

**THE CARTEL MODEL: FACT OF FICTION?  
DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS SINCE 1970**

A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of  
PhD in the Faculty of Humanities

**2006**

**KARIN ATHENA BOTTOM**

**SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

ProQuest Number: 13805279

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 13805279

Published by ProQuest LLC (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.

This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

(EUSXM)

~~X~~

Th 31714

✓

THE  
JOHN RYL  
UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARY

## List of Contents

	List of Contents	1
	List of Tables	5
	List of Figures	7
	Abstract	8
	Declaration	9
	Copyright Statement	10
	Acknowledgments	11
	The Author	12
<b>Chapter 1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>13</b>
	1.1 Changes in access to government: the role of establishment status	14
	1.2 Structure of the dissertation	17
<b>Chapter 2</b>	<b>An introduction to the cartel model: a new ideal type</b>	<b>20</b>
	2.1 Recent developments in west European politics	20
	2.2 Party cartelisation: theory and empirical findings	25
	2.3 Cartel parties and party cartels: theory vs. reality	35
	2.4 Chapter structure	41
<b>Chapter 3</b>	<b>Conceptualising the cartel and cartel parties</b>	<b>45</b>
	3.1 Size, composition and membership: what exactly is a party cartel?	46
	3.2 A framework for identifying party cartels in modern day party systems	49
	3.3 Concluding comments	57

<b>Chapter 4</b>	<b>Party cartelisation: fact or fiction?</b>	<b>59</b>
4.1	The measurement of political space	65
4.2	Identification of the mainstream left and right	70
4.3	Cartelisation as an assessment of office-seeking behaviour: classifying probable strategies	71
4.4	Findings	83
	<i>4.4.1 Convergence as a function of office-seeking incentives</i>	84
	<i>4.4.2 Available competitive space after 1970</i>	85
	<i>4.4.3 Convergence?</i>	88
	<i>4.4.4 Stabilisation as a function of office-seeking incentives</i>	91
4.5	Implementation and efficiency: the new ideology	93
4.6	Concluding Comments	96
<b>Chapter 5</b>	<b>System cartelisation: a consolidation of seats and office</b>	<b>100</b>
5.1	Operationalisation of the cartel framework	103
5.2	Gauging system cartelisation: indicators and predictors	108
5.3	Findings: systemic cartelisation as a function of convergence in the mainstream	113
5.4	Concluding Comments	124
<b>Chapter 6</b>	<b>Cartel politics and the extreme right-wing</b>	<b>126</b>
6.1	The third wave of extreme right-wing politics and party cartelisation: a theoretical overview	128
	<i>6.1.1 State subsidies and convergence: two indicators of Cartelisation</i>	132
	<i>6.1.2 Operationalising anti-cartel politics</i>	133
6.2.	Developing and testing the theory	137
6.3	Findings	144
6.4	Suffering from cartel environments: true or false?	148
6.5	Discussion	150

<b>Chapter 7</b>	<b>Conclusion: a cartelisation of party politics?</b>	<b>155</b>
7.1	Findings in context: movement towards a cartelisation of politics?	155
7.2	Politics post 1970: Cartel or catch-all?	160
7.3	Concluding comments and recommendations for future research	162
<b>Appendix A</b>	A.1 Mainstream left and right left-right averages by decade	165
	A.2 Disproportionality by decade	166
	A.3 One Sample t-test calculations measuring the difference between mainstream left and right ranges before and after 1970	167
	A.4 Centre left and Centre right ranges before and after 1970	168
	A.5 Bivariate correlations between centre-left and centre-right range and election date 1970-1998	171
	A.6 Post-war mainstream centre left and right ranges on the left-right dimension 1945-1998	174
	A.8 Bivariate correlations between centre-left and centre-right competition and election date 1970-1998	178
	A.9 Post-war mainstream volatility on the left-right dimension 1945-1998	181
	A.10 Mainstream left and right emphasis on administrative efficiency by decade	183
<b>Appendix B</b>	B.1 Operationalisation of parties that do and do not have access to the cartel	184
	B.2 Effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) averaged by decade	191
	B.3 Numerical distribution of seat percentages across mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties by decade	192
	B.4 Graphical distribution of seat percentages across mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties 1945-1998	193

<b>Appendix C</b>	C.1	Electoral scores of the extreme right-wing 1980-1998	197
	C.2	Full titles, translations and abbreviations of extreme right-wing parties	199
	C.3	Mainstream centre right left-right averages by decade	200
<b>Bibliography</b>			<b>201</b>

**Word Count: 56,067**

### List of Tables

2.1	Catalysts and party change in the cartel model	27
2.2	Classification of systems according to the first dimension in Lijphart's majoritarian/consensual distinction	43
3.1	Features of parties that do and do not have access to the cartel	50
4.1	Costs of opposition	74
4.2	Average disproportionality after 1970	76
4.3	Classification of systems by way of most common governmental formulae 1945-1998	78
4.4	Impact of direct subsidies	81
4.5	Ranked likelihood of office-seeking policy cartelisation	82
4.6	Bivariate correlations between mainstream left and right ranges and the four ranked measures of office seeking propensity 1970-1998	85
4.7	Mainstream left and right ranges before and after 1970	87
4.8	Bivariate correlations between mainstream left and right range and election date 1970-1998	88
4.9	Decade-based distances between the mainstream left and right on the left-right dimension	90
4.10	Average mainstream left and right volatility on the left-right dimension by decade	92
4.11	Bivariate correlations between mainstream left and right competition and election date between 1970 and 1998	93
4.12	Average mainstream, left and right efficiency by decade	96
5.1	Features of parties that do and do not have access to the cartel	106
5.2	Governmental dynamics 1945-1970	113
5.3	Bivariate correlations between effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) and election date 1970-1998	115

5.4	Bivariate correlations between mainstream and secondary party seat percentages 1970-1998	117
5.5	Numerical distribution of decade-based collective seat percentages across mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties 1945-1998	118
5.6	Changes in mainstream seat percentages 1970-1998	119
5.7	Parties obtaining semi-status 1970-1998	122
6.1	Decade-based emphases on political corruption in the extreme right-wing	134
6.2	Decade-based left-right emphasis in the extreme right-wing	136
6.3	Impact of state support	139
6.4	Impact of ballot access	141
6.5	Distances between the centre-left and centre-right on the left-right dimension 1980-1998	143
6.6	Overall impact of state imposed barriers	144
6.7	Correlations between indicators of cartelisation and political corruption and left-right emphases in the extreme right-wing 1980-1998	145
6.8	Decade-based left-right emphases in the centre-right	147
6.9	Bivariate correlations between extreme right-wing vote and indicators of cartelisation 1980-1998	149
7.1	Overall display of behaviour suggestive of cartelisation 1980-1998	161

**List of Figures**

1.1	Establishment status and the legitimacy divide	17
2.1	Flow chart to suggest the progression of party cartelisation	40
3.1	Application of the cartel framework to parties that have access to government	52

### **Abstract**

Scholarly analysis has a proclivity to try and understand party behaviour through the lens of 'ideal types'. While a surfeit is available, four appear to dominate the party literature: cadre, mass, catch-all and cartel. This dissertation develops a number of arguments relating to the latter that was introduced by Katz and Mair in 1995. Essentially proposing that party behaviour has been reflective of that shown by business cartels since 1970, the Katz/Mair model suggests that in order to survive, party cartelisation has seen specific sets of parties capturing and controlling markets of their choice. The speculation is tested in this dissertation in terms of policy, parliamentary seats and access to government before proceeding to examine the predicted impacts of the process. Hypotheses are subjected to bivariate analysis and tested on data from eleven western industrial democracies between 1945 and 1998, specifically concentrating on the era most associated with cartelisation: post-1970. The results provide no real evidence supportive of the thesis at the level of individual systems or as a generalised process. Nevertheless, in support of the model's claims, bivariate analysis does appear to suggest that extreme right-wing policy is more likely to criticise the political elite in environments where cartel-related features are evident. Due to recent developments in party politics, analysis of the time period after 1998 is required before it is possible to conclude whether parties have made any efforts to cartelise and recommendations are made for extending the size and brevity of the sample set. Overall, it is suggested that the scholarly research would be better served by avoiding the search for ideal party types in the future.

**Declaration**

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

### Copyright Statement

- (i) Copyright in text of this thesis rests with the author. Copies (by any process) either in full, or of extracts, may be made **only** in accordance with instructions given by the author and lodged in the John Rylands University Library of Manchester. Details may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made. Further copies (by any process) of copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the permission (in writing) of the author.
  
- (ii) The ownership of any intellectual property rights which may be described in this thesis is vested in The University of Manchester, subject to any prior agreement to the contrary, and may not be made available for use by third parties without the written permission of the University, which will prescribe the terms and conditions of any such agreement.
  
- (iii) Further information on the conditions under which disclosures and exploitation may take place is available from the Head of School of *Social Sciences* (or the Vice-President and Dean of the Faculty of Life Sciences, for Faculty of Life Sciences' candidates).

### Acknowledgements

Throughout the course of this endeavour I have been grateful for the help I have received from colleagues, friends and family. First however, I must express my gratitude to the University of Manchester which funded my work between 2001 and 2004. I am primarily indebted to my supervisor David Farrell for his advice, guidance, support and patience throughout the last five years. Within the Politics Department at the University of Manchester I would like to express my gratitude to Jill Lovecey for helping me to unravel the French party system, Adrian Blau for his advice, particularly throughout the final weeks, Andrew Russell and Gerry Stoker for valuable contributions in my supervisory boards and Peter John for advice when I first embarked upon a quantitative route. I am grateful to my PhD colleagues Jerry Johnson and Robin Pettit for their suggestions, particularly Jerry for his statistical expertise, and I would like to express my appreciation to Tessa Brannan for her proof reading skills in the eleventh hour. From outside the department thanks must go to Judith Bara for guidance on data analysis and use of the Comparative Manifesto Data Set, and Elizabeth Carter for what at times must have seemed like endless requests for guidance and help; I would also like to thank her for allowing me access to her data. Thanks must also go to those attending the 'Re thinking political parties' panel at the 'Elections, Public Opinion and Political Parties' (EPOP) Conference, Cardiff 2003, and the 'Populist parties as governing parties' panel at the 'European Consortium for Political Research' (ECPR) Conference, Marburg 2003. In an academic sense the final person I would like to thank is Kurt Richard Luther whose teaching throughout my undergraduate and graduate degrees at the University of Keele encouraged me to pursue research in political parties to the level of doctorate. I would also like to thank my friend and fellow PhD student Anna Gustavsen for her endless support since 2001 and I am indebted to Julie O'Brien for help with my graphs just before submission. Finally, however, my thanks and gratitude must go to my parents Alan and Jackie Bottom for their advice, support and forbearance throughout each stage of this project.

I am grateful to my internal and external examiners Peter Humphreys and Paul Taggart. Their advice enabled me to clarify a number of issues for the final version of this thesis.

## **The Author**

### **Candidate details**

Karin Athena Bottom

### **Qualifications**

BSc., Dual Honours, Political Science and Psychology, School of Politics International Relations and the Environment (SPIRE), University of Keele, 2000.

M.A., Parties and Elections, School of Politics International Relations and the Environment (SPIRE), University of Keele, 2001.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

Party politics has undergone a series of quite significant changes in recent years. Cleavages delineating the boundaries of competition and political alternatives have shifted; previously considered frozen (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), they have more recently been described as thawed and electoral behaviour has altered accordingly (Dalton and Flanagan, 1984; Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck; 1984; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). The extent to which these developments signify an introduction of permanent instability of party fortunes and political behaviour (Blondel, 2002 ; Drummond, 2006), a repositioning of both (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Mair, 1993; 1997), or indeed a mixture of the two (Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck, 1984) is an ongoing and fluid debate.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the power base of traditional politics appears to have been eroded somewhat, not least in terms of its hitherto predictable position of hegemony. Moreover, new parties, particularly those representing new and alternative cleavages have been able to consolidate their position in modern day politics. Termed as ‘mobilisers’ by Rochon, these organisations – predominantly green, extreme-right and to a lesser extent regionalist – have been more successful than their ‘challenger’ counter-parts that articulate traditional cleavages (1985) expanding their electoral, parliamentary and governmental presence in western Europe throughout the last three decades. Their fortunes present a significant threat to traditional politics particularly in the face of their decline.

In many respects the fortunes of new parties highlight the widespread failure of traditional politics to address the demands of their political environments. Moreover, the accession of new parties to office has curbed their power and heightened that of new parties, blurring the distinctions between organisations that do and do not have access to office.

This dissertation investigates the most recent attempt of traditional parties to regain primacy over the political environment: this development has come to be encapsulated in the notion of ‘cartel politics’. Thought to have become evident in the 1970s (Katz and Mair, 1995) the model is

---

<sup>1</sup> For a review of the literature and a particularly recent perspective on this debate refer to Drummond (2006).

grounded in the assumption that to achieve desired ends, parties have adopted behaviour that is analogous to that exhibited by business cartels. Before attending to this concept however, the chapter elaborates on the proposition that new parties' access to government has muddied the waters that previously separated governing from non-governing parties. Addressing this issue in section 1.1 the concept of establishment status – addressed throughout this dissertation – is introduced. Section 1.2 then proceeds to place cartel politics in context and discuss the central questions posed.

### **1.1 Changes in access to government: the role of establishment status**

The division between parties that were suitable and unsuitable for government was generally always clear in the past: ideological divisions were accepted, and the norms of competition and behaviour understood. Governing parties conformed to and perpetuated institutionalised rules that purported to articulate principles of the state, parties, and those that voted for them (see Beetham, 1991:16).<sup>2</sup> Displaying pro-system characteristics<sup>3</sup> and therefore accountable and responsible behaviour subscribing to, and promoting the political status quo,<sup>4</sup> parties that had access to government enjoyed an 'establishment status' that allowed them to become involved in 'elite' working relationships denied to irresponsible political actors.

Establishment status has always separated responsible, consistent and system up-holding parties from those that are not. Organisations with establishment status comprised elite, influential and exclusive groups with political leverage where inclusion provided access to certain goods,<sup>5</sup> debates, forums and exposure; it also provided a stage for the demonstration of political competency, an increased 'political voice', influence over the policy process, and ultimately government. Parties with establishment status were parties of government and those without it were not. Membership of this group and access to its goods were a prerogative earned on the

---

<sup>2</sup> Beetham suggests that legitimate power is based on three factors: conformity to established rules; rules that can be justifiable through reference to beliefs shared by those that are dominant and subordinate; demonstrable consent to the rules by all parties (1991: 16).

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion on the importance of systemic effect, although in relation to anti-system parties, refer to Sartori (1976: 57), Abedi (2002) and Cappocia (2002).

<sup>4</sup> Gordon Smith suggests that endorsement of a system can be measured by a party's support for the 'existing socio-economic order' (Smith, 1987: 54).

<sup>5</sup> Goods here refers to intra-and extra parliamentary opportunities associated with political legitimacy and establishment status.

basis of behaviour that was suggestive of benefit to both the mechanisms of government and civil society. As a collective group or 'whole', the sum of parties with establishment status was extremely powerful and able to exert an enormous influence on the input and output of a political system. As would be expected, criteria for establishment status was set by those with possession of it, enabling them to assign boundaries, establish norms of behaviour and secure their status. This created an equilibrium that perpetuated the status quo and created a divide between parties with and without access to government.

Electoral successful anti-system parties operated at the fringes of their respective systems and held extreme ideological positions that had the potential to cause systemic disruption (Capoccia, 2002). In general they were not responsible contenders for government: circumstances necessitating their inclusion saw them constrained, but in most instances established parties were able to command sufficiently large levels of support and exclude them.<sup>6</sup> While some anti-system parties achieved success at the polls, they displayed neither coalition potential nor establishment status and were therefore treated as 'outsiders', left reliant upon blackmail (Sartori, 1976: 123) and mobilisation (Herzog, 1987)<sup>7</sup> power in parliament. However, recent decades have seen new parties begin to participate in government further curtailing the ability of traditional politics to prevail over office and initiating a shift of the legitimacy divide. Whereby it had hitherto separated parties on the basis of two characteristics, possession of establishment status and access to government, it now separated them only on the basis of establishment status.

This transition of non-established parties into the governing realm is illustrated in Figure 1.1. While parties had always been separable for classificatory purposes in terms of historical,<sup>8</sup> structural<sup>9</sup> and functional<sup>10</sup> roles (Sartori, 2005: 5), divisions within the latter had become blurred

---

<sup>6</sup> For example, the Italian Social Movement (MSI) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) were examples of electorally successful parties which were permanently excluded from government on the basis of their anti-system characteristics. Each instance when they provided external support to the government (MSI late 1950s, PCI late 1970s) the agreement crumbled (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000: 442). The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) provided constrained support to the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) between 1983 and 1986/7 (Luther, 2001).

<sup>7</sup> Mobilisation potential is an ability to attract attention and change the status quo of competition. It does not necessitate a large share of the vote and is displayed by small, controversial, often polemic parties (Lucardi, 1991: 123). For a reevaluation of the relevance achieved by small parties, see Herzog (1987).

<sup>8</sup> Historical roles describe ideal party types associated with critical junctures in history (Sartori, 2005).

<sup>9</sup> Structural roles describe organisational/anatomical distinctions forwarded by Maurice Duverger (1954).


and non-established parties were beginning to exhibit characteristics (coalition potential) and achieving positions (government) that had previously been reserved exclusively for those with establishment status: the status quo was shifting. The left side of the diagram illustrates the situation party systems operated under when only traditional parties had access to power, one cell depicting parties with access to government and establishment status, the cell below depicting parties with neither access to government or establishment status. Separated by an impermeable legitimacy divide, preventing movement and ensuring that each group of parties experienced well defined and relatively unchanging roles and opportunities, this barrier ensured that all parties without establishment status, irrespective of their vote, had no access to government, while all parties with establishment status did.

The right side of the diagram shows the environment parties have operated under since the dominance of traditional party politics has been threatened by new and non-traditional organisations. The four-by-four typology illustrates four different kinds of party: parties with access to government and establishment status, parties with access to government without establishment status, parties without access to government but in possession of establishment status, and finally, parties without access to government or establishment status. In comparison to the previous phase a number of developments can be noted: (1) parties without establishment status now have access to government; (2) all parties now have potential access to government; (3) parties with establishment status can theoretically be displaced by those without establishment status; and (4) the legitimacy divide has become permeable – thus, while still distinguishing between parties with and without establishment status, its presence *inside* the group of parties with access to government has meant that rather than distinguishing between governing and non-governing parties, it now discriminates between different *types* of governing party.

---

<sup>10</sup> Functional roles are listed as participation; electioneering; integration; aggregation; conflict resolution; recruitment; policymaking; and agency of expression (Sartori, 2005: 23-24). Here, 'governing' is added to this list.

Figure 1.1: Establishment status and the legitimacy divide.



## 1.2 Structure of the dissertation

Since inception, parties have fashioned themselves to most effectively address the dilemma they face (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 34-38). Initially born out of a need to coordinate action within ‘assemblies of nominal equals’ they represented the first recognisable party type, the ‘cadre party’. Ostensibly an organisational response to problems relating to ‘internal coordination’, this party formation embodied the transfer of power from the monarchy to parliamentary government (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 35).

The subsequent mass party arose out of a need to address problems relating to ‘external coordination’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Duverger, 1954). Unable to deal with extra-parliamentary demands emanating from the expansion of suffrage, the cadre party had to transform into an organisation that could encapsulate the networking needs of this newly enfranchised mass of people (Katz and Mair, 1995). The third type of party, the catch-all party was a cadre or elite party response to mass parties’ electoral success and in turn their response to a persistence of network-related dilemmas (Katz and Mair, 1995). In this instance they sought to obtain as extensive a power base as possible exchanging ideological policies for the provision of increased public goods. (Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Kirchheimer, 1966). Most recently, the cartel party is described as the ‘latest organisational response’ to these various coordination problems (Blyth and Katz, 2005). No longer able to procure the desired returns for provision of goods, they sought to create a new and professionalised party form – the cartel party – (Katz and

Mair, 1995). This particular type of organisation placed less emphasis on the importance of voter demands and party responsiveness but more on a new inter-party relationship that stabilised competition and was, in many respects, analogous to that found in business cartels (Blyth and Katz, 2005): in essence the theory suggested that large, mainstream parties with experience of government began to eschew policy and electoral competition in order to divide up available votes, seats and office thus ensuring that even if they could not obtain maximum gains and monopolise the market, they could rely on securing a portion of it (Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Katz and Mair, 1995).

