steps can also be seen to underpin separate models of the consultancy process, and of planned change.

Ronald Lippitt - Lewin's Inheritor and Promoter?

In the history of management ideas, Ronald Lippitt is probably the better known of the two correspondents. Lippitt was co-author of two management classics. *The Dynamics of Planned Change* (1958), which made current the term "change agent" and presented a step by step quasi action research approach to planned change which was to underpin the OD and Change Management orthodoxy (eg see French and Bell

1998). *The Consulting Process in Action* (1978), co-authored with his brother Gordon was one of the first guides to consultancy to set out the ideas both of the consultancy process, and of the distinction between "task" and "process" oriented consultancy. This was not all. In the 1930s, with Kurt Lewin and Ralph White, Lippitt conducted the famous research into leadership styles, which made the distinction between authoritarian, laissez-faire, and democratic leadership (Lippitt et al 1939). Lippitt was also a participant in the 1946 New Britain workshop. Although it is true than Lewin himself produced little about it, and about action research more generally, Lippitt's own extensive account of New Britain, Training in Community Relations, published in 1949 is often overlooked. Indeed, it is case that Lippitt is in Lewin's shadow, and his own achievements are underplayed as a consequence. Lippitt himself did much to promote Lewin's reputation post-mortem. Hence *The Dynamics of Planned Change* was dedicated to Lewin, and the planned change process it outlined was explicitly based on Lewin's three stage unfreeze/change/refreeze process.

John Collier, and Lewin and Lippitt and Action Research

The New Britain workshop was about improving race relations; and in *Action Research and Minority Problems*, Lewin speaks out against Jim Crowism, and the potentially harmful domestic effects of US imperialism. He calls for the policies proposed by one "John Collier" leading to gradual independence to be followed. In their lifetimes, and possibly subsequently, Collier was/is probably generally better known that Lewin. A public figure, Collier was the longest serving ever Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affair (BIA), from 1933 to 1945 (ie during Roosevelt's Presidency), was responsible for the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), and the so called "New Deal for the Indians". Subsequently in 1945, he established the Institute for Ethnic Affairs in Washington DC, of which more below. Collier is the subject of two biographies (Kelly 1983, Philp 1977), published widely himself, including an autobiography (Collier 1963), and there are a number of accounts of the impacts of the New Deal (which are the subject of controversy) on Native American groups (eg Parman 1976).

Mention of Collier's involvement in the invention of action research is limited in OD texts, but always tracks back to French and Bell (1998) who in turn cite personal correspondence from Lippitt. According to French and Bell, Collier invented action research at the same time as Lewin, but independently of him. This is not how Collier himself represents his relationship with Lewin. His biography contains a photo of Lewin and the claim that before his death he had become "...one of my own intimate friends..." (1963:233). Certainly, there is evidence within the Collier archive that he and Lewin were close, not least a letter on Lewin's death from Lippitt to Collier stating:

> I think I can truly understand your feeling at the news as expressed in your note [not found in the archive] and in your poem, which I have not as yet shown to Mrs Lewin, although I think one of these days she will like very much to read it.
>
> I think you will be glad to know that after the first shock the result of our loss has been a high state of morale on the part of the students and the staff in reacting to what is perceived as a crucial challenge to somehow fill in by group ability the loss of great individual ability.

Collier was to apparently disagree with this latter hope, writing in 1963 (233) that Lewin's "... human insights and principles faltered at the hands of somewhat lesser men...." This may be an intended slighting of Lippitt, given the existence and nature of the correspondence discussed below, and Collier's reputation for frankness. If so, it is not fair to Lippitt, in terms of his own work, or his promotion of Lewin's reputation. If Lippitt was aware of this opinion then his own apparent pointing out of Collier's role at the birth of action research to French and Bell is particularly generous. Of course it may not have been intended as slight; and another reading sees ironic self criticism, as Collier himself had previously claimed (see below) to be acting on Lewin's heritage. Either way, it does not do justice to the correspondence which follows.

Another part of the correspondence fascinating in its own right is Lippitt to an IEA administrator on May 14 1946:

> I am sorry to say that it will be impossible for me to get away on May 29th for our annual dinner meeting. I would certainly like to do it, but we'll be right in the middle of a cooperative project in the training of community leaders in about a dozen Connecticut communities, working with the Governor's Committee on Intergroup Relations. It is organized as a genuine action research project and is giving us an opportunity to test out a number of hypotheses in a way which I think is rather exciting.

This is of course was what was to become known as the New Britain Workshop. Lippitt's excited anticipation somewhat belies the popular understanding that the outcomes of the event were an unexpected surprise (see Cooke 1999).

Beginnings of a Debate on Action Research

Turning to action research per se, earlier, in August 1945 while Lippitt was working at the Federal Security Agency Training Section, he wrote to Collier about his IEA prospectus and its reference to action research. This is worth quoting at some length:

> .... the process of action-research as we have meant it and developed it in usage denotes quite a new thing. It is not research-to-be-followed-by-action, or research-on-action, but research-as-action. The getting of citizens involved in planning, executing, and facing in analysis of a fact-finding process about themselves. Such projects can be counted on your fingers and over half of them failed. The others were dramatically successful. Many others will fail until there is recognition that this is not a simple process. Basically it is social therapy with skilled, non-directive leadership in the fact-facing and insight-having process. As Kurt Lewin says in the conclusion of a paper which will soon be out in the *Journal of Social Issues*, "... this principle of in-grouping

makes understandable why complete acceptance of previously rejected facts can be achieved best through the discovery of these facts by the group members themselves. Then, and frequently only then, do the facts become really *their* facts (as against other people's fact). An individual will believe facts he himself has discovered in the same way that he believes in himself or his group. The importance of this fact-finding process 'for the group by the group itself' has been recently emphasized with reference to re-education in several fields. It can be surmised that the extent to which social research is translated into social action depends on the degree to which those who carry out this action are made a part of the fact-finding on which action is to be based." Many of the projects mentioned in the prospectus are of course not action-research....

This is indicative of an early recognition of the complexities of action research; but also (on the part of both Lewin and Lippitt) of the positive "ownership of the problem" that action research can generate. It also provides a reminder that action research projects had been under way for some time before action research itself began to be written about. This was as much the case for Collier as it was Lippitt and Lewin. Indeed, as has been noted elsewhere (Cooke 1999) Collier was writing as early as 1917 of the New York People's Institute with which he was then connected "The Institute's is role action not talk. Experimental sociology is action..." (in Kelly 1983:73). In May 1945, Collier published a review of his time at the BIA, in which he described his approach there in terms of a series of principles. Principle seven (also cited by French and Bell):

"... I would call the first and the last; that research and then more research is essential to the program, that in the ethnic field research can be made a tool of action essential to all the other tools, indeed that it ought to be the master tool.... We had in mind research impelled from central areas of needed action....since the finding of the research must be carried into effect by the

administrator and the layman, and must be criticized by them through their experience, the administrator and the layman must participate creatively in the research, impelled as it is from their own area of need." (1945:275).

The Institute for Ethic Affairs

Despite the evidently warm relations between Collier and Lippitt, that continued for a while anyway, Lippitt's August 1945 letter does point to what was to become the issue at dispute between them; namely the true nature of action research. The Collier archive contains several drafts of the prospectus for the IEA, and in some places in is hard to make out where one draft stops and another takes over. We cannot therefore be sure which version of the document to which Lippitt is referring. What the archive does contain, however, is a copy of the prospectus which was finally printed by the IEA. We can be fairly sure that this was *not* the version that Lippitt commented on, in that the prospectus page and section numbers mentioned in other parts of Lewin's letter not reproduced here do not match up. It is however a final, not a draft document, and thus goes as far as is possible towards being a definitive statement on Collier's part. The preamble (1945: no page number) defined the IEA as: "An action research agency created to find and to achieve solutions to problems within and between white and colored [sic] races, cultural minority groups, and dependent peoples at home and abroad."

It continues (1945:1) that the IEA

> "has been established to deal with the profoundly disturbing problems of group tension and conflict, problems commonly referred to as "racial" in origin..... [IEA founders] believe that solutions are possible only if peoples develop to the utmost their native capacities, utilize them in harmony with other peoples, and participate fully in the determination of their own destinies...they believe these solutions must summons a deliberate and integrated use of the sciences."

This is preparatory ground for the introduction of action research, the definition of which starts out along terms which would then and subsequently be generally accepted, say within OD. However, it concludes by taking quite a different turning:

> The Institute's approach to these problems will stress the importance of "action-research". It is intended that which has been used successfully on other occasions, and to push through with all energy from research finding to knowledge in action. In brief action-research combines these essential elements: (a) assembling data, published or unpublished, experimentally proven or subjectively experienced in the lives of people (b) sharing the task of research with the very people whose hazards and whose needs are under scrutiny - indeed inviting and encouraging the leaders of people to assume a prime responsibility in working out the task: and (c) calling to assistance all the agencies of government, of private and public finance, of public opinion,

and of conscience, in programs of action which arise out of the needs of people and move toward a better ordered world.

Point (c) is important in relation to understanding the correspondence that follows, in that it sites the action that is to be taken following the research outside those being researched. The action-research orthodoxy, including that to be found in OD, has it that the researchers and the research have responsibility themselves for action. This, in essence, is the focus of the correspondence in the annexe, and is discussed further in the commentary thereon which follows. Before moving on, though, it should also be noted that prospectus continues:

> Action-research by preference will be the method used, because in human affairs, research is immeasurably more effective when evoked by the needs of action and made to flow into action and to be tested through action. And action without prior and continuing research is wasteful, when not dangerous (1945:2).

A resonance here, then with Lewin's "No action without research, no research without action". Also clear, and relevant to the following correspondence, is the claim made for scientific authority; thus while affirming the belief in action research,

> "...the Institute emphasizes that is approach is scientific. No implicit assumption is made that all ethnic or minority groups can avoid responsibility

for the disadvantages of their own situation. The institute will seek to operate not with the one-sided zeal of the reformer, but with the scientists passion for discovering the truth, conditioned by the peoples' dream of an energetic democratic society" (1945:3).

So those being researched do have some responsibility for problem solving. The ground is set, then to consider the correspondence. Before we do so, though, we should note first, that Lewin and Lippitt apparently signed up to the contents of the prospectus, in that it lists Lewin as one of three Vice Presidents, and both Lewin and Lippitt as members of the board of directors, along with other prominent social scientists like Clyde Kluckhohn and Laura Thompson. Second, the handwritten aide memoire that accompanies the correspondence in the archive suggests that Collier thought it was important, and to be preserved for posteriety, even though circumstances at the time [which are not specified] meant that it could not enter the public domain.

The Relevance of the Correspondence to Understandings of Action Research

The correspondence to our understanding of action research has several layers of relevance even before its intrinsic content is addressed. First, its very existence, hitherto unacknowledged, provides evidence that Collier has a far greater claim to be recognised Lewin's equal, at least in action research than has hitherto been the case. This in turn points to the need to continue to rigorously research Collier's contribution, not least to explore the detail of the action research projects that he conducted. That this is the case, second points to a historical ignorance, even denial

on the part of the action research literature. These words are chosen carefully. Accounts of action research have usually tracked back to Lewin, the founder, and claim to be acting on his heritage. Yet at the same time it is recognised that Lewin himself wrote very little about action research; and some concerns he did manage to raise are continuously ignored. At the same time other quite astonishing historical connections are made. It is claimed, for example that action research belongs in the Marxist/Gramscian tradition (because it is about changing the world (Reason and Bradbury 2001a)). Yet the contribution of Collier, no shadowy figure, and to a lesser extent Lippitt , goes unrecognized.

The sin is compounded because of the very claims made for research rigor, for reflexivity, and for a commitment to learning on the part of action research practitioners on the part of practitioners is clearly not followed through in terms of understanding action research's own development (again see many of the chapters in Reason and Bradbury 2001b). This particular dimension of self awareness, should be, it may be thought, a foundation level competence. Yet it does not exist, despite the huge amount of material on action research which suggests that it is not under-researched per se.

Turning to the content of the correspondence itself, it speaks for itself, and it is not intended to provide a comprehensive summary here, nor to perform the presentist act of detailed reinterpretation according to current debates within the field. The correspondence does speak for itself, and for this author, with telling insights not just

into the history of action research, but also into current theory and practice. From that current standpoint of the end of 2001, though, four overlapping themes stand out, and other readers may see more. There is the role of science and the scientist in action research; there is the role of the scientist action researcher as social activist; there is the question of whether the purpose of action research is to achieve content or process goals; and there is the question of the strategic and tactical consequences for the action researcher/action research institute of adopting/not adopting the scientist identity.

Thus Lippitt argues that the action researcher role as a scientist requires a focus on process, and a requirement that an alignment with particular causes or content goals undermines claims to science, and also can be strategically and tactically problematic. Colliers response is to argue first, that the action researcher cannot help but make content goal choices when, for example intervening in one arena and not another, and that the very presence of the scientist changes, and helps construct the field being researched. Therefore the action researcher has to make explicit choices about the nature of the society sought, and the overall policy goals which action research is seeking to achieve.

Insofar as there is a parallel with more recent work on action research, it is with that conducted in Human Relations in 1993, rather than the more recent Management Learning. The former was more critically distinctive, not least because the initial orthodoxy was challenged by others who went back to first principles, not least

questions about the extent to which researchers change and create the reality in which they intervene, and use fundamentally shaky claims to science to protect their professional position. (Bartunek 1993, Mangham 1993, Ledford and Mohrman 1993) Again, space permitting, these parallels could be drawn out in detail; but the key point to make, again, is the very absence of any mention of Collier or his contribution therein in this debate.

What this indicates is that Lippitt's philosophy prevailed. It is certainly the case that action research, in the First World at least, did not develop along the lines Collier proposed, in that the action emanating from action researched continued to be primarily the responsibility of the research, and not societal institutions (Collier's point (c) in the prospectus.) More, action research became famous, if not infamous (again, see Mangham 1993, Cooke 1999) for its emphasis on process rather than content (hence the generic critique of change management that it focuses on the process of change to the exclusion of its context). There is some (ignored) evidence that Lewin himself was sensitive to this danger. In *Action Research and Minority Problems* he wrote:

> "...let us examine the way... intergroup relations are handled. I cannot help feeling that the person returning from a successful goodwill meeting is like the captain of a boat who somehow feels that his ship steers to much to the right and therefore has turned the steering wheel sharply to the left. Certain signals assure him that the rudder has followed the mover of the steering wheel.

> Happily he goes to dinner. In the meantime of course, the boat moves in circles. In the field of intergroup relations all too frequently action is based on observations made "within the boat" and all to seldom based on objective criteria regarding to the relations of the movement of the boat to the objective to be reached (1945: 38).

But by the mid 1950s this was not the view which had prevailed. Lippitt's arguments can be seen to have prepared the ground for action research's shift away from the early focus on social change to intra-organizational and workplace from the early 1950s onwards identified by Elden and Chisholm (1993). Process came to be all, and in *The Dynamics of Planned Change* Lippitt et al's position on the change agents value judgements, and how they inform practice was merely that the "Judeo Christian democratic ethic provides general prescriptions which can guide the activities of an agent" (1954:98).

CONCLUSION

The conclusion does not lead where the preceding analysis might suggest, however. In this all too brief consideration, it should be recognised that Lippitt was unequivocally correct in one thing. There were strategic and tactical advantages in adopting scientific neutrality rather than seeking social change. Interweaved in the correspondence are mentioned the IEAs financial precariousness, and Collier's hope that this would be resolved by the Internal Revenue awarding tax exempt status.

This did not happen. This was according to Collier's biography, because the IEA criticism of US Navy policy to overseas holdings had offended then Navy Secretary Forrestal who determined to shut the IEA down. This he did, according to Collier, by persuading the Internal Revenue to withhold tax exemption. On appeal the finding was that it was "oriented to *action-research* [Collier's emphasis]. Research which involved action was by definition (Internal Revenue's definition) political and the tax privilege must be denied" (Collier 1963:33). It is ironic, then, that the Revenue agreed more with Collier than did Lippitt, and on Colliers own terms was correct to do so (which is not to deny Colliers claims of victimization). Lippitt's claims for science, and his (at risk of caricature) removal of planned change/change agency from the political arena did arguably, in the era of McCarthyism and the Cold War provide space for action research to flourish conceptually and in practice.

What this paper has provided is an understanding of the history of one particular, but important social and behavioral science idea. Revealing the history of ideas per se is an important academic endeavor, moving forward our knowledge of the development of knowledge, so to speak. This case is made by Hill (1993), who also points out the benefits of archival research as bringing more rigor to historical understandings of the development of disciplines, which often occur through the codification of oral histories and anecdote, with little attempt at verification. It is hoped that this paper, along with any intrinsic merits it may have, supports this case. Hill also points out that that archives themselves produce only partial understandings, and that too should be noted here. Not least, for example, it may be

there are substantial parts of the correspondence which did not find their way into the archive. There is certainly one piece missing, Collier's note to Lippitt and accompanying poem on Lewin's death.

Finally, the sting in the tail for those, like this author, initially sympathizing more with Collier's than Lippitts position. It is one thing to say the action-researcher must take sides; it is another to get that side right. Collier's social and political aims were actually problematic. Not least, his approach to decolonization, and perhaps to the development of action research, was heavily influenced by the British Colonial administrative policy of indirect rule, which gave only a limited amount of autonomy (Cooke 2000, Hauptmann 1986). This suggests more problems with action research per se, and of course further makes the case for a full exposition of Collier's involvement with action research.

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THE JOHN COLLIER – RONALD LIPPITT CORRESPONDENCE ON ACTION RESEARCH 1948- 1950

Edited by Bill Cooke

Aide Memoire in Colliers file, dated: December 19, 1948

The letter which follows is in reference to one from a "charter member" of the IEA. His letter, we are not free to reproduce. It questioned whether a social scientist could rightly continue as a member of an organization which professed, and acted upon, "content goals", i.e. which was moved by, and which moved towards, public policy objections. The [illegible] of the [illegible] valued member's letter can be inferred from the letter sent in reply. The correspondence relates to one of the central occupations and latent controversies and conflicts of present social science. The minor part, it considers the record and the purposes of IEA.

Lippitt to Collier, December 8, 1948 (a)

When I re-read the enclosed letter to you I decided to tear it up as sounding too critical, rather than expressing the state of puzzlement which is a more accurate description. But as long as it is clear that I do not feel personally critical in any way, I think the note does express my questions as to what direction the Institute is taking, and my own feeling of non-participation in that direction....

Lippitt to Collier, December 8, 1948 (b)

I was very sorry to hear, from your letter of December 1, about the financial difficulties of the Institute. Certainly you have been carrying on an active program of publication and communication toward influential sources of action. I am sorry to say that I have been unable to find much in these activities which resembles what I had understood and hoped the Institute would become. Our own limited program of research and consultation during the past two years, and currently, makes it clearer than ever to me that there is a very widespread readiness for collaboration in

action research formulated and executed with high scientific standards. We are forced to turn down 90% of such requests because of our problems of securing personnel to do a high level job. Financing does not seem to be a problem. At the moment, we are most enthusiastic about the request from the United Nations to explore the possibilities of collaborating on research analysis of committee procedures, with members of secretariat staffs on the research team. The staff, led by Stuart Cook at the Commission on Community Interrelations, has made a great many methodological advances in action research techniques while they have been making major action contributions at the same time. Our training program for action research teams in the summer laboratory of the National Training Laboratory in Group Development is meeting with a most enthusiastic response from all types of agencies and organizations. We are hoping for more social scientists from abroad this summer than last summer.

Perhaps my difficulty is that my definition of action-research is somewhat different from your own conception. Or perhaps I was quite incorrect in my original understanding of the statement of purpose of the organization. I do wish I could get a more adequate understanding of the situation.

...I would like to tender my resignation from the Board of Directors. It is certainly not fair for me to continue on such a non-participant basis....

Collier to Lippitt, December 19, 1948

[...] I don't know that our conception of research and action research differs from yours. In my own case, in a social research seminar which I am leading, I use Kurt Lewin and Group Dynamics material and ideas more than any source.

It is rather, I think, that a major purpose of the Institute, as stated from the beginning, was to help in offshore dependency problems, particularly those of the American dependencies but also a worldwide intent. And it still remains a fact – regrettably – that no organization except the Institute is handling the subject of the USA

dependencies, and especially of the Pacific Islands beyond Hawaii. In this last area, while we have done research currently on the ground (the Joseph-Murray Saipan project, not yet published), we have had to rely on numerous other research results (US Commercial Co. and now, Pacific Science Board). The Saipan research, under naval government limitations, could not be of the action type.

Our action-research project for the Near East, formulated with Kurt Lewin, remains adjourned until peace comes over there. Our research into organic acts and administrative technics and goals, conceived thoroughly as action research involving the Islanders and local administrators, awaits both the coming of civil rule and the finding of money: so far, we have only the Navy's offer of transportation and hospitality to and on the Islands, and a pending fellowship grant (Viking) for one worker. Meantime, the Foundation for Research in Ethnic Affairs is incorporated but has not yet been brought alive; its projects of research will all be of the integrative and action research sort.

Unless you disapprove of what we <u>are</u> doing, as distinct from wishing we were doing other and more, I hope you will remain on the Board . . . . . The real difficulty, I believe, is absence of face to face contact, and this applies to too many Board members....

Lippitt to Collier, January 5, 1949

Thank you very much for your good letter of December 19th. I am afraid I wasn't very coherent in indicating to you the reasons why I felt it was necessary for me to resign as one of the Directors of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs in spite of my belief that you are doing a very important piece of work which should be continued with all the financing that can be located.

I tried to indicate to you that the reason for this decision is the clearer and clearer differentiation which I have been forced to make between citizen activities toward political goals and social scientist's activities toward social science values as I

perceive them. This problem has become more and more apparent to me during the period that it has also become clearer to me that the Institute of Ethnic Affairs is not primarily a social research organization but a group having specific "content goals" concerning American policy in regard to the American dependencies. I am completely in sympathy with these goals, but I have come to question my right to identify with them. I indicated above the logical distinction between my role as a citizen and my role as a social scientist... As a result of some stimulating conversations with A.T.M. Wilson of Tavistock and other colleagues here in this country, I have come to question the possibility of maintaining this as a psychological and social differentiation, logical though it may be. I have pretty much decided that in order to carry on most effectively my political and scientific activities as a social scientist, I must try to build this role of a scientist as the "socially visible role" as well as increasing its psychological weight. As a consequence I must inhibit the attainment of visibility in a citizen role dedicated to the attainment of a wide variety of "content goals".

What do I mean then by political activities as a social scientist? As I see it, my major public or political goal as a social scientist must be to "lobby" in every way possible for the application of scientific methodology in the solution of the problems of human affairs and human relations. Universal sensitivity to and participation in scientific activity and the "experimental outlook" seems to be the surest approach to the distribution of a genuine democratic power.

If I identify with the content goals of the United Auto Workers with whom we are now working, then I tend to lose the possibility of furthering this goal of scientific skills and outlook with the American Telegraph and Telephone Company or the Ford Motor Company, and visa versa. But to the extent that I can clearly define my role as that of the methodological collaborator or consultant, oriented to the job of helping them find out the consequences about their own goals and their own ways of locomoting toward these goals then I find I can work effectively with these and many other groups which are even more incompatible in their "content goals".

Because I am most vitally interested in the application of scientific methodology to the area of conflict and collaboration between groups, I of course have an interest in stimulating various strategic groups to apply scientific methodology to the examination of their relationships with other groups as well as the analysis to their own functioning. The role of the "methodological middle-man" seems to be absolutely essential in the stimulation of adequately objective approaches to such inter-group examination of relationships and behavior. And such a middle-man must be perceived as neutral as concerns a range of specific group goals of each of the groups concerned.

