

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF AN
OASIS COMMUNITY IN LIBYA

by

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AUTHOR'S BACKGROUND

I received a B.A. from Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts in 1961. In September of the same year, I enrolled at Manchester University as a graduate student in the Department of Social Anthropology. Between March, 1964 and September, 1965 and between September, 1966 and January, 1967, I did field work among pastoralists and sedentary oasis dwellers in the Libyan Sahara. From September, 1967 until the present, I have been teaching Anthropology at Teachers College, Columbia University in New York City, U.S.A.

This account of Sawknah oasis is based upon two periods of field work carried out between March, 1964 and September, 1965 and between September, 1966 and January, 1967. While in the field, I was supported by a research grant from the National Institute of Mental Health, grant Number MH-08193-01.

Many people have contributed to this study. Thanks are due to Professor Elisabeth Colson and Dr. Grace Harris, who taught me anthropology during my undergraduate years at Brandeis University. I also wish to express my gratitude to Professor Max Gluckman and Professor A. L. Epstein who greatly influenced my thinking during my years as a graduate student at Manchester University.

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To the people of Sawknah who patiently taught me the riches of their culture I owe a debt that cannot be repaid. This study could not have been completed without their interest and help.

My wife, Bonnie, has collaborated in most aspects of the work. She was responsible for gathering much of the information concerning women's activities in the field. She drew the maps and diagrams, did much of the typing, and made many valuable criticisms of the text.

Finally, thanks are due to the members of the Department of Anthropology at Manchester, both faculty and students, for their helpful criticism during the earlier preparation of this work.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The western Libyan desert is a land of great physical variation, of plains and plateaus, sand and gravel seas, of broad wadis (dry river beds) and depressions, sharply outlined escarpments and uplands which have eroded into desert badlands. The Jebel Nafusa mountains stand at the northern rim of a vast interior plateau. At the northwestern rim, the Jebel Nafusa escarpment drops abruptly for over 2,000 feet to the coastal plain of Tripolitania. Eastward, it decreases in elevation and widens into a belt of sharply dissected hill lands, which ends near Homs and gives way to the undulating landscape of the Sirte region to the east.

A northeastward sloping plateau separates the Jebel Nafusa from the large Ubari sand sea, which occupies most of the central Fezzan depression to the south. The flat gravel desert of the Al Hammadah al Hamra dominates the plateau, but large wadi complexes have disrupted the continuity of the surface to the north and east. The largest of these ancient drainage systems are the wadis Sawfajjin, Zamzam, and Bey Al Kabir. All three drainage systems are in turn linked to smaller wadi systems on their way to the sea. While Sawfajjin and Zamzam drew their impetus from wadi complexes to the north and east on the Al Hammadah al Hamra, wadi Bey Al Kabir is linked to a wadi complex emanating from the uplands of the Jebel-es-Soda to the south.

The Jebel-es-Soda and Jebel Fezzan, essentially one continuous escarpment, flank the Ubari sand sea to its north, the former isolating the smaller depression of Al Jufrah from the main Fezzan depression. To the southwest of the Ubari sand sea stands the vast and eroded Tassili-n-Ajjer; and to the south are the upland spines of the Mesach Mellet, which separate the Fezzan basin from the Murzuq plateau and sand sea.

Typical desert conditions of extreme aridity and high year-round temperatures are characteristic of the region south of the Jebel Nafusa. Even in areas immediately south of the escarpment, rainfall rarely exceeds three inches in any given year, while annual averages are considerably lower. Nowhere in the western Sahara is there a perennial, or even a seasonal stream.

Desert vegetation is affected by the climatic conditions. The dominant types of vegetation are the small xerophalitic shrubs and drought-resistant grasses, which form a discontinuous cover over the land. Widely scattered pockets of vegetation, including occasional acacia trees, are to be found in the more favored areas, particularly in the deeply eroded wadi beds, which are more likely to flood in the event of a rain storm. There are large amounts of vegetation in the western Sahara, but concentrations are widely scattered, isolated from one another by great stretches of barren plain, sand seas, and desert wastes. Owing to a sporadic rainfall, yearly revival of the grasses in any particular region is not a regular occurrence.

The extreme environment of the Sahara desert imposes severe limits on the way of life of its human population, sedentary and nomadic alike. The ecological conditions demand that pastoralists make long forced marches in search of spring grazing, while sedentary life is confined to those few places where water is available for agriculture.

Permanent settlements in the area south of the Jebel Nafusa are widely dispersed. Clusters of towns, villages and hamlets are confined to the larger depressions, where subterranean water resources are close to the surface and easily accessible. The great majority of the population of the western Sahara is located in the depressions to the east end of the Ubari sand sea in the Wadi Ash Shati, which flanks the sand sea to the north, and in the Wadi al Ajial to its south. Other large concentrations of population

are to be found in the Murzuq depression south of the main Fezzan depression, and in the Al Jufrah depression north of the Jebel-es-Soda. The total population of this vast area is 60,000 people, averaging roughly 9 persons to 100 square kilometers.¹ Most of that population is concentrated in the oases settlements.

Throughout the area the construction of settlements is similar. Each oasis community usually consists of a nucleated town or village, surrounded by irrigated gardens and date palm plantations. Since in the wadis and depressions, the ground water table is relatively near the surface, the water necessary for irrigation requires a lift of only a few meters. For this reason permanent settlement is confined almost exclusively to these areas. Agriculturalists, through the skillful use of the permanent water supplies, can effectively insulate their highly productive agricultural economy from the arid conditions of the surrounding desert lands. Thus, the oases are characterized by viable agricultural economies. Their dependable water supplies sets them in marked contrast to the arid desert surroundings.

There is a large pastoral population living within this oasis region of the western Sahara, concentrated mainly in the areas between the Ubari sand sea and the area south of the Jebel Nafusa. These people are engaged in a different type of pastoralism than either the cow herders of the coastal belt or the sheep herders of the semi-desert in the north. The nomads inhabiting this region of the Sahara are primarily camel herding pastoralists.

The rigours of the environment affect the organization of pastoral life. They influence the transhumance pattern, the composition of herds, and to

¹

Population Census United Kingdom of Libya 1954.

some degree, regulate those types of relationships that are necessary to survival. Pastoralists in this area of the Sahara are not economically self-sufficient. They must seek economic arrangements outside their pastoral domain. To achieve such security, all pastoralists in this region contract economic relationships within the oases.

Traditionally, pastoral tribal structures have articulated with the oasis structures in two ways. Most pastoralists form trading alliances with shopkeepers and gardeners, usually called "Sadik" (friend). The relationship is institutionalized, and usually a pastoralist will buy from only one shopkeeper or gardener. The villager, on the other hand, is expected to feed and lodge the pastoralist when in the village, sell to him at a preferential price, and put aside goods for him (dates in particular). Pastoralists in return will provide hospitality for the merchant if he visits him in spring and occasionally will herd animals for him free of charge. These relationships are individual, as close kinsmen do not usually deal with the same merchant or agriculturalists.

The second form of articulation is much more complex. Most pastoral tribes in the western Libyan Sahara have a base in an oasis, where they have property rights as owners of agricultural lands and date palm trees. In these cases the tribal social structure is evident in village affairs. Recently this aspect of tribal organization has taken on new importance as social change, facilitated by economic development in rural areas, has compounded the interest that pastoralists have in the oasis. Thus three factors make the oasis important to pastoralists: (1) agricultural goods and markets for their products, (2) property rights, and recently (3) the development of wage labour.

The agriculturalists of Sawknah oasis (the Sawaknah) and the pastoral nomads of the adjacent desert (the Riah) are the subject of this thesis.

in range.

The thesis is microscopic ~~in scope~~, but has more general implications, since most of the tribes of the western Sahara have oasis affiliations.

Sawknah, the oasis studied, is one of three communities located in the Al Jufrah depression. The three oases are geographically separated from one another by stretches of barren desert. Sawknah is the most southerly situated, located near the northernmost foothills of the Jebel-es-Soda (Black Mountains) escarpment. Hun, the second community, is situated 17 miles northeast of Sawknah, while Waddan, the third community, lies twenty miles northeast of Hun.

The villages of Al Jufrah depression are separated from other settlements by great distances. The nearest village of Zillah is 100 miles east of Al Jufrah. One hundred and fifty miles of open desert separate Al Jufrah from Bu Nujaym to the north; while to the south, 200 miles separate Al Jufrah from the nearest of the Fezzan settlements. There are no settlements within 150 miles of Al Jufrah to the west. Thus Al Jufrah oasis communities are geographically remote from other Saharan settlements as well as from the larger centers of population on the coastal belt.

Sawknah is the smallest of the three oases, with a population of 2,100. Waddan has 4,300, making it slightly larger than Hun, with 3,900.² Included within the population figures for Sawknah and Waddan are a larger number of pastoral tribesmen, many of whom own oasis property and reside on the territory which is considered to belong to the oasis.

The pastoralists of Waddan and Sawknah belong to tribes, distinct from one another, as well as from the agricultural population of the communities in which they reside. Tribesmen own oasis property individually, and collectively claim rights to water and pasture within the oasis territory. The

² Population Census United Kingdom of Libya 1965.

pastoral lands of Waddan are located to the west of Al Jufrah, below the Sirte region, while those lands belonging to Sawknah are located to the east. Rarely do the pastoralists of the two communities meet in the course of their transhumance cycles. They form distinct groups, each affiliated to a different territory and oasis. Thus both Waddan and Sawknah are socially separate communities, each having an agricultural and pastoral population.

In Table I, I list the number and type of dwellings in all three oases. In both Waddan and Sawknah, the pastoralists constitute a major portion of the population.³ In the former, the tent dwellers number roughly one-fifth

T A B L E I.

RESIDENCE - by Type of Dwelling

Households	Tent	House	Total
Hun	57	582	639
Sawknah	144	261	405
Waddan	111	501	612

of the population, while in the latter, they comprise more than one-third of the population. In Hun there are pastoral families, but the figures for that community are misleading. Hun does not administer desert land, nor is there a pastoral tribe in residence. The 57 tent-dwelling households, drawn from various pastoral groups, are attracted to the oasis by the prospect of obtaining casual labour and purchasing agricultural products. These tent-dwellers, therefore, are socially distinct from the local community. Unlike pastoral tribesmen in Waddan and Sawknah, they do not have rights to resources which belong to the oasis, are not represented in the village bureaucracy,

³

As the census was taken during the summer, many semi-nomads who dwell in the village during the summer were not listed as tent-dwellers. In Sawknah, there are 20 families in this category.

and do not own oasis agricultural property.

Thus it is not only pastoralist property owners who are attracted to the oases; other pastoralists come to trade for agricultural products. The remoteness of the oases from other settled areas makes Al Jufrah the center of commercial activity in the region. The main attraction of the oasis to pastoralists has traditionally been their highly productive agricultural economies.

In all three oases, agriculture is supported by an irrigation system which taps permanent supplies of ground water.

Al Jufrah depression lies over an extensive and powerful water table, which maintains the ground water at a relatively constant level throughout the year. Shallow wells are numerous in the depression. The supply of ground water is sufficient to sustain a highly productive irrigated agricultural system. In spite of the prevailing extreme aridity in the surrounding desert, the irrigation system makes possible stable and prolific agricultural output. While many varieties of crops can be grown in the oasis gardens, certain crops fare better than others. Thus, each oasis tends to grow similar crops -- some in great abundance.

The date palm dominates the agricultural system in all three oases. Date palms are prolific and consistent in production. The hot, dry desert of the Sahara region and the availability of water in great quantities combine to produce favorable conditions for this crop. Dates of the arid desert are far superior to those of the coastal regions, and for that reason, the former are exported from Al Jufrah to the coast and abroad. In Al Jufrah there are 300,000 date palms (130,000 are productive) from which a yearly total of 17,000,000 kilos of dates ⁴are produced.

⁴Government Agricultural Census 1961.

In recent years, the government has ^{built}~~introduced~~ a packing plant in Hun, which is successfully producing for the foreign market. The enterprise is still small, taking only a fraction of the local date production and a small percentage of the total Al Jufrah crop. Only the superior quality dates are marketed outside the area. While some of the crop is exported, the poorer quality dates are consumed locally. The date supply is sufficient to provide food from one harvest season to the next for most farming families, and still furnish a surplus which is either fed to animals, traded or sold.

In Table II, I give the number of palms and the annual date yield for each oasis as recorded in the 1961 Agricultural Census.

T A B L E II.
P A L M T R E E S

	Number of Productive trees	Date Yield Guntor*
Hun	75,000	140,000
Waddan	40,000	25,000
Sawknah	15,000	7,500
Total	130,000	172,500

*Guntor = 100 kilos.

All three oases have large numbers of date palms, but the amount owned by each community varies considerably. Sawknah has much fewer palms than the other two oases, while Hun has by far the greatest concentration. Indeed many pastoralists, without sufficient date palm holdings of their own, contract trading relationships with wealthier gardeners in Hun.

Unlike date palms, which derive their moisture directly from the ground water table, all other crops produced in the oasis must be carefully irrigated.

In Al Jufrah crops grown under irrigation methods return a high yield. The hot daily climate and abundant water supply afford the oases a prolonged growing season, and crops are cultivated throughout the year. Cereals are grown in the winter and vegetables, alfalfa, maize and millet in the summer. Onions, tomatoes, and peppers in particular are of great value for they can be dried and easily stored.

A number of tree and vine crops are also grown. While apples, peaches, almonds, plums, and oranges mature parched and shriveled, figs, grapes, and pomegranates are of excellent quality. Despite these qualitative differences, the oasis population eagerly awaits the maturation of fruits as a welcome variation in their staple diet.

Very few vegetable products are sold outside of Al Jufrah, in that such crops are usually grown in greater quantities in the more populous regions of Libya. Nonetheless, the oasis system does produce a rich variety of crops, some of which are of excellent quality and have extremely high yields.

The agricultural surplus is of great importance, for it not only affords the oasis dweller potential self-sufficiency, but also provides a surplus that is critical for pastoralists. In Sawknah, Riah tribesmen own one-third of the date palms and nearly half of the arable land.⁵ A few wealthy tribesmen reside in Sawknah as landowners; others, poor expastoralists, have become small farmers or agricultural labourers. Some tribesmen are highly nomadic, while the majority usually return to the oasis in the summer.

Sociologically, there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between the traditionally agricultural population of Sawknah (the Sawaknah) and Riah tribesmen, but not on the basis of residence or even occupation. Riah tribal organization includes persons who have adopted various modes of

⁵ Author's census, taken 1964-1965.

residence and economic activity. It is not uncommon to find close kinsmen who can be placed at the extreme ends of a sedentary-nomadic continuum.

The Riah tribesmen's social organization and their political rivalry with the Sawaknah distinguish them as a separate and perhaps dominant group in Sawknaah oasis. In recent years economic changes in rural Libya have greatly increased the complexities of tribal interest and involvement in the affairs of the oasis community.

Sawknaah oasis is a village community that is part of the oil-rich state of Libya. The economic development facilitated by oil revenues has caused far-reaching social and economic changes that have affected many modes of local organization. It has changed the relationships of the oases communities vis-a-vis one another, the articulation of the local political and economic structures with the national system, and the nature of Riah tribal participation in village affairs.

The year prior to the beginning of my field work, a new paved road linking Sebha, capital of the Fezzan, with the paved coastal road in Tripolitania was completed. The road passes through all three Al Jufrah communities, thus linking them to each other as well as to the larger centers of population in Fezzan and on the coast. Bus service three times a week makes travel to the outside cheap and convenient. Many persons travel frequently.

The opportunity of wage employment attracted many persons to the larger centers of population. The effects of this movement on the agricultural system were disastrous, in that many gardens ceased to be worked and date palm plantations were not properly tended.

A government five-year-plan followed the opening of the road, introducing the full weight of government influence at local levels. Hun developed

rapidly as an administrative center. Government construction projects and public works administration were set up. The expansion of government works and the emergence of a patronage system created paid jobs and posts for many persons. This period resulted in a decline of emigration and the settlement of many pastoralists, as most men sought wage labour.

In Sawknah, new patterns of relationships have become institutionalized. Modes of cooperation that were sanctioned and supported by the organization of herding activities on the one hand and the organization of gardening on the other have been modified.

Some sets of relationships appear to have been transformed dramatically while others seem to persist, but are now^e embedded in a radically altered social field. Change has differently affected the various groups of oasis dwellers and tribesmen. In this thesis, I shall not only attempt to analyze the changes in organization that have taken place within the two major groups occupying Sawknah oasis, but also those changes in relationships that link these groups to each other and to the wider community.

II. THE ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL ACTIVITIES IN SAWKNAH OASIS

The village of Sawknah is walled and fortified. The exterior wall surrounding the main residential area has only three gates which, according to local inhabitants, were closed and locked at night in the past. In the center of the village stands a large fort which, like all buildings in Sawknah, is constructed of sun-dried mud brick. At the northeast side of the fort is the main square, where the largest mosque, Sanussi lodge, and a few small shops are situated.

The village is oval in shape, with all the main streets radiating from the square. These narrow and twisting streets are flanked on either side by two-storied houses, some of which have iron-barred windows facing the street from the second floor. Certain house owners have chosen to build apartments connecting houses on opposite sides of the street at the second-story level. And in some places, where a kin group owns all the houses, an entire street is covered in this fashion, with the entrances gated. This attests to the concern of the population for the privacy of the kin group and the seclusion of its women.

In the area surrounding the village, there are large groves of date palms and a number of irrigated gardens, thirty-two of which were being worked in 1965. The date palm plantations belonging to Sawknah all lie within a radius of ten miles from the village. They are marked off from the holdings of Hun, a neighbouring oasis, by five or six miles of open desert. The garden lands lie outside the perimeter of the village, scattered among the date palm groves. Six gardens are located within a few hundred yards of the village, but the majority are located about one-half mile to the southeast.

In addition to numerous wells in the village, there are many others throughout the immediate area, and a powerful artesian well, Ain Hamum, lies

six miles to the northwest in one of the date palm plantations. Few of these wells are used for irrigation by the sedentary population. The water supply in the village, therefore, far exceeds the present needs of the agricultural system, and the output is more than enough to meet the seasonal demands of the pastoral population and their animals during the summer.

Besides the main concentration of population in the village, there are two outlying hamlets used as dry season camps by the pastoral section of the community. The larger of the two is called Farjan and usually has a summer population of 90 tents. It is located at a distance of seven miles to the southwest of the village.

The second, smaller hamlet of Bir Wishka is located 46 miles south of the town in the Soda mountains, and usually has a summer population of 44¹ tents. Both camps vary a good deal in size from year to year, depending upon the prevailing climatic conditions of the particular time. The rest of Sawknah's pastoral population spends the summer in the country to the west of the village, at one of the wells on the oasis lands or in the village itself. It is not customary for the Riah pastoralists to use the resources of other oases in the area. They tend to live in summer within the territorial limits of Sawknah oasis.

In addition to the lands immediately surrounding the oasis, Sawknah claims water, grazing, and agricultural rights to 13,000 square miles of desert. The area is the customary grazing grounds of the Riah pastoral tribe, who for centuries have inhabited this part of the Libyan Sahara.² The land-

¹ Author's Census, 1964-65.

²


Many earlier travelers record the Riah tribe as living in and around Sawknah oasis. G. F. Lyon visited Sawknah in 1818 and mentioned Riah tribesmen in his account. Later in his travels, he met Riah tribesmen returning from the southern Sahara to Sawknah with captured slaves. G. F. Lyon, A Narrative of Travels in North Africa in the years 1818, 1819 and 1820, etc. London: 1821. (continued)

holdings include an area extending west along the south side of the Jebel-es-Soda from Bir Gaf to the Jebel Fezzan, and north from the Jebel Fezzan along Wadi Fat to the north of Bir Gheddafi^a, where Wadi Bey Al Kabir intersects with Wadi Bey Al Khaib. From this point, they extend south along Wadi Bey Al Khaib through Al Jufrah depression to Bir Al Gaf south of the Jebel-es-Soda (see Map 1). Sawknah oasis community, then, can be defined as larger than its immediate village, hamlets, surrounding gardens, and date palm plantations. It also includes a large desert area west of the oasis, the grazing land of the Riah tribe.

In Table I, I show the population of Sawknah oasis and the Riah tribe by age and sex. The recorded resident population was, according to my census in 1965, 1,609. The government figures entered in the national census taken in the same year register over 2,000 residents, but many persons entered in the government census had emigrated to the larger towns and cities in Libya. (I discuss these facts in Chapter III).

2 (Continued)

Dixon Denham and Hugh Clapperton traveled through Sawknah in 1823 and mentioned the Sawknah as sedentary residents of the village. They also recorded that Sawknah was the administrative capital of Al Jufrah. Dixon Denham and Hugh Clapperton, Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa in the years 1822, 1823, and 1823. London: 1826. James Richardson traveled through Al Jufrah in 1845. James Richardson, The Travels in the Great Desert of Sahara in the years of 1845 and 1846. London: 1848. Heinrich Barth, on his return from Africa south of the Sahara fell sick and spent some days in Sawknah. He remarked that Sawknah was of interest because of its mercantile activity. Barth, H. Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa. London: F. Cass, 1965. Later Agostini in 1917 recorded the population and boundaries of Sawknah's land. Riah and Sawknah were the numerically dominant groups in Sawknah. It would appear that the social composition of the community has altered little over the past 150 years. Agostini, E. La Popolazione Del Tripolitania. Tipografia Pirotta and Bresciano, 1917.



T A B L E I.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION - Riah and Sawaknah by age and sex

Age	R i a h		Sawaknah	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
0 - 4	100	89	36	44
5 - 9	65	55	22	26
10 - 14	52	63	26	19
15 - 19	35	66	20	23
20 - 24	41	48	10	12
25 - 29	72	65	17	20
30 - 34	35	38	16	14
35 - 39	41	28	8	15
40 - 44	20	15	8	10
45 - 49	28	18	10	16
50+	85	98	49	31
Total	574	583	222	230

Total Population - 1,609

Those persons **resident** in the oasis can be divided into two distinct groups sociologically. The Riah tribesmen and dependent pastoral families comprise two-thirds of the population, while the Sawaknah agriculturalists and peasants comprise one-third. There is, on the whole, a clear divide between sedentary oasis dwellers and those who **wander** or in the past wandered with **animals**.

The division of the population into tribesmen and sedentary agriculturalists, a cleavage that is manifest in most areas of social activity, has its roots in the economic system and the division of labour. The demands of the agricultural system require a year-round commitment from agriculturalists, while pastoral activity usually requires tribesmen to spend the greater part

of the year 100 or more miles to the west and northwest of the village. Pastoralism and agriculture entail specialized tasks which in the Libyan oasis system are not easily mixed.

It is possible, however, for pastoralists to engage in certain types of agricultural labour during slack periods in the herding cycle. For example, during the fall date harvest, some pastoralists can afford to work in the palm plantations. But the date palms also require care at other times of the year when pastoralists are away in remote parts of the desert. Hence, the day-in-day-out care of the plantations and gardens is entrusted to sedentary cultivators. It is this fact more than any other that accounts for the basic cleavage between tribesmen and sedentary cultivators. A full account of the organization of these two activities should make the distinction clearer.

Oasis agriculture requires that labour be available in all seasons. There is thus a steady routine that affords the agriculturalist little respite or time for other activities. The major task here is the maintenance of the system of irrigated gardens, for without intensive care agriculture would not be possible.

Irrigated gardens are formed around a well, and the size of the garden is strictly regulated by the water supply. Few wells are powerful enough to supply water for more than three hectares, hence, some of the larger gardens have two or three wells. Since the area of cultivation cannot be moved, the same lands are cultivated each year. Therefore, the possibility of soil exhaustion is ever present. Agriculturalists solve this problem by literally manufacturing topsoil. Mixing fertilized topsoil and maintaining the irrigation system are two major jobs that occupy cultivators throughout the year.

At least twice a year, the garden land must be plowed and a mixture of

new earth and fertilizer (human detritus) laid on top of the plots to form topsoil. Then the garden plots must be shaped. The irrigated gardens are constructed in a grid fashion, in plots of four feet by three feet called "jedwell" (plural - "jedool"). Each small plot is bordered on all four sides by narrow mounds of packed earth, a few inches high. The irrigation channels are laid out between the plots and a fine layer of cement is often poured along the bottom of the channels to guard against water loss. When the garden has been formed, a second layer of new topsoil is spread over the plots. Once the preparation is completed, crops are planted in each individual plot. Since many crops are grown throughout the year and planted at different times during the year in the same plots, the process of preparing the earth and irrigation channels is a feature of garden work in all seasons.

After the crops are planted, the garden has to be irrigated twice daily. The water is pumped out of the wells and stored in cement tanks (khazan). Today water is pumped mechanically, but informants say that before the introduction of the pump, it took a full day's labour of a man and a draft animal to draw enough water to irrigate a three-hectare garden, while other men channeled the flow of water to irrigate each plot.

When the tank is full, the gardener opens a valve, releasing water along the irrigation channels. He then directs the flow of water by blocking and opening the various channels in the system. The border of the plot is opened by removing a handful of the packed earth banking. Once the plot is flooded, the border is sealed off again by packing the earth back into place. This process is repeated for each plot and must be carried out twice a day during the hot months, although in the winter it is done less often.

Many other agricultural tasks have to be regularly performed: the canals must be cleaned; the borders of the plots must be kept packed; the wells must be maintained; and human detritus must be collected and mixed

with the new topsoil. All this work is done in addition to tending, weeding, and harvesting the crops.

The production cycle maintains a fairly constant rhythm throughout the year. In all seasons the daily labour of the agriculturalist is required in one activity or another.

In the spring, after the grain harvest, plots are made ready for a variety of vegetable crops, millet, and alfalfa. These crops are grown in spring, through the summer, and into the fall. When the millet and other crops ripen and are harvested, the plots they occupied may be turned over to other crops (i.e., more vegetables or alfalfa) or allowed to lie fallow for a few months. The gardens, therefore, produce vegetables or alfalfa through the spring, summer, and fall. In the late fall, they are cleared, reconstructed, and planted with grain and some of the more hardy vegetables. Crops other than grain are irrigated, although less frequently than in the summer. The grain is harvested in late winter. After this, the ground is prepared for the spring and summer crop. All crops, with the exception of grain, are planted to mature at various intervals during spring and summer, so that some crops are always being harvested daily throughout the gardening season.

Each day, cultivators must inspect their crops and pick the mature vegetables, leaving the rest for another time. In addition, alfalfa is cut daily from late spring to late fall to provide fodder for animals kept in the gardens, or to be sold in the local market. Beds of alfalfa are planted at irregular intervals during the spring so that the crops in a few plots mature each week. The alfalfa in a single plot may be cut as many as nine times during the growing season.

However, the agriculturalist must also devote time to other activities in the early spring after the grain harvest, and again in the fall after the

major summer growing season has ended. During these periods, the date plantations are tended.

In the early spring the cultivators must pollinate each fruit-bearing date palm. Since there are between 10,000 to 15,000 productive palms in the oasis, this is a major task. The labourer must first climb a male tree and cut the pollen-bearing flowers, then climb each female tree and shake this pollen on her fruit-bearing stems. The trees again require attention in the autumn, when the arduous job of harvesting the dates begins. Each tree must be climbed, and stems bearing the dates cut and dropped to the ground. Dates are protected by many thorny branches which interfere with the work and make the cutting a slow process.

After the stems have been cut and thrown to the ground, the fruit must be stripped from them, packed, and carried back to the village. In that date gardens are situated as far as ten miles away from the community, transportation adds to the labour problem. Hence, the harvesting of the crop from a few trees requires the work of cultivators for a lengthy period in autumn.

But the date harvest comes at one of the slower periods in the agricultural cycle. Thus the cultivator is usually able to find the time to harvest dates as well as tend the gardens. Although labour is intensive throughout the year, seasonal variations are not great enough to demand the influx of migrant workers at harvest time, and some pastoralists are able to free themselves from herding responsibilities in this season to work in the date plantations. The indigenous population is organized to meet the predictable variations that occur seasonally in the agricultural system.

Nonetheless, tending the irrigated gardens and date palm plantations requires a specialization of labour that leaves the cultivator little respite. A person working in the system is not in a position to mix pastoralism with agriculture, for the latter requires year-round attention. But the agricul-

tural system in Sawknah not only explains this specialization of labour it is also the key to understanding the rather rigid social stratification that characterizes the village social system.

Landowning families dominate the sedentary community both politically and economically. They own the major share of the village agricultural property, but rarely work the land themselves. Peasants work the land and are dependent upon the landowners for their subsistence. The economic ties between peasants and landowners bind both groups in a series of well-defined, enduring relationships.

Small farmers of "Fellah" form the second major group in the oasis community. They can be distinguished from the landowners economically in that they usually work their own gardens. Few, however, have sufficient agricultural property to maintain complete economic independence. Some of these men work in the gardens of the landowners in addition to working their own lands, while many others also work as artisans. The village builders, donkey carters, smiths, and bakers are all drawn from this group, as are some of the small shopkeepers.

The major distinction between small farmers and landowners is one of wealth. Status differences are not rigidly defined at this level. Through the chance factors of inheritance or marriage, a person may rise or fall in the status system. It follows that in the larger descent groups, agnates are often members of different status groups. Hence, the stratification system cross-cuts the bonds of agnation emanating from common descent.

Together these two status groups, landowners and small farmers, are referred to by the Riah tribesmen, neighbouring villagers, and the third status group in the village, the peasantry, as the Sawaknah. The Riah tribesmen regard them as distinct from themselves, stressing the Sawaknah's Berber

origins as well as minor differences in culture and life style as symbols of a wider political cleavage between themselves and the villagers.

The third status group in the village, the peasantry, is distinct from the other two groups in a number of ways. Most own little agricultural property and earn their living as sharecroppers for the wealthy families. The peasant gardeners are negroes and are called "Swasheen" or "Abid" (slave).

Villagers say that many of the Swasheen are descended from slaves who belonged to the landowning families in the oasis. Today, some continue to work in the gardens of their former owners or in other servile positions. Unlike the social distinctions that exist between the small farmers and landowners, Swasheen inferior status is manifested in a number of overt forms of behaviour.

Swasheen show deference to persons of high status by bending and kissing their hands when greeting them. Rarely are members of this group invited as guests to Sawaknah social functions, nor do they regularly marry with the other two groups in the oasis. Their inferior status precludes them from a range of activities, while some of the rules of conduct applicable to other groups do not apply to them.

In a society where women are closely guarded and secluded from the male members of the community, Swasheen men, like pre-pubescent boys, may freely enter a house where they are known, even when the male members of the household are absent. Men of the higher status groups say that Swasheen men do not constitute a threat sexually to the women of the household.

In some situations the position of Swasheen men is with the women. On one occasion when I was visiting a Bedouin camp, a Swasheen man was there as a servant of one family. When guests gathered in the men's section of the divided tent, the Swasheen servant, who had been sitting outside the women's

entrance spinning rope, retreated into the women's section of the tent. After some time, my host called to the man to come forward and be introduced to me. He refused to enter the men's section of the tent while there were guests present, and came only after my host had him playfully dragged inside.

The rules governing the conduct of women are less rigorously applied to Swasheen. Swasheen women do not veil to the same extent as do higher status women in the community. They frequently work in the gardens with their menfolk, and they also buy things at the local market where women of the higher statuses are precluded by custom from entering. Local persons say that Swasheen women are not shy.

The position of the Swasheen in the village is somewhat unique. Individual Swasheen are dependent on the other two groups in the oasis for livelihood. They have little hope of amassing agricultural property, since the richer groups will not sell to them; of contracting a profitable marriage, since other members of the community do not intermarry with them; or of organizing themselves into a pressure group, since their livelihood depends upon the patronage of individual landowners. Swasheen families are bound to the wealthier families by strong, enduring patron-client relationships.

Swasheen are horizontally mobile in the system in ways that are not true of the other status groups. The men will sometimes work as herders for pastoralists, or change village affiliations to work as gardeners and household servants of wealthy families in other oases. Their inferior status is rigidly fixed in the system and is both a cultural and economic fact.

According to my population census taken in 1965, there were 159 households that could be classified as traditionally sedentary (Sawaknah or

³ Swasheen). Of these, only 102 households of traditionally sedentary persons were actually resident in the village. In the ten years prior to the beginning of my field work, 57 households had emigrated to the cities in Libya in search of wage employment.⁴ The households were distributed among the status groups in the following way: landowners 69; small farmers 41, peasants 48.

In Table II, I show the average ownership of date palms per household for each of the three status groups in the village.

T A B L E II.

Average ownership of date palms
per household for Sawaknah and Swasheen

Status Group	Total Trees	No. Households	Average Trees per household
Landowners	12,825	69	186
Small Farmers	1,728	42	41
Peasants	295	48	6

The deprivation of the Swasheen peasants is evident. An average of only six date palms per household indicates the extent of their poverty. There are few Swasheen property holders who own more than ten date palms.⁵

³

In the remainder of the thesis, when referring to these two categories collectively, I will use the term "traditionally sedentary." This term is used to distinguish this category of persons from Riah tribesmen whether they be pastoral or sedentary.

⁴

I have included these emigrants in my analysis of the oasis social system for a number of reasons. Most emigrants register the village as their legal residence, many still maintain economic interests there and most continue to participate in the social and political life of the village. Unless otherwise stated, tables containing information on traditionally sedentary population will include emigrants as well as residents. While I feel that my count of Sawaknah emigrants is accurate, information on Swasheen emigration is less reliable. It is almost certain that some families from this group moved away, severing all ties with the village.

⁵

Information on property is derived from two sources. I was able to obtain the census sheets upon which the ownership of property for inhabitants of Sawaknah was recorded in the national agricultural census of 1961. I checked the information with the residents of the village and conducted my own

(Continued)

The table also makes clear one distinction between small farmers and landowners. The average ownership of date palms per household clearly shows a substantially greater amount of wealth, in date palms, for the landowners.

The range of individual variation from one household to another indicates some overlap. A few small farmers own as much property as some of the members of the wealthy group, while some of the latter are nearly propertyless.

The variation is to some degree a function of the developmental cycle of households. I recorded seemingly propertyless landowners as well as rather wealthy small farmers in my census. Those recorded as propertyless among the landowners were usually young men who had not received their inheritance, while wealthy small farmers were invariably old men who had collected relatively large amounts of property and had not yet had their estates divided among their heirs.

Since the small-farmer and landowner groups both tend to marry endogamously, the agricultural property of each group is maintained within it. As a result, individual landowners through inheritance or marriage are more likely, at some point in their lives, to accumulate a far greater amount of property than would be possible for any single small farmer. Thus the marriage patterns of the two groups and the rules governing inheritance tend to reinforce status differences and perpetuate the landowners' control of most agricultural resources. Certain technical features of the oasis agricultural system support this pattern.

5 (Continued)

agricultural census. On the whole, the government information was accurate, but where in error, I made the necessary adjustments.

The low level of technology in the oasis, particularly with respect to locating and exploiting more powerful supplies of water, makes it unlikely that new land can be brought under cultivation. All known arable land is owned for the most part by the Sawaknah. Those areas that are adequate for date palm cultivation (i.e., where the water table is near the surface) are already controlled by village residents. Hence in that expansion onto new territory is impossible without technological innovation, purchase and inheritance remain the only avenues open to individuals who wish to increase their wealth. The technological parameters of the system, then, can be seen to reinforce the system of stratification.

The gardening system in turn, reinforces and gives added visibility to the village system of stratification. In 1965-66 there were thirty-two gardens being worked in Sawknaah oasis. Nineteen gardens were owned by landowning families. Some members of every extended family of landowners had a garden in production. In addition, eight gardens owned by landowners, had been allowed to run down to disuse in the ten years between 1955-1965. All of the gardens owned by landowners were worked by persons other than the owners. Two of the gardens were rented by Riah tribesmen who had recently settled in the village, and the rest of the gardens were worked by persons on a share cropping basis. Nine gardens were being worked by Swasheen families; three were being cultivated by small farmers and three were tended by Riah tribesmen, poor men who had left pastoralism in the distant past and in many ways acted as members of the small farmer status group. In two gardens the sons of the owners occasionally worked with the Swasheen tenant. It was not customary for landowners to actively work in the gardens, indeed, it was inconsistent with their status. A different pattern emerges for the small farmer group.