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine aspects of the cartel model from both a normative and empirical perspective. Rather than focusing on parties themselves or their relationship with the electorate, it seeks to investigate a number of key factors associated with the unique form of competition or inter-party relationship (the cartel) that Katz and Mair (1995) drew attention to in Cartel party Theory I (CPT I) and Blyth and Katz (2005) fully developed in Cartel Party Theory II (CPT II).

Overall, a number of broad questions are asked. First, has the party cartel or oligopoly, become the preferred form of competition in modern westernised industrial democracies (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005)? This dissertation asks if manifestations have conformed to theoretical predictions and if so, to what extent have they corresponded or differed across the systems that are investigated: either way, how can the political realities be explained? Second it asks how well the cartel model of competition stands up as a new, unique and identifiable behavioural form? Does it represent true party change? Is it realistic and are its features appropriate given the challenges that have faced parties in recent decades? Moreover, are the features that are studied in this work sufficiently different from those associated with previous party types to warrant the introduction of a new model: are they reflective of adaptive capabilities or weakness in the face of insurmountable challenge? Finally, the dissertation questions the use of the cartel metaphor? While the model seeks not to 'stretch' the concept too far, nor 'over analogise' it (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 35), the term generates specific and pre-determined expectations. Though it has been suggested that the 'discursive metaphor analysis' enhances our ability to 'delineate' and 'integrate' information (Walter and Helmig, 2005: 12); is

this the case with the cartel model or do findings diminish the utility of metaphor usage here? Of course, metaphorical terminology is not a novel innovation in the literature concerned with ideal party types and the cadre, mass and catch-all models provide examples of how knowledge from known fields of experience can be used to further our understanding of occurrences taking place in other environments:<sup>11</sup> while the aforementioned appear relatively appropriate,<sup>12</sup> it is asked whether the cartel model truly reflects the behavioural form of business oligopolies – ‘a combination of independent firms or enterprises [that] form... to control a market’ – and can its title be justified (Chambers, 1999: 250)?

Within the context of developments discussed above, these questions are re-visited throughout the forthcoming chapters and answered in the conclusion. Throughout, the importance of establishment status as a concept in modern day politics is evaluated and in the conclusion its relevance as a classificatory tool is determined. Prior to embarking upon an empirical investigation of the cartel model however, the following two chapters engage in a certain amount of groundwork: Chapter 2 introduces the concept of party cartelisation in full proceeding to review the necessary literature and to provide a short discussion about the structure of the dissertation while Chapter 3 proposes a framework that can be used to classify parties as potential cartel members or not. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 then logically proceed to investigate various aspects of the model. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation summarising the findings presented in previous chapters and analysing them in relation to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.

---

<sup>11</sup> For a discussion on how experience can assist understanding of the unknown through the use of metaphors refer to Schäffner (2002).

<sup>12</sup> Cadre referring to a ‘nucleus of key personnel’; mass referring to ‘the ordinary people’; and catch-all referring to the ‘ability to deal with a number of instances, eventualities or problems’ (Chambers, 1999: 223: 987: 256).

## Chapter 2

### **An introduction to the cartel model: a new ideal type**

The introductory chapter of this dissertation drew attention to a number of issues that have arisen from the widening of participation in government. It also introduced the notion of ‘establishment status’ suggesting that while government had previously been the exclusive domain of those that exhibited the quality this was no longer the case, and, by virtue of this, large traditional parties were experiencing unprecedented levels of insecurity in terms of their access to office. The chapter then went on to explain how party cartelisation, the most recent stage in party development, had emerged, in part, to try and offset this challenge and neutralise the threat it posed. Theoretically complex and questioned for its plausibility (Detterbeck, 2005: 173), the cartel model has posed as many questions as it has answered in terms of its contribution to understanding the behaviour of modern day political parties. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the cartel party literature and propose a clear interpretation of how the theory can be understood. Accordingly, the model is placed in its developmental and environmental context and disaggregated into a clear explanation of party and party system change in section 2.2: this is an exercise that has been called for in the literature (see Koole, 1996) but never fully undertaken. Section 2.3 then proceeds to address a number of inconsistencies that have been identified in the theory. Finally, the structure of the dissertation is introduced in section 2.4.

#### **2.1 Recent developments in west European politics**

Generally speaking parties are conservative creatures that resist change. That which does take place is glacial and though westernised, institutionalised politics have been characterised by unprecedented levels of flux and volatility in recent decades, their ability to withstand the majority of it (Bartolini and Mair, 1990) suggests that what has occurred has been well absorbed. An almost dizzying number of models and typologies have been forwarded attempting to both understand and classify party change<sup>13</sup> that has taken place over the last hundred years or so (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 168-9).<sup>14</sup> However, a number, namely the cadre, mass (Duverger,

---

<sup>13</sup> Refer here to the party change literature (Panebianco, 1988; Janda, 1990; Harmel and Janda, 1994; Harmel, 2002). For an exploration of goal-related change see Ström (1990) and Müller and Ström (1990). For an application of goal-related theory to party models see Wolinetz (2002).

<sup>14</sup> For an extensive overview of party models, refer to Gunther and Diamond (2003).

1954), catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966) and cartel models (Katz and Mair, 1995) are thought to have been particularly important in identifying the crucial junctures in mainstream party development. This chapter investigates the fourth and most recent stage. The cartel party model is seen generally as pioneering in its identification of developments at various levels; it provides a penetrating but 'provocative' account of 'fundamental' party change (Detterbeck, 2005: 173).

Whereas cadre parties were small, restricted, loose gatherings of notables organised to represent society's elite (Duverger, 1954) and distribute 'particularistic benefits' to a very select portion of society (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 175), mass parties were superior organisational forms (Duverger, 1954) created out of mass suffrage and designed to penetrate a number of spheres of social life (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 178). Concerned with social reformation and widespread representation (Duverger, 1954; Katz and Mair, 1995: 18), they mobilised civil society in the run-up to elections yet also provided them with benefits and social goods outside of these periods in order to maintain allegiance (Barnes, 1967). Unlike the previous model that was part of the state and restricted to representation of society's elite, this party-type was available to all (Katz and Mair, 1995). In contrast, the catch-all party embodied the decline of ideology and mass principles, also being characterised by the ascendancy of professionalism and entrepreneurial logic (Kirchheimer, 1966; Katz and Mair, 1995: 18). Placed somewhere between society and the state, this party model unlike its predecessors, divided its loyalties between the two (Katz and Mair, 1995: 14).

Increasingly professionalised and distanced from society, the cartel model is in many respects an extension of its predecessor (Harmel, 2002: 134). Hypothesising 'a relationship...between patterns of inter-party competition on one hand, and intra party developments on another' (Katz and Mair, 1996: 526) it offers an account of how the established political class has managed to survive, even prosper in post-catchall environments. Essentially, it explains party change in 'advanced capitalist societies' suggesting that large parties with strong histories of leading government have altered their profiles both internally (Katz and Mair, 1995) and externally (Blyth and Katz, 2005; also Katz and Mair, 1995) in order to control their environments. While the Cartel Party Theory I (CPT I) concentrated on suggesting that they had adopted more efficient and professionalised profiles in order to empower party leaders and central office at the expense

of the party on the ground (Katz and Mair, 1995), the second (Cartel Party Theory II or CPT II) built on concept of party cartels that had been introduced in CPT I.<sup>15</sup> In this instance however, the theory provided an almost exclusive focus on the specific form of competition displayed by these by these parties. Essentially the proposal was stated as follows: just as business cartels form to assure access of all participants to the market and its ensuing goods, party cartels are constituted for much the same reasons. In these instances however, the commodities they pursue are stable environments, assured electability and survival (Blyth and Katz, 2005): they seek to provide voters with ‘fixed menu[s] of political parties’ so that they can control the market for votes, parliamentary seats, ‘government office’ (Katz and Mair, 1995: 21) and at the same time procure the benefits that stem from all three. This dissertation places its focus on the unique form of inter-party competition introduced by Katz and Mair (1995) in CPT I and developed by Blyth and Katz in CPT II. It concentrates exclusively on the argument that parties have formed cartels in order to stabilise competition and carve up the market; it also investigates whether the presence of such arrangements have brought about the associated outcomes described in the model.

The basis of the cartel model is an ‘appealing one’ (Koole, 1996: 508) that suggests party competition imitates an oligopolistic market or business cartel (Blyth and Katz, 2005; Pelizzo, 2003a; see also Katz and Mair, 1995). Cartels are ‘joint sales agenc[ies]’ that bypass market demand and reach a behavioural agreement in order to maximise shared profits of all sold goods (Stigler, 1964). Whereby perfect competition leaves the seller vulnerable to shifting demand and subsequent marginalisation, cartels circumvent this possibility by monopolising the market share and dividing it up: so providing all members honour their commitment not to compete, survival and inclusion is assured. What is particularly important here is that unlike environments characterised by perfect competition – or permutations of it – firms are prevented from acting independently and cannot ignore the actions of their peers (Pelizzo, 2003a: 26): the argument is that mainstream parties have begun to mimic this behaviour in order to secure their future in unstable environments (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Making use of the cartel metaphor it is possible to provide a description of this phenomenon: parties (firms) set policies (quantities) supply them to

---

<sup>15</sup> For example, Katz and Mair referred to a converging of party programmes. (Katz and Mair, 1995: 22) contained competition (Katz and Mair, 1995: 19), the inter-dependence of parties, shared resources and cartel formation (Katz and Mair, 1995: 15).

the electorate (buyers) and alter them (as price leaders) in the knowledge that other(s) partaking in the agreement will follow suit rather than instigate competition (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 39). Much like business cartels, party cartels are vulnerable to the problems associated with an iterative prisoner's dilemma that suggests defection and the re-instigation of competition option to be the most rational course of action that will procure the most goods (votes, seats, office and associated benefits) (Kitschelt, 2000: 168; see also Blyth, 2003: 10 and Blyth and Katz, 2005: 34). However, Blyth and Katz suggest that Cournot-Nash equilibrium ensures this does not occur. Here, the suggestion is that because all parties hold the same goals and subscribe to the same strategic system, they acknowledge any benefits to be gained from the rejuvenation of competition for maximum gains would be short lived and followed by unfavourable outcomes such as exclusion or collapse of the cartel (Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Blyth, 2003: 6-7).

The cartel phenomenon can be interpreted in a number of ways when applied to the party environment. First, it can be construed in the 'systemic' sense as a set of individual and collective behaviours that are exhibited by a group of parties which share a common goal<sup>16</sup> (Pelizzo, 2003a: 3; 73). This approach is that provided in the work by Katz and Mair, (1995) and Blyth and Katz (2003). Second it can be understood as a breakdown in the party-voter link whereby parties are seen to be unresponsive to electorates *and* voters believe this to be the case;<sup>17</sup> or third, it can be seen in the normative perceptions of voters who consider the political elite to be an unreceptive cartel irrespective of whether they actually are or not<sup>18</sup> (Pelizzo, 2003a; see Kitschelt with McGann, 1995; and also 2000). However, the starting point for understanding cartelisation must lie in the initial 'systemic' version of the model, the features of which were identified by Katz and Mair (1995) and subsequently expanded on by Blyth and Katz (2005). This perspective considers political parties as evolving and responsive organisms that are capable of shaping their environments; it rejects the thesis of party decline and pays testimony to their adaptive qualities suggesting not only that parties have moulded opportunity structures to suit their requirements, they have also fashioned them to mitigate against challenge (Katz and Mair, 1995; see also Blyth.

---

<sup>16</sup> Pelizzo refers to this as the 'systemic' approach to understanding the cartel model (2003a).

<sup>17</sup> Pelizzo terms this as the 'system-subjective' approach to understanding the cartel model and forwards his own theory and empirical research in this area which he claims demonstrates evidence supportive of the argument (2003a).

<sup>18</sup> Pelizzo terms this as the 'subjective' approach to understanding the cartel model and refers to Kitschelt's work (see, Kitschelt and McGann, 1995).

2003: 5). While the initial thesis provided a conceptual contribution to the understanding of developments in party politics (Katz and Mair, 1995) interpreting the phenomenon through path-dependent means and emphasising the significance of a new fraternal and collusive relationship that had developed between parties (Kitschelt, 2000: 168), the most recent contribution has been data-driven and based on demonstrable findings (Blyth and Katz, 2005).<sup>19</sup> This interpretation of the model has viewed it from a relatively monolithic perspective describing the process as a rational survival strategy rather than a unique behavioural innovation. Accordingly the theory has retreated from emphasising the existence of overt collusion suggesting that where it does exist it is tacit and a means to achieve personal rather than collective goals (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005).

Partly as a function of the model's emphasis on collusion, cartel politics were initially thought to occur in more consensual environments where patronage and inter-party relationships provided 'fertile' ground for its development (Katz and Mair, 1995). However, based on evidence from Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States Blyth and Katz (2005) have recently claimed that though the process seems to be the preferred course of development across all western industrial systems, it is more likely to occur in systems prone to majoritarian politics (Blyth and Katz, 2005). They suggest that the more adversarial a party environment, the higher the costs of opposition and the greater the incentives for parties to maximise their chances of office through cartelisation. Furthermore, they also suggest that this process is more likely to occur in systems characterised by less effective parties as well as few exit, and thus bargaining options for voters.

In contrast to Blyth and Katz who are of the conviction that CPT II 'advance[s]' and 'supplement[s]...' CPT I (2005: 34) it is suggested here that this is not entirely the case. While both concur at a macro level agreeing that organisational profiles have professionalised and party cartels have developed, they are substantially different at the micro level – as will become clear throughout this chapter – in terms of their emphases and the importance they attribute to various aspects of the cartel process. By virtue of this it is suggested here that it is not academically expedient to conflate the two theories or suggest they compliment each other. Moreover, that the

---

<sup>19</sup> I am grateful to Adrian Blau for a conversation relating to this issue.

two versions disagree on the environment most conducive to cartelisation – as discussed above – it is suggested that CPT II constitutes a revision, not an advancement of and supplement to CPT I.

Taking into account the similarities that do exist between CPT I and II, the methodology of this dissertation adopts that presented by Blyth and Katz (2005) in CPT II and the remainder of the chapter is structured accordingly first providing a review of the available literature. It then proceeds to highlight a number of tensions in the model. Finally, an interpretation of how CPT II can be understood is proposed and the chapter then goes on to place the suggestions within the context and layout of the dissertation. As a function of the differences between methodologies presented in CPT I and CPT II (Katz and Mair, 1995 and Blyth and Katz, 2005), unavoidable inconsistencies have forced some theoretical discussions and a number of empirical findings to be neglected.<sup>20</sup>

## **2.2 Party cartelisation: theory and empirical findings**

According to Klaus Detterbeck, cartelisation has seen parties change in three fundamental areas: organisation, role and competition (2005: 174). Evolutionary, yet also a response to challenges from within their operational environments, party cartelisation has been both a deterministic and reactive process. Table 2.1 lists the factors involved here. While the first column lists the factors that engendered cartel politics, the second, third and fourth describe change that took place in terms of organisational profile, role and competitive behaviour before proceeding to indicate subsequent consequences. From the evolutionary perspective, the ‘entrepreneurial logic’ of Michel’s ‘oligarchical tendency’ (Panebianco, 1988: 240) goes some way towards rationalising the process to have been a natural and inevitable development in organisations whose DNA has programmed them to become more complex, differentiated and institutionalised with age (Panebianco, 1988: 239). From this perspective parties have been destined to adopt a profile similar to that described in the cartel model.

Environmental changes thought to have catalysed cartelisation have been both systemic and global. Perhaps one of the most important factors introducing environmental challenges at both party and party system level was the unfreezing of hitherto stable cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan,

---

<sup>20</sup> Here, research concerned with consociational environments and overt collusion has been disregarded.

1967). Electoral volatility increased and despite it being a predominantly intra rather than inter bloc phenomenon, it appeared to favour non-traditional parties at the expense of older traditional organisations (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). The collective vote and membership figures of mainstream organisations dwindled (Dalton, 2000; Scarrow, 2000),<sup>21</sup> party identification declined as cognitive mobilisation increased (Merkl, 1988) and voters, in the perception that the political elite was becoming increasingly unrepresentative and less concerned with its aggregative responsibilities, became increasingly alienated from traditional party alternatives (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). Traditional forms of linkage between the citizens and the state weakened and became increasingly inadequate (Lawson, 1988) while portions of the electorate began to express themselves through non-traditional party organisations and social movements choosing to support them rather than traditional party alternatives (Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck, 1984; Flanagan and Dalton, 1984; Lawson and Merkl, 1988; Lawson, 1988). Whether or not instability has become the norm rather than the exception is a moot point (see Mair, 1997: 51) and while some scholars suggested that changes were introducing a permanent state of volatility to party politics (Flanagan and Dalton, 1984; Blondel, 2002), others contend that instability has been relatively transient and merely brought about fundamental and stable realignments (Bartolini and Mair, 1990). However, the reality appears to be a little less precise and manifestations of change suggest that experiences have been mixed and levels of change have varied: in some cases there has been a significant decline in cleavage politics while in others there has not (Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992): similarly, some instances have seen a realignment of voter preferences while others have not (Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck, 1984). Either way, traditional parties have found their positions less secure while new parties have begun to enjoy new and hitherto inaccessible opportunities.

Older and once 'pariah' parties began to make inroads into mainstream politics and virtually all western European party systems experienced the explosion, albeit at varying levels, of green, far-right and regionalist politics. As a function of these developments, innovative and experimental coalition formulae started to challenge traditional ones (Katz and Mair, 1996) and because of this, participation in government became increasingly attainable for virtually all 'substantial' parties

---

<sup>21</sup> However, reduction in support for traditional parties has been contested by Bartolini and Mair, (1990).

Table 2.1 Catalysts and party change in the cartel model

Catalysts for Change	Organisation	Role	Competition
<b>Genetic Profile</b>	Stratarchy; empowerment of public office; disempowerment of party in central office and party on the ground ▶ mutual autonomy and dominance of party in public officepost-war	Increased attention to state demands; reduced attention to members and civil society's demands ▶ representation of the state/state embeddedness at expense of members and society; dislocation from members and voterspost- war	<b>Policy profile</b> rejection of left-wing Keynesian- based policies; reduced commitment to public service expansion; external devolvement of policy issues ▶ reduced issue remit; reduced aggregative behaviour
<b>Environmental Change</b>	disempowerment of voters ▶ merged voter/member role	society; autonomy from members and voterspost- war	<b>strategy</b> Policy convergence (predominantly left on right); post convergence policy stabilisation; increased emphasis on business model of efficiency ▶ new competitive goals
<b>Systemic</b>	state penetration; acceptance of state subsidies of subsidies ▶ state embeddedness; reduced dependence on voters		Efforts to raise electoral and state barriers ▶ attempted closure of electoral and parliamentary market
new parties' success in electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas ▶ to insecurity in all arenas			
proliferation of state subsidies			
professionalisation of politics ▶ parties experiencing increased financial needs			
<b>Global</b>			
Increased dependence on exports and foreign direct investment (FDI); widespread failure of domestic economy efficiency; increased reliance on market sentiment ▶ reduced utility of Keynesian economics and the catch-all model			Cessation of overt competitive behaviour over state subsidies and state resources ▶ new competitive goals
			Revision of terms of officepost-war ▶ office sought as an end in itself

Sources: Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair (1995); Hamel (2002); Blyth and Katz (2005).

(Katz and Mair, 1995: 16; 2000: 124). While the declaration and success of these new organisations hardly represented a novel phenomenon (Harmel, 1985; Hug, 2001), what was so significant was that the escalation of their success coincided with the decline or transformation of traditional politics (Merkl, 1988: 562) thus leaving mainstream or core parties vulnerable and less able to control their environments or respond to change. Predominantly associated with office-seeking through vote maximisation (Kirchheimer, 1966; see also Strøm, 1990; Wolinetz, 2002), catch-all, otherwise known as mass integration parties, realised that as a group they were losing their hitherto undisputed dominance in the electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas.