Perhaps at this point you are inclined to question my assumption about the impossibility of maintaining a clear and visible distinction between my social scientist role and my citizen role. I have collected quite a number of anecdotal observations which are indications to me of the loss of effectiveness of various social scientist colleagues of mine because of what I have now come to regard as their impulsive readiness to allow themselves to achieve visibility as citizens. This loss of effectiveness is primarily of course in the area of working as a scientist with citizen groups. I do not have any observations about loss of effectiveness as academic teachers or as supervisors of graduate student theses. I am also inclined to believe that this is primarily a problem of the social scientist working with groups on problems of social environment as contrasted to the physical scientist working on problems of physical environment.

If you think this general outlook is screwy, I would like very much to review your thinking about it before you take my name off the list of Directors. As you can see, I am inclined to press my letter of resignation.

I am of course very interested in the whole idea of the Foundation for Research in Ethnic Affairs. I shall be glad to contribute whatever help I can through a distance to that activity when it becomes vitalized. I certainly hope it may be possible for us to

collaborate with you in the training of an action research team through our summer laboratory. If you have any thoughts about a possible team this summer, please let us know as soon as possible because the program of the past two summers seems to have resulted in quite a flood of applications for next summer.

I quite agree with you about the big problem of a policy board trying to operate when geographically spread out. Even active correspondence on policy decisions (such as we have in SPSSI) is not enough. I belong to one group which has done a fairly adequate job by diminishing the restraining forces to the use of the telephone. It would be an interesting experiment to see what an executive secretary could do with an adequate organizational budget to hold telephone conferences with his board when he needed them.

Collier to Lippitt, February 4, 1949

I am tardy in replying to your January 5 letter: not only because of trying to work in 8 or 9 successive places of residence in 4 weeks, but because the subject of your letter is profoundly interesting – important, I believe – and cannot be discussed (usefully) in few words. I have, in fact, wanted to re-think the question. I have not finished trying to re-think it, although my own position is implicitly clear.

What follows goes beyond the issues directly posed by your own trend of thinking and choice as formulated in your letter. It goes to the question which hovers about and stirs within all social science now, of whether "value" and purposiveness do or do not functionally belong within social science. Science, the knowing process, John Stuart Mill's "Logic" concludes, is in the indicative mood; art, the doing process, is in the imperative mood. It has been held to follow, that the scientist, including the social scientist, is obligated to be, and entitled to be, an indifferentist. Clearly, Mill was within the Cartesian century. The historical necessity of that century is clear. The necessity was both sociological and intellectual. Its monition remains permanently needful, wherever testing or verification is pursued. But the Cartesian century is a good many decades past its end, now, intellectually speaking, and can be

as much an inhibitor of new discovery as Thomism came to be; and sociologically, its holdover in the momentum of institutions, and of philosophical pre-suppositions which are evermore re-verified by the actions of the market economy, are hag-riding a large part of the world, and are extremely handicapping the effort to keep and to replace in the changed world those very values of freedom and disinterestedness which Locke and Descartes helped to establish. (Karl Polanyi is one of those who have most lucidly stated the above proposition).

Surely, we can all now see the thing that some deep thinkers in all ages have seen, and that field and subliminal psychology and, now biology, make plain: that knowing process is acting process, that perceiver and field partly make each other, that discovery is a creative, not only a passive operation, that the whole "apperceptive endowment" is needfully involved in the identification of problems and the feeling-out and meditative effort (unconscious as well as conscious) which leads to hypotheses, and even, and perhaps hardly less, in the invention of tecnics of verification. (Who more greatly than Kurt Lewin shows these factors?). We are coming, in social science, to an additional realization, making clear again that the *whole man* is the productive social researcher: to wit, that the feeling-out, the tracing, and the persuasively and courageous statement of the implications of research findings is the way that the findings are brought into world meaning, the way that values generically emerge from scientific findings, and one of the ways that social science delivers its weight to the world.

Some additional realizations are emerging fast, among them these: That social science has potentialities (of good and ill) as great for human life as biology or physics; that there are interests and power groups which are not going to be deterred from their limited, their sometimes explicitly anti-social objectives; that toward their purposes they will use physics, biology, social science, if the scientists are willing to help them. This consideration by itself, apart from the more generically compelling facts stated in the preceding paragraph, confront all scientists, but uniquely the social scientist, with the question: are you going to take civic, citizen, moral, human

responsibility for choosing whether, in the face of conditions not hypothetical, you shall contribute, perhaps decisively, to the ruin of the world? The question then shifts to the positive side: Are you going to choose to devote your limited resources to the making (and, through action research, to the implanting) of social discovery, for and within those groups, those enterprises - those "causes", if one will - which are committed and through new social discovery, may be made more irrevocably and potently committed to the saving and making of the world? The choice may be one decided purely from within the social-scientific data if the implications of findings are boldly and creatively spelled out (see last sentence of above paragraph, starting line 2, page 2). But the choice may have to be made in the absence of such spelled-out implications: Soviet scientists have had to make it thus, and we here may have to make it simply on the basis of our inherited ethics and values and ideals and sense of the real.

One more, partly disparate, consideration. Time is running out. The programming of social research - first things first - is imperative. It is not to be taken for granted - rather, the opposite is well known - that governments, diplomats, military officials, businesses, political parties, church organizations, pressure groups, functional associations, philanthropic foundations, etc. etc., are going to attempt to do this imperative programming in terms of world requirement and possible wealth of most universally usable research-yield. In your letter you speak of the social scientist's duty to propagandise for social science. Yes, but a duty more uniquely his own, is to propagandise for, to sacrifice for, and to direct his discovering activity toward this urgent world-programming of social science. This includes planned, cooperative endeavour by social scientists to establish the discovering process in areas of the human and man-nature problem which are critical areas of maximum potential social and world influence. Here, once again, valuing, citizenship, unbeatable social purpose, must be conjoined within the scientific functioning.

(An item in the neighbourhood of some of the above, but especially of paras. 2 and 3 of this letter. I chanced today to come upon Chapter 3 of Havelock Ellis' "The Dance

of Life". It is the chapter on "The Art of Thinking". It is not only graceful and rich but surprisingly *au courant.*)

Not all of the above applies to the suggestions contained in your letter: yet perhaps it does apply. To elect to have no "socially visible role" other than that of an indifferentist social scientist plus a visible advocacy of the use of social science, would seem - if one really does such a thing - to involve abandoning most of the affairs and the sources of significant apperception which are of this world. Socially invisible roles become roles non-existent or only sterilely alive inwardly, for we live through communicating, we can act only with others, thought immured from action lies down and dies. But perhaps most relevant: thus much of socially invisible - rather, thus little of socially visible, therefore of actual - role very often (in our present society, usually) will forbid the tracing through and the bold statement of the implications of research findings. It will truncate the research process and ultimately deliver research into the limited-purpose confines of special-interest groups. Among other lines, the veritably immense and profound potentialities of "group dynamics research" cannot be realized within so self-limiting a role, I believe.

About Ethnic Institute. It has specific "content goals", as you state, although goals much broader than the welfare of the American Dependencies. (Its equal concern is with the world dependencies, with all of Chapters 11 and 12 of the UN Charter, and it finances and operates the USA branch of the Interamerican Indian Institute. Much else beside, but see the News Letter etc.)

But what your letter omits, is that these "content goals" derive from the results of research deep and broad, while also explicitly moving toward further research. I refer to research by those who formed the Institute research, whose generalized findings caused them to organize the Institute. (Among other research-sources of the "content program" I mention only a few: The twenty-years' continued research, involving numerous disciplines, into Indian life, and Indian administration, experimentally conducted as a special case of cross-cultural and dependency

administration. The studies of sub-professional health work in Oceania, and of native medicine and its present and future used among the Navajos, and the sub-professional health enterprise of Nicaragua. The analytic and experimental studies of bi-lingual education, mass literacy etc. The social analysis experience in WRA. Kurt Lewin's work, and yours. The Spanish colonial record, and the successes and shortcomings of the post-revolutionary ejidal enterprise of Mexico. Exhaustive research into the Guam record, including the record and present of the Naval government there. These examples, preceding, but supplying the research foundation for the "content program", could be multiplied.) Subsequently, in treating of all the American dependencies, the Institute has used all source material, the interview method, psychiatric and psychological research "on the ground" in Micronesia; its representative soon will depart for a re-survey of all the Pacific Islands, the Navy being our host. The research purpose, and concepts of research methods etc., would be more conspicuously evident had the Institute more money. We hope that with tax-exemption of the Ethnic Research Foundation, we *shall* have more money.

This turns out to be a very long letter; as remarked at its beginning, your letter caused me to try to re-think the whole subject, and I haven't finished trying yet. You realize, I know, how high a value I place on your own work. Consider this letter as not really addressed to you, but to the numerous social scientists whose thinking upon the subject-matter of our letters seems to have moved in the same direction as yours . . . . In Washington the coming Monday, back in N.Y. for good by the 10th.

Every wish, as ever,

Lippitt to Collier, February 23, 1949

Dear John

Many thanks for your helpful contribution of February 4 to the problem we are both trying to solve - the proper role of social science and the social scientist in the solution of the "action problems" of human affairs. I certainly cherish your

collaboration in helping me to clarify my rusty efforts at thinking about the problem. Some of what follows is new territory into which you have pushed me, and some is an effort to communicate more clearly certain notions that I evidently did not say very well in my last letter.

The first of these misunderstandings is your identification of my self-defined role as that of the "indifferentist" – the scientist who splits *knowing* from *acting*. Certainly there are many thoughtful scientists today who maintain that wholehearted devotion to "increasing our stockpile of knowledge" is the only appropriate role for the scientist – *as a scientist*. This type of scientist of course is free to take a variety of active citizen roles, as is the banker or the shoemaker. I agree with you that in our field (1) the "knower" cuts himself off from much of the field of data that must be known if he tries to split knowing and action as independent realms; (2) and also the need for everyone to contribute to social problem solving is too urgent for us to reject this responsibility.

What we are faced with is the problem of making the most effective contribution we can. At this point, I think the two of us begin to analyze the situation somewhat differently.

You stress that the urgent need is for the productive social researcher to "- - - - persuasively and courageously state the implications of the research findings (so) that the findings are brought into world meaning - - - -".

I stress the notion that the social scientist is in most cases quite ill-prepared to make direct interpretations of his findings to *new* problem situations, partly because of the state of development of the basic science, but more because every important decision situation in human affairs demands its own unique problem solving effort, its own separate diagnosis of the relevant variables and hypotheses about probable consequences. Therefore I arrive at the conclusion that the greatest social need is for the widespread application of sound problem solving methodology, which we

scientists are want to call scientific method. It seems compellingly clear to me that whatever relevant nuggets of knowledge social science has turned up will only be utilized appropriately within the framework of intelligent problem solving processes being carried out in regard to each specific decision and action of each unit of society. Until the scientist can get over his godlike role of "shouting interpretations and implications through a distance" he is doomed to be rejected, and should be rejected as a appropriate resource person in the problem solving processes of a democratic culture.

If (this is an assumption I'm making) this problem solving process is the application of the principles of scientific methodology to the continuous selection and assessment of goals and means, values and tools, then this is the crucial social situation that calls for the collaboration of those social researchers who want to extend their role most appropriately beyond the other very important role of scientific stock-piling of knowledge which we assume will acquire greater or lesser relevance for the solution of certain action problems at some time – distant or soon.

As you point out so cogently there are a number of difficult problems which I run into in attempting to test this extension of the scientist role as my "scientist-citizen role".

1. What about my value system concerning certain goals for action in this society which I have come to think are good or bad? Is this problem solving methodology amoral? Will I accept the opportunity to give, or sell, my services to any group?

2. What about my notions about democratic process as well as goals? How do these relate scientific methodology as process?

3. Are the skills I have acquired as a research scientist really the appropriate skills for this job or training others in a research approach to

problem solving, or are there other functionaries who would and can do a better job?

As I try to start the examination of these questions I find I must first check myself on where I stand on the question of social change. In the position I am taking is there any basis for saying that there should be change? Or what kind of change it should be?

I seems clear to me that social change is required by the nature of events. The field of relations or forces to which adjustment must be made is constantly changing - so the formulating of new goals and means is a continuous requirement if our behaviour is to be oriented to the realities of the changing environment (which to quite an extent we are creating). Change is certainly neither good nor bad - it is just a fact.

But the process by which we go about changing - that is something I have a value system about in the position I'm trying to explore and define for myself. Explicitly my value judgment or assumption is that the application of the principles of scientific methodology define the best process of changing our human relations toward more appropriate patterns. (I want to acknowledge my indebtedness here and at many other points to Kenneth Benne, Professor of Social Philosophy at the University of Illinois for clarifying this general point for me in a manuscript which he has just completed).

But does this give me any satisfying and stable end values for my behavior? I think so. The end value is that there be a maximum utilization of scientific problem solving procedures in dealing with all problems of human endeavor - goal setting and unsetting, means setting and changing, etc. This implies that I have arrived at the notion for myself that what we customarily call the democratic way of life is an attempt to formulate the group conditions in which scientific problem solving can emerge and develop.

Let me test this notion with an example. Obviously a lot more work must be done to push to a real test.

It seems to me that one criterion of scientific method is that data about a state of affairs being analysed be derived from objective measurement of that situation rather than from projections of the wishes and hopes of the scientist who is attempting to arrive at knowledge and interpretations about that state of affairs.

If we ask what implications this methodological value or norm has for the actual the actual problem solving operation of a person or group which accepts this value, I come up with such derivations as the following:

1. The group must establish and maintain the type of inter-member communication that will provide maximum flow of data for decision and action at any time.

2. The group must resist stratification along influence dimensions based on emotional and prestige factors which are not task-oriented (status weight in opinion influencing should be proportional to contribution-of-data weight, also manipulation of data skill at a later stage, etc.).

3. The group must so constitute itself and organize its effort that it can and does seek and receive intelligence from its environment relevant to the decisions it is making and action it is taking.

etc. (we could go on)

Let's look at some implications of this criterion at the level of individual functioning rather than group functioning:

1. The individual must recognize continuously the psychological fact of emotional involvement in activities and ideas as both an asset and a liability – as a source of motivation and a source of unintelligent resistance – and must practice skill in inhibiting his tendencies to defend and promote ideas which need objective evaluation and reformulation.

2. The person must achieve sensitivity in assessing the sources of influence on himself, to differentiate between depending on status figures and dependence on fact-oriented influences.

These then would seem to be a few of the skills I would promote in the interests of this particular methodological value, as a scientific methodologist working with this group.

Each element of scientific method which one selects for this type of analysis – regarding it as the value to be achieved (to be fought for) seems to lead directly to statements about personal functioning and group functioning which seem to me to be the operational definition of democracy.

Now I come to the question of whether I'm ready to work with any group in our society in the role of scientific methodologist? My answer at the moment is Yes – and No. Yes – as far as my personal value reaction to their goals of the moment is concerned. But No –

1. If my efforts to create a need for my participation with them as a methodologist is a failure; if there is a lack of sensitivity to the problem of need for help on methodology of problem solving.

2. If the spread potential of my effort (within the group or outward from the group) is very low compared to other situations and there is opportunity for choice.

3. If, after a tryout, I find unyielding resistance to the application of these methodological principles in the examination of the values or goals of the group in its relation with its environment - limiting its efforts only to some minor aspects of internal functioning. (This I think is a crucial point in regards to your remarks about the misuse of science).

4. If my working relationship with this group would be inevitably perceived (in spite of the best I could do) as identifying me with the goals of this group in the eyes of a large proportion of the groups I would hope to have access to.

This last point brings up a rather important strategic issue I think, one which you point to at some length in your letter. At the present moment I think there are a number of reasons why it is psychologically difficult or strategically unwise to identify oneself with the objectives of a particular group or organization in which one is functioning as a scientific methodologist.

1. First of all, many of the groups which are most in need of help do have, or perceive themselves as having, incompatible interests - so there is intergroup tension. The methodological consultant is in a position to work with both groups - in fact very often to serve as communication middleman in problem solving of intergroup tensions - if he restrains carefully from any public identification with the goals of any of the groups.

2. In his work with a particular group the scientific methodologist (as also the therapist) begins to run into a number of difficulties if he begins to be perceived as "one of us" rather than as actively and sympathetically interested in "how we do things we are trying to do".

3. A third reason has to do with the strategic contribution of energy of the scientist in working with groups in this role. If the nature of the objectives of the group is used as the basis for his selection, it is highly probable that much effort will be wasted, because the potentialities for change must be painstakingly diagnosed in terms of readiness or resistance to the exploration of scientific problem solving procedures – as well as in terms of strategic position in society in relation to the overall dynamics of change.

As far as I can see so far this self-imposed restriction for strategic purposes on becoming socially visible as actively identified with the objectives of various action groups does not inhibit the responsibility for intensive personal analysis of all these objectives and inevitably arriving at private value judgements. I think we must know how we feel in order to do a disciplined job of controlling our role as a methodological therapist. [illegible] certain this line of analysis opens up whole new areas for vigorous socially visible political activity and decrying unintelligent problem solving procedures in establishing the goals and means of all types of groups in our society.

Let me return now to the final question I posed – is this a job for a social researcher? My answer is yes – this is basically a job of training in social research methods, usually by close collaboration and consultation rather than in any formal "teacher role". Although the specific requirements of this scientist consultant role call for broader skills in a number of ways that those we need in order to personally produce good research – I think the categories of skill are the same – the creating of readiness, the training of other in the objective observer role, the design for hypothesis testing, methodology of sampling, etc. All of these are major skill requirements of the scientist-citizen as problem solving methodologist.

I guess I have shot my bolt for this time. I don't feel anywhere near as certain as I may have sounded. I feel you've pushed me to considerable progress in formulating

some of the aspects of this particular position so that we can examine it a bit more effectively. I'm eager for your next share of this conversation.

Collier to Lippitt, April 27, 1949

This is a belated follow-up of our earlier correspondence on role, value, purpose in social science. The remarks will be fragmentary . . . . a rounded-out discussion would be lengthy indeed.

1. The scope of social research and social science. It includes inter-personal relations and intra- and inter-group dynamics but includes much beside. Economics, for example, the man-nature relationship; population problems; organization of industry, of government etc.; administration. Etc. True, that most social action is mediated or implemented through inter-personal relations and group dynamics, but so, equally, it is mediated through muscle action (at one extreme), semantics (at another). As soon as the breadth of scope of social science is held in mind (for example, in terms of resources exhaustion, of human hygiene, of housing, of the assembly-line, of fascism and democracy), it seems to become plain that the social scientist must be possessed of value and purpose, whether or not he chooses a socially visible or a socially less visible role. I mean, not just as a man but as a scientist; for otherwise there will be no assurance that he will choose problems of critical importance to work on or that he *will not* wind up by becoming simply a technician for power groups, ideological groups, etc.

Within group dynamics, I would agree that there is some little of room for usefulness and for discovery, in the absence or suppression of any purpose beyond that of increasing the experience of reasonableness among men. Yet even there, I recollect Kurt Lewin's remark at the end of his discussion of your democratic-authoritarian experiment. Reasonableness is a situational response, he suggests. Achieve the democratic situation and you achieve reasonableness. Within the authoritarian situation you can get all sorts of

other results, but not reasonableness. Thus, the social scientist, though he may seek only to increase reasonableness, has to have the value and purpose of aiming at comprehensive and deep democracy and aiming against (say) fascism overt and covert. He must make choices in terms of both worldwide and domestic and intimate. And those choices often will have to eventuate in overt socially purposive roles. No escaping it, that I can see.

2. The matter (see my Feb 4 letter, p.2, and your Feb 23 letter p.1) of: "To wit, that feeling out, tracing, and persuasively and courageously stating the implications of research findings, is the way that findings are brought into world meaning, the way that values generically emerge from research findings" etc. This does not mean, as your letter puts it, that the scientist in a "godlike role" would be "shouting interpretations and implications through a distance", although it *might*, sometimes, mean that the scientist would be "doomed to be rejected".

The proposition can be stated in two ways or at two levels. First, *methodological.* It is the scientist's job not merely to make particular discoveries but to generalize them into hypotheses covering wider fields of fact, which hypotheses he or someone else proceeds to test. This proposition is contained in all the textbooks and illustrated by the whole history of science. Second, if one will, *political or ethical.* The nuclear scientists were entirely capable, in advance of making the atom bomb, of spelling out to themselves and to the world the consequences [rest of sentence illegible]. However, it is multiplied in such instances as the insecticides, the consequences of engineering dependence on big downstream dams, the consequences of public health work in (say) Puerto Rico, the consequences of the guided missile. All these are negative examples. The way that Wm. Ja [?] backed Thomas Beers in his mental hygiene crusading is an example on the positive side; the way that Hugh Bennet spelled out into economic and social terms the implications of his findings into soil erosion and methods of conservation, is a positive

example. In this second, or ethical aspect, I'm not suggesting that it is the obligation of every scientist to go beyond his intellectual competence or to stand himself up to be shot at in tracing the indirect consequences of his invention or discovery and drawing out its implications for the social whole: I only am suggesting that much of such tracing-out is in fact within the scientist's intellectual competence, and that often he can enrich human thought and sometimes he is categorically obligated to such tracing out. And a research becomes more richly of the inter-disciplinary and integrative type, *the research team* will possess great intellectual competence for the tracing out.

3. A generalized quote from Kurt Lewin, in conclusion. From *Action Research and Minority Problems*, Nov 1946. "Unfortunately there is nothing in social laws or social research which will force the practitioner toward the good. Science gives more freedom and power to both the doctor and the murderer, to democracy and fascism. The social scientist should recognize his responsibility also in respect to this.

Lippitt to Betty Cooper, IEA, cc John Collier December 8, 1949

Thank you for your letter of November 28 calling my attention to the expiration of my membership in the Institute of Ethnic Affairs this month. About a year ago, I wrote to John Collier asking that my resignation from the Board of Directors of the Institute be accepted. I indicated at that time the reasons why I felt it was necessary for me to resign from the Board of Directors, although I was in active sympathy with the objectives and activities of the Institute and had planned to continue my membership. As far as I can see from the letterhead, no action has been taken on my resignation, so the only recourse I seem to have is to allow my membership in the Institute to expire in order to make my resignation effective.

I certainly think you are doing a fine piece of work and I wish you every success in the gruelling work of the Institute.

Cooper to Lippitt, February 17, 1950

... I think Mr Collier hoped that you would change your mind about resigning from the Institute Board and consequently never formally accepted your resignation. Then at the annual meeting in October, 1949, the membership indicated its desire to include you among the Institute directorate. That is why your name continued to appear on the letterhead.

Now, before initiating a large membership drive in March, in which names of Board members will be printed on promotion pamphlets and letterheads, I thought it best to ascertain your current wishes in the matter of Board membership. Your consent to serve would be most welcome, but at the same time I do not want to overlook entirely the desires you have previously expressed.

P.S. Iwould be interested in seeing any current publications of the Research Center.

Lippitt to Cooper, March 13 1950

Thank you for your letter of February 17. I would appreciate very much your removing my name from the membership of the Board. I am afraid I am rather compulsive about having my name related to activities where I cannot be active in the affairs of the group.

I am glad to enclose a copy of the current Research Center bibliography as you request. Please give my very best greetings to John Collier when you see him next. I would certainly relish an opportunity for some good conversations with him to hear how the affairs of the Institute are developing.