Nine gardens owned by small farmers were being worked in 1965. Eight gardens were worked by members of the family that owned them, and only one

was being worked by a Swasheen peasant. Small farmers tend to work their own land as family units; while landowners entrusted the care of their gardens to peasants. Peasants work the lands and date palm plantations of the landowners on a contractual basis. The usual arrangement in 1965 was that the peasants received half the produce. Informants said that in the past contracts had provided the owners with a major portion of the produce but as we shall see, labour had become scarce in the oasis and the circumstances favored the contracting party. Indeed many gardens were not being worked at all and many of those in production were not working to full capacity. Lack of labour was the complaint of many for most individuals were working for wages at the time of my field study.

Some landowners were desperate. In one case that I recorded, a landowner agreed to extend rights of usufruct to a pastoralist who had the capital to buy a motor and who wanted a garden in which to raise fodder for his animals during the summer. The sole condition was that the pastoralist water the owner's date palm trees. Since the palms were within the irrigation grid along the edges of the irrigation channels, watering the trees required no extra effort on the part of the pastoralist.

The stratification system in the oasis is reflected in differences in wealth and occupational specialization between the member groups. Landowners who own the greatest share of the oasis resources hire labourers to cultivate their lands and tend their date plantations. Small farmers work their own lands as family groups, occasionally work as tenants of landowners and some are skilled artisans. Peasants hire out as agricultural labourers, some as tenants of the landowners and some perform menial jobs as building labourers, household servants, and as unskilled wage labourers on government construction projects.

The most pervasive feature of the oasis social system is the attendant stratification system which is manifest in most fields of relationships.

This system is reinforced by the agricultural economy in which it is nearly impossible to change the distribution of wealth through extending gardening into virgin territory. The only road to wealth is through purchase or inheritance of already existent agricultural property. The mechanisms for maintaining the system are therefore wholly social. Marriage patterns which produce near endogamy of status groups operate to restrict the channels of possible upward social mobility and insure the control of the major share of the agricultural resources will remain in the wealthy landowning group.

The conditions of pastoralism are in a striking organizational contrast with the sedentary village system. Pastoralists are organized into a tribal system in which most individuals have the opportunity to accumulate wealth and in which there is a greater spirit of egalitarianism. Pastoral loyalties are to his agnates and variations in wealth and status, within the agnatic group serve to strengthen its organization. Since much of pastoral organization can be related to the way in which they exploit the physical environment, I begin my analysis in this area. I will then contrast the organization of the Riah tribe with the organization of the sedentary community and show how these two groups relate to one another.

Pastoral nomadism, the movement of man with his herds, is in response to the demands of the physical environment. The main concern of the pastoralists is for the welfare of his herd from which he gains a livelihood. Since the herds depend for their survival on available pastures and water, movements to some degree are determined by these ecological conditions. Therefore, before proceeding further, I will give a detailed account of rainfall and temperature patterns in the region of the Sahara inhabited by the Riah.

TABLE III.

Average Rainfall at a Number of
Meteorological Stations in the
Western Libyan Sahara

Brak	.41 in.
Edri	.19 in.
Murzuq	.33 in.
Sebha	.33 in.
Ubari	.43 in.
Hun	.94 in.
Mizda	1.45 in.

In Table III, I have listed the average rainfall for various settlements in the Sahara. At Mizda, a meteorological station immediately south of the Jebel Nafusa, the average rainfall is less than two inches a year. Further south, the averages are uniformly under an inch per year. Averages are misleading, however, for within any given year there are great variations of rainfall within the area. Some regions receive two to three inches of rainfall, while other adjacent regions may receive no rain at all.

Table IV shows the distribution of rainfall for the year 1936.

TABLE IV.

Total Rainfall in a Single Year (1936)
Recorded at Several Meteorological Stations

Brak	.49 in.
Edri	.01 in.
Sebha	.10 in.
Murzuq	1.22 in.
Ubari	.35 in.

While Ubari and Brak received almost a half inch of rain, Sebha, further south, received only one-tenth of an inch of rain that year. In the same year, Murzuq, further south still than the other three oases, received over an inch of rain. The table demonstrates that the rainfall for the Sahara is usually localized in any year. Furthermore, the annual rainfall for a particular region is extremely variable. Some years it may rain heavily, only to be followed by a succession of nearly rainless years.

*The figures in Table III and IV are taken from an Italian work: Fantoli A, Elementi Preliminari della Pluviometria, Libica L'Agricoltura Coloniale, Firenze, 1939.

Meteorological information available for Al Jufrah over a ten-year period demonstrates this point.

T A B L E V.

Rainfall in Al Jufrah, 1955-1964
Meteorological Information

1955	.37 in.	
1956	1.14 in.	
1957	.30 in.	
1958	0.00 in.	
1959	.61 in.	(Maximum 2.50 in.)
1960	.20 in.	(Minimum 0.00 in.)
1961	1.20 in.	(Mean .772 in.)
1962	1.00 in.	
1963	2.50 in.	
1964	.40 in.	

The table was compiled from the records of the Meteorological Station Hun Al Jufrah and includes all the accurate information available in their files.

Rainfall within the Al Jufrah depression is subject to great fluctuation. Over a ten-year period, the range was from no rainfall in 1958 to two and one-half inches in 1963. In one area over the years, and from place to place in a particular year, fluctuation is considerable.

The climatic conditions, in particular, the high average daily temperatures the year around, reduce the positive effects of what little rainfall occurs. In Al Jufrah there are only twelve rainy or cloudy days per year. The average temperatures during the winter months remain high and evaporation reduces the effects of the slight rainfall on the Saharan vegetation.

T A B L E VI.

Average Daily Temperatures for Al Jufrah
Per Month over 10 years (in Fahrenheit)

Month	Minimum	Maximum
January	37.4	66.2
February	37.4	69.8
March	44.6	77.0
April	53.6	86.0
May	59.0	91.4
June	64.4	100.4
July	64.4	98.6
August	64.4	96.8
September	62.6	93.2
October	55.4	86.0
November	50.0	78.8
December	41.0	69.8

Compiled from the records of the Meteorological Station Hun Al Jufrah

In Table VI the average temperature per month over a ten-year period is given for Al Jufrah. Even during the winter, the season when rain is likely to fall and be most effective because of the relatively low temperatures, the temperature rarely falls below sixty degrees Fahrenheit in the daytime. The effects of high average daily temperatures, low rainfall, and few cloudy days combine to produce severe drought conditions in the western Sahara.

Temperatures rapidly increase toward the month of June, usually beginning during the middle of May. At that time the hot southern Gible winds usually commence and grasses soon die, sometimes within a few hours after the Gible begins. Following the abrupt end of spring, there is usually an extended period of severe drought which continues for at least six months of the year, from the last two weeks of May until the end of October. Often the period of drought is extended to two or three months further into late fall, as the rains, in most years, do not occur until the winter months of January or February. In those years, the spring, with plentiful grasses, does not last more than two and one-half to three and one-half months. The rainfall and temperature patterns combine to produce prolonged and severe periods of

drought in the Sahara, a condition which lasts at least six months and frequently nine months of the year.

The sporadic and general low rainfall make it necessary for pastoralists to migrate great distances in search of the often-illusory spring grazing lands.


In Table VII, I listed the summer residence of a sample of Riah households as an indicator of the migration pattern (between 1938-1965).

T A B L E VII.

1938.....Bir Tar	1952.....Farjan
1939.....Fatia	1953.....Alga
1940.....Reshedia	1954.....Reshedia
1941.....Gheddafia	1955.....Bir Salacca
1942.....Gheddafia	1956.....Farjan
1943.....Winsif	1957.....Farjan
1944.....Reshedia	1958.....Al Mghetteb
1945.....Izman	1959.....Al Makhrih
1946.....Farjan	1960.....Rigil
1947.....Reshedia	1961.....Farjan
1948.....Chaylan	1962.....Farjan
1949.....Reshedia	1963.....Mukareg
1950.....Reshedia	1964.....Farjan
1951.....Alga	1965.....Al Mgatta

In the course of twenty-eight years the same families have passed the summer at most of the wells on their tribal territory, and on occasion outside of their area all together. During the twenty-eight years, the households in the sample passed the summer at fifteen different wells, most widely separated from one another. Only on four occasions did they return to the same well in two successive years and they did not return in summer to the same well on three or more successive years. Sixteen times, they camped during the summer over one hundred miles from where they had passed the previous summer. In 1946, 1955, 1958, 1960 and 1964 the men left their families at one of the hamlets in Sawknah oasis or in the village itself and took their stock outside the area to pastures in Sirte, on the border of Cyrenaica, and on one occasion as far as the Jebel Nafusa, north of Mizda.⁶

⁶The reader will be able to visualize the migration pattern more clearly by checking Table VII with Map II. Map II shows the customary grazing lands of the Riah in some detail.



On these occasions men found it necessary to drive their animals in a weakened condition for more than three hundred miles before finding adequate pastures. Although less dramatic, long migrations to pockets of grazing in early spring and from one pocket of pasture to another in late spring is a frequent occurrence among the Riah. Many organizational features of camp life can be explained by this necessity. This fact will become apparent with a discussion of the annual migration of the pastoralists.

In the summer, the pastoralist must reside close to wells to insure that animals have drinking water. In this season, there is little grass, and the animals often suffer a period of hunger. The lack of fresh grass reduces the milk supply from the flocks and poor pastoral families often suffer deprivation; while wealthy men purchase staples of grain, rice and macaroni.

With the coming of the rains in winter, the pastoralists disperse in small groups on the land in search of green pastures. In this season, dairy products are plentiful and the family members are busy tending their flocks.

While the grasses last, usually until the late spring, pastoralists move every few days from one pasture to another. Frequently, during spring, camps are maintained as far as two days march from the nearest wells so as to conserve the pastures near the wells for late spring grazing.

As the drought sets in, herding families move closer to wells where they can conveniently water their animals every three or four days and let them graze on the vegetation in the vicinity saved for that purpose. At this time, families must make a decision regarding summer residence. Families normally remain at wells where there is stubble left from the spring. But the individual interests of families modify this pattern, and with economic growth in Sawknah, families are passing the summer more frequently near the oasis.

Some families who are wealthy and have a large labour force reside in Sawknah during the summer. Others who do not have a large labour force or village interests will stay at the outlying wells. Many, however, journey to the larger wells near Sawknah where they can harvest their dates, sell dairy products in the village and find casual employment.

Thus, the movements of herding families are influenced by a number of factors, to do with ecology, economic resources and the deployment of manpower. But, of first concern to all households is the management of their herds.

Camels, sheep, and goats are all kept by the Riah, but under the harsh environmental conditions of the Sahara, it is not surprising that relatively fewer sheep are herded. There are only two pastoral families with substantial sheep herds (i.e., more than 70), while the remaining rich families usually keep only ten to fifteen.

Those families with large numbers of sheep tend to camp in the areas to the north, where the environment is more suitable to sheep rearing.

Rich families who maintain normal pastoral activities further south tend to rely heavily upon surplus dates as fodder for their sheep. The lack of substantial coverage of grass in the spring, and the frequency with which animals must rely upon drought resistant shrubs for feed, is not conducive to sheep rearing. Nearly all of the drought resistant shrubs are more suitable for consumption by camel and goat. For that reason, most wealthy men prefer to invest in camels rather than sheep.

Both goats and camels do well on the bush vegetation, and hence are more adaptable to the environment than sheep. Camels are particularly suitable to the ecological conditions, for they thrive on the bush vegetation. Of the three types of animals kept, they alone are capable of consuming

nearly all of the varieties of vegetation found in the environment. Their height gives them a further advantage in that they can feed from the high branches of trees which are not accessible to goats.

In summer they are watered at the larger wells in the vicinity of Sawknah, and travel the 30, 40 or even 50 miles, unattended, to pastures in the Soda mountains, an area covered with shrubs, with no difficulty. Even in the height of the drought, they require watering only once every four or five days, a fact which accounts for their extensive summer grazing range. Their ability to go without water for long periods, and their extensive grazing range allow them to use the area's resources, both water and pastures, much more effectively than either goats or sheep. Goats are kept in great numbers and are essential to subsistence pastoralism.

Nearly all of the pastoralist migrations are geared to providing adequate pastures for goats. Without pastures and water, goats would not supply the dairy products which are critical to the subsistence of pastoral families. As in many Bedouin societies, goats provide the bulk of protein foods consumed by the pastoral household. They provide milk, butter, and cheese for household subsistence; meat for feast days and entertainment; hides for water and milk bags; and hair to weave tent tops. They furnish, in fact, so many of the needs of the nomadic household as to make pastoral life extremely difficult without them. The maintenance of the goat herd is a major concern of all pastoral households, since their subsistence depends upon dairy products. It is the welfare of the goat herds that determine family movements in the spring migration.

To insure the welfare of his goat herds, a man must be prepared to make frequent long moves in search of pastures. The family must be highly mobile. Successful pastoralism therefore depends upon ownership or use of enough camels to move the pastoral household and their possessions. For this reason,

camels are indispensable to nomadism under Saharan desert conditions. The Riah are forced to make extensive moves from summer to winter camps, as much as 300 miles in one journey. Frequently, during the spring, further long moves are again necessary, when one grazing pocket is exhausted and another must be sought. Again, a move of 50 or 60 miles may be required. Without the camel as a baggage animal, nomads would be forced to live a more marginal existence than is the case now.

In spring when animals need not be watered, families often camp 40 to 50 miles from the nearest well. Camels are needed to transport water. Having the use of a number of camels, therefore, makes it possible to visit the wells once every seven or eight days, and camp labour can be used in other tasks. If only for these reasons camels are necessary to the maintenance of herding activities under such marginal ecological conditions.

Camels, goats and sheep, also represent wealth that is negotiable in the village markets. Besides meat on the hoof, such products as clarified butter, skins, wool, etc., find a ready market. Pastoralism is lucrative under modern conditions. A general rise in living standards and increased prosperity in the rural villages has contributed to the rise of the prices of meat and dairy products. The pastoralist has found that the value of his animals and dairy products have greatly increased, and many pastoralists have become wealthy under modern conditions.

Camels are the most lucrative investment, which, when fully matured, i.e., three years old and older, can be sold for £80 to £100 a head. Two-year-olds sell for £55 to £65, and yearlings, for £25 to £35. There are fairly wide margins in the price-given size, and general condition of the particular animal. But, in general, the above prices apply.

Goats, on the other hand, are obviously much cheaper, but are still a worthwhile economic proposition, partly due to their relatively rapid reproductive cycle. A full-grown goat sells for £8 to £9; a two-year-old, for £6

to £7; a one-year-old, for £4 to £5; and younger kids, for £2 to £3. Roughly speaking, six two-year-old goats equal in value one two-year-old camel. But the prospect for increasing the value of the two is quite different. While five two-year-old goats will at most increase in value by a total of £15, a single camel by maturity may very nearly double its value as a two-year-old.

There is, of course, the fact of reproduction; camels only give birth every other year, while goats produce two or more offspring per year. But it is not ^{merely} the simple addition of their number which determines which is a more lucrative investment.

† Goats, unlike camels, are used to meet a variety of everyday social obligations and expenses. People have obligations to feast visiting relatives, and on religious occasions, to sacrifice animals. Debts must be paid, supplies have to be bought. Most expenses require ready outlay of cash which is usually met through the sale of goats. Their rapid reproduction insures that most herds will have animals of various sizes and worth, which can be used to meet expenses as they occur. The goat herds are constantly being tapped to meet social obligations and expenses as they crop up throughout the year.

Camels, however, represent a much more substantial investment. At all stages of growth, they are worth a good deal more money than goats and the young are expected to increase in worth rapidly.

The sale of goats represents little immediate loss. In relation to camels, they are worth less, and their numbers rapidly increase. Investment in camels, therefore, represents money which is tied up and growing, since the camel herd is not ravaged for numerous minor social and economic commitments.

Ownership of camels, therefore, confers both wealth and status on the owner; status because the individual does not have to rely upon someone else for transport in migration; wealth, because individual animals can be converted

into large amounts of cash. For these reasons, pastoralists, sedentary tribesmen and some Sawaknah are actively engaged in trying to amass capital for investment in camels.

Whatever the financial objectives of the household, whether to accumulate cash or increase livestock, domestic life could not be maintained in the desert without both goats and camels. In turn, nearly all primary labour has to focus upon maintenance of the herd. The labour of the family must be both highly organized and flexible to meet the changing seasonal conditions.

During the spring all animals must be carefully herded. Goats and sheep are often herded separately. Each herd moves at a different rate, even grazing in different areas of the wadi beds and hills. The goat herds are further divided into herds of milking stock, non-milking stock, and kids. Kids are kept separately from their dams to insure that the household has control of the milk supply. The Riah live in a rugged mountainous country where it is easy to lose sight of animals. Herders must watch their flocks carefully at all times, for predators frequently attack unattended animals.

Further heavy demands on labour arise from camel herding. If unattended, camels will wander and may be lost or stolen. The camel herder, therefore, must endeavor to group his camels at least once a day, and he usually brings them to the vicinity of camp at night where they are hobbled and milked.

To manage the stock in winter, a camp must have at least three mature herdsmen. In addition, the labour of small children is necessary to herd the kids. Other men are needed as well to draw water from distant wells and carry out other tasks which arise unexpectedly. The pressure of herding continues until the beginning of the drought, when families move to a well for the summer.

At that time there is a marked decline in herding activity. The goats and sheep are no longer giving much milk, therefore the kids are herded with the main flock. The flocks can be herded by one person.

Camels, too, present less of a herding problem in summer. Because the wells to the north and west of Sawknah are of comparatively low yield, camels are sent to the powerful wells at Sawknah for the summer. This occurs with such regularity that camels, if unattended, will leave for Sawknah at the first signs of drought. This practice allows the less powerful, outlying wells to carry a greater number of goats and sheep.

During the drought camels are not herded, for they will return to the wells every few days for water. The herd boys no longer have to roam the land with their animals, but live at the wells and draw water. Since this job requires less labourers, the herd boys often form alliances, taking turns at the wells and thus affording themselves rest periods or time for other economic activities. From season to season, the nature of pastoral activity alters considerably as does the amount of manpower required in herding activities.

The ecology not only shapes the transhumance pattern, and organization of herding activity, but also regulates a range of relationships which must be maintained if Riah pastoralists are to continue to exploit the land. Pastoralists must have access to wells, pastures and the products of the sedentary cultivators if they are to continue their way of life. These needs are met in various ways, some through the internal organization of the tribe such as those mechanisms regulating the use of tribal wells and pastures; others by maintaining certain types of relationships with neighbouring tribes which function to allow reciprocal use of pastures in winter and spring; and others still with oasis cultivators which function to insure

that the pastoral family has a market for their goods and a supply of agricultural products.

In spring when rain has been localized, there is often a concentration of pastoral families from two or more tribes within the same general area. Usually there is little regard for tribal boundaries at this time. It is recognized by most tribesmen that this flexibility is necessary for the continuation of pastoralism in the region. Tribesmen make a distinction between this practice of spring grazing and use of wells in summer. Pastoralists may cluster in the spring on common grazing ground without regard for tribal boundaries, but usually retire to wells on their own tribal lands in the summer. Since in some years there is a good deal of competition for grazing lands the process of coming together in spring is not without friction and on occasion open hostilities occur. As among other Bedouin groups a certain number of marriages are contracted between Riah and neighbouring tribes. These linkages become important at times when hostilities are eminent. Affines often act as channels of communication between quarreling groups. Indeed, I have witnessed marriages negotiated between groups on the occasion of a peace settlement. Although not numerous, these linkages are of critical importance in regulating inter-tribal relationships.

Some aspects of nomadism among the Riah resembles the pattern described by Evans-Pritchard for Southern Cyrenaica. According to Evans-Pritchard, the Bedouin of the more arid regions of Cyrenaica "chase" the rains: "There is that spirit of the Aulad Ali tribesmen who said to me: 'We call no place our home. It is wherever there is grass and water.'⁷" This sentiment, reflected in the attitudes of many Riah, is best expressed in a phrase commonly heard

⁷
E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Sanussi of Cyrenaica. Oxford University Press. 1948, pp. 34.

from them: "Where there is food we camp." Their patterns of spring migration are in marked contrast to the more regular transhumance of groups in the better watered areas to the north in Tripolitania or in Northern Cyrenaica. But Table VII, showing summer residence patterns of the Riah, demonstrates that they do maintain a territory and regular homeland.

The presence of Sawknah oasis and the pastoralists' dependence on the agricultural economy explains this phenomena to some extent. The account of the climatic conditions of the area in which the Riah live suggests that the environment is not likely to allow pastoral self-sufficiency. One index of this degree of dependency of the Riah on the oasis agricultural system is reflected in the comparative figures on wadi bed cultivation. The cultivation of cereals in wadi beds is possible less frequently in the areas occupied by the Riah than in the northern Sahara and when it does occur, there is less of a return.

During the winter and spring of 1964, I observed the cultivation of cereals (wheat and barley) and recorded, in detail, the harvest returns for ten groups of pastoral cultivators. I recorded a thirty-five fold return for wheat and a twenty-nine fold return for barley. This figure is considerably lower than that reported to Evans-Pritchard by the Bedouin of Cyrenaica: "Bedouin have told me that they expect from the sowing in the beds of wadis up to a hundred-fold of barley and in the Barqua up to fifty-fold."⁸

It might be added that the grain cultivated in the winter and spring of 1963-64 was the first wadi bed cultivation undertaken by the Riah in five years. The infrequency of conditions favorable to wadi bed cultivation are yet another set of factors which underly the critical importance

of the oasis agricultural system to pastoralists. Indeed the seasonal nature of labour demands in herding and the fact that many tribesmen have property interests in the oasis agricultural system brings a great many pastoralists to the oasis in summer and fall where, during the date harvest, their added labour is of some importance.

One convenient approach to the analysis of Riah pastoralism is to view it as one type of specialization within the general oasis economy. Persons who engage in pastoralism do so with varying degrees of intensity. Most households mix pastoralism with other types of economic activity which are centered in the village sectors of the economy. In my 1965 census of Riah households, I recorded 264 households⁹ who were either pastoral or were members of agnatic groups whose primary economic activity was in the pastoral sector of the economy.

Two hundred and twenty-one households were classified as Riah, i.e., they were included as members of one of the tribal sections and recorded on the tribal genealogies. Forty-three households were listed in two other categories, twenty-two households were members of another tribal group, the Aulad Sleman, whose members are dispersed throughout most of the central Libyan Sahara.

The Aulad Sleman members of the community combined a variety of occupational specializations. Sixteen householders were poor men who mixed pastoralism with occasional agricultural and wage labour. Two of their number were major property owners in the oasis, both owned more than 100 palm trees and one of them owned a garden which he and his family worked. This group of tribesmen are distinguishable from the Riah and Sawaknah in that they acted politically and socially as a distinctive group in village

9

27 Riah households not enumerated here, have emigrated to the cities.

affairs. Their tribal ties to kinsmen outside of the oasis in some respects labeled them as marginal members of the community. The second category of pastoralists, twenty-one households, I classify as herdsmen. The feature which these householders had in common was that they had come to Sawknah Oasis as herdsmen of either wealthy Sawaknah or Riah tribesmen who had hired their services. The conditions of their contract and who they worked for determined their pattern of pastoral activity. Some who worked for Sawaknah mixed pastoralism with agricultural labour depending on the season; others who contracted as herdsmen for wealthy Riah pastoralists differed little in movements and life style from other nomadic Riah. Since the Riah tribal system is not rigidly stratified, herdsmen cannot be fixed a low status as are sedentary agricultural labourers. It is difficult at first to distinguish who in the Riah's terms are "hur", free members of the tribe, and who are not. There are structural mechanisms which allow for the gradual incorporation of these individuals into the tribal system where they can become fully franchised members of one of the tribal sections. The tribal system is therefore much more open than the village social system, and in part, the differences can be explained in economic terms.

Herding on contract is a means to accumulating wealth, a course adapted by all herdsmen and most Riah pastoral tribesmen. Contract herding lends itself to capital accumulation but there is a distinction between those who hire their services to a pastoral family and those who as family units undertake to herd the flocks of others. The second form of contract is more lucrative than the first.

A single herdsman who hires services to a pastoralist will do so for a set payment, for a year's services. The householder to whom he contracts will agree to feed the herdsman, buy him a new outfit of clothes, pay him one yearling camel (male) and a payment in cash or its equivalent in young stock. The final payment in cash or goats is the part of the contract which

is negotiable. It may range from twenty-five to forty pounds sterling, depending upon the type of herding duties undertaken and the reputed skills of the herdsman.

The second form of contract is the one favored by pastoral householders. In this contract an independent householder agrees to herd the animals of the owner in return for half of the offsprings of the herd. The dairy products of the herd, except for a portion, clarified butter, are considered the property of the herdsman. Through this arrangement it is possible for a householder with a bit of luck to accumulate a sizeable herd of his own over a period of ten or fifteen years. There are herdsmen among the Riah, now middle aged, who have become wealthy through negotiating successful contractual relationships.

The contrast with agricultural labour should be obvious both from an organizational and an economic perspective. While there is little opportunity in the agricultural system for a poor man to acquire wealth in palm trees and irrigation lands, pastoralists always have the opportunity of enhancing their wealth through increasing the size of their herds. Nearly all pastoralists, whenever possible, use herding contracts as one means of achieving this end.

With the exception of a few wealthy men, the herds of most pastoralists have a mixture of animals, some belonging to the pastoral household and others belonging to various partners in herding contracts. Some animals may belong to a shopkeeper with whom the pastoralist deals commercially, others to agriculturalists from whom the pastoralist buys vegetable products and others belong to wealthy men, sedentary tribesmen, and Sawaknah who invest in animals for commercial reasons. Herding contracts provide another set of linkages between pastoralists and sedentary villagers.

It should be clear now that the concept "pastoralist" seen in the context of the oasis economy is a relative term. Riah tribesmen view the pastoral life in idealistic terms. Frequently they can be heard to say that when the rains come there is no better life on earth than being in the desert with ones animals. But this ideal is rarely achieved in reality for most households have many economic activities outside of the domain of herding. A large number of Riah householders not only have flocks of animals, but also have interests that bring them to the village in summer. Others come to the village at that time to seek employment or to aid agriculturalists in harvesting the dates. Thus, depending upon the wealth and economic interests of the household, the pattern of pastoralism will vary. Deficiencies in environment, a variety of property interests, and the need to supplement their income, bring most pastoralists to the village annually. If placed upon a continuum of sedentary to nomadic, there are few Riah households that can be fixed on the extremes, while most households can be located somewhere in the center.

It is possible for Riah tribesmen to pursue two very different ways of life within the oasis. One possibility is for the tribesmen to pursue a strictly sedentary existence in which they attempt to accumulate agricultural property in sufficient amounts so that they may adopt the life style of the Sawaknah landowning class. The closed nature of the agricultural system provides little opportunity for this possibility. The other course is to adopt a completely nomadic life in which all profits are reinvested in stock. In this case, the herding family adopts a type of pastoralism which is similar to the pattern of nomadism described by Evans-Pritchard for the Aulad Ali in Cyrenaica.

The figures on property ownership presented in Table VIII indicate that few Riah pastoral households have the means to adopting either extreme.

T A B L E VIII.

Riah Property Ownership By Household

	Palms	Sheep	Goats	Camels
200 +	4	0	3	0
199-175	0	0	0	0
174-150	1	0	1	0
149-125	1	0	1	0
124-100	4	0	6	1
99-70	7	2	10	1
69-50	8	3	8	9
49-35	7	2	10	6
34-15	21	23	38	26
14- 5	23	45	40	42
4- 1	1	13	3	33
0	61	50	18	20
Dependent				
Married Sons	59	59	59	59
Unknown	24	24	24	24
TOTAL	221	221	221	221

There are only four property owners among the Riah who have sufficient agricultural property to adopt the life style of the landowning Sawaknah. In actual fact, twenty-nine households who are classified as Riah in my census are categorized as sedentary (i.e. sedentary for more than ten years.) Seven of these households (four property owners and three dependent sons) own property in sufficient quantities to place them among the landowners. Nineteen households (two extended families) are gardeners or artisans. These people have broken many of the linkages with their pastoral kinsmen. They marry among the small farmers; work with them and politically identify with this group.

At the other extreme, there are only three property owners who are nomadic to the extent that they do not come to the village regularly. These men and their dependent families move in the desert to where it has rained without regard to the distances involved. In spring they camp well away from the other members of the Riah. Their herds are so large and demand so much pasture that it is difficult for them to live with other members of the tribe. In summer, they never return to the oasis, but camp at the outlying

wells again choosing areas where they are isolated from others.

The great majority of Riah households adopt a mode of pastoralism which is somewhere in between these two extremes. As indicated in Table VIII, the main property interests of Riah tribesmen is in the pastoral domain, but this is modified by the interests that they have in the agricultural system. The interests of the household determine the economic arrangements that are made, the mode of residence and type of pastoralism that are adopted. Oftentimes, these conditions will change during the course of an individual's life as the example described below indicates.

In 1941, A, a Riah pastoralist, came to reside in Sawknah for the first time in his life. Although A's father and his close relatives owned houses and agricultural property in the village, and A himself owned both date palms and a share in a house inherited from his mother, he has^d never been in the village. Until that time, A had herded for his father, a task that kept him in the grazing lands to the west of the oasis even during years when his father came to reside in the village. A's first visit to the village came about as a result of his enlistment by the Italians in their army. After serving for a year in Benghazi, A returned to the pastoral life. At that time he was 25 years old. The following year, in 1943, A was married, but continued to live with his father in much the same way as before, herding animals. The following year, 1944, A and his father quarreled. A left his father, taking with him a few head of goats and five camels. As he did not wish to become the herdsman of another pastoralist, but had too few animals to prosper as a full-time pastoralist, A went to Sawknah, where he lodged his family in his mother's house and obtained odd jobs as a building labourer. He used some of the money he earned to buy stock to increase his herds, and he followed this pattern of summer residence in Sawknah from 1946 to 1950. In 1950, he entered into a contract with a man from Hun who had

fifteen female camels which he wanted to pasture in the desert. The contract agreed upon was that, in return for herding the camels, A would receive half of the offsprings of the herd. Thus having accumulated a sizeable herd, A altered the pattern of his pastoralism.

From 1950 to 1957, A did not return to Sawknah at all, finding that his herding duties committed him to a pastoral way of life. By 1957, A had prospered from the herding arrangement, was able to hire a herder, and he came to Sawknah for the summer. A did not return to Sawknah again until 1966. It was a year of drought and he stayed in Sawknah while he sent his herds to the territory of Sirte to the north. From the fall of 1957 until 1966, a period of nine years, A did not return to Sawknah to reside, but lived a completely pastoral existence.

This example is not atypical, since other life histories show similar patterns. The Riah tribesmen operate in the pastoral economy as well as the village economy. A number of factors emerge from the example given above. In the first place, the definition of a production unit as being nomadic, semi-nomadic, or sedentary, may in fact, be the result of the response of the individual to a set of economic circumstances which if changed produce a different mode of residence.

On three occasions, A altered the pattern of his pastoralism in response to the economic possibilities of the oasis. From 1946 to 1950, A worked in the Al Jufrah during the summer, using his wages to buy animals in order to increase his herds. Only after acquiring the basis of a sizeable camel herd, did A turn to pastoralism as a way of life, returning to the village to work on only one occasion, in 1957. Thus, from 1957 until 1966, A and his family were completely nomadic. In 1966, A again altered his residence pattern, and used a great deal of capital to repair his home in the village. In that

year, A also sold the last camel which he had in partnership. He was now a wealthy man and in keeping with his status, he was establishing a residence in the village.

This aspect of A's behavior is not atypical, for most wealthy men in the tribe establish a residence in the village, where they reside in summer and fall.

Even though there are differences in wealth between Riah tribesmen and this can be expressed in mode of residence and style of life, this does not lead to the rigid stratification that is a characteristic of the sedentary village system. Most Riah, regardless of residence pattern, count pastoralism as their primary source of income. Since few men free themselves from reliance upon their herds for support, they must organize most relationships with other pastoralists usually their agnates.

Pastoralism requires that most households join with others and coordinate their labour so as to more efficiently organize herding. Since herding relationships are usually arranged between independent households there is an element of equality in them even though some members may be more wealthy than others.

When wealthy men come to reside in Sawknah in summer, herding arrangements must continue. Invariably, some members of a wealthy man's household continue to reside in the desert with other pastoral families. In the village wealthy men reside in the same neighbourhood with their close agnates, most of whom also have primary economic interests in herding and who may also be summer residents of the village.

Many of the date plantations that belong to pastoralists are owned jointly by groups of agnates. Again a wealthy man is brought to cooperate with his close kinsmen. Those who are independent owners join forces with

other independent owners among their close agnates and cooperate in harvesting the crop, again reinforcing agnatic ties.

The common way of life, and the necessity of forming relationships with one's agnates to accomplish primary economic tasks reinforces the agnatic tie. As long as the individual's primary economic interest is in pastoralism, he must continue to cooperate with other households as an equal. There are few Riah tribesmen who count pastoralism as their primary source of livelihood who are not involved in the management of herds either directly through organizing herding activities themselves or indirectly in that their sons live a pastoral existence. No Riah tribesmen owns enough animals to allow him to turn the management of herds over to a client and live on the divided profits.

Pastoralism reinforces the tribal organization of the Riah and it is in marked contrast to the organization of the village system. The village social system is characterized by a rigid system of stratification in which the majority of the agricultural resources are owned by land owning families. These individuals are not involved in production and their style of life makes clear the distinction that exists between them and less wealthy groups in the oasis. Pastoral households demonstrate variations in wealth and these differences are expressed in life styles and residence patterns, but wealthy men do not form a group. The nature of pastoralism draws them at every point to interact with other pastoralists most of whom are their agnates.

Thus, the village system is organized through a hierarchy of groups, each with different degrees of control of resources. Riah are organized into a tribal structure in which the individual's closest associates are his agnates and in which wealthy men and poor are united. The ties of interdependence which unite tribesmen and provide the building blocks of the tribal system can be analytically contrasted with those ties of economic

reciprocity which link pastoralist and agriculturalist. The economic relationship is one which can be easily broken and another with a different farmer or shopkeeper can replace it. The ties between pastoralists are multistranded and not easily broken. The relationship^S between agnates within tribal sections and between sections of the tribe are pervasive in many fields of activity. The dominant cleavage between Riah tribesmen and Sawaknah is clearly manifest in most areas of social activity.

III. THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AT VILLAGE LEVEL

Since 1951, the year that Libya gained national independence, radical changes have occurred in the residential and occupational structure of Sawknah oasis. During the period 1951 - 1960, nearly 30 percent of the agricultural population of the village emigrated to the major cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, 38 percent of the Riah tribesmen who had been pastoral settled in the village. In 1965, 39 percent of all employable males, resident in the village or on its territory, had obtained government posts. Persons not holding posts were able to obtain employment without difficulty on the many government projects under way in Al Jufrah. Nearly the entire male population of the oasis was¹ employed by the government for part of the year.

Economic change in Sawknah is not an isolated phenomena. It is a local expression of the rapid change that is occurring throughout Libya.

The recent history of economic development in Libya documents a change from poverty to wealth in a matter of twelve years. Modern prosperity that has effected nearly every area of the country is a radical departure from the condition at the time of national independence.