In turn, a drop in membership figures reduced financial support for parties at a time when politics was becoming increasingly professionalised and capital-intensive. Depleted resources and increased financial needs forced a reevaluation of their relationship with their members and encouraged them to look elsewhere for financial support (Katz, 1996). At the same time, comparatively reduced ties with their grassroots enabled them to forge new relationships and seek alternative forms of provision, and, by virtue of their governing and law-making responsibilities (Katz, 1996:120) as well as an increasingly close relationship with the state, the latter presented itself as the ideal benefactor (Katz and Mair, 1995).

The last four or five decades have seen a progressive inter-penetration of party and state. Rationalised by diffusion or path dependency theory, the former refers to a cross-country diffusion process aided by international links while the latter – and that adopted by Katz and Mair (1995) – describes a progressive synthesis of party and state (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 18). Perhaps the most important aspect of this new relationship has been the increased availability of state subsidies: largely, believed to be one of the most significant developments to have influenced the triadic relationship between political parties, state and citizenry in recent years (Katz, 1996: 120; Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 1).<sup>22</sup> Labelled as the driving force behind cartelisation in the first thesis (CPT I), the second version of the theory (CPT II) places slightly less importance on the role of state subsidies. In this instance, it is suggested that while important and contributory to the cessation of parties' dependence upon their membership – in turn limiting the latter's influence and bargaining power and empowering parties to pursue

---

<sup>22</sup> State subsidies were first introduced in West Germany and Sweden (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 18).

alternative allegiances – state subsidies are not the singular driving force behind the process (Blyth and Katz, 2005).

The cartel process can also, in part, be conceived of having been a response to the constraints of globalisation. It is suggested that increased dependence on the export market and the availability of foreign direct investment (FDI) has meant that parties have become less able to finance public goods through taxation (Rodrik, 1997). In addition to this the tendency for countries to open their economies has reduced state and party control over domestic economies and limited the use of inflationary tools that traditionally enabled the expansion of public goods. Therefore, appeal has had to be directed towards market sentiment rather than proof of output in the domestic arena (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 42; see also Keynes 1964: 152-64); this argument suggests that collectively, these developments highlighted the inefficiency of Keynesian catch-all policies and rendered centre-left politics – as they were – incapable of providing realistic policies and effective governance (Blyth and Katz, 2005; Blyth, 2003; see also Scharpf, 1991, Blair and Schroeder, 1998).

However, an equally powerful argument suggests that the real power of globalisation ‘may lie in its discursive rather than its material role’ (Hay and Smith, 2005: 124);<sup>23</sup> and, in reality, the constraints attributed to the process have not been as limiting as the thesis would have us believe (Blyth, 2003).<sup>24</sup> Moreover, it seems that that policy makers have been inclined to treat globalisation as a reality in order to effect outcomes – which of course may not be popular – that can be attributed to it rather than party goals (Hay and Smith, 2005: 125).<sup>25</sup> While the effects of globalisation on social democratic policy cannot be denied (Blyth, 2003: 3) it also appears they are unable to fully explain the left’s convergence on policies of the right (Blyth, 2003): it is here that cartel reasoning links environmental and globalisation-related explanations and makes its own contribution. It suggests that the dominant driving force behind policy cartelisation is in fact the desire to guarantee control of the operational environment. To do this parties must cartelise

---

<sup>23</sup> For a review of the literature concerned with this proposal refer to Hay (2005).

<sup>24</sup> For example, it is claimed that deficit financing was not practiced in the pre-globalisation period; the causal effects of trade competitiveness on growth and unemployment are exaggerated (Blyth, 2002; Callaghan, 2003); Europe is in fact de-globalising its trade (Hay, 2001); and the threat of capital flight is often over-exaggerated (Blyth, 2002). For an overview of this argument in relation to the cartel model refer to Blyth (2003).

<sup>25</sup> For an overview of this proposal refer to Rosamund (1999; Hay and Marsh (2000) and Watson (2002).

votes, seats and office and in order to achieve these ends they must first control the policy environment and disassociate from unrealistic demand-led high-cost policies. So while taking factors such as globalisation into account, party cartelisation *must* still be seen as an attempt by political parties to avert risk and (through tacit collusion) create stable and predictable environments where survival, pre-eminence and electability is assured (see Blyth, 2003).

In sum, mainstream, established parties were faced with a number of dilemmas all of which could be surmised as a failure of catch-all politics (see Blyth and Katz, 2005: 34). Ill-equipped to meet the challenges being posed by a changed environment, their hitherto undisputed status of hegemony was becoming increasingly untenable. These factors laid the building blocks for cartelisation, and, similar to when established parties had to change in order to make the transition from cadre to mass and then catch-all status (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 34-38),<sup>26</sup> change was also required here. Rejecting the highly competitive demand-orientated politics of mass integration, parties sought to address their insecurity by altering the business of politics on a number of levels: it had become an exercise in survival and the goals they had previously adhered to were no longer relevant.

A political party functions according to its organisational structure and the power relationships that are borne out of it, and, the greater the concentration of power in the dominant coalition (Panebianco, 1988), the more autonomy the political elite has in terms of deciding and executing its strategy. Indeed, Michels predicted that all parties were destined to narrow their power base (1962) and the trajectory of party development concurs with this suggestion, as since the decline of mass party politics, parties have centralised their power and become increasingly capital-intensive, professional and efficient (Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1992: 1995). Monopolised by the elite in the cadre party, the mass model – as prototype of bottom-up politics – distributed power in favour of its members and the grass roots. While the party in public office made inroads into regaining that power throughout the catch-all period, literature suggests, that the cartel party is, to all intents and purposes, the oligarchy that Michels (1962) predicted it would become (Harmel, 2002: 134).

---

<sup>26</sup> Throughout party development organisations have had to address coordination problems that are inherent features of liberal democracies: internal external or networking dilemmas (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 36-37).

Increasingly mercantile and business-like from the 1960s (Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988), the cartel model transformed parties into well oiled professionalized machines as public offices strengthened at the expense of those on the ground. Indeed, a particularly important development in party research over recent years has been the departure from seeing parties as unitary actors (Mair, 1997: 123) and this has been exemplified in the model.<sup>27</sup> Internally atomised, they began to operate by way of stratarchy and in order to empower party elites and provided them with virtual autonomy: middle and lower elites were bypassed in the decision making process (Katz and Mair, 1995: 20-21; see also Katz and Mair, 2000; also Katz and Mair, 1993 and Koole, 1994). Furthermore this was compounded by an ascendancy of the party in public office – parliamentarianism as termed by Koole (1994) – at the expense of the party in central office and that on the ground (see Katz and Mair, 1993). Furthermore, members – traditionally in favour of collective rather than selective benefits (Panebianco 1988) – were marginalised. Still necessary for the maintenance of a ‘legitimising myth’ (Katz and Mair, 1995: 18), members became regarded in terms of potential utility, were evaluated on a cost-analysis basis and treated accordingly: the extent of their use determined energy expenditure on the part of the party in terms of recruitment and maintenance activities (Katz, 1990; Pelizzo, 2003a).<sup>28</sup> While empowered in terms of individual responsibility and influence, as a group they were weakened in that parties lessened the distinction between them and voters, inviting the latter to participate in party business (Katz and Mair, 1995: 21; 1996; see also, Katz, 2001; Carty, 2004).

Parties perform a number of social and political responsibilities (Yanai, 1999: 6) traditionally representing the most important link between the masses and their government (Katz, 1986: 40; Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994: 240). While mass parties were clearly agents of the

---

<sup>27</sup> Rather than seeing parties as fused organisms Katz and Mair have suggested that they can in fact be characterised on more than one level. They identify three sides or faces to a party: the party in public office, the party in central office and the party on the ground (1993).

<sup>28</sup> Pelizzo has shown that while members constitute the most loyal section of a party’s vote, support is not a function of their membership so in terms of cost-benefit analysis, it is not in party interests to expend resources to enlist new members if their ‘added value’ is limited (2003a: 41). However, a neglected member that receives no utility from his or her party may be encouraged to withdraw support on the basis of past experience where the utility of membership was high. However, members and voters do not tend to share the same characteristics, as personified by May’s Law of Curvilinear Disparity (May, 1973; see also Norris, 1995), so a new member may have lower expectations than a more established one and thus require less utility – or similar levels to those expected by a supporter – in return for their support: such circumstances would suggest it is rational for parties to allocate low resources to membership retention.

people functioning as channels between civil society and the state, catch-all politics saw parties begin to divide their loyalties, acting as brokers between the two (Katz and Mair, 1995). Perceiving the costs of satisfaction (ideological demands) to outweigh provided utility (votes and financial support) parties reduced blind pursuit of membership-increasing activities (Katz, 1990; Katz and Mair, 1995) while access to subventions and their increasingly close relationship with the state gave them the space to re-evaluate their loyalties. Distancing themselves from their representative responsibilities, the process of inter-penetration between party and state was expedited and traditional, established organisations with a history of electoral success and office became agents of the state (Katz and Mair, 1995).

The cartel process also saw parties begin to deviate from customary forms of rivalry and though habitually competitive, traditional manifestations were extracted from the environment and replaced with new alternatives. Rather than battling for the lion's share of resources and goods – such as state subsidies and access to the media – the political elite chose not only to share them but also to use them as tools to consolidate their control and limit the fortunes of those threatening them (Katz and Mair, 1995). With greater access being available to those in government and or with high vote or seat shares (Katz, 1996: 131; Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000:9; Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003:88), control of electoral, parliamentary and governmental arenas became paramount and because of this parties actively sought to regulate institutions to work or continue to work in their favour. While there is nothing new about established parties seeking to maintain their position at the expense of others, what was new here was that they did it in order to close competition not monopolise it (see Koole, 1996: 515).

Competition was also affected by changes in mainstream party policy; while introduced in Cartel Party Theory I (CPT I), the importance of this development in the cartelisation process is accentuated in Cartel Party Theory II (CPT II). Parties of the mainstream left were forced to reject the Keynesian methods that were becoming increasingly impractical as a result of the globalisation-related developments discussed above (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Forced to downsize expectations within the electorate because of an inability to meet demands relating to growth and public service expansion, parties externalised a number of decision making responsibilities to devolved and un-elected bodies (e.g., central banks and the EU) that were neither accountable to

the electorate nor in pursuit of its endorsement (Katz and Blyth, 2005: 42-44; see also Cerny, 1995). Somewhat dislocated from their representative role anyway, these developments compounded the parties' retreat from their constituency related responsibilities (Blyth and Katz, 2005).

These developments constricted the space that was available for competition and resulted in policies of the centre-left and centre-right becoming increasingly similar. However, in contrast to the catch-all model which was – theoretically – characterised by centripetal vote-seeking convergence on the median voter (Kirchheimer, 1966), convergence in the cartel model saw the mainstream left shift rightwards in a pragmatic attempt to articulate more realistic policies and make themselves more electable (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Yet, what was particularly unique about policy cartelisation was that this particular form of convergence accompanied stabilisation that extracted inter-party competition from the policy arena and it was this, rather than anything else that distorted competition (Blyth and Katz, 2005).

This is not to say that all competition was removed from party politics. In line with Giddens' assertions about the future development of progressive politics, particularly those emanating from the centre left (1998), an 'ideology of managerial competence' was introduced to replace 'the various ideologies of principle' as the defining variable upon which electoral choice was made (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 46) – the beauty being that as cartel parties held the monopoly in terms of policy implementation, voter decisions, given their proclivity to administer reward and punishment retrospectively (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981), would be pushed in the direction of the cartel. This process would, in turn, be accelerated by a false environment that was hostile to the success of non-cartel parties: the upshot being that the mainstream parties could set the policy environment, supply voters with fixed options and compete in terms of implementation capabilities, all with the knowledge that non-cartel parties held little capital so the plurality of support would remain with them.

Finally, cartel politics have taken much of the competitive element out of parties' quest for office. While both mass and catch-all parties pursued office in order to implement policy and be re-elected, the former did so to 'maximise its effect on public policy' (Ström, 1990: 567) and

achieve social change while the latter did so to implement voter demands, maintain their favour and seek a monopoly of the vote market. In contrast, cartel parties have sought office in order to provide proof of their efficiency and procure its associated goods (Strøm, 1990: 567): and, seeing it as an end in itself (Katz and Mair, 1995: 22; see also Wolinetz, 2002), any associated benefits such as electoral success and policy influence have been relatively incidental (Budge and Laver, 1986). Though little separates office – and vote – seeking behaviour in a two party system (Strøm, 1990; Wolinetz, 2002) – other than a desire to maximise turnout – multi-party dynamics demand that office-seeking parties pursue durable coalition possibilities over and above all else. This involves small parties maximising their coalition potential and large parties building a network of allies that will secure market share and ‘maintain a continuous flow of benefits’ (Wolinetz, 2002: 152).

As with the cadre, mass and catch-all parties, a particular form of democracy was introduced here (Katz and Mair, 1995: 6) and this manifestation severed much of the electorate’s influence in political and social arenas. Homogenisation of policy and goals impeded the ability of election outcomes to influence governmental performance and rather than continuing to be channels through which political participation was able to exact ‘social change’, cartel politics rendered them “‘dignified” parts of the constitution’ that secured ‘social stability’ (Katz and Mair, 1995: 22).

Change is associated with consequence and the cartel model engendered a number of specific developments. Just like the cadre, mass and catch-all eras, the party type is a product of its previous form and its operational environment and, as in the past, its existence has stimulated innovation and further change showing that party models are not identifiable positions on a barometer of change, they are in fact fluid and moveable points on a developmental continuum (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Heidar and Saglie, 2003).<sup>29</sup> The very factors associated with bringing about stability throughout this period are also charged with introducing instability and flux. Accused of limiting the prospects of parties from outside the cartel as well as restricting choice and opportunities for political participation, cartelisation has, we are told, engendered dissatisfaction in the electorate and exacerbated alienation to such a point

---

<sup>29</sup> Heidar and Saglie suggest that homogenization of parties eventually encourages innovation (2003).

that many have chosen to retreat from traditional politics and redistribute their support both inside and/or outside of party arenas (Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck, 1984; Flanagan and Dalton, 1984; Lawson and Merkl, 1988; Lawson, 1988). This is particularly the case in terms of far-right politics which critiques the establishment and accuses mainstream politics of conspiracy and corruption: it is suggested that in its chameleonic ability to tap into and mobilise electoral dissatisfaction (Taggart, 2000), the far-right has found cartel environments to be ideal facilitators of its success (Katz and Mair, 1995; Taggart, 2000; Blyth, 2003; Blyth and Katz, 2005).

### **2.3 Cartel parties and party cartels: theory vs. reality**

The cartel party thesis has spawned a sizeable literature in terms of development (Katz and Mair, 2000; Katz, 2001; Blyth, 2003; Carty, 2004; Pelizzo, 2003a), critique, (Koole, 1996; Kitschelt, 2000), extension (Koole, 1996; Kitschelt, 2000; Yishae, 2001) and empirical analysis (MacIvor, 1996; Young, 1998; Pedersen, 2001; Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003; Hopkin, 2003; Blyth and Katz, 2005; Detterbeck, 2005). While providing varying levels of support for the thesis, these contributions have also produced some criticisms and highlighted a number of inconsistencies. While some of these areas are explored more fully throughout the dissertation, the following paragraphs address a selection that while applicable to Blyth and Katz's work (CPT II) were directed at the first version of the theory (CPT I).

First, the model has been criticised for placing too much emphasis on the role that state subsidies have played in terms of facilitating cartelisation (Koole, 1996; Kitschelt, 2000; Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000; Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003). While recent work by Blyth and Katz downplayed the importance of them somewhat, they are still generally considered to have broadened parties' opportunities and been a contributory factor to the cartel process (2005). Though it would be reasonable to expect them to have been associated with the consolidation of parties' positions, they have, in contrast, been linked to electoral decline (Kitschelt, 2000: 171) and research has not been able to associate them with a stabilisation or decline in the number of effective parties (Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003).

Second, the model has been accused of trivialising the representation question and it has been suggested that parties do in fact remain responsive to voters. Supporting this, Detterbeck has

reported increased levels of responsiveness in the British Labour party as well as parties in Denmark (2005: 184) and Pedersen has shown that party members in the latter report a generalised satisfaction with the level of responsiveness they perceive in their organisations of choice (2001: 27). Indeed, the spread of neo-liberalism and its adoption on the left has, by and large, been an unpopular move as far as the (centre left) vote has been concerned and because of this Kitschelt suggests parties have never had more reason to be responsive in order to maintain favour (2000: 175). Accused of alienating the electorate through its oligopolistic behaviour, he has suggested that it is not cartels that engender voter chagrin, rather, it is their uptake of neo-liberalist agendas at the expense of Keynesian demand-driven ones (2000: 161; see also Kitschelt with McGann, 1995). In contrast to the claims made in cartel theory (Katz and Mair, 1995), Kitschelt suggests that parties remain responsive to these electorates; they have just learned to spread their representation more thinly and time it appropriately. He explains that in order to limit the damage of tradeoffs they have been forced to make, they save the delivery of 'good economic news' for the 'run up' to election periods so as to maximise positive evaluations at the ballot box (2000: 162).

Even if the model is correct and parties have become less responsive to voters, a cartel world driven by valence politics and proof of efficiency still forces parties to choose where they place their emphases. Likely to concentrate on the policies that make them electable they run the risk of violating their commitment to eschew competition by emphasising efficiency in areas most important to the electorate, thus aggregating their concerns and responding to them.

A third criticism of the theory has been in terms of the link between cartelisation and the rise of the far-right. While numerous arguments portend to explain the rise and success of this party family (see Eatwell, 2003), cartel theory suggests that this particular strain of extremist politics has been a response to the cartel arrangement, truncated policy space and an inability to respond to concerns within the electorate (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth, 2003; Blyth and Katz, 2005; Pelizzo, 2003a). However, this proposal has been criticised for being too simplistic in that it confuses attacks on old and established political practices with responses to cartelisation (Kitschelt, 2000: 174) and labels rational vote seeking behaviour as a characteristic specific to the

far-right when in fact it is a common behaviour exhibited by most small and disadvantaged parties (Koole, 1996; Kitschelt, 2000).

In terms of empirical analysis a number of attempts have been made to operationalise the cartel model. While there has been a generalised move within parties to professionalise, and centralise their power, (Katz and Mair, 1992; Pennings and Hazan, 2001) no consistent pattern has been evident in terms of party change;<sup>30</sup> indeed some developments have not even been consistent with the model's predictions (MacIvor, 1996; Young 1998; Detterbeck, 2005).<sup>31</sup> Evidence of party homogenisation has been noted within systems (Heidar and Saglie, 2003) and across party families (Heidar and Saglie, 2003; Detterbeck, 2005); however, it has been suggested that while external factors encourage parties to become more similar, internal factors subsequently encourage parties to differentiate themselves from each other and innovate (Heidar and Saglie, 2003). Moreover, it has been shown that the electoral success of non-cartel challenger parties can be the result of factors other than a backlash against the cartel (MacIvor, 1996: 329).<sup>32</sup> Evidence of cartel arrangements have also been mixed. While in some instances cartels do not seem to have developed,<sup>33</sup> no pattern is evident where they have and agreements have been shown to arise for reasons other than those postulated in the model (Young, 1998: 357).<sup>34</sup> These have been

---

<sup>30</sup> Danish parties were shown to be responsive to their members (Pedersen, 2001). German parties were shown to be dislocated from society and reliant on the state, but evidence was shown of federalisation as opposed to stratarchy in the party and members were less marginalised 'than expected' (Detterbeck, 2005: 177). Danish parties were shown to display a slight increase in autonomy between ordinary members and the elite, (Pedersen, 2001: 27) but a federalisation was found at the higher levels (Detterbeck, 2005: 180) a mild blurring between member/non-member rights and slight increase in the individualisation of members was also found. (Pedersen, 2001: 27). South European parties have been shown to exhibit a form of the organisational profile of the cartel party in terms of weak organisations, low memberships, dislocation from the electorate, a reliance on state subventions and clientalism (Hopkin, 2003: 9-12).