Enclosure

IDPM
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

Paper No 68

THE DENIAL OF SLAVERY IN MANAGEMENT STUDIES

by

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July 2002

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ISBN: 1 904143 29 6

Published by: Institute for Development Policy and Management
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THE DENIAL OF SLAVERY IN MANAGEMENT STUDIES

> "Throughout the era of slavery the Negro was treated in a very inhuman fashion. He was considered a thing to be used, not a person to be respected. He was merely a depersonalised cog in a vast plantation machine."
>
> Martin Luther King (1956), in King (1986, p. 5)

INTRODUCTION

This article is about the wrongful exclusion of American slavery from histories of management. There is at least an argument that this is of intrinsic relevance to management studies. This is a part empirical revision that writes in a missing link with one of the most significant, and devastating social processes to have affected Africa, Europe, and the Americas in the modern era. This revision extends what is recognized as the collective understanding of our field.

If this is not enough, however, there is additional significance in relation to the construction of management history, and the purposes that that history serves. This derives from a view of history that its writing is as much about the present in which it is produced, as it is about the past. History is "never for itself. It is always for someone" (Jenkins 1991, p. 17); and as Cooke (1999, p. 83) points out, "the way history is written, the choices made in selecting and ignoring past events are shaped by prevailing, albeit competing power relations and their associated ideologies."

From this position, what is called history, but might more accurately be called historiography, contributes to the legitimization of present day institutions, practices, and bodies of knowledge; but also to emergent and established critiques thereof. Thus, a standard history in which management first emerges on the US railroads from the 1840s onwards (Chandler (1977)) associates it with what is often represented as an heroic, frontier extending episode in the history of the United States. Extending Pushkala Prasad's (1997) identification of the intra-organizational imprints of the myth of the frontier, this association can be seen to give management a broader social and cultural legitimacy.

A history which constructs an alternative narrative, in which American, and particularly US pre-Civil War slavery is a site of the birth of management (as is the case here) gives management quite different associations, with oppression and exploitation. This history would imply quite a different view of the social legitimacy of management in itself. In making its case, presenting data and the interpretations of non-management historians, it would also undermine any claim of the heroic model to be based in the only empirically true representation of the past.

Of course, such a history would equally challenge *any* version of the history of management which explicitly or otherwise excludes slavery. Every version I have seen does so exclude; this a general phenomenon. It is the case even of critical approaches to management, including those which present alternatives to orthodox historiography (eg Jacques 1996), and/or point to other historical instances of management's complicity in the worst forms of oppression (eg Burrell (1997) on

management in/of the holocaust). The implications that this article has for these versions does vary according to their historical/ historiographical approach and position, and these are addressed in the conclusion. There are implications are for the whole of management studies, though; and it is management studies as a whole which has excluded – indeed denied - slavery.

A Prima Facie Case

At the time of writing, this is feels like quite a remarkable claim, and indeed part of my main thesis is that it is unprecedented. But even the briefest prima facie consideration of the organization, scale, and significance of slavery provides strong support. Martin Luther King's use of metaphor associated with the production line and bureaucracy (Morgan (1986)) is neither anachronistic or unique. Fogel (1989, p. 28) confirms this with a quotation from Bennet Barrow's Highland plantation rules: "A plantation might be considered as a piece of machinery. To operate successfully all its parts should be uniform and exact, and its impelling force regular and steady."

Equally telling is Olmsted, who wrote in 1860 of one plantation (1860, pp. 53-54): "The machinery of labor was ungeared during a day and a half a week, for cleaning and repairs, experience having proved here, as it has in Manchester and New York, that operatives do very much better work if thus privileged.... Regarding only the balance sheet of the owners ledger it was admirable management." In this short paragraph Olmsted employs the machine metaphor; suggests a conscious proto-hawthorne manipulation of rest periods and uses the very word "management" to describe this. In repeating a parallel he makes elsewhere with Manchester and New

York (1860, p. 27), Olmsted also by implication locates the plantation within a global, capitalist, economy.

Elsewhere, in one of the few direct references to slavery in management histories, Jacques (1996, p. 42) claims that the US Civil War "is usually represented as either a contest between state and national authority or a fight to end slavery. It was in part both these things, but it could more appropriately be termed the country's Industrial Revolution. By 1865, the industrializing North of the US had politically demolished the feudal economy of the manorial South."

This is not a received view amongst contemporary historians (see McPherson, 2001). Fogel (1989) shows that if the North and the "feudal" and "manorial" South were considered separately, and ranked among countries of the world "the South would stand as the fourth most prosperous country in the world in 1860. The South was more prosperous than France, Germany, Denmark or any of the countries of Europe" (1989, p. 87). The South was also continuing to industrialize, albeit more slowly than the North, on the basis of slave labor; and it was in reality not a separate country but an integral, and according to Richards (2000) the most politically powerful, part of the burgeoning US state and capitalist economy. Fogel states: "throughout the eighteenth century, the great plantations of the sugar colonies...were the largest private enterprises of the age, and their owners were among the richest of all men. The same can be said of the cotton plantations in the United States on the eve of the Civil War" (Fogel, 1989, p. 24).

Of course, the eve of the Civil War takes us well into the time period of 1840 onwards in which orthodox histories (Chandler 1977, also Wren 1972) have management emerging on the railroads. According to Taylor (1999, p. xxvi), by 1860 "capital investment in slaves in the [US] south – who now numbered close to four million, or close to one third of the population – exceeded the value of all other capital worth including land". US slavers could therefore literally have claimed 'our people are our greatest asset'. Management studies is concerned with a field which can define itself as about "the process of getting activities completed efficiently with and through other people" (Robbins, 1994, p. 3). Yet it has not exhibited even superficial curiosity about how these four million enslaved people were managed, at the very time and in the very nation where it claims management to have been born, in a set of long established, economically important organizations.

The structure and approach of the article

As I have already stated, this is the case for the range of differing understandings that there are of management. Considering these understandings collectively, and trying despite their difference to account for the exclusion of slavery is not without its methodological problems. But as the next section demonstrates, none of the three main schools of managerial thought Grey (1999) identifies (technical, elite, and political) sees the management of people who were slaves as having anything to do with modern management.

That section will also explore why this is the case. Recognizing the vastness and diversity of the field Grey quite helpfully follows Reed (1989) in identifying exemplar texts for each of the schools; and he also argues despite their differences they together

constitute a taken for granted understanding of what management is. These exemplars, and this taken for granted understanding are then examined to reveal the often implicit logic which appears to have led to the denial of slavery.

Subsequent sections of the article will in turn refute the three main components of this logic. Section three will analyze slavery's relationship with capitalism, and its role in the emergence of industrial discipline. Section four will review how slave plantations were managed, and section five will set out the extent to which there was a distinctive management occupational category in the ante-bellum south. The material that is drawn on in these three sections, aside from one or two primary sources, is the work of political, social, and economic historians of slavery. That these are secondary rather than primary sources actually lends strength to the underlying claim of denial. The material which management studies has ignored is not obscure hard to retrieve primary data; but the often publicly acclaimed (eg David Brion-Davis, cited below, has won the Pultizer Prize, the Bancroft Prize, and the National Book Award for books on slavery) and widely reviewed work of those with a longstanding and substantial institutional presence in the academy.

The conclusion assesses the implications of the preceding sections on their own terms, in relation to management history/historiography more generally, and for various versions of that history. In so doing it proposes a more postcolonialist understanding of that history; but at the same time suggests that this should not be seen as the only, or even primary significance of the article. If there is to be one message above all to arise from this article, the conclusion suggests, it is that with which it started – that management studies has wrongly excluded slavery; and that that exclusion is properly termed a denial.

THE ABSENCE AND PRESENCE OF SLAVERY IN MANAGEMENT LITERATURE

The standards on slavery

When it comes to slavery's actual, rather than metaphorical, presence in management there is little to be found. The standard histories of management either make no mention at all of ante-bellum slavery in the modern context (for example Pollard (1968) Wren (1972)), or alternatively explicitly exclude it from modernity, as we have already seen with Jacques (1996). An explanation of both unspoken and explicit exclusions is sought here in a review of three texts proposed as exemplars on management by Grey (1999), after Reed (1989), namely Burnham (1945), Braverman (1974) and Chandler (1977).

Grey follows Reed in distinguishing between technical, elite and political accounts of the emergence of management. In the technical account, exemplified by Chandler, the "growth in scale and complexity of capitalist enterprises required the development of a new group of specialists to manage" (Grey, 1999, p. 566); hence the requirement to coordinate through the visible hand of these managers rather than the invisible hand of the market. In the elite account, exemplified by Burnham, management is seen as a body of theory and practice which sustains an advantageous status for a particular, managerial, elite, which is able to attain that position in the first place because of the separation of ownership from control. In the political account, exemplified by Braverman, management emerged from the drive to subject workers to the discipline required by capitalist accumulation. According to Grey, "it may be noted that while

this political approach to management is opposed to the functionalism of technical accounts of management, it has its own functionalism: workplace discipline is seen as functional of the drive for capital accumulation, and is at least in indirect form, functional to capital accumulation" (1999, p. 568).

All three exemplars locate slavery outside the development of modern management. Burnham presents a quasi-Marxist epochal history of economic development, which concludes not in socialism but managerialist corporatism, and does therefore cover the era of ante-bellum slavery. But for Burnham wage labor is a defining characteristic of the capitalist epoch, implicitly precluding any consideration of slavery, which consequently is only mentioned briefly in relation to feudalism. For Braverman, the production process is framed by the "antagonism between those who carry on the process and those for whom it is carried out, those who manage and those who execute...." (1974, p. 68). But again, any recognition of this antagonism on ante-bellum plantations is precluded by wage labor as a defining feature of capitalism, and slavery is only mentioned in relation to ancient Egypt.

Chandler pays most attention to slavery, over three pages; but these are three of 500, and their title ("The plantation - an ancient form of large scale production" (1977, p. 64)) makes his pre-modern situating of slavery clear. Chandler clearly recognizes some managerial complexity in the plantation economy. It is accepted that there was some division of labor, and managerial record keeping suggested a certain level of sophistication. Chandler also states that as the first salaried manager in the US, "the plantation overseer was an important person in American economic history. The size of this group (in 1850 overseers numbered 18,859) indicates that many planters did

feel that they needed full time assistance to carry out their managerial tasks" (1977, p.64). Despite this it is asserted that the Southern plantation "had little impact on the evolution of the modern business enterprise" (1977, p. 66), for three reasons. First, notwithstanding the nearly 19,000 overseers, Chandler claims there was no meaningful separation of ownership and control. "The majority of southern planters directly managed the property they owned" (1967, p.64) which, we should remind ourselves, included people, and cites Fogel and Engerman's (1974) claim that many owners of large plantations did not employ resident salaried overseers.

Second, he argues that plantations were limited in scale. Thus the "plantation workforce was small by modern standards. Indeed it was smaller than in contemporary New England cotton mills...[in] 1850 only 1,479 plantations had more than 100 slaves" (1977, p. 64). The scope for managerialism to develop was by implication constrained; hence Chandler's third argument, that there was a lack of managerial sophistication on the plantations. The managerial task was "almost wholly the supervision of workers" (1967, p. 65), which by implication was straightforward, and indeed a little more than a seasonal requirement ("only at those critical periods of planting and harvesting.... did the work of the planter the overseer and the drivers become more than routine" (1977, p. 65)). Division of labor was limited, the accounting there was simple, and in any case book keeping was more likely to be undertaken by the plantation owner.

A Logic of Denial

What the exemplars Burnham, Braverman and Chandler have in common is the construction of a grand narrative, in which the emergence of management as an

activity and of managers as a group or class is a consequence of the growth and increasing industrial sophistication of a globalising capitalist economy. In addition, for Grey, for their real theoretical differences the three perspectives "collectively constitute the fabric of the knowledge through which the commonsense and taken-for-granted reality of management is woven". This knowledge is that "... management is what managers do" (1999, p. 569); that is, a conflation of a certain set of distinctive managerial activities ("what managers do") with an occupational category possessing a distinct managerial identity (i.e. "managers"). Taken together these shared features produce three inter-related tests for inclusion in modern management, which whatever it was that facilitated profitable production on the backs of 4 million enslaved people apparently fails. First, for management to be modern, it has to take place within the capitalist system. Slavery is excluded from capitalism explicitly by Chandler with his assertion of ancientness, and his claims for a lack of separation of ownership and control in particular, and tacitly by Burnham and Braverman with their specification of wage labor as a defining feature. Second, for management to be management, the activities carried out in its name have to be of a certain level of sophistication – for Chandler, beyond the apparently simple harnessing of enslaved people's seasonally varying labor, for Burnham and Braverman in order to achieve wage laborers' submission to capitalist relations and processes of production. Third there has to be a group of people carrying out these management activities who have a distinctive identity as managers.

The following three sections will show that the ante-bellum plantation economy actually passes rather than fails these tests. I will begin by exploring the case not just for locating the plantation economy within the development of capitalism, but for

seeing it as a site of the emergence of industrial discipline, as attempts were made to overcome the resistance of enslaved people in the production process. Next, I will show that managerial practice in the face of this resistance was sophisticated to the extent that it closely resembled what we now see as scientific management and as classical management theory. Third, I will show there was a substantial (greater even than Chandler allows) cadre of managers, labeled as such, with a managerial identity sustained by white supremacist racism. Although much that follows in these sections explicitly rebuts Chandler, it only does so because his is the only history of management which gives slavery serious mention. To restate, this article is about the exclusion of slavery throughout management studies, not just in Chandler.

SLAVERY, CAPITALISM AND INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE

Slavery and capitalism

It must be acknowledged immediately that there is some support for the identification of ante-bellum slavery as pre-capitalist (and therefore pre-modern) precisely because wage-labor was absent (see Genovese, 1969, 1975; Smith, 1998). This analysis coincides with that implied by Burnham and Braverman, and apparently provides some justification for the exclusion of ante-bellum slavery from modern management.

This view is however contested; indeed one of the central debates in the history of slavery has been whether slaveholders in the 19th century US were actually an "a pre-capitalist seigneurial class" (Reidy, 1992, p. 31) or an entrepreneurial capitalist class. The alternative analysis, moreover, not only questions whether wage labor is a

defining feature of capitalism, but also uses the very modernity of organizational forms and processes on plantations as a central component of its case. That is, there is a substantial, long established, but still growing literature that shows just how managerialist in the modern sense ante-bellum plantations were. This has been ignored by management studies. The slavery as capitalism position is associated in terms of US slavery with, for example, Fogel and Engermann (1974), Fogel (1989) (as we have already seen), Oakes (1982) and Dusinberre (1996). It is summarized thus by Smith (1998, p. 13): "True, they did not employ free labor on their plantations. But the way slaveholders organized their workforce, the way they treated their bondpeople, their heavy involvement in the market economy, and their drive for profit made them *much more* capitalist than historians like Genovese are willing to concede".

The added emphasis indicates how the debate has moved on from one between absolute capitalist – pre capitalist positions to the consideration of questions of degree, and of the significance of slavery in the transition to the modern capitalist economy. As an illustration, Genovese (1998) has praised Dusinberre's account of rice production in the South Carolina and Georgia, despite its coupling of an account of the utter horror of slave labor in the swamplands with an unequivocal argument that those responsible were capitalist. Dusinberre argues in relation to a particular slaveowner that:

> "he and his predecessors had made a massive investment (of other people's labor) in embanking, clearing and ditching the swamp, so as to enhance the productivity of future laborers. This is what capitalist development is all about – the increase of labor productivity by combining an ever-increasing

> proportion of capital with the labor of an individual worker, so that the laborers product becomes much larger than it could otherwise have been..." (1996, pp. 404-5).

For Dusinberre, the relatively low cost of labor to the slave owner, and the ability to coerce slaves, outweighed the benefits of wage labor, which slave owners could of course have chosen to use. More, while the slave owner's capital stake in a slave was greater than that in a wage laborer, "a planters capital investment in a slave was "not so "fixed" and unchangeable as that in a rice mill" (1996, p. 405), and a slave could be disposed of quickly at market. Reidy (1992) produces similar arguments in relation to South Central Georgia, and Johnson (1999) shows the deal making and speculation in ante-bellum slave-markets was of a complexity which reflected the significance enslaved people embodied as capital. Individual traits of age, gender, beauty, skin color, strength, attitude and so on were catalogued, classified and measured one against the other, reducing people to commodities who were traded as such in a modern commodity market, irrespective of family ties, personal desires and aspirations, or indeed their very status as human beings.

For Oakes (1998), though, the key issue now is not whether slavery was or was not capitalist, but the relationship between capitalism and slavery. Oakes commends both Genovese (1992), and Blackburn (1997), who analyses the development of New World slavery (i.e. in the Americas as a whole and not just the USA) up until 1800, that is before the major pre-Civil War expansion of slavery in the US. Nonetheless, Blackburn's intention is to explore the "many ways in which American slavery proved compatible with elements of modernity [which] will help dispel the tendency of

classical social science… to equate slavery with traditionalism, patrimonialism and backwardness" (1997, p. 4), and goes on to argue that slavery, inter-alia advanced the pace of capitalist industrialization in Britain, and conversely that industrial capitalism boosted slavery. Though Blackburn's work is relatively new, this is not a recent argument, but one which can be found in, for example, Moore (1967), which specifically identifies the southern plantation economy as part of the engine of broader US capitalist development.

Resistance and industrial discipline

Blackburn goes on to make the link between capitalism, slavery and the emergence of management more explicit. In so doing he contradicts Chandler on the irrelevance of slavery to modern enterprise (1997, p. 588):

> "The contribution of New World slavery to the evolution of industrial discipline and principles of capitalist rationalization has been neglected....[In] so far as plantation slavery was concerned, the point would be that it embodied some of the principles of productive rational organization, and that secondly, it did so in such a partial or even contradictory manner that it provoked critical reflection, resistance, and innovation...."

Blackburn locates this "reflection, resistance and innovation" outside the plantation, with "the secular thought of the enlightenment which was important for anti slavery because it explored alternative ways of motivating labourers. It established the argument that modern conditions did not require tied labour" (1997, p. 587). He continues "Not by chance were prominent abolitionists in the forefront of prison

reform, factory legislation, and the promotion of public education. In each area progress was to be potentially doubled edged, entwining empowerment with discipline." It was not just abolitionist views alone of human motivation, and of organization more generally which were informed by enlightenment thought, however; indeed there is clear evidence that it was used to explore ways of maintaining the productive oppression of the people who were slaves. Hence, according to the Southern Cultivator of 1846, quoted in Oakes (1982, p. 153) "[n]o more beautiful picture of human society can be drawn than a well organized plantation, thus governed by the humane principles of reason."

Furthermore, while Blackburn is correct that resistance to slavery was important to development of industrial discipline, he takes no account of the innovation of managerial strategies for dealing with this resistance at the intra-organizational level, within the labor process itself. The resistance which slave managers developed practices to address day to day was not that of famous abolitionists, but that of the people who were slaves. Debates as to the nature and significance of these people's resistance and coercion are as central to histories of slavery as those surrounding its place within capitalism. Controversially, Elkins (1959) drawing parallels with concentration camps argued that an infantilized slave consciousness was imposed by various oppressive means, such as the forbidding of literacy or any act of individual initiative. This was countered by presentations of various forms of slave resistance and self organization which suggest that people who were enslaved had a clear and sophisticated consciousness of their oppression (e.g. Webber, 1978).

Also controversial was the work Fogel and Engerman (1974), whose case for slavery as rationalist capitalism went so far as to argue, inter alia that people who were enslaved bought into a protestant work ethic, and that slaves were rarely physically mistreated, as no rational capitalist would intentionally damage their own property. Fogel and Engerman's representation of the everyday life of slavery was contradicted by others drawing on an equivalent level of empirical and archival data, who detailed both its harshness and cruelty, and the extent of slave resistance (see for example David et al., 1976). Fogel's subsequent work (1989) backed away from his and Engerman's initial position and appeared to recognize the validity of the opposing case; for example, he acknowledges Stampp's (1956) earlier view that there was almost an anti-work ethic, a moral code amongst slaves which made resistance a duty.

Taken together, recognizing that there are profound differences of principle, the various analyses suggest a range of forms of discipline matched by a variety of forms of ever present resistance. This variety ranged from the less frequent, and high risk insurrection or absconding, although Franklin and Schweninger (1999) argue that slaves' willingness to escape has been understated, through arson (Jones, 1990) to acts familiar from any account of work in modern organizations – for example, overt or concealed insubordination, sabotage and theft (Genovese, 1975). Patterns of discipline and resistance varied over time, according to geography (escape was more frequent in states closer to the North), and to industrial/agricultural sector. There were also understandable desires on the part of enslaved people to improve their circumstances, or at least mitigate the harshnesses of their existence. The empirical evidence leaves no doubt that these were real, taking the form of the most inhuman extremes of physical punishment and, even under the most paternalist owner, the ever present and

often implemented threat of sale of partners or children (again, see Jones, 1990). Slaveholders tried to manipulate these desires to limit resistance; and in conjunction with and as part of this manipulation attempted to use a range of what can only be seen managerial techniques with, as was ever to be the case, only partial degrees of success.

A Case Study: Soldiering in the fields

In 1861 Olmsted provided an example of plantation industrial discipline, depicting work in production line terms:

> "[Slaves] are constantly and steadily driven up to their work, and the stupid, plodding machine like manner in which they labor is painful to witness. This was especially the case with the hoe gangs. One of them numbered nearly two hundred hands....moving across the field in parallel lines, with a considerable degree of precision. I repeatedly rode through the lines at a canter, with other horsemen, often coming upon them suddenly, without producing the smallest change or interruption in the dogged action of the laborers, or causing one of them....to lift an eye" (1861/1953, p. 452).

This was later partially quoted by Fogel (1989, p. 27), and conveys an image of resistance overcome by industrial discipline. What Fogel doesn't quote is an earlier section in Olmsted which suggests resistance was not always overcome. This is introduced with the claim that "...slaves...very frequently cannot be made to do their masters will...Not that they often directly refuse to obey an order, but when they are directed to do anything for which they have a disinclination, they undertake it in such

a way that the desired result is sure not to be accomplished". Significantly, the section in Olmsted is entitled "Sogering", (1861/1953, p. 100). According to Partridge (1984:1111) the verb soger, dating from the 1840s means "to shirk and/or malinger; to pretend to work....Also *soldier*". It is "soldiering" (1967:11), of course, that Taylor famously sought to address in 1911 in the Principles of Scientific Management. Olmsted makes no further reference to the term, but goes on to draw parallels between slaves and soldiers and sailors, who find themselves "in a condition in many particulars resembling that of slaves" (1861/1953, p. 101), albeit a condition entered into (according to Olmsted) by voluntary contract, who obey the letter of an instruction but defeat the purpose.

Franklin and Schweninger (1999) suggest that because slave resistance, particularly escape, carried on in the face of efforts to impose industrial discipline that therefore it did not work. But it is also the case, as Reidy (1992) argues, that these efforts were nonetheless intended to overcome resistance, just as soldiering was represented by Taylor as something to be overcome by scientific management; and the economic growth of slavery suggests that these efforts, while not eliminating resistance completely, worked well enough for the enslavers. The next section will show just how managerialist, in the modern sense, these efforts were.

SLAVERY AND "WHAT MANAGERS DO"

The pattern of slave resistance, combined with the scale and significance of the plantation economy suggest a strong circumstantial case that the operation of slave plantation and the handling of enslaved people must have been more complex than

Chandler allows. This section shows that there is no need to rely on circumstantial evidence alone, and instead that modern managerial practices were to be found in the operation of the ante-bellum plantations. Taylorism and classical management theory, as summarized by Morgan (1986, p. 30 and 26 respectively) are the benchmarks of modernity here. Taylorism can be seen in the application of scientific method, the selection of the best person for the job, and the monitoring of performance. The principles of classical management can be seen in the division of labor, the development of sophisticated organizational rules, a chain of command, a distinction (just) between line and staff esprit de corps, analyses of the appropriate span of control, debates about unity of command (related to the separation of ownership and control), and attempts to instill discipline. The separation of conception from execution, the final principle of Taylorism, is dealt with in the next section.