A United Nations report, published shortly after national independence, describes the economic situation as follows:

The achievement of true economic independence for Libya is complicated by the fact that the Libyan economy is presently dependent to a degree matched by very few other countries. It has become commonplace among observers of Libyan affairs to describe the economy as deficitary; indeed the economy is deficitary to an extraordinary extent. There are deficits in the budgets in all three provinces, and most municipalities...There is a deficit in the balance of trade, whether in commodities alone, or in

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Author's census - 1965.

goods and services combined of all three provinces; this deficit is not met by the net receipts from foreign investment, as it might be in an advanced country, but by grants-in-aid, military expenditures, and investments of foreign powers. The wheat growing experiment at Borce operates at a deficit, the tobacco growing scheme launched by the Azienda Tabacchi Italiani operates at a small deficit; most of the Italian colonization schemes operated and still operate at a deficit...Fezzanese agriculture operates at a deficit; the power plant in Tripoli operates at a deficit; the railways operated at a deficit; the harbour and the gas works at Tripoli have incurred deficits in several years of the last decade, and so on.

These individual deficits are reflections of the hard fact that the whole Libyan economy operates at a deficit; the country does not produce enough to maintain even its present low standard of living.²

The funds to support the national government and various development programs came from a variety of sources, but mainly from three major contributors: the U.S.A., Great Britain, the United Nations, with smaller amounts contributed by the U.A.R., Turkey, Italy and France.³

The British-Libyan treaty of "Friendship and Alliance" was signed in 1953. The treaty committed Britain to contribute one million pounds a year for development, and 2.75 million pounds a year to budgetary support for a period of four years; from 1953-1954 to 1957-1958.⁴

In the following year, 1954, the United States concluded a similar agreement with the Libyan government. In return for certain military rights, the United States was to pay the Libyan government seven million dollars a year, and supply agreed quantities of wheat. A further four million dollars a year was awarded for development from 1954-1960. It was further agreed that the United States would contribute one million dollars a year for eleven years, beginning in 1960.⁵

² R. Higgins. "The Economic and Social Development of Libya" U.N. Report No. 15, p. 23, 1953.

³ World Bank Report, Economic Development in Libya, p. 48.

⁴ Farley. The Evolution of Planning in Libya, Commentary #14, Ministry of Planning and Development, Tripoli, Libya, p. 12

⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

The United Nations' grants were equal in size to the combined contribution of the other four countries that gave financial support to Libya. The amount of aid contributed by all foreign sources increased throughout the 1950's from 3,755,000 pounds in 1951 to 14,884,000 in 1960.⁶

During the 1950's Libya was heavily dependent upon foreign aid. More than 40 percent of the total national revenue came from aid funds and direct cash payments from foreign powers. In 1959, for instance, the total government revenue from all internal sources was only 12,049,000 pounds; 2,000,000 pounds less than the foreign aid received in that year. But the yearly increase in aid during the 1950's allowed the government to expand public works administrative functions and development projects. /

The major expenditures were on law and order, civil administration, public building, municipal services and administration, with little revenue left for development of agriculture or natural resources.

The expansion of the government administrative organs provided jobs for many persons. Expenditure on law and order of over a million pounds each year during the 1950's provided new openings in the police and army for many young Libyans.

Public building also provided additional labour opportunities. In the Fezzan, for instance, a new town was constructed at Sebha, the capital of the Fezzan province, to house the provincial government and ministries.⁷

Government construction activities, mainly in the cities, provided jobs for country folk who came to the cities in search of wage labour. In addi-

6

World Bank Report, p. 48.

7

Ibid., p. 20.

tion to these obvious sources of jobs, there were many others created in the various government office buildings for custodians and janitors. Figures are not available on the exact number employed in this area. However, the World Bank report mentions patronage as a major source of fiscal wastage and inefficiency.⁸

During the 1950's, economic development in Libya increased steadily each year. Nearly all development funds were channeled through the government agencies or technical assistant programs from countries contributing aid. The objective of much of the program was to stabilize the country politically and strengthen the central government. The aim was to make a poor country as self-sufficient and as stable as possible under the circumstances. Development was largely confined to the major towns of Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha.

The discovery of oil in the late 1950's, altered the projected picture of development and led to rapid expansion of the economy. Although oil was not produced in large amounts until 1962, the presence of the oil companies encouraged economic development in the private sector of the economy. The prospect of large finds of oil brought many companies to prospect.

The oil companies spent large sums of money in Libya, and hired large numbers of local labourers. In 1957, the oil companies spent four million pounds in Libya, and in the following year the amount doubled.⁹ Local expenditures greatly increased each year. In 1962, oil companies spent 86,451,667 pounds in Libya, 26,953,987 pounds of which was spent on local purchases and to pay the salaries of 10,000 Libyan workers.¹⁰

⁸
Ibid., p. 10.

⁹
Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁰
Kubbah. Libya: Its Oil and Economic System, p. 158.

The first substantial oil revenue, 13,565,000 pounds, paid to the Libyan government in 1962, brought a second, more rapid stage of economic development in Libya. Each year since 1962, the oil revenues have increased substantially. In 1963, revenues were 33,000,000 pounds;¹¹ 1965, 100,000,000 pounds;¹² 1967, the expected revenue was 138,800,000 pounds.¹³ The oil wealth provided an increased revenue to the government, thereby making it possible to develop a wide range of projects. Until this period, nearly all development had been confined to the cities.

The oil boom not only provided funds for the public sector, but also gave impetus to the expansion of the private sector of the economy. Industry grew as a result of the oil wealth.

Two industries that grew rapidly during the late 1950's and in the 1960's were construction and transport. Many companies contracted to the oil companies or saw the opportunities created by the increase in commercial activities. Lorry ownership figures provide an indication of the rise in importance of transport. In 1959, there were 1,072 privately registered lorries in Libya. (Government police, and army vehicles are not included.) In 1960, the figure jumped to 9,099, while by 1965, there were 20,196 lorries on the road.¹⁴

Construction, particularly in the cities, increased. Whole sections of Tripoli city were built. Modern buildings abound in the newly "built up" areas; their light futuristic design is in marked contrast to the traditional Arab architecture, and the grand "heavy" structures that are a legacy from

¹¹

Ibid., p. 228

¹²

Middle East Journal, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1967, p. 73.

¹³

The Libyan Review, Dec., 1966, No. 12.

¹⁴

Kingdom of Libya Statistical Abstract, 1965, p. 87.

the Italian Colonial era. Construction was undertaken to provide suitable quarters for the many new local and foreign companies that grew in Libya. The figures on building in Tripoli provide an indication of that growth. Between 1962 and 1965, 1,182 new, nonresidential dwellings were built by private contractors in Tripoli city.¹⁵ Similarly, the figures in Table I on construction of private dwellings show a large scale increase.

T A B L E I.

Construction of Privately Built Dwellings
in Tripoli City

	<u>Apartment Buildings</u>	<u>Villas</u>	<u>Houses</u>
1962	1	8	69
1963	2	63	171
1964	16	92	199
1965	21	79	217

Construction was undertaken to provide accommodations for the increased population and the thriving business community in Tripoli city. In the years between 1954 and 1964, the American and British population increased from 2,349 in 1954 to 13,409 in 1964.¹⁶ Tripoli city grew rapidly in the early 1960's; the prosperity in the cities and the large foreign population stimulated the development of a host of service industries. Nearly all sections of the cities' economy grew rapidly. The development in the cities attracted rural dwellers away from the country.

Accurate figures on the extent of migration to the city do not exist. The 1965 census did not make the distinction between domicile and registered

¹⁵Ibid., p. 187.¹⁶

Population Census United Kingdom of Libya. 1954, p. 113; 1964, p. 14.

residence. Largely for political reasons persons are usually registered in their natal villages regardless of where they reside. A comparison of my census figure and the government figures in 1965 for Sawknah oasis provide an indication of this. The government records the population of Sawknah as 2,100; my figures total 1,609 residents. The 491 persons not counted in my census as residents are all members of families that have been residing outside of Al Jufrah since the 1950's. Most of these families emigrated to Tripoli.

In the ten years between the 1954 and 1964 censuses, the citizen population of Tripoli increased by 58.2 percent, from 240,150 to 379,925. The second major city in Libya, Benghazi, increased in size by 65.9 percent, from 169,062 to 278,826 persons. Thus both cities increased in size during this period, faster than the net increase in the citizen population over the ten-year period which was reported to be 45 percent.¹⁷ The figures suggest a large migration to the cities from the rural countryside.

Not only did the increased prosperity effect a change in resident pattern, but also brought about a large-scale occupational change. In Table 2, I contrast selected occupations taken from the 1954 and 1964 Libyan Census.

T A B L E II.

Comparison of Selected Occupations between 1954 - 1964
(Males only)

<u>Occupations</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1964</u>
Clerical workers	1,582	18,240
Farmers & related industries	211,448	141,893
Crafts, production & process workers, labourers	18,631	64,018
Services: Sports & recreation workers	17,460	36,812
Transportation and communication	5,309	19,583

¹⁷ Kingdom of Libya. General Population Census, 1964. P. 26

The table demonstrates that there has been a sharp decline in persons working in agriculture, while there has been an increase in the other four occupations listed. Thus a large number of persons are now working for wages in Libya and farming is becoming increasingly less important as a source of livelihood.

One would like to know how many of those persons work in the private, as opposed to the public sector of the Libyan economy. The information is not available. However, most of the persons working in the services of sports and recreation are government employees. The number of persons working in the professions and other paid occupations also has risen sharply.

The data presented suggests both an extensive migration of persons to the cities during the 1950's and early 1960's; a decline in agricultural activity and an increase in wage employment throughout Libya. Sawknah oasis community has been radically affected by these economic changes.

The wage labour opportunities and government positions that became available in the 1950's accelerated a process of emigration from Sawknah oasis that had been under way for some years.

In the Colonial Period of Italian rule (1917-1942) there was some emigration from the village. I have not been able to trace the full extent of emigration, for many emigrant families have not maintained ties with villagers. In one section of Sawknah village and in the outlying gardens, there are a number of ruined houses, judging from their size and location, the dwellings of agricultural labourers. Few people remember who owned these properties.

In the palm plantations there are stands of trees, not tended, that belong to kin groups who moved to Tripoli before World War II. However, there are some families that have maintained close relationships with emigrant kinsmen. Members of these families make frequent visits to kinsmen in the city. Those emigrants that maintain ties with the community are

members of wealthy families who have property interests in the village. Some return annually to claim their share of the date harvest and profits from the gardens. Often members of these families cooperate in marketing the date crop in Tripoli. Emigrants who are familiar with marketing sell the dates while villagers harvest the crop and make transport arrangements. Thus, property ties and mutual commercial interests are one set of links uniting urban dwellers with their rural kinsmen resident in the oasis.

In the 1950's these urban-rural ties acquired another dimension. When wage labour opportunities developed in the cities and emigration to the cities increased, the many oasis dwellers who left the area had contacts with kinsmen in Tripoli. A few of the urban dwellers from Sawknah's wealthy families had taken important positions with the government in Tripoli. Some were able to help relatives and friends find employment in the city. In Table III, I show the emigration pattern from Sawknah oasis.

T A B L E III.

Emigration from Sawknah (Households) *

<u>Year of Emigration</u>	<u>Riah</u>	<u>Sawaknah</u>
1951 - 1955	5	19
1956 - 1957	6	10
1958 - 1959	10	20
1960 - 1961	5	4
1962 - 1963	1	2
1964 - 1965	0	2
TOTAL	<u>27</u>	<u>57</u>

*Author's Census

I include only those families who have not returned to the oasis. Many young men who worked outside the area during this period, returned to the village after 1960; while other unmarried men worked outside during the period of my field work. As evident from the table, the majority of emigrants are of Sawaknah origin. Few emigrants of the Riah tribe were drawn from pastoralist families. The rest of the Riah migrants were of sedentary

families, residents of the village whose way of life was similar to that of the Sawknah agriculturalist population. Thus, during the 1950's the economic developments outside the area attracted sedentary folk to the cities. Persons living as pastoralists during the 1950's were less affected by the economic development than other categories of persons living in the oasis.

It was not until the late 1950's to early 1960's, when wage labour was available in the Al Jufrah area, that residential and occupational patterns among the pastoralists were altered. In the same year, emigration from the oasis declined (see Table III). In 1960 wage labour became available in the rural area.

Economic development in Al Jufrah commenced with the construction of a paved road through the area. The road construction brought both the era of rural development in Al Jufrah, since it provided construction work and on completion provided the communication link necessary to integrate Al Jufrah into the national structure.

The Fezzan road project was considered by the government a worthwhile expenditure. Proponents argued that a surfaced road would ease communications with the interior and possibly attract companies to explore for oil and other mineral wealth in the Fezzan. The initial contracts to build the road were awarded in 1958. The amount awarded was 1,900,000 pounds Sterling. This amount covered the construction of 1,000 km. of surfaced road through the desert interior of Libya. The budget was thought by some at the time of the agreement to have been too low. A crisis over the financing of the road occurred in 1960.

In a climate of political controversy, the budget for the construction of the new road was increased by an additional four million pounds - two and one-half times the amount originally tendered by the contractor to

construct the whole road. Kaduri, writing on this subject, says:

In 1960 Sayyid Abd-Allah (the contractor), as was expected, submitted a statement to the Ministry of National Economy requesting further funds for the completion of the road on the grounds that in accordance with the terms of the contract, he had completed one unit, for which he had received the one million and nine hundred thousand pounds and asked for funds for the other units. Unaware of the precise terms of the contract, the government transferred the Fezzan Road project from the Ministry of National Economy to the newly established Development Council for a decision. After careful examination of the matter, it was decided to revise the contract in such a way as to allow Sayyid Abd-Allah to receive a further four million Libyan pounds for the completion of the remaining portion of the road, rather than permit him to ask for more funds after the completion of each unit. This arrangement was satisfactory to Sayyid Abd-Allah, who received an advance of one million Libyan pounds on the basis of the revised contract. The difficulty seemed to have been settled in June, 1960, although the whole affair was dealt with behind closed doors.¹⁸

The vast increase in the funds for the road construction at that juncture, placed Al Jufrah in a favorable position. The first unit of the road had been completed. Al Jufrah's location in the geographical center of the next unit of road to be built made the area the logical headquarters for the construction company. Since there were no other settlements in the region, much labour was recruited from Al Jufrah.

The era of rural development brought about the settlement of pastoralists in Sawknah. In Table IV, I show the number of pastoral families that settled in the village between 1957 and 1965. In this period, thirty-eight percent of all tribesmen discontinued pastoralism. There is no indication that the process has subsided. In 1966, when I returned to the village after nearly a year's absence, I found that an additional eight families had given up pastoralism, while many other pastoral families also had members working in the oasis.

¹⁸

Kaduri. Modern Libya, p. 302.

T A B L E IV.

*

Settlement of Pastoral Households

<u>Year Settled</u>	<u>No. of Households</u>
1957 - 1958	6
1959 - 1960	27
1961 - 1962	28
1963 - 1964	19
1965 (1st 6 months)	9
TOTAL	<u>89</u>

* Author's Census, 1964-1965

Thus, the residential change in Sawknah oasis can be divided into two phases. The period prior to 1960 saw large numbers of villagers emigrating to the large towns in search of work. This process subsided after 1960, when wage labour opportunities became available in Al Jufrah. In this second phase the pastoralists began settling and continue to settle in the village. This is related directly to the road construction, and then a government five-year-plan, one aim of which was to provide large scale development in the rural areas. With the increase in revenues, from oil royalties, the government spending increased rapidly.

In 1963 a much delayed five-year-plan was implemented. The government proposed to spend 169,097,000 pounds on development schemes. Special attention was given to agriculture (£29,275,000), communications (£27,460,000), public works (£44,912,000) and education (£22,500,000).

Although the plan was directed at development of the country as a whole, special consideration was given to development of the countryside, as announced in "Objectives 1, 2, and 4" of the plan:

- (1) to ensure the early improvement of the standards of living of the people, particularly those of limited income who did not benefit from the economic prosperity.

(2) Special consideration to the agricultural section, being the source of supply of most of the essential consumer goods, besides being this source of income and employment for the majority of the people: to pay attention to industry, to improve production efficiency of farmers and labourers; and to encourage the private sector to make investments in these fields; and

(4) To develop the rural areas by establishing all the productive and public service projects, thus ensuring regular employment for countrymen, utilizing their production faculties and raising their incomes in such a way as to achieve justice in the distribution of national income and restrict their migration to the cities.¹⁹

As indicated in the Objectives of the five-year-plan, one concern of the government was to bring prosperity to the villages. Indeed in Al Jufrah, this has occurred. Many new jobs and posts have been made available in Al Jufrah as a result of the government five year plan. Public works departments, services and civil administrative agencies have been greatly expanded.

Hun, the administrative capital of Al Jufrah, experienced the most extensive growth in local public works, services, and administration. In Hun, during the years of 1964-1965, a tourist guest house was constructed; houses were built for the foreign staff of the Hospital; a water storage tank for the village domestic water supply was constructed; three government work shops were erected; an electricity generator was installed in new buildings; and offices for the agricultural department were built. Telephone lines to the three oases have been erected. Construction of a pipeline to connect a newly drilled artesian well at Sawknah to all three oases was begun.

In the construction phase, a large number of local labourers were employed on a daily basis. When the construction was completed, the new offices, workshops and service departments employed persons from the Al Jufrah region in most positions in the local bureaucracies.

Hun was not the only village to benefit from the five year plan. Other

¹⁹

Farley. The Evolution of Planning in Libya, Commentary #14, Ministry of Planning & Development.

villages in Al Jufrah received new buildings and experienced growth in local public works, services and administration. In Sawknah, in the same period of time, a new school was built, a new police station and administrative office for village officials were constructed, as was a power plant and a building to house the government sponsored youth club. In addition, employment in such services as the agricultural extension program, a local medical dispensary and public utilities was increased. Villagers were employed in the construction, maintenance and operation of village based government agencies. Although these institutions were nominally controlled by higher level officials whose offices were located in Hun, all local level institutions in Sawknah, with the exception of the police post and the school, employed villagers to the exclusion of outsiders.

In Hun this was not the case, for it was the headquarters of regional administration, public works and services. Many persons from the other oases worked there.

In most of the local level government agencies Al Jufrah residents held the highest administrative posts. There were only four agencies which were not administered by local residents. They were the police department which had a policy of rotating its high ranking officers from one area of the country to another; the head of local civil administration, a department that followed the same policy as the police department; the head of the local date packing plant, an Egyptian who was hired as a technical expert; and the doctor who managed the local hospital and out-patient clinics in the other villages. At lower levels, a minority of school teachers and policemen were recruited from outside the Al Jufrah region. Most local level government institutions are managed by Al Jufrah residents and within these agencies large numbers of government posts, for both skilled and unskilled persons, have become available to local inhabitants.

I do not have accurate figures on the number of persons employed by the government in Al Jufrah as a whole, but it is my impression that most of Hun's male population have some sort of government employment. Many of the local agencies are greatly overstaffed and certainly in Sawknah, patronage positions are numerous.

In my census of the population of Sawknah oasis, I recorded 453 males who were of working age.²⁰ 174 of these individuals held government posts. 36 persons held positions with government outside of Al Jufrah while the remainder worked in either Hun or Sawknah.

32 of those persons employed outside the area were skilled workers or persons with "civil service" occupations such as clerks, school teachers, etc. 53 persons from Sawknah were employed in Civil Service positions in Al Jufrah; while 81 persons had posts with the government that required no specialized skills. Nearly all of the latter positions were patronage appointments.

In Sawknah there were 8 janitors employed to maintain a six room school house, 11 persons were employed to care for a generator that provided the village with electricity for six to eight hours each day and 15 custodians were retained by the government to maintain the four mosques and the Sanusi lodge in the village. There were 35 persons in Sawknah who were employed in custodial positions.

The remaining 50 persons who were on the government payroll as unskilled employees, worked as labourers for the various ministries. Here again there was a good deal of overstaffing.

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I classified all males under 65 years old and over 16 years of age and not in school as employable. Also included in this figure are all pastoralists. There are 164 persons who fall into this latter category.

One example of overstaffing is evident in the public road department. In 1964 there were heavy rains in the desert surrounding Al Jufrah. The Wadi beds rushed with torrents of water and where water passed over or under the new Fezzan road great sections of the surface were swept away rendering the road impassible in many places. Temporary employees were taken on by the road department in order to clear debris. Even though the job was finished within a few months after the storms most of the "temporary employees" were retained by the road department. There were twenty three persons from Sawknah employed in this area. It would seem that each time there is a chance to increase the number of employees in one of the government departments the option is taken and the persons who were taken on as temporary workers become permanent employees. For political reasons, it is difficult to remove a person from a government payroll once he has obtained a position.

✓ In addition to those persons that I recorded as government employees, there are many others who work for the government as day labourers. Because of the building and construction activity many other short term projects were under way while I was in the field. Few persons experienced difficulty in obtaining employment. There were 115 persons who were working as day labourers during my stay in Sawknah. Some worked exclusively on government projects, but many worked for private entrepreneurs. It may be added that government development stimulated growth in the private sectors of the economy thus providing work for skilled and unskilled persons in building, commerce, trucking and a host of related activities. Even in this area, government was important for they subcontracted some of their work to local entrepreneurs.

Development of wage labour in Al Jufrah has had wide reaching effects. It brought a decline in emigration of the villagers to the cities, induced many pastoralists to settle in the village and provided most persons with paid employment.

From my description of local level development of bureaucracy and my figures on government wage employment, it would appear that wage labour was easy to come by. Indeed this was true during my stay in the field. But there were significant variations in the quality of posts and the security of tenure within the wage structure; this is most apparent of the level of unskilled work - the capacity in which most residents of Sawknah were employed.

There was a major distinction to be drawn between those who worked in custodial positions and those who worked as unskilled labourers. Attached to the former category of employment were certain benefits, tenure, family allowances, paid holidays, and sickness benefits. Also the nature of the work was less taxing and "cleaner" than manual labour, an important consideration to those seeking employment.

Labourers did not receive these benefits, they were paid less, frequently had to work harder, and many expressed insecurity. Most who were aware of the politics involved in acquiring unskilled patronage jobs worried that a cut back on the rosters of some agencies might affect them.

At another level there were many day labourers who relied quite heavily on government employment as their source of livelihood and they too were interested in obtaining positions that had more security of tenure.

Thus, between the categories of unskilled government workers there were significant differences in quality, security and duration of employment; nearly all unskilled persons were seeking custodial positions.

Competition for administrative positions took place among Al Jufrah residents at other levels in local bureaucracy. There were persons living in all of the oasis communities in 1965 with the qualification to take positions at various levels of administration. In each village, there were

persons who, through experience with the oil companies or as a result of government training, were capable mechanics, and drivers; others had been graduated from teachers training colleges, and there was a cadre of young, literate, men who could qualify as clerks, office workers, etc. Similarly, there were older men in each of the villages, who had had experience in local government for a number of years. There was more than one qualified person for almost every government position made available in Al Jufrah.

Nearly every appointment to a post was a political act. The rapid expansion of the public works, services and administration not only radically affected the local economy, but also was the single most important focus of political manipulation while I was in the field.

Three basic questions arise from my description of development of local level bureaucracy in Al Jufrah. First: How have these rapid changes affected the inter-village political relationships? Second: How has development of administration affected the political functions, modes of recruitment to, and organization of, political groups in Sawknah? Third: How have traditional positions of authority and traditional political groupings among Riah been effected by wage labour and sedentarization of large numbers of tribesmen?

The three questions are related and we must seek answers to them through the analysis of the relationship between formal politics, administration and the informal system of patronage which influences all aspects of political and administrative life in Al Jufrah. All three areas of inquiry not only involve analyzing relationships within the Al Jufrah political system, but also require that we analyze the articulation of the Al Jufrah administrative, political and patronage systems with the wider field of relationships outside Al Jufrah proper. Although my main concern is with the analysis of

the impact of administration and wage labour on the political organization of Sawknah oasis, I must at least sketch the context within which the system in Sawknah functions. Continuity and change in the local political system can only be understood through examination of its relationship to external factors.

There are many channels open between the influential members of Al Jufrah communities and politicians and administrators at a higher level in the system. Some are formalized through bureaucracy, others are informal ties of political and economic patronage and a few, while containing the components of the first two, are also based on kinship. Some Al Jufrah residents have become important in politics and administration outside of Al Jufrah. However, the actual channels through which these relationships operate can be classified three ways. First, Al Jufrah elects one parliamentary representative and through this office many positions, at various levels in local administration are made available to locals. Secondly, the village leaders of the Al Jufrah oases belong to different national factions and it is through the patronage of these groups that appointments are made available at local level, and indeed, the appointments to offices are protected. Third, administrators at local level are responsible to and perhaps politically aligned with higher level bureaucrats. This relationship is variable however and is greatly influenced by the nature of the informal factional matrix in which the supposed subordinate-superordinate relationship is fixed. Some local administrators have the ability to exercise the power to appoint employees, because of their political ties with politicians outside the area. Other bureaucrats are virtually powerless, dependent upon influential villagers outside of the bureaucracy who have the critical political ties with powerful men outside the area. In a very real sense the administrative system is subject to the control of political groups.

The organization of these three sets of links within the wider society has largely determined the impact of social change in Al Jufrah.

First, Al Jufrah is represented in National government by one elected parliamentary representative. The contest for the seat is decided by the democratic process of one man one vote. Since Hun and Waddan are the largest Al Jufrah communities, it is the candidate from one of these two communities who invariably occupies the parliamentary seat. Since the two communities are equal in size, candidates compete for support from the other three smaller oases of Sawknah, Zillah, and Al Fogha, which make up the electoral district, to tip the balance in their favor.

Candidates use three means of obtaining extra village support. First, — they purchase votes with a cash payment; second, they promise patronage to supporters in the form of posts; third, alliances are contracted between the leader of smaller oases communities and candidates. These alliances take two forms: first, candidates promise patronage to village leaders; or second, they promise to step down from office at a future date and support the candidacy of an ally from one of the smaller oases communities that supported him. Many such alliances were formed, but to my knowledge none were honoured. This has served to increase suspicion and hostilities between villages.

In the 1950's Hun had control of the parliamentary seat. The mechanisms for perpetuating this control are obscure, but informants said that one reason was a patronage alliance between the leaders of Sawknah and Hun. Some also accused the villagers of Hun of using illegal procedures. Stuffing ballot boxes, deliberately miscounting votes and the active support of government in these illegalities are counted as reasons for Hun's continuing domination of local level politics.

Sawknah informants claim to have supported Hun's leaders but say that they stopped doing so when it was seen that most benefit from government expansion was going to that village and few amenities were coming to Sawknah. Riah informants said that it was largely through tribal pressure that the alliance was broken in the late 1950's at a time when the Riah tribesmen were becoming more aware of political intrigue.

Notables in Hun praised the tenure of their representative, attributing local prosperity to him. It was during his tenure that Hun began to grow rapidly. Persons from Hun defend the selection of their town as the seat of local administration. They argue that the geographical location of Hun, in the center of Al Jufrah makes it the logical location for services and administration. Moreover, they argue Hun had been the seat of local Italian and then British administration. The Italians had built a number of administrative buildings, workshops and some housing which was taken over by the government at the time of independence. It was logical that administration should be located in Hun for it already had some facilities.

X In retrospect, persons in Sawknah, particularly the leaders of the Riah tribe do not view the situation in these terms. They complain that at election times promise of patronage were made to them in return for electoral support, but that the residents of Hun were given preference in employment over persons from other villages. The Sawknah were less inclined to see the situation in these terms as they were favored with posts in local administration and some of their numbers acquired good paying administrative positions outside of the area. But as more Riah tribesmen became involved in wage labour, they began to realize the causal relationship between politics and good paying government posts. They grew more discontent with the electoral situation in Al Jufrah and they questioned the support that they had given to Hun.

There was little that could be changed. Persons from Hun had a near monopoly of influence with political groups outside of Al Jufrah through whom most of the patronage positions were obtained.

In the 1950's Al Jufrah was part of the administrative structure of Tripolitania province and patronage in that structure was organized through important persons in Hun. In 1959, however, a national policy radically altered the position of Al Jufrah in the National administrative structure and created a situation that allowed for political readjustment in Al Jufrah.

In 1959 the boundaries between Tripolitania and Fezzan provinces were altered. Ghadames on the Libyan border with Tunisia and Algeria was shifted from Fezzan to Tripoli province. In return, Al Jufrah came under Fezzan rule. This adjustment had a major impact on the administrative and political organization of Al Jufrah as well as the political position of the Riah tribe in Sawknah oasis. For one thing, many of the government agencies represented in Al Jufrah now came under the control of Fezzane^s officials, and a different group of politicians. It weakened a set of political connections in Tripoli province that had been in part responsible for the dominance of Hun in Al Jufrah affairs during the 1950's. Informants said that there was a great deal of opposition in Al Jufrah to the boundary changes. The reasons for the opposition in Hun should be obvious, and effective realignment of some government agencies with Fezzan province was never realized. In Sawknah, the reasons for opposition were historical rather than structural. Their old tribal enemies, the Aulad Sleman under the ruling house of Saif al Nasir, governed in Fezzan province.

Informants related that Sawknah fought a protracted battle with the Aulad Sleman in the late 19th century. The Aulad Sleman held Sawknah in siege for nearly a year, many persons were said to have starved to death, and large areas of the garden land and much of the palm plantations were

destroyed.²¹

During the Italian conquest of the Fezzan, the Sanussi Army that opposed them was led by the Saif al Nasir. Riah tribesmen saw an opportunity to settle an old score and fought with the Italians who eventually defeated the Sanussi Army, and Saif al Nasir fled to Chad. Shortly before National independence, Bey Mohammed Saif al Nasir returned from Chad and was elected ruler of Fezzan. Most persons in Sawknah feared that an administration controlled by Saif al Nasir would be harsh on them.

According to local accounts, Saif al Nasir came to Al Jufrah after annexation to Fezzan province to assure people that they would be fairly treated. One of the many problems facing the Saif al Nasir, however, was that of gaining effective influence in Al Jufrah. To do so they would have to dislodge Hun leaders from their positions of influence, gain administrative control over some local bureaucracies, and offer alternative patronage positions to supporters. Saif al Nasir supported other Al Jufrah groups in opposition to Hun leadership.

The two smaller villages of Zillah and Sawknah were given seats in the Fezzan Parliament and patronage posts through these offices were passed on to villagers. In the National parliamentary election of 1960, the Saif al Nasir had the opportunity to break Hun's control of the Al Jufrah parliamentary seat. They proceeded to do so by forging an alliance between Waddan, Zillah and Sawknah behind an opposition candidate. An agreement was reached between the three villages that a candidate from Waddan would run and that the parliamentary seat would then pass to Sawknah or Zillah in the next election. The hold of Hun on the parliamentary seat was broken

²¹Apparently the Aulad Sleman were renowned in this kind of activity in most of Fezzan during this period. H. Barth records that the Aulad Sleman destroyed Edri oasis in a similar fashion and were active against other settlements as well. Barth, H. Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, Vol. iii, page 136.

in the next election, a man from Waddan became Al Jufrah's representative in Parliament.

Between the 1960 election and the election of 1964, Waddan's parliamentary representative entrenched himself in the parliament seat and refused to step down to support a candidate from the other villages in the alliance. The incumbent, with the support of the Waddan villagers, broke with the Saif al Nasir alliance.

In the two parliamentary elections that I observed in the field, the main contenders were from Waddan and Hun, rivals to one another, as well as to the Saif al Nasir. Zillah and Sawknah remained loyal to Saif al Nasir. In the first election an alliance was forged between Zillah and Sawknah in which Zillah supported the candidate from Sawknah in return for reciprocal support for a Zillah candidate in the next election. In the second election Sawknah refused to honour the pledge and both villages ran candidates.

Although the notables in Sawknah villages did not expect to win the election, they felt it necessary to run a candidate in order to protect the village's corporate political character.

If a villager did not seek office, it was feared that the other candidates would create patronage alliance with sections of the village and the tribe thus breaking the corporate village character and undermining the position of the village and tribal leaders. As long as they could command the electorate, local leaders were in a position of strength with the Saif al Nasir. And as long as they controlled the patronage they could maintain their position of influence in the village.

Thus, the different relationships with outside factions perpetuated a situation of intense rivalry between the villages of Al Jufrah and supported the corporate character of the villages in political affairs. The links of Al Jufrah notables to political factions at higher levels in national politics outside of Al Jufrah were so varied as to make it unlikely that any one person or group would be able to monopolize them, thus insuring competition between local leaders for a greater say in the distribution of posts. The era of Fezzan influence in Al Jufrah not only broke the monopoly control of Hun over Al Jufrah, but also had a profound effect upon the intra-village politics in Sawknah oasis. Until that time, the Sawknah had been dominant in village affairs. Through their alliance with Hun, and influence with migrants, the Sawknah had acquired administrative and patronage posts and they controlled Sawknah's administrative and political offices.

In the late fifties most Riah were pastoral and few had responded to the prospects of employment outside of Al Jufrah. The Saif al Nasir rule, however, brought tribal leaders into government and administration. The numerical dominance of tribesmen over sedentary villagers was recognized, organized, and tribal political dominance in some village affairs was realized.

Riah and not Sawknah leaders were selected to serve as village representatives to the provincial parliament in Fezzan. Thus, when the wider system was beginning to expand with more jobs becoming available, the tribal system was formally brought into the wider political system through their elected officers in the Fezzan parliament. More Riah were given administrative positions in Sawknah and many settled in the village after receiving patronage positions in local bureaucracy.

Between the time of annexation to Fezzan in 1959 and the abolition of provincial parliaments in Libya in 1963, two members of the Riah tribe sat

in the Fezzan parliament. Each of the men was a powerful notable in the tribe before election and represented the two most powerful (rival sections) of the tribe. Hamad Lishlim (C17 II)²² of the Sawowda section sat first in parliament and he was followed by 'Abdalla bin Salih (D24 I) of the Bu Rasie tribal section.

During and shortly after Hamad's tenure in office, all but four of the families in the Sawowda tribal section became sedentary and acquired posts in government. Hamad was also responsible for obtaining posts for non-agnatic kinsmen and political supporters outside of his section. Informants said that Hamad's nepotism was all too obvious and strong opposition to his re-election to parliament developed in the village.

Accounts of the campaign for re-election are confused and contradictory. Hamad openly contested the election and was opposed by a Sawknah landowner. According to informants there was a great deal of bribery and bitterness in the campaign as the Sawknah attempted to break tribal solidarity. When the election was over, however, a person who had not run, 'Abdalla bin Salih, was announced winner over the radio. 'Abdalla said that he knew nothing of his appointment until it was announced. Few people believed this story. Most tribesmen and villagers privately accused him of shady dealings.

While in office, 'Abdalla's conduct differed slightly from Hamad's. 'Abdalla had his close kin and supporters appointed to positions of patronage and obtained positions as trainee drivers and mechanics for the sons of his close political supporters. But more important, it was 'Abdalla who gave Riah administrative parity with the Sawknah, and had his supporters placed in positions of authority in the growing village bureaucracy.

22

Reference numbers and letters beside proper names refer to genealogies in Appendix 1.

'Abdalla managed to have his brother-in-law, Muftah (D14 I) appointed to the newly-created position of tribal headman instituting a separate autonomous administrative structure for the Riah in Sawknah oasis. During my stay in the field this structure was still in existence. Both the village and the tribe had separate headmen, and lower level administrators. While there were only two salaried Shaikhs of the village, five of the seven Shaikhs of tribal sections were recognized by the government and placed on payrolls. 'Abdalla was responsible for at least two of these Shaikhs being recognized and paid by the government. The era of parliamentary involvement of Sawknah in Fezzan strengthened the Riah tribes' position in Sawknah oasis. They grew more aware of the political aspect of intra-village competition for patronage posts, and the importance of tribal leaders as brokers between themselves and national factions in these matters.