<sup>31</sup> For example, the move toward universal membership voting in a number of Canadian Parties did not start until the 1980s, appears not to accompany other cartel characteristics, be more prevalent at provincial rather than state levels and not be a deliberate attempt to isolate activists (MacIvor, 1996: 331).

<sup>32</sup> Polls indicate that the Canadian Reform Party's electoral gains in 1993 were more a result of policy initiatives other than anti-cartel platforms (MacIvor, 1996: 329).

<sup>33</sup> Danish parties were shown to be non-collusive and protectionist (Pedersen, 2001). Based on the receipt of state subsidies, evidence of a party cartels were found in Germany and Denmark, but not Sweden and the UK. Based on the cartelisation of policy and a more majoritarian model, the UK and US were suggested to show more cartelisation than Sweden (Blyth and Katz, 2005).

<sup>34</sup> Unanimous and cartel type behaviour between the three main parties acting more in favour of the state than the populace over the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords was however, more indicative of conformity to traditional and 'national unity' measures which date back to brokerage initiatives from the nineteenth century (Young, 1998:357)

indicative of parties seeking to achieve goals other than those associated with cartelisation; therefore they have not been representative of the process under investigation here.

While the model is invaluable for heuristic purposes, the reality is that representation of it has varied across systems and, accordingly, it is probably more fruitful for it to be understood as a number of behaviours that are exhibited independently. Indeed, it is now accepted that parties do not tend to exhibit ideal forms in their full entirety, and, without detracting from the significance of these contributions, each party type has, in some respects, served only to highlight what others are not (Wolinetz, 2002). However there remains an important unresolved tension in that while investigative studies have tended to detect 'semi' or 'partial' models, the history of party literature shows an overall proclivity to have favoured ideal types rather than realistic manifestations resulting in their overuse and abuse of terminology (see Puhle, 2002). The cartel model is no exception here: while empirical work has been unable to detect a party or system showing a full complement of characteristics, the tendency of referring to a wholesale model across the wider literature still remains.

Another oversight of the model has been its failure to provide a 'clear conceptual definition' of the phenomenon and this has been noted at a number of levels (Koole, 1996: 508). Though referring to 'individual'<sup>35</sup> and 'systemic' properties (Koole, 1996: 508), no clear distinction between the two has been provided and clarification has been lacking in terms of what exactly the relationship is between the party and party system profiles. Moreover, it is not clear whether cartel status requires the adoption of a full or partial set of characteristics. In addition, we are not sure which parties do and do not have access to a cartel. While the theory appears exclusively concerned with describing developments in larger traditional parties, it also makes reference to all 'major competitors', further muddying our understanding of the terms of membership (Koole, 1996: 508). Yet, the implication is that in order to exert power, the cartel must be large enough to dominate the market as a collective group and also as a government (see Koole, 1996: 508), and, to achieve this, most systemic configurations necessitate the inclusion of parties that are not disposed to adopt the behavioural profile; for example by virtue of their age, level of institutionalisation, or party family. Therefore, it has become apparent that while the theory

---

<sup>35</sup> Author uses italics in original text.


remains consistent in its virtual exclusion of parties that are anything but large, its references to more innovative office formulae (Katz and Mair, 1995: 6), its discussion on the cooption of smaller organisations such as The Progressive Democrats in Ireland (PD) and Democrats '66 (D66) in the Netherlands (Katz and Mair, 1995: 24) – relatively small parties without traditional and established back grounds – and its placement of the model in environments where office makeup is controlled by the cartel (see Katz and Mair, 1995: 21) all point to inconsistencies in terms of the understanding of cartel makeup and its relationship with government. These factors detract from the coherence and subsequent utility of the model and need addressing. Concurring with Detterbeck, it is suggested that the model needs to be reduced to its 'core elements' (2005: 187).

Widespread demonstration of some organisational features described in the model (Katz and Mair, 1992; Pennings and Hazan, 2001) and the importance of party and system specific factors in determining the route that is taken to achieve both the party and party system profile (McIvor, 1996; Young 1998; Detterbeck, 2005) make it difficult to distinguish between what Carter terms as 'possible' and 'necessary' qualities (2005: 15): accordingly it is suggested that operationalisation of the party profile should not be particularly restrictive. However, this is not the case for party cartels and for the following reasons it should be possible to identify and operationalise the central components of the process. While the first version of the theory (CPT I) appeared to suggest that the procurement and cessation of state subsidies and associated goods were the driving force behind the development of party oligopolies (Katz and Mair, 1995), the importance of policy cartelisation has recently been forwarded as being more pivotal (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Sought not as ends in themselves, but vehicles enabling a retreat from voter demands and control of electoral, parliamentary and governmental markets, the inter-dependence between these variables points to a clear, progressive and somewhat staged path to party cartelisation, questioning Blyth and Katz's claim – at least in reference to this aspect of the model – that it 'need not proceed in a lock-step [manner]' (2005: 53).

Party cartelisation is achieved when a group of organisations extract competition for the environment and tacitly collude in order to control access to and distribution of electoral, parliamentary and governmental assets; as well as the goods that arise from them, This

guarantees their electability and survival. Clearly the process is not unilateral and cannot be controlled by one party. Rather, it is an iterative state that is reliant upon both implicit and explicit support from a number of actors. Figure 2.1 describes the course of cartelisation, the flow of arrows illustrating its sequential and cyclical nature also drawing attention to the various actors involved. It illustrates the importance of the parties' ability to shape their environments, but also reveals the restrictions that limit their autonomy. For example, if the state withdraws its support, parties become more reliant on their members and can be forced into more responsive behaviour; if a party or parties depart from the cartel agreement, those left are compelled to accept the new terms of competition; finally, if voters refuse to accept cartelised policy options and transfer their support to alternative organisations, parties must seek to regain their allegiance by way of responsive and competitive policies. Though parties may secure different aspects of the process independently and in a somewhat unsynchronised fashion, cartels are only present if outcomes can be linked to oligopolistic – as opposed to any other – behaviour: for example, the mass party era saw larger mainstream parties monopolise votes, seats and office but this was through non-oligopolistic means.

Figure 2.1 Flow chart to suggest the progression of party cartelisation



‘[C]onstrained by circumstances, yet [with a ] certain freedom to shape [their] own future (McAnulla, 2002: 272) the cartel model personifies the long debated structure and agency dilemma by posing questions that ask how much freedom parties have to cartelise should they wish to. Indeed, is it a simple question of whether structure or agency dominates? Or, are the real issues better identified through what has come to be known as the dialectical approach? Here the

‘strategic relational approach’ (Hay, 1996; Jessop, 1990) identifies a thread that is constant throughout this dissertation. It suggests that behaviours take place in contexts that are strategically selective and actors tend to favour certain strategies above others because of the utility they are likely to provide (McAnulla, 2002: 280). Here, actions are considered to be reflexive and based on partial knowledge of the constraints and opportunities posed by surrounding structures (McAnulla, 2002: 280). Throughout the empirical chapters, the underlying assumption is that goals, behaviour and strategy are reflective of the opportunity structures that parties operate within.

## 2.4 Chapter structure

The remaining chapters of this dissertation seek to address what this author believes to be a number of key issues that surround the cartel debate. Eleven westernised industrial democracies are examined here, ten of which are parliamentary (Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands Norway, Sweden) and one of which is semi-presidential (France). A comparative approach is adopted and with the exception of the last empirical chapter all eleven systems are addressed throughout. It must be stressed that this dissertation does not claim to investigate full cartelisation. To do this comprehensively an investigation would have to demonstrate that parties were engaging in tacit collusion and failing to respond to electoral demands (see Pelizzo, 2003); such a task could not be embarked upon here.<sup>36</sup> Accordingly, evidence supportive of Blyth and Katz’s theory (CPT II) is sought for. First, the dissertation tries to establish exactly what party cartels are; how are they comprised and which parties have access. Second, it engages in an empirical investigation that seeks to determine whether parties have shown any behaviour suggestive of cartelisation; if so which ones and why? Third it investigates if the process has facilitated the rise and success of the most recent strain in right-wing extremism? Finally, it brings all findings together to determine if any evidence of party system cartelisation can be identified across the eleven systems between 1970 and 1998.

To examine these questions a most similar systems design has been adopted. The dissertation seeks to pinpoint critical features that differ between similar systems and account for the ‘observed political outcome[s]’ (Landmann, 2000: 27): in other words, its purpose is to try and

---

<sup>36</sup> Refer to Pelizzo (2003a) for a comprehensive investigation into levels of party responsiveness to the electorate.

ascertain if and indeed why cartel features arise in some systems but not others. Though it is suggested that most modern western democracies now approximate cartel politics to some degree or other (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 33), adoption is thought to have been uneven as some systems are considered more disposed to the model than others (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Based on findings from Sweden, the UK and the US, the most recent interpretation of cartel politics suggests that while a number of factors influence whether it does or does not take place, the majority of them fall under the umbrella of the majoritarian vs. consensual distinction (Lijphart 1984).

Each of the eleven systems are included in the sample and systems are classified according to the first of the two clustered patterns that constitute Lijphart's majoritarian vs. consensual model (1984).<sup>37</sup> Based on their proclivity for minimal winning cabinets, executive dominance, effective number of parties, number of issue dimensions and electoral disproportionality each system is allocated to one of three distinctions, majoritarian, consensual or intermediate. The sample represents an equal balance, comprising four majoritarian systems (Austria; Germany, Ireland; UK) , three consensual systems (Belgium; Denmark; the Netherlands) and four intermediate systems (France Fifth Republic; Italy, First Republic; Norway; Sweden). According to Blyth and Katz's version of the model (2005) – and that adopted throughout this work – the prediction would be that cartelisation would be stronger and more evident in majoritarian and then intermediate systems before it was in consensual ones.

---

<sup>37</sup> Lijphart's original model (1984) has been adopted here as his subsequent work on the majoritarian vs. consensual distinction uses scattergrammes to identify progressive change rather than tables to classify system types (1999: xii).

*Table 2.2: Classification of systems according to the first factor in Lijphart's majoritarian/consensual distinction*

Variables	Classification
Minimal winning cabinets; executive dominance; effective number of parties; number of issues dimensions; electoral disproportionality (Lijphart, 1984).	Majoritarian: Austria; Germany; Ireland; UK Intermediate: France V; Italy I; Norway; Sweden Consensual: Belgium; Denmark; the Netherlands

Source: Lijphart (1984: 216).

The chapter immediately following this sets the context for the rest of the dissertation tendering an interpretation of the party cartel while the following three provide empirical analyses of various characteristics described above.

Chapter 3 seeks to further our understanding of exactly what the party cartel is, which parties have access to it and what the terms of membership are. Presently there is no consensus within the literature about what exactly constitutes the makeup of a cartel or which parties do and do not have access to it: this discrepancy mitigates against accurate operationalisation of the model and to some extent prevents meaningful comparison. Here the dissertation tries to conceptualise what a party cartel is by proposing a method that can be used to classify parties that have access to government. It enables the operationalisation of party cartels and to this effect it facilitates the investigation of the relationship that exists between those inside and outside of it. Finally, it provides a description of how the framework influences the subsequent three chapters.

The following three chapters embark upon an empirical investigation of systemic party cartelisation as understood by Blyth and Katz's work (and introduced as Cartel Party Theory II or CPT II) and the process is investigated in sequence. Chapter 4 asks whether larger parties with establishment status have attempted to cartelise policy options, also attempting to determine whether their efforts have been associated with features specific to their party systems. Chapter 5 asks whether parties with access to the cartel have been more successful at consolidating parliamentary and government options in environments characterised by policy cartelisation. Chapter 6, the final empirical chapter seeks to determine whether policy cartelisation encourages and facilitates extreme politics. Concentrating on the extreme right-wing party family, it seeks to determine if extreme-right policy has responded to various aspects of cartelisation in traditional

established parties. Finally, Chapter 7 examines each chapter's findings in relation to the proposals made by CPT II. Here it is determined whether they do in fact support the suggestion that party cartelisation has become the preferred behavioural state at a collective and individual system level in westernised industrial party systems. Ultimately it is concluded that the dissertation's findings provide an overall refutation of the cartel hypothesis as presented by Blyth and Katz in CPT II. Here, we also revisit the issues discussed in Chapter 1 addressing the importance of establishment status and the utility of the cartel metaphor in understanding developments in party politics between 1970 and 1998.

### Chapter 3

#### A conceptualization of the cartel and cartel parties

The previous chapter described the cartel model evaluating it within the context of accepted wisdom on party development. Adopting what Pelizzo terms a 'systemic' approach (2003a), it addressed developments at both party and party system level firmly adopting the methodology described in Blyth and Katz's work – here in this dissertation described as Cartel Party Theory II or CPT II – the chapter then went on to evaluate the cartel literature developing on a number of criticisms that had been levelled at its claims.

In this chapter attention is directed towards the party system component of cartel theory: specifically parties are analysed with reference to their relationship with other parties in the cartel. With the premise that parties in western industrialised democracies have begun to exhibit oligopolistic behaviour analogous to that of business cartels, an interpretive framework that enables their classification in relation to this proposal is forwarded.

Cartelisation represents the most recent innovation on the part of large traditional parties to maintain control of their environments and ensure their electability. While it is suggested that they have adopted a number of internal and behavioural changes in order to achieve this end, what has been particularly controversial about the concept are the suggestions it has made regarding developments in inter-party relationships. Despite the recognition that their fortunes have always been somewhat dependent upon their operational environments parties are generally understood as single entities seeking personal goals that benefit them exclusively. Cartelisation suggests that this is no longer fully the case and claims that they have come to believe that the probability of them being able to maintain electability, monopolise access to office, create stable environments and control the distribution of goods increases if they are sought through collective rather than individual action. Able to achieve outcomes that as individual players they would otherwise not be able to, this collective group of parties represents something greater than the sum of its individual parts.<sup>38</sup> Just as business oligopolies ensure their survival and secure access

---

<sup>38</sup> It must be noted however that this relationship does not exist in a vacuum and in some instances other actors such as the state or the electorate influence the extent to which parties can achieve desired outcomes.

to desired goods by circumventing demand with the cessation of competition as well as fixed production and supply quotas, party oligopolies behave in much the same way. Negating voter demand, they have cartelised policy by supplying the electorate with similar, uncompetitive and (relatively) fixed options transferring the site of competition to proof of efficiency and implementation abilities that only they, the mainstream with experience, can compete over: this has enabled them to retain the lion's share of available goods.

Yet, there is a lack of clarity in the literature regarding exactly what cartels are. Three particular questions stand out. First, how big do cartels have to be to be effective? In other words is there a critical mass they must reach? Second, which parties have access to the cartel, and is membership restricted to large mainstream organisations that exhibit the party profile or is its makeup heterogeneous? Third what are the terms of membership and what specific qualities, if any, do parties have to exhibit? Section 3.1 expands on these questions tendering some possible answers, section 3.2 proceeds to suggest a framework that can be used to understand party cartels and the final section, section 3.3, provides a number of concluding comments.

### **3.1 Size, composition and membership: what exactly is a party cartel?**

Arguably, one of the biggest and most problematic oversights of the cartel model has been its failure to provide clear conceptual definitions of how it envisages size, structure, composition and the requirements of membership (see Koole, 1996: 508). This omission has mitigated against research being able to identify exactly what they are, how they are comprised, and which parties do and do not have access. Moreover this lack of clarity has obstructed accurate operationalisation and prevented the identification of similarity and difference between parties and systems. For example, the literature has not been consistent, confining operationalisation to the 'mainstream' in some instances (see for example MacIvor, 1996; Young, 1998; Blyth and Katz, 2005; Detterbeck, 2005), yet also casting its net further afield in others (Pedersen, 2001; Miller, 2003). This lack of equivalence has muddied our understanding of the model and mitigated against comparative analysis. Referring back to the three questions posed above, the remainder of this section addresses in turn cartel size, composition, and terms of membership.

In order to be effective, a party cartel must be able to control each step of the cartelisation process. It must be able to cartelise policy options and successfully supply them to the electorate. From this it must then proceed to successfully cartelise votes, seats, government portfolios and subsequent access to state goods. Factors it cannot control become vulnerable to competition, thus threatening its survival. In view of state goods being considered facilitative of policy cartelisation which in turn cartelises votes, seats and office composition, preferred circumstances see the cartel exert a monopoly of power over all four. As discussed in Chapter 2, the process is iterative and self-perpetuating.

A cartel must continue to distort policy options if it is to maintain a monopoly over the goods that it seeks and their subsequent distribution. Likewise it must retain its access to these goods if it is to keep charge of the policy market: if it does not it is vulnerable to collapse. For example, significant loss in one good will, in most cases, bring about loss in another, encourage competition and dismantle the policy environment. Together these developments will, in all probability, demolish the cartel arrangement. To maximise effectiveness then, not only must a cartel control policy, votes, seats, office and ensuing state goods, it must also possess a 'dispositional' or potential power that provides it with the tools to raise its game and maintain that control when challenged.<sup>39</sup>

Though a cartel's ability to exert authority and achieve outcomes is very much dependent on its market share, its internal cohesion and co-ordination abilities are just as important.<sup>40</sup> Too much diversity and fragmentation will mitigate against internal consistency and contribute to collapse. Similarly, a cartel is very much dependent upon how those outside its boundaries co-ordinate themselves; the more market share they have access to – collectively or individually – and the more cohesive they are as a group, the more threat they pose to the cartel and its members. The implication is that a party cartel must be large and powerful enough to dominate its environment (see Koole, 1996: 508). Despite the fact that many party systems see the larger mainstream parties able to secure a collective majority in terms of votes and seats, this is not always the case, for example in countries such as France, Italy and the Netherlands, (Comparative Manifesto

---

<sup>39</sup> For a discussion on real and dispositional power, refer to Dowding (1996: 3-4).

<sup>40</sup> Refer to Dowding for a discussion on group power and cohesion (1996: 34; 35).

(CMP) Data Set, 2001). Moreover, governments other than single party and grand coalition majorities are not characterised by larger mainstream parties holding majorities; rather, they see them relying on smaller parties to assist them in securing and maintaining their position. As office-seeking parties (Wolinetz, 2002), secure and predictable access to government is a necessity for cartel parties; accordingly it is suggested that instances – such as government make-up – which see the mainstream unable to command more than 50 percent of the market tend to be characterised by an extension of cartel boundaries. Indeed, it is in cartels' interests to extend membership to all parties that conform to their norms (Katz and Mair, 1996) as by doing this it is possible to increase their market share and maximise opportunities for providing an exclusive resource for office. This also enables them to maintain the primacy of cartel politics and ensure against influence from outside competition.

This more inclusive interpretation presents a problem in that as an ideal type, the cartel party, much like cadre, mass and catch-all ones, is exclusively concerned with explaining developments in larger mainstream organisations (Katz and Mair, 1995; see also Duverger, 1954; Kirchheimer, 1966) and, despite the model providing party and party system accounts of change (Koole, 1996: 508) the implication is that they are linked and explain two aspects of a single phenomenon (see Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005), not least because smaller parties are incapable of making some of the changes it describes. Yet, in contrast to this, the theory also makes references to the cartel's ability to co-opt (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005), even its preference is to do so (Katz and Mair, 1996) and this suggests that the party system account extends beyond that of change in 'ideal types'.

Nevertheless, developments that take place at party system level do so at the instigation of the larger mainstream parties. Without their leadership cartels can neither form nor function: they set behavioural norms and any co-option that does take place does so at their will. In this sense it is possible to interpret the party system component of the model as an explanation confined to large mainstream parties. However, the role of smaller parties in cartel maintenance should not be underestimated. Depending on party system dynamics they can be pivotal: the more they contribute to maintaining a majority the greater their relevance and bargaining power. Therefore,

it is suggested that while smaller parties must be included in the analysis of party cartels, it is appropriate to still consider the model as one concerned with change in the 'ideal type'.