Scientific Management and slavery

Brion-Davis (1998) suggests that Ellis (1997) portrays Thomas Jefferson as "an efficiency expert, a kind of proto-Frederick Winslow Taylor". Jefferson established a slave run nail factory on his estate at Monticello in 1794. "Every morning except Sunday [Jefferson] walked over to the nailery, to weigh out the nail rod for each worker, then returned at dusk to weigh the nails each had made and calculate how much had been wasted by the most and least efficient workers" (Ellis, 1997, p. 167). Ellis continues to describe the "blazing forges and sweating black boys arranged along an assembly line of hammers and anvils...". Despite acknowledging this proto-Taylorism, Brion-Davis takes Blackburn's argument with respect to abolitionists and industrial discipline further, making a specific link between it and Taylorism:

> "English and American Quakers who were in the vanguard of the abolition movement also led the way in devising and imposing newer forms of labor discipline. There is a profound historical irony in the fact that "Speedy Fred Taylor", our century's exponent of efficiency of and the first to dispossess workers of all control of the workplace was born of Quaker parents in Germantown, Pennsylvania, the site in 1688 of the world's first great petition against human bondage" (1998, p. 51).

This underplays just how Taylorist "proto-Taylorist" slave organizations were. Long before Taylor, workers who were slaves had been "dispossessed of control over the workplace", and subject to "newer forms of labor discipline". Hence, as Blackburn himself points out, even in the late seventeenth century, in the British Caribbean "[t]he plantation was a total environment in which lives of the captive workforce could be bent unremittingly to maximize output" (1997, p. 260). This, in passing, counters Chandler's exclusion of the plantation from managerial modernity on the grounds of the unintensive seasonality of slave labor, as does the experience of Frederick Douglass (1996, p. 64):

> "We were worked in all weathers. It was never too hot or too cold; it could never rain, blow, hail or snow, too hard for us to work in the field. Work, work, work was scarcely more the order of the day than of the night. The longest days were too short for him [the slaver], and the shortest nights too long for him."

Empirical confirmation of Douglass is provided by Stampp (1956), Fogel (1989), and Campbell (1989, p. 120) who shows seasonality for slaves in Texas meant a 10 hour working day in January and 12 in July.

Elsewhere Oakes (1982) summarizes plantation organization in a chapter entitled "factories in the fields"; and Reidy, (1992, p. 38) talking of the growth of larger scale Georgian plantations in the 1830s, which involved the acquisition of both smaller plantations and slaves used to working on them talks of a "campaign to reshape the relations of production" in which ""[s]cientific management" – of seeds, soils, animals, implements and techniques as well as laborers provided the framework", although he takes the claim no further in terms of the purposes of this article. It is arguably the case, then, that the proto-Taylorianism which Jefferson brought to the nailery was not innovative, but a transfer of managerialism from the plantation fields to manufacture. Thus the supposedly Taylorian application of scientific method to the labor process, evident in Jefferson's measuring of individual output and scrap, was long established in slave worked organizations. Blackburn (1997, p. 463) identifies "attempts to introduce a form of work study calibrating what could be extracted from each slave" as early as the mid 18th century, and goes on to cite a planter's diary:

> " as to all work I lay down this rule. My overseers then their foremen close for one day in every job; and deducting of that 1/5 of that days work, he ought every other day keep up to that. Therefore by dividing every gang into good, middling and indifferent hands, one person out of each is to watched for 1 day's work; and all of the same division must be kept to his proportion"

Another set of plantation rules states (Scarborough, 1966, p. 69): "[the overseer] must attend particularly to all experiments instituted by the Employer, conduct them faithfully & report regularly and correctly. Some overseers defeat important experiments by carelessness or wilfulness." Wesley (1978) notes widely reported 1850s experiments at the Saluda cotton mill in the 1850s, which found that found that slave rather than free labor resulted in a thirty percent cost saving. More, Smith (1997) shows that from the 1800s onwards the greater use of more and more accurate watches and clocks increased time discipline, and led to more accurate measurement and management of slaves' productivity.

Classical Management

There was also a systematic approach to the division of labor, which is associated both with Taylor and classical management more generally. Fogel (1989, p. 26) argues that sugar plantations saw developments in industrial discipline, "partly because sugar production lent itself to a minute division of labor, partly because of the invention of the gang system, which provided a powerful instrument for the supervision and control of labor, and partly because of the extraordinary degree of force that planters were allowed to bring to bear on enslaved black labor". Although a small proportion of plantations were engaged in sugar production in the US, the gang system spread to other crops (with the notable exception of rice), and for Fogel (1989) and Reidy (1992) it is a mainspring of economic success. Reidy, discussing cotton adds: "in short, the gang system of labor, backed by the lash, proved an excellent mechanism for the subordinating large numbers of slaves to the will of a small number of masters" (1992, p. 37).

The gang system required a complex division of labor. First, there was that between those slaves who worked in gangs, and those who did not, for example artisans. On sugar and cotton plantations gangs were usually of 10 to 20 people, but sometimes far larger. Second there was an internal division of labor within the gang "which not only assigned every member... to a precise task but simultaneously made his or her performance dependent on the actions of the others" (Fogel, 1989, p. 27). Thus on one plantation, in which the planting gang was divided into three classes (in pre-Taylorian selection of the best person for the job), according to a contemporary account (Fogel, 1989, p. 27):

> "1st the best hands, embracing those of good judgement and quick motion. 2nd those of the weakest and most inefficient class. 3rd the second class of hoe hands. Thus classified, the first class with run ahead and open a small hole about seven to ten inches apart, into which the second class drop from four to five cotton seed, and the third class follow and cover with a rake."

Thus, third, work was divided between gangs, in a way designed to produce inter-gang dependencies and tensions (again, Fogel, 1989). The use of gangs also developed what Blackburn (1997, p. 355) identifies as an "esprit de corps" (which sometimes erupted in insurrection) in which effort and commitment for one's peers was manipulated for slave owners ends; although the term Chandler uses (1977, p. 65) to describe gang labor – "teamwork" – is of more current, if unwitting, resonance. Oakes (1982, p. 154) also sets out the chain of command: "all were subservient to those immediately above them, and at each level of bureaucracy, duties and responsibilities were explicitly defined. On large highly organized plantations there might be separate rules

for watchmen, truck-minders, nurses, cooks as well as drivers, overseers and field hands. The chain of command went upwards from drivers to overseers to masters. Always there was obedience".

Along with this was an ongoing consideration of the optimum span of control. Hence "for any thing but corn and cotton 10-20 workers are as many as any common white man can attend to" (Hammond, 1847 in Scarborough, 1966, p. 9). Scarborough continues, " a ratio of fifty slaves to one overseer was considered the most efficient unit in the plantation South". There was also a debate over unity of command and centralisation of authority revolving around the involvement of plantation owners in management (i.e. the separation of ownership from control): "To make the overseer responsible for the management of the plantation he must have control of it otherwise he cannot be responsible, because no man, is nor should be responsible for the acts of another"(Southern Cultivator, 1854 in Scarborough, 1966, p. 118). It is even possible to distinguish, just, between line and staff. A visitor to a Louisiana sugar estate of 6 plantations noted that it employed six overseers and a general agent, and "staff" employees covering a traditional managerial trinity - financial resources (a book-keeper) literal human resources (two physicians and a preacher) and plant (a head carpenter, a tinner and a ditcher). The visitor added "Every thing moves on systematically, and with the discipline of a regular trained army" (Stampp, 1956, p. 43).

This mention of discipline leads to its consideration in the classical management sense of "obedience, application, energy, behavior and outward marks of respect in accordance with agreed rules and customs; subordination of individual interest to

general interest through firmness, example, fair agreements and constant supervision; equity, based on kindness and justice, to encourage personnel in their duties...." (Morgan, 1986, p. 26). That management of slave plantations was "routine", as Chandler (1977, p. 65) has it, was by design. Overseers were told "[t]wo leading principles are endeavored to be acted upon... 1st to reduce everything to system 2nd introduce daily accountability in every department". (Southern Agriculturist, 1833, in Starobin 1970, p. 91); and "... arrangement and regularity form the great secret of doing things well, you must therefore as far as possible have everything done to fixed rule." (n.d. in Scarborough, 1996, p. 74). This emphasis on regularity and routine, the division of labor, and rules was widespread (see also Stampp, 1956). Indeed, Oakes (1982, p. 154) goes so far as to argue that "before punishment and persuasion, rules were the primary means of maintaining order on the ideal plantation" and that the overarching purpose of all plantation management – rules, division of labor, chain of command – was to achieve obedience on the part of slaves. Unity of interest was stressed; according to a planter in 1837: "The master should make it his business to show his slaves, that the advancement of his individual interest, is at the same time an advancement of theirs. Once they feel this it will require but little compulsion to make them act as it becomes them" (Stampp, 1956, p. 147).

This was apparently not felt by slaveowners and managers to be incompatible with the systematized cruelty that clearly existed, albeit dressed up in claims for reasonability and fairness. Hence, another set of rules for overseers states "[i]f you punish only according to justice & reason, with uniformity, you can never be too severe & will be the more respected for it, even by those who suffer"(Scarborough, 1966, p. 74). According to (Reidy, 1992, p. 37):

> "In placing jurisdiction over field operations in the hands of overseers, planters encouraged the use of the lash, the prime mover of slaves working in gangs. Cracking whips constantly punctuated field labor, but slaves suffered more serious whippings – often in the form of "settlements" at the end of the day – for falling short of quotas, losing or damaging tools and injuring animals. Defiance of plantation rules, such as keeping cabins clean met the same kind and degree of punishment".

Reidy suggests that the employment of overseer managers was the norm, at least in central Georgia. The next section will show how far this was the case for the ante-bellum South as a whole, and that these overseers really were "managers".

MANAGERS, RACISM AND THE MANAGERIAL IDENTITY

Overseers and Managers

This section shows how the organization of ante-bellum slavery passes the third and final test for inclusion in modern management, namely that there was an occupational category with distinctive managerial identity. It also provides disturbing evidence of how this distinctive identity was legitimized. To begin, as the quotation from Olmsted in the prima-facie case above suggests, the description of overseers as managers, and the use of the term managing or management to describe their practice is not anachronistic. As Franklin and Schweninger (1999, p. 241) point out, "advice.... came from the pages of periodicals such as De Bows Review, Southern Cultivator, Farmer's

Register and Farmer and Planter, in articles "On the Management of Slaves", "The Management of Negroes", "Judicious Management of the Plantation Force", "Moral Management of Negroes" and "Management of Slaves." This in turn provides confirmation, if it is still needed that there was a managerialist consciousness and reflexivity associated with slavery.

Moreover, Chandler's representation of the size of this category is open to challenge. While obliged to acknowledge that the number of salaried plantation managers in 1850 (18,859) is significant, Chandler nowhere explains the categorization of ante-bellum slavery as ancient nonetheless; neither does he in The Visible Hand, or elsewhere (e.g. Chandler, 1965, 1994) provide a comparative figure for managers on the railroads, where modern management was supposedly concurrently being born. Nor does he explain his choice of 1850 rather than 1860. According to Chandler's source, Scarborough (1966, p. 11), who uses US census data, the number of plantation managers slightly more than doubled in this 10 year period, rising to 37,883. The increase is explained by plantations merging (bigger plantations, fewer owners, more managers – hence an increasing separation of ownership and control) and the expansion of slavery into the "new" parts of the western US. Accordingly, the number of plantations with more than 100 people who were slaves had increased to 2,279 by 1860 (from the 1,479 in 1850 cited by Chandler (1977), above).

Racist construction of the managerial identity

The empirical data demonstrate, therefore, that there was a substantial and growing group of people using what are now seen as management practices, who were known

as managers, running ante-bellum plantations. What is also clear, and discomforting, is that white supremacist racism underpinned the creation of the managerial identity. The key principle of Taylorism in the construction of this identity, hitherto unaddressed, is the separation of conception from execution, the shifting "of all responsibility for the organization of work from the worker...". What distinguishes modern managers as managers is that they "...should do all the thinking...leaving workers with the task of implementation" (Morgan 1986, p. 30). On the plantations this principle was specified thus "[t]he slave should know that his master is to govern absolutely, and he is to be obey implicitly... he is never for a moment to exercise either his will or his judgment in opposition to a positive order", and slaves should have a "habit of perfect dependence on their masters" (Southern Cultivator, 1846, in Stampp, 1956, pp. 145,147).

Racism was used to justify the assumption of this right to manage. Attempts were made to impose "a consciousness of personal inferiority"; slaves "had to feel that that their African ancestry tainted them" (Stampp, 1956, p. 145). According to Oakes "[t]he ideal plantation was a model of efficiency. Its premise was black inferiority..." (1982, p. 154). Black people were categorized as the moral and intellectual inferiors of whites, suitable only for drudgery, and beseeching management. This is epitomized in Hammond's infamous speech to the US Senate in 1858 (quoted in Frederickson, 1988, p. 23).

> "In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the drudgery of life. That is a class requiring but a low order of intellect and little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, fidelity. Such a class you must have...it constitutes the very mud-sill of society...Fortunately for the South we

> have found a race adapted to that purpose to her hand...We do not think that whites should be slaves either by law or necessity. Our slaves are black, of another, inferior race. The status in which we have placed them is an elevation. They are elevated the condition in which God first created them by making them slaves."

Kanigel provides evidence of Taylor's own concurrence with this view, notwithstanding his abolitionist parents, quoting him saying in 1914 (1998, p. 522):

> "Only a few hundred years ago a great part of the world's work was done by actual slaves....and this slavery was of the very worst type –far worse than that of our own country in which the black men (on the whole an inferior race) were made the slaves of the white men."

Having criticized Jacques in the introduction, it is important to note his recognition of the racist continuity in Taylorism. This is exemplified in the representation of the pig iron shifter Schmidt in the "Principles of Scientific Management". Taylor's right to manage, to conceive in order that Schmidt might execute, is implied both in description of him as "mentally sluggish" (Taylor, 1967, p. 46) and in the representation of him, as Jacques puts it (1996, p. 81) as "childlike". Hence:

> ""Schmidt, are you high priced man ?"
>
> "Vell, I don't know vat you mean"
>
> "Oh yes you do..."
>
> "Vel I don't know vat you mean"
>
> "Oh come now answer my questions.... What I want to find out is whether you want to earn $1.85 a day or whether you are satisfied with $1.15..."

"Did I vant $1.85 a day? Vas dot a high priced man? Vell yes I vas a high priced man…"" (Taylor, 1967, p. 45).

Jacques points out that Taylor here adopts an infantilizing slavers' voice, as a comparison with a slave owner's account of a black foreman's behaviour under threat of flood confirms: ""Marster! Marster!" he called up to the big house; "For Gawd's sake Marster, come! De levee done broke and de water's runnin' 'cross de turn row in de upper fiel' jes' dis side de gin! Oh Gawd A'mighty ! Oh Gawd A'mighty!"" (Van Deburg, 1979, p. 49).

The slaveowner urges the slave to "be a man" and commands the slaves to put things to rights. They "gathered around him in their helplessness, trusting implicitly in his judgement, receiving his rapid comprehensive orders" (Van Deburg, 1979, p. 49). This too leads us to another, final, challenge to Chandler. Here it is the slaveowner who is depicted as capable of the managerial brainwork, and this may be seen as supporting Chandler's assertion apparently based on Fogel and Engerman (1974), that there was little separation of ownership from control. But, again, things are not quite as they seem. Fogel and Engerman's argument that there were relatively few salaried managers is made in support of a once again controversial and contested (again see Day et al., 1976) claim that non-salaried, (i.e. slave) managers were "ubiquitous" (1974, p. 211) on plantations. This in turn was a plank in their main case, diametrically opposed to Chandler, that the plantation system was modern, with slaves (metaphorically) buying into the system. Neither Fogel and Engerman nor their critics argued that plantations had no managers; rather the issue was who the managers were.

CONCLUSION – SLAVERY'S MULTIPLE SIGNIFICANCES

This article has shown that there is a strong case for arguing the ante-bellum plantation system was not pre-capitalist; and certainly that there is no real question nowadays that it is implicated in the broader processes of capitalist development, and that it was a site of the early development of industrial discipline. It has also shown that plantation management has passed the other two tests for inclusion in the history of management – the existence of a sophisticated set of managerial practices and of a significant group of managers described as such at that time.

The industrial discipline which emerged on the plantations was not disconnected temporally, spatially or in substance from that which emerged in other parts of the US economy. The imprint of slavery in contemporary management can be seen in the ongoing dominance from that time of the very idea of the manager with a right to manage. It can also be seen in the specific management ideas and practices now known as classical management and scientific management which were collated and re-presented with these labels within living memory of the abolition of US slavery. As this article has shown, this presence of managers and management is widely documented outside management studies, but has not had any mention within it

These are findings enough, and the temptation is to leave things as they are, and not diminish or dilute them by further theorizing at this stage. However, a claim was made in the introduction of further significance for management history/historiography. The exploration of what this might be leads to a reaffirmation, however, that it is the link

with slavery, and its consequences, that is the most important finding of this article; it also reinforces the use of "denial" over "absence".

Postcolonialism

This article shows one way in which management owes more than a little to European settlers' and their descendents' exploitation of the six million Africans who were transported to the Americas, and their 4 million fairly immediate ante-bellum descendents. It quite clearly therefore also shows it to be one of the "new ways of perceiving, organizing, representing and acting upon the world which we designate as 'modern' [which] owed as much to the colonial encounter as they did to the industrial revolution, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment" (Seth, Gandhi and Dutton, 1998 p. 6). That is, this article supports a postcolonialist understanding of management.

According to Seth, Gandhi and Dutton: "(p)ostcolonialism has directed its... critical antagonism towards the universalising knowledge claims of 'western civilization'; its "protestations *against* 'major' knowledges and *on behalf of* 'minor'/deterritorialized knowledges" (Seth, Gandhi and Dutton 1998, p. 8). Unlike Holvino (1996), this article does not address these deterritorialized knowledges in management. But its deconstruction of the managerial 'major' knowledge might claim to be postcolonialist, in that it reveals an aspect of the process through which, in the face of resistance:

> "The countries of the West ruled the peoples of the non-Western world. Their political dominance had been secured and was underwritten by coercive means...It was further underwritten by narratives of improvement, of civilising mission and the white man's burden, which were secured in systems of

knowledge which made sense of these narratives, and were in turn shaped by them." (Seth, Gandhi and Dutton, 1998, p. 7).

The support that this article offers for postcolonialism in management is important, given that it is otherwise quite rare, exceptions being Holvino (1996), and Anshuman Prasad (1997, 2003). However, I am anxious that this is not seen as its primary significance. This is a shift from my own initial position (indeed the first version of this article was written for a postcolonialism conference stream).

Part of my caution derives from a recognition that other theorizations might equally claim to be sustained by this paper. Marxism, as Loomba (1998) points out, also gives central a role to imperialism, although its representatives in management studies (not least, the exemplar Braverman) have yet to acknowledge this. The material in this article might also be reordered in a way which supports Burrell's poststructuralist/ Foucauldian view of management history, which might otherwise reasonably claim to have been badly done to, excluded even, by the ideal type linear model of management adopted here (but more on this to come). [1]

Thinking about slavery and its consequences not in grand global imperialism terms but in relation to social processes closer to those normally associated with management studies, that is of organization and management, also suggests another narrative, a kind of meta-level grounded theory. In this, it is white racism particularly towards African Americans, and resistance thereto in work organizations which is the continuing and defining strand. While the Civil War ended formal slavery in the US it

did not end the racism that underpinned it, as we have seen in relation to Taylor. This racism, and resistance to it did not, and does not stop at the door of the workplace.

Thus King (1995) outlines how from the early to the late-mid 20th century, as white Southern politicians once again gained the upper hand, the Federal Government actually extended its anti African-American segregationist employment practices. In 1913 W.E.B. DuBois stated in an open letter to the unequivocally racist (again King 1995) President Woodrow Wilson, who within management studies is also known as the founder of public administration (Shafritz and Hyde 1992):

> "Public segregation of civil servants in government employ, necessarily involving personal insult and humiliation, has for the first time in history been made the policy of the United States government. In the Treasury and Postoffice [sic] departments colored clerks have been herded to themselves as though they were not human beings. We are told that one colored clerk who could not actually be segregated on account of the nature of his work has consequently had a cage built around him to separate him from his white companions of many years ...." (in Lewis 1995, p. 446).

Cooke's (2003) postcolonialist recasting of the invention of group dynamics and action research as mechanisms of surveillance and control of African American rebellion can also be fitted into this account. In the related context of Organization Development, there is Wells and Jennings' assessment of contemporary US organizations as "neo-pigmentocracies" with "quasi-herrenvolk democratic cultures' (1989, p. 108). Bell and Nkomo's (2001) contrasting of black and white women

managers' experiences would add gender to this strand. While there are already generally micro-level considerations of dealing with racism in relation to specific and current management practices, for example equal opportunities in employment and HRM, this all points to a need to acknowledge race, and particularly anti-African American racism, as a continuing factor in the historical development of management.

Such an acknowledgment would however be contrary to Burrell's (1997) argument against linear histories of management. Ending linearity not only challenges the authority of existing meta-narratives; it removes the opportunity for nascent (e.g. postcolonialist) or under-written (e.g. anti-African American racist) continuities to be codified within management studies. Burrell does have a point that linearity can be an exclusionary force, though. The final cause of my caution about seeing this article primarily as postcolonialist is that while a consideration of management in slavery supports postcolonialism (and perhaps other social theories), a postcolonialist (or any other) theorization should not be a prerequisite to any consideration of slavery. This is particularly the case given that whatever existent or emergent theorization we use to frame the past, the link between management and slavery is always waiting to be obviously made. It is a transcendent feature, not least because slavery through the very nature of its human devastation and oppression has an empirical significance which does not need prequalification. This is notwithstanding all I have said in the introduction about the epistemology of the past. Burrell (1997) was right to consider the relationship between management and the holocaust (not that I otherwise see any point in comparing it with slavery), on the same grounds, because the holocaust was the holocaust.

Some of the histories of slavery used in this article do make heavy use of social theory (eg Genovese's Marxism). But generally, it is not this theory, but the scale and scope of slavery itself which makes its investigation a legitimate, indeed moral, academic imperative. History as a discipline, of course, has different research priorities to management studies. Nonetheless, from its prima-facie case onwards this article has shown slavery to have had a particular affinity with management, which management studies might be expected to have addressed before now . The weight of evidence shown here to underpin this expectation is so great that denial is surely the appropriate term.

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[1] In passing, there is in Cuba's Valle de los Ingenios ("ingenios" being the Cuban Spanish term for slave worked sugar mills and plantations, as well as generic Spanish for engines; thanks to my colleague Armando Barrientos for explaining this) the 150 foot tall Manaca Ignaza watchtower (1835), designed to give armed guards a 360 degree panoramic view of slaves in the fields and mills from every floor. These people themselves could not see whether or not they were being observed, however. (Fraginals 1976). The tower is, in other words, a panopticon.

IDPM
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

Paper No 63

FROM COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION TO DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

by

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March 2001

ISBN: 1 9025182X
Published by: Institute for Development Policy and Management
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ABSTRACT

This paper is about the field of development management (previously development administration) and its continuities with the processes of imperial rule known as colonial administration. Development administration/ management represents itself as a subset of public administration/ public sector management. However, this conceals its status as First World discourse about how the Third World should be managed. Moreover, while development management recognizes the continuity between itself and post-1945 development administration, its advocacy of participatory methodologies, the cause of the poor and the marginalized, and democratization are seen as new, and as implying a clear break with colonial/neo-colonialist administrative practice. This paper challenges this orthodoxy on the basis of three overlapping arguments. First, understandings of the benefits of participation presented by advocates of development management are naïve and fail to understand its potentialities as a control mechanism. Second the so called "governance agendas" of First World development agencies not only promote a particular, neo-liberal version of democratization, which includes the extension of the market vis-à-vis the state, and in their implementation replicate imperial power relations. Third the methods and rhetoric surrounding participation and empowerment themselves have colonial roots, and developed as a consequence of the late colonial approach to administration known as indirect rule. Thus, the paper concludes, while metaphors of colonization have been used to describe the development of management and organization theory there is also a more literal relationship between colonialism and management.