The era of rural development in Al Jufrah and the nature of the articulation of the national system with the village system 1) reinforced intervillage rivalry; 2) gave continuity to the dominant intra-village cleavage between Sawknah and Riah tribesmen; 3) supported traditional structural divisions within the tribe. External alliances supported traditional leadership positions in the tribe and the support that these leaders could marshal, particularly at election time, made the leaders useful to their patrons the Saif al Nasir.

IV. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN VILLAGE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Emigration of large numbers of sedentary families from Sawknah to the cities in the 1950's and expansion of National Government hegemony at village level beginning in the early 1960's posed the possibility of radical changes in the traditional stratification pattern of Sawknah oasis community. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore and analyze how new economic and political conditions initiated by the central government affected the social structure of the sedentary community in Sawknah oasis. To analyze this process fully, I first analyze those sets of structural relationships which supported the traditional stratification system and perpetuated the dominance of the land-owning power group and then turn to the ways in which some of these relationships were adapted to meet the changing economic and political situation in Al Jufrah in 1965.

The traditional stratification system in Sawknah oasis was based upon control and exploitation of agricultural resources. Most irrigated gardens and date palm plantations were owned by a few wealthy families, who formed the dominant power group in the oasis. Patrilineal descent played an insignificant part in the organization of the land-owning group. Most named groups were no larger than extended families, and when in a few cases genealogies of more than three generations in depth were kept, they were merely an historical record and were not the bases for a corporate group organization.

When in the field, I was struck by the marked contrast between the nearly all-pervasive importance of descent group organization among Riah tribesmen and the near absence of descent as an organizing feature of village social life. While Riah tribesmen organized most of their political relationships through descent group structures, there were few clearly defined functions that I could attribute to descent groups in the sedentary

population. In only a few cases were binding linkages maintained between members of Sawknah descent groups and in these groups corporate property interests usually were not continued when the senior male of an extended family died. In only a few cases were first cousins owners of joint estates and beyond that range of affiliation, common property interests were not usually maintained.

One indication of the differential importance of agnatic descent groups in village and tribal organization is reflected in the contrast between my census material collected in 1965-66 and material gathered by the Italian sociologist Agostini in 1917.¹ While the six of seven descent group names collected by Agostini for the Riah tribe had not changed between 1917 and 1966, only four of fourteen names of Sawknah descent groups had remained in use. It was only after probing that I discovered that many descendants of Sawknah groups recorded in 1917 were still resident in the village. In one case, the agnates were distributed among all three status groups in the village, some as land owners, others as small farmers, and a few who had become impoverished as members of the peasant status group. There was no indication that the fact of common descent was a meaningful linkage between these families.

Marriage was one social linkage which maintained the stratification system, as all three status groups were nearly endogamous. Where differences in wealth developed between the individuals in the same descent group, members were pulled into the orbit of different status groups and marriages were usually contracted with status equals rather than with members of one's agnatic descent group.

¹

Agostini, E. La Popolazione Della Tripolitania, pp. 203.

Thus, descent group organization became subordinated to the system of stratification and marriage was one important relationship which ensured that the major share of agricultural resources in the oasis was maintained by a few wealthy families, families who had broken linkages with poorer agnates in favor of forging linkages with families of similar status.

Basically, the two processes, emigration and inequities in inheritance between heirs to an estate ensured that a few families in the oasis would continue to own the major share of resources. Descent groups in which the members maintained the same social status were less likely to segment than those in which, through fragmentation of estate, members demonstrated radically different degrees of wealth.


One indicator of descent group instability is the frequency with which family names are not perpetuated from one generation to the next. In Diagram I, I show one descent group which has bifurcated several times over the last three generations. "El Uhdat" is the name of one of the groups recorded resident in Sawknah by Agostini in 1917.² Some members of the El Uhdat still reside in Sawknah, but the name is not used and the descendants of that group do not maintain even minimal social contact as a group. I could only discover the common agnatic tie of the El Uhdat descendants after confronting villagers with information drawn from Agostini's account.

Section B1 of the El Uhdat has been renamed on two occasions in the last two generations. C1 was called by the name Salim and in the next generation, D1 and D2 both founded separately named families and the name Salim was not continued in common use. C3 and C4 of the El Uhdat, however, have retained the name of B2 - Moosa - for the past two generations.

2

Ibid., p. 203.

DIAGRAM I
'AILET EL UHEDAT



Section C⁴ emigrated to Tripoli in the 1920's, but the C3 line has remained resident in the community and has maintained control of sufficient wealth to support their position among the landowning status group in the village. One way in which this wealth was attained was through gaining effective control of C⁴'s property and further agricultural property through the marriage of C3 to a woman of a wealthy family who inherited a share of her family's estate.³ There is considerable status difference between the B1 and B2 sections of the E1 Uhdat indicated by the fact that individual families who remained resident in the village did not retain a descent group name from one generation to the next.

Both D1 and D2 are men of moderate means who individually own twenty date palm trees, have little garden land, are small shopkeepers in the village, and occasionally work as agricultural labourers. D3 owns 252 productive date palms and a large garden, and is headmaster of the local school. D⁴, his younger married brother, is a school teacher in Sawknah. While D⁴ acquired his position as a result of successfully completing a course at teacher's training college, D3 has no formal credentials, but simply the Koranic training traditionally afforded men of wealthy families in the village. Informants said that D3 acquired his position through his affinal connections with a Sawknah landowner who was a minister of education in Fezzan during the federal era - in other words, by virtue of his membership in the landowning power group. The B1 section of the descent group does not have these links; both D1 and D2 have contracted marriages with families in the small farmer status group.

³The residents of Fezzan are Sunni Muslims who follow the malaki school of Islamic Law. Rules of inheritance specify that a woman inherits one-half a share to each full share inherited by her brothers when an estate is divided. Among nomads, women rarely claim their inheritance, but among the Sawknah landowners, women, with few exceptions, claim their property rights.

Members of the B2 line of El Uhdat have retained their status in the village as members of the landowning power group, while the descendants of B1 have lost their position. The original name of the descent group has not been perpetuated, indicating the disappearance of a corporate focus and common property interests. But more important, the differences in wealth and status between the descendants of the A1 descent group would seem to have worked against descent group unity.

D1 and D2 organize their economic and social life with their affines among the small farmers; in contrast, D3 and D4, as members of the landowning power group, take direct part in the important decision-making processes in the village. During my stay in the field, I observed no behavior among members of the El Uhdat that would indicate that they attached any special significance to the fact that they were agnates.


Inequities in inheritance may account for the differences in wealth between the two sections of the El Uhdat, but another factor influencing the position of the B2 line was the emigration of C4, whose agricultural property was taken over by C3, his brother. Emigration of households of wealthy descent groups has been historically a second major factor contributing to the maintenance of large undivided estates among the landowners. Emigration makes it possible for a few families to maintain large holdings which, if divided among the heirs, would result in most of them being reduced to the position of have to work their own land.

In Diagram II, I show the genealogy of a landowner descent group, the largest descent group of that status resident in the village. The name of the descent group has been perpetuated through a number of generations; the status of the resident households is roughly equivalent in the wider
⁴ system. Their continued membership in the landowning status group has

⁴ Agostini records the Sa'adi as Cher et Trigh; the name of the founding ancestor of the group. Informants said that the name Sa'adi had been used even before Agostini visited Sawknah.

DIAGRAM II

'AILET SA 'ADI



been aided by the emigration of family members.

The 'Ailet Sa'adi have been among the wealthiest families in the village for a number of generations. In 1965 there were nine nuclear families of the Sa'adi descent group resident in the village. In this descent group there is a degree of corporation, as the members maintain a joint estate and at harvest time divide the produce from their gardens and date palm plantation into shares and distribute them among the members.

The Sa'adi have kept a family genealogy for a number of generations, a simplified version of which I present as Diagram II. There are 67 nuclear families depicted on the full genealogy. (I have not recorded the descendants of emigrants). The nine nuclear families are members of E7 and E10 extended families and the single household of D1, whose sons emigrated to Tripoli after 1950. Section C2 of the Sa'adi has lived in Tripoli since the early part of the 20th century. The members of section C4 emigrated to Tunisia in the latter part of the 19th century and in 1965 were still living there. Some years later, C4 was followed to Tunisia by his brother's son, D3. As a consequence of these moves, a sizeable estate which would have been divided into a great number of shares passed instead to D2 and has been kept as a corporate holding by his descendants.

My informants said that, until the mid-1960's, there had been little contact between the emigrant branches of the descent group and those families that remained in the oasis. The agricultural property which should have been shared by the emigrants was effectively controlled by the D2 line. In 1966, a man from the C4 section of the family returned to Sawknah ostensibly in search of a job. He was entertained by the E7 and E10 sections of the family in Sawknah. When I asked a son of E7 about the relative he spoke proudly, saying that he was from the family section resident in Tunisia, spoke French, and had spent some years working in France. I asked the son

if the C4 descendant had come back to reclaim his property, to which he replied that he had none. He explained to me that when the C4 line moved away, there was no one to care for their property. Their palms and gardens had gone to ruin. Other persons in the oasis community said that this was not true; rather, there was a part of the estate that had never been divided previously, and when a second share of the estate had been divided, the old and barren date palms were "written off" as the inheritance of the emigrant sections. The resident heirs had kept the gardens and date palms for themselves. Thus, 1,700 productive palm trees and three large gardens in Sawknah have been retained by the resident members of the D2 section of the kin group. In both the E7 and E10 lines, there has been enough property retained to place each of the extended family heads among the wealthiest in the oasis. In this context, it is significant that the Sa'adi carry the family name and members use it in much the same way as a surname is used in the West.

D1, an old man, and the only resident member of the A1 section of the Sa'adi remaining in the village, is poorer than the others. His status in the community is a function of his Koranic scholarship, and he is not considered either a member of the landowning status group or a full member of the Sa'adi family. Neither he nor his sons use the family name of Sa'adi, but are known by the name of D1's father Salheen. I was unable to discover the reasons for D1's poverty, nor was I able to fix him to an exact status category. His religious knowledge gives him prestige in the village, his marginal membership in the Sa'adi makes his position more ambiguous, and, finally, the remittance payments from his sons affords him the opportunity to live in the style of a landowner even though he has few agricultural resources. The man represents one of the many cases in which individuals hold ambiguous positions in the community, I suspect partly because of the

insurgence of wealth made possible by the oil income in Libya. I shall deal with this problem more fully in later chapters.

Thus, wealth and status group membership are closely related, and to a considerable degree stratification works against the principles of agnatic corporation. Those families in which great differences in wealth occur between the members tend to lose their identity. More important, however, emigration of members of wealthy families has made it possible for landowning families to maintain large undivided estates. Although my data is not complete, I suspect that, as in the case of 'Ailet-Sa'adi, most descent groups of landowning status have more members living outside the oasis than inside, and that this was true of Sawknah even before the modern era of economic development.

Thus far, I have been using the status groups as reference categories for my arguments. I have not dealt with any of the specific sociological principles which serve to differentiate them one from the other or with those principles of organization which give groups within these categories internal cohesion. In fact, much of my prior argument in this chapter has specifically ruled out a group recruitment principle common in the middle east, namely, agnatic descent.

Marriage is perhaps the most important principle articulating group cohesion for sedentary villages. Marriage patterns indicate a tendency toward status group endogamy, while at the level of the household, specific affinal linkages tie the individual into a closely-knit network of affinal alliances with members of his own status group. Marriage is one important tie that reflects both the internal cohesion of groups and defines boundaries between groups in a society where no single overall principle, such as agnation, is present.

The latent functions of the marriage pattern are similar to those reported by Peters for a Lebanese village.⁵ In that article, he demonstrated that one latent function of endogamous marriage pattern in the village power group was to ensure that the property that women inherited would not be alienated from the group. In Sawknah, where Sunni law rather than Shiite law prevails, the dangers to the estate are not as great but are nonetheless present. One problem with treating the question of the marriage pattern in Sawknah as a manifest indicator of the group's intent is that the boundaries between status categories are difficult to define in any absolute sense. The power group in Sawknah, unlike the group analyzed by Peters in Lebanon, does not have an overriding genealogical charter to define membership, nor are the landowners of Shorifa⁶ of saintly status which would allow them to claim a ranked difference between themselves and other village residents. In Sawknah, it was control of property and enough wealth to maintain the life style of a landowner which conferred membership of that status on the individual. For that reason, status differences between some small farmers and some landowners were not clearly defined. Status was more easily adjusted to the fluctuations in individual wealth and personal qualities. These adjustments are expressed in part through marriages which occur between members of different social categories.

✓ I shall analyze marriage from two perspectives, first to demonstrate that the marriage pattern is closely associated with levels of wealth, and second to analyze the ways in which affinal alliances within the dominant landowning group have been adjusted to effectively control areas of economic and political change within the Sawknah community.

⁵ E. L. Peters, "Some Aspects Of Rank In A Lebanese Village" In *Pitt-Rivers, J. Ed. The Mediterranean Countryman*, pp. 159-203.

⁶ A Sharif (Shorifa Pl) is a person who is accepted as being a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.

T A B L E I.

Extant Marriages of Sawaknah and Peasant Householders

	[*]	<u>Landowners</u>	<u>Small Farmers</u>	<u>Peasants</u>	<u>Sedentary Riah</u>	<u>Nomads</u>	<u>Outsiders</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ownersn	36 (33)	22 (18)	5 (0)	0 (0)	6 (3)	1 (0)	2 (13)	36 (34) + 1 Polygamous
Farmersn	32 (10)	3 (2)	19 (3)	2 (2)	6 (1)	2 (0)	0 (2)	32 (10)
Peasantsn	34 (14)	0 (0)	2 (1)	22 (11)	3 (0)	1 (1)	7 (1)	35 (14) + 1 Polygamous

*Migrants are shown in parenthesis)

Table I includes all extant marriages (males only) of the sedentary residents of Sawknah oasis. I have included in brackets migrants who have left the oasis since 1950 for reasons which will become self-evident further on in this chapter. The categories of marriage choices as I have delineated them need some clarification. The category of Sedentary Riah includes persons who have severed their agnatic affiliation with their nomadic kinsmen and have taken on the way of life of specific village status groups, adopting agriculture and commerce as their occupations. I distinguish them from categories of Riah who have effectively maintained their membership in tribal groups and indicate that distinction by counting marriages involving nomadic Riah separately. In a few cases (two, to be exact), sedentary Riah are pivotal as linkages between the landowning power group and the leadership of the Riah tribe. The rest of the members of this category are indistinguishable in occupation, life style, and social and political affiliation from the particular status group to which they belong.

I recorded a universe of 161 extant marriages for the three status groups of Sawknah residents, including emigrant householders who have left the oasis since 1950. The tendencies toward status group endogamy is, I think, clear from the figures.

Forty of sixty-nine married males of the landowning group are married to women of that status group. When other factors are taken into account, the pattern is even stronger. An additional eight marriages which were contracted with sedentary Riah are functionally equivalent to marriages within the landowning status group. The families involved are socially members of the landowning group. A second category of marriage outside the oasis population accounts for fifteen exogamous marriages among landowners. Eleven of thirteen unions in this category were contracted between men who emigrated as bachelors, and only two were contracted prior to emigration from Sawknah. My information on the status of these emi-

grants at the time of marriage is not sufficient to allow me to explain their choices. The trend toward status group endogamy among male landowners is clear, however. If one includes the category of sedentary Riah in the figures, forty-eight of seventy-married males of the landowning class married from within their status group. A similar situation of status group endogamy prevails among small farmers, where, including migrant householders and sedentary Riah in the category, twenty-nine of forty-two men married from their own status group. With the exception of two emigrants, small farmers did not contract marriages outside the village.

Peasant marriage patterns differ somewhat from those of the other two status groups in that they marry outside the community more frequently. Patterns of mobility among peasants were not the same as for the other groups, and the difference is reflected in the marriage figures. Traditionally, peasants have moved about between the ^eoasis of Al Jufrah a good deal more than members of the other two groups. Some readily change village residence when interests dictated. It is perhaps significant that the only marriages contracted between residents of Sawknah and residents of Hun occurred between members of peasant groups. The political rivalry between the two villages does not directly involve~~d~~ the peasants, since they have little power. Group endogamy of peasants resident in the village is as marked as that of the other two status groups, with thirty-three of forty-eight peasants married within their own status group.

In Table II, I show the marriage pattern for the women of the three status groups. I have not included the marriages of women from emigrant families because my figures on women from this category are unreliable. The same tendency of status-group endogamy marks the marriage pattern of women. Only two women of the landowning group have married outside the

T A B L E II.

Extant Marriages of Sawaknah and Peasant Women

	<u>Landowners</u>	<u>Small Farmers</u>	<u>Peasants</u>	<u>Sedentary Riah</u>	<u>Nomads</u>	<u>Migrants</u>	<u>Outsiders</u>
Owners n53	22	3	0	3	1	20	2
Farmers n38	5	19	2	6	2	4	0
Peasants n43	0	2	22	0	0	13	6

oasis community, while the pattern of outmarriage among the peasant women is similar to that demonstrated for peasant males.

Both tables indicate the absence of marriages between landowners and peasants, but a few marriages have occurred between both small farmers and landowners and small farmers and peasants. Three marriages of landowner women with men of the small farmer status group were contracted in the early 1960's, and represent a departure from tradition. Two young men of the same small farmer family married women from landowning families. Both young men have managed to change their individual status in that they no longer farm and have skilled occupations. One is a school teacher in the village and his brother is a clerk in an office in Tripoli.

Four of the women who married outside the landowning group were married to men categorized as Riah tribesmen. Three of these were to sedentary Riah landowners referred to earlier. The fourth marriage was contracted with a Riah tribal leader, which was a departure from tradition and, I think, is also a response to the changing economic and political conditions in Sawknah oasis, where, as will be seen, alliances between Riah and Sawknah are critical to maintaining the village as a viable political unit.

Thus, both men and women marry within their own status group with greater regularity than they marry either outside the village or with groups of different status within the village. Peasants and landowners do not intermarry. Small farmers marry into both groups, but as indicated in Chapter II, the individual variation in wealth between small farmers is considerable. Some men own greater amounts of agricultural property than some established landowners, while other men are impoverished. This in itself places many small farmers in an ambiguous position.

X A second explanation for the marriage of small farmers into both lower and higher status groups is that such cross-category marriages are a response to social change. Although it is too soon to specify a pattern, there is every indication that status re-evaluation will continue at an accelerated rate as men work for wages and many of the young men of all classes in Sawknah acquire the education and skills necessary to obtain high prestige posts. I discuss these aspects of social change in Chapters VII and VIII.

Finally, one critical aspect of the marriage pattern as it affects the position of the Sawknah landowners should be noted. Twenty women of landowning families resident in the village are, in fact, married to men who work and reside in Tripoli or Benghazi. Eighteen of these women are married to men of the landowning group, and two to men of small farmer origins. It is these linkages that articulate a series of crucial "affinial alliances" which serve many functions from the perspective of the villagers in the present situation of rapid political and economic change. Before beginning the analysis of economic and political change in Sawknah oasis, I shall sum up the arguments thus far presented in this chapter.

In Sawknah, the traditional stratification system was based upon differential control and exploitation of agricultural resources. Occupation, wealth and status-group membership were correlated. Peasants worked the lands of others for a percentage of the crop which they grew. Small farmers worked their own lands in family groups, while some from their numbers were artisans, too. Landowners lived from the labour of peasants who worked their gardens and from the profits gained through sale of agricultural surplus, particularly dates, to merchants from the coastal region.

Two important social mechanisms which insured continued control of the majority of village agricultural resources in the hands of a few

landowning families were endogamous marriage and emigration. Endogamous marriage restricted the outflow of property from landowning families to the other two village status groups. Emigration of landowners diminished the possibility that large holdings would be fragmented through the division of an estate among legal heirs.

I have been dealing with a limited number of variables in my argument thus far. My concern has been to analyze the major structural principles which account for stratification in Sawknah oasis. The facts of social change have been deliberately excluded from my analysis. In so doing I have followed the necessary steps of first describing the structure in static terms and now, in Bailey's words, I shall attempt to "describe the structure in action",^{*} by analyzing the impact of social change. Three areas will be analyzed in the following pages: 1) The present day organization of agriculture. 2) Wage labour as it affects the village status structure. 3) The position of landowners, both recent emigrants and villagers, in the expanded field of government bureaucracy. The latter area of inquiry is much more complex than the first two areas.

In Chapter III, I traced the development of government bureaucracy in Al Jufrah in some detail. I made the point that the expansion of bureaucracy was characterized by a great increase in wage paying jobs and posts for local residents. Posts are awarded to some persons with the obvious technical skills, but most are awarded for political reasons.

It is in the competition for those positions which allow individuals and groups to allocate government employment (i.e. patronage) that the greatest amount of political manipulation takes place at the local level. At all points administration and bureaucracy are subject to the pressure

*Bailey, F. Tribe Caste and Nation, p. 197.

of local political groups and therefore it is difficult to separate administration from politics. Why this should be so is the major concern of the remainder of this chapter. I shall take particular care to analyze the position of Sawknah landowners for it is in this field that traditional relationships have been organized to meet the changing economic and political situation.

The 1961 agricultural census recorded 105 arable hectares of land in Sawknah divided into 90 separate gardens. In the same year, however, there were only five hectares of land under cultivation and that was distributed among thirty gardens which were being partially worked, providing little more than vegetables for the table of the owner and those persons who worked them.

Census data which I collected in 1966 indicated that twenty hectares of land were under cultivation. While there was no increase in vegetable crop cultivation, fifteen hectares of land had been committed to the cultivation of alfalfa. This crop was used as fodder, and the increase in production indicates a change in garden uses. Many pastoralists who had become sedentary saw the advantage of keeping livestock in the gardens and had negotiated leases with owners. In many cases, landowners had given the gardens rent-free simply to insure that palm trees planted within the irrigation grids were watered. There were thirty-two gardens being partially cultivated in 1966. Only ten peasants and eight small farmers counted agriculture as their major occupation. In only one case was the agriculturist middle aged. All of the rest of the men who worked in agriculture were in their late fifties or over, and most had sons who were working for wages. Seventeen gardens were being worked by groups of four or five poor men on a part-time basis to provide vegetables for household consumption and/or fodder for their animals. Locally grown vegetables

were usually absent in the shops as most agriculturalists produced little surplus. Many villagers bought their fresh produce from the market in Hun or from itinerant traders who brought produce in trucks from the coastal regions.

The failure of the agricultural system in Sawknah was caused by the growth of spending by the national government, a policy which contributed to heavy emigration from the village to the cities in the 1950's and widespread wage employment at the local level in the 1960's.

The diminished importance of the oasis agricultural system to the economic life of Sawknah could possibly have undermined the dominance of Sawknah landowning families within the village, but in fact this is not the case. There has been a transfer of regime to the governmental employment structure.

The government bureaucracy has become the mechanism through which landowners have perpetuated their position of dominance in the village. In Table III, I list the number and type of government posts held by the members of various status groups in the village. The figures indicate that the landowners control the majority of government posts and occupy the most influential positions in the bureaucracy.

For purposes of clarity, I make an additional distinction in the table between householders and single males of working age. Twenty-eight of thirty-six householders and all eight employable single males in the landowning group have government positions. Small farmers are not as well represented in the employment structure. Thirteen of thirty-two householders and three of nine single males in this group have government positions. Peasant representation falls somewhere between the two other groups with over half of the employable males - eighteen of thirty-four householders and eleven of twenty-one single males - working for the government.

T A B L E III.

Government Posts and Jobs Held By Sedentary Residents
Sawknah Oasis

Where employed:	Job Held	<u>Land Owners</u>		<u>Small Farmers</u>		<u>Peasants</u>		<u>Total</u>
		Within Village	Outside Village	Within Village	Outside Village	Within Village	Outside Village	
Gov. Admin.	H*	6	1	0	0	0	0	
	S	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Ed. Official	H	1	0	0	0	0	0	
	S	2	0	0	0	0	0	3
Teacher	H	2	0	2	0	0	0	
	S	1	2	0	0	0	0	7
Clerk	H	2	0	2	0	0	0	
	S	0	3	0	2	0	6	15
Relig. Off.	H	3	0	2	0	1	0	
	S	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Police	H	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	S	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Mechanic	H	2	0	0	0	0	0	
	S	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Driver	H	0	0	2	0	0	0	
	S	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Off. Servant	H	7	0	3	0	4	0	
	S	0	0	1	0	1	2	18
Unskilled	H	2	0	2	0	13	0	
	S	0	0	0	0	1	0	18
Pension	H	2	0	0	0	0	0	
	S	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Total By Class		30	6	14	2	20	9	81
		36		16		29		

Total jobs in oasis: 174
 Total sedentary community: 81
 Total Riah: 93

Landowner householders N = 36
 Single males working N = 8
 Single males in school N = 6
 14
 Small farmer householders N = 32
 Single males working N = 9
 Single males in school N = 9
 18
 Peasant householders N = 34
 Single males working N = 21
 Single males in school N = 4
 25

*H = Householder
 S = Single male

While all three status groups in the village have members working for the government, clearly the landowners have a proportionally larger number employed and, as a group, they hold the better positions.

The first two categories of employment, government administrator and education official, are controlled by the landowners. Three of the administrative posts are the traditional positions of village headman (mudir) and two assistants (shaikhs) who are responsible for administering to sections of the village. Four other administrative posts are newly-created positions which have resulted from government expansion in the Al Jufrah area. Two of the three posts in education also fall into this latter category. Posts which suggest a measure of authority are held by the landowners.

The category of religious official, the only other category with suggestions of general authority, is a bit of an anomaly. All three status groups have religious officials who are paid by the government, but there is a great difference between them. Religious knowledge is an ambiguous phenomenon in the middle east. A man can inherit religious knowledge or saintly status; he can claim this position through individual scholarship; or he can be said to have religious knowledge through being thought to possess "baraka," or goodness. In the case of the category of the religious official, all three factors apply. The peasants' religious official is said to be descended from a man who possessed saintly qualities, and he has been given a stipend by the government as custodian of a small mosque in Sawknah. Two of the small farmers are similarly remunerated, both are accepted as Koranic scholars. In evaluating the position of the three landowners who fall into the same category, we must make a distinction between the possession of religious knowledge and the position held in the bureaucracy administering religious institutions. The positions of the

three landowners are as follows: one is the Imam of the major mosque in Sawknah, a second is the head of the Sanussi Lodge in Sawknah, and the third is Director of Religious Affairs in Al Jufrah. The important positions in the religious bureaucracy are thus held by landowners.

Two other categories of employment which should be elucidated are the positions of office servant and unskilled labourers. There is a major distinction to be drawn here. "Office servant" covers a wide range of posts, but generally applies to positions in which the incumbent has light office or custodial tasks. The job is easy and preferable to unskilled labour. It is significant here that landowners hold seven of the sixteen custodial positions available, while the peasants hold by far the greater number of labouring jobs. The position of members of the three status groups within the government wage structure broadly reflects the prior distinctions between the groups based on land tenure. Landowners control the bureaucracy, and the other two groups are employed in positions which carry little authority.

The figures presented in Table II suggest that the government employment structure reflects the traditional stratification pattern in Sawknah oasis. There is, however, another dimension to government patronage. The Sawknah not only control some areas of village administration, but also many have positions in bureaucracy outside the village structure.

There is a major distinction to be drawn between posts in village administration such as: Headman, Imam, Shaikh, etc., and positions outside the village held in regional administration and agencies of the government such as: public works, agricultural extension utilities, etc. In the former category, positions traditionally have been open to village residents only. It is for posts in the latter category in which there is no tradition of local level participation that intense competition takes place on an

inter-village level. Persons in these administrative positions are important to local political groups for they are able to make patronage jobs available to villagers sometimes as many as forty or fifty temporary labouring positions at one time. One way in which landowners maintain their position in the community is through controlling such blocks of patronage. In turn, the local power group allocates jobs to individual villagers. Without these strengths in the wider system, it would be impossible for Sawknah landowners to maintain their dominance in village affairs.


The actual mechanisms by which landowners perpetuate their political power cannot be adequately analyzed without introducing facts concerning emigrants. Rather than add another table, let me simply state that twenty-four of the thirty-three emigrant householders of the landowning families have government positions. Further, more than five individuals in this category have relatively important positions in government ministries. One individual is the Secretary to the Minister of Religious Affairs in Libya and another was Minister of Education in Fezzan during the federal era. Since positions at this level in bureaucracy are in part political appointments, these individuals take great interest in Al Jufrah affairs and consciously participate in the political dealings of villagers at the local level. This is one reason why affinal alliances among landowners have continued to be important in the changing situation. Men in the village will petition their affines in urban areas for jobs for their sons, themselves or friends. Some of these men are in business partnership with affines resident in the urban areas. Wealthy villagers invest in building, commerce, and transportation enterprises organized by emigrants. Perhaps the most important aspect of affinity as it effects the continued dominance of the landowners in village affairs is the fact that some of these urban dwellers are able to protect the political interests of the village power group from the Riah tribesmen leaders at one level, and, at another level, from the encroachment of rival political groups in the neighbouring villages.

Affinal alliances, originally the product of a marriage pattern which had the latent function of protecting landowners' interests in agriculture have become crucial politically as they now link political groups which have a base in both the rural and urban areas. I now follow out some of these arguments through case material.

In Diagram III, I depict one section of an affinal alliance which connects members of some of Sawknah's landowning families. Each of the five families depicted could be represented as part of a larger agnatic group but at the level of action, I do not feel that such a representation would depict reality. A1, for instance, is the wealthy family of the El Uhdat descent group analyzed earlier in this chapter. Not all the members of the alliance are resident in Sawknah and those who live outside have moved away since 1950. B2 of Family 2 lives in Tripoli and little contact between him and B3 is maintained. Although each brother has children of the appropriate age and gender, there is no interest on the part of B3 in allowing B2's son to marry one of his daughters. B4 of family 3 resides in Sawknah while his brother, B5, lives in Tripoli. The males of Family 4 do not reside in Sawknah. C11 and C12 of Family 5 live in Sawknah, although C12's occupation requires that he spend a good deal of time in Sebha. C8 lives and works in Sebha. Although males in Family 4 live in Tripoli, two women of the group live in Sawknah and a third lives in Sebha.

Members of this alliance control a great deal of wealth in the village and have political influence in the wider field of regional politics. In addition, they act as brokers in the allocation of government patronage posts to certain sections of the community. Finally, they are members of a wider more powerful group of village notables drawn from the landowning families.

DIAGRAM III
AFFINAL ALLIANCE



The members of Family 4 own over 3,000 palm trees in Sawknah and one large garden belonging to them is still being worked. The male members of Family 5 have some claim to that estate through their wives' inheritance. D2 and D3 have received their inheritance, but control of their property by their husbands is not secure. In fact, there is a public joke among villagers that C11, a weak man, has to weigh the dates from his wife's tree in her presence at harvest time and purchase them from her before he can even so much as eat one of them. Members of other groups in the alliance have large agricultural holdings in their own right, but their holdings do not approach in size those held by Family 4.

C12 acts as the steward of C5's estate; he oversees the various tasks which have to be carried out during the year. Although this position might have been of great importance in the past, it is only marginally important today. Rather, the responsibilities that he undertakes for C5's agricultural property can best be understood in relation to other political and economic links between them which are of greater importance. This latter area has specifically to do with the control of areas of the government patronage system which are used to enhance the position of these men politically.

C5 is an influential member of the Fezzan's ruling faction under Saif Al Nasir Family. Under the federal system of government in Libya, Fezzan was a semi-autonomous state. C5 was Minister of Education for a time in Fezzan. He used his influence to acquire positions for Sawknah residents. In return, he had a say in how the village would vote at election time.

C5 aided C12 in acquiring a post with the Antiquities Department in Fezzan. In 1965, C12 was appointed head of construction for the Antiquities Department. C8, a young man, was also aided in a similar manner and in 1965 was head administrator in the Fezzan offices of the Antiquities Department. C5 and C6 were also instrumental in appointing another man, not

in the group, as head of an excavation gang working to uncover ruins in Southern Fezzan. For a time in the early 1960's, many labourers from Sawknah worked on these projects.

B4 and B5 are the only persons resident in Sawknah who are accepted as being of "Shorifa" origins; that is, descendants of the prophet Muhammad. B5 is director of religious affairs in Al Jufrah and his brother, B4, is director of religious affairs for Fezzan Province. It is their membership in the Sawknah landowning group rather than their rank as descendants of the prophet which account for their government appointments. A number of people living in a neighbouring oasis claim Shorifa rank, too. An ally of C5, Muhammed Bin Rejeb, a wealthy property owner in Sawknah and affine of the Sa'adi, is currently secretary to the Minister of Religious Affairs in Libya. Informants said that he was responsible for the appointment of B4 and B5 to their posts.

B3 is a ^Counsel in Al Jufrah, i.e. a position instituted by the Turks and retained by King Idris. Holders of this office are supposed to collect seditious information and report it to the government. It is largely an honorary title, but the government does pay a stipend. B3 is important to members of the alliance because one of his daughters (C2) is married to the captain of Saif al Nasir's bodyguard thus linking that person to two other members of the alliance.

With half of the landowners living outside the oasis and with most of them employed in government ministries, some in important positions, it would be possible to annotate the connections for nearly every landowning householder in this fashion. Here I have attempted to demonstrate the connections that exist between some members of the landowning group. It can be seen that the relationships are kept active over great geographical distance, that there is a pattern to the allocation of government positions,

and that this pattern gives some villagers greater influence than others in government administration. More important, I have described some structural relationships that continue to ^{link} ~~like~~ villagers in a new social field.⁷ These relationships serve to give continuity to the village as a political community even though the character of the social field is, in Barnes' terms, in a "fluid state". It is the ability of landowners to structure relationships in the wider system that allows them to maintain their control of part of the government patronage system against neighbouring villages at one level, and against encroachment on the part of Riah tribal leaders. Their ability to influence the allocation of patronage is the means by which landowners maintain dominance in the village. The following case demonstrates that local political groups must have influence at various levels in the political and administrative systems if they expect to continue to control patronage at the local level. Some of the participants in the case are members of the affinal alliance described above.

In May of 1965, construction of a new rest house was begun in Hun. The responsibility for construction of the building came under the Department of Antiquities and an official of that Department, Muhammad Fadiel (C12), a Sawknah landowner, was appointed in charge of construction. Fadiel hired a crew composed entirely of day labourers from Sawknah and contracted the services of a Sawknah truck owner, 'Abd-al Salam to haul construction materials.

Construction began in Hun with the crew made up completely of Sawknah residents. Townspeople from Hun objected, grumbling that since the rest house was to be constructed in their own town, officials in Hun should direct the project. Besides, they confided, Muhammad Fadiel was not knowledgeable enough to direct the project. Telegrams citing these arguments were sent to the Department of Antiquities and to emigrant from Hun in

⁷Barnes, J.A. "Class and Communities in a Norwegian Island Parish." Human Relations vii, pp. 39-58.

government administration, among them Bu Bakr Helu, once headman of Hun, and, in 1965, Director of Public Road Works for Tripolitania and Fezzan provinces. At first the petitions went unheeded for Muhammad Fadiel had good connections at high levels in the government bureaucracy. His wife's uncle (C5) an emigrant Sawknah, had once been Minister of Education in Fezzan and was still a prominent member of the Saif Al Nasir faction in Fezzan. Muhammad Fadiel confided to me that his wife's uncle and other prominent Sawknah, among them Muhammad Bin Rejeb, secretary to the Minister of Religion, would look after the interest of Sawknah when it came to competitions with other communities in Al Jufrah. Important men in Hun had similar linkages with highly placed government officials. They continued their campaign against Muhammad Fadiel's appointment as construction boss.

Each morning after the project was under way, thirty to forty labourers from Sawknah traveled to Hun in 'Abd al Salam's truck to labour on the rest house. Three weeks after construction was begun, it became public knowledge that Muhammad Fadiel had incorrectly built one of the walls of the building. Using this information, notables in Hun renewed their campaign against him. This time they were successful; Muhammad Fadiel was sacked as construction boss and replaced by a builder from Hun.