It is not entirely clear what the criteria for cartel membership are. While in many respects the large mainstream parties set the terms, it is suggested that for a party to be included it must display some utility that will benefit the cartel and pose a threat if it remains outside its boundaries; yet, it must also exhibit behaviour that is consistent with establishment status – a feature consistent with pro-system, mainstream and traditional politics (as described in Chapter 1) – and cartel norms.

A number of features associated with the cartel model are empirically investigated throughout the forthcoming chapters. Prior to this however, a methodology and framework that may be used to identify parties that do and do not have access to party cartels is suggested.

### **3.2 A framework for identifying party cartels in modern day party systems**

Exclusively concerned with those that are relevant in parliament and have access to government, this framework distinguishes between organisations that do or do not display establishment status suggesting that those without it – irrespective of any other quality – cannot gain full access to a cartel. Figure 3.1 proposes a hierarchical and layered<sup>41</sup> interpretation of these parties, identifying four types of party organisation: 'mainstream', 'secondary', 'semi-status' and non-governing. While all may not be evident in every system, it is suggested that this generalised schema accounts for all possible party variations – that meet the above criteria of parliamentary relevance and coalition potential – and can be appropriately applied across all westernised industrial democracies. Interpreted in a stratified and hierarchical sense, it is suggested that three layers of parties can be identified on the basis of a number of linked criteria: age, size, party family, possession of establishment status, primary goal and office experience. While their size, experience of office and primary goal facilitate a functional classification, age, party family and possession of establishment status give a more normative slant to the process. Table 3.1 describes

<sup>41</sup> Miller describes the cartel in New Zealand as becoming multi-layered following the instigation of a mixed member proportional electoral system (2003: 3).



the mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governmental parties in relation to each of the aforementioned variables.

*Table 3.1* Features of parties that do and do not have access to the cartel

	M	S	S-S	N-G
Age	Post-war or pre 1960	Post-war pre 1960 or new parties that have shown three continuous terms in government or similar (Smith, 1989) Exhibition of qualitative relevance and utility	Mainly post 1960	Mainly post 1960
Size	Large	Moderate or small	Mainly small	Mainly Small
Party family	Traditional	Traditional only pre 1960	All	All
Establishment status	Yes	Yes		
Primary goal	Office: Office holders (Wolinetz, 2002)	Office: Office seekers (Wolinetz, 2002)	Vote or policy seekers. May hold office as a long-term goal	Varied but irrelevant
History in government	Office holders Long continuous history of leading government; dominant position in government; possession of prime-ministerial posts	Office seekers Substantial history of playing supporting role in government; varied influence	Intermittent supporting role	No role

*Source:* Adapted from information in Chapter 3; Katz and Mair, (1995); Blyth and Katz, (2005); Wolinetz, (2002).

*Notes:* M = mainstream, S = secondary, S-S = semi-status, N-G = non-governing.

The first comprises what Gordon Smith (1989: 161) refers to as 'core' parties; according to Hans Keman (2004) these are 'parties of government': parties with a history of leading positions in their system – influence over its functioning, and power over party alignments and coalition formulae. Larger, electorally successful traditional parties that boast core electorates, established membership bases and long-term relevance, they are associated with traditional cleavages dating back in either their present or past form to the freezing of party system alternatives in the 1920s (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). These parties command high vote shares and, despite variation across systems, have experience of holding dominant positions in government, and a history of


having contributed to, and actively maintaining the political process and democratic infrastructure. With relatively equal governing potential, these organisations have enough ministrable members to either control a government single handed or be confident of taking the majority of cabinet positions (Laver and Shepsle, 2000). These parties exhibit ‘establishment status’, and are likely to display internal profiles consistent with those described by Katz and Mair (1995). With a primary goal of office (Wolinetz, 2002), their objectives are to maintain their electability, perpetuate their hegemonic status, and collectively limit the electoral share of those that challenge their position. These parties form the ‘core’ of the party system (Smith, 1989)<sup>42</sup> and in most instances a centre left and centre right force is found; here they are referred to as ‘mainstream’ parties. Figure 3.1 places ‘mainstream’ parties at the top of the party hierarchy. Short of transformational party system change (Smith, 1989), membership of this layer is static and this is indicated by the presence of a bold membrane separating them from those below.

These parties have a strong incentive to cartelise. As the most powerful members in any given system they stand only to benefit by the process as they will secure the greatest share of any goods – votes, seats, office and subsequent state goods – that can be procured from the creation of a party cartel. By virtue of their status these parties lead the cartelisation process should it take place. They seek to limit traditional forms of rivalry between themselves and their main opponent and set the terms of competition for the remainder of the system. With governance as a central goal, they display office-seeking behaviour, aim to secure regular access to dominant positions in government, and are apt to engage in coalition-building activities with other parties: these parties are ‘office holders’ (Wolinetz, 2002: 153; 155).

---

<sup>42</sup> The party system core comprises the party or parties that have a history of dominant positions in a party system and have been particularly influential in its functioning, the formation of alignment and coalition formulae (Smith, 1989: 161).

Figure 3.1 Application of the cartel framework to parties that have access to government



Parties in the second layer are termed ‘secondary’ parties. Generally representing a traditional party family or a slightly more radical variant of it, these parties tend to display establishment status and a systemic relevance. A number of these could be termed as ‘core’; but, as a group, their role in government and relevance in party systems is mixed. As third, and generally non-governing parties (in two and a half or three party systems), ‘hinge’ or small parties<sup>43</sup> (in moderate multiparty systems), or small parties on either the left or right (in polarised multi-party systems), they tend to be smaller than mainstream parties – most significantly so – and exhibit mixed degrees of responsibility, power and influence. Unable to control government single handedly, their size tends to determine the number of ministrable politicians they can provide (Laver and Shepsle, 2000). They conform to the cartel norm and display some characteristics consistent with the cartel profile; however, because they are unable to command the vote and seat shares consistent with majoritarian status, these parties exert less power and have varied access to cartel goods. In terms of access to office, they rely on their indispensability as coalition partners and are largely dependent upon their operational environment; larger parties in this layer have more influence and wield higher levels of coalition and blackmail potential. Secondary parties participate in government on a regular basis; those that only gain sporadic access to office are not

<sup>43</sup> Hinge parties hold coalition potential, operate around the centre of the ideological spectrum and can form alliances with either of the major parties (Smith, 1991: 36-37).

secondary parties. These parties are office seeking parties; they avoid articulating controversial policies and concentrate on maximising their coalition potential (Wolinetz, 2002: 153; 155)

Incentives for cartelisation are mixed in this layer. These organisations are not likely to secure extensive goods in terms of votes, seats or state goods. Nevertheless, their positions may allow them to enjoy disproportionately high gains in terms of office: for example, its pivotal place in German politics allowed the German Liberal Party (FDP) to enjoy an access to government portfolios that was disproportionately high in terms of the votes, seats and state goods it was able to procure (see Smith, 1991).

While those secure in their ability to pass electoral thresholds are more likely to concentrate on maximising their coalition potential and conforming to cartel requirements, those with histories of more volatile experiences at the ballot box may be encouraged to engage in more vote-seeking behaviour. Moreover, those substantial enough to feel that they will benefit by engaging in direct competition with mainstream parties may also choose to operate outside the cartel: however, parties this significant have the potential to prevent the effective formation and maintenance of a party cartel so it is in the interest of those that seek it to try and re-manipulate their goals. While pro-system and in possession of establishment status, the position of these organisations tends to prevent them from procuring vast amounts of goods and by virtue of this their motivations for conformity will not be high. For example, they may choose to fill the policy vacuum left by party convergence in the hope it will encourage voters to transfer to them from their initial party of choice.

In a cartel situation these parties follow the mainstream and while they may enjoy high levels of bargaining or blackmail power in certain situations, their relevance tends to be environmentally specific and somewhat fragile. Reference to Figure 3.1 illustrates this showing that parties can move in and out of this layer. While the bold membrane between them and the parties above suggests that progression to mainstream party status is unlikely, the more permeable membrane between them and the layer below suggests that movement out of the cartel is a more likely possibility. Again, the fortunes of the German Liberal Party (FDP) provide an example here. Pivotal, for over forty years, (Smith, 1991: 30-31), the FDP lost its hinge position to the Green

Party in 1998. This not only dismantled a seemingly unshakable cartel figuration in Germany, it saw a core party lose its role almost over-night. Presently one of various minor or secondary parties with coalition potential, it provides an extreme example of how easily these organisations can lose much of their relevance in a very short period of time.

Much like the economic relationship that Katz has identified between members and their parties (1990) the relationship between the latter and the cartel is similar. In return for the security and assured access to goods, organisations relinquish a certain amount of autonomy, yet they also face the constant dilemma of whether to defect and seek maximum gains through competitive means (Kitschelt, 2000; see also Blyth and Katz, 2005). Though the distortion of competition may suit the larger mainstream parties as they are likely to secure the majority of any good that is cartelised, smaller parties, by virtue of their lower vote and seat shares, may feel that the constraints of membership are not outweighed by the goods procured from it: in this sense the internal unity of a cartel may rest on parties such as those found in the second layer. The important variable here is the relative distribution of power. If it is too weighted in one area it is likely that those disadvantaged will be encouraged to defect. Therefore the test of a cartel is, at some level, an exercise in the extent to which the most powerful can manipulate the incentive structures of those that are less, so convincing them it is in their interests to remain within the agreement.<sup>44</sup>

Parties able to penetrate cartel boundaries tend to enter the second layer. While Kitschelt states that they are required to overcome electoral, financial and publicity barriers in order to gain access (2000: 170-174), it is suggested that these qualities are necessary but by no means sufficient. Rather than automatically gaining status after exhibiting certain behaviours, the claim made here is that parties must be actively co-opted into a cartel by pre-existing members and for this to happen they must display more than just competitive ability. First they must be a contender for government; in other words to join the cartel a party must have passed the threshold of coalition potential. Additionally, they must display qualities that make them attractive prospects for co-option. Two thresholds are proposed here: 'qualitative acceptability' and 'utility' and it is suggested that a party must display one or both, depending on situational

---

<sup>44</sup> For a discussion on the relative distribution of power refer to Dowding (1996: Chapter 1: 3-8).

requirements. To achieve the former, 'qualitative acceptability', they must function both behaviourally and normatively in line with cartel requirements over a sustained period that is appropriate to the demands of a system whereas to achieve the latter, 'utility', they must present some good that is so attractive to the cartel or a number of its members – for example increased market control or new and sustainable governmental formulae – inclusion of the party is preferable to exclusion.

Three examples of parties co-opted to this layer have been the Centre Democrats (CD) and Christian Democrats (KD)<sup>45</sup> from Denmark and the Democrats'66 (D'66)<sup>46</sup> from the Netherlands (see Katz and Mair 1995). Both Danish parties entered the party system in the earthquake election of 1973 with relatively radical agenda, but turned out to be 'true centre parties' (Bille, 1990: 53). Despite, fading into insignificance and failing to pass the parliamentary threshold in recent years (Nordsiek, 2006) each organisation was involved in virtually every political compromise after 1973, supported various governments without portfolio, participating in bourgeois and social democratic office throughout the 1980s and 1990s and all of this despite vote shares of below 10%<sup>47</sup> (Bille, 1989; Nordsiek, 2006).<sup>48</sup> In contrast, D'66 remains a vital actor in contemporary Dutch politics (Koole, 1996:516). Initially opposed to the entrenched system of pillarisation, the party has assimilated into mainstream politics (Lucardi, 1991: 122) and with sporadic periods in office throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it has been included in three out of the last four governments (Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, 2000; Zarate, 2006).

Previously unable to break the established matrix, new parties have experienced unprecedented success in recent years passing the thresholds of representation and relevance:<sup>49</sup> indeed, some have been able to secure office and challenge traditional and established governmental formulae. While a number – for example those articulating mainstream policies – have been absorbed into the party system, or indeed cartel, others – specifically those associated with new-politics – have

<sup>45</sup> Formerly the Christian People's Party (KrF).

<sup>46</sup> Katz and Mair cite the Dutch D'66 as an example of a party co-opted into the cartel (1995).

<sup>47</sup> The CD vote ranged from 7.8% (highest) in 1973 to 1% in 2005. The KD vote ranged from 2% in 1971 to 1.7% in 2005 (highest vote 5.3% 1975) (Nordsiek, 2006).

<sup>48</sup> The Centre Democrats held junior office in 1982-1988; 1993-1996; 1996. The Christian People's Party held office 1982-1988; 1994-1996 (Lane, McKay and Newton, 1997; Zarate, 2006).

<sup>49</sup> Pedersen identifies a four thresholds in the party lifecycle: declaration; authorisation; representation; and relevance (1982).

challenged the status quo and threatened to disrupt established patterns; this is particularly so in the case of the far-right.<sup>50</sup> In many respects the fortunes of these new parties have altered the terms of politics. As a result of these developments, inter-party relationships have changed and vulnerabilities not previously experienced have been introduced. While facilitating new channels of communication and forging of new alignments, they have also weakened the density and strength of those that pre-dated their success.<sup>51</sup>

Participation in office does not necessarily equate with membership of the cartel, however, and relevant coalitionable parties without establishment status operate at the interface between it and the rest of the party system. These parties are labelled as semi-status parties. Figure 3.1 separates them from those that have full access to the cartel. The semi-permeable membranes at the top and bottom of the layer suggest that while it is possible for these parties to gain entrance to the cartel, it is also possible for them to lose what status they do possess. Like secondary parties, but more so, the fortunes of these organisations are very much dependent upon somewhat fragile parliamentary relevance and coalition potential; by virtue of this, movement and flux is common here. Successfully having passed some of the barriers linked to membership (as discussed above), the motivations for full cartel membership vary throughout parties in this layer. While some seek establishment status and are willing to conform to the cartel line, others are not because the costs of normalisation are too great. These parties may hold a goal of office but also tend to primarily seek to maximise vote or policy influence and because of this their behaviour is often interpreted as controversial. A lack of experience in government suggests that when in office they have little bargaining power in terms of the portfolios offered (although this depends on their legislative weight and indispensability to maintenance of the cabinet) (Laver and Shepsle, 2000). When not in office these parties tend to be relegated to non-governing status (as shown on Figure 3.1).

---

<sup>50</sup> Rochon (1985) differentiates between two different types of new party, those associated with traditional politics, and those associated with new politics, and for the purposes of this study it is a particularly attractive distinction. He discriminates between parties which have been created to mobilise along the lines of traditional politics in terms of policy profile and behaviour: 'challengers' and those responding to changes within the established cleavage structure by suggesting an alternative to the accepted political norm and mobilising along the lines of new cleavages, new political identities, alternative behavioural methods: 'mobilisers' (Rochon, 1985). Challenger parties are those which are generally formed out of a split with another party, and they contest 'the legitimacy of existing parties on their own turf' (Rochon, 1985: 421). In contrast, mobilisers are new organisations, which are formed to exploit their social environment and offer political views from an alternate standpoint. They draw attention to the importance of new issues and the need to approach traditional issues from a new perspective (Rochon, 1985: 421).

<sup>51</sup> Using social network theory to evaluate economic outcomes, Granovetter refers here to the 'strength of weak ties' (1973).

Prone to lose support in government, these parties tend to engage in vote and policy maximising activities when returned to opposition and because of this, they often lose much of the legitimacy they might have obtained whilst in office.

The final type of party identified in this classificatory framework is the non-governing party. Predominantly – but not exclusively – exhibiting post-1960 origins, these parties can be of any ideological hue and tend to be small with no governing role. While they may have past experience of office, their relevance tends to be transient and while they may experience periods of ‘semi-status’ it is not prolonged. Their goals vary depending on their fortunes and because of this they can not be classified as either policy, vote or office seeking organisations.

### **3.3 Concluding comments**

What has been presented here is not a conception of the cartel; rather it is a heuristic framework that enables the classification of parties that hold parliamentary relevance and coalition potential. Providing a new lens through which to view modern day party systems and their composition, it suggests a point of departure for theoretical and empirical analysis. Suggesting that party cartels tend to form as two layered entities that are heterogeneous in makeup, the argument is that as the universe of parties has become more homogenous in terms of its access to government, it has also become clear how strikingly different they are in terms of the goals they hold, the challenges they face, and the strategies they employ to deal with them. Distinguishing between organisations that do and do not have full access to the cartel, it has implied that access to office does not necessarily equate with access to the cartel, and it has been proposed that incentives for cartel membership differ. Finally, it has been identified that while motivations for membership are high in some parties, they are comparatively lower in others and because of this, when cartels do form their stability is permanently under threat.

The following three chapters operationalise this framework within the context of Cartel Party Theory II or CPT II. While Chapter 4 looks for evidence of policy cartelisation in ‘mainstream parties’ between 1970 and 1998, Chapter 5 asks whether they and secondary parties were able to cartelise parliamentary and government options throughout the same time period. Finally, Chapter 6 considers semi-status parties – specifically the extreme right – and considers the

proposition that the third and most successful wave of right-wing extremism has been an inherent by-product of cartelisation.

## Chapter 4

### Policy cartelisation: fact of fiction?

While the first chapter of this dissertation provided a general overview of certain changes that have taken place in westernised industrial democracies in recent decades, the second introduced the cartel model which claims to explain how parties have adapted to, even shaped political environments to their benefit. The third chapter suggested a framework through which the model can be interpreted in modern day party systems. Adopting the methodology presented in Cartel Party Theory II (CPT II), this chapter focuses on the most influential set of parties in any cartel, referred to in Chapter 3 as the mainstream, and investigates the extent to which they have been able to cartelise policy since 1970.

The central assumption of the cartel model is that all traditional and established mainstream parties, within the opportunity structures of their respective systems, now seek office as a primary goal and pursue the construction of environments most conducive to achieving that goal (Wolinetz, 2002). It is suggested that the most effective way to pursue this course is through a cartel-like agreement between parties (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). Less effective in terms of controlling their environments, it is suggested that the proliferation of state subsidies provided parties with an opportunity to retreat from their representative responsibilities and both restrict and stabilise the policy environment. In turn this enabled them to supply voters with non-responsive policies, which, if accepted, cartelised the policy environment and re-directed competition towards implementation and efficiency issues. This confined electoral choice to those able to provide proof of efficiency (larger parties) and retained options inside the cartel. In turn these developments cartelised electoral, parliamentary and government options, certified parties' survival and also guaranteed a mainstream monopoly over state goods.

While the process is described as multifaceted and unlikely to proceed in a 'lock-step' manner (Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Katz and Mair, 1995), the most recent theoretical contribution to the debate – CPT II – has suggested that the driving force behind cartelisation is a reduction of available policy space, particularly between the mainstream parties of government: while state

subsidies remain vital to the process, their catalytic status – as forwarded in CPT I – is now doubted (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 53; see also Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000).

Policy holds a specific and unique utility for the cartel party much as in the case of previous types. The mass model saw the 'intellectual and moral *encradement* of the masses' (Kirchheimer, 1966: 52), a shaping of political preferences and a supply of policies that were specific to identifiable social groups. Accordingly, parties competed but only in order to enact policies; they maintained selective constituencies and divided up the electoral market. The instigation of catch-all politics, however, saw the electoral market become 'fair game' for all as parties tried to 'exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success' (Kirchheimer, 1966: 52). While parties tried to retain the support of their traditional constituencies, they also relinquished much of their ideological baggage, thus enabling them to engage in competitive, vote maximising policies aimed at dominating the electoral market and securing office. With the cartel model, parties have, again, tried to maximise their chances of incumbency but by a different route, and this has involved a diminution of the electoral process, reduced emphasis on the mobilisation of voters, a neglect of interest aggregation, and severance of the link between policy output and voter demands (Katz and Mair, 1995: 8). Rather than providing a measure of policy endorsement, electoral returns now legitimate accession to office and the electoral process has become an almost incidental feature of democracy – the means by which 'social stability' rather than 'social change' is achieved (Katz and Mair, 1995: 22).