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FROM COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION TO DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper

This paper is about the continuities between colonial administration, development administration, and development management. It begins, in this introduction by defining the terms imperialism and colonialism, and setting out a prima-facie case that these continuities exist. In section 2, 'Development Administration Then?', the paper looks at the how development administration defines itself, and its accounts of the ideas and practices associated with it as they have changed over time. This consideration of the orthodoxy culminates in section 3, 'Development Management Now?', in a review of the principles currently claimed underpinning development management. While generally accepted as a recent version of development administration, development management does make particular claims for distinctiveness in relation to participation and empowerment.

Section 4, 'Colonial Administration Then and Now' challenges this orthodoxy, first by giving an account of what colonial administration involved, specifically in its later forms employing 'indirect rule'. It argues that imperial concerns about governing colonies are replicated in contemporary First World governance agendas for the Third. This is notwithstanding, first, the supposed development management concern with democratization. This it is argued, is more about a neo-liberal economic agenda, and lacks credibility given the role of development administration in the Cold War. It is also despite, second, the claims made by development management for empowerment and participation. These, it is

demonstrated, are based on language and methodologies inspired by indirect rule, and in their practice are always subservient to First World political and economic agendas, not least in relation to debt relief.

The paper concludes by arguing that proponents of development management have been naïve in their understanding of management, and accepted at face value simplistic definitions of it being about a means to an end, about getting the job done. Instead, note recognition should be given to a critical management understanding of management, which sees management's supposed technocratic neutrality as both concealing and perpetuating its role in maintaining existing structures of power.

Imperialism and Colonialism

Clearly, before we move on, it is important to be clear about what is meant by the terms colonialism and imperialism. Debates about the meanings, significances and relationships between these terms have existed for as long as the processes that they are supposed to describe themselves, and any definition here inevitably will not do justice to these debates. The usage chosen, proposed by Edward Said (1994) has two advantages; first, its association with the recent resurgence in analyses of the consequences of imperialism and colonialism; and second its recognition of interweaving economic, political and cultural dimensions.

In Said's usage of the terms, '"imperialism" means, the practice, theory and attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory: "colonialism", which is almost always a consequence of the implanting of settlements on distant territory' (1994: 8). Said then quotes Doyle (1986: 45): 'Empire is a relationship, formal or informal in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by

social, economic or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process of maintaining an empire'. Said continues (1994: 8):

> In our time colonialism has largely ended; imperialism ... lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere, as well as in specific political, ideological and social practices ... Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories *require* and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination ...

Said goes on to state (1994: 9-10) that while profit was a 'tremendously important' motive of imperial expansion,

> [t]here was a commitment ... over and above profit, a commitment in constant circulation and recirculation, which on the one hand allowed decent men and women to accept the notion that distant territories and their native peoples *should* be subjugated, and on the other, replenished metropolitan energies so that people could think of the *imperium* as a protracted almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior or less advanced peoples.

The argument in this paper, in short, then, is that the continuity between colonial administration, and then development administration and now development management confirms development management's status as, using Said's term, 'a form of knowledge affiliated with domination'.

The prima-facie case

Development administration (and subsequently development management) does depict itself as relatively new. Its beginning, we are told, is in the post-1945 era of colonial independences, and the consequent need for nation building and development. Thus, a leading figure in the field, Milton Esman is able to claim 'I was present at the creation of the field of development administration' now in its 'fourth decade' (1991: 1). He continues with its origin story:

> While the field's pioneers confronted the dilemmas of the declining colonial era with its hesitant and post-World War II commitment to development, the subject was transformed by the precipitous expansion of US imperium into terra incognita in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These encounters through technical assistance with the realities of Third World governments revealed that the conceptual equipment of Western, particularly American, public administration was inadequate to the task at hand. This challenge produced several nodes of activity among them ... Indiana ... Michigan State ... Syracuse ... Southern California ... Harvard ... Pittsburgh.

In this brief paragraph Esman presents a received view, which contains three key premises which the development administration and management orthodoxy uses to distance itself from its imperial and colonial past. Having located itself in a post-colonial, development era ('the hesitant commitment to development, it represents itself, first as technocratically neutral, with the term 'technical assistance' (and elsewhere 'technical cooperation') suggesting parity of power between the helpers

and helped. Second, it suggests that the ideas underpinning development administration were innovative (existing 'conceptual equipment' was inadequate) and, third, that likewise the institutional apparatus through which it operated was new (e.g. new university institutions emerged in the US, which apparently previously didn't have much of an Empire ('imperium') in Asia, Latin America, and Africa).

To be fair, Esman doesn't make this separation absolute, in his acknowledgement that the colonial era was declining, rather than had ended, and in his hint that US had some imperial status. However, the claim that the orthodoxy makes is one of novelty and newness – not least in the assertion of a 'birth'. In this paper this claim is challenged. It is argued instead that, notwithstanding the changes there have been in the various versions of administration and management over the years, there are direct historical continuities between the ideas and practices of colonial administration, and those associated with what was known as development administration, and we now are more likely to call development management. These continuities are far stronger than has hitherto been acknowledged. This means that development administration/management, far from constituting a new set of relations between 'developed' and 'developing' countries has continued to serve as a means of replicating and sustaining imperialist power relations in the world, and the (neo-) colonial status of certain nations and their populations.

Even the briefest historical review suggests that the claims made by Esman, and the orthodoxy more generally, are tenuous, and that there is a prima-facie case for examining the continuity in colonial and development administration/management practices. First, the US 'imperium' was more extensive pre-1945 than Esman's 'terra incognita' suggests. It is important to recall (as we will see) that the US is a country created by white settler colonialism, and the genocide of

its indigenous population within what is now its own borders, which were extended by imperial annexations in the 19th and 20th centuries (e.g. California, New Mexico, Arizona, Texas, Hawaii). LaFeber (1993) notes that during the 19th century 'US military forces consolidated white power over the entire country; by destroying the last major opposition in the late1890s white Americans were using this continental empire as a base from which to create a new empire of commerce and insular possessions in the Caribbean and across the Pacific ocean' (1993: 53-54).

US subsequent development as a colonial power was comparatively late, and to some extent depended on the extension of economic power rather than the formal acquisition of territory. However, it did, as LaFeber (1993) sets out, acquire possessions in the Pacific including the Philippines in 1898. The US also annexed, occupied and established protectorates in the Caribbean, including Cuba, where it still has a military base, Panama (handed back in 1999) and Puerto Rico (still a US possession). US anti-colonialist credentials are also compromised by its foundations as a slave state, and its formal institutionalization of racist segregation at all levels of society, not least in Federal government, for the majority of the 20th Century (and certainly beyond the 1940s/50s 'birth' of development administration), (see King, 1995). As Munene (1995a) points out, the Pan-Africanist movement which brought together many African and African American leaders, and reached its pre-independences zenith with its 5th congress in Manchester in 1945 saw the fight for African independence and against racism in the USA as a common struggle. For many, US imperialism continued through the post-1945 cold war era, which saw US military interventions most (in)famously in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua, and CIA inspired overthrow of democratically elected governments in Iran, Brazil, and Chile.

Second the start of the development era was, more generally, decidedly hesitant, and the decline of colonialism has been slow. In relation to the British Empire some countries became independent soon after 1945 (e.g. India and Pakistan). Others had to wait for decades later (e.g. Ghana and Malay states until 1957, Cyprus, Nigeria and Somalia until 1960, Tanzania in 1961, Kenya 1963, Zambia 1964 and Botswana, Guyana, and Barbados 1966, Papua New Guinea 1975, Brunei 1984), (See Hadjor, 1992 for a full list). Thus colonialism's institutions, ideas and practitioners persisted during Esman's 'four decades'.

Third, development administration has always had its proponents in the traditional imperial power of Britain. At least fourteen of the approximately 100 Universities in Britain run postgraduate programmes which fall under the umbrella of 'development administration and management'. With the exception of Glasgow Caledonian Universities development management is taught in separate 'development' institutes, faculties or departments rather than management or business schools (CDSC, 1999). Many of these were founded at the start of the post-1945 era, and according to Kirke Greene (1999) employed former colonial administrators (as did, he states, NGOs including Oxfam). As the years progress, the numbers have declined; but in one case at least, the Institute for Development Policy and Management, at the University of Manchester (where the author works at the time of writing) ex-colonial officers were teaching as full time staff members in the late 1990s.

An established link

My linking of imperialism/colonialism and development is by no means original. For example Escobar (1989, 1995), Cowen and Shenton (1995) Crush (1995), and Williams (2000) are among those who make a case for the continuity between the

colonial and development eras and/or the discourses associated with them. Others have noted specific institutional continuities between colonial administration: for example Dwivedi and Nef have noted the 'quick turn around of colonial European officers in Africa and Asia into their 'new' positions as UN development administrators' (1982: 63). More recently, the leading development administration/management journal Public Administration and Development's 50th anniversary edition (Collins 1999) tracked its own history as the British Colonial Office publication Journal of African Administration, and contained a number of articles referred to here.

This paper has a debt to all these authors. However it differs from those who have identified the continuity between colonialism and development more generally, in that its focus is on a subset of ideas, i.e. those relating to administration and management. In so doing it does lend strength to the broader argument, and builds on the work of those who have suggested specific institutional continuities, by demonstrating just how fundamental and pervading this continuity is.

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION THEN?

Definitions

We are not short of choice in definitions of development administration. For Riggs (1970: 6-7):

> development administration refers to the administration of development programmes, to the methods used by large scale organizations, notably government, to implement policies and plans designed to meet developmental objectives ... (and to the improvement of development capacities).

Reviewing fourteen different texts on development administration published between 1961 and 1983, Luke (1986: 74) suggests:

> ... persistent trends running through the evolution of the subject include a concern with the creation, maintenance and strengthening of organizational and administrative capacity – as an instrumentality of the development process – to facilitate efficiency, responsiveness, accountability and equity ...

Schaffer (1973: 245) defines development administration as

> development programmes, policies and projects in those conditions in which there are unusually wide and new demands and in which there are peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting them.

Schaffer's specification of a particular set of conditions (i.e. wide and new demands, low capacities, severe obstacles) and the particular task of development is what distinguishes development administration from administration's other forms, particularly generic public administration. These conditions are a euphemism for 'third world countries'. Making this point explicit, Luke argues (1986: 74) that 'the context of the struggle for development in the Third World gives the subject ... [its] peculiar status', going on to quote Swerdlow (1975: 347) that development administration '... must be limited to the administration of those countries that are seeking development and are starting at low levels of economic productivity'.

Moving beyond definitions to what development administration involved as a body of theory and practice, Turner and Hulme see its early years (the 1950s and

1960s) as the 'practical application of modernization theory' (1997: 12). Box 2 summarizes their version of its basic tenets at its start.

Box 1: Development administration then?

Development administration:

1. Was based on the notion of big government 'as the beneficient instrument of an expanding economy: and an increasingly just society (Esman, 1988: 9)'; [d]evelopment administration was synonymous with public administration, which itself was synonymous with bureaucracy.

2. Had an elitist bias: [a]n enlightened minority, such as politicians and planners would be committed to transforming their societies into transforming their societies into replicas of the modern nation state.

3. Would tackle head on the 'lack [of] administrative capacity for implementing plans and programmes through the transfer of administrative techniques to improve the central machinery of national government'.

4. [Used] foreign aid [as] the mechanism by which the missing tools of public administration would be transferred from the West to developing countries

5. [Early on] recognized culture as an impediment to the smooth functioning of Western tools and dominant Weberian bureaucracy: development management

had to overcome such cultural obstacles which were seen as the sources of bureaucratic dysfunctions.

Source: Summarized from Turner and Hulme (1997: 12-13)

Perceptions of changes in development administration in the intervening years diverge. For some there was a relatively smooth sequence of development. Thus, Luke talks of 'the evolution of the subject' (1986: 74), while Esman talks of challenges to certain tenets of development administration by a new generation of scholars as 'insights and contributions' which have been 'embraced with appreciation by their elders' (1991: 3). For others, these challenges have been so great as to require description as episodes of 'crisis', 'impasse', or 'deadlock'. The first episode, famously associated with Schaffer (1969) resulted from disagreements about the efficacy of state bureaucracies as a vehicle of development. Later, in 1981, Hirschmann identified three further issues. These were, first the division between practically and theoretically oriented scholars; second whether these scholars had any influence over practitioners; and third, building on Schaffer, between those who saw bureaucrats' own class interests meaning that it was in their interests to obstruct development, and those who took the opposite view. However, even Hirschmann writing in 1999 was to state that 'deadlock or not, the theory and practice of Development Administration (or Management as it came to be known) have continued, and with some vibrancy' (1999: 288).

DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT NOW?

Administrative continuity

That there is, as Hirschmann suggests, a continuity between development administration and development management is not really disputed. According to Esman (1991: 1) the change in name occurred 'for no particular reason that I can discern, with no significant changes in substance in methodology'. From the US, Brinkerhoff and Coston's 1999 assessment of development management also acknowledges this continuity, tracking its history back to the 1950s. Like others before them Brinkerhoff and Coston identify development management as an applied discipline, and locate it within a parent field of public administration, and suggest that it has changed alongside changes in broader development strategies, particularly in its emphasis on the state as a vehicle of development. Thus:

> The trend has been away from a technocratic, universalist, public-sector administrative model toward a context-specific, politically infused, multisectoral, multiorganizational model. From its initial focus on institution building for central level bureaucracies and capacity building for economic and project planning, development management has gradually expanded to encompass bureaucratic reorientation and restructuring, the integration of politics and culture into management improvement, participatory and performance-based service delivery and program management, community and NGO capacity building, and policy reform and implementation (1999: 348-9).

Brinkerhoff and Coston go on to suggest that development management's 'analytic and practical contents reflect four related facets' (1999: 349). These facets, at once inter-related and sometimes the source of tensions are summarized in Box 3.

Box 3: Development management now?

1. *Development management as a means to foreign assistance agendas* – [it] is most often sponsored by international aid agencies, all of which have their own ... agendas; [t]ypically development management professionals enter the scene upon the request from a donor agency for a predetermined task ... development management is a means to enhancing the effectiveness to projects and programs determined and designed by donor agencies

2. *Development management as toolkit* – [it] promotes the application of a range of management and analytical tools adapted from a variety of disciplines, including strategic management, public policy, public administration, psychology, anthropology and political science ... [these] tools merge policy and program analytics with action.

3. *Development management as values* – development promoting activities constitute interventions in the status quo ... any intervention advances some ... set of interests and objectives at the expense of others [this is] expressed in two ways ... first development management acknowledges management is infused with politics ... second, [it] takes a normative stance on empowerment and

supporting groups, particularly the poor and the marginalised, to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs.

4. *Development management as process* operates at three levels – [first] in terms of the individual actors involved it builds on process consultation and organization development ... starting with the client's priorities needs and values ... [it] serves as a handmaiden to (1) empowering individual actors to assert and maintain control (2) building their capacity to sustain the process into the future ... [second] at the organizational level, whether ... individual agency or multiple organizations ... as a process it is concerned with the interplay between policy, program and project plans and objectives, and the organizational structures and structures through which plans are implemented ... [third] at the sector level – public, civil society, and private ... as a process [it] addresses broader governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and the role of the state ... this brings in empowerment in its societal and political dimensions.

Source: Summarized from Brinkerhoff and Coston (1999: 349-50)

The UK equivalent of Brinkerhoff and Coston is Alan Thomas, who is part of the team responsible for the launch of the Open University's 'Global Development Management Programme' in 1997. Not suprisingly one of Thomas' key concerns is what should comprise a development management curriculum. He states (1996: 108):

To summarize, development management should contain three types of material:

1a Development studies; and

1b conventional management theory in a development context

2. New areas arising from viewing development management as the management of intervention aimed at 'progress' in a context of conflicts over goals and values.

3. Radical participative management methods aimed at enabling and empowering, arising from cases where development management may be viewed as the management of interventions on behalf of the relatively powerless.

There are clear differences between the early incarnations of development management and contemporary versions of development management. First, according to both Thomas and Brinkerhoff and Coston, development management incorporates more of conventional management, which Thomas accepts at face value as being about getting the job done by the best means possible. Second, there is an emphasis on the use of participatory management approaches (e.g. process consultation and organization development), and its associated language of empowerment. Third, for Brinkerhoff and Coston at least, the remit of development management is extended beyond the public sector into the private sector and 'civil society', which is usually a euphemism for NGOs. Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, both recognize that what 'development' means, and that how it should be carried out are contested. This is evident in Brinkerhoff and Coston's point 3, and in Thomas's argument (1996: 102) that the goals of development are for social

change, and that these are 'strongly subject to value based conflicts, derived from different conceptions of 'progress' and development, and differences of interests'.

Here Brinkerhoff and Coston and Thomas take a particular side, that of the powerless and the poor, going so far in Thomas's case to argue for the application of the 'radical' ideas of Freire, Chambers, and others. Brinkerhoff and Coston present a version of development management where, implicitly this is what actually happens, although they acknowledge 'tensions' between the four facets summarized in Box 2. Thomas is even more cautious, and makes the distinction between the 'management *of* development', the generic management of 'deliberate efforts at progress, i.e. 'development interventions', and subsequently (2000: 46) 'management *for* development', where development is seen 'as an orientation towards progressive social change'. For Thomas, authentic development management is the progressive management *for* development (2000: 42), but he is ultimately uncertain about whether or how this progressive orientation is maintained in practice: '... the majority of cases will be ... ambiguous, with value based conflicts, contestations over the definition of development and power struggles. Development management will often remain an ideal rather than a description of what takes place' (2000: 51).

First world agendas first: empowerment last

Thomas is correct in his view that this explicit stand for the empowerment of the powerless, the poor, and the marginalised in societies as a whole goes well beyond mainstream management versions of empowerment (which he nonetheless accepts at face value), and distinguishes development management from conventional management. It is also, apparently, the clearest difference between development management and its development administration predecessors. More, in its claims to

seek to increase the power of those in the Third World (not least, it is implied, in relation those in the First), development management is apparently enabled to distance itself from parallels with colonial administration.

But how can we judge whether those parallels exist if we have no understanding of what colonial administration is/was? Thus far, this paper has followed the general example of development administration and management texts, and not examined how colonial administration actually operated. This deficiency is remedied in the next section, which will then go on to show that at the level of basic principles, participation and empowerment and all, development management and colonial administration have more in common that is different.

Underpinning this case is a recognition that both colonial administration and development management are fundamentally about First World interventions in the operations of Third World states and societies. While development management may now be 'multi-sectoral', and, supposedly unlike development administration, focus on more than government, its primary concern has always been to shape the operation of nation states, as Ferguson (1990) has pointed out in relation to development more generally. This simultaneous continuity and blurring of focus is symbolized by the increased use of the term 'governance', partly government but partly not, the 'structures and mechanisms that are used to manage public affairs according to accepted rules and procedures' (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 602).

More, against claims of being 'multi-sectoral' we also have to set the continuing assertion that development management, like development administration before it is still synonymous with, or a subset of the discipline of Public Administration or sometimes nowadays, Public Sector Management. However, this discipline, development management aside, is otherwise a First World discourse

about First World states. The location of development management within it serves to conceal fundamental truth of its different status as a First World discourse about, and structuring relationships with, the Third.

Brinkerhoff and Coston to their credit do make this truth clear in relation to contemporary development management ('development management as a means to foreign assistance agendas', in Box 2). But, they suggest, and Thomas similarly implies, that these agendas can be negotiated through the use of the participatory/empowering facets or strands of development management. What this conceals is the primacy of the 'foreign development agenda' facet, and participation and empowerment's status as subservient to these agendas, without which there would be nothing to 'participate' in. Going back to Luke's (1986: 74) definition of development administration cited at the start of section 2 above, development management's use of empowerment is as '... an instrumentality of the development process ...' as specified in the First World.

This is not to say that the dynamics of the relationship between First World agendas and what actually takes place as 'development' are complex and cannot be negotiated and even subverted. However, participation and empowerment cannot be in the gift of the First World, nor a requirement it makes of the Third, unless there is some imbalance of power between First and Third to begin with. This imbalanced power relationship means that any negotiation or subversion that there is shaped by First World agendas, and empowerment and participation in practice always takes place within First World boundaries which prescribe genuinely empowering options (e.g. unconditional Third World Debt relief). But what the next section shows is not just a replication of colonial power relationships at this broad level. Rather it sets out the replication, and indeed the continuities, in the priorities, rhetoric and practices of

development management, particularly as they relate to ideas of governance at the macro-level and the related instrumental uses of participatory interventions at the micro-level.

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION THEN AND NOW

The permanence of governance

Some contemporary continuities with colonial administration have not gone unnoticed. Turner and Hulme (1997) for example note that administrative structures in some Third World nations are still those established by colonial powers. These colonialist remnants are real, and significant, for example the continuing existence in some countries of District Commissioners, who were once imperial rulers incarnate on the ground, and who now are more likely to be Heads of States' local personification, keeping an eye, and more, on local government. However, this does not tell us about contemporary manifestations of colonial administration in terms of the relationship between the First World and the Third. Others have done this, however, in relation to particular aspects of current development agendas. Thus Hailey (1999) has reviewed colonial administrators' support for NGOs, currently reprised in the calls for multi-sector/civil society capacity building, and Blore (1999) notes colonial administration's emphasis on decentralized local government, currently the concern of governance interventions.

But what has not been recognized explicitly, and certainly not dealt with in any detail is development's, and development management's concern with *governance* per se, in which the continuity between colonial administration and development management has its strongest and most significant manifestation. As a term governance has come to be widely used in different situations: but in

international development contexts its primary meaning is in terms of how nations are governed. According to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) governance is a neologism. If that is the case, one of the earliest institutionally significant users of the term was the World Bank in the mid to late 1980s. George and Sabelli (1994: 150) suggest that the term was attractive to the Bank because '"[g]overnment" would have been a bit too blatant, since the Bank according to its papers, is not allowed to intervened in politics at all ...'

George and Sabelli's book does not explicitly explore continuities in theories and practices. However, their discussion of World Bank governance prescriptions which the Bank singularly fails to apply to itself, and indeed the book's subtitle, 'The World Bank's Secular Empire' makes clear their view that the governance agenda's concern with how Third World nations are ruled, and attempts to control how this happens are, as noted earlier, a defining feature of imperialism. It is in relation to this concern that the continuity between colonial administration and development management has its strongest manifestation.

Indirect rule as governance

As with imperialism and colonialism more generally there are dangers in seeing colonial administration as a homogeneous set of ideas and practices. But certainly there were widespread approaches which dominated large parts of the world at certain points in history. The particular parallels and continuities that this paper identifies are with the concepts and practices of indirect rule, which are typically associated with late colonial rule in Africa, but were to be found elsewhere in the Imperial world. Its principles were most famously set out in the British colonial administrator Lord Lugard's 1922 *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*,

which according to Perham (1965: xlii) was a 'canonical book' for British Colonial Administrators in the 1930s.