At the building site, the new chief of construction informed 'Abd al Salam that his services would no longer be needed, but told all labourers from Sawknah that they could continue at their present positions. A friend of the new foreman confided to me that people in Hun were concerned only to have the building constructed soundly in the new building style approved by the government, a style not understood by Muhammad Fadiel and the "uneducated" people of Sawknah. It was apparent, however, that there were financial and political motives involved. A truck owner from Hun, a relative of the new foreman, was employed to haul building materials.

In Sawknah that evening the events were discussed at length by Muhammad Fadiel and some of the notables. It was decided that no one from Sawknah would continue to work on the construction gang. This was discussed with most of the labourers later that evening and all agreed to the boycott. The next morning, only one person from Sawknah - a swasheen man - affine to one of the local peasant families who had moved to the village four years earlier reported to work. That evening he was publicly scolded by other labourers and did not return to work the following day.

In one day, the whole crew working on the rest house was replaced. Only one person who had worked under Muhammad Fadiel returned to work after he was sacked. This was accomplished even though the alternative open to many workers was a period of unemployment or the insecurity of seeking day to day employment.

The case illustrates one aspect of the intense inter-village rivalries for control of patronage allocations within the framework of government bureaucracy. The actual position of members of village power groups within the government bureaucracy to some degree **regulates** each group's ability to allocate patronage positions. Muhammad Fadiel's position as an official in the Department of Antiquities gave him the credentials to supervise construction. But there is much more to it than that; government projects, whether administered properly or by the appropriate official, are subject to political attack from competing village power groups. The control of projects such as the one discussed in this case depend upon the influence which village groups can marshall at higher levels in the system. Frequently, these linkages are to highly-placed emigrant villagers who, although absent from the village, are nevertheless members of village-based power groups. Reasons for the intense political rivalry between these groups have both a political and an economic aspect.

First of all, much government construction results in lucrative side-benefits even at the local level. Muhammad Fadiel hired a Sawknah truck owner to haul construction materials. I do not know whether Fadiel received a "kick-back" from his arrangement with 'Abd al Salam, but it is my impression that in Libya these payments are the rule rather than the exception. Many entrepreneurs earn a great deal of money from government contracts. It is the political connections of village political groups that determined which entrepreneurs are to be chosen to work on projects.

A second category of persons who benefit directly from temporary employment are those people whose major occupation is outside of the government employment structure. Village artisans and building labourers, as well as many pastoralists who seek part-time wage employment fall into this category. Without political links to men outside the area, local power groups would not be able to obtain employment for village labourers and they would look to other political groups outside of the village for patronage. Thus, by providing part-time employment to Sawknah residents, the village power group is able to continue to dominate the village politically.

The political unity of the village was amply expressed by the actions of both leaders and workers in the period after Fadiel was sacked. The workers showed their solidarity by following the decision of the local power group that no one could continue to work on the construction project in Hun. To my knowledge, there were no sanctions imposed by Sawknah leaders in the situation. Interestingly enough, the one man who returned to work after Fadiel's ~~sacking~~ sacking was sanctioned not by the power group but by the workers, who viewed his actions as an act of betrayal. This example clearly indicates that the village has maintained its political integration in the changing situation and the landowners are clearly accepted as village leaders.

Landowners can sanction the behavior of villagers who break rank individually. If a man changes village political affiliation, it is unlikely that he will be able to obtain a government patronage position. Village power groups are interested in extending their influence into other villages at the expense of rival groups. They usually will award employment to individuals when the political return results in a block of villagers realigning their political loyalties. It is not very often that a man receives a patronage post when the gain for the group awarding the post is simply one more ally. Thus, a man who does not comply with requests made by Sawaknah leaders is likely to experience difficulty in finding a job.

An attempt at using patronage jobs as a means of extending the village's political clients can be seen in the above case. Muhammad Fadiel used the construction job as a means of employing persons from his own village. In that regard, he had little alternative, since Sawaknah leaders would surely have sanctioned him had he attempted to employ persons from other villages. Persons in Hun seized on what they regarded as Fadiel's nepotism, but had Fadiel extended work to villagers from Hun or Waddan, it is unlikely that it would have been accepted. This principle was demonstrated by the actions of Hun's power group once they had control of the project. They offered employment of Sawaknah residents who, however, refused to continue to work on the project even though many were not sure where they might next find wage employment. While one principle of political continuity is to have access to government patronage allocation, a second, equally important principle is to keep other political groups from successfully winning supporters by offering patronage to them. Village power groups are positioned in the political structure between villagers who depend upon patronage jobs and those individuals and groups who make patronage available. The power group maintains control of the village system by allocating patronage in

such a way as not to alienate supporters. It is important to the continuity of the village power group that no other political groups intersect the linkage between themselves and supporters. Political groups attempt to expand their influence beyond their own village by offering jobs to groups of people from other villages in return for political support. Sawaknah has continued as a viable political unit because attempts to break village unity have not been successful. The village power group has been successful in maintaining their position in Sawaknah because they are supported at the higher levels by regional political groups.

The effects of government patronage on village political continuity and change are adequately documented when villagers discuss the recent history of neighbouring Al Jufrah oases. Al Fogha, for instance, has received very little government patronage and what has come their way has come from other villages in Al Jufrah. While Hun, Waddan, and Sawaknah vote in elections as unified blocks, individuals in Al Fogha sell their votes to the highest bidder or in return for promises of government posts. I observed a similar process of fragmentation during the 1965 national elections when various factions in the village of Zillah supported different candidates from one of the unified villages in return for promises of patronage. Politically corporate villages have fragmented, sections of them have become clients of other local level political groups in Al Jufrah, and their political leaders have lost their influence with former supporters. Instead of patronage being administered by local leaders, outsiders have taken over that function and award jobs directly to village residents.

One explanation of why some of the Al Jufrah villages remain corporate politically and others do not, is apparent in the case cited above. Both Hun and Sawaknah have influence with high-ranking administration officials and politicians who work at the national level. Both villages have emigrant community members whose own position at higher levels in the systems

are to some extent dependent on their ability to influence the course of political events at the local level.

A representative elected to national assembly from or with the backing of Sawknah would be an ally for the Saif al Nasir faction; one elected to parliament from Waddan or Hun would be an ally of one of several factions based in Tripolitania. Patronage given in Al Jufrah, although from the central government, is directed through different political factions who seek to control the administrative agencies of government. To elaborate this argument further to include an analysis of national groupings would take me beyond the scope of my data.

One final point from the case does illustrate these tensions. Muhammad Fadiel's dismissal was interpreted by both villagers in Sawknah and Hun as a blow to the Saif al Nasir faction who had controlled the Ministry of Antiquities in Fezzan. They saw the change in regime at the construction site as an indication that the Saif al Nasir no longer controlled patronage allocations made available through that agency.

V. THE CHANGING BASE OF PASTORAL ORGANIZATION

In this chapter, I analyze the impact of economic change on the organization of pastoralism. The generative factors responsible for radical changes in the economic field of activities in Sawknah were described in Chapter III. Casual labour, government jobs and posts, and entrepreneurial opportunities developed rapidly in the early 1960's. Given the scale of these developments, it is perhaps surprising that in 1966, 50 percent of the households in the Riah tribe were still involved directly in nomadic activities.

The factors explaining why some households become sedentary while others remain primarily in pastoralism are complex and range through many fields of relationships. Domestic organization, political organization, economic interests, and concepts of status are all factors to be taken into account. While economic self-interest may explain many continuities and changes in occupation and residence among Riah tribesmen, analysis of these factors cannot be divorced from their social context. Economic parameters have radically expanded in Sawknah oasis, but the option to exploit these new opportunities ^{is} are not open equally to all individuals and groups.

One cannot fully understand the process of sedentarization without analyzing the dynamics of nomadic organization. Pastoral activities dictate a specific organizational pattern. Herd owners must organize labour in such a way as to care for the needs of their flocks. Many young men who are economically dependent upon their fathers are not free to choose an occupation outside ~~of~~ pastoralism. Other young men, independent of parental controls, can take advantage of employment opportunities, and it is from this category that many of the recently settled folk are drawn. Thus, a major factor determining whether or not a man is free to exercise the option to settle

to some extent is dependent upon the developmental stage of the domestic group to which he belongs.

A second set of factors influencing sedentarization is embedded in a wider field of political and economic relationships. Some tribesmen have economic interests in the agricultural economy of Sawknah oasis. It has been long the practice of many men to return to Sawknah annually to oversee the harvest of their date palm plantations and collect produce from their garden lands. Most wealthy families maintain a house in the oasis where the head of the family often passes the summer months. The possibility of a man maintaining this semi-nomadic life style is as much dependent upon family structure as upon wealth.

A semi-nomad has to command a large labour force, sufficient in size to manage the herds while he is away. Since responsibility for maintaining the herds is the task of household members, residential mobility depends upon a man having enough mature sons to organize herding in his absence. Built into this life style are selective mechanisms that weight possibilities in favor of older men with mature children. The ability of a man to adopt a semi-nomadic style of life continues to be a way in which important men can demonstrate status differences between themselves and poorer or younger agnates. Traditionally, summer residence in Sawknah was also a means of acquiring membership in the oligarchy that managed tribal political life.

With the expansion of local-level government agencies and the articulation of the tribal system with the national political system, the position of these prominent tribesmen was enhanced. Many older tribesmen who were semi-nomadic were brought into government, some through elected office or administration, others as brokers in the newly developed government patronage system.

At this level of analysis a dichotomy between nomadic and sedentary tribesmen based upon fully ramified distinctions between social groups is not analytically meaningful. In 1966, it was not uncommon to find wealthy men organizing their households to participate in both sections of the local economy. In wealthy extended families some sons were able to take up what in tribesmen's eyes were prestigious positions as government drivers and mechanics, while other members continued living as nomads caring for the family stock. Frequently, family enterprises were still controlled by the Patriarch in the extended family, who managed the cash income and acted as overseer of the family estate. As in the past, many older men continued to divide their time between residence in the village and in the desert camps.

In 1965, many men were beginning to view pastoralism as more of an economic venture than a way of life. Those who were involved in both the wage economy and pastoralism were, on the whole, interested in the political and economic benefits of their enterprise as it affected their status within the tribal system. In general, the social status and political importance of men cross-cut the boundaries of residence in that tribesmen, whether pastoral or sedentary, were part of one social system.

Neither government agents nor politicians from outside the tribe allocate patronage positions directly to individual tribesmen. Influential tribesmen act as middle men, allocating jobs and posts to their supporters. Since it is the wealthy semi-nomads who occupy these brokerage positions, their status, influence, and political prominence within the tribal system are given continuity in the expanded fields of modern political and economic activity. Frequently, it is the sons of these men who acquire the well-paid posts or are registered as apprentices in government training schemes, though close agnates and other members of tribal political groups

usually benefit also. Traditional groupings remain the vehicle through which most political and economic activities are organized among the Riah. In the tribal sections the traditional hierarchy has been preserved as men important prior to economic development have gained control of patronage and allocated resources in a way that maintains their own powerful positions within these political groups.

The process of sedentarization has brought about changes in the organization of political and economic behavior. In order to understand these changes, we must begin with the analysis of pastoral life.

The household is the primary economic unit in the pastoral system. It is in consideration of the household's interests that most economic associations are contracted. The wealth in livestock and agricultural property associated with the household is owned by the senior male, while his wife and children form the labour pool which manages family economic life. The man and his sons are responsible for managing the herds, planning and executing the strategies in migration, marketing animals, and deploying male family members in other economic pursuits which benefit the household. Men are a highly mobile population involved in a variety of alliances throughout the year, frequently with different groups of people. Women, in turn, are responsible for most of the domestic tasks, are less mobile than men, and have a narrower range of associations.

Aside from tending the tent, preparing food, and gathering firewood, women also milk the goats and prepare the various dairy products. In addition, they also process the wool and weave tent tops, bags and some clothing, including the heavy cloaks which herdsmen wear in winter. Nearly all labour connected with the maintenance and general care of the household falls into the women's domain. In this sense their tasks vary little throughout the year and are centered in the household.

It is the ambition of every male to head a large household composed of members of his extended family. Through controlling the herds and therefore his sons' livelihood, even after their marriages, a man can achieve this ideal. Thus, the basic economic unit in the pastoral system can reach a size to include three generations of family members. The household head maintains control of his sons' and grandsons' labour and effectively organizes all economic undertakings of the extended family. A household with this structure has a good deal of independence and frequently is able to manage its economic interests without strain to the labour force. It can also undertake and coordinate a variety of economic activities which smaller households cannot.

While a fully extended family is an ideal strived for by all men, few in fact achieve it. One factor determining family organization is wealth. Wealthy men have the resources to support sons who work in the family enterprise. A major expenditure occurs at the marriage of young men when bride price must be paid and large amounts of money spent on the wedding festivities. In wealthy households, fathers agree to meet these expenses, while in poor households the financing of marriage and the capital for the nucleus of a herd must be found elsewhere. As a result, young men from poor households must often leave their parents to seek their fortune. In the past, they have contracted as herdsmen for wealthy men in order to accumulate the capital necessary for marriage and to form the nucleus of a herd. Today, however, a new set of options is open to these individuals. Men can now go to the villages of Al Jufrah to seek labouring posts, work for oil companies, or join the Army or police. Some of them may later return to nomadism, but most continue to reside in the village after marriage and work as labourers for the government. In a few cases, they have been able to acquire a skill useful to them in entrepreneurial ventures.

While sedentarization has had a strong impact on pastoral organization, the lack of detailed information concerning the latter prior to 1951 makes it difficult to discuss with precision the subtle changes that have occurred in this area. Two factors, however, have no doubt greatly affected the organization of pastoral groups, and both of these have to do with depopulation. Firstly, the settlement of many households has removed pressure from environmental resources and all but obscured those social mechanisms whereby kin groups formerly organized access to wells and pastures. I found that systematic inquiry into that problem produced little information on the specific mechanism at work.

A second, more important factor influencing the organization of herding has been the continual decline in available labour. Many of the householders who were quick to discontinue pastoralism and obtain wage labour were in fact poor men who in the past had acted as herdsmen for wealthy men. Young men, too, when free to choose between herding and wage labour chose the latter. Although some may seize upon what is known in sociology as the "bright lights theory" to explain this behavior, a more solid explanation can be found in pure economic self-interest.

When I was in the field I recorded several attempts on the part of herd owners to negotiate herding contracts with young men. Herd owners were prepared to pay a standard rate for a year of work: board, a new set of clothing worth twenty-five pounds, a young male camel worth twenty to forty pounds, and a cash payment of twenty to forty pounds, all totaling up to roughly one hundred pounds. Young men, however, were demanding between two hundred and two hundred-fifty pounds, which was equivalent to a year's wages as a labourer. Because of the labour shortage, many pastoralists were probably forced to rely to a greater degree on members of their own extended family or on alliances with other pastoralists to manage their herds than was true in the past.

Another major change in pastoral organization has come from the expansion of the economic possibilities open to pastoralists. In the realm of husbandry itself, a man is able to make a great deal of money from the sale of the surplus stock which he raises. Men are increasingly becoming conscious of the market situation and are rearing stock for sale. Although profits were not readily discussed, I was able to gain information on sales made by a number of pastoralists. One nomad whom I knew well earned nearly 1,000 pounds from the sale of animals in 1964.

Labouring jobs, both semi-permanent and seasonal, were open to pastoralists, as were markets for certain products, among them charcoal. Thus, every pastoralist family that I studied was organizing herding activities with an eye to making profits from the expanded village economy. In the spring of 1964, I began to study the organization of several pastoral households in detail. During that year, the various households entered into a number of different alliances. Each household joined with others to form a camp (nega) after the rains in the late fall, the purpose of which was to organize herding and migration activities. Early in the winter most of them formed a second alliance, usually with persons outside the camp, to grow grain. Finally, in the summer when people had moved back to summer camps and herding activity had slackened, an annually renewed alliance was activated to harvest dates.

During the year most households regardless of the size of their labour force, had overextended themselves in their efforts to take advantage of the economic situation in Al Jufrah. But the range and type of association undertaken varied from household to household. In the remainder of this chapter, I intend to analyze two sets of factors: 1) The reasons households remain pastoralist and 2) the various ways in which households organize activities to maximize the economic opportunities open to them. I

begin the analysis with the description of the household organization of two camps which I had occasion to study in depth.

In the winter of 1964, Muftah (D14 I), Faturi (D8 I), 'Abdal 'Aziz (D2 I) and Bu Ras (D7 I) were cooperating in herd management.¹ This particular group of householders had not cooperated before, although the brothers Bu Ras and Faturi in prior years had been herdsman in their father's camp. The previous summer their father became sickly and retired to the village allowing his sons to claim their inheritances. Now they were independent householders able to camp with whom they pleased. Faturi and his younger unmarried brother Bashier still maintained a joint herd, but Bu Ras had claimed his share of property.

Bu Ras remained a member of Muftah's camp until late spring of that year and then withdrew. The other three households continued to arrange herding activities together through my stay in the field. On several occasions other domestic groups attached themselves to the camp in the spring, but this peripheral element changed from time to time and did nothing to alter the structure of relationships which remained between the three "core" households of the camp.

The camp members were wealthy; the figures on herd ownership are as follows:

	<u>Camels</u>	<u>Goats and Sheep</u>
Muftah	75	120
'Abd al 'Aziz	18	32
Faturi-Bashier	60	85
Bu Ras	22	19
TOTAL	175	256


The combined herds of the households presented some difficult management problems, but associated with the camp was a large labour force. Muftah, the oldest of the three men, had four mature sons. Two of the sons

1

See Appendix I.

DIAGRAM I

THE COMPOSITION OF MUFTAH'S PASTORAL CAMP



= SINGLE TENT

were living in Sawknah in 'Abdalla bin Salih's (D2⁴ I) household while they attended school. In return, 'Abdalla's oldest son Salih lived with Muftah and cared for 'Abdalla's camel herd (85 head). Muftah's oldest son Yusif, a married man with two young children, cared for his father's goat herds; 'Abd al Qadir, Muftah's second oldest son managed the camels.

Faturi had no live children - three had died in infancy. His brother Bashier managed the camels while he was responsible for the goat herds. 'Abd al 'Aziz and Bu Ras had one son each, too young to make a contribution to herd management. Muftah therefore was the only adult male member of the camp who did not have to personally undertake herding responsibilities. Faturi and Bashier could have managed their herds without help while Bu Ras and 'Abd al 'Aziz lacked sufficient manpower to do so.

In fact, the households in the camp did not herd their own stock independently. A carefully worked out agreement between Muftah, 'Abd al 'Aziz and Faturi concluded that each man would withdraw labour from the camp at some point in the year, while the other two households covered for him. Bu Ras was a party to the agreement, but found the arrangement unworkable and withdrew in late spring.

In the winter of 1964, three months before the 'Aid Al Kabir, Faturi shifted his herding responsibilities to 'Abd al 'Aziz and Yusif (Muftah's² eldest son) who alternated in taking the animals to pasture.

Faturi spent the greater part of the next two months visiting distant camps and purchasing stock. A few days before the 'Aid al Kabir, he drove the animals to Al Jufrah, where he sold them individually in the market

²'Aid al Kabir (Great Feast) or 'Aid al Lahma (Feast of the Flesh) is one of the most important in the Muslim calendar. Custom dictates that on the feast day every household slaughter an animal.

place to persons buying animals for slaughter on the feast day. Faturi had managed to purchase sixty five animals, requiring a capital outlay on his part of over 500 pounds. He had amassed the capital for this venture through smaller dealings of the sort over the years. Profits from the sale that year were in excess of 200 pounds, and he used most of the money to reinvest in animals over the next year. Faturi thought of himself as a merchant specializing in the purchase and sale of animals. Most others accepted this definition of his occupation. As many people said, "Oh, Faturi, he is always buying and selling." Indeed, I never saw him pass over an opportunity to inspect someone else's herds or make an offer to purchase animals. Although he made major investments before feast days, he bought young animals throughout the year, kept them with his own herds, and sold them at a later date for a profit. To successfully manage his economic life he needed both the free time to travel about buying animals and a stable and reliable base for his herding activities. His arrangement with Muftah and 'Abd al 'Aziz met both of these requirements.

In the late spring, after the 'Aid al Kabir, Faturi took up his herding responsibilities while 'Abd al 'Aziz, Yusif, and Bu Ras went off to harvest grain planted in the early winter. Faturi and Muftah were the only married men to remain in camp, and during the four weeks of harvest, Faturi managed the goat herds. 'Abd al 'Aziz, Bu Ras and Faturi were members of the same grain-growing alliance, along with Salim of Camp II. Muftah was involved with a different group of people. The fact that three members of the same camp were also involved in a second alliance was the cause of some friction, and a dispute between Bu Ras and Faturi resulted in the former leaving the camp in late spring. Although he remained in camp, Muftah did not personally undertake herding duties. He had sufficient labourers in his household to free him from such tasks.

During the late spring and part of the summer the arrangement continued. Faturi and Yusif herded the animals and drew water for them. 'Abd al 'Aziz used his free time to his advantage, by making charcoal, which he sold in Al Jufrah in late summer at a profit of 25 pounds. Later he was able to find a job in the village for two weeks that earned him another 20 pounds. He used the money to purchase such luxury items as macaroni, tinned tomato paste, tea, and sugar, but also spent 25 pounds to purchase a young male camel which he hoped to keep for a year or two and then sell at a considerable profit. Thus, while Faturi and Muftah fulfilled their part of the herding agreement, 'Abd al 'Aziz was given the free time to pursue economic interests outside of herding. Like Faturi, 'Abd al 'Aziz used his time to accumulate capital which he invested in animals with an eye toward taking a profit in the future. But it must be emphasized here that the profits of his undertaking were not as great as those of the other two households.

Early fall saw a shift in the arrangement of herding responsibilities among the three households. Muftah, who had moved his family to his house in Sawknah in the late spring, now withdrew the labour of his eldest son, Yusif, from the camp. In addition to owning a substantial herd of animals, Muftah also owned over 100 palm trees which had to be harvested during the fall. A hired labourer in Sawknah had pollinated the trees in winter and was harvesting them, but Yusif's added labour was also essential to the task. After the date harvest, Yusif spent roughly one month working as a labourer for the agricultural department in Hun, a position arranged for him by 'Abdalla bin Salih (D24 I), his mother's brother.

In the winter of 1965, Muftah's household did not return to pastoralism. However, he honoured his agreement with Faturi and 'Abd al 'Aziz by sending his sons to the camp that winter to fulfill their part of the camp herding

arrangement. Muftah significantly kept his sons, wife, and children in the village with him.

The description of camp organization present above shows the extent to which such relationships are contractual among the Riah. The "nega" relationship is negotiated by independent householders to meet deficiencies in household manpower. Bu Ras and 'Abd al 'Aziz would find it difficult to manage herding along^e. While Muftah has the capacity to meet all the demands of his herds from within the family labour pool and still have a manpower reserve, Faturi and Bashier are not as fortunate. It would be difficult for them to migrate, draw water from the wells, and meet the other demands of camp life, while still giving proper attention to the task of herd management. More important, however, independence would virtually preclude Faturi from pursuing other economic interests in addition to managing his herds.

Most persons who herd together are kinsmen; but kinship does not explain a person's choice of herding partners. A major factor influencing the choice of herding partners is determined by economic interests the householders maintain outside of camp organization. For two members of the "nega", Faturi and Muftah, outside economic interests are critical determinants of their relationship. Faturi is certainly not a subsistence pastoralist. Nearly all of his major economic activities center on speculation in animals. One important aspect of his enterprise requires that he keep^s many of the animals that he buys, allow them to mature, and sell them when the market situation is best. This enterprise not only entails free time in spring to purchase young animals after they have been weaned, but also an arrangement with dependable herdsmen to manage his flocks in his absence. Clearly Muftah's camp fulfills the conditions of his enterprise. In this respect, it is perhaps significant that there are three

dependable married men who act as herdsmen: in many other camps goat herds are managed by adolescent boys.

'Abd al 'Aziz, although poorer than the other two men, finds it convenient to maintain relationships in the camp. To some extent he is dependent upon Faturi, in that the latter's younger brother, Bashier, herds his camels for him. 'Abd al 'Aziz is a first cousin to Faturi and Bashier, married to their sister. All three men cited their kin relationship as the main reason of their alliance. The debt that 'Abd al 'Aziz owes Faturi and Bashier for tending his camels was reciprocated in various ways. In the grain-growing alliance of which they are both members, 'Abd al 'Aziz undertook some work on Faturi's behalf, because the latter was involved in other matters at the time. More important, however, 'Abd al 'Aziz's young son is old enough to look after the younger goats kept near camp in spring and is expected to be able to share more fully in herding duties in a few years.

Muftah, too, benefited from the herding arrangements, perhaps to a greater degree than the other two households. There were few tasks related to general camp maintenance which he personally had to undertake, for he had more than enough manpower in his household to meet his commitment to the other members of the camp. He not only provided two herdsmen from his own family, but also had some control over his wife's brother's son, Salih, who could occasionally help in such camp chores as drawing water and packing camels for migration. Although camel management was not part of the general camp herding agreement, Bashier, 'Abd al Qadir and Salih (all mature, unmarried men) were long-time friends and frequently aided each other in tending the camels. Their willingness to cooperate greatly facilitated the smooth running of this camp.

The composition of Muftah's household closely approximates the ideal type aspired to by most pastoralists. A major advantage of this large household is the ability it gives him to manage a greater range of enterprises than the other households in the camp. Most of these other associations are devoted to political and economic activity in Sawknah. Faturi and 'Abd al 'Aziz cannot engage in these associations, because they lack the manpower in their households to free themselves from herding responsibilities.

Muftah has a post with the government. He is tribal headman, a position he acquired through the political connections of his brother-in-law, 'Abdalla bin Salih. Muftah is free to serve in this capacity, in part because he has the free time to move between the village and desert camps. During the winter and spring of 1964 he made frequent trips to Sawknah to keep abreast of local political activities and discharge his administrative functions as headman. Muftah is also able to keep two of his sons in school in Sawknah on a full-time basis. He reasons that if his sons acquire education, they will be able to find good paying jobs which will contribute to the family income. Finally, Muftah was able to find a month's employment for his son Yusif at a higher wage than that usually paid to labourers. The success of his village economic activities is to some extent a result of his participation in a village-based, tribal power group, comprised of men of the Bu Rasie tribal section. Clearly his household labour force makes this participation possible without jeopardizing his economic interests in pastoralism.

As mentioned, 'Abd al 'Aziz and Faturi, owing to a lack of manpower in their households, are not able to exploit the village economy in areas open to Muftah. Both men own palm trees and shares of houses in the village. To take full advantage of the village economic situation, however, they

would have to give up pastoralism, and it is not in their economic interests to do so. The possibility of earning twenty to forty pounds per month does not approach what they can earn by successfully increasing their herds. Muftah's family organization is not only an ideal family type, but also an ideal economic unit to which they aspire. Both Faturi and 'Abd al 'Aziz fully expect to be able at some future date to adopt a life style similar to that of Muftah.


Muftah's various activities bring him a great deal more revenue than is true of other camp members. He earns 480 pounds per year as headman and in 1965 made 700 pounds from the sale of eight camels he had been rearing for market. He also sold some small stock that year for approximately 200 pounds. In addition, his son, Yusif, earned 40 pounds for his month's work with the agricultural department. This position is controlled by 'Abdalla bin Salih, and was awarded to various individuals for short periods of time throughout the two years that I was in the field.

Much of the money Muftah earned was reinvested, particularly in camels. During 1965, however, Muftah's second largest expense was on constructing a large guest room in his house in Sawknah where he could entertain friends, political allies and visiting dignitaries.

The structure of Muftah's household represents an ideal adaptation of a politically prominent man to the changing economic situation. His camping relationship with Faturi and 'Abd al 'Aziz gives him a stable base for his pastoral activities, while he is free to enter into the political and economic life of the village. The camp functions smoothly, largely because the agreement has been carefully worked out and is satisfactory to the men concerned. A major factor influencing both the camp organization and Muftah's political life is his household composition. Without this labour


DIAGRAM II

THE COMPOSITION OF SALIM'S PASTORAL CAMP



1 SALIM 2 BIN 'ALI 3 ZIEDE 4 BIN QADURA 5 MUHAMMAD BIN 'ALI

6 BOBI 7 ZIEDE'S SON 8 RAMADAN



= SINGLE TENT

he would find it difficult to manage his diverse activities. The decline in available labour in the desert has little affected his ability to organize his interests.

I will now present a description of a second camp in which the impact of economic change has had a more serious effect on the ability of another influential man to adjust to the changing circumstances.

In Diagram II, I showed the composition of a second camp formed in the winter of 1964. The members had joined together for the purpose of managing their stock. Camp two differed from Muftah's camp in that there were a number of major disputes between members during the spring. This was due to the fact that there was a labour shortage in the camp and the outside economic interests of the individuals clashed with the obligations which they had undertaken as camp members.

Salim (D3 I) is polygamous, and each of his wives occupies her own tent. His father's widow and a divorced sister occupy a third tent, and his imbecilic brother, a fourth. Salim is one of the wealthiest pastoralists in the Riah tribe. While he can afford to take care of unproductive dependents, there is also an economic motive behind his generosity. In 1954, when Salim's father died, the estate was divided among his widow and children. Each of the males received four camels, and his widow and daughters received two each. Salim supports three of the inheritors and herds their animals. To some extent, he controls their property. In return for tending their animals, he claims half of the offspring. Ten camels in Salim's herds were acquired through caring for the stock of his dependent relatives. The rest of the camels came from a successful herding contract which he had negotiated in his youth. During the summer of 1964, Salim sold the last of the camels owned by the contracting party, thus dissolving the partnership. Now at forty-five years of age, Salim is a wealthy man.

Salim also has seven dependent children. The two eldest are both daughters of marriageable age. Unfortunately for his economic interests, he has only one son old enough to manage stock, Ramadan, a boy of twelve. On occasion his imbecilic brother, Bin Qadura, manages the camels, but he cannot be trusted on his own. Hence, while Salim is a wealthy man, he does not have the labour force in his own household to meet the demands of herding and allow him free time for other economic activities. In the past, he hired herdsman, but can no longer find anyone willing to work for what he regards as a reasonable wage. To resolve this dilemma, Salim joined Bin 'Ali (Cl1 I) and Ziede, an immigrant man from another tribe married to a Bu Rasie woman, in a camping arrangement.

Bin 'Ali, an old man in his seventies, is unfit to undertake anything but the lightest herding duties. He does not own large flocks, but still cannot manage without help. Bin 'Ali has two sons, but only one is living with him. His other son lives in Sebha, where he has found a good-paying government post. When I interviewed the son, he claimed that he had no intention of returning to pastoralism. A third household in the camp, Bin 'Ali's son-in-law, Bobi, is not a member of the herding alliance. He is normally a day labourer in Sawknah. In 1964, he had made an agreement with Bin 'Ali whereby his family would be supported from Bin 'Ali's herds while he entered a grain-growing alliance with some other men. In the agreement Bin 'Ali provided the seed and plow camel and Bobi provided the labour. They were to divide the harvest between themselves. With only one herdsman in his family and two herds to contend with, Bin 'Ali was forced to seek out herding partners for the spring.

Ziede, the third householder in the camp, is a poor man. He makes his living through herding animals on contract for some villagers. Since most lucrative herding contracts are given to political supporters of important tribesmen and Ziede is an outsider, he manages on contracts with several

people who own two or three camels, mainly poor men who have quit pastoralism to find wage labour. It was convenient for Ziede to camp with Salim, in that Salim loaned him several camels when they migrated, making the burden of these trips less taxing. Also living with an influential man like Salim, made it less likely that tribesmen would challenge his right to water and pasture on tribal lands. Ziede's presence in the camp was a benefit to Salim, because Ziede's son was an excellent herdsman and compensated for some of the deficiencies in skill exhibited by Salim's younger, less experienced son.

The contract in Salim's camp extended to herding camels as well as goats and sheep. It was agreed that the sons of Salim and Ziede would herd the goats and sheep, while Muhammad Bin 'Ali with the aid of Bin Qadura, would look after the camels. It was also recognized that the contribution of both Salim's and Ziede's labour would be required on occasion. Finally, it was expected that Salim would take a greater part in managing camels, since his herds made up the majority of animals in the camp. This last part of the agreement was vaguely implied in the initial agreement, and only came up later in disputes. Usually, householders who enter "nega" arrangements will refuse to work unless other people are willing to pitch in and help with the general management of camp affairs.

Bin 'Ali and Ziede maintained a limited set of economic interests outside of herding. Bin 'Ali did not have the human resources in his household to become involved in other economic activities in spring. He had to commit the labour of one son to the camp, while his second son was living in the large town of Sebha. Ziede had neither the capital nor the free time in spring to engage in activities outside of herding. He was not even a member of a grain-growing alliance. For either household, withdrawing labour in the spring would require undertaking obligations in the summer, a thing neither household was prepared to do.

Salim, however, was involved in a diverse set of activities in all seasons. He was a member of a grain-growing alliance with his brother, 'Abd al 'Aziz and first cousins Bu Ras and Faturi. Like Faturi, Salim traveled a great deal buying animals. In addition, he owned large palm tree holdings near the summer camp as well as a house in the village. Most important, however, Salim is a man of great wealth, and high status required that he have the free time to entertain. Unfortunately, Salim did not have the household labour force necessary to maintain the calculated indolence of his high status. He tried to compensate for this ²deficiency in manpower in various ways. In the camp he attempted to use his superior resources to make the other two households indebted to him, but these acts were a constant source of strain to the herding agreement.

The first in a series of attempts by Salim to indebt the other members of the camp occurred in the early spring, when the camp was located between thirty to forty miles from the nearest wells. Salim had many camels trained to carry loads and roughly three times as many water bags as the other two households. Consequently, he could draw enough water from the wells to last two weeks, while Ziede and Bin 'Ali could only draw enough to last their households about five days. For convenience, the trips to the wells were organized as a cooperative effort, whereby the other two households would help Salim with his water. When they returned from the wells, Salim would fill two fifty gallon drums kept in his tent. Once the other two households had exhausted their water supplies, they were invited to draw water from Salim's tent. Salim tried to indebt the other two households to him in other ways. He loaned Ziede pack camels, as mentioned earlier, and when Salim went to the village he brought back provisions for the other two households.

A month after the camp was formed, Salim began performing fewer chores in camp and started to order others about. On one occasion, he sent Muhammad Bin 'Ali to track some of his stray camels without first consulting Bin 'Ali. He also undertook some economic ventures of his own, beginning by visiting

camps around the area and purchasing livestock. In the spring, before the 'Aid al Kabir, Salim took a flock of animals to town and sold them. He was gone for ten days, and during that time the major burden of managing the camp fell on the other two householders.

Finally, a major altercation occurred when Salim withdrew the labour of Bin Qadura from the camp. Shortly before harvest time in the spring, the group of men with whom Salim was growing grain had a meeting in his tent. In the discussion it was concluded that Bin Qadura would go with the group to harvest the grain and not Salim, as was planned. Members of the camp hearing of the decision were quite angry. They had been looking forward to Salim's departure as a time when they would not be directly subject to his manipulations. What is more, Bin Qadura had been committed to the camp labour pool as part of the agreement, and Salim was breaking that agreement. Salim contended that he had done more than his share in managing the camp, citing the loan of camels to Ziede and the freedom with which he had given water to them. Ziede retorted that the others had done more than their share. The greatest number of animals in the camp belonged to Salim, he noted, and with the departure of Bin Qadura the other two households would in fact be contributing a greater share of labour than Salim. Ziede also cited the numerous absences of Salim during the early spring as further grievances.