Policy cartelisation is the product of various factors. Facilitated by the proliferation of state subsidies, organisational change, alterations in the state-party-civil-society relationship and parties' recognition of their vulnerable position (Katz and Mair, 1995: see also Blyth and Katz, 2005), the process has also been a forced response to globalisation - dependence on foreign direct investment, an increased inability of countries to control domestic economies and a new-found reliance on international as opposed to domestic markets (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 41-42) - or

indeed its rhetoric,<sup>52</sup> and the reduced utility of Keynesian-based politics. This has necessitated their retreat from a number of representative obligations causing them to tighten policy remits, ‘downsize’ constituency expectations and externalise aspects of fiscal and monetary policy, hence disassociating the business cycle from the electoral cycle and depriving politicians from access to inflationary tools (Blyth and Katz, 2005). With an ‘institutionally truncated supply curve for policy’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 44), traditional vote-maximising policies of the mainstream left have been rendered futile and the party family has made a wholesale shift towards the right rejecting a number of its key traditional policies (Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Blyth, 2003). While it is possible to interpret policy cartelisation solely as the mainstream left’s attempt to make itself more electable, a significantly durable explanation is one that suggests modern-day environments encourage mainstream parties to actively prevent change and create predictable environments which can be achieved through minimising policy differences and then stabilising profiles: in this context, policy cartelisation has been an entirely rational strategy (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 44).

Policy convergence, the first stage in the process, is not unique to the cartel model and a wealth of empirical evidence appears to show increased similarity between mainstream policies (Kirchheimer, 1966; Beer, 1969; Thomas, 1975; 1979; Norton, 1994; Mair, 1995; Vowles et al. 1995; Knutsen, 1998; Pesonen, 1999; Caul and Grey, 2000).<sup>53</sup> Referred to as an inevitable outcome in two-party systems (Downs, 1957), and more recently also in multi-party systems (Caul and Grey, 2000), policy convergence has been described as a rational vote maximising technique employed to counteract the decline of mass party politics (Kirchheimer, 1966). It has also been seen as a by-product of candidate and media-based politics (Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 1995). However, convergence associated with pre-cartel politics was characterised by a flexible and highly competitive approach to the electoral market (Farrell and Webb, 2000) that required a certain amount of ideological agnosticism. In contrast, cartel convergence – we are told – has been accompanied by policy stabilisation, reduced competition between parties, and closure of the policy market. While catch-all policies reflected a balance between a pursuit of the dealigned

---

<sup>52</sup> For a discussion the fact that globalisation has not been as significant an influence as initially suggested and the process is as much, if not more, a rhetorical rather than real tool of change refer to Blyth (2003) and Hay and Smith (2005).

<sup>53</sup> For a comprehensive review of post-war policy convergence refer to Caul and Grey (2000).

voter and retention of the ideological member, and so in an ideological sense remained restricted at some level (Blyth and Katz 2005), cartel policies have been relatively free from such constraints. Providing some support for this argument Pelizzo has demonstrated that voters in Britain, France and Germany believe mainstream parties are becoming increasingly unrepresentative of their demands (2003a: 101).<sup>54</sup>

Severance of the tie between cartel parties and their 'core constituencies' has enabled the former to enjoy relatively high levels of autonomy in terms of policy formulation and extrication from aggregative responsibilities has permitted the introduction of a new supply politics: one that bypasses public opinion. Rather than trying to socialise the electorate and then shape its opinion as in the mass era, cartel parties have negated public sentiment as much as possible and supplied the electorate with non-negotiable and limited policy options. In the interests of mutual self-interest and survival, cartel parties have chosen to maintain a policy oligopoly in order to contain competitive space and ensure that the electorate receives an apportioned, controlled and measured supply of goods (policy). These developments have enabled parties, at the expense of voters, to manage policy formulation, thus instigating a decisive reversal of the principal – agent (PA) relationship and moving party politics into a 'post-catch-all period' (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 45).

Policy cartelisation limits parties' left-right remit, permitting them less room for manoeuvre, but also freeing them from the responsibilities that previously constrained them. Furthermore, while similar and stable policies make parties less distinctive in their own right, they also reduce the prospects of them being rejected in favour of their main opponent. Such situations also create environments in which there is less likelihood of voters exhibiting strong party preferences. Implicit in this is that the prospects are comparatively low for one large mainstream party monopolising seats, office, power and associated spoils. Therefore, both have relatively equal opportunities of securing office and thus, according to theory, should alternate. So while such situations inhibit opportunities for predominance, they also provide security and relatively equal access to the primary goal of office. However, maintenance of these environments is contingent upon the parties continuing to see it in their interest to maintain the balance. Blyth and Katz

---

<sup>54</sup> Pelizzo lists voter opinions from the British Election Survey in 1997. French voters surveyed in 1997 and the German Election Survey, 1998 (2003a).

suggest that this is made possible through Cournot-Nash equilibrium that prevents defection – a hazard of any cartel – as all players believe they operate by way of the same strategy acknowledging that any benefits resulting from withdrawal and re-introduction of competition will be short lived and followed by unfavourable outcomes such as exclusion or dismantling of cartel arrangements (Katz and Blyth, 2005; see also Blyth, 2003: 6-7). Accordingly, in a cartel the parties set the policies and alter them in the knowledge that others will follow suit (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 39).

Whereas the motivations for office have always been a balance between a desire for the position and its associated goods against that to control policy formulation (Budge and Laver, 1992: 1), the cartel argument suggests that a dissociation from the electorate and a wish to control the environment now sees parties making firm moves to prioritise office above policy influence. If this is the case then parties have become more office-seeking and willing than they were in the past to make compromises – in this instance policy cartelisation – in order to achieve their goal: the behaviour is therefore, a rational approach for maximising the likelihood of incumbency (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Facilitated by a restructuring of party funding and a retreat from representative and constituency-based responsibilities, parties have created favourable conditions for policy cartelisation by carving out access to state goods and lowering the costs of opposition (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 4). In turn, these developments have facilitated a consolidation of autonomy within central party organisations and also encouraged the adoption of new strategic behaviours (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 45; see also Katz and Mair, 1995).

Initially thought to be part of a wider developmental process, policy cartelisation was first described as a collusive, progressive and insulating behaviour most likely to take place in consensual environments (Katz and Mair, 1995). But, this view was criticised for mistaking long-held consensual practices for new problem-solving behaviours (Koole, 1996). More recent work has claimed to negate the initial position, however, proposing that policy cartelisation is more of a survival strategy than a product of overt collusion and is in fact the logical and rational response to coordination problems that result from endogenous and exogenous challenges (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 33). While the process is ‘emerging as the equilibrium type in modern western democracies’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 32) it is suggested that it is more likely to occur – or occur

to a greater extent – in environments characterised by majoritarian, adversarial politics and situations that require a higher level of market concentration, particularly when one party is forced to address its non-electability and enter a more favourable political space to secure votes and thus office (Blyth and Katz, 2005).

Blyth and Katz justify the revised version of the theory with evidence from Britain, the US and Sweden, claiming that the former two show strong evidence of policy cartelisation while that in the latter is comparatively weak. The motives behind change in Labour (Britain) and the Democrats (US) were to increase electability, whereas in Sweden they were to limit welfare costs and promote competitiveness: yet, though all three engaged in the rhetoric of globalisation, downsized constituency expectations and limited mainstream policy differentiation (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 52), the systems cartelised in Britain and US but not in Sweden. The reason for this appears to be that while electorates in Britain and US accepted this change, continuing to vote for the main parties, in Sweden they did not. Despite the Social Democrats (SAP) and Conservatives presenting a set of cartelised options in 1998, they were rejected and the voters deserted the mainstream (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 46-53). This forced the SAP to restore the welfare state and re-instigate a supply-based policy agenda, ‘thus exposing the limits of the cartelisation strategy’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 52), highlighting the power of the electorate and underlining the process’s dependence on opportunity structures .

This chapter investigates the extent to which policy cartelisation has taken place since 1970 – the period associated with party cartelisation (Katz and Mair, 1995). While Blyth and Katz (2005) have provided a qualitative assessment of policy changes in three systems this chapter takes a broader and more quantitative approach to the subject, empirically investigating mainstream policy developments in eleven party systems throughout western Europe. The following section, 4.1, provides a brief introduction to the concept of political space and policy measurement, and this is followed in section 4.2 by the identification and operationalisation of mainstream left and right trends in each system. Section 4.3 examines policy cartelisation as a function of office-seeking behaviour, proceeding to identify a number of indicators likely to predict the probability of it taking place. Findings are reported in section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides a brief investigation

into the uptake of managerial efficiency as the new basis for competition in the mainstream, and section 4.6 ends the chapter with a discussion and a number of concluding comments.

#### **4.1 The measurement of political space**

The purpose here is to gauge comparative change and therefore a measure that is equally comparable across systems must be employed. Party positions are only meaningful if they are assessed within a defined political space, and by virtue of this the concept has become the common vehicle for comparative evaluation of electoral preferences and party competition (Laver and Hunt, 1992: 11; Carter, 2005: 103). Yet, while electoral preferences are generally multi-dimensional, the vast percentage of party competition tends to be conducted along a single left-right dimension (Carter, 2005: 103). Indeed it has been shown to be the predominant and most universal focus of inter-party competition (Budge and Robertson and Hearl, 1987: 392), and with the exception of systems where the overriding cleavage is different, party competition is, by and large, confined to left-right issues (Budge and Robertson and Hearl, 1987: 104):<sup>55</sup> while 'generalised' (Budge and Robertson and Hearl, 1987: 395) and much used, the lion's share of spatial analysis conforms to this belief.

The left-right dimension is used to describe the dominant cleavage in advanced industrial democracies (Huber and Inglehart, 1995: 73). It has been described as an economic tension concerned with the allocation of resources separating state and market and an authoritarian/libertarian divide of attitudes that shape governance and behaviour (Kitschelt, 2000); it has also been linked to roles in terms of the state dimension, public ownership, social policy, socio-economic, domestic and foreign affairs (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006: 171). Perhaps the most comprehensive definition is provided by the Manifesto Project (CMP) which suggests that it 'refers to classic economic policy-conflicts – government regulation of the economy through direct controls or takeover sometimes associated with Keynesian economic management – as opposed to free enterprise, individual freedom, incentives and economic orthodoxy' (Budge and Robertson and Hearl, 1987: 395). Parties' left-right dimensions, can be

---

<sup>55</sup> Budge, Robertson and Hearl suggest that the left-right dimension was weak in the Irish Republic and West Germany (1987: 393). However, these systems' inclusion in the study is deemed appropriate as the mainstream parties are still forced to address left-right issues. Moreover, recent work by Franzmann and Kaiser suggests that the left-right dimension is relevant in Germany (2006).

identified in terms of ideological position (Castles and Mair, 1984: 73), position emphasis (Budge and Fairlie; 1983; Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987), socio-economic base of voter profile and proclivity to carry out certain programmes (Castles and Mair, 1984: 73). There are various approaches for estimating these locations, on either a priori or inductive criteria. The former ranks parties in an ordinal fashion by way of their identity or genetic origin: this is one of the oldest and most commonly utilised methods of spatial allocation. Predominantly confined to party family distinctions, this approach limits itself to ordering in left-right terms (Mair, 2001: 12) – connecting policy proximity to coalition outcomes (Taylor and Herman, 1971) and investigating the spread of ideological variation in western European party systems (Siegelman and Yough, 1978). One of the oldest methods for spatial allocation is that of secondary reading or ‘the judgement of experts’ (Taylor and Laver, 1973: 216) which involves scholars making a position judgement based upon the available literature (Mair, 2001: 13). Used to identify the role of ideology in coalition formation (Taylor and Laver, 1973), ideological trends in western Europe (Thomas, 1975) and isolation of important ‘cleavage dimensions’ (Dodd, 1976: 97) it was also used in Kenneth Janda’s International Comparative Political Parties Project (1980: 53-77).

Then there are mass surveys. Work by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) shows the benefits of surveys in terms of locating the spatial position of parties; however, though proving particularly useful in determining party-voter congruence, they have been of limited use in understanding coalition formations or the policy-party link (Mair, 2001: 14).

Although limited to single country studies by virtue of their fragility, elite studies provide a particularly unique lens through which to assess political space. Indeed, they have taken on a number of guises, for example, investigating the proximity of parties (Pedersen, Damsgaard and Nannesstad Olsen 1971) or determining elite positions (Daalder and van Geer, 1977; Hillebrand and Meulman, 1992). However, they too are limited in their utility, not least because it is questionable whether elites are representative of their party as a whole (May, 1973; Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995).

Expert surveys seek to provide interval measurements between parties on given scales of ideological measurement over a specific period of time, utilising the judgmental skills of a

number of scholars (Morgan, 1976). The first carried out by Morgan (1976) was followed by Castles and Mair (1984) and Huber and Inglehart (1995), and more sophisticated work has since been provided by Laver and Hunt (1992) and replicated by Laver and colleagues (Mair, 2001: 18). However, judgements associated with this method have been charged with subjectivity, poor transparency (Castles and Mair, 1984), low levels of equivalence (Huber and Inglehart, 1995), and a failure to provide adequate tracking of longitudinal change (Knutsen, 1998).

Recent developments have shown that it is possible to locate party positions through the manual or computerised coding of text. Based upon a two step procedure of data reduction (creation of a coding scheme; definition of a text unit; coding of these units) and data manipulation (raw data are converted into variables which enable researchers to make valid estimates of parties' policy positions) (Laver and Garry, 2000: 622), these innovations have strengthened the conditions of accuracy and equivalence under which text analysis can be conducted. While a number of new and innovative developments have been seen in the work of Laver and Garry (2000) and (Ray, 2001), the first and presently most-used development in data coding for spatial location took place through the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (formerly the Manifesto Research Group or MRG).<sup>56</sup> The CMP heralded a new era in party positioning, as prior to it there had not been any large scale comparative assessment of policy and spatial location of parties within their operational environments (Budge and Bara, 2001b: 52). Attempts at content analysis date back to 1930s America and particularly the work of Bernard Berelson (1952; 1954) who defined it as a 'research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication' (Berelson, 1954: 481). Generally speaking, manifesto data has not been exploited to its full potential (Budge and Bara, 2001a: 4). Other than a small number of specialised comparative studies (Hearl, 1988; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Krowel, 1998) it has primarily been used for case-study investigations (Mair, 1987; Strøm and Leipart, 1989; McAllister and Moore, 1991; Evans and Norris (eds.) 1999; Gibbons 2000). However, the CMP sought to remedy this through the comparative assessment of post-war party manifestos in 20 countries (Volkens, 2001a: 36). Human coding decisions were theoretically grounded and undertaken by trained experts, who broke texts down into quasi sentences which were then assigned to one of 54 categories (Volkens, 2001a: 36). Categories were either bi-polar

---

<sup>56</sup> For the sake of clarity the term CMP will be used throughout.

or saliency contingent, the latter embedded in the conviction that parties do not actually oppose each other on a number of issues; rather they merely accentuate areas most likely to provide the most utility and maximise their vote (Budge, 2001b, 52).

Manifestos, as opposed to other documents, provide the widest range of policy positions held by a party (Volkens, 2001a: 34). They offer a 'key set of statements' (Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987: 18), information on policy priorities (Budge and Bara, 2001a: 9) and also have the legitimacy of being officially ratified in most cases, thus articulating the 'authoritative' position of an entire organisation (Volkens, 2001a: 34). In addition, they are published by all parties before every election provides an opportunity for functionally equivalent comparison (Volkens, 2001a: 34) and the tracking of developments over time. The basic cross-country similarity between national elections enables assessment within and between systems and party families, and from a more specific point of view, the richness of manifestos (Budge and Bara, 2001a) allows for differences in policy emphases to be identified (Budge, 2001a: 82), party competition within given spaces to be studied, coalition formation to be investigated, and the relationship between party programmes and policy implementation by governments to be assessed (Budge and Bara, 2001b: 52). This ties governing parties to pre-election manifesto pledges and enables them to be held accountable for their actions (Klingemann Hofferbert and Budge, et al, 1994; Budge and Bara, 2001b: 52).

Although reliable (Volkens, 2001a: 37) and demonstrative of validity on varying levels (Budge and Bara, 2001a: 14-15), the CMP has been criticised for a number of reasons. Accused of being too coarse-grained, and in need of finer coding techniques (Laver and Garry, 2000: 622), it has been questioned on the basis of whether it provides suitable assessments of left-right positioning (see Laver and Schofield, 1990; Kim and Fording, 1998) or meaningful estimates (Harmel, Janda and Tan, 1995; Laver and Garry, 1999). Although a number of different techniques have been applied to the data, little evaluation is available (Gabel and Huber, 2000: 96). Its coding scheme has been accused of gross inconsistency with common wisdom (Pelizzo, 2003a),<sup>57</sup> and labelled inappropriate for generating left-right positions (Harmel, Janda and Tan, 1995; Laver and Garry,

---

<sup>57</sup>The locations of some parties in the data set strongly contrast with their ideological portrayal in accepted scholarly literature. Pelizzo specifically refers to the Austrian, Belgian, French, Danish, Dutch, German and Italian party systems (2003b).

1999) as some categories are more suitable for tapping into policy emphases and not positions and failing to acknowledge the difference between the two (Gabel and Huber, 2000:96). A similar stance is articulated in work by Pelizzo and Franzmann and Kaiser. Both claim meaningful comparison is not possible with CMP data as it now stands because a lack of equivalence mitigates against meaningful comparison (Pelizzo, 2003b) and country-specific factors determine whether categories provide positional or valence information (Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006). Finally, it has been suggested that although the data may provide faulty estimates of party locations, on a country-to-country basis they are capable of providing valuable insight into the competitive relationship between parties.

Despite these criticisms, however, the CMP Dataset provides the most comprehensive resource for the study of party preferences: 'it covers areas at the heart of rational choice theory' (Budge and Bara, 2001a: 1) and has been shown to be a valid and reliable estimate of party positions (McDonald and Mendes, 2001: 140; Volkens, 2001a: 37).<sup>58</sup> Given parties' inherent aversion to change it is reasonable to assume that it is easier and more preferable for them to alter their 'packaging' rather than absolute content (Janda, Harmel, Edens and Goff, 1995), and considering this chapter's interest in the policies supplied to the electorate rather than parties' core ideological positions, the CMP Dataset (Budge et al. 2001) is the most appropriate vehicle with which to measure development. Here, party cartelisation on the left-right dimension is measured. Based on the left-right position of party as defined by Laver and Budge (1992), the dimension has been compiled from 26 bipolar categories and the left-right measure has been created by adding percentage references to left and right categories and then subtracting left from right (Volkens, 2001a).<sup>59</sup> In a general sense the scale opposes peaceful internationalism, welfare and government intervention on the left with strong defence, free enterprise and traditional morality on the right.

---

<sup>58</sup>Five left-right scales were compared to three expert left-right scales in order to test validity and the manifesto scales were tested over a 21 year period in order to assess reliability (McDonald and Mendes, 2001).

<sup>59</sup> Labelled as 'rile' the left-right dimension has been compiled as follows, negative scores represent left positions and positive ones right positions. Right wing categories: military-positive: freedom (human rights), constitutionalism-positive; effective authority; free enterprise; economic incentives; protectionism-negative; economic orthodoxy; social services limitation; national way of life-positive; traditional morality-positive; law and order; social harmony **minus** left wing categories: de-colonisation; military-negative; peace; internationalism-positive; democracy; regulate capitalism; economic planning; protection-positive; controlled economy; nationalisation; social services-expansion; education-expansion; labour groups-positive (Budge et al., 2001: 228; see also pages 222-227).

Guidance on the grouping of categories has been provided through Marxist writings on the left and speeches from Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher on the right: the fit between categories was determined through factor analysis that was applied to the 1983 data set (Budge and Klingemann, 2001).

#### 4.2 Identification of the mainstream left and right

Mainstream parties are the policy setters in a cartelised environment (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). Therefore, it is suggested that the extent to which the process has taken place will be reflected in their policy profiles. The remainder of this chapter investigates the post-war left-right trends of the mainstream searching for evidence of policy cartelisation. By virtue of their predominance over votes, seats and government as well as their articulation of the left-right cleavage, parties of interest here are the mainstream left and the mainstream right. However, a number of systems do not exhibit consistently predominant mainstream left or mainstream right parties and because of this composite trends comprising those in government *with* the highest seat share at each election have been constructed. The largest, most dominant traditional, mainstream parties are identified here because even if their ideological grouping does not necessarily categorise them as traditional left or right, and even if left or right issues are not their natural domain, they will, by virtue of their positions, have to make binding, responsible and accountable decisions on the dimension.