In the Dual Mandate, Lugard argued that British colonial rule could only be sustained 'indirectly' by co-opting (or in reality, creating) 'native' (sic) institutions. Hence indirect rule, the essential feature of which was that 'native chiefs are constituted as an integral part of the machinery of the administration' ... however, the 'chief himself must understand that he has now right to place and power unless he renders his proper services to the state'. More, there were limitations on 'chief's' powers – they could not raise or control armed forces, raise taxes, appropriate or redistribute land, and 'in the interests of good government the right of confirming or otherwise the choice of the people of the successor to a chiefship and deposing any ruler for misrule is reserved to the Governor' (1965: 207). Hence Mamdani's description of a 'separate but subordinate state structure for natives' (1996: 62).

As Mamdani points, the idea of indirect rule did not 'spring full blown from the mind of a colonial architect, for although Lugard theorized it as the British colonial system, its origins predated Lugard's reflection on it; also the practice it summed up was not confined to British colonies' (1996: 62), in Africa or elsewhere. Mamdani also noted the pejorative and offensive nature of the terms 'native' and 'tribes', and argued that the investing (not to mention invention) of 'chiefs' with administrative power led to forms of decentralized despotism.

The need for imperial rule to be sustained, was described in terms of obligation first, exploitation second. Thus the first part of the dual mandate typifies the 'almost metaphysical obligation to rule' described by Said, consisting of:

> ... moral obligations to the subject races ... such matters as the training of native rulers; the delegation to them of the responsibility as they are fit to exercise; the constitution of Courts of Justice free from corruption and accessible to all; the adoption of a system of education which will assist progress without the creation of false ideals; the institution of free labour and a just system of taxation; the protection of the peasantry from oppression and the preservation of their rights, etc. (Lugard, 1965: 58).

Here we see themes that have current development management parallels – the need to train to build capacity, the importance of the rule of law and the absence of corruption, the role of education in progress, flexible labour markets, fair revenue collection, and espoused support for the rural poor. Together, they form what might now be called a governance agenda, although what is missing, and what we come to below, is any mention of politics, and particularly, democratization. Having apparently given moral and ethical issues primacy, the second part of the mandate went on to address economics, concerning 'material obligations ... [the] development of natural resources for the mutual benefit of the people and mankind in general' (1965: 58). Lugard was clear that there was self interest involved here; but argued that both the colonizers and the colonized would benefit. Fundamentally, he asserted '[w]e hold these countries because it is the genius of our race to colonize, to trade, and to govern' (1965: 618-9).

Indirect rule was subsequently endorsed by, among others, the British liberal imperialist Huxley, (who was to become the first Director-General of UNESCO in 1946). In *Africa View* (1931) he states:

> Indirect rule, in fact, means the employment of the existing institutions of the country for all possible purposes to which they are adequate, their gradual molding by means of the laws made and taxes imposed by the Central [i.e. colonial] Government and of the guidance given by administrative officers, into channels of progressive change, and the encouragement within the widest limits of local traditions, local pride and local initiative, and so of the greatest possible freedom and variety of local development within the territory (1931: 103).

Huxley gives the colonial officer a technocratic status, claims them as agents of 'progressive change' (compare with Thomas, above, 60-odd years later). More, his use of the term 'development' as a concern of colonial administration is not coincidental. Lee (1967: 54), in *Colonial Development and Good Government* sees this the advocacy of development as gathering strength in the 1930s, and increasing colonial administrators' technocratic power vis-a-vis indigenous structures permitted by indirect rule:

> In many colonies the D.C. [District Commissioner] became the spearhead of development, a chairman of a 'district team' of technical officers, an embryo development committee ... 'indirect rule' had laid a stress on the natural and organic growth of native authorities. The new philosophy meant a shift away from the this aspect of colonial government towards the 'administration' and a more positive role for the field service of colonial officers; what the 'new deal' achieved was to place the Colonial Office is a position to reassert the new version of the doctrine of native paramountcy – a doctrine of 'public

interest' interpreted by the 'administration' – and to provide the money and specialist personnel for making every district commissioner aware of opportunities for economic development and social welfare.

Lee also notes that by the start of World War II 'the term "colonial development" excluded the "white dominions", and the Indian continent' (1967: 43), although recognizing earlier (1967: 37) that India 'in many respects was the original experimental ground for the "development idea" in colonial administration'. He also produces evidence that this concern for development did not arise from any desire to establish a foundation for independence.

The resonances that even this briefest of considerations of colonial administration have with the contemporary rhetoric of development management are so strong that it is tempting to ignore the cold war era. However, there was a strong governance agenda promoted through development administration from the late 1940s through to the early 1980s (and the current day for Cuba) albeit one which was not described using this term. In this period, the concern was about who should not rule, and the desire of the US to maintain its sphere of influence around the world. According to Turner and Hulme (1997: 12), 'Development administration would wage an unarmed managerial struggle against communism in the underdeveloped nations by engineering the transformation to capitalist modernity and the good life'.

Dwivedi and Nef (1982: 60) argue that 'national development' was as aspect of US counterinsurgency, 'which was to be achieved through administrative development ...', quoting Fall in 1965 (277), 'When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought, it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign'.

Later, they continue:

> Traditional societies had to be saved, if not from the appeals of communism, then at least from themselves. In this context it is not surprising to find a close association between military assistance on the one hand and technical and economic development on the other ... South Vietnam, Korea, Malaysia and Iran are examples where defense and development considerations went hand in hand . Administrative modernization often became an attempt at building the capabilities of the security forces. AID [the US Agency for International Development] public safety programmes in Iran, Korea and Latin America operated as a conduit through which the CIA expanded the repressive capabilities of client states. All of these components were part of a single 'development package' whose real and main concern was stability ... (63).

It should also be noted that the cold war 'development assistance' provided the rationale for First World loans to kleptocrats, and illegitimate and puppet regimes which today forms a substantial proportion of Third World debt. Thus for example the debt Vietnam 'owes' includes that accrued by the puppet Thieu regime of South Vietnam; that of Zimbabwe that of the illegal white supremacist Smith dictatorship; and even the ANC in government in South Africa are being compelled to agree to repay loans made to the illegitimate Apartheid state (Chossudovsky, 1997; Ransom, 1999; Hanlon, 1999).

And so to 'democratization' ...

Thus while development management's concern for governance is not new, its concern for a democratic version (epitomized in Brinkerhoff 2000) of it is, post-dating the end of the cold war (Cuba excepted). A number of different authors have pointed out that this, combined the failure to deal with the consequences of earlier eliminations of democratic government, and financial support of murderous dictators undermines both the credibility and legitimacy of First World good government agendas, as has the ability of a number of leaders who have come to power by non-democratic means to manipulate democratic processes to secure their own election (Muriuki, 1995; Munene, 1995b; Hippler, 1995; Vashee, 1995; Baker, 1998).

Current development management practice reinforces this undermining. To illustrate a recent advertisement in *The Economist* (April 8th, 2000: 137), for a 'Chief, Office of Democracy and Governance', in Kenya sought someone to provide 'intellectual leadership in the design, implementation, management and evaluation of programs needed to support democratic local governance ...'. Required qualifications included:

"1. Experience in providing leadership in the following areas: rule of law, elections and political processes, civil society and governance;

2. Ability to carry out analyses of Kenyan democratic development and formulate appropriate Mission's objectives, targets and strategies for achieving them;

3. Ability to design and manage the implementation of programs and projects through which the strategies are implemented;

4. Ability to evaluate the results of projects and their effect on the related objectives in the democracy and governance sector in Kenya ..."

Combining managerialist language, for example of 'objectives, targets and strategies' this advertisement is for a technocrat specializing in political processes. According to Brinkerhoff (2000: 602), the word 'democratic' in the term 'democratic governance' denotes 'features of a political regime in which citizens hold the right to govern themselves ...'. However the role of 'intellectual leadership ...' as advertised is open only to 'a US citizen or US resident alien'. It is a post with a US AID Mission for which the selected individual 'will be required to obtain a US government secret security clearance'. While she or he will have to have 'excellent communication skills in English ...', 'fluency in Swahili ...' is only 'recommended'.

This advertisement typifies a relationship between development management and the third world which replicates those of indirect rule. Nowadays an American or quasi-American with US secret security clearance is required to provide 'self government' for Kenya; and there is more than an echo of indirect rule's 'separate but *subordinate* state structures for natives' (Mamdani, 1996: 62, emphasis added). Again to their credit, Brinkerhoff and Coston's discussion of 'development management as means to foreign aid agendas' acknowledges:

> First and most obviously foreign assistance agendas at a minimum compromise some degree of self determination in pursuit of socio-economic reforms; and sometimes these externally-derived reform agendas strongly limit the ability of countries to modify the reform package in ways that would support local empowerment.

Day to day managerial minutiae reinforce this neo-colonial relationship:

> Second, donor programming requirements and incentives – such as loan disbursement schedules, project timetables, and compliance with pre-determined indicators – can further inhibit the ability of groups in the recipient country, whether inside or out of government to play an active role in the assistance provided (Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999: 349).

The apparent aims of development management interventions in governance may locate themselves above question - for example 'high levels of transparency and accountability ... increased citizen participation, particularly of marginalised groups ... the equitable delivery of public services ... [respect for] human rights and the rule of law'. But not only are these aims redolent those claimed for indirect rule: agendas that these high level aims conceal are, at the very least, contestable. From many perspectives, 'Democratic governance structures' are not one and the same as those sought in development management interventions which 'redefine the role of the state (less direct service provision, creation and maintenance of a "level playing field" for economic activity, and empowerment of nonstate actors' (Brinkerhoff, 2000: 602). Even more telling is Brinkerhoff's conflation of democracy and the market: 'democratic governance creates a broad institutional framework that enables market led economic growth to occur ...' This is the agenda that 'sectoral level interventions' promotes. It is thus a particular, neo-liberal variant of democratic governance, identified by Hippler (1995: 18) as 'market democracy' that development management promotes, serving, according to Leys, as 'essentially an exercise in restabilization through improved circulation of elites to lend legitimacy to economic deregulation' (1997: 15).

Participation then and now

As we have noted in relation to the examples of Brinkerhoff and Coston and Thomas, participation is apparently development management's current talisman against accusations of neo-colonialism. However, recently questions have been raised about whether participation works on its own terms (e.g. Cooke, 2001), and critical accounts of contemporary participatory development (see Cooke and Kothari, 2001) have also explored how participatory interventions which focus on poverty elimination at the micro level (of, say, individual communities), or even that of specific nations, can mask, and indeed perpetuate social and economic structural inequalities (Cleaver, 2001; Hildyard et al., 2001; Mosse, 2001).

Directly relevant to this paper, though, is Stirrat's, analysis of the use of colonialist language in participatory rural development in particular. Terms central to participatory development which came into vogue through colonial anthropology 'like "community", "village", "local people" and so on are all elements in colonial and post-colonial discourses which depict the world in terms of a distinction between "them" and "us"' (1997: 70). We might add that these terms were often made real by indirect rule, which (c.f. Mamdani) which required and often constructed tribes, villages, communities for 'native authorities' to govern. Stirrat then goes on to argue, among other things, that the seductive yet ultimately vague rhetoric of 'empowerment' associated with participation serves to justify the activity (or interventions in Brinkerhoff and Coston's terms) of outside agencies, ignores the extensive literature which stresses autonomous forms of organization, resistance and self-empowerment, and is based on naïve assumptions about power, which some have and others don't. Consequently, according to Stirrat, contrary to participatory

rhetoric, 'in practice new forms of dependency are also encouraged in which "motivators" and "mobilisers" form the new elite' (1997: 76).

Stirrat's case is strengthened when we recognize that the application of participation in development processes per se has colonialist roots. In the managerialist literature, the inventor of participatory processes is usually identified as the social-psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890-1947); and some participatory development texts (e.g. Fals-Borda and Rahman (1991)) also track their approaches back to his work on action research . However, in one managerial case (French and Bell) a certain John Collier is mentioned as a simultaneous, but apparently separate inventor of the same process. Collier was Commissioner for the US Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) between 1934 and 1945, and architect of the so called 'New Deal for Indians' ('Indians' here in the sense of Native Americans). However, far from working separately Lewin and Collier were actually collaborators (see Cooke, 1999); and in an earlier paper (Cooke, 1998) I showed how Collier's concerns were those of contemporary development management, and how he, and his colleagues at the BIA applied participatory methodologies. I also noted Colliers use of 'development management' terminology (e.g. 'technical cooperation') to describe the BIA's work in the 1930's, and argued that the principles Collier guided his work at the BIA paralleled contemporary development management practice, for example:

> ... working with established and regenerating new communities with democratic control over land use; sustaining cultural, civil and religious liberties ... support which passes responsibility to tribes in organization, education, the provision of cooperative credit and the conservation of natural resources (Cooke, 1998: 40).

But what this work did not acknowledge is Hauptmann's (1986) research, which reveals Collier's frequent identification of himself as a 'colonial administrator'. Particularly telling here is Hauptmann's revelation that Collier's advocacy of participatory approaches, and espousal of self government was inspired by the British model of indirect rule. As Hauptman points out, the very paragraph quoted above from Huxley's Africa View on indirect rule is cited approvingly in Collier's memoirs (Collier, 1965: 345), which also discusses British indirect rule in Fiji, India, and well as Africa. While Collier is far from uncritical of certain manifestations of indirect rule, and its manipulation by white settlers, he was clearly an advocate. According to Hauptmann, Collier made 'Africa View' required reading for BIA employees, and agreed with the liberal imperialist view that 'British responsibility to the Africans will take a century' (Hauptmann, 1986: 367). Hauptman also cites a BIA employee in Collier's time claiming Collier set up participatory experiments because 'he believed that students of group activities among exotic peoples might demonstrate some skill in manipulating them' (1986: 371).

Compared to both his predecessors and successors Collier was a comparatively liberal figure, and the debate continues about his real significance. However, even those who see Collier engaged in a 'decolonization' in his espousal of Indian autonomy, recognize that his was 'a non-Indian model for Indian self government' (Biolsi, 1992: 148). Collier made a significant, if historically underplayed contribution to the methodologies underpinning the management field of Organization Development, which subsequently metamorphosed into change management. Strongly associated with this is the idea of 'psychological ownership',

that employees should feel a high level of belief in and commitment to what their work organization is doing, and take responsibility for ensuring that it operates effectively. But psychological ownership never translates into literal ownership, or control beyond the most micro levels of organizational processes; broader managerial goals are always taken as given and immutable, and, moreover the desire and strategies the achievement of such 'ownership' are always externally, i.e. managerially, impelled (see for example Willmott, 1993).

The rhetoric of 'ownership'

This managerial language of 'ownership' has now found its way into the discourse of development and of development management. However, as is development management's wont, 'ownership' is a prerequisite of nations rather than individuals. Hence the UNDP Management Development Programme Manual on 'Systemic Change in the Public Sector: Process Consultation' takes as uncontested the requirement for a particular form of Public Sector Reform (e.g. 'as the pace of change accelerates, governments with administrative processes designed for routine operations and agencies geared to the performance of distinct and separate functions will have difficulties. Bureaucratic organizations are not design to cope ... administrations need to develop flexibility, creativity ...' (Joy and Bennett, n.d.: 9) While the manual uses the managerialist language of process consultation, to achieve 'ownership' this has to be at the level of a nation's government as a whole. Hence 'systemic improvements must be internalized ... fully assimilated and owned by the system ...' (n.d. 5), the requirement of a 'national programme for action' which 'has to be owned by those who implement it' (n.d: 21).

Perhaps more telling, though are requirements of nations regarding 'ownership' in relation to debt relief. Current International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank policy, supported by donors like Britain's DfID, multilaterals like UNICEF and some First World NGOs like Oxfam is that nations must 'qualify' for fairly limited reductions in debt repayments by demonstrating the money thus saved will be spent on poverty reduction (IMF/IDA 1999a). Nations seeking debt relief are required to produce a 'PRSP', a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. According to the IMF/World Bank:

> [c]ountry-ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount. Broad based participation of civil society in the adoption and monitoring of poverty reduction strategy tailored to country circumstances will enhance its sustained implementation'(IMF/IDA, 1999b: 6).

Later, it is stated '[b]road participation of civil society, other national stakeholder groups, and elected institutions is expected ...'. There is then a list of 'Factors Governments may wish to consider in Drawing Up their Participatory Process' (1999b:12) . Of course, ' [m]ajor multi-lateral institutions – including the bank and the fund – would need to be available to support the process, as would other donors ...' (1999b: 13).

Thus Fund/Bank 'teams will need to cooperate closely' (with one another) 'and seek to present the authorities with a coherent overall view, focusing on their traditional areas of expertise ...':

> [For IMF staff] this would include prudent macroeconomic policies; structural reforms in related areas such as exchange rate, and tax policy; and issues related to fiscal management, budget execution, fiscal transparency and tax and customs administration. The Bank staff will take the lead in advising the authorities in the design of poverty reduction strategies ... the design of sectoral strategies, reforms that ensure more efficient and responsive institutions, and the provision of social safety nets; and in helping the authorities to cost the priority poverty reducing expenditure through Public Expenditure Reviews and the like and in other structural reforms such as privatization and regulatory reform. Many areas will need to be shared between the two staffs, such as the establishment of an environment conducive to private sector growth, trade liberalization, and financial sector development (1999b: 13-14).

Once completed, the 'owned' PRSP's have to be assessed by IMF/World Bank staff, and then approved by World Bank/IMF boards before debt relief is agreed. Nowhere, however, is there a recognition of the contradictions in requiring a country to own a poverty reduction strategy as a condition of debt relief, in creditors telling nations how their participatory processes should work, and in making an 'owned' strategy the outcome of detailed IMF/Bank 'advice' and conditional on their approval.

Likewise there is no recognition of the Bank/IMF's failure to deliver its commitments thus far in relation to debt relief, or in the contradiction in calling for democracy and at the same time demanding that nations incorporate unelected 'stakeholders' and 'civil society' of unproven legitimacy and accountability.

Although, having said that, according to a press report, 'full consultation with civil society over PRSP's has proved to be a bit of a joke. The IMF told Mozambique and Mauritania that they could only obtain rapid approval for debt relief ... only if they did not put the PRSP out for public consultation' (Elliot, 2000: 25).

In his analysis of the activities of international development agencies in Lesotho in the 1980s Ferguson described their operation as a technocratic 'anti-politics machine', stating '[B]y uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of the powerless, and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of "development" is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicitized' (1990: 256). Development management is a 21st century model of this machine, incorporating many repackaged features from the past. And behind its participatory façade, it still precludes any questioning of how poverty is caused beyond the neo-liberal model, let alone the IMF/World Bank being held to account for its own complicity in the extension of poverty, through their imposition of this model in practice, and their lending to kleptocrats and illegitimate regimes.

CONCLUSION – FACILITATORS OF POVERTY ?

This paper began by defining its terms, setting out the received view on the history of development administration/management, and the prima-facie case for challenging this view. In sections two and three, it summarized the development administration and development management orthodoxy, noting the accepted continuity between the two on the one hand, and the differences in the espoused multi-sectoralism and the rhetoric surrounding participation and empowerment on the other. Section four set

out a basic picture of indirect rule, and then to argue that in its contemporary concern for governance, and in the participatory ideas and practices invoked in associated with it development management not only reproduced, unacknowledged, colonial relationships and interventions, but that there was, as the case of participation demonstrated, a direct historical link.

Thus, against Esman's claim that the change of name from development administration to development management happened 'for no reason at all', we should set the view of Williams (2000: 4), writing on development more generally:

> [n]ames have consequences. They define and legitimate the terms of public debates and carry their assumptions into the framing and implementation of policies, behind the backs of those who use them ... hence our need to be aware of 'keywords', to find out where they come from, and the recognize the baggage that they bring with them ... [*r]enaming* [emphasis added] covers up the continuities of institutional forms and functions.

The process of covering up development management's colonial heritage that this paper has outlined has been helped not only by renaming per se, but in the choice of the word 'management', which apparently signifies an ongoing modernization of the field itself, while maintaining a self-representation of technocratic neutrality. This neutral meaning of the term is that supported by the orthodoxy of management more generally, what we can call the mainstream management, or the managerialist view. This is of management, as Thomas puts it, 'getting the work done by the best means available' (1995: 10). But this is a particularly narrow understanding. Not everyone who researches or theorizes within the field of management and

organization studies is looking for ever better means of getting the work done, any more than those in development studies are all seeking better processes of development. Management and organizational theorists include those who subject management per se – its ideas, its discourses – to critique.

Thus, well known in development studies are writers on development who go beyond, and challenge its orthodoxy to locate it in within a range of critical sociological, political and or historical analyses. Some of these have been cited in this paper (Escobar, 1989, 1995; Ferguson, 1990; Cowen and Shenton, 1995; Crush, 1995, and Williams, 2000). Notably ignored by those who write on development management, is the equivalent literature which does the same for 'management' (see for example Braverman (famously), 1974; Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; and Alvesson and Willmott, 1996). These analyses have been around for some time; but recently, as Grey and Fournier (2000) have suggested, they have come collectively to be seen as 'critical management' approaches.

While these writers and others form a management literature, it is not one which is managerialist. This literature is substantial, diverse, and can also be contradictory. If it has anything in common, though, it is a recognition that managerialist representations of management as a neutral, technical means-to-an-end set of activities and knowledge conceal its status as a product of broader social (at every level from the global to the personal) power relations, and in particular, its role in sustaining these. As Alvesson and Willmott (1996:12) put it: [r]epresenting management as an essentially technical activity creates an illusion of neutrality. Management theory is sanitized and management practice is seemingly distanced from the structures of power and interest, that inescapably are a condition and consequence of its emergence and development', having earlier stated 'a moments

reflection makes it obvious that the technical functions of management do not exist and cannot exist in a social or historical vacuum ...' (1996: 10).

As we have already noted in the case of Ferguson, this analysis is directly paralleled in accounts of development interventions. It also can be found in relation to development administration. Thus Dwivedi and Nef noted in 1982 that 'development administration was supposed to be based on ... technically-competent, politically and ideologically-neutral bureaucratic machinery', before going on, as we saw in section 4 above, to set out its role as a cold war weapon. However, that this claim for neutrality is bogus has apparently now been recognized by development management, in acknowledging its value laden nature, and of the potential for conflict over these values and consequent goals in and of development which development management must deal with.

But in its limited engagement with management, development management has ignored other discomforting parallels. Thus Alvesson and Willmott discuss the relatively recent development of 'progressive' (the word now recurs for a third time, after Thomas and Huxley above) conceptions of management which do recognize intra-organizational political processes, so called micro-politics; and then state that 'received wisdom is now beginning to assimilate the understanding that managerial behaviour is now mediated by organizational, societal cultures and contexts ...' (1996: 30).

The key word here is assimilate – political and social analyses are being incorporated into managerialism on managerialist terms, in order to make management a better 'means of getting the job done'. Alvesson and Willmott argue 'all too often attention is focussed on the ideological and political dimensions of organizing simply as a means of smoothing the process of top-down change.

Established priorities and values are assumed to be legitimate' (1996: 31). Moreover, they suggest managerial uses of participatory processes and the rhetoric of empowerment can actually be about deliberately managing values. Emphasis on psychological ownership can 'portend a more totalizing means of management control that aims to produce an internalization of the means and norms selected by senior managers' (19996: 32).

The examples in this paper, of the UNDP's use of process consultation, and the IMF/World Bank use of participatory methodologies show how it is possible to see the now supposedly more nuanced and sophisticated versions of development management as actually setting out how this internalization is to be operationalised at the level of nations, rather than work organizations. Both cases show use of the rhetoric of participation, and espousal of the cause of the poor can serve to delude well meaning development management practitioners and theorists (this author included) into supporting interventions which do not actually challenge 'established priorities and values', which date back to the colonial era.