The dispute was not resolved and had the effect of curtailing cooperation between the three households. A week later, Salim decided that it was time to make a long move to pastures near the wells at the summer camp. Ziede used this as an opportunity to break with Salim. He moved his family closer to the nearest watering point, while Salim and Bin 'Ali moved to a valley fifty miles to the east. Three weeks later, Bin 'Ali and Salim returned to the summer camp, where they dissolved their herding partnership.

Ziede returned to the summer camp a few weeks after the other two. During the summer both Ziede and Muhammad Bin 'Ali took labouring jobs in Sawknah. Ziede was away for three months and earned roughly sixty pounds. Muhammad Bin 'Ali did not return to his father's camp the next year. For the rest of my stay in the field he remained in Sawknah working on various private and government jobs. That summer, Bin 'Ali's daughter married a man who had been away for five years working for an oil company, and in the next year he took Muhammad's place as herdsman in Bin 'Ali's household.

The organization of Muftah's camp demonstrates some sharp contrasts with Salim's. Most striking in comparison are the intense conflict and lack of stability in Salim's herding relationship. Most of the conflict was due to the fact that Salim pressured the other two households to undertake a greater share of the work involved in managing the affairs of the camp. As a wealthy man with many other economic interests and political ambitions, Salim could only afford to take a marginal part in herding his own animals. He tried to put the other members of the camp in his debt, and thus justify his lack of involvement in camp management. But this proved a source of conflict which ultimately led to the premature breakdown of the camp.

Perhaps an enduring relationship with Salim would have proven beneficial to the other members of the camp had the economic situation been different. Salim was interested in establishing a stronger relationship with one of the households so that he could free himself of camp responsibilities in summer and reside in the village. Bin 'Ali and Ziede would not agree to this, for it was summer and its slack season in herding that allowed them to seek wage labour in the village. Thus, a more general agreement among the three could not be reached because of this fundamental conflict of interests brought about by the expansion of the village economy.

Neither Bin 'Ali nor Ziede had occasion to withdraw labour from herding in the winter months. Bin 'Ali, as a consequence of having only one productive herdsman in his camp, had a limited set of possible economic options in winter. He was too old to manage economic tasks himself, was forced to commit his son to the herding alliance, and had lost the labour of a second son who had become sedentary. He even had to bring in his son-in-law, a day labourer in the village, to activate a grain-growing alliance.

Ziede was not able to enter a grain-growing alliance, for he did not have seeds, and the responsibilities of keeping animals on contract during the winter were too much for his young son to be entrusted with alone. Both men lacked the manpower and capital to maximize their economic interests in areas of activity outside of pastoralism during the winter.

Ziede and Bin 'Ali waited until the summer months to take advantage of the economic situation in Al Jufrah. While Ziede worked for wages and returned to pastoralism, Muhammad Bin 'Ali took his wife and small child with him to Sawknah and used the prospect of steady employment to break with his father and remain a labourer in the village. The twenty pounds per month as a labourer was a more desirable road to capital accumulation than living with his father. In 1964, Bin 'Ali only made fifty pounds from the sale of two animals to another pastoral entrepreneur - he was not able to market the animals himself. Furthermore, the prospects for increasing his herds were limited. Muhammad had viewed residence with his father as a filial obligation. As soon as there was another person to pick up his commitment, in this case his new brother-in-law, he exercised the option to become sedentary.

Muhammad Bin 'Ali had little prospects of becoming wealthy as a pastoralist. Ziede, on the other hand, clearly saw it to his advantage to remain a pastoralist. His son was capable enough to manage the flocks during the

summer in his absence. He used the free time to accumulate capital to invest in animals, and herding contracts brought him half the offspring of the animals in his care. Furthermore, in a few years, his son would be able to undertake more responsibility, giving Ziede a greater amount of time to pursue other economic interests. He also had another young son, who in a few more years, could assume herding responsibilities, too. In conversations, Ziede cited these arguments to answer my questions as to why he preferred to remain a pastoralist rather than settle.

By comparison ^{with} to the members of Muftah's camp, Bin 'Ali and Ziede were poor men. 'Abd al 'Aziz and Faturi were both men in their middle thirties who were successful in capital accumulation. Both saw their chances of becoming wealthy as a logical progression towards late middle age. Bin 'Ali, an old man, had not been successful in accumulating capital. As a consequence, when the option of choosing wage labour became available, one of his sons left his household and was followed by Muhammad, his second son, in 1964. Thus, Bin 'Ali remained poor and was forced to rely upon a succession of temporary alliances to maintain his household. Only Salim could be placed in an economic category with Muftah, but there were significant differences in the options open to the two men.

Salim owned a large herd of animals, a large grove of palm trees, a house in Sawknah, and sizeable herds -- in short, all the resources to confirm upon him a position of prominence among the tribesmen. Nonetheless, he found it difficult to manage this wealth in a way that would ensure him the status among tribesmen he deserved. In the domain of pastoralism, he could manage his herds with a minimum of trouble but it was hard to manage other activities as well. In 1964, Salim made 800 pounds from the sale of camels and 160 pounds from the sale of goats. His income gave him the resources to entertain and in various ways demonstrate his status among

pastoralists. However, Salim was not able to confirm his position among the notables of his tribal section, for his domestic labour force was not strong enough to let him spend part of the year in the village, interacting with the other important men of his tribal section.

The options open to persons in the labour market directly restricted Salim's mobility, for he was not able to maintain a stable base for his herding relationships. Persons who ordinarily might have worked as herdsmen for him had gone to the village to seek labouring jobs. A householder such as Ziede found a relationship with Salim detrimental to his own interests. He could maintain himself through herding contracts and seasonal employment without putting himself in a client relationship. In the past, Salim had been able to rely upon his brother 'Abd al 'Aziz and his close agnates to support his position. They were still tied to him in various ways. 'Abd al 'Aziz, for instance, still passed part of the summer with Salim when they harvested their date palms. During the year, Salim loaned money to agnates to invest in camels. In 1964, he loaned Bu Ras 80 pounds and 'Abd al 'Aziz 70 pounds. He could not use these relationships with close kinsmen to establish a stable camp, for outside economic activities necessitated that they maintain their independence. Thus, Salim was not able to maintain the life style of a high status man and had to confine his activities to the pastoral section of the population. Men who in the past had the wealth to be able to move freely between the village and desert camp now found that they had to rely upon the labour in their household more than was true in the past.

Another option open to Salim was to become sedentary, but that was not a viable alternative by his own admission. He maintained that he would not be able to profit from his flocks and that the post of labourer was not conducive to his status as a wealthy man. As Salim put it, "Those who do not have any property become settled." Although the case material suggests that

there is some truth in his statement, the process of sedentarization is more complex than that.

In analyzing why some persons remain pastoral and others become sedentary, three factors seem of prime importance: wealth, household composition, and extended family structure. It would appear that wealthy men such as Faturī and Salim would not find it in their interest economically to give up pastoralism. Less wealthy men such as Bu Ras, 'Abd al 'Aziz and Ziede see the possibility of amassing capital as greater in the pastoral domain. Bu Ras and 'Abd al 'Aziz have large enough herds to expect a rapid increase through reproduction. If they took positions as labourers in Sawknah they would have to share the profits with a herdsman. Muftah, on the other hand, is able to maximize his interests even though he spends a great deal of time in the village, because he has the labour in his household to manage activities in both the pastoral and village sectors of the local economy. Salim would like to become sedentary for at least part of the year, but the lack of labour in his household and his inability to establish a viable camping relationship prevent him from doing so.

Muhammad bin 'Ali became sedentary out of self-interest. He worked in his father's household as its only productive member. His father was poor by comparison to other pastoralists his own age, and he saw little possibility of increasing his income in the pastoral domain. With only one small child of his own, it would be years before he could derive benefit from his labour. The prospect of making a minimum wage of twenty pounds per month seemed to him to be a better way of accumulating capital.

In 1964-65, I took a census of all pastoral and sedentary members of Riah.Tribe. One question on which I gathered information was the relationship which individual householders maintained within a larger extended family. I discovered a strong correlation between family developmental stage,

residence pattern, and occupation among Riah tribesmen. The results of that census are presented in Table I.

T A B L E I.

Household Residence Patterns		
	[*] <u>Sedentary</u>	<u>Nomads</u>
Married man living in joint family with father	19 (21%)	45 (44%)
Householders with married sons, living as member of joint household	11 (13%)	24 (23%)
Householders independent without married sons	59 (66%) 89 100%	34 (33%) 103 100%

*I have included only those households that have become sedentary since wage labour opportunities became available in Sawknah.

Sixty-six percent of all settled Riah householders in Sawknah are men without married sons and are independent of parental controls. This means that many of the men who left herding in favor of sedentarization had neither a position in their fathers' domestic groups nor dependents who could work as members of their own households.

A second category of sedentary men have dependent sons. They are a minority representing a small percent of those who are sedentary; nevertheless, they are important tribesmen. Seven of the eleven are persons who are structurally in a **similar** position to Muftah, in that they have interests in both areas of the economy. All of these men have married sons who either are pastoralists or hold government jobs. Only three of the men have posts themselves.

Among the nomads, forty-five householders - over forty percent - are married men living as dependents of twenty-four herd owners. Most approximate the position of Yusif Muftah in his father's household. Thus it would

appear that where ties are maintained within the framework of an extended pastoral household, men are less likely to become sedentary. However, as in the case of Muftah's son Yusif, many were able to find wage employment in Al Jufrah, and during the summer of 1964, twenty-seven of these men did so.

A second category of nomads, young unmarried men over fifteen years of age, is not represented on the table. There are sixty-two men in this category, most of whom work as herd boys for the greater part of the year. Six from this group, however, hold government posts which allow them to spend little time at their parents' camps. During the year, an additional twenty-nine men were able to find employment in the village for at least a week while twelve of those were recruited for an extended period of time to work for a construction company building a road in southern Fezzan. Nine other men from the category of nomads living in a joint household with their fathers, also found long-term jobs with this company.

Men who are nomadic without married dependent sons cover a range of types, even though they are not a large percentage of the pastoral population. Salim, Ziede, Bu Ras and Faturi fall into this category. From the case material, it is clear that their adjustments in herding activities as a response to economic growth in Al Jufrah were varied. Twenty-three men from this category took wage employment in the village at some point during the summer of 1964. Thus, of 166 employable males in the pastoral domain, 85 men worked for wages at some point in the year. Most found jobs in summer, when herding was slack. While some worked on government projects, many were building labourers for members of the community. While I was in Sawknah, one-third of the houses were being reconstructed or repaired, providing work for many men for short periods of time. Thus, most households were able to take advantage of the wage economy at some point in the year. This they were

able to do in addition to maintaining their herds. The table demonstrates a strong correlation between family structure and changes in residence and occupation.

A second factor which influences the residence and occupation of tribesmen is wealth. Married men without many animals become sedentary when jobs and posts become available. Those men whose herds are sufficient in size to provide them with a substantial income often choose to remain pastoralists. These statements more accurately apply to younger married men who have few male dependents old enough to work as herdsmen. The case material suggests that older men with mature male dependents can easily shift residence and maintain interests in both the village and pastoral domains.

While in the field, I was able to establish some rough estimates on the herd size necessary to maintain a pastoral nuclear family. In 1965, there was little rainfall in the desert and some households were forced to live on reduced milk supplies. One man with only ten lactating goats was forced to give up a young gazelle which he had captured because he did not have enough surplus milk to feed it. I estimate that in years of sparse rainfall it requires a minimum of ten lactating goats to supply sufficient milk to meet the needs of a pastoral family of four. The great majority of pastoral families own at least ten goats. Even those families with few animals were able to compensate for these deficiencies by taking animals on contract. Perhaps because of the availability of casual labour and herding contracts with people who had become sedentary there were no pastoral families suffering great deprivation in 1965.

As a practical measure of wealth in pastoral society, I adopted standards which the people themselves use. It was generally agreed that young men who owned roughly ten or more female camels were said to have a promising

herd, one which, with a bit of luck, would make them wealthy in ten years or so. Twenty mature female goats was considered as a minimum number from which one could easily increase through reproduction. From herds of this size, a man could make a profit, meet most of his subsistence needs and also increase his herd size.

A man with ten female camels can expect to produce five offsprings per year, say three females and two males. If he keeps them for two years he can expect to sell the males for 100 pounds and the females will produce offsprings in their third or fourth years. Twenty mature female goats will produce an average of thirty offsprings per year, roughly half of which will be males. It is likely that five of the males will be butchered for their meat while the other ten will be sold for roughly six pounds apiece. A young man with twenty female goats and ten female camels can expect to earn roughly 210 pounds per year from the sale of animals, show an increase in his herd size and maintain his family largely on the dairy products which his animals produce. While these measures apply to young men who ^{have}~~are~~ independent households, the minimum number of animals required to maintain a household consisting of a man and his married son or sons is forty goats and twenty camels.

When comparing recently settled householders and pastoral householders on the basis of these measures significant differences occur. Of 24 pastoral householders who are heads of joint families, 21 own more than the minimum number of animals required to make a substantial profit. Furthermore, 19 householders in this category own a great many more animals than the minimum stated. 26 of the 34 heads of independent nuclear families own more than the minimum number of animals required to show substantial profits. The herd sizes of recently settled tribesmen show significant difference when compared to pastoral tribesmen. 39 of the 59 nuclear family heads

who become sedentary owned less than ten camels and twenty goats, while 14 men in this category became sedentary even though they had sufficient property to show substantial profits as pastoralists. Six households remain unaccounted for in my census.

A reverse correlation exists between residence and wealth for heads of joint families who have become sedentary. 7 of the 11 settled heads of joint families owned more than enough animals necessary to earn a substantial profit as pastoralists. As stated earlier, these correlations when applied to heads of joint households are less meaningful for most of these men may choose to reside where they please without damaging their interests in pastoralism. However, for men without the option of exploiting both the pastoral and village economy, the decision to continue in pastoralism or give it up in favor of seeking a full time job or post in the village depends upon their wealth in livestock.

In this chapter, I have described some of the factors which influence continuity and change in residence and occupation among Riah tribesmen. The options open to individuals and the choices made by them have been analyzed. Wealth, extended family structure and household composition are facts which were taken into consideration.

Another set of factors are political in nature, cannot easily be analyzed without reference to tribal structure. Some individuals and groups in the tribe are more politically influential than others. This is due to the fact that they control the allocation of government posts made available to tribesmen. The reasons why some groups were able to continue to dominate the tribe politically in a time of rapid change is best understood through the analysis of tribal political structure.

VI. LEADERSHIP AND TRIBAL STRUCTURE

In Chapter V, I discussed the types and range of alliances formed by the Riah pastoralists in making a living. Interests are diversified. Some types of associations, such as the "nega" grouping, are common organizational forms found among all pastoralists. Participation in other alliances such as grain growing, charcoal making, and other entrepreneurial activities, varies greatly from household to household. Three factors, wealth, household composition and extended family structure, limit the number and kinds of associations that any one household can undertake. Furthermore, associations tend to involve the individual with many different groups. Those households involved in a greater range of activities tend to contract alliances with a greater number of people.

Wealthy householders with several dependents contract many more types of economic alliance than labour-poor householders. It is further suggested that wealthy households are able to contract more stable relations than are households with little manpower reserve. Moreover, wealth and household composition also play a major role in setting the dimensions of prestige and political influence.

Men with wealth and a large number of dependents are able to reside in the oasis during summer and other times of the year when it is politically or economically advantageous to do so. While there, they entrust the management of pastoral affairs to sons or other dependents. Persons without these resources are denied the option of being involved in major political decision making. They cannot afford to be away from their camps for extended periods of time, for they must contribute **their** work to the maintenance of the households.

Family wealth and the size of domestic unit therefore affect the political influence and achievement of men. To become important in tribal affairs a man must spend considerable periods of time in the oasis politicking while maintaining ongoing alliances with more pastorally oriented kinsmen.

Two deviant patterns exist. Firstly, some wealthy pastoralists do not become involved in the decision-making group among the Riah. Although wealthy, they tend to spend most of their time herding. They are denied influence partly because they do not interact with other wealthy men of the tribe in the oasis, where most important decisions concerning tribal policy are made.

Secondly, other wealthy persons accumulate agricultural property and are acculturated into the group of sedentary wealthy landowners. They no longer participate in activities with their more pastoral relatives, and as a result lose the basis of support that they ordinarily would have from these kinsmen. Important men must balance two categories of relations: 1) they must pass some time each year in the village in the company of other wealthy tribesmen and 2) must continue to reinforce relationships with their more pastoral kinsmen. Influence over the second category of persons is essential if one wishes to maintain a position of prominence in tribal affairs.

It remains to examine the political process in the context of the tribal structure. Individuals do not contract relationships haphazardly. Rather choices are to a large degree delineated by structural principles.

The household and the tribe provide, respectively, the minimum and maximum enduring structural units among the Riah. Between these groups are

two other structurally persistent groups of importance, the Bait and the section, and it is here that leaders build a following, factions operate, and major political and economic alliances are formed. To analyze the structural prerequisites of leadership we must examine the structure of these middle groups.

The Riah tribe has a segmentary structure, with a gene^{cl}alogy that incorporates the smaller structural units into one framework. The tribe is segmented into seven tribal sections called (by the Riah) either "Qabilla" (the word used for tribe) or "'Ailet" (literally families).

The sections of the tribe are in turn segmented into smaller agnatic groupings known as "Bait", or literally "house" groups. The Bait groups vary in numerical strength from one or two households to as many as twenty or thirty households. Thus, the importance of Bait groups as political units varies considerably within the tribe.

The members of the Bait groups claim to be consanguin²ally related. A member of a Bait group can usually trace the actual agnatic relationship that exists between himself and any other member of the group. There is little ambiguity within the genealogical framework of the Bait. However, clarity of genealogical relationship is not a characteristic of the larger structural units within the tribe.

There are a number of versions of the ascending tribal genealogical framework. No one commonly accepted version of the linkages exists that would connect the seven sections of the tribe. Disagreements occur over the exact agnatic linkages that unite the various sections into one structure. Occasionally, old men will debate these points, but since no important groupings are formed on structural principles at this level, the dis-

tinctions are of little social consequence. All tribesmen are in agreement that the seven sections are derived from a common ancestor who was descendent from the Bani Hilal tribe, one of the Arabian tribes that invaded North Africa in the 11th century.

Over the years, however, many people have left the tribe to reside elsewhere and other persons and groups have been incorporated into its structure. Thus, the tribal genealogy provides little more than a set of indigenous categories that "map" present day relationships between groups. Although the gene^ological links between the sections are of little significance, linkages within the sections that connect the Bait groups are of major political importance. Hence, while sections are the main political groups in the tribal system, each one of them consists of an alliance of Bait groups, which is expressed in gene^ological terms.

The Bu Rasie, the numerically strongest Riah tribal section, is composed of the following Bait groups: Hag Salih, Zaruq, Sardowie, Al Fallah, Yusif, Bin Kita and Bin Qadura.¹ From the geneology, two processes of accretion appear to take place in forming the section. Bait groups are "grafted" onto the main structure through stressing an affinal relationship. The Sardowie, Al Fallah, and Bin Kita stress this linkage to the main body of the section.

While one might expect the rest of the Bait groupings to be the result of the growth of a single grouping through time, this is, in fact, not the case. Only the Hag Salih and Zaruq are of the original Bu Rasie line. The Bin Qadura claim that their ancestor 'Abd al Qadir (A1) was the brother of A3, and A4. Many persons in the section refute this claim, saying that 'Abd al Qadir was married to the sister of A3 and A4. The same process of converting affinal into an agnatic link is true of the Yusif, while the Sardowie are grafted to the group through stressing an affinal tie with the Yusif.

¹Refer to Diagram I, Appendix I.

Yusif.

Two processes of accretion occur within the section: one through converting an affinal link into an agnatic tie in the area of structural ambiguity, two generations beyond the living; the other, through stressing an affinal tie with one of the major Bait groups of the sections. These types of accretion reflect two different orders of political incorporation. The alliance between the Hag Salih, Zaruq, Yusif, and Bin Qadura is expressed in many fields of activity and through a host of interpersonal relationships. The attachment of the Sardowie, Bin Kita, and Al Fallah tends to be less inclusive and focused primarily in the field of political behavior. This difference in degree of incorporation is given structural recognition.

The process of accretion and incorporation are the result of many factors, of which genealogical recognition is but one. Members of the different Bait groups within the section tend to compound relationships in various fields of activity. Hence, the agnatic tie is essentially one of many component relationships between members of the same section. When these other relationships are not present, the single agnatic link is of little political significance. Since the section is a structural alignment of Bait groups, we must begin the analysis at that point.

Some authors have made clear functional distinctions between Bait groups and larger structural units. Many have shown that groups with a structure similar to that of the Bait function with respect to inheritance and transmission of certain property rights while the political groupings of the tribe are in fact large groups of a totally different order and function. While it is quite true that among the Riah some functions of the Bait have to do with property allocations, there is nonetheless a political component to the Bait organization, which can be seen in the context of the sectional political

alliance. For purposes of analysis it is feasible to view the sections as alliances of important men, each of whom draws the majority of his support from his fellow Bait group members. In one sense the alliance of Bait groups can be seen as a faction in which the wealthy members of the component Bait groups band together into a politically effective force. At another level powerful sections can be viewed as a group of independent householders united by various overlapping ties of economic and political cooperation as well as ties of kinship and affinity. Neither argument is correct, for both sets of factors support one another.

In politically powerful sections the members are tied to one another in numerous ways. Sections tend to use the same wells and their members tend to draw herding partners and other personnel for alliances from within the group. During summer, they generally live in the same large dry-season camp or in the same area of a camp. In the village, streets are named after some sections as are certain neighbourhood wells. Usually, the men of a given section attend the same mosque and in general interact more with each other than with persons of other sections. Finally, marriages are contracted more frequently within the section than without.

Among the Riah there are few formally recognized statuses, with the exception of household head, that confer a rank position upon an individual. Yet, clearly, some individuals hold more sway in tribal affairs than others. The explanation of their influence must be sought in the qualitative differences in relationships and the way these contribute to the total status of the individual in the group, rather than in any single structural component or imperative.

There are many informal mechanisms that control differences in status and political influence among the members of sections. Perhaps the most

important are those elucidated in Chapter V, wealth, household composition, and extended family structure. But these factors alone are not enough to confer political importance upon the individual. To be influential a man must have the support of a group of people. A prominent man usually draws his support from two groups: his Bait in sectional affairs, and his section in tribal, village, and even national politics.

But the sectional alliance is not a structural imperative. The group only persists and flourishes if a certain clustering of sociological components is present. Group strength depends directly upon these components buttressing each other and integrating the section behind the leadership of its important men. The analysis focuses on the ways in which such men seek and achieve eminence within the group.

I will argue that the section maintains its structure through the very mechanisms that break down Sawaknah agnatic groups. Wealth differentials and stratification will be seen to strengthen rather than weaken the structures of the section and the Bait.

Thus far I have limited my discussion to one type of property, namely herds. It is possible, however, to accumulate other sources of wealth in addition to animals. Most Riah pastoralists have the opportunity to acquire agricultural property in the form of date palms and occasionally garden land, as well as house sites in the village. Thus, ideally a tribal member can choose to build property interests in the village and give up his nomadic ways. Although some men manage through marriage, inheritance, or purchase to acquire large agricultural holdings, few choose to concentrate wealth in one type of property. Rather, wealthy men tend to participate in diverse areas of economic activity.

There is no tendency for economic specialization among the sections of

the Riah. In six of the seven tribal sections for instance, the average individual ownership of date palms falls between twenty to twenty-six trees per householder. All the sections of the tribe have rich and poor members who own various amounts and combinations of property.

A similar pattern of property distribution appears for the majority of Bait groups within the sections of the tribe. An attempt to diversify property holdings within the household structure rather than to specialize in any one area of the economy is a characteristic of most Riah households. Men attempt to acquire agricultural property and village house sites, as well as stock and the equipment necessary for successful pastoralism.

In Table I, I list the average ownership of four important categories of property by household for five Bait groups of the Bu Rasie tribal section.¹

T A B L E I.

Tribal Section - Average property ownership
per household
(Bu Rasie)

<u>Bait Groups</u>	<u>Camels</u>	<u>Goats</u>	<u>Sheep</u>	<u>Palms</u>
Hag Salih	17	34	6	21
Bin Qadura	19	24	6	19
Bin Kita	9	21	5	8
Sardowie	12	32	6	2
Al Fallah	26	71	13	32

Although there are significant differences in average amounts of property owned by Bait groups, individuals in all of the Bait groups own some property in each of the four categories. The largest discrepancies occur in ownership

¹

I do not have enough reliable information on the Yusif Bait group to include them in this table.

of date palms and camels, two categories of property in which investment is most common.

In two Bait groups in the Bu Rasie section, individual ownership of camels and date palms is significantly less than in the other sections. The Sardowie and Bin Kita average fewer camels and date palms per household than the rest of the Bait groups. The Al Fallah average more of all types of cited property than the rest. The explanation of the difference is simple. There is an absence of rich men within the Bin Kita and Sardowie Bait groups, while the Al Fallah group has one very wealthy member and a number of moderately wealthy ones.

Particular types of property do not cluster in particular Bait groups. All of the Bait groups in the section exhibit marked differentiation in wealth among the members. Modes of residence, style of life, types and range of economic interests do not differentiate Bait groups or sections from each other. Rather, differentiation occurs within the Bait group themselves.

Most property accruing to the Bait group is owned by relatively few individuals. Furthermore, men who own large amounts of one type of property tend to own large amounts in other categories.

In Table II, I list the five richest men in the Bu Rasie tribal section. Four of the five wealthiest palm tree owners also are among the wealthiest camel owners within the section. A major share of the wealth that accrues to the section is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals. The wealthiest palm owner in the section, however, owns few camels; in many ways he has been socialized into a sedentary way of life. Nonetheless, he maintains other important connections with his kinsmen, although he suffers abuse for having adopted the life style of landowning Sawaknah.

T A B L E II.

Bu Rasie Tribal Section
Five Wealthiest Property Holders

<u>Name of Individual Bait</u>	<u>No. of Date Palms</u>	<u>No. of Camels</u>
Zaruq	100	50
Hag Salih	500	20
Bin Qadura	130	57
Yusif	170	35
Al Fallah	50	102
TOTAL	950	264

Total number of Households in Section: 64

The richest men within the section are not drawn from the same Bait group. The Hag Salih; Zaruq, Yusif, Bin Qadura and Al Fallah each hold one of the five wealthiest palm owners. The Bin Kita and Sardowie are the only Baits without such men. Similarly, large numbers of camels are owned by members of four of the Bait groups.

It must be stressed at this point that the richest tribesmen do not approach owning as many date palms as the wealthiest Sawaknah. On the other hand, wealthy Sawaknah do not own nearly as many camels as do rich pastoralists.

Here an interesting comparison of poor Sawaknah peasants and poor Riah pastoralists can be made. Poor peasants are dependent upon wealthy Sawaknah landowners in a way in which no pastoralist, rich or poor, is dependent upon another. Peasants do not own land or trees. Their livelihood is gained by working as sharecroppers for wealthy landowners, and in this sense they are directly dependent upon them. It has been through the control of agricultural property and, recently, the government patronage system that wealthy

Sawaknah have dominated the oasis political structure.

Unlike these peasants, nearly every pastoral household has the resources to be economically self-sufficient. Relations outside the household are entered into to maximize opportunities for increasing wealth, and in these relationships, pastoralists jealously guard their independence. While many Sawaknah peasants are impoverished, every Riah pastoralist owns at least one camel and controls enough goats to insure his subsistence.

Thus influential Riah men must rely on factors outside of property control to maintain their status as leaders in the tribal political system. Wealth is a means of acquiring a life style from which one gains prestige. But wealth is only one component of such a status, for it does not necessarily lead to control over persons outside of one's family. It is through the skillful management of diverse sets of economic and political associations that leaders maintain their position within the tribal political structure.

Men contract most of their economic associations within the section. I have already given an account of those contracted by Muftah (D14) and Salim (D3) in Chapter V. (Genealogy I). It will be remembered that Salim herded with Bin 'Ali (C11); Muftah herded with Salim's brother (D2) and cousin (D8). But, as was pointed out, these alliances were not enduring, few lasting from one spring to the next. Furthermore, herding alliances are only one of many kinds of alliances contracted by pastoralists during the year. Both Salim and Muftah, like most Bu Rasie, contracted all of their alliances with other members of their section. It now remains to show why cooperation takes place within this unit.

Although the Bu Rasie (Diagram I) can be represented as a compact group, one must keep in mind a distinction between social and geographical distance. Great physical distances often separate the members of the section for long periods of time. Oftentimes, men will pass a year interacting with but a

small number of section members. The group is infrequently united as one residential group. Only one out of every three or four years yields sufficient rainfall for the members of the section to camp at the larger wells near the oasis in summer. Weddings, to a lesser extent funerals, and pressing political issues are the only events likely to bring a large number of the members of the section together at the same time. Isolation is frequently greater for the women than the men.

Toward the latter part of my field work, I met the wife of D2 I in the oasis. I politely inquired into the nature of her visit, for it was late spring and I knew that her husband's camp was located over one hundred miles to the west of the village. She replied: "I came to visit my mother." She continued by saying that the spring had been harsh, leaving no grasses near the large summer camp on the outskirts of the oasis. Hence, they were to pass the summer a great distance away. She had come to visit her mother before the heat made travel difficult. Furthermore, she reminded me that she had not seen the members of her natal family since the first month of my field work, nearly two years previous to the encounter. Often the particular interests of families take them away from close kin for great periods of time. The section and Bait group members therefore do not interact in a face-to-face manner as groups very frequently. This circumstance gives added importance to the extended network of the important men as a means of facilitating communication and integrating the group.

Men travel more frequently and more widely than women. In spring they travel afar with their herds and cover great distances in search of lost animals, visiting camps to make inquiries. They also travel to other areas of the desert to plant grain or make charcoal. In addition, they make frequent trips to the oasis to collect stored provisions, replenish supplies, and sell goods and animals. Most household heads make two or three visits

to the oasis in the course of the spring; while young men in search of casual labour often go to the oasis with more regularity.

The important men of the section often provide lodging and meals for these visitors, using the opportunity to pass on information, particularly on subjects of importance to section members. Thus the important men have two advantages over less important men from this point of view. They have an extended network in which their own family members are involved in a variety of activities with others, and they also are at the center of communications by virtue of their residence in the village. The combined factors of geographical distance separating members of the section and their close interdependence aids important men in maintaining their position of influence.

To explicate the ways in which the members of a section cooperate in various types of activities, I now give a full account of the alliances binding various members of the Bu Rasie tribal section together. One feature of these alliances is clear: They^y constitute a framework of cross-cutting ties that link persons of various statuses, modes of residence, and degrees of wealth.

The most important men of the Bu Rasie section are also among the wealthiest. 'Abdalla bin Salih (D24 I) and Muftah (D14 I) are leaders of the section. To a lesser extent, Zaruq (C17 I), Hamad (C18 I), Bu Ras (D22 I), Hag Salih (C19 I), and Salim (D3 I) are important men. However, they are not as influential as the first two men, and tend to follow their lead rather than set policy. These seven men with the occasional support of Bashier Bin Kita and Mohammed Sardowie constitute a faction that protects the interests of the Bu Rasie in tribal and village affairs.

All of these men have interests in both the village and the pastoral economy. 'Abdalla bin Salih and Hag Salih are sedentary. Hag Salih is a

wealthy date palm owner in the section, and is married to a Sawaknah woman, heir to a large fortune in agricultural property which he now controls. He is not politically powerful in his own right, for he has few positive connections with the pastoralists in the section. In the past he quarreled bitterly with the members of his Bait group, and he and his brothers are not on friendly terms. However, his status as a landowner makes him a useful ally to the faction, and members consciously pull him into their political orbit.

'Abdalla has been sedentary for eight years and through the last five has become the most influential member of the section. Although sedentary, he still maintains a large herd of camels which his eldest son, who is attached to Muftah's camp, herds for him. In addition, he also has some goats and a few sheep which he keeps with a number of the poorer men of the section. Muftah, Zaruq, Hamad, and Bu Ras are semi-nomadic. All solve their residential problems in a manner similar to Muftah, by maintaining members of their household labour force in different activities. Only Salim is fully nomadic, although he is wealthy and actually owns two houses in the village. Salim's position of importance among certain sections of the pastoral population is reinforced by the group. During the summer he generally resides in the largest of the summer camps. When the faction wishes to present an issue to the pastoral population, they usually visit with Salim.

Salim is polygamous, with two households lodged in separate tents. He entertains frequently and uses the large tent of his second wife to feast and lodge his guests. Thus whenever 'Abdalla bin Salih or other members of the faction have to visit the desert to discuss issues with the men of the section, they use Salim's guest tent for the purpose. This increases Salim's prestige among the poorer pastoralists and commits him more deeply to the faction. Further, he is able to go to town and accept one of the resident notable's hospitality without feeling indebted. It is considered merely

a reciprocation of hospitality and as such does not create a debt. (This is of a different order than the patronage hospitality that poor men commonly accept from richer agnates). But Salim's influence is limited to the pastoral community to a large extent, for he is not able to live in the oasis for the summer months. Therefore, he can only enter into the crucial decisions affecting the faction's strategy when 'Abdalla comes to the desert to drum up support or on the odd occasion when he is in town on other business.

The semi-nomadic and sedentary members of the factions are linked together in many activities and are more closely allied. All of these men are neighbours, living in the same section of the village. They also co-operate in a wide range of activities. Both Zaruq and Muftah have sons in school and working for the government. When they are away in the spring with their herds, the sons live in 'Abdalla bin Salih's household. In addition, when the members of these households come to town during the spring to buy provisions, they stay with 'Abdalla bin Salih. Occasionally, 'Abdalla bin Salih and Hag Salih agree to oversee the date palms of these men, contracting a person to pollinate the trees if the owners are absent from town in the late fall. Cooperation also extends in the other direction. Bu Ras, who is the only man with a client family ('luf') working for him, herds some of Hag Salih's stock and the stock of an important government official from the Fezzan.

The latter is a political ally of 'Abdalla, the son-in-law of Hag Abdalla, and the brother-in-law of Bu Ras. In the late summer, Bu Ras brings his family to the village for a period of six weeks to two months, leaving the care of the herds to his client. He then cooperates with 'Abdalla and his father-in-law, Hag Salih, in harvesting the date crop.

Aside from cooperating in village-based activities, cooperation is also seen among the younger unmarried males who herd for **their** fathers. In spring they often form a group that extends beyond the domain of the camp organization, helping each other in camel herding. In summer those ties are often expressed in a more formal way, as the young men form alliances specifically set up to water camels. Since there are only two persons needed at the well at a time, they are afforded a change from herding activities and can engage in alternative pursuits. Often the rotation at the wells is planned by the parents, taking into consideration the labour demands of the households. In the summer of 1964 and 1965, D6 I, E14 I, D34 I, E5 I and D35 I formed such an alliance. Thus the wealthy men in the section cooperate in a variety of ways, both in pastoral and village-based activities.

These men also have a separate set of individual connections to more pastorally oriented persons. Such alliances are usually contracted within the section as well. Thus Zaruq (C17 I) camped with D40 and D15 I; Muftah camped with D2 I and D8 I; Hamad camped with two members of the Sardowie. Only Bu Ras camped alone, but he had the ample labour of his herding client and his son.

Thus in pastoralism each of the important men tends to have his own camp. It consists of a line of tents and is usually known by the name of the wealthy man attached to it. The pastoralists will refer to "Nega" Zaruq, "Nega" Hamad, etc. Men who are members of the same faction, although they cooperate in other activities do not usually camp in the same line of tents.

In other activities, such as grain production, wealthy men enjoin a group of labourers composed of their close agnates. Muftah grew grain with three members of Bait Yusif, although they do not form a corporate group in other activities. Similarly, Salim headed a grain-growing group composed of

members of Bait Bin Qadura.