Post-war mainstream left and right trends have been constructed for each of the eleven systems under investigation. While five systems can boast consistency in terms of predominant parties on the mainstream left and right since 1945 (Austria; Germany; Ireland; Norway; Britain) by virtue of party system change or an alteration in leading parties six cannot (Belgium; Denmark; France; the Netherlands; Italy; Sweden). Ordered in terms of mainstream left (L) and then mainstream right (R) classifications for the period between 1945 and 1998 are as follows:

- **Austria:** (L) Austrian Socialist Party; (R) Austrian People's Party
- **Belgium:** (L) 1946-1977: Belgian Socialist Party, 1978-1995: Flemish Socialist Party, Francophone Socialist Party; (R) 1946-1965: Francophone Christian Social Party; 1968-

1995, Flemish Christian Social Party, Christian People's Party (Flemish), Christian Social Party (Wallonian)

- **Britain:** (L) Labour; (R) Conservatives
- **Denmark:** (L) Social Democratic Party; (R) 1945-1966, 1973-1979, 1994-1998: Liberals, 1968-1971, 1981-1990: Conservative People's Party;
- **France:** (L) Socialist Party; (R): 1946-1958: Conservatives; 1958-1993: Gaullists; 1993-1997: Rally for the Republic
- **Germany:** (L) Social Democratic Party of Germany; (R) Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
- **Ireland:** (L) Fianna Fáil; (R) Fine Gael<sup>60</sup>
- **Italy:** (L) 1946- 1963, Socialist Party, 1968-1972 PCI, 1976-1992, Socialist Party, PDS, 1994-1996; (R) 1946-1992: Christian Democrats, 1994-1996 Forza Italia; the Netherlands: (L) Labour Party, (R) 1946-1972 Catholic People's Party, 1977-1998: Christian Democratic Appeal
- **Norway** (L) Labour; (R) Liberal Party
- **Sweden** (L) 1948-1998, Social Democratic Labour Party; (R) 1948-1956, 1960-1964: Liberal People's Party, 1958, 1979-1998: Moderate Coalition Party

#### 4.3 Cartelisation as an assessment of office-seeking behaviour: classifying probable strategies

In this chapter we are investigating the extent to which policy cartelisation – spatial constriction, convergence and policy stabilisation in the mainstream left and right – has taken place since 1970. Parties are, of course, only likely to adopt behaviours that are to their benefit and this must be taken into account when assessing the extent to which any change has taken place. It is reasonable to assume then that if cartelisation does not increase, or indeed mitigates against the probability of parties achieving incumbency, they are unlikely to pursue it. Furthermore, it stands to reason that the parties most likely to engage in overt office-seeking behaviour are those for whom it is in their best interests. Therefore, it is suggested that their goals, strategies and subsequent behaviours are products of their opportunity structures. Five important factors must

<sup>60</sup> While the left-right dimension is weak in Ireland (Budge Robertson and Hearl. 1987: 393). Appendix A.1 shows that aggregate measures of the mainstream on the left-right dimension in the 1940s, 1950s, 1980s and 1990s place Fianna Fáil as the most left wing mainstream party and Fine Gael as the most right wing.

be considered when assessing a party's proclivity for seeking a position in government and adopting policy cartelisation as the vehicle through which it can be achieved: first, how much does it desire office?; second what is the probability it can achieve it?; third, will policy cartelisation increase its chances of goal maximisation?; fourth will its main opponent participate in the cartelisation process?; fifth, does its environment provide an opportunity structure that facilitates cartelisation?

For a party to place office-seeking as its primary goal it must be willing to compromise aspects of its identity and make concessions, and, because this behaviour is not without risk, it stands to reason that they will only undertake it – over and above all else – if they consider its achievement absolutely necessary and attainable. By reason of the association between market concentration and power, Blyth and Katz (2005) suggest policy cartelisation is more likely to take place in adversarial, majoritarian environments rather than consensual ones and the likelihood of office-seeking policy cartelisation taking place is dependent on parties' perceived necessity of office and the ability of them to engage in, and complete the necessary behaviour in order to achieve it. It is reliant on both parties holding the same goals and is a balance between the persistence of office-losing policy and the accommodation of office-facilitating policy (see Finegold and Swift, 2001: 99-100).<sup>61</sup> Finally it is a product of opportunity structures.

With the assumption that policy cartelisation is a rational and deliberate choice, the chapter investigates its relationship with factors likely to influence office seeking behaviour. First it takes requirements for office into account. Then it investigates two aspects of Lijphart's majoritarian/consensual distinction: cabinet size and disproportionality. Finally, it addresses the kick-start to cartelisation – state subsidies. The principal argument is as follows: the higher the costs of opposition, the higher the chances of exclusion from office, the less likelihood of significant challenge and the greater the ability to disengage from representative responsibilities, the more likely it is that parties will engage in aggressive office-seeking behaviour, understood here as policy cartelisation. Each will now be dealt with in turn.

---

<sup>61</sup> Finegold and Swift suggest that in order to win elections the issue-based strategies available for parties out of power are persistence, innovation, cessation or accommodation (2001).

Other than exclusion from office and the fora designated only for incumbents, parties out of government often experience reduced access to state benefits; however, they are particularly disadvantaged in systems that afford them little influence in the policy-making process. Though cartel theory suggests motivations for office have shifted and parties are now more concerned with securing the position as an end in itself rather than a vehicle through which to influence policy and a means to exact social change (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005), it is more than reasonable to suppose that control of the policy process remains an attractive option. If this is the case then, parties that have less influence over policy whilst in opposition are more likely to seek office. Kaare Strøm suggests that non-incumbents are more likely to exert influence over policy in systems where strong committee systems prevail, and conversely, they are less likely to exercise it where committee systems are weak and policy decisions are thrashed out on the legislative floor (1990). Accordingly, it is suggested that the lower a party's chance of influencing policy whilst in opposition, the more it will want office and thus the greater the likelihood that it will engage in aggressive office-seeking behaviour and seek cartelisation.

On the basis of expert opinions, Laver and Hunt compiled a scoring system that distinguishes systems by the impact parties can reasonably exert on government policy when they are out of office (1992). Allocated a score between 1 and 9 they confirmed and built on Strøm's theories surrounding oppositional power in minority government situations (1990). Countries with strong committee systems such as Italy and those in Scandinavia were shown to exert the most influence on government policy whereas countries with weak committee systems such as Britain were shown to exert the least (1992). The first column in Table 4.1 illustrates Laver and Hunt's calculations describing the impact of opposition parties on government policy (Laver and Hunt, 1992). Scored between 1 and 9 there is substantial variance. It is suggested that one factor affecting the extent to which parties seek office is directly related to the influence they can exert on the policy process when in opposition; in other words, the more influence they have out of office the less they will seek it and visa versa. Based on this, the second column in Table 4.1 lists systems by costs of opposition. Ranked from 1-10, the system experiencing the lowest cost is Italy. It is followed by Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and finally Britain. On the strength of this it is predicted that the higher the

cost of opposition, the greater the probability that a party will seek office and engage in policy cartelisation.

*H<sub>1</sub>: The greater the cost of opposition, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.*

*Table 4.1* Costs of Opposition

	Impact of opposition parties on government policy	COO
Italy	7.1	1
Norway	6.8	2
Denmark	6.5	3
Sweden	5.2	4
Austria	4.1	5
Ireland	4.1	5
the Netherlands	3.6	7
Germany	3.5	8
France IV & V	3.4	9
Belgium	2.6	10
Britain	2.0	11

*Source:* Laver and Hunt, (1992) Appendix B.

*Note:* COO = cost of opposition.

Scores were calculated from an average of expert opinions ranked 1-9 (Laver and Hunt, 1992).

Austria and Ireland share the same COO rank of 5 and because of this the rank of 6 has been omitted.

If a party believes that changing its policy profile will increase its vote/seat profile and ensure against loss it is more likely to do so (Janda, Harmel, Edens and Goff, 1995; Finegold and Swift, 2001). It also follows that party A is less likely to alter its policy if there is a party B to which party A's voters can migrate. By virtue of its retreat from demand-responsive politics, much of the policy change associated with cartelisation is, we are told, unresponsive to voter demands (Blyth and Katz, 2005). Therefore, it is in a party's interests to ensure that challengers modify their policies to meet cartel requirements (Katz and Mair, 1995; 1996; Blyth and Katz, 2005), or their electoral success is limited to such an extent that voters have little incentive to re-focus their support (Katz and Mair, 1995). Clearly then, the fewer parties in a system and the higher the barriers for entry, the greater the chances of successful and effective policy cartelisation (Blyth and Katz, 2005), and, in this sense, it is reasonable to conclude that majoritarian environments, by virtue of their features, are more likely to facilitate policy cartelisation. Accordingly, it is suggested that the higher the threshold for representation, the more confident parties will be that they are insulated from challenge and the more willing they will be to risk displeasing their voters.

It has long been recognised that the system for translating votes into seats engenders psychological effects in the electorate that in turn influence the likelihood that they will vote for any given party. While some debate exists as to whether the issue is really this simple,<sup>62</sup> it is reasonable to assume that the number of parties operating in any given system is a function of its proportionality, and, smaller parties enjoy a greater chance of vote and seat gain in more proportional environments where the congruence between the two is high. Situations such as these place mainstream parties at risk because low thresholds for representation suggest ample opportunity for new party entry and opportunities for voters to transfer their support to other parties. In contrast, the greater the disproportionality of a system, the less likelihood of challenge and the greater the probability of successful policy cartelisation. For example, voters in Sweden were able to punish the mainstream for limited policy options and force the re-instigation of competition (see above and refer to Blyth and Katz, 2005) due to the opportunities afforded by its high proportionality; in contrast they were not in Britain and the US because of their high disproportionality. The first column in Table 4.2 documents post-1970 disproportionality averages calculated by the Gallagher Index (Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003); decade-based averages can be found in Appendix A.2. On the premise that parties are more likely to seek office the more disproportional their environments are, systems are ranked from 1-10 with increasing disproportionality. The Netherlands exhibits the lowest measure of disproportionality. Britain the highest. The list is as follows: the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, Norway, France and Britain. It is suggested that the greater the disproportionality of a system, the higher probability of mainstream parties being able to set policy options without challenge, achieving successful policy cartelisation and using it as a tool to gain office, resulting in the following hypothesis.

H<sub>2</sub> The greater the disproportionality of a system, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.

---

<sup>62</sup> For instance, recent work suggests that the extreme-right vote between 1979 and 2002 was unrelated to electoral system proportionality (Carter, 2004).

Table 4.2 Average disproportionality after 1970

	Post 70s Mean	D
the Netherlands	1.42	1
Germany	1.62	2
Austria	1.70	3
Denmark	1.70	3
Belgium	3.03	5
Sweden	1.90	6
Ireland	4.03	7
Italy	4.14	8
Norway	4.61	9
France V	14.0	10
Britain	15.50	11

*Source:* Bowler, Carter and Farrell (2003). Data kindly provided by E. Carter.

*Notes:* D = disproportionality.

Disproportionality calculated by the Gallagher Index. Vote-seat differences for each party are squared and then added. This total is then divided by two and finally the square root of this is taken as the disproportionality score.

Austria and Denmark share the same of rank of 3 and because of this the rank of 4 has been omitted.

The difficulty differential, or ‘threshold for office’ is the third factor suggested to influence the probability of office-seeking policy cartelisation. The argument is as follows. Where office space is at premium, parties have to maximise their electoral majority or coalition potential so it follows that the more difficult it is to secure office, the more effort parties have to put into achieving it. Therefore, the more restrictive and exclusionary governmental formulae, the greater the likelihood of office-seeking behaviour (party cartelisation); likewise it is suggested that the less restrictive a governmental formula and the easier it is to obtain office, the lower the likelihood of office-seeking behaviour. Four government types are listed here by their propensity to encourage office-seeking behaviour: single party majority (SPM); minimal winning coalition (MWC); surplus majority coalition (SMC) and minority government (MG). The suggestion here is as follows: if office is sought as an end in itself and is considered a route to goods that are otherwise inaccessible, it stands to reason that governments will choose not to include ‘passengers’ (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006: 385). It is reasonable to assume then that systems more likely to cartelise will show a proclivity for governmental formulae that include only parties whose seat share is essential for the maintenance of a parliamentary majority. It is suggested therefore, that SPM is most likely to encourage office-seeking behaviour. Similarly, it is suggested that the need to maximise coalition potential encourages such behaviour in parties that work in environments prone to MWC; alternatively, where SPM is the norm, parties are unlikely to engage in overt office-seeking behaviour as the fear of exclusion is low. Finally, it is suggested that where MG is

most common there is little incentive to seek market share (single party government) or government partners (coalition government); rather, parties are more likely to face challengers that are policy orientated (Strøm, 1990), ideological, competitive and able to mobilise a policy-orientated electorate. Accordingly, it is suggested that these restrictions do not encourage parties in MG environments to exhibit office-seeking behaviour and therefore they are less likely to attempt policy cartelisation.

Table 4.3 allocates all eleven systems to one of these four categories. While the first five columns provide information relating to the different types of post-war government in each system, the sixth lists most common governmental formulae evident since 1945. While only one system fits the SPM category (Britain), four fit that of MWC (Austria; Belgium; Germany; Ireland), three that of SMCG (France; Italy; the Netherlands) and again three that of MG (Denmark; Norway; Sweden). The seventh column lists the number of elected governments that ran between 1945 and 1998 and the eighth calculates the percentage that have conformed to the most commonly displayed formula: while most have shown a clear propensity for one type throughout the post-war period, a number have not. Prone to surplus majority coalitions in the First Republic, Italy has also shown a strong tendency for minority governments; the Netherlands has governed by MWC and SMC in roughly equal proportions; finally, Ireland has governed by SPM and MWC to the same extent but has been allocated to the MWC category purely on the basis that its government since 1997 has been that of MWC. With the assumption that the higher the threshold for government, the greater the incentive for aggressive office seeking behaviour – policy cartelisation – the final column ranks systems by threshold for office. Listed from 1-11 by increasing threshold the system with the lowest score is Denmark and it is followed by Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Germany and finally Britain. It is proposed that the higher the threshold for government, the greater the propensity for aggressive office seeking behaviour and policy cartelisation.

*H<sub>3</sub> The higher the threshold for office, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.*

Table 4.3 Classification of systems by way of most common governmental formulae 1945-1998

	SMP	MWC	SMC	MG SPMN	MC	MCGF	TG	MCGF%	TFO
Denmark		4		14	12	MG	30	86.6	1
Sweden	3	5		15	2	MG	25	68.0	2
Norway	6	3		13	5	MG	27	62.9	3
France IV & V		7	40	4	5	SPC	56	71.4	4
Italy		2	30	11	9	SPC	52	57.7	5
the Netherlands		8	9			SPC	17	52.9	6
Ireland	7	7		4	3	MWC	21	33.3	7
Belgium	3	22	7	1	2	MWC	35	62.9	8
Austria	4	15	1	1		MWC	22	68.2	9
Germany		17	5	1		MWC	22	77.3	10
Britain	20			1		SPM	20	100	11

Source: Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006: 401; Woldendorp, J., Keman., H., Budge, I. (2000); Zarate, 2006).

Note: SPM = single party majority; MWC = minimal winning coalition; SMC = surplus coalition;

SPM = single party minority; MC = minority coalition MC = minority government; MCGF = most common governmental formula; TG = total governments; MCGF% = most common governmental formula percentage;

TFO = threshold for office.

The proliferation of state subsidies is, by and large, believed to be one of the most significant developments to have influenced the triadic relationship between political parties, state and citizenry in recent years (Katz, 1996: 120; Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 1). Rationalised by diffusion or path dependency theory; the former describing a cross-country diffusion process aided by international links,<sup>63</sup> the latter a progressive synthesis of party and state (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 18) resultant from state cooption or party penetration but most probably a mutually instigated merger (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 1), state financing of political parties has generated considerable debate. Described by some as a testimony to parties' and states' adaptive qualities that have stabilised the terms of competition and consolidated party systems (Katz and Mair, 1995; Katz, 1996; Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 1), opposing views portend that the spread of state subsidies has quashed the voluntaristic and representative role of parties, provided them with too much strength and interfered with the 'Darwinian' life-cycle process that should regulate and also vary party system make-up (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 3).<sup>64</sup>

<sup>63</sup> State subsidies were first introduced in West Germany and Sweden (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 18).

<sup>64</sup> In contrast to all predictions, it has been claimed that expected impacts have not occurred (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000; Bowler, Carter and Farrell: 2003). Only one in a number of financial resources available to parties – thus less crucial than some arguments suggest – subsidies have been suggested to neither limit membership recruitment nor widen the gap between parties and the electorate (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt: 2000: 22). Moreover, they have failed to consolidate the status quo, prevent the arrival of new parties and mitigate against their success (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 22; see also Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003). In contrast to the cartel model's claims pertaining to the pivotal importance of state subsidies (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005).

Yet, irrespective of the influence of state subsidies, their introduction – when viewed through the cartel lens – is strongly indicative of the political and state elite’s pursuit of self-insulation at the exclusion of all others. Regulated by equality of access but tending to be distributed by proportionality – of votes or seats (Katz, 1996: 131; Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000:9; Bowler Carter and Farrell, 2003:88) – allocation of subsidies has, in reality, ‘entrench[ed] the already strong’ and mitigated against the weak (Katz, 1996: 130). This party-state fusion has extended as far as influencing the laws that determine other allocated resources and electoral opportunities such as ballot access and it has been suggested that all changes, even liberalising ones, have strengthened those most embedded within the state while continuing to mitigate against those outside it – ‘nest-feathering’, so termed by Bowler, Carter and Farrell (2003: 95).

Cartel theory suggests that the more access parties have to state subsidies, the less likely they are to rely on financial support from their membership and the more opportunities they have to disengage from constituency related responsibilities and negate demands from within the electorate. (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). Therefore, it stands to reason that the more subsidies they have access to the less attention they have to give to interest aggregation.

Assessment of state subsidies must take into account when they are determined and received (Katz, 1997: 265). While those received prior to elections benefit all parties, those allocated retrospectively can severely disadvantage smaller ones as what they do receive tends to be in proportion to the seats and or votes gained at the most recent election: this method of distribution leaves them at a severe disadvantage (Katz, 1997: 265). It is suggested that retrospective subsidies favour large and more successful – mainstream – parties at the expense of smaller ones and are facilitative of cartel conditions as they promote the former while mitigating against the latter: while the larger parties can rely on the state for financial support they have little incentive to respond to demands from within the electorate, or more specifically the membership: situations such as these create favourable conditions for policy cartelisation.

---

Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt suggest that though important, their presence has not been significant enough to make a ‘decisive difference in any crucial aspect of party development’ (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 22; Bowler, Carter and Farrell: 2003).

Table 4.4 lists direct retrospective subsidies available to parties in each of the aforementioned eleven systems. Reference to the first column shows that while Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Britain do not receive any the other six systems do but amounts and barriers vary quite extensively. The second column in the table ranks systems by way of subsidy generosity *and* restrictiveness of barrier, the logic here being that the higher the subsidy *and* the higher the barriers of access, the more the mainstream will benefit and have the opportunity to cartelise while others are marginalised. Ranked from least to most restrictive, Denmark Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Britain rank lowest followed by France, Germany, Norway, Italy, Sweden and Austria. It is proposed that the higher the threshold – the more generous the subsidies and the higher the barriers – the greater the propensity for office-seeking policy cartelisation.