Thomas' aspiration for a radical development management is worthy, and has this author's support. However, as Thomas himself acknowledges, how it is achieved and maintained is not clear. Thomas case is certainly not helped in his citation of the best known proponent of participatory development, Robert Chambers as an example of the radical approach, when Chambers (1997) himself has approvingly identified parallels between his own work and the managerialist participation espoused by Peters and Waterman, whose 'In Search of Excellence' (1982) helped legitimize Thatcherite assaults on the Public Sector in the UK (see Butler, 1992: 6), and whose work is amongst that 'portending a more totalizing means of management control'.

What those who aspire to a radical version of development management come up against, therefore, apparently unawares, is the longstanding debate within mainstream management and organization studies around paradigm incommensurability. This followed Burrell and Morgan's landmark 1979 'Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis', which categorized theories of organization according to fundamental, paradigmatic assumptions. The first category was assumptions about the nature of social science (the subjectivist/objectivist dimension). The second, more pertinent, here was theories' location within either the 'sociology of regulation' or the 'sociology of radical change', with managerialist approaches to organization falling in the former. Discussions around paradigm incommensurability focus on whether paradigms were mutually exclusive, and the dynamics of relationships between them.

However, Burrell and Morgan recognize that managerialism, and the sociology of regulation has been good at assimilating ideas from radical paradigms. A directly relevant example is the construction of managerialist approaches to participation from the assimilated work of political leftists (including John Collier, ironically (see Cooke, 1999)). This appropriation by the managerialist orthodoxy of radical ideas is, appropriately enough, labeled 'colonization' within mainstream management (e.g. Grey 1999). What this paper demonstrates is that the claims made by development management for the empowerment of the poor, participation, and for poverty elimination are not an example of the radical prevailing over the orthodox, but of this metaphorical colonization. The strongest and saddest irony is that this metaphorical process both maintains, and is maintained by, a literal perpetuation of colonization processes on the part of development management.

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MANAGEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT GROUP WORKING PAPER SERIES

Paper No 3

MANAGING THE NEO-LIBERALIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD: THE CASE OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

by

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March 2002

ISBN: 1 904143 12 1
Published by: Institute for Development Policy and Management
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MANAGING THE NEO-LIBERALIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD: THE CASE OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT

This paper is about the relationship between management, a First World discipline, and the Third World. Evidence is that management is assumed to apply in organizations in modern, or post-modern societies. There is however a distinctive form of management, Development Administration and Management (DAM) applied to Third World nation-states that are deemed in the First World to require neo-liberal modernization. This essential difference is concealed by a certain level of crossover with generic management. This article sets out this institutional and conceptual separation and crossover. It then goes on to demonstrate how DAM, with particular help from participatory ideas associated with the management of organizational change (for example action learning) is complicit in the World Bank's neo-liberalizing "poverty reduction" agenda. It concludes by reviewing the implications of DAM/management's status as a direct instrument of neo-liberalism for both management generally and for Critical Management Studies.

MANAGING THE NEO-LIBERALIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD

INTRODUCTION

This article is about the relationship between management and the Third World. Its significance however is for understandings of management in and of both First and Third Worlds. It builds from an agreement with Diana WongJi and Ali Mir (1999) that what is taken as "management" in the First World, in the field of management and organization studies (MOS), its associated journals and texts, and business and management schools which train its academics and practitioners has ignored, with few significant exceptions, the Third World. But this is only a beginning: the purpose of this article is to identify the existence and implications of a largely separated set of First World managerial theories and practices, which takes and indeed helps constitute the Third World as its subject. This separated discipline was once known as "development administration", and now more typically as "development management" or "development administration and management" (henceforth DAM, considered in comparison with the "management" of business schools, MOS etc.)

DAM, despite this separation, has connections to "management". It uses some of its techniques and language, and claims to be subset of public administration. Although these connections appear to be strengthening, DAM maintains its distinctive self-identity through its "developing country" orientation. This in turn points to the two

fundamentals of DAM which identify it as separate. First, "management" has historically taken "the organization" as its basic unit of analysis and action. This is often a tacit assumption, or if not, one which passes unremarked, as in the very conflation of MOS. Ferguson's statement, however, that "the development paradigm insists on taking *the country* as the basic unit of analysis" (1990:60) and, it can be added, action, is also true for its subfield, DAM. Second, whereas management assumes that its primary subjects (organizations being managed) are situated within modernity (or for some, beyond it, in post-modernity), DAM assumes that its primary subjects (countries being managed) have yet to achieve modernity, which is why they are deemed to need "development".

Formal definitions provide some insights into the distinctiveness's claimed by the DAM orthodoxy, and in this article. Thus Schaffer (1973: 245) defines development administration as:

> development programmes, policies and projects in those conditions in which there are unusually wide and new demands and in which there are peculiarly low capacities and severe obstacles to meeting them.

The specification of a particular set of conditions (i.e. wide and new demands, low capacities, severe obstacles) and the particular task of development is a tacit distinction from generic public administration. It is also another way of saying "Third World

countries" requiring modernization. Making this point explicit, Luke argues (1986: 74) that 'the context of the struggle for development in the Third World gives the subject ... [its] peculiar status', going on to quote Swerdlow (1975: 347) that development administration '... must be limited to the administration of those countries that are seeking development and are starting at low levels of economic productivity'.

How this separation/connection between DAM and "management" manifests itself in practice is illustrated in a job advertisement in *The Economist* (April 8th, 2000: 137). It sought a 'Chief, Office of Democracy and Governance' in Kenya to provide 'intellectual leadership in the design, implementation, management and evaluation of programs needed to support democratic local governance ...'. Required qualifications included:

1. "Experience in providing leadership in the following areas: rule of law, elections and political processes, civil society and governance
2. Ability to carry out analyses of Kenyan democratic development and formulate appropriate Mission's objectives, targets and strategies for achieving them
3. Ability to design and manage the implementation of programs and projects through which the strategies are implemented
4. Ability to evaluate the results of projects and their effect on the related objectives in the democracy and governance sector in Kenya ..."

The job is only open to "a US citizen or US resident alien". For this post with US AID (Agency for International Development) the selected individual "will be required to

obtain a US government secret security clearance". While she or he will have to have "excellent communication skills in English ...", "fluency in Swahili ..." is only "recommended".

What is going on here, then, is a First World intervention in the political processes of another nation-state. The post-holder will not manage a modern (or beyond) organization, which is what "management" has assumed managing is all about. Yet this is an advert for a manager, as the use of the managerialist terminology of leadership, objectives, strategy and strategies, program and project, implementation and evaluation (not to mention 'manage') makes clear.

So, despite their differences "management" and "DAM" are both at the same time versions of management in its most broad and generic sense (perhaps it is clearer to say that they are both versions of managerialism). They are both cases of "a common sense and taken for granted reality of management...." in which "management is what managers do" (Grey 1999:569). That is, management as a conflation of a certain set of distinctive managerial activities ("what managers do") with an occupational category possessing a distinct managerial identity (ie "managers"). This is more than a parallel between different sets of technocrats and technocracies; as the illustration shows, "management" language and practices are used in DAM. Ironically this helps conceal the fundamental differences that there nonetheless are. In turn, this paper will show, this combination of similarity and difference hides the contemporary complicity of both

DAM, and "management" when used in DAM, in a neo-liberalising global modernization project.

In the next section this paper will set out the presence and absence of relationships between DAM and "management", in terms of the institutional settings in which DAM is produced, and its claimed theoretical underpinning. The section following that looks at DAM in practice in the case of the largest and most influential development agency, the World Bank, and its current intervention strategies. Again, the concern is the separation and connection between DAM and management. The conclusion explores the implications of the preceding sections for understandings of the various versions of management encountered thus far - IM, "management", and DAM. Most attention, however, is paid to the significance of my analysis for Critical Management (CM). In that this article challenges representations of different managements as neutral, technocratic, means to ends, but instead reveals them as establishing and reinforcing particular ideologies and power relations, it falls within the CM genre (Grey and Fournier 2000). Yet, it is argued in the conclusion, it also indicates problems and gaps in CM theorizing thus far.

AN OVERVIEW OF DAM

Esman's account of DAM begins as follows:

> While the field's pioneers confronted the dilemmas of the declining colonial era with its hesitant and post-World War II commitment to development, the subject was transformed by the precipitous expansion of US imperium into terra incognita in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These encounters through technical assistance with the realities of Third World governments revealed that the conceptual equipment of Western, particularly American, public administration was inadequate to the task at hand. This challenge produced several nodes of activity among them ... Indiana ... Michigan State ... Syracuse ... Southern California ... Harvard ... Pittsburgh (1991:1)

Elsewhere (Cooke 2001) it was argued that this statement ignores the continuance of formal imperialism well past the end of the second world war, underplays the extent of US imperialism pre- and post- 1945, and fails to recognize the old imperial power of Great Britain's contribution to DAM. Relevant to this paper, it was pointed out the common term 'technical assistance' (and elsewhere 'technical cooperation') helps DAM represent itself as technocratically neutral, with the words 'assistance' or 'cooperation' implying a non existent parity of power between the technical helpers and helped. In specifying new "nodes of activity", and inadequate public administration conceptual frameworks, Esman also points to an institutional separation. This, it is argued here sustains the conceptual separation, which is at once claimed and concealed in Esman's alignment to an inadequate public administration.

DAM Institutions

Evidence of the institutional separation of "management" and DAM is provided by contemporary calls for its diminution by senior staff in international development agencies. The vision for United Nations' Development Program (UNDP), of its head, ex-World Bank Vice-President Malloch-Brown, is that it must become like the archetypal management consultancy: "[w]e need to become a kind of McKinsey for the developing world...." (in Morgan, 2000:5). The former head of Social Development at the UK Department for International Development (DfID) argues that: "as orthodox development loses its dominant position, so we can take advantage of recent postmodernist organizational theory which has been developed in business management faculties to explain the success of certain transnational corporations" (2000:10). Eyben does not subsequently discuss this theory; but institutionally she implies a turn away from the 13 or so non-management/business school University departments in the UK, as well as those listed by Esman in the US, where DAM or some aspect thereof is taught (CDSC 2000).

As the introduction noted this institutional separation has been confirmed empirically, in relation to 16 leading management journals, by Wong-MingJi and Mir (1997). Their concern was the global spread of International Management (IM), but their methodology means that their research is equally about "management" generally. Wong-MingJi and Mir analyzed every article in these journals[1] (3,649 articles in total)

according to the country of authors' institutional affiliation, and the nations represented in articles besides those where a given journal was published. All the journals are published in the First World, and within them Third World countries were overwhelmingly underrepresented. 37.41% of articles originated from the US, and 15.68% each from Canada and the UK, while the highest percentage from a Third World nation was 2.25% from India. Ninety-eight countries had no representation amongst contributors, and 89 countries were not represented as subjects. Among those which featured neither among contributors or subjects were Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kenya, Mozambique, Oman, Sri Lanka, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe. The highest representation as subject in percentage terms was the 1.73% of articles that featured India, 1.51% the Third World per se, and 0.36% Nigeria.

There are however other First World journals which claim countries engaged in modernization as their subject. Of these, generic development journals include *World Development* ("a multidisciplinary monthly journal of development studies. It seeks to explore ways of improving standards of living and the human condition generally..."), *Development and Change* ("an interdisciplinary journal devoted to the critical analysis and discussion of current issues of development"), and *Journal of International Development* ("... wishes to publicise any work which shows promise in confronting the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in low income countries"). All have published articles

about DAM as part of their broader development remit (see for example Brinkerhoff 2000, Hirschmann 1999, Thomas 1998).

Some are more directly development management oriented, for example *Development in Practice* ("a multi-disciplinary journal of practice-based analysis and research concerning the social dimensions of development"), which has recently published a collection of its articles under the title *Management and Development* (Eades, 2000), and *Public Administration and Development (PAD)* ("reports and reviews the practice of public administration.... where this is directed to development in less industrialized and transitional economies. It gives special attention to the management of all phases of public policy formulation and implementation which have an interest and importance beyond a particular government and state. *PAD* also publishes articles on the experiences of development management in the NGO sector...") (all statements from journals' aims, 2001).

At the same time, the institutional separation between management and DAM has never been absolute. What for some are separate identities are for others merged. Thus, from Tanzania, Malloch-Brown's aspiration for the UNDP might appear pointless, because McKinsey is the "McKinsey for the Developing World". Max, on the ruinous decentralization of Tanzanian local government in 1973, notes the central role of "McKinsey and Co Inc, an international capitalist consultancy firm specialised in development management" (1990:84). Some development institutes (for example my

own) teach "management" topics such as HRM (but segregated from similar business/management school classes). *Organization* was not included in Wong-MingJi and Mir's analysis, but has, particularly in its early years addressed the failure of development (Escobar 1995a), global organization (Gergen 1995), feminist international development (Ferguson 1996), and a sub-field of management (OD) read from the Third World (Holvino 1996). This article supports some parts of these earlier contributions, for example Ferguson's concerns for the hegemonic nature of the IMF/World Bank, and for the role of practitioners acting at their behest. However, it does so in meeting a remit hitherto unaddressed, in acknowledging the existence of DAM per se, and in exploring the DAM/ "management" nexus, and results in different, and more current, findings. Elsewhere, public administration journals do from time to time publish articles on DAM (eg *Public Administration Review* of Brinkerhoff and Coston 2000); also Blunt, Jones and Richards (1992) and Kiggundu (1989)), have applied management OB/OD theories in the Third World, but still with organizations primarily understood as instrumentalities of the development process.

There is nonetheless much else in DAM journals and books which readers from a "management" background would not recognize as management as they understand it. This is partly because of DAM domain specific techniques and methods which do not occur elsewhere, for example institutional development, the logical framework, and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) (Cooke 1998, Chambers 1997). But mutual understanding is also constrained because DAM and "management" work from

different sets of paradigms. Accordingly, Cooke (1997) recognizes that a development practitioner adopting a MOS Burrell and Morgan multi-paradigm approach would still be working within the development paradigm. The same applies to a "management" practitioner working in DAM. The difficulties of cross paradigmatic understanding on one hand, and the "management" in common both sustain the obliviousness of management practitioners and theorists to the switch from modernity to modernization, from organization to nation-state, and even from "management" to DAM, as the former is applied in the latter.

The ideas of DAM

In addressing the paradigmatic situation of DAM a transition has been made from its institutions to its ideas. To continue in this vein, but at the sub-paradigmatic level of DAM's representations of itself, it should be noted that that there is continuity between development administration and development management is not disputed.

Hirschmann's historical survey notes that for its internal disputes "…. the theory and practice of Development Administration (or Management as it came to be known) have continued, and with some vibrancy' (1999: 288). From the US, Brinkerhoff and Coston's 1999 assessment of development management also acknowledges this continuity, tracking its history back to the 1950s. In the DAM tradition, they identify development management as an applied discipline, and locate it within a parent field of public

administration. But they also say that it has changed, particularly in its emphasis on the state as a vehicle of development. Thus:

> The trend has been away from a technocratic, universalist, public-sector administrative model toward a context-specific, politically infused, multisectoral, multi-organizational model. From its initial focus on institution building for central level bureaucracies and capacity building for economic and project planning, development management has gradually expanded to encompass bureaucratic reorientation and restructuring, the integration of politics and culture into management improvement, participatory and performance-based service delivery and program management, community and NGO capacity building, and policy reform and implementation (1999: 348-9).

This inclusion of community and NGO capacity building, which elsewhere Brinkerhoff (2000) suggests should also include the private sector shifts DAM further still from public administration. More generally, the shift of emphasis away from state bureaucracy to a variety of organizational forms and processes might be taken as suggesting notice has been taken of Eyben's call for post-modern organization, along the lines perhaps of that proposed by Clegg (1990). This is far from the case, as the following section will show. DAM is still very much about the attempt to achieve modernity, albeit the "neo-liberal modernity" Fotopoulous (2001:33) identifies as succeeding its "statist" version.

Although they are DAM insiders Brinkerhoff and Coston's assessment is nuanced. It does for example recognize DAM is about First World interventions in the Third World, identifying: *"Development management as a means to foreign assistance agendas* [their italics]... most often sponsored by international aid agencies, all of which have their own ... agendas; [t]ypically development management professionals enter the scene upon the request from a donor agency for a predetermined task ...". In describing *"development management as values"* they recognise explicitly that DAM requires political interventions in the status quo, but for the best of reasons, because it "takes a normative stance on empowerment and supporting groups, particularly the poor and the marginalised, to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs" (1999:349).

There are according to Brinkerhoff and Coston two additional "facets" of development management. Both contain substantial components recognisable as "management" but at the same time differentiations which point to country as the unit of analysis and action. *"Development management as toolkit...* promotes the application of a range of management and analytical tools adapted from a variety of disciplines, including strategic management, public policy, public administration, psychology, anthropology and political science ... "; (1999:350) whereas:

"*Development management as process* operates at three levels – [first] in terms of the individual actors involved it builds on process consultation and organization development ... starting with the client's priorities needs and values ... [second] at the organizational level, whether ... individual agency or multiple organizations ...concerned with the organizational structures and processes through which plans are implemented ...[third] at the sector level – public, civil society, and private... [it] addresses broader governance issues, such as participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and the role of the state ... this brings in empowerment in its societal and political dimensions" (1999:350).

The relationship between "management" and DAM is also explored from the UK by Alan Thomas, for whom a development management training curriculum should cover (1996:108):

"1a Development studies

1b Conventional management theory in a development context

2 New areas arising from viewing development management as the management of intervention aimed at 'progress' in a context of conflicts over goals and values.

3 Radical participative management methods aimed at enabling and empowering, arising from cases where development management may be viewed as the management of interventions on behalf of the relatively powerless."

In sum, besides the extension of remit from the state alone to incorporate civil society and the private sector there are three other changes evident in the transition from development administration to development management. First, according to both Thomas and Brinkerhoff and Coston, development management incorporates more of "management". The relationship between Brinkerhoff and Coston's four "facets" is however better conceived as hierarchical, than as they have it in "tension" (Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999:349), with "foreign [ie First World] assistance agendas" informed by particular "values" determining what is permitted in the "management" orientated "process" and "toolkit".

Second, there is an emphasis on the use of participatory "management" approaches (e.g. process consultation), as well as those developed separately in DAM, and their associated language of empowerment. Third, both recognize that development in theory and practice are contested. This is evident in Brinkerhoff and Coston's "development management as values" facet, and in Thomas's argument (1996: 102) that development's goals for social change are 'strongly subject to value based conflicts, derived from different conceptions of 'progress' and development, and differences of interests'.

In relation to this last point Brinkerhoff and Coston, and Thomas suggest DAM takes a particular side, that of the powerless and the poor. Brinkerhoff and Coston present a version of development management where, implicitly this is what actually happens,

although their acknowledgement of 'tensions' suggests that this is not always the case. Thomas is even more cautious, and makes the distinction between the 'management *of* development', the generic management of 'deliberate efforts at progress, ie 'development interventions', and 'management *for* development', where development is seen 'as an orientation towards progressive social change' (2000:46). For Thomas, authentic development management is the progressive management *for* development but he is ultimately uncertain about whether or how this progressive orientation is maintained in practice: '... the majority of cases will be ... ambiguous, with value based conflicts, contestations over the definition of development and power struggles. Development management will often remain an ideal rather than a description of what takes place' (2000: 51).

Thomas claims, accurately, that this alignment of participation with a radical, pro-poor agenda takes development management beyond mainstream "management" versions of empowerment. This might offer hope to some of those focused on "management" but at the same time outside it in Critical Management, seeking "more humane" forms of management which are "less irrational and socially divisive" (Grey and Fournier 2000:23). DAM does offer techniques unknown in "management" and CM for working with and organizing the poor and the marginalized (notably associated with Chambers' (1997) PRA). Yet at the same time neither Thomas nor Brinkerhoff and Coston recognize the managerial orthodoxy's capacity to appropriate radical ideas (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Willmott and Alvesson (1996)). Also not acknowledged in DAM are CM

claims that participation and empowerment are used in the workplace as means of control (Cooke 1999), although similar analyses are now finding their way into critiques of participatory development (Cooke and Kothari 2001). In both cases the argument is that participation and empowerment at the micro level (of say, work teams, or individual "communities") can sustain, through co-optation and undermining resistance, macro-level inequalities and exploitation.

Sadly, this appropriation and co-optation is what appears to be happening. The following section reveals how claims for pro-poor interventions, which it is claimed distinguishes DAM, mask interventions which have the opposite effect. It also shows how, at the level of practice, "management's" participatory processes, and those associated with organizational culture change more generally have, via DAM, become implicated in management of change at the most macro levels possible, that is in the global, neo-liberal, transformation of nation-states.

DAM IN PRACTICE

In "management", the ideas of participation and empowerment are associated with the idea of collective psychological ownership by employees of the policies, processes and activities to which an organization is committed. This is particularly the case in relation to the management of organizational change (eg Schein 1987). Psychological ownership does not translate into literal ownership however, nor control beyond the most micro

levels of organizational processes; broader managerial goals are always taken as given and immutable, and, moreover the desire and strategies for the achievement of such 'ownership' are always externally, ie managerially, impelled (Willmott, 1993).

"Ownership" at the Country Level

The difference in DAM is that countries are required to show "ownership", that is it is prescribed in the First World for Third World nation-states. As in "management" the desire and strategies for ownership are managerially impelled, but in this case as a means to achieve DAM's "foreign assistance agendas" facet.

This is demonstrated with greatest significance by the World Bank, and its implementation of Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDFs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (the latter shared with the IMF). The largest development agency, the Bank has 8,000 staff, and lends and guarantees around $25 billion a year to 177 member countries. Headquartered in Washington DC, its Executive Board is dominated by representatives of First World nations. Its President, currently James Wolfensohn, is always chosen by the US government (Bretton Woods Project, 2001). The Bank is not merely a financial institution however; its lending is often tied to specific projects which it directly or indirectly manages. As the following section will also show, it increasingly sees itself (with the IMF) as the architect of global financial and political systems and processes, and the global coordinator of First World

development interventions in the Third). Important in relation to the distinctiveness of contemporary development management, all this is done in the name of the World's poor. Bank web pages are tagged "A World Free of Poverty", and its stated purpose is to help "developing countries fight poverty and establish economic growth that is stable, sustainable, and equitable" (World Bank 2001a).

The Bank's claim for world-wide authority in this realm is evident, for example, in its Global Development Gateway, aimed at becoming 'the premier web entry point on poverty and sustainable development' (cited in Bretton Woods Project 2001). It is also evident in the term "comprehensive" in CDF, one aspect of which signifies the Bank's intention that there should be a single, overarching development strategy (in Brinkerhoff and Coston's terms, "foreign assistance agenda") for a given Third World country, to which individual First World nation development agencies (eg USAID, DfID) contribute. Within CDFs, poverty alleviation is a key goal, and addressed through country PRSPs, which are a joint Bank/IMF initiative. In the implementation of CDFs and PRSPs, there has also been a heavy incorporation of "management" ideas and practices, as this section will go on to show. CDFs and PRSPs therefore show how DAM, embodying all Brinkerhoff and Coston's four facets (in the hierarchy I have suggested), and an apparent pro-poor management *for* development on Thomas's lines (and containing his three components) is practiced by the most powerful development agency in the world (see George and Sabelli 1994).

The other aspect of CDF comprehensiveness, where comprehensive means thorough, and the centrality of ownership therein is stated by the Bank thus:

> "The CDF suggests a long term holistic approach to development that recognizes the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals but give equal weight to the institutional, structural, structural underpinnings of a robust market economy. It emphasizes strong partnership among governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other development actors. Perhaps most importantly, the country is in the driver's seat, both "owning" and directing the developing agenda with the Bank and the country's other partners... (World Bank 2001b).