Thus, as we have seen, influential men are allied in oasis-based activities as well as in certain areas of pastoral activity. It is not one, but both of these connections that support a man's position in political affairs.

I have already discussed how wealth differentials and modes of cooperation strengthen the relationship between members of the section. Affinal ties, perhaps the most important from a structural point of view, add another dimension to these relationships. Frequently, intermarriage renews in each generation a set of relationships that further unites the families of a section.

In Diagram I, I drew the marriage linkages that unite the various families of the Bu Rasie section. Among the Bu Rasie, two thirds of the extant marriages have been contracted within the section. Marriage ties tend to link families exhibiting different modes of residence levels of wealth and status. To complete the analysis I present the Bu Rasie material before introducing the analysis of other sections for comparative purposes.

'Abdalla (D24) has two daughters. One is married to a poor pastoralist of his own Bait. The second daughter will be married to a man of the Zaruq Bait group. 'Abdalla also has two sons who were to be married in 1966. The second oldest son was to marry his first parallel cousin, Ell I. The oldest son was to marry a daughter of 'Abdalla's half brother, a member of a second, rival section. Bu Ras (D22), 'Abdalla's brother, has only one son, who is married to Muftah's daughter. Since Muftah himself is married to the sister of Bu Ras, and one of Muftah's sisters is married to Bu Ras, the abovementioned young couple are double cross cousins. Bu Ras' older daughter is married to a member of the Bin Qadura Bait group, a man who was a poor herd boy in the past. Bu Ras is polygamous. His younger wife is the daughter of Hag Salih.

Although Hag Salih (C19) is married to a Sawaknah woman none of his daughters have married into the sedentary community. One of the daughters is married to Bu Ras and a second daughter is married to a poor pastoralist of another section -- one of five families that has become politically attached to the Bu Rasie. A third daughter is married to an important government official in the Fezzan, who is a friend and external ally of 'Abdalla. He married Hag Salih's daughter during the time that 'Abdalla was an elected representative in the now defunct Fezzan parliament, and in the same year that Bu Ras took Hag Salih's daughter as a second wife.

Riah, unlike the Sawaknah, may marry their daughters to men outside of their own socio-economic status, though usually within the sections. Men tend to marry within the group in which they interact in economic activities. They contract marriages with poor members of the section as frequently as they contract marriage with persons of equivalent status.

Marriages within the section link families of different statuses, modes of residence, and levels of wealth into a network of affinal relationships which complement the other factors of political and economic cooperation that give unity to the section. In the politically powerful tribal sections, affinal ties support the economic and political links that bring together men of complementary interests. The combination of these sociological components: agnatic ties, affinal ties, and ties of cooperation, all of which crosscut differences of wealth and status within the section, support its unity as a political group.

To illustrate this argument, I compare the structures of other sections of the Riah tribe with the Bu Rasie. In Diagram II (Appendix I), I present the full genealogy of the Sawowda tribal section, another powerful section in the Riah tribe. The Sawowda are the major rivals of the Bu Rasie in tribal affairs. Their effectiveness as a political group is in part

supported by the same factors that bring solidarity to the Bu Rasie section.

The group is economically stratified, with leadership accruing to the wealthiest men. Their position as leaders, however, is supported by the same type of components that support the Bu Rasie leadership. Until recent years group members exhibited different modes of residence commensurate with differences in status. The leadership of the section centers around three men: Hamada (C12 II), the wealthiest man in the tribe and the leading entrepreneur in Sawknah; his cousin Hamad (C17 II) an older man who is politically adroit; and Hamada's brother-in-law (D25 II). In the recent past, many of the lines of economic cooperation in herding and agriculture united members of the group. Today, although sedentary, cooperation continues, but in different sets of activities (see Chapter VII).

Both the interdependence of the members in the past and their continued interdependence in the present is reflected in the marriage pattern of the section. Most of the extant marriages are concentrated within the group. In the politically powerful Farhart family, ten of thirteen extant marriages have been contracted within the section. Five of the seven brothers as well as five of their six sisters have married within the section. Nineteen of twenty-nine extant marriages recorded for the section were contracted internally. The Bait groups within the section are linked to one another, as well as to the Farhart family, through marriage. Marriage ties crosscut points of potential structural cleavage and provide a network of ties that articulate the group's cohesiveness.

The marriage pattern for the various sections provides an insight into the qualitative differences in strength of the sections. In Table III, I list the extant marriages for the Riah tribe by section.

T A B L E III.

	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Descent Group</u>	<u>In Section</u>	<u>In Tribe</u>	<u>Sawaknah</u>	<u>Luf</u>	<u>Outside</u>	<u>Total</u>
Bu Rasie	63+2	21	18	17	3	0	6	65
Sawowda	29+1	1	19	9	1	0	0	30
Yamie	46+2	10	18	9	3	2	6	48
Melamda	33+1	5	10	8	4	2	5	34
Duma	18	1	5	7	1	0	4	18
Sheshall	19+1	4	9	5	0	0	2	20
Mehemdat	13	1	2	8	0	1	1	13
TOTAL	<u>221</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>228</u>
	+7							
	<u>228</u>							

In the larger sections, the Bu Rasie, Sawowda, and Yamie, over 50 percent of the extant marriages have been contracted within the section. In other sections, members of some of the Bait groups marry externally with greater regularity. In some cases, this pattern shows a shift of Bait groups from an alliance with one section to an alliance with another section. In other cases, there is evidence that a new political grouping is emerging. In still others, this may point to the dissolution of an agnatic group. The interpretation of the pattern therefore depends upon weighing the other components that go into making up the sectional alliance.

In Diagram III (Appendix I), I present a partial genealogy of the Yamie tribal section (Genealogy III). The concentration of marriage ties is between three Bait groups, (B1 III), (B2 III) and (B3 III). The members of this group have gradually closed themselves off from the B8 III, A5 III, and A6 III families, and compounded relationships among themselves. The members of the B1, B2, and B3 families contract most of their herding relationships within the group and camp in the same areas during the spring. Moreover, the wealthier members live in the same street of the town, called by the name of the section.

The degree of influence of the important members of the section in tribal affairs is not as great as the numerical strength of the section would suggest. In closing themselves off from other members of the section, they have undermined the strength of the section as a corporate political group and in turn limited their own strength as leaders. The members of the B8, A5 and A6 families have transferred their allegiances to the Bu Rasie.

These families camp with those of the Bu Rasie section; in summer, they live at the same well with them and support them in political affairs. Of critical importance here are those affinal ties that to some degree express this structural realignment. Of twelve extant marriages contracted by male members of the three families, seven have been with the Zaruq Bait of the Bu Rasie, two were contracted internally, and three were with other categories of persons. No marriages were contracted with the central core of the same section.

Significantly, members of these families are not wealthy enough to be able to spend the summer in the village. They support Hag 'Abdalla (D16 I), their most influential affine in the Bu Rasie faction. Thus the strength of the affinal ties, when weighed with other factors, takes on a one directional property. The tie does not link two structurally equivalent groups into an alliance. Weighed against other ties in other areas of activity, the marriage pattern demonstrates a structural realignment. In this case, the process of accretion to the Bu Rasie is a direct blow to the numerical strength of the Yamie tribal section and the influence of its leaders in tribal affairs.

It would appear that the Yamie have lost members because they have not forged alliances with their less wealthy agnatic members, and these people have changed alliances to a group where the relationship is being compounded with more and more supportive ties.

Finally, sections that no longer exhibit the components of mutual cooperation, major differences in wealth, and relatively high rates of endogamy rarely constitute a viable political group. In Diagram IV (Appendix I) I show one group that has lost its corporate character. The diagram shows the claimed agnatic links of the various Bait groups of the Mehemdat tribal section. They have all but ceased to exist as a group, however, for there are few relationships between members in any domain of activity. None of the members are wealthy, few cooperate in economic activities, and many belong to different sectional alliances. It is as though each of the members stresses ties particular to him rather than ties held in common with other members of the section.

Informants say that in the past, the Mehemdat section was large and politically powerful. The Imbarak (A3 IV) were the most important family, descendents of Mahmud, reputed to once have been an important tribal leader. They have lost their position as leaders partly through a loss of wealth and manpower and the erosion of the kinds of cross-cutting ties that unite the more powerful sections. The members have aligned themselves with other sections, leaving the potential leaders without a base of support.

In generation C, ten young males in the Imbarak Bait died without issue. C18, C19, and C20 were killed in the early 1940's while defusing an Italian bomb. The others were killed while fighting with the Italians in the Fezzan against their tribal enemies, the 'Aulad Suliman. The death of sons without male issue lost the Bait a great deal of its wealth, which then passed through married daughters to other Bait groups. Thus Salim Bin Qadura (D3 I) (gene^aology I) became a major heir to the property when his mother (C10) inherited her father's property. The Bait group lost 700 trees through this demographic accident. By the same procedure, some of B5's property went to his daughter (C11), then to C3, finally ending in the control of C5. At that time, the Bin Qadura were aligned with

the Mehemdat, and Salim Bin Qadura was then known as Bin Imbarak -- a name identifying him with his mother's kin.

During the 1950's, Imbarak was still an influential man, with many animals and a client family that herded for him. In 1956, however, a severe period of freezing weather destroyed most of his stock. After that he was unable to spend the summer in the village, for he could no longer afford to pay his clients and had to negotiate herding arrangements with others. Imbarak was therefore cut off from village political activity.

During the following years, the corporate strength of the group was slowly sapped as the members struck up relationships with kinsmen in other groups and moved into the political orbit of other sections. In 1964-65, C22 was herding with a group of poor men who spent the major part of their time making charcoal. C27 was herding with the Sardowie, his affines. C24 had struck up an alliance with his brother-in-law, a man from another small section. C5 and his sons had joined the Yamie section and bought a house in their quarter of the village. The members of C2 had aligned themselves with the Sawowda and given up pastoralism in favor of day labour. C21 and his brother (C17) became aligned with the Bu Rasie and were accepting patronage from its leaders. Families within the section no longer cooperated with one another. Each had taken up activities with their affines or other close relatives outside of the section. Hence, the one remaining tie, the agnatic tie, has little importance for the members of the section. The demise of the leadership of the group restricted the possibilities of mutual cooperation between its members. In turn, the lack of these supportive components restricted the possibilities of creating a leadership and strong faction within the section. The collapse of the section as a viable unit was recognized by the government, and for administrative purposes they were merged with the Sawowda section.

VII. THE IMPACT OF SEDENTARIZATION ON TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

The expansion of government bureaucracy at local level and the accompanying economic opportunities have involved many Riah tribesmen in the field of village political and economic life perhaps more deeply than in the past. Change has radically altered the way of life of many individuals as they have settled in the village and taken up labouring jobs and government posts. While most tribesmen have acquired jobs and posts requiring little skill, some men have received training that has led to skilled positions as mechanics, drivers, hospital assistants etc. A few young men who were able to attend school have become teachers and clerks. Persons occupying these new statuses have acquired prestige among their peers. It is perhaps significant that these men are called by their occupational status as though it were part of their name. One refers to Driver Muhammad, Mechanic Habib, Clerk 'Ali, Doctor 'Abdalla and so on; one never hears labourers, herdsman or farmers referred to in this manner. The whole category of young men holding skilled positions is referred to locally as "Sbort", a corruption of the English word Sport. Although less obvious, the organization of most tribal groupings has been affected by change too.

Political groups composed of members of tribal sections deal with old intertribal problems in new ways. Boundary disputes, well ownership, camel rustling are still topics of concern, but persons have to consider the role of government and the courts in these matters. The threat of self help is still considered by tribesmen, usually as a strategy to prompt government into acting. During my stay in the field I did not hear of a case in which disputes between tribes were settled through use of physical force. When disputes occurred, government stepped in and forced the disputants to settle

matters in court. The extension of the power of government into the tribal system had changed the perimeters of political action.

National politics is a major concern to tribal leaders as a new resource, patronage posts in particular have been made available to them to allocate to their supporters. It is the concern of politicians to have the members of the tribe vote as a unit and this is facilitated through supporting traditional tribal leaders. Leaders, in turn, compete with one another and the Sawaknah for blocks of patronage careful to guard their own positions as middlemen in this system. Government services are also seen as resources of a kind and are used instrumentally by tribal leaders. Pastoralists are often made to feel a debt to tribal leaders when they receive medical treatment or the veterinarian ministers to their animals. The fact that tribal leaders are able to some extent ^{to} determine who will receive government services no doubt enhanced their positions within their own political groups. The fact that they deal with government regularly makes them a good deal more sophisticated in that area than pastoralists and further enhances their position. The expansions of the fields of economic and political activity has brought changes and this has not been confined exclusively to the area of government sponsored activities.

Development at local level provides opportunities in ^{the area of} entrepreneurialism. Men with the capital to invest and the political connections are able to make substantial profits in a variety of ways. Men with trucks haul goods to and from the cities. In Sawaknah there are two men with large trucks who also make money through government contracts. Other men are beginning to move in this direction. While I was in the field three men with commercial ambitions purchased vehicles. One started a taxi service to Tripoli and Benghazi; a second began charging persons fare to ride to and from work in Hun; and a third man specialized in moving goods for pastoralists. Many

young men are beginning to expand their interests far beyond the field of government employment and patronage jobs. It is in the field of entrepreneurship^{Ship} that the challenge to tribal forms of organization are being most frequently expressed.

However, social change within Riah tribal organization has not resulted in simply the breakdown of traditional groupings and their replacement by new ones. Traditional political groups control government patronage. Furthermore, many of the more lucrative entrepreneurial activities are organized through government sponsored projects and therefore are influenced by these groups. The Bait group and tribal section remain strong viable groups which still regulate most persons' lives and place the limits on acceptable action. There are contradictions however between some tribal forms of organization and those new modes of activities which are developing as a consequence of economic and political change in the village. In this chapter I explore some of the continuities and changes in tribal organization within the village setting.

The two most powerful political groups in the Riah tribe are composed mainly of the members of the Sawowda and Bu Rasie tribal sections (see diagrams one and two in Appendix 1). Persons of various statuses in these two groups have adapted to economic change in different ways. While most Bu Rasie have continued in pastoralism, the majority of Sawowda have become sedentary and taken wage employment in Al Jufrah.

The Sawowda political group centers primarily around the Farhart family (B1), their cousin Hamad Lishlim (C17), and Shaikh Hamad bin Hamad (D25--see Diagram two). Hamad Lishlim is an old man who has been important in local politics for many years. After national independence in 1951, when Libya was a federation of three states, he served one term as village representative in the Fezzan Parliament. The second term was served by

'Abdalla bin Salih (D24-Diagram One), the most influential man in the Bu Rasie tribal section. After 'Abdalla's tenure in office, the federation was terminated in favor of a centralized government; the parliaments of the three states were dissolved and their functions taken over by national parliament. During the federal era, however, Hamad Lishlim (C17-II) established many important relationships with influential men in the capital of Fezzan, Sebha. He also managed to secure work in the Fezzan for many people and was also instrumental in acquiring jobs for persons in Al Jufrah.

In 1959, for instance, when the Fezzan Road was being built, he managed to secure a position for Hamada Far Hart (C12 II) as construction boss on a road gang. Indirectly, this supported Hamad's own position, for he was responsible for Hamada's appointment. But Hamada (C12 II), too, grew in stature in that he had control of allocating jobs on the construction gang. Hamada appointed many of his kinsmen from the Sawowda. They worked for a few years, after which most managed to obtain easier, better paying government posts in the village bureaucracy, largely through the efforts of Hamad Lishlim (C17 II). Only four households of the Sawowda tribal section continued in pastoralism after 1962. In 1965, 19 of 25 sedentary Sawowda householders had government posts. All of the others had either acquired government posts or worked as or for entrepreneurs. Thus, the way of life and occupational structure of the Sawowda tribal section altered drastically during the late 1950's and early 1960's. Hamada's (C12 II) and Hamad's (C17 II) influence with the government supported their positions as leaders, for they were directing the flow of patronage.

Hamad was the more influential of the two, for he had strong political links with important men in the Fezzanese government. In addition, he was an older man respected by tribal and village elders. The Sawowda elders supported Hamad Lishlim (C17 II), for he was in a position to acquire for

them and for their sons government jobs and protect their positions in the government structure from the maneuvering of rivals.

Hamada (C12 II) was an energetic young man in his early thirties. He was not content merely to entrench his position in the local bureaucracy. During the early 1960's, he extended his activities into the areas of new economic opportunity. He went into partnership with a politician of national stature as part owner of a large truck. Through the politician's influence, he was able to obtain work for the truck on government construction at a high rate of return. Two of Hamada's younger brothers quit pastoralism in 1959 (C10, C11 II) were trained as drivers for him. When they were not working on the family truck, they were hired by the government as drivers.

Thus through his contacts, Hamada secured skilled, high-paying work for his brothers and other young men, and continued to expand his own interests. He was awarded the franchise to run a gasoline station, the only station between Sawknah and the Fezzan Oases, a distance of three hundred miles. He also bought a land rover, which gave him the necessary mobility to manage his diverse interests outside the village. When I knew him, he spent much time away from the oasis, prospering from his many business enterprises.

During 1965, for instance, he spent a month buying grain in the Sirte region to the north, with the advanced knowledge, according to informants, that the government would be buying grain at a higher price in the late spring. It was rumoured that Hamada's share of the profits was £8,000. Indeed, this was probably not far from the truth; later in the year he spent over £1,500 in running for parliament, bought a new land rover, and expanded the guest room in his house to accommodate over one hundred persons comfortably. Through his entrepreneurial activities, Hamada was rapidly becoming the wealthiest person in Sawknah.

Hamada's guest room was run as a hotel. Nearly every evening of the week, during the earlier part of my stay in the village, found him entertaining visitors, many of whom were influential persons traveling between the coast and the Fezzan. Since powerful political figures often visited, people were frequently reminded of Hamada's prominence outside the village.

In addition, young men within the Sawowda gathered at the guest house regularly to drink tea and gossip in the evening. The "clubby" atmosphere attracted many of the younger men in the village who were government employees and interested in the way of life outside of the village. Discussion usually focused on politics including local patronage, and new money-making schemes. Evening gossip sessions afforded the younger, technically-minded members of the village community the opportunity of meeting regularly. A new group was forming, based on associations that were also new to the village. Categories of persons who ten years previously would not have interacted now found themselves bound by a recently-acquired tie -- one that to them was becoming of major importance in their lives. Hamada drew this group together.

Since Hamada owned three vehicles when I knew him, he had equipped his garage to do repairs. The Far Harts had the reputation of being knowledgeable in mechanical matters, and young men frequently spent the hours after work at the Far Hart workshop. Hamada and his brothers aided those who owned vehicles in repairing them, and taught others the basics of vehicle repair. Hamada was able to use his entrepreneurial skills to gain prestige among both the younger members of his kin group and certain categories of persons outside the kin group. His influence, however, was limited to a great extent to the younger, technically trained men in the village. His entrepreneurial activities worked against maintaining relationships with some categories of people.

Hamada was married to a member of a wealthy nomadic family. In 1965, I was spending a few days in the camp of his father-in-law, when one of Hamada's close agnates (C25 II) visited the camp. He had come to retrieve a large flock of sheep that the family was herding for Hamada. The withdrawal of the animals came as a surprise to them. My curiosity was aroused, and so the next time I met Hamada I inquired into the incident. He said that he had asked his in-laws if they would herd his animals on contract. They had insisted on doing it without payment. He had finally agreed, thus incurring an obligation to them. In turn, this gave Hamada's in-laws an excellent opportunity to exploit his resources. Every few weeks a member of the family came to the village and Hamada extended him hospitality. They also demanded favors from Hamada, usually asking that he transport them and their possessions from village to "Nega" (i.e., pastoral camp). On occasion, they asked that he use his vehicles to move their camp and flocks in spring migration. And, what was more upsetting to Hamada, they interceded on behalf of other pastoralists requesting that he perform the same services for them.

Hamada finally tired of this treatment and sent his animals to the Sirte region to be herded on contract by a Bedouin family there. He confided in me that he found this a better solution, as his relatives could not plague him as much. There was a conflict between Hamada's position as an entrepreneur and the obligations and duties that he owed his pastoral relatives. They were not concerned with the fact that the trip to the camps frequently involving a day and a half of travel, was time spent when the vehicles could be working.

Hamada's main strength was with the growing group of young, technically-oriented persons in the village drawn from his own agnates as well as from other agnatic groups. In attempting to increase his prestige and

influence in the Sawowda kin group, Hamada was competing with his cousin Hamad Lishlim (Cl7 II), a traditional leader in the group. There was a split developing in the Sawowda section between more traditional elements and the younger men. In addition, this latter group was being joined by men from other tribal sections who found that they had more in common with Hamada and his followers than with the traditional members of their own agnatic groups.

Most members of the Sawowda tribal section had become sedentary and taken up occupations in the government wage structure. These opportunities were organized by Hamad Lishlim, who achieved prominence by successfully involving himself in regional politics. Through his activities most Sawowda and members of some of the other tribal sections were able to obtain secure government posts. Beyond this, however, some men were able to engage in entrepreneurial activities, the most lucrative of which came through government contracts.

Hamada, perhaps the most successful entrepreneur in Sawknah, was able to expand his activities through his political connections into enterprises which brought a high cash return. Thus his successful entrepreneurialism when viewed from another perspective was simply another patronage link extended by politicians to tribal leaders.

Barth has suggested that when studying the role of entrepreneurialism in social change one should make a distinction between what makes the entrepreneur¹ and what the entrepreneur makes. The usefulness of this distinction can be seen clearly when applied to the situation in Sawknah. There can be little doubt that Hamada's success as an entrepreneur was linked to his

1

Barth, F. "On the Study of Social Change", American Anthropologist, Vol. 69, 1967, p. 664.

leadership position in the Sawowda section. His entrepreneurialism itself, however, brought about some radical changes in the organization of groups and forced shifts in certain types of relationships.

Hamada provided many young men with a new model of economic success. Furthermore, his activities were organized in such a way as to bring together a group of young men with similar interests. While he was able to use entrepreneurialism as a means of welding this group together, the enterprise itself led to conflicts in other sets of relationships. One element of contradiction can be seen in the attitude which Hamada himself felt that he must adopt toward his more pastoral kinsmen. It resulted from a fundamentally different view of the function of a vehicle and the nature of reciprocity between close kinsmen who are also cooperating in economic activities. Among pastoralists who are cooperating, camels are frequently loaned to persons who need transportation. Sometimes close kinsmen will make use of a camel without feeling it necessary to first ask permission. Hamada's pastoral kinsmen felt that it was within their rights to demand his assistance in transporting them. The animals that they herded for Hamada were not on contract and therefore reciprocity of some kind was a legitimate expectation on their part.

Hamada, however, used his truck in activities which were financially
 x remunerative. He could not at the same time conduct his business activities and also commit his truck in activities where obligations were counter-productive to his business interests. He therefore was obligated to break the relationship with his pastoral kinsmen for it interfered with his busi-
 x ness commitments. Because of the nature of the enterprise, Hamada could not maintain certain types of relationships. He also had to negotiate new types of relationships, some with different categories of people. Others, while organized within the framework of existing relationships, were constituted upon a new basis.

As noted earlier, Hamada's success as an entrepreneur is related to activities in the political domain. The Sawowda leaders act as brokers between politicians active in regional affairs and tribesmen. The option for Hamada to enter into entrepreneurialism while maintaining a position of political prominence within the section rests upon the compatibility of these two roles. The fact that most of Hamada's close agnates are sedentary reduces the conflict between entrepreneurialism and leadership. The demands upon him are not as contradictory as they might be if most of his agnates were pastoralists. In fact, most of Hamada's close agnates were able to benefit considerably from his enterprise.

Eleven of Hamada's close agnates worked with him or for him. Two of his brothers drove for him. Another agnate worked regularly as a labourer for him and eight others found jobs with him on occasion. In addition, Hamada was able to do favors for others while still conducting his business. He frequently provided free transportation to persons traveling to the larger centers of Tripoli and Sebha when his truck was going there. Also, he frequently did shopping for his agnates while in Tripoli where the price of some items was considerably cheaper than in the shops in Al Jufrah.

Thus, Hamada was able to honour obligations to his close agnates and still carry on with his business enterprise.

Although it is true to say that anyone with the capital could take advantage of entrepreneurial opportunities, certain structural relationships limited the opportunities open to persons. Successful entrepreneurialism requires political support from influential politicians in the Fezzan region. Direct support of this kind is only given to persons whose political position within the tribal system allowed them to act as brokers. The option to pursue some types of entrepreneurialism are not open to some tribal leaders due to the nature of their political support. The impact that the structure of agnatic groups and interests of supporters have upon

the options open to important men can clearly be seen through the analysis of the political structure of the Bu Rasie tribal section.

The political power of the Bu Rasie and Sawowda leaders is drawn from the same source -- control of government patronage. One difference, however, is that in each group resources are administered differently and to a different category of persons. 'Abdalla bin Salih (D24 I) is the leading member of the Bu Rasie political group. Like Hamad (C17 II), he initially gained his influence with the government when serving a term as village representative to the Fezzan parliament. During his term, he secured the headmanship of the tribe for Muftah his brother-in-law. He also obtained government training, leading to skilled positions, for his younger son, Muhammad, the son of Zaruq, the son of Hamad and the sons of some other important men. In addition, he obtained numerous positions for other persons of pastoral origins both in the Fezzan and in Al Jufrah. He controlled and administered patronage in a manner similar to Hamad (C17 II). But unlike the Sawowda, most Bu Rasie families maintained a dominant interest in pastoralism. Zaruq and Hamad both had sons living as pastoralists caring for the families' flocks.

While 'Abdalla was in office, parliament voted themselves a substantial increase in pay. 'Abdalla used most of his money to invest in camels and to enlarge his house. Like Hamada, he frequently entertained important men from outside the oasis, among them members of the Saif al Nasir family. Nearly every night during my stay in Sawknah he had guests at dinner. In the evening, the members of the Bu Rasie political group congregated at his house to drink tea and gossip. There was a marked contrast between the composition of 'Abdalla's gossip group and of the group that gathered in Hamada's guest room. Bu Rasie frequently spent the hours talking of animals and the pastoral life. The sons of these men, who worked as government employees,

were, however, more apt to be at Hamada's guest house of an evening with the other young men of this new status group.

'Abdalla and all the other important men of the Bu Rasie political group were entrepreneurs, but in a different sense than Hamada and most other Sawowda. Bu Rasie invested heavily in traditional property and those with the capital to do so specialized in buying and selling animals, camels in particular. They gained a good living by fattening young animals and selling them at the inflated prices that were paid in Tripoli.

'Abdalla's position prevented him from establishing certain types of relationships and engaging in certain types of activities. For example, although he had the capital to buy a Land Rover truck and had expressed to me on numerous occasions the desire to do so, he clearly perceived it as a threat to his position. For a period of months, his son, Muhammad, had the use of a Ministry of the Interior's Land Rover. Every afternoon after work he was forced to use it to transport goods and people between the village and desert, frequently not returning until late at night. This was brought to a halt when an anonymous letter was sent to the Ministry disclosing these illegal acts.² Later, 'Abdalla often joked over the incident, saying that it was he who had informed the Ministry and implying that use of a car was more trouble than it was worth. The majority of 'Abdalla's agnates were either pastoralists or had major interests in pastoralism. Owning a vehicle and pursuing commercial activities would have placed him in the position of alienating his agnates, for not to honour their requests for transportation would have undermined his position as a leader. 'Abdalla used his position to reinforce his ties with his pastoral kinsmen.

2

Frequently persons use the independent authority of the bureaucracy to victimize their enemies.

In addition to organizing permanent employment for a few, 'Abdalla went to great lengths to obtain seasonal employment for pastoralists. He had been instrumental in obtaining kinsmen herding contracts from prominent men outside the area who wished to invest in camels. More important, however, 'Abdalla championed the cause of the pastoralists in intertribal disputes or in confrontation with the government. He had access to the inner circles of government in the Fezzan.

'Abdalla pressed the government agencies to carry out services for pastoralists. Frequently, he pressured the local hospital employees to care for the sick in the camps and the veterinarian to treat animals. The last thing that he was involved in doing before I left the field was pressing the Ministry of Agriculture to put a motor-driven pump and attendant at a large outlying well so that pastoralists would not have to draw water by hand.

'Abdalla used his influence with the government to reinforce links with kinsmen, the majority of whom were pastoralists. Since his activities benefited most pastoralists, many, not linked to him through kinship, became his supporters. Thus, the power of the leaders of both political groups was similar, resting on influence with the government. But their base of support in the tribe was different.

'Abdalla (D24 I) and Hamad (C17 II) concentrated their efforts of directing patronage to kinsmen, mainly their agnates. The majority of Bu Rasie were pastoralists; while the Sawowda were sedentary. Hamad was concerned with manipulating the system so as to control the better paying jobs, to advance his kinsmen in the government structure. 'Abdalla too was involved in competing for allocations of this kind, but he was also concerned to protect the interests of pastoralists. Hamad and 'Abdalla's positions were not complementary, both were competing for a great influence

in the allocation of patronage.

Both men were limited in what they could undertake and what categories of persons that they could favor. Politicians external to the community, responsible for decisions on patronage, were concerned with control of the tribal electorate. The position of both men rested upon balancing between two forces. They had to have the support of a large number of tribesmen for them to remain important to politicians outside the village; and they had to use resources awarded them to entrench their position with kinsmen and other supporters. Hamad and 'Abdalla had the support of their agnates. They competed for the support of other persons outside their agnatic groups, and also between themselves for control of a greater part of the resources made available to the community by the politicians.

Hamada (Cl2 II) represented a potential threat to both men. To Hamad, Hamada was a threat because he was the focus for a breach between the older and younger members of the agnatic group and thus was a potential rival for leadership of the Sawowda. To 'Abdalla he represented a more general threat as someone who was alienating the younger men of his agnatic group and giving them an alternative alignment. However, the threat was not serious in either case since Hamada had not challenged the traditional leaders in any concrete manner.

Thus, 'Abdalla was not in a position to exploit the new economic opportunities without exposing his own position as a leader. On a number of occasions he explained to me the damaging effects such a move might have. It would place him in bitter competition with Hamada and force outside politicians to choose to whom they were going to give contracts. Furthermore, his position of leadership would be placed in jeopardy. Had he carried on and used his vehicle commercially he would have had to deny agnates favors which would ultimately result in his loss of support. In turn,

if he lost the support of his agnates he would not continue to be of importance to the Saif Al Nasir. In one sense the men who remain in power by allocating patronage which keeps them in power are undermining their own position. Structurally, they are not in a position to take advantage of new opportunities themselves; they must make these opportunities available to others. This, in turn, has created a situation in which control of the system could pass out of their hands.

Although a few men in the Bu Rasie and Sawowda tribal sections are the most influential tribesmen in village political affairs, their control of government patronage is far from absolute. Members of other tribal sections have become sedentary and acquired government posts. Some of these men in turn have been able to find positions for their own kinsmen.

In Table One, I show the residence of householders by tribal section. In all of the sections some households have become sedentary since 1955. The majority of householders in the Bu Rasie and Yamie sections have remained pastoralists while all but four households in the Sawowda section are sedentary.

The members of the central core of the Yamie section are rather wealthy pastoralists. The most important men in that group are highly nomadic and do not return to the village very often. They do not have the links in the political structure in the community to acquire the types of prestigious positions that might attract their members to settle. The Bu Rasie, however, have been affected by wage labour opportunities in a different way. The central core groups of the section, those who claim common agnatic descent, have been affected more directly than the other groups in the section. All members of the Al Fallah are nomadic, only two members of the Sardowie and six members of the Bin Kita descent groups have settled. Thirteen households from the central core of the section are sedentary and most of them have

received government posts.

The settlement of tribesmen, to some extent, can be related to the availability of government jobs and posts. In this area, the relative advantages of the Sawowda and the agnatic core of the Bu Rasie can be readily observed.

T A B L E I.

Residence Of Householders By Tribal Section

	<u>Sedentary More Than Ten Years</u>	<u>Recently Settled</u>	<u>Nomadic</u>
Bu Ras	3	18	42
Sawowda	0	25	4
Yamie	8	8	30
Melanda	6	13	14
Duma	7	10	1
Sheshall	3	10	6
Mehemdat	2	5	6
TOTAL	29	89	103

In Table II, I show the numbers and types of posts held by members of the Riah tribal sections. Members of the Bu Rasie and Sawowda tribal sections hold the majority of government posts controlled by the Riah tribe. Two categories of posts reflect this situation for they are the most prestigious posts and therefore aspired to by persons without educational qualifications.

The first category includes mechanics and drivers, posts which are accorded high prestige and are well paid. Four of the seven men holding these positions are members of the Sawowda and Bu Rasie Sections. The

The three others who hold these positions are members of one extended family among the Duma, affines of Hamad Lishlim, the Sawowda leader. It should be mentioned that these posts were filled by the Duma only after they were released by the Far Hart family, cousins of Hamad Lishlim who are now entrepreneurs engaged in trucking. All appointments to mechanic and driver positions were influenced by either Hamad Lishlim or 'Abdalla bin Salih, leader of the Sawowda and Bu Rasie sections respectively.

In a second category of office servants and unskilled labourers, the same two men controlled many appointments, although other factors operate here as well. In both categories, Bu Rasie and Sawowda hold more posts than men of other sections and dominate the labour market. Eleven of seventeen office servant positions, those unskilled jobs most valued by tribesmen, are held by members of the two dominant sections. Furthermore, informants said that the two appointments held by members of the Mehemdat were acquired through 'Abdalla bin Salih.

Members of the Sawowda and Bu Rasie tribal sections hold over half of the government posts made available to Riah tribesmen. It is the structural position held by 'Abdalla bin Salih and Hamad Lishlim as representatives of the tribe in Fezzan political affairs which accounts for these facts. The figures on government employment in these groups would be even higher had not some members of both groups quit the government in favor of full time entrepreneurship and been replaced by others in the wage structure.

Also of importance in the table are the number of positions requiring skills which are occupied by recently settled tribesmen. Many young men, in particular, have acquired the education necessary to become clerks and teachers, while others have been afforded the opportunity of taking apprenticeships which have led to posts as mechanics and drivers.

T A B L E II.

Government Jobs and Posts By Tribal Section
(Settled Tribesmen Only)

	<u>Government Administrator</u>	<u>Teacher</u>	<u>Clerk</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Mechanic</u>	<u>Driver</u>	<u>Foreman</u>	<u>Office Servant</u>	<u>Unskilled Labourer</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M / S</u>	<u>M* / S**</u>
Bu Rasie	2 / 0	0 / 1	0 / 2	2 / 1.	1 / 0	1 / 1	1 / 0	3 / 1	5 / 0	15 / 6
Sawowda	1 / 0	0 / 2	2 / 1	0 / 1	0 / 0	1 / 0	0 / 0	7 / 0	8 / 0	19 / 4
Yamie	0 / 0	0 / 1	0 / 1	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	2 / 1	3 / 0	5 / 3
Melanda	2 / 0	1 / 0	1 / 1	0 / 0	0 / 0	1 / 0	2 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 1	7 / 2
Duma	0 / 0	1 / 1	0 / 0	0 / 0	1 / 1	1 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 1	3 / 0	6 / 3
Sheshall	0 / 0	0 / 0	1 / 0	2 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	4 / 0	7 / 0
Mehemdat	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	1 / 1	2 / 0	3 / 1
TOTAL	5 / 0	2 / 5	4 / 5	4 / 2	2 / 1	4 / 1	3 / 0	13 / 4	25 / 1	62 / 19

* Married Men

**Single Men

It is this group of young men who represent a threat to the established patterns of tribal organization at many levels. In the following case material I explore some of the areas in which conflict are most intense. The case concerns 'Abdalla bin Salih and his sons.

'Abdalla had two mature sons, Salih who herded camels for him; and Muhammed who was a driver working with the government. Although well into their twenties, neither was married in 1965. 'Abdalla preferred to keep them single for Salih could remain herding his camels and he could maintain control of Muhammed's wages; most of which he used to invest in camels.

Two issues were a source of grievance between 'Abdalla and his sons. One was the fact that 'Abdalla had kept his sons from marrying and the other was the use to which 'Abdalla put Muhammed's money. On the latter, Muhammed, a member of the younger generation, wished to invest in more lucrative schemes that would give him a strong position among the young men, while 'Abdalla preferred to use the money in other ways. Implicit in this mode of cooperation was the understanding that 'Abdalla would pay for the weddings of his sons and furnish their households.

A breach in family relations occurred in winter, 1965 when Muhammed failed to turn over his month's salary to his father. Muhammed countered his father's anger by saying that he had invested the money and there would be a return on it. A number of the young men in the village had organized a cooperative store. Muhammed had bought shares in the enterprise after first being pressured by his peers to do so. This act cut 'Abdalla's monthly income and potentially redirected one set of relationships. To take advantage of his son's investments, he would have to sever an on-going relationship with a village shopkeeper who, on many occasions, had given 'Abdalla credit, and buy from the store controlled by the young men in the village. It also signified that 'Abdalla was losing control over his son. A second incident occurred two months later when 'Abdalla alienated his second son.

The Muhaffet of Sebha was at 'Abdalla's for dinner one evening when he announced that he had some camels for sale and asked if 'Abdalla was interested in buying them. The cost would be between two and three thousand pounds. 'Abdalla hedged a bit, but said that he was interested. Other members of the Bu Rasie political group later said that he had expressed interest for fear of losing the political support of the Muhaffet.

Salih, 'Abdalla's older son, went into a rage. He left the house in the middle of the meal and with the son of Hamad (D35) came to see Muhammed and me. He related the story and said that he was not going to herd for 'Abdalla if he bought the camels and was going to demand payment for his services as herdsman for the past ten years. They went to the house of their brother-in-law (D15), related the story again, and berated 'Abdalla.

Salih was angry because 'Abdalla had put his marriage off for the last three years. Earlier that year, 'Abdalla had bought the derelict house site next to his own from kinsmen, a sign that he was considering Salih's marriage for that summer. Salih now knew that if 'Abdalla bought the camels, there would not be enough cash remaining to repair the house site and pay for the large wedding commensurate with the status of the family.

The breach also suited Muhammed, who had suffered many embarrassments among his friends as 'Abdalla had sanctioned his behavior. On one occasion, Muhammed and I were part of a wedding feast group ('Arasa). Each member of the group in turn undertakes to feast the 'Arasa at their house. When making the plans, friends asked Muhammed when he would like to have the group at his house. He replied that he would rather pay a fee. Others countered that it would be necessary to have one more meal. The party when possible ends on a Thursday so that members can conclude with a noonday picnic feast on Friday, the Muslim Sabbath. Muhammed had to reply that he could not hold the meal at his father's house. Although his sister and mother were

members of the household, they were "'Abdalla's women" and he could not obtain their services as cooks.

The 'Arasa pattern is a village institution. Tradition allows young men of Sawaknah origins to meet at their parents' house. The institution is absent among pastoralists. Muhammed could not operate in a manner consistent with his status for two reasons. He was not married and, therefore, did not control his own household. Secondly, 'Abdalla was not about to comply with his wishes, especially after the breach that had taken place between them. The move to reside in his brother-in-law's house suited Muhammed, for he would have more status and greater freedom.

Ali (D15) was a simple poor man who had become sedentary within the last year. What money he did have, he had used to renovate his house. He worked as a casual labourer and was waiting for 'Abdalla to obtain a post for him. In the meantime, Muhammed's knowledge of the labour market and the persons in charge, had aided Ali more than once in finding work. Living in this household and contributing to its maintenance would give Muhammed a certain amount of influence. For one, he could use the facilities of the household and the services of his sister and niece to prepare meals for his friends. Using loyalty to Salih as an excuse, Muhammed formally broke with his father.

The next morning 'Abdalla's daughters told him what had happened. They pleaded Salih's case asking him not to buy the Muhaffet's camels and to agree to Salih's wedding. 'Abdalla was unmoved. The women took the side of the young men. 'Abdalla's wife and his older unmarried daughter refused to cook, thus making it impossible for 'Abdalla to entertain. The women in the kin group close to 'Abdalla kept pressuring him to reconsider. The men, although not siding with the sons, attempted to reason with 'Abdalla. In public, they were not prepared to take the boys' side. In one conversation,

when Muhammed was at the Far Harts, Hamada lost no opportunity to attack 'Abdalla. Salim (D3), who happened to be there, said "'Abdalla has no sons; sons do not behave toward their father in that manner."

Members of the kin group attempted to persuade the young men to patch it up with 'Abdalla. Muftah (D14), Bu Ras (D22), Zaruq (C17), and Hamad (C18), 'Abdalla's closest supporters, in turn on successive evenings had Muhammed and Salih to supper; also inviting the other young men of the kin group. On each evening the conversation was the same, sometimes 'Abdalla is evil-tempered but he is your father. Return to his household and we will intercede on your behalf.

The young men were not persuaded. They continued to ask for a settlement from their father. Finally, after much pressure from the women, 'Abdalla agreed to give them five camels each. The full weight of the group had succeeded in bringing a partial settlement, but did not succeed in restoring relationships to a normal state. 'Abdalla had to contract his animals to a kinsman.

Muhammed/ now prepared to engineer his independence, but he was not free to choose the course that he desired. 'Abdalla made this impossible in some areas, while his close kin acted to sanction his behavior in others. At this point Salih became a pawn in the rivalry between Muhammed and his father. Muhammed wanted to set up an independent household as quickly as possible, for many of his peers were married and his status as an unmarried man precluded his being involved in many types of activities. In order to confirm his status among the young men, he wanted to marry a girl of a Sawaknah family. Secretly, he had been courting a girl, and since there was competition for her hand, he would have to act quickly. But before doing this, he was morally bound to see that his older brother was married. He also had to rent or build a house. On all three counts, 'Abdalla was

able to manipulate the situation so as to block his son's actions.

The first priority on the list was to purchase a house site. Since most men will not sell to persons outside their kin group, Muhammed surveyed the houses belonging to the Bu Ras. 'Abdalla, in the meantime, had asked all of the owners not to sell to his sons, arguing that he had already bought them a house site. Muhammed was not able to find one person willing to sell him property. After that, 'Abdalla went to his matrilineal half-brother, the father of Salih's future wife, and asked him to announce that his daughter was still too young to marry and to postpone the wedding for another year. (Perhaps it is coincidental, but shortly afterwards the father of the bride received a letter from the Ministry of Education informing him that he had a post as a janitor in the local school). This action blocked Muhammed's chances of marrying the Sawaknah girl, since to do so, he would have to marry before his older brother, a break with tradition that would have alienated all his kinsmen. Still, he went ahead with courting, and at one point, her father agreed to her marriage.

Muhammed was already betrothed to his first parallel cousin, the daughter of Bu Ras. When Muhammed's plans were discovered, the women of the kin group called him their enemy, and his sisters said that if he married the Sawaknah girl, the women of the kin group would not attend the wedding. The men, too, pressured Muhammed and lectured him about his responsibilities to his kinsmen, stressing the insult to his uncle if he pressed on with his plans. Thus a combination of factors - the manipulation of the situation by 'Abdalla and the sanctions imposed by members of the kin group - effectively limited alternatives for Muhammed.

A few weeks later, 'Abdalla attempted to win his sons back. He requested that Muhammed come to see him. In the ensuing conversation, 'Abdalla said that he did not mind his sons' living at 'Ali's house, but

that they should return to him occasionally for meals. He said that he was an old man and asked whether, if he died, there would be anyone to look after his younger family members, or to care for his property. Muhammed listened and then asked if 'Abdalla was willing to sell him the derelict house site that had been intended for them. 'Abdalla refused, but said that they could build on it if they chose to. After a month of fruitless negotiation, Muhammed was left with no other choice. He agreed to build on his father's house site. However, neither Muhammed nor Salih returned to reside in 'Abdalla's house. Salih continued to reside at his sister's house, and Muhammed took his meals there and slept at a bachelor friend's house. This continued throughout my stay in the field and was still the case when I returned to the field a year later.

The family relationships were restored to normal under a new set of conditions. 'Abdalla had succeeded in regaining control over Muhammed's wage package. Muhammed had agreed to use his funds to build a house on property owned by 'Abdalla. What had occurred as a generational struggle in which there was a danger of a young man's gaining independence was brought to a conclusion by the kin group in favor of traditional and against Muhammed's taking his position among the progressive young men.

But the norms governed not only what the young men could do, but also the lengths to which 'Abdalla could go in his action against his sons. He experienced the strongest and most immediate disapproval from the women who, by denying their labour, effectively disrupted the normal functioning of the household. The older men were able to persuade the young men not to act with complete disregard for the norms of the relationship. They reminded the disputants of the obligations that each had to the other. 'Abdalla was not free to act without regard for their wishes. He relied upon his kinsmen for his position in the political structure. To disregard their counsel

completely would be to jeopardize his own position of leadership. The conflict was brought to a conclusion from the various pressures of interested agnates.

The dispute, although disruptive, was at every stage contained by various pressures from the agnatic group, which set the limits of the conflict and the extent to which each party could go without strong disapproval. From this case, however, it is clear that the norms can be manipulated for personal benefit. Thus, 'Abdalla took the pressure off himself in the initial stages by having the girl's father announce that she was not old enough to marry that year.

Of further interest is the fact that the power structure within the kin group, essentially a conservative element, used the norms to reduce the likelihood of the younger men's breaking the traditional sets of alignments. Muhammed had an independent income, and because he possessed a skill, his post could not be easily taken away from him. Thus in some senses he could act without regard to the traditional power structure. Yet, in critical areas of social relations he was bound by obligations to kinsmen, and his behavior could be sanctioned. Although he wanted to break away from his father's control, certain options were not available to him. When he tried to buy a house site without his father's approval, he was not successful, and his bid to marry a Sawaknah woman was disapproved of by his kinsmen, who blocked it. Although Muhammed tried to attain independence, his options were curtailed by sanctions imposed by his father and close agnates. In very few activities was he free to act without regard for traditional sets of relationships.

In this chapter, I have followed F. G. Bailey's sound advice: "It is particularly necessary to make use of case material in studying social change because our theoretical apparatus for the study of change scarcely exists. The beginnings must be empirical".³

I have shown that some changes that have taken place have strengthened the position of persons who held influence in the tribal system. Members of the tribal elite passed the summer in the village regularly. With the era of government expansion and the development of local bureaucracy, it was these persons who naturally assumed positions of power in the patronage system. In turn, this strengthened many of the institutionalized political relationships within the traditional tribal system. 'Abdalla of the Bu Rasie tribal section, was placed in such a position, as was Hamad of the Sawowda. But both of these leaders were experiencing some difficulty in maintaining their positions. The challenge here came from persons who were deriving their power from factors recently introduced.

The cases describing Muhammed and Hamada illustrate two separate aspects of social change. Through his entrepreneurial activities, Hamada was in a position to provide jobs for others. More important, he drew to him a category of young men who were adopting new attitudes and life styles. Many of the relationships between these men were becoming institutionalized in the work situation as well as in other fields of activity. Hamada's enterprise was providing an organizational base for young men who were able to participate in new commercial ventures. While opportunities were available in the economic field, not all persons were free to take advantage of them. The case of Muhammed demonstrates the degree of control that some agnatic groups continue to exercise over their members.

3

F. G. Bailey. Tribe Caste and Nation, p. 15.

Muhammed's initial break with 'Abdalla could only have taken place in this situation. As a government driver, Muhammed had a secure independent source of income. His decision to withdraw his pay from the household was motivated by a desire to enter into an alliance sponsored by the other young men in the community. Muhammed then used the dispute between his father and brother to further his independence. Had 'Abdalla been unable to mobilize the support of his agnates, Muhammed could have bought a house and in spite of other pressures, married a Sawaknah woman. The moral pressures enforced by the women of the agnatic group caused Muhammed some difficulty. This, coupled with the sanctions imposed as a result of 'Abdalla's manipulation of certain relationships, restricted Muhammed's choices and brought him for the time being back into 'Abdalla's control. Most of the young men who are members of strong agnatic groups find that many options open in the wider system are closed off to them. But in other agnatic groups where the constraints are not as rigorous, breaches in traditional relationships have occurred and these options have been seized upon.

In the latter part of my field work, there were a number of marriages negotiated which brought strong disapproval from large sections of the community. One marriage took place between a man of pastoral origins, who had attended teachers training college, and a Sawaknah girl. Because his family was not a member of a strong agnatic group, he was not subjected to the pressures inflicted on Muhammed.

The school teacher wished to further his status among the young men by contracting a favorable marriage. First he sent an emissary to the father of a Sawaknah girl asking for his approval. The father agreed, but when it was made public there was such a resistance from the Sawaknah that the young man desisted.

He was, however, still intent on the marriage. A few months later he

secretly began negotiations again. He had his emissary invite the girl's father to his house for a meal and found that the latter was still in favor of the marriage, though he feared community disapproval. The young man then plotted to marry the girl secretly. On the day chosen, he told his mother to prepare meat for the noon meal, as there would be guests. The young man then went with friends for a picnic, leaving the emissary and his father to conclude the contract. Religious officials invited to the meal were then asked to witness the contract, which they did reluctantly. The school teacher returned in the late afternoon and found that many Sawaknah were angered by the marriage. He simply went to the village square, however, where he announced to friends in a loud voice that if he heard anyone discussing his wife he would summon the police from Hun.

By threatening to call in an external agency of the government, the young man was able to avoid a confrontation with the Sawaknah who disapproved of the marriage. He had outmaneuvered the other interested parties and used external force to back up his actions. When I questioned him and asked why he had gone to so much trouble, he replied: "I did not want to marry one of my pastoral relatives, as they do not know how to cook or keep house; and therefore I would not be able to entertain my friends in a manner appropriate to my status." There was little pressure against the marriage from his own agnates. This same young man, free of many constraints imposed by the more powerful agnatic groups or their members, took advantage of new options in other fields of activity.

He and his two brothers were able to purchase a Land Rover and run a taxi service for Bedouin, transporting goods and people between desert and village. Because they were not members of political groups and were too young to have political ambition of their own, they were able, unlike Hamada, to charge for these services. In a matter of nine months they had regained the

cost of the Land Rover.

A few other men in similar positions also entered commerce during the period of my field work. One bought a minibus and carried passengers to Tripoli. Another instituted a taxi service between Hun and Sawknah. It was among these men, who stood outside of the major agnatic groups and who were not directly linked to the tribal political structure, that the solid bonds of alliance in entrepreneurialism began to emerge.

VIII. THE DYNAMICS OF LOCAL LEVEL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

In this final chapter, I focus upon local-level political behavior. Specifically I shall analyze the role of the entrepreneur in this area. Although entrepreneurialism usually refers to economic behavior, the concept¹ has been applied to political behavior as well. In Sawknah oasis, politics, patronage and entrepreneurialism are all closely connected.

There was one parliamentary representative for the Al Jufrah region. The oasis communities competed for the position. Hun, Waddan and Sawknah each ran a candidate for election, and each village voted as a block for the village candidate. The decisions on local candidacy were resolved within the village informally prior to election. In 1965, when the King dissolved Parliament and proclaimed a national election, both Hamada Far Hart and 'Abdalla bin Salih expressed an interest in candidacy.

They were both urged by their supporters to campaign. However, the Saif al Nasir intervened privately with the two candidates and it was decided² that Hamada should run. 'Abdalla's supporters were angered. The morning after the decision was made, some members of the Sawowda faction lead by Hamad Lishlim (C17 II) came to 'Abdalla's (D24 I) house to plan election strategy. Great emphasis was placed upon tribal solidarity. Hamad said that it was not the time to argue their differences, but to stress their common interest. Members of 'Abdalla's faction objected angrily to the way the decision leading to Hamada's candidacy had been reached. They said that the candidacy should have been decided by the tribesmen and not by an outsider. 'Abdalla countered their objections by saying that his only intention in running was to "Shed al nas", keep the people in their village patronage alignment. 'Abdalla was able to pacify his followers and get them to pledge to

¹F. Barth. The Role of the Entrepreneur in Social Change in Northern Norway.

²Although I was not present at this meeting, it was generally accepted that only Hamada had enough cash to mount a campaign. The Saif al Nasir influenced the decision by claiming that they could not finance the campaign.

work for Hamada. Thus a small group of men, those who controlled patronage were able to decide who would represent the village in the election and how the villagers would vote.

The problems of the campaign were strategic rather than ideological. With the support of the leaders of the village no one worried about groups breaking from the village alliance. It was rightly assumed that everyone in the village would vote for the village candidate. The problem was to insure that all eligible voters would be present in Sawknah the day of the election. This was not an easy task for more than 150 pastoral voters were scattered in tents over an area of 12,000 square miles. In addition, a great many eligible voters were resident in the big cities of Benghazi, Tripoli and Sebha. In Libya in 1965, a man had to deposit his vote in the ballot box in the area in which he was registered; there were no absentee procedures. To this end, to bring all male members of the community together for the election Hamada used his skills. The organization that he built was staggering in its effectiveness and efficiency.

Hamada turned his attention to organizing the pastoral population and buying votes from other oases. To do this, he needed 'Abdalla's support. Together they made a tour of the desert camps in his Land Rover. 'Abdalla convinced the pastoralists of the importance of this event for the community. 'Abdalla said to me during the campaign that without his support the pastoralists would not have come to the village to vote for Hamada.

A major problem facing the pastoralists was the difficulty of obtaining water for domestic consumption in the absence of the adult males. With 'Abdalla's aid, Hamada secured nearly one hundred empty 50-gallon oil barrels, which he filled at the village artesian well, packed on his truck and carried to the camps, thus releasing men of a major responsibility. In addition to using his own truck and two Land Rovers in the campaign, Hamada hired the services of the other truck owner in the oasis, the Land Rover of a second

person and Saif al Nasir gave them use of a jeep for the week prior to the election. Thus, Hamada had a large fleet of vehicles at his command.

Hamada also had command of the manpower of the campaign. First of all, he had the aid of his kin group organized by Hamad Lishlim (Cl7 II). Since transportation and maintenance of the vehicles was essential to the organization of the campaign, many of the young men who were government workers and entrepreneurs in their own right, came to his support. The organization of the work situation was adapted to running the communication of the election. And the de facto split in both the agnatic group and in the tribe became clear.

Many of the young men, members of various agnatic groups took roles in Hamada's election organization. Among them were members of the Bu Rasie section, E14 (I), D36 (I) and a descendent of B2 all of whom drove for Hamada. In addition, E2 and E3 (I) owners of a vehicle loaned it to Hamada for the election. This was done even though the elder members of the Bu Rasie were rivals of the Sawowda and few Bu Rasie leaders took an active part in the election campaign. Within the Sawaknah kin group the cleavages between younger supporters of Hamada and the older supporters of Hamad Lishlim were given expression, but all worked for the election of Hamada. Hamada's younger brothers C10 and C11 and a cousin, D13, who took a leave of absence from his job for the occasion, worked as drivers. In addition, other young men in the group acted as helpers on the trucks and in repairing them when they broke down. The technically minded young men from the Sawowda as well as the members of this category from other groups gathered around Hamada. Within a few days, after his candidacy was decided, Hamada had organized an effective machine and the function of the other village leaders was minimized. Hamada effectively managed to acquire the support of most of the pastoral electorate. He did this by providing water for their households, and other favors.

During the week prior to election Hamada honoured nearly every request

for transportation made by persons. He taxied women to visit with relatives, sick persons to the hospital, guests to wedding parties, goods to pastoral camps and to Sawknah from the large market in Hun. On one occasion, he even had a driver travel sixty miles into the desert, catch a camel, and bring it to the oasis. It was to be slaughtered at a wedding celebration. For the week before the election, the village, normally tranquil, became a hub of activity. The seldom-traveled footpaths and animal trails of the desert became highways frequently traveled by vehicles as they shuttled persons and goods from one place to another. And Hamada was "the general" in this organization, negotiating, listening to requests and giving orders to lieutenants. People took advantage of him. As one man put it: "he has to honour our every request for he wants us to elect him." Other leaders became less conspicuous as the week progressed and were stunned by the degree to which Hamada had usurped their position. The final increment to Hamada's prestige was the hospitality that he extended to the village.

He threw his house open to the townspeople, fed and lodged the majority of pastoralists, migrants, and many of the villagers who were working in this organization. Again, members of the Sawowda agnatic group were instrumental in organizing and managing the complex business of providing lodging and three meals a day for nearly 150 persons. To this end, other close agnates and affines of Hamada within the group organized. Gelani (C16), Hamada 'Abbas (C18), Brageim (C21), Hamad (C25), 'Abdalla (C14) and (D25) Shaikh of the section, Hamada's brother-in-law, slaughtered and butchered animals and served the food that was prepared by Hamada's sisters and the wives of these men. Hamad Lishlim did not take an active part in these preparations, but spent his time consulting with the important older men of other tribal sections and traveling to other oases in an attempt to purchase votes. Thus, it did not appear that he took a servile role to Hamada, and his status as an important man was not impaired. Hamada expended a great deal of wealth on the election. The patronage was a means to an end. But the means itself

had the effect of raising Hamada's prestige enormously. Hamada had succeeded in galvanizing the support of the young men in the village, securing the functional leadership of the Sawowda kin group, and directly intersecting lines of patronage to most supporters of other factions. In the situation 'Abdalla (D24 I), in particular, was undercut. Where previously 'Abdalla had been an intermediary, members of his kin group and other supporters now petitioned Hamada directly for favors. 'Abdalla kept to himself, for participation in the election activity would have placed him in a subservient role to Hamada. There was much joking about 'Abdalla's absence at meals at Hamada's house. On one occasion, Hamada confronted 'Abdalla and invited him to dine. Rather than make excuses 'Abdalla said "No, we are having meat at my house; " intimating that the meals Hamada was presenting to guests were of inferior quality. In the election weeks, Hamada was by far the most important man in the village. Through an enormous expenditure of funds, Hamada had acquired prestige among tribesmen.

Hamada lost the election to the candidate from Waddan, but polled more votes than was expected. A candidate from Waddan or Hun, both communities twice the size of Sawknah, usually won the parliamentary seat. The leaders of Sawknah were not primarily concerned with winning, but with maintaining the village as a unified electoral block. The campaign had fulfilled this end, everyone in Sawknah had voted for the village candidate. The relationship of the village leaders with the Saif al Nasir faction in Fezzan thus remained secure.

The case illustrates many aspects of the political process in Sawknah oasis. The characteristics of the political structure are in Swartz's terms "local-level": "The core of our meaning was that local level politics occurs in communities where relationships are 'multiplex' rather than 'simplex' (Gluckman 1955b, P. 19) and where politics is incomplete in the sense that

actors and groups outside the range of local multiplex relationships are vitally and directly involved in the political processes of the local group."³

The Saif al Nasir determined to a certain extent which of the local tribesmen would be the village candidate. This was done by denying campaign funds to 'Abdalla when Saif al Nasir knew that Hamada had earned a great deal of money in the spring speculating in grain.⁴ They had further influenced that situation by insisting that the village run a candidate and not join forces with another oasis community to support a common candidate. In the past Zilah and Sawknah had mobilized behind a common candidate at Saif al Nasir's suggestion in an attempt to capture the parliamentary seat.

Both the Saif al Nasir and the local leaders saw the importance of a local candidate running in the election. 'Abdalla stated this quite clearly when he maintained that his only interest in running was to keep the people together in the village political alliance. The implication was that if someone from the village did not run in the election, politicians from the other villages might succeed in attracting support in Sawknah thus causing an irreparable breach in the corporate political structure of the village. Clearly, both the Saif al Nasir and village leaders saw the dangers of not running a candidate. They were prepared to campaign rigourously even though they did not expect to win.

What had begun as a simple strategy to maintain the villages' external patronage alignments ended with a major disruption of internal tribal political organization. The latent conflicts which divided tribesmen became quite evident. In the initial stages of competition for candidacy the expected rivalry between Sawowda and Bu Rasie was manifest. However, once

3

M. Swartz, Local Level Politics, p. 1.

4

It was rumoured that the Saif al Nasir had pressured Hamada into running arguing that the money made from the grain was due entirely to the Saif al Nasir political connections.

the campaign was underway the cleavage between young skilled men and the older more conservative tribesmen became evident. Young skilled men from all of the tribal sections were participating in the campaign as the group most closely associated with Hamada. To some extent these ties ran counter to agnatic loyalties and resulted in some major altercations between old and young.

The older men who, in other situations, would have taken major roles in political activities were undercut. The decision making was controlled by Hamada and other young men. One major aspect of decision making was technical knowledge. Before undertaking a venture, such things as driving skill, accurate knowledge of distances involved and petrol consumption, weight distribution, carrying capacity, mechanical condition of the vehicle, countless other technical matters had to be taken into account. Their technical knowledge gave the young men the final say in all strategies involving transportation in the election campaign.

Both 'Abdalla bin Salih and Hamad Lishlim did not involve themselves in village activities. They assumed responsibility for negotiating support for Hamada in other Al Jufrah villages, an activity that most were aware was fruitless.

More important, however, the election allowed Hamada not only to gain prestige in the village but also gave him the opportunity to attempt to convert his resources in the economic field to resources in the political field. The election campaign welded together the large category of young men with technical skills into a political group that gave unqualified support to Hamada. Many believed that he was the best person for the job arguing that he was literate and had a knowledge of government affairs beyond the range encompassed by the more conservative tribal leaders. Some of the young men were openly contemptuous of the older men and regarded them as ignorant. Hamada, on the other hand, by extending hospitality, was able to put many

people in his debt. Thus, during the week of the election it seemed as though Hamada had become a major tribal leader and that a group of solid supporters stood behind him. It appeared that the cleavage brought through economic development in the village had manifest itself. It was unclear, however, just what the functions of such a group would be in the political organization of the tribe.

In the weeks after the election, Hamada attempted to legitimate his newly acquired, if ambiguous, status, as an important man within the tribal political structure. The next major issue facing the tribe led to Hamada's isolation as a major political figure in tribal affairs.

There was a territorial dispute between the Riah and a neighbouring tribe regarding ownership of wells and territory west of Sawknah. The issue was to be taken to court, and the town leaders were awaiting the hearing. Since the villagers as well as the pastoralists, regarded themselves as owners of the land, most Sawaknah were interested in the case too.

The village and tribal notables had met without inviting Hamada to join them and decided to charge each village resident a five pound tax in order to hire a nationally known lawyer to plead their case. 'Abdalla and Muftah had been at the meetings with the village elders. The Sawowda were represented by Hamad Lishlim (C17) and the Shaikh of the section, Hamad Muhammad (D25); Hamada was not consulted in this matter. Other important men sought out these two Sawowda ignoring Hamada. Hamada protested not being consulted and announced that he was not going to contribute to the court costs. He tried to get the young men to hold out, but they were pressured by their agnates to contribute. On this issue, Hamada's political support was undermined.

Early one day in the late winter of 1965, the government officials of Al Jufrah called the notables of Sawknah, the mudir and shi^heks, to a secret meeting in Hun. There they were asked to sign a paper stating that the pastoralists would not use the disputed territory that spring. Early in the afternoon of the same day, news of the agreement was made public by a Sawowda, Gelani (C16). An argument began between Gelani, brother-in-law to Hamada, and Hamad Bil 'Ain (D4), brother-in-law to Hamad (D25). Hamad Bil 'Ain took the side of the shakhs arguing that the matter was procedural and that the government wanted to avoid conflict. He said the courts should make the decision. Gelani argued that the lands belonged to Riah, that no external power was going to tell tribesmen what they could or could not do on their own land. The jurisdictional issue being argued was lost as a large crowd began gathering, and noticeably, the argument turned to threats against the village government officials, but only those representing certain tribal sections. Members of the Bu Rasie leadership were present, as were members of the Yamie section. They did not make accusations against their leaders, but members of two tribal sections threatened their officials and there was great concern on the part of those present that hostilities would break out. Members of the Melamda tribal section gathered saying that they were going to kill their Shaikh. Kinsmen of the angry men restrained them. The second, and more serious incident in the dispute occurred between members of the Sawowda tribal section. Hamad, the Shaikh (D25), joined his brother-in-law in the argument; Gelani (C16), ran to find Hamada; while another member of the section went to find Hamad Lishlim (C17), who wisely chose not to become directly involved. Hamada came to the group in a car where upon he jumped out, walked up to Shaikh Hamad (D25), and said: "Now that the Muta Sarraf (Governor of Sebha) has increased your pay by £25 per month, he has you in his pocket. You will do anything that he tells you. You are afraid of the government 'Ya dillel', (fearful one)." Although a mild

rebuke in English, this reference to cowardice in Arabic is a major insult. Hamad, normally a mild mannered man of slight build, slapped Hamada's face. Braheim (C21 II), a supporter of Hamada, stepped between them and the two other men. People referred to the incident in terms of personalities. They stressed that the disputants were brothers-in-law and that this incident had damaged their relationship. Among the people, perception of what had actually happened was changed to conform with the disputants' other social characteristics. Hamada (C12) was said to have hit Hamad (D25), and all agreed that the action that he had taken was deplorable.

The redress mechanism brought into operation strengthened Hamad Lishlim's position for he undertook to organize the members of the group to pressure the disputants to attend a meal at his house. The disputants finally agreed and Hamad, responsible for organizing the settlement, had regained a position of major importance among his kin. Hamada was rebuked by his kin. The support that he had was undermined in the situation in two ways. He committed an offense, which in traditional terms, forced kinsmen to turn to mechanisms of redress, losing sight of the larger issue at hand. Secondly, Hamada's support from the young men was of little value, since it was unclear what role ~~this~~ support could take. The situation in which Hamada had acted and the type of action he had taken, robbed him of support. In that situation, Hamada could not mobilize the support of the young men.

Hamada's isolation from the kin group leaders and from the centers of influence in the village continued. The support from his kin group, that he once enjoyed, was now behind Hamad. The types of issues facing the village were those requiring solutions that reinforced traditional modes of support. Hamada's entrepreneurial skills and his supporting professional skill were of little value in the land dispute. Hamad (C17) had legitimacy with other village and tribal leaders, his influence with the government continued, and on the issues confronting the tribe, the land dispute, he was thought knowledgeable. Hamada (C12) did not have any means of mobilizing

support for a position on these issues. Persons were tied to him through entrepreneurialism. On issues of this kind they were bound to tribal grouping by ties which in this situation were pre-emptive.

Hamada's isolation in the community was continued as other stereotypes were used. Sanctions brought down by the government, once said to be anonymous, were now attributed to Hamada Far Hart and a few other men who consistently supported him. It was said that Hamad Lishlim's affines, members of a smaller tribal section, had been fined by the government when Hamada informed the police that they did not have insurance on their car. On another occasion, Hamad Lishlim was defendant in a lengthy court trial, and rumour had it that Hamada had informed the government that Hamad had slaughtered a camel and sold meat at a higher price than was allowed by law. In return, anonymous letters were sent to the petrol company asserting that Hamada was putting water in the petrol at his service station. Then too, he became the butt of jokes. The members of the more traditional alliances in the community had succeeded in isolating the entrepreneur, and thus limited his influence within the tribal political system.

It would seem that in Sawknah the structural prerequisites to bring about marked political changes in tribal structure are present. It could be argued that Hamada attempted to do just that, but during my time in the field, he was unsuccessful. In this final section, I will explore some of the structural reasons for his failure.

Clearly Hamada attempted to use resources acquired in the field of economic activity instrumentally to achieve political ends. He was successful in organizing a group of supporters from among the young technologically oriented members of the Riah tribe. In the election activities this worked well, but he was not able to maintain this group as supporters afterwards.

One indicator of the inability of his supporters to maintain themselves as an interest group after the election can be seen in the notables treatment of Hamada. Since he was not able to muster support for his opposition to their policies they were able to exclude him from the decision-making process in the village, by simply not including him. The reasons why Hamada could neither use his supporters or other resources to gain political prominence are linked to the political field in two important ways.

First sources of external support for both Hamada and other important men must be considered. Most support came from the same source-the Saif al Nasir faction (in the form of patronage). While Hamada received lucrative government contracts, others were given the right to allocated government jobs and posts to followers.

It is unlikely that Hamada could interfere with other tribal notables at this level without first gaining a substantial following from within the community. Most people knew this fact. On one occasion, when Hamada in anger threatened to have a man removed from the government payroll, most persons stated that they did not think that he had the power. A rumour also circulated that he was a member of the secret police, hardly an explanation linking him to the village patrons.

A second explanation of Hamada's failure politically is linked to the organization of political groups within the tribe itself. The major politically corporate groups are the tribal sections which form around important men who claim to be true agnates. While these groups do not hold territory, they are corporate in other ways. They possess a definitive normative structure and as indicated in the case of Muhammed, described in Chapter VII, the group can sanction the acts of its members. While the information on the major functions of these groups in the past is suspect, it is clear from the case material that patronage allocations from the government are giving them continuing political importance in the present situation.

The leaders of these groups have been able to use their positions as "brokers" to continue their control over men who work for government. While government itself has provided a new set of sanctions available to competing groups they are not monopolized by any particular section of the population. The use and counter use of government sanctions by persons described in the cases bears witness to this fact. Indeed at the level of explanation these government sanctions function in a manner similar to witchcraft accusations in other societies.

In Sawknah among the Riah one finds a situation similar yet reversed to that described by Bailey.⁵ At village level the tribal system has had a major impact on the organization of bureaucracy and effectively regulated the options open to persons who are able to exploit the new opportunities. In one sense traditional tribal institutions have been adapted to control these new resources.

As a consequence an interesting structural situation prevails in Sawknah oasis. One finds action sets restricted to the same field of activity as corporate tribal groups. While most anthropologists have focused their attention on the former group in situations where institutions did not seem to regulate social life, Boissevain has argued that they are a feature of all societies.⁶ Unfortunately, Boissevain does not tell us why they should be studied, but the case material from Sawknah provides us with a clue. The coalition formed by the young men to support Hamada during the election is such a group.

⁵
F. G. Bailey. Tribe Caste and Nation.

⁶
Boissevain. "The place of non groups in Social Science", Man, 1968, p. 542.

Indeed, this category of young men had all of the characteristics necessary to form a corporate political group. They had a common identity, an ideology which ran counter to tradition and, more important, common interests to protect. But they only infrequently emerged as a group with skills and organizational potential to rival the traditional leaders.

An answer to their ineffectiveness as a support group for Hamada emerges from the analysis of the case material. The group had neither a clear normative charter nor could it attain a consensus as to in which situations it had a legitimate right to act. While the norms regulating the action of the tribal groups are clearly defined, there is no such clear set of indicators open to the young technologically oriented men. Furthermore, in most political activity the agnatic group makes claims on their loyalty and to act against the norms of the agnatic group exposes the individual to severe sanctions. Although at the point of radical change tribal groupings regulate most aspects of the political and the economic life of their members.

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
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
APPENDIX I

DIAGRAM I
'Ailet BuRas Tribal Section



C17 ZARUQ
 C19 HAG SALIH
 D3 SALIH BIN QADURA
 D14 MUFTAH BIN YUSIF
 D22 BU RAS BIN SALIH
 D24 'ABDALLA BIN SALIH

DIAGRAM II
'Ailet Sawowda Tribal Section



C12 HAMADA FAR HART
 C14 'ABDALLA
 C16 GELANI
 C17 HAMAD LISHLIM
 C18 'ABBAS
 C21 BRIHIEH
 D4 HAMAD BIL 'AIN
 D25 SHAIKH HAMAD

DIAGRAM III
 'Ailet Yamie Tribal Section





DIAGRAM IV
'Ailet Mehemdat Tribal Section



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