According to the latest figures, 46 countries are involved in the CDF/PRSP processes (CDF Secretariat, 2001). The conceptual and practical link between CDFs and PRSPs is not clear. Figure one (appended) is what is seen, in toto, when following the link on the World Bank's CDF "Background and Overview" web page (in December 2001) entitled "To learn more about the relationship between CDF and PRSPs" (World Bank 2001b). There is no accompanying text, so explanations of the underlying logic have to be read into the diagram. The official line is that the PRSP is "an operational vehicle which can be a specific output of a CDF or of processes based on CDF principles. Its intent is to integrate countries' strategies for poverty reduction into coherent, growth oriented macroeconomic frameworks and to translate these strategies into time bound action plans..." (World Bank 2000:32). Again, ownership is required. The IMF states "[c]ountry-ownership of a poverty reduction strategy is paramount. Broad based

participation of civil society in the adoption and monitoring of poverty reduction strategy tailored to country circumstances will enhance its sustained implementation' (IMF/IDA, 1999b: 6). At the time of writing there is much more publicly available information (to a writer based in Britain) about the content of PRSPs as opposed to CDFs.

Figure 1 reduces individual nations' political, social, and economic processes, internal relationships between and within state, market, and civil society, and external relationships with other states, and global organizations and processes to a single diagram. It also is intended to provide the basis for the management of nation states, helped by "management" ideas and processes. At its heart is the 4 by 7 matrix which comprises the CDF, which each country is required to complete. This is to be accompanied by a series of annexes. As Paul Cammack (forthcoming) points out a CDF requires a detailed - indeed comprehensive - specification of government policy to the Bank's satisfaction if Bank/IMF support (which includes some relief of existing debts) is to be given. Cammack quotes Wolfensohn (1999: 24) that "the matrix will be a summary management tool", behind each of its headings being annexes, which "set forth where the country stands in terms of achievement, and where they want to go...." followed by "a strategy for implementation with a timeline." This is to be followed with "a more detailed listing of projects achieved, projects underway, and projects planned, together with a listing of those institutions providing assistance, and a detailed description of the projects planned and undertaken with their results."

What Wolfensohn proposes is very close to a standard description of a strategic or a business plan. However, as the matrix headings make clear what is being managed is not a work organization, but a nation-state, which is required to prioritize and taxonomize its activities according to the Bank's matrix to its satisfaction. In achieving ownership of CDFs the Bank also clearly sees a need to buttress hard systems change embodied in the matrix with that in so called softer systems, mimicking, for example, Saithe's (1985) approach to organizational culture change. Hence: "[f]undamentally the CDF approach calls for a change in internal culture and mindset and it is evident from the pilot countries that this is beginning to happen" (World Bank 2001d).

The Bank itself produces examples of how this culture change is to be achieved globally in table 1, reproduced verbatim (World Bank 2000:37). To repeat a belabored point, the headings of each column - leadership, organizational environment, learning approach and so on, and the "culturalist" (in the sense described by Kunda 1992) language in the boxes is evidently from "management", but the application is to countries. The names in the first column are supposed to represent nation-states, not the regional offices of a transnational organization.

Table 1: Promising Changes in the Bank's Way of Working

Examples from Bank's way of working with pilot countries that facilitated incorporation of CDF principles (one country per region shown).

	Leadership Behaviour (roles, skills, attitudes)	**Organizational Environment (structure, processes, culture)**	**Learning Approach (learning, context, content, process)**
Bolivia	*Empowering teams incl. ACS []staff and infusing passion* inspired a higher level of effort and forged more committed internal and external relationships.	*Decentralization of decision making* facilitated receptiveness to emerging opportunities.	*Using a results- and decision-oriented learning approach* promoted a results- and decision oriented work culture together with the government.
Ghana	*Giving priority to national experience and capacity* encouraged government to take stronger leadership role.	*Building a culture of mutual respect and trust* gave the government the opportunity to present their long-term country strategy directly to the Board.	*Building upon lessons* learned in Bolivia and applying an action-learning approach sped the process of joint learning.
Morocco	*Adapting our CAS* [Country Assistance Strategy] *practices* to the dynamics in the country and to the timing of the national process for developing country strategy improved the relationship between government and Bank.	*Developing cross-sectoral working practices* promoted movement towards a more holistic approach.	*Facilitation of country team retreat by process expert* enhanced team process skills and effectiveness.
Romania	*Being more innovative and working within the broader context* together with the government is helping to create a network for change inside the country and to open up dialogue between the government and the private sector and other members of civil society.	*Leveraging the matrix structure* facilitated inter-sectoral teams, both within the Bank and within the government.	*Leveraging external change process expertise into a joint learning experience* supported vigorous national dialogue, including with civil society.
Vietnam	*Performing a networking role* and ceding leadership to others facilitated synergies among development partners.	*Modelling more open and transparent work culture and processes* encouraged government to take a more open and inclusive approach with civil society and private sector.	*Sharing of knowledge and joint learning* supported the institutionalizing of bi-annual mini-CG-meetings, bringing together internal and external stakeholders.

source: World Bank (2000: 37)

Claims are also made for action learning, recognizing "that people learn better by using a "hands-on" approach than the traditional classroom setting" and which for the Bank helps focus on the "need to deliver real country products in real time". The US Society for Organizational Learning was commissioned by the Bank to evaluate its action-learning program in the CDF pilot phase, and concluded that "the approach catalyzed innovative institutional change, enhanced leadership competencies consistent with the CDF requirements, and led to enthusiastic support for the new way of doing business" (note, in passing, SOL's extension of its mandate from organizations to institutions). According to the World Bank Country Director for Bolivia, action learning "was essential in producing effective stakeholders discussions. I have never seen this in the Bank before - where you go through the process of discussion, have so many perspectives at once, but you have action, but you have action at the end. And there was not just a unilateral decision, but everyone was involved..." (all quotes from World Bank: 2001d).

There is an unspoken consequent implication that what happened before, when decisions were unilateral, lacked legitimacy. The debt which PRSPs are a stipulated pre-requisite to relieving does include that accrued through First World loans (many of which were from the private banking sector and subsequently nationalized) to dictatorial regimes (eg Thieu of South Vietnam, Smith of Zimbabwe, Mobutu of DR Congo, the South African apartheid state (Chossudovsky, 1997; Ransom, 1999; Hanlon, 1999)). Problems with the pre 1999 action-learning CDF/PRSP strategy of Structural

Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (known as austerity programs), were also attributed to by the Bank to a lack of ownership. Others saw the civil unrest that resulted in many countries as a consequence of the social harshness of reform that they required, for example the removal of subsidy for essential goods and services, privatizing and downsizing, which had a disproportionately damaging effect on the poor, on women, on children, on people with disabilities and on the elderly (Cornia et al 1987; Bernstein 1990, Elson 1991).

Accountability and remedy for harmful past Bank/IMF practice are not issues which are able to be addressed in the Bank's participative, mindset changing, ownership engendering learning processes. This is not surprising given the control that is exerted over them. No contradiction is recognized in calling for participation and PRSP ownership on the one hand, and the initial prescription of 'Factors Governments may wish to consider in Drawing Up their Participatory Process' on the other (IDA/IMF1999b:12). This in turn has developed into hundreds of pages of analysis and recommendations on the conduct of PRSP participation which can be downloaded from the World Bank PRSP website, including a 69 page report by Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2001) titled *Macro-economic Policy, PRSPs and Participation.*

Throughout, though, there has been no Bank departure from the understanding that '[m]ajor multi-lateral institutions – including the bank and the fund – would need to be available to support the process, as would other donors ...' (IDA/IMF 1999b: 13). This

"support" is extensive. Bank/IMF 'teams will need to cooperate closely' (with one another) 'and seek to present the authorities with a coherent overall view, focusing on their traditional areas of expertise ...':

> [For IMF staff] this would include prudent macroeconomic policies; structural reforms in related areas such as exchange rate, and tax policy; and issues related to fiscal management, budget execution, fiscal transparency and tax and customs administration. The Bank staff will take the lead in advising the authorities in the design of poverty reduction strategies ... the design of sectoral strategies, reforms that ensure more efficient and responsive institutions, and the provision of social safety nets; and in helping the authorities to cost the priority poverty reducing expenditure through Public Expenditure Reviews and the like and in other structural reforms such as privatization and regulatory reform. Many areas will need to be shared between the two staffs, such as the establishment of an environment conducive to private sector growth, trade liberalization, and financial sector development (1999b: 13-14).

The implication is that sovereign governments' ownership is therefore supposed to derive from their responsibility for everything else; though what else remains is not specified. A detailed World Development Movement (WDM) review (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001) of 16 country PRSPs/Interim-PRSPs (I-PRSPs) demonstrates an absence of ownership and participation in both process and content. Globally, trades

unions have been excluded from participation (another parallel with "management"). More generally negotiations over PRSPs have been conducted in private between Bank and government officials, with evidence that the latter have tried to second guess what the Bank wants in order to gain debt relief. In Cambodia, PSRP documentation was not available in the Khmer language by the time the final draft was put before cabinet. "Foreign technical consultants of major donor institutions [are] setting the parameters of Cambodia's poverty reduction strategy" (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001: 36). Ghanaian women's organizations argued that the requirement that civil society speak "with a single voice...would mean subordinating women's gender interests to men's". In Tanzania, there are 157 policies attached to the I-PRSP which "pressure the Government of Tanzania [GOT] to carry out political, economic and social reforms designated by the IMF and World Bank and acceded to by the GOT. Such excessive conditionality amounts to micromanagement of the GOT by its creditors." (Global Challenge Initiative 2000, in Marshall and Woodroffe 2001:39).

The WDM review identifies the compilation of a PRSP as an intensively political process, provides examples of manipulation of consultation processes by governments and oppositions, and highlights the exclusion of civil society organizations (CSOs). It does not however quite go so far as to raise the broader questions of the legitimacy and accountability of CSOs and their right to participate. However, according to the Bank itself those who are elected but outside government have little involvement. For both CDFs and PRSPs "parliaments are mostly absent from the debate" (CDF Secretariat

2001: 4). That there is therefore a divergence between espoused and actual practice when it comes to participation and empowerment is only part of the case. CDFs and PRSPs have been produced and adopted, so what the Bank proudly claims for action learning, teambuilding, changing leadership behaviors and so on seems to have had some effect. That effect may have been the co-optation and ideological conversion of technocratic/political elites achievable through participative culture change processes (Cooke 1999, 2001) or to engineer their knowing yet unwilling capitulation to the realities of Bank/IMF power. Bond (2000) suggests the former in the case of South Africa and the World Bank generally; Marshall and Woodroffe (2001) provide evidence of the latter. Either way the result is a highly homogenous set of PRSP outputs which belie the claims made for participation. Marshall and Woodroffe state "the consistency of policies put forward is remarkable given the different histories, characteristics and drafting processes of the... countries surveyed" (2001: 14).

Marshall and Woodroffe's tabulation of components of individual nations' PRSP/I-PRSPs demonstrates conclusively that each one amounts to an extensive neo-liberal reform package, the assumption being that economic growth leads to poverty reduction, although the logic behind this trickle down approach is never explained or justified. All sixteen countries proposed macro-economic policy based on "economic growth..., macro-economic stability... prudent monetary/fiscal/budgetary policies"; and private sector development. Central are liberalization and privatization. The former includes the removal of price controls ("eg gas, cotton, petroleum, transport, electricity, water,

telecommunications, seeds), the removal of trade barriers and tariffs, and the promotion of foreign trade and direct investment. Core privatization policies "across all countries" include privatization of telecommunications, ports, energy, railways, posts, public enterprises, and making the private sector the engine of growth (Marshall and Woodroffe 2001:14). Central to PRSP social policy is the idea of cost recovery, that is that users of services such as education, health, and clean water should pay for that service at the point of delivery and that the private sector should deliver such services (how Brinkerhoff and Coston's enabling "the poor and the marginalized... to take an active role in determining and fulfilling their own needs..." is realized). This is the face of detailed evidence that user fees exclude the poor from the receipt of such essential services.

There are at the same time common absences from PRSP's and I-PRSP's of policies which would directly help the poor. In the few places land reform is considered it is in terms of clarifying ownership, not redistribution. Labor laws, in terms of a minimum wage and safety and employment legislation are barely mentioned, except in relation to the states' role in deregulation. No strategies mention children's rights, and other vulnerable groups receive little attention (again, Marshall and Woodroffe 2001:22). Neither is income redistribution, despite the Bank's own earlier acknowledgment that "...the greater the improvement in income inequality over time, the greater the impact of growth on poverty reduction" (World Bank 1996: 46), which is also reiterated on the current Bank PRSP website. Marshall and Woodroffe go on to comment in detail on the

likely negative consequences for the poor not just of user fees but the other detail of PRSP policies. That they are able to do so is because these policies so closely resemble those of SAPs. If there is any difference it is that PRSPs extended privatization further – into public sector services – than was the case with SAPs; and that national economies are deliberately further exposed to global markets than had previously been the case. So much, then, for "innovative" organizational (or is it institutional?) learning.

Moving to CDF, given there is little CDF content in the public domain, the focus can only be on the mechanics of and plans for the CDF process. Cammack (forthcoming: 1) addresses the "hard" dimension of the CDF matrix alone, but despite this methodological difference, and a classical Marxist philosophical and political position not shared by the WDM his analysis of CDF's parallels that of the WDM on PRSP's: namely that the rhetoric of ownership and the managerialist practices of conditional participation conceals and facilitates a neo-liberal agenda. Hence:

> The CDF is absolutely rigid in the set of fundamental macroeconomic disciplines it imposes. It prescribes on top of these a range of economic and social policies without parallel in their scope and in the depth and intensity of intervention they represent in the affairs of supposedly sovereign states. Presented as a vehicle for incorporating social and structural policies into an agenda previously dominated by macroeconomic policy alone, it is in fact a means of <u>shaping</u> social and

structural policies so that they reinforce and extend macroeconomic discipline, and subordinating them to imperatives of capitalist accumulation.

Cammack goes on to summarise Bank/IMF plans for the extension of the CDF/PRSP framework to middle income countries, concluding that it has be "trialled with the most heavily indebted countries, prior to being extended to the remaining clients of the Bank and the Fund as a generalised means of intervention in economic and social policy and political governance." For Cammack the Bank, via the CDF/PRSP initiative and matrix, is becoming the "mother of all governments" (2001). The evidence suggests that this version of DAM is becoming the mother of all managements.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS, PESSIMISM

The preceding sections have set out the nature of the similarity and simultaneous difference between DAM and "management" - institutionally, conceptually, and in practice. They have demonstrated how this paradoxical mix results in a managerialism absorbing and applying the ideas of organizational change management, but which seeks to change not organizations but nation-states, and does so to establish a particular, neo-liberal political economic order. This statement is sweeping, yet it is believed, it is accurate. Nonetheless, it is accepted some nuance and detail is lost in producing this big picture; and there may be criticisms which ostensibly arise as a consequence. Two of

these can be anticipated before the implications of my analysis are explored for the various versions of management that have appeared in this article.

First, if the World Bank is taken as a case study of DAM, there is the possibility of the usual question of generalizing from cases. The Bank is not the only institution through which DAM is operationalized, and other development agencies might have agendas which allow for a DAM different in process and output. There are however no such agencies of remotely comparable significance; moreover, the Bank's policy of sub-, and sub- sub- contracting its work directly and via other donors means that apparently independent agencies are drawn within the Bank's sphere of influence. This is as true of academic institutions where DAM is taught, which rely on development agency payment of student fees and commissioned research and consultancy income, as it is other NGOs. The World Bank has also not been selected as a representative case study, but precisely because it is the World Bank, with power that derives from that status.

This leads to a second potential criticism, that to accept the World Bank as a centre of global power is to reinforce that power. It might be argued that the World Bank's political position is not as unprecarious or unchallenged as previous section implies. There is also difference and debate within the Bank – it is not a homogeneous organization (see Kanbur 2001, Wade 2001 on internal difference and income redistribution). Bank agendas are challenged and negotiated by First World governments and CSOs Kanbur 2001 and Wade 2001 on this regarding income

redistribution). Some Third World states, which are not homogeneous, reified, entities either (so perhaps ruling elites is more accurate) have also historically subverted Bank agendas, for social as well as individual gain (see Storey (2000)). By the World Bank's own account, things are not going absolutely smoothly in the implementation of CDFs/PRPs; for example new national governments have not automatically accepted their predecessors CDF/PRSP commitments. (The Bank response is to include opposition parties in the participatory process, making the unitarist assumption that consensus is possible and natural. (CDF Secretariat 2001)). Kothari's (2001) Foucauldian analysis of the dynamics of power in participatory development points to a need to understand its micro-circulations and manifestations as well as its national and institutional operation, and again to recognize the opportunities for subversion therein.

It has to be accepted, in the face of all this, that the terrain is contested; but it is still terrain of the Bank's choosing. In the end, the outcomes of the CDF/PRSP processes are much as the Bank would want; or if we acknowledge debate within the Bank, as the victorious anti-redistribution, neo-liberals in the Bank would want (again, see Kanbur 2001, Wade 2001). Participatory processes may open up some space for resistance and to reshape Bank strategy; yet at the same time the imbalance of power relations means that it only occurs within First World boundaries which proscribe genuinely empowering options. One such would be unconditional debt relief: nations are still paying back huge proportions of GNP to First World creditors, which the Bank is using

to leverage "management" practices which substitute for government and politics to result in neo-liberal policy change.

This article has tried to demonstrate how this leveraging has been aided by the differentiation of DAM from management, where the former tries to engineer the neo-liberal modernization of nation-states, while simultaneously using and cloaking itself in, "management" language and practices. This is not good news for the various versions of management that this article has covered namely, International Management, DAM, "management", and Critical Management. Briefly, for IM, Wong-MingJi and Mir's finding that it has ignored the Third World is even more problematic for its claims to authority, given the extent to which "management" does pervade those parts of the globe within DAM. For DAM, the explicit and actioned desire to intervene of the side of the poor and the oppressed does not preclude its sustaining, through co-optation or choice, interventions which have the opposite effect. More, a commitment to participation and empowerment has not stopped, but facilitated, this. Saving DAM might begin, therefore, by stipulating which of the contested versions of development (which hitherto have only been acknowledged) it will and will not engage with. Second, the potential for manipulation and cooptation in "participation" and "empowerment" noted within CMS should be acknowledged, and might form the basis for a move towards a Critical Development Management.

To a great extent this article thus far is an example of the critique associated with CM in that it has sought to reveal management as a political, in this case perhaps geo-political, rather than a technocratic, instrument. Alvesson and Willmott's discussion of CMS offers DAM the possibility of more than critique in at least two cases. First, in terms of practice they set out a version of action learning, ie critical action learning, which goes beyond its apparent practice in the Bank, in that it deliberately sets out to enable learners to confront social and political phenomena posing as "givens". More profound, perhaps, is their proposition of a version of management grounded in Critical Theory, which among many, many, things, explores the opportunities for a genuinely emancipatory management, not "a gift to be bestowed..." through managerialist empowerment "but rather is an existentially painful process of confronting and overcoming socially and psychologically unnecessary restrictions." But none of this is unproblematic.

Not least, the idea of a Critical DAM assumes that the idea of development in itself is worth preserving. As CM is to management, so are a range of critics – sometimes collectivized as "post-Development" thinkers but heterogeneous and conflicting in outlook - who identify the development paradigm as intellectually and practically problematic, if not bankrupt (see for example Escobar (1995b), and others in Crush (1995), Rahnema and Bawtree (1997), and Williams (2000)). The development paradigm and/or the development discourse (distinctions between the two not being clearly drawn) are seen as an interweaving body of knowledge and practice which enable the

management (in the most general sense) of the Third World. Not least, the development paradigm provides a false logic to and legitimation of processes like, inter alia, the infliction of debt and of structural adjustment. Ironically these analyses draw on much the same social theory that one finds in CM, for example Foucault in the case of Ferguson (1990), whose critique, like that of CM, is of the idea of a technocratic neutrality. In his analysis of the activities of international development agencies in Lesotho, Ferguson describes their operation as a technocratic 'anti-politics machine'. He notes 'by uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of the powerless, and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of "development" is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized' (1990: 256).

As the argument of this article leads one to expect, despite the commonalities of theory and analysis, these considerations of management on the one hand, and development on the other barely touch. One exception is Banerjee (2000) who has used post-development and post-colonialist theorising to reveal the exploitative nature of a stakeholderism, and to critique the post-modernist tendency within CM. Agreeing with Radhakrishnan (1994), Banerjee points to the Euro-centrism of post-modernism in the assumptions it makes about the global universality of its ontology and epistemology, and its exclusionary consequences for those in struggle with the forces of self proclaimed modernization in the Third World. What can be added here is that the very same problem exists with the other parts of CM, and indeed "management" that assume

a state of modernity or beyond and stick with modernist understandings. That is, that parts of the World are deemed to yet require modernization, that modernization interventions are theorized and take place, are ignored. This is not to accept the categorization of "requiring modernization (or pre-modern) /modern/ post-modern". Instead it is to recognize that it has an existence (explicit or tacit), in the work of development agencies, in the separations and linkages between DAM and "management", and in the construction of the latter and its critique in CM.

This article has shown that the failure to address this categorization means that "management's" role instrument of modernization is lost. More than the spawn of capitalist development, as the grand narratives have it (classically in Chandler 1977, but also Braverman 1974) management thus becomes the virus creating the conditions for its own reproduction. It is not always successful; going back to McKinsey in Tanzania, sometimes the virus overpowers its host. In a revised narrative, though, "management's" engagement with public institutions, particularly those of nation-states, might usefully be reassessed as more than public sector mimesis of the private, and a symptom of market extension. This article demonstrates that it is also helping create the institutional circumstances that enable that extension, and at the same time more opportunities for itself. Certainly this is the case for its involvement with DAM, illustrated in the practices of the World Bank.

Missing also from CM hitherto, then, is an understanding of this role of management as an institutional (rather than organizational) change agent. Here management is a facilitator of the global hegemony of neo-liberalism, whether this is ultimately in the cause of Hardt and Negri's (2000) de-nationed Empire or as Govan's analysis suggests (2000), US business interests. Either or neither of these two positions may be accepted. What this article suggests nonetheless is that, along with its relation to development, there is a need to understand the function of management in the international (or some would have it, global) political economy, in which neo-liberal economic conditions are increasingly taken for granted as a natural condition (Cerny 2000). Overlapping with development (Hoogvelt 2001), international (or global) political economy is another discipline, with its own paradigm debates (again some of which draws on the same social theory eg Cerny (2001) on Giddens) with which Critical Management has yet to engage. Until it does both its critique, and where it has them, its proposals for emancipation can only be partial, focusing as they do on the micro-organizational and sub-organizational level to the exclusion of all else. It is perhaps stating the too obvious, but nonetheless, for all the supposed difference between MOS paradigms, and now discourses, and the debates on (in)commensurability, one transcendent, common factor is taken for granted. To go back to the start of this article, all privilege organization as the most important category of social activity and arrangement, and idealize that activity and arrangements accordingly. That they might be alternatively, and better, understood, as for example, institutions or nation-states is ignored. So, as a consequence, is the managing of the Third World.

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FIGURE ONE

COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK



CAS: World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy
MTEF: Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, prepared by government
PRGF: International Monetary Fund's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
RDB: Regional Development Bank(s)
UNDAF: United Nations system's Development Assistance Framework
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, prepared by government (Required for IDA, HIPC, and PRGF countries only)

End Note

[1] The sixteen journals and the years of their first issue are: Academy of Management Journal (1958); Academy of Management Review (1976); Administrative Science Quarterly (1956); California Management Review (1958); International Studies of Management and Organisation (1971); Journal of International Business Studies (1969); Journal of Business Studies (1980); Journal of General Management (1974); Journal of Management (1965); Journal of Management Studies (1961); Long Range Planning (1968; Management International Review (1961); Management Science (1954); Organization Studies (1980); Sloan Management Review (1960); Strategic Management Journal (1980) (WongJi and Mir, 1997, 344-345).