*H<sub>4</sub> The greater the impact of direct subsidies, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation .*

Table 4.4 Impact of direct subsidies in the mid 1990s

	Financial support	IDS
Belgium	No direct monetary campaign support.	1
Denmark	No direct monetary campaign support	1
Ireland	No direct monetary campaign support.	1
the Netherlands	No direct monetary campaign support	1
Britain	No direct monetary campaign support.	1
France	Parliamentary candidates with at least 5% of the vote reimbursed costs of printing ballots and posters for polling places. Presidential candidates with at least 5% of the vote receive FF100,000 and costs of printing and sending platform to each voter as well as printing campaign posters.	6
Germany	DM 5.00 per vote received. Paid to parties receiving at least 0.5% of the vote in a given Land or 10% of the vote in a single-member district if no Land list is presented.	7
Norway	Nkr 22.10 (1991) per vote received; 2.5% of vote required to qualify.	8
Italy	15 million lire divided among all parties (a) with lists in at least two-thirds of the constituencies; (b) which elect at least one member and have at least 300,000 votes or 2% of votes cast; 15% is divided equally, the remained in proportion to votes obtained.	9
Sweden	Skr 274,850 (1989) per seat in the Riskdag.	10
Austria	ÖS 85 million (1991) divided among parties in Nationalrat in proportion to vote at last election.	11

Source: Katz, (1997: Table 14.4, 266-270).

Note: IDS = impact of direct subsidies.

Countries are ranked from lowest to highest direct state subsidy and restrictiveness of barrier.

To rank systems financial subsidies were converted to British pounds using Moneycorp Commercial Foreign Exchange converter [[www.moneycorp.com/tools/currency\\_converter/sharedConverterIndex.com](http://www.moneycorp.com/tools/currency_converter/sharedConverterIndex.com)] (28.08.2006). First, subsidies were compared in a direct quantitative sense by way of available finances; they were then compared in a qualitative sense by way of imposed and other thresholds.

Germany: 5DM = £1.73; Norway: Nkr22.10 = £1.86; Italy: 15million lire = £5.232.95; Sweden: Skr 274.850 = £20.075.53; Austria: ÖS 80 million = £4, 172, 659.75.

Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Britain share rank of 1 so the ranks of 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been omitted.

In summary, it is suggested that the overall likelihood of a party engaging in office-seeking behaviour – interpreted here as policy cartelisation – is likely to be function of its environment and opportunity structure: specifically cost of opposition, disproportionality, threshold for office and impact of direct subsidies. Table 4.5 brings all four indicators together in order to provide an aggregate predictor of office-seeking behaviour and policy cartelisation. Rankings for costs of opposition, disproportionality, thresholds for office and impacts of direct subsidies in all eleven

systems are provided in the first four columns. It can be seen that some systems are similarly ranked across all three indicators while a number are not. However, with the premise that each indicator carries roughly equal weight, it is suggested that summed rankings found in the fourth column provide an accurate and comparable measure of systems' predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation (PIFOSPC): finally the last column ranks the totals. Ranked from the least to most likely to seek office Denmark is suggested to hold the lowest incentives and it is followed by the Netherlands, Ireland, Norway and Sweden, Belgium and Italy, Germany, Austria, France and finally Britain. It is predicted therefore that if the incentives for office are high parties are more likely to engage in policy cartelisation.

*H<sub>5</sub> The greater the predicted incentive for office-seeking, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.*

Table 4.5: Ranked likelihood of office-seeking policy cartelisation

	COO	D	TFO	IDS	Sum	PIFOSPC
Denmark	3	3	1	1	8	1
the Netherlands	7	1	6	1	15	2
Ireland	5	7	7	1	20	3
Norway	2	9	3	8	22	4
Sweden	4	6	2	10	22	4
Belgium	9	5	8	1	23	6
Italy	1	8	5	9	23	6
Germany	8	2	10	7	27	8
Austria	5	3	9	11	28	9
FranceV	10	10	4	6	30	10
Britain	11	11	11	1	34	11

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Note: COO = cost of office; D = disproportionality; TFO = threshold for office; IDS = impact of direct subsidies; PIFOSPC = predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation.

Note: Norway and Sweden share rank of 4 so the rank of 5 has been omitted. Belgium and Italy share the rank of 6 so the rank of 7 has been omitted.

Accordingly, office-seeking policy cartelisation throughout the post-1970 cartel period (Katz and Mair, 1995) is investigated. In mind of the five hypotheses listed above which suggest the behaviour is most likely to be found where the cost of opposition, threshold for office, disproportionality and impacts of direct subsidies are high, three specific questions are posed in terms of mainstream left and right behaviour on the left-right dimension: has policy space constricted?; have trends converged?; and has there been a post-convergence stabilisation?

#### 4.4 Findings

Throughout this chapter policy cartelisation has been interpreted as an office-seeking behaviour. It has been suggested that the probability of it occurring is directly related to parties' requirements for office and the belief that policy cartelisation will succeed and produce desired results. It has also been suggested that the environments most conducive to the process are those where the opposition has little influence over government policy and so requires office to exert influence (high costs of opposition); where electoral barriers allow few opportunities for challengers to pass the thresholds of representation and relevance (Pedersen, 1982) all but excluding them from relevant politics and providing the mainstream with control of the policy environment (high levels of disproportionality); where office space is at a premium and a position in government necessitates particularly strategic even aggressive office-seeking behaviour if electability or coalition potential is to be secured; and where direct subsidies favour the mainstream and mitigate against others. While it is hypothesised that on a theoretical basis incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation increase exponentially as the costs of opposition, disproportionality, thresholds for office and impacts of direct subsidies also increase, it is recognised that the effects of one factor may mitigate against the influence of another. While the relationship between these four factors and policy cartelisation are investigated here, it is expected that the strongest relationship will be shown through the aggregate rank of predicted office-seeking. Therefore, it is suggested that the sum of all four provides the optimum indicator for identifying office-seeking behaviour that is displayed through policy cartelisation.

The following hypotheses have been proposed:

*H<sub>1</sub> The greater the cost of opposition, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.*

*H<sub>2</sub> The greater the disproportionality of a system, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.*

*H<sub>3</sub> The greater the threshold for office, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.*

*H<sub>4</sub> The greater the impact of direct subsidies, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation .*

*H<sub>5</sub> The greater predicted incentive for office-seeking, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.*

Policy cartelisation is a two step process comprising convergence – a reduction in the distance between mainstream left and mainstream right policy – that is then followed by a stabilisation that extracts competition from the bilateral party relationship and tacitly endorses a new inter-party relationship (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). Accordingly, convergence and stabilisation will be searched for in turn.

#### *4.4.1 Convergence as a function of office-seeking incentives*

Table 4.6 displays bivariate correlation coefficients between mainstream left and mainstream right left-right ranges and stated independent variables: all analysis is conducted for the post-1970 period and the directional nature of each relationship is determined through best lines of fit.<sup>65</sup> In contrast to expectations, findings show rather weak relationships where only two are congruent with stated hypotheses. In contrast to expectations, an extremely weak and non-significant correlation of .011 shows that as costs of opposition increase so does the distance between the mainstream left and mainstream right. A similar and unexpected positive relationship is also found between disproportionality and the distance between the mainstream left and mainstream right. At .084 it too is very weak and non-significant showing that as disproportionality increases so does range. However, the relationship between threshold for office and range is rather more promising. While relatively weak at -.176 the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level suggesting that as the distance between the mainstream left and mainstream right decreases thresholds for office also increase. The relationship between the impact of direct subsidies and convergence is weak and insignificant. Negative at -.016 it suggests that as the impact of subsidies decrease, the distance between parties increases: however the relationship is too vague to be suggestive of anything concrete. The final relationship assessed here is that between predicted incentives for office-seeking convergence and inter-party range. Thought to

---

<sup>65</sup> Source CMP Dataset (2001). Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests were used to determine the normality of data. Throughout the dissertation Pearson's Product Moment is used to correlate data of a normal distribution while Spearman's Rho is used to correlate data that is not of a normal distribution.

be to be the most robust predictor and therefore expected to provide the strongest validation for the relationship between predicted incentives for office-seeking policy convergence and range, the coefficient of .051 disappoints by being exceptionally weak, insignificant and directionally the opposite of what was predicted.

*Table 4.6* Bivariate correlations between mainstream left and mainstream right ranges and the four ranked measures of office-seeking propensity

	COO	D	TFO	IDS	PIFOSPC
Mainstream left and right range	.011	.084	-.176*	-.016	.051

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; n = 96.

*Source:* data provided in tables 4.1-4.5

*Notes:* COO = cost of office; D = disproportionality; TFO = threshold for office; IDS = impact of direct subsidies; PIFOSPC = predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation; dependent variable: mainstream centre left and centre right left-right range; independent variables: indicators of cartelisation measured by COO, D, TFO, IODS, PIFOSPC.

Together, these four measures provide relatively little support for the hypotheses made in section 4.3 of this chapter. While some significant evidence suggesting that convergence is more likely to be found in situations where thresholds for office are high and some very weak and non-significant evidence points to an association between convergence and predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation, the distance between the mainstream left and mainstream right has been shown to increase as costs of opposition and disproportionality increase. While a number of extraneous factors may mitigate against the relationships investigated here, it is possible that in contrast to all expectations, the mainstream left and mainstream right have behaved at odds with predictions or volatility thus preventing the development of strong trends. It is also possible that these weak, somewhat inconclusive relationships can be explained by stabilisation rather than directional change. These possibilities are now investigated and trends are examined for evidence of policy constriction, convergence and subsequent stabilisation.

#### *4.4.2 Available competitive space after 1970*

Blyth and Katz, state that policy remits have been restricted as a result of globalisation-related change and because of this limitations have been imposed upon the space available for party competition; moreover they suggest that all westernised and institutionalised systems have been affected by these developments (2005). While it would be pertinent to expect policy space constriction to be greater in systems prone to cartelisation, this development should be evident

across all systems throughout the cartel period (post-1970). Rather than examining changes within the political space used by *all* parties, again, only that used by the mainstream is examined here. The reason for this is as follows. By and large, smaller parties do not set policy and to some extent, they are free, should they wish, to articulate irresponsible and unrealistic platforms. In contrast, the threat of incumbency and ‘making good’ on their promises forces mainstream parties to make realistic commitments they can follow through. By virtue of this, developments in the competitive space used by them, rather than the party system as a whole, are more likely to be indicative of changes in remit. Providing a comparison of the pre and post-1970 period, the first two columns in Table 4.7 provide the mean difference or range between the mainstream left and mainstream right on the left-right dimension. The third column illustrates the difference between the two periods indicating significant increase or as determined by one sample t tests (statistical calculations are provided in Appendix A. 3). The fourth calculates the percentage of change.

Table 4.7 shows that in total the average competitive space used by the mainstream left and right on the left-right dimension after 1970 is only marginally smaller than that used before 1970. With a pre-1970 range of 33.42 and a post-1970 range of 30.69 the difference is only -2.73 and a one sample t test confirms that the decrease between the two periods is not significant. The reason for this lack of change becomes somewhat clearer when pre and post-1970 ranges are observed individually. Calculations in Table 4.7 show heterogeneity across systems as ranges between the periods under consideration show quite substantial variance. Change after 1970 appears quite extensive in some systems but relatively minimal in others. In contrast to expectations, the distance between the mainstream left and the mainstream right does not lessen in all cases, though it reduces by up to 36.3% (the Netherlands) it also increases by as much as 88.4% (Britain): It decreases in only eight instances (Austria, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Sweden, Norway) while it increases in three (Britain, Germany and Denmark). One sample t tests determine that only seven cases display significant difference between pre and post-1970 mean ranges: five show significantly lower readings (Austria; Belgium; the Netherlands; France; Norway) while two show significantly higher readings (Britain; Germany).

*Table 4.7* Mainstream left and mainstream right left-right ranges before and after 1970

Country	Pre-1970	Post-1970	Difference	Percentage change
Total	33.42	30.69	-2.73	-8.2
Denmark	30.26	50.2	+19.94	+66.0
Sweden	46.43	38.04	-8.39	-18.0
Norway	48.50	34.10	-14.44**	-29.8
Italy	23.17	17.55	-5.62	-24.3
the Netherlands	26.44	16.84	-9.6**	-36.3
Austria	40.15	27.34	-12.81**	-31.4
Ireland	32.51	21.62	-10.89	-33.5
Germany	18.93	31.33	+12.4**	+65.5
Belgium	26.57	19.45	-7.12*	-26.8
France	52.82	39.12	-13.70*	-26.0
Britain	22.90	43.14	+20.24**	+88.4

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: Tests are all one tailed predicting reductions.

Notwithstanding system specific factors, the broad assumption was that all ranges would reduce after 1970. While eight out of eleven systems did show constricted policy space, three did not. It was expected that reductions would be greatest in systems where predicted incentives for office seeking were the greatest. However, reference to Appendix A.4 suggests that this was not the case and the two systems expected to display the greatest reductions (Britain; Germany) did in fact increase the most in size. While available political space also increased in the system with least predicted incentives for office seeking policy cartelisation (Denmark) some of the larger and most significant reductions took place in systems where lower reductions were expected. Additional to this, data in Appendix A.4 also suggest that there were no obvious associations between changes in available policy space and costs of office, disproportionality, thresholds for office and impacts of direct subsidies.

While findings here provide some support for the cartel model showing reduced competitive space in the majority of systems, some findings are contrary to expectations. However, data provided in Table 4.7 only supplied information comparing mean differences across two periods and was not provisional of insight into the specific developments that took place after 1970: the following section investigates for any evidence of post-1970 convergence.

#### 4.4.3 Convergence?

In order to test for convergence between the mainstream left and mainstream right since 1970 left-right ranges are examined on an election-to-election basis. As high negative coefficients would indicate relatively consistent convergence, moderate readings suggestive of post-convergence stabilisation are expected here. Table 4.8 lists non-parametric bivariate correlations that measure the extent to which the distance between trends have developed throughout the period of interest. While the first column provides correlation coefficients indicating significance where appropriate, range increases or decreases (as displayed in Table 4.7) are provided in the third.

Table 4.8 Bivariate correlations between mainstream left and right left-right range and election date 1970-1998

	Mainstream range and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range
Total	-0.067	96	D
Denmark	.165	12	I
Sweden	.455	10	D
Norway	.703	7	D**
Italy	-.943**	8	D
Netherlands	-.333	9	D**
Austria	-.467	9	D**
Ireland	-.533	9	D
Germany	.214	8	I**
Belgium	-0.050	9	D*
France	-.929**	7	D*
Britain	.095	8	I**

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: Dependent variable: mainstream range. Independent variable election date.

Tests are all one tailed predicting reductions.

I = increase; D = decrease.

Congruent with what might be expected, considering the varied results discussed above (and shown in column 3), there is virtually no relationship between the progression of summed mainstream left-right ranges over time. Admittedly slightly negative, at -.067 the coefficient is not significant and is suggestive of variation across systems. As with all other findings reported so far, system-based calculations are mixed. The mainstream left and mainstream right do not converge in all cases and coefficients vary from -.929 to .703. Comparison against post-1970 increases or decreases in range highlights some inconsistencies: two systems exhibit positive correlations but reduced competitive space (Norway; Sweden) and one exhibits a weak positive

correlation despite significantly increased competitive space (Belgium; Britain). Only six mainstream left and mainstream right trends converge throughout the period (Austria; Belgium; Ireland; the Netherlands; France; Italy) while five diverge (Britain; Germany; Denmark; Norway; Sweden): only two exhibit significant change over time, both in terms of convergence (France; Italy). Reference to Appendix A.5 shows that a number of those with low predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation show evidence of divergence (Denmark; Sweden; Norway), though not significantly and with variation, and the system with the highest predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation and most expected to converge (Britain) does not; although the positive correlation is very weak. While a number of trends meet expectations and converge the two systems showing the steepest and most significant convergence are Italy and France ranked 3.3 and 7.5 in terms of predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation. Remaining tables in Appendix A.5 suggest no evident trends in post-1970 range developments as far as costs of opposition, disproportionality, thresholds for office and impacts of direct subsidies.

While the literature clearly suggests the presence of universal post-1970 trends (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005) the data, in many respects, appears to suggest otherwise. It may be that the search for relatively long-term phenomena has in fact prevented the detection of late onset cartelisation or more punctuated and short-term trends. This is now investigated for.

Table 4.9 provides decade-based mean distances between the mainstream left and right. With the exception of a slight increase in the 1980s, it can be seen that in total the overall distance between the two reduced between the 1940s and the 1990s. With the exception of Denmark, all systems exhibit smaller policy spaces in the 1990s than the 1940s however, this change has not been linear and it can be seen that ranges have shown a proclivity to both diverge and converge. A comparison of the 1970s and 1990s shows that again, the total distance between the mainstream left and mainstream right has reduced, however this is only the case for six of the eleven systems (Britain; Austria; Belgium; Ireland; the Netherlands; France) as ranges in five increased over the same time period (Germany; Italy; Denmark; Norway; Sweden): of those increasing, with the exception of Germany, they were amongst those least expected to display strong incentives for office-seeking behaviour. Comparison of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s shows that while in total,

the mainstream left and mainstream right showed consistent reductions in range, the same trend was only evident in three systems (Austria; France; Ireland) and two showed continuous divergence (Denmark and Norway). Graphs provided in Appendices 4.6 and 4.7 respectively chart post-war ranges and mainstream left and right trajectories from election to election (systems are ordered by increasing predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation rank). They demonstrate the almost universal lack of directional consistency after 1970, and, in line with the decade-based calculations, convergence that has taken place appears to have been being episodic and not indicative of long term change. Britain and particularly France – those with the highest predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation – are the only two systems that show reasonably consistent convergence throughout the 1990s as do Austria, Ireland, and Germany albeit to a much lesser extent. Though almost all trends have shown at least one relatively prolonged period of convergence since 1970, they have also shown equally prolonged periods of divergence. In contrast to predictions the overwhelming post-1970 norm for this measure has been flux and volatility and because of this findings are too varied to investigate for possible relationships with any of the predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation. Contrary to expectations, there does not appear to be evidence of long-term convergence nor it seems, subsequent policy stabilisation. Nevertheless, the final section of this paper investigates whether there has been any stabilisation of policy since 1970 and questions whether any systems have moved towards a cartelisation of policy.

*Table 4.9* Decade-based distances between the mainstream left and right on the left-right dimension

	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Denmark	26.75	31.20	31.08	45.68	51.39	56.16
Sweden	56.30	50.70	38.87	22.00	61.70	35.75
Norway	52.10	47.10	33.63	19.95	25.80	34.10
Italy	40.96	11.91	16.65	20.74	2.07	24.69
the Netherlands	22.50	30.33	24.55	26.00	11.58	13.65
Austria	45.80	49.60	23.15	30.00	29.20	22.54
Ireland	63.30	30.30	24.47	44.00	17.87	8.63
Germany	6.80	45.93	4.97	27.46	34.14	31.10
Belgium	48.00	21.99	16.87	18.41	26.20	11.40
France	39.92	49.30	60.63	54.70	43.13	17.53
Britain	46.50	18.42	20.05	39.23	56.11	37.99
Total	39.95	34.53	27.71	31.41	32.03	28.05

*Source:* CMP Dataset (2001).

*Notes:* columns provide decade-based averaged of centre left and centre right ranges from election-to-election.

#### *4.4.4 Stabilisation as a function of office-seeking incentives*

What makes the cartel model unique and distinguishes it from the catch-all model is that it predicts a link between convergence and policy stabilisation: indeed, it has been suggested that recent decades have seen a stabilisation in larger established parties (Caul and Grey, 2000). Rather than parties targeting and converging upon the median voter, vying head-to-head for votes and engaging in policy-based competition, the suggestion is that they now converge and subsequently stabilise in order to achieve controllable environments that facilitate restricted competition and limited policy options they can control electoral choice with. According to theory (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005), after convergence we would expect to see the policy trajectories of both the mainstream left and mainstream right stabilise as they cartelise the policy environment.

Table 4.10 provides a measure of competition between the mainstream left and right on the left-right dimension.<sup>66</sup> It reports calculated mean change from election-to-election and provides information in a decade based format. In total it is clear that competition has been somewhat lower in the 1990s than it was in the 1940s and while the former were characterised by less competition than the 1970s, they were in fact more volatile than the 1980s. Comparison of systems' volatility measures between the first post-war decade for which they are available and the 1990s shows that it has only decreased in three cases (Italy; Ireland; Belgium), and, in contrast to expectations, most systems show higher levels of volatility in the 1990s than they did in either the 1970s or 1980s. France and Germany are the only systems that show consistently raised competition across the three decades whereas Ireland and Belgium are the only two that show consistent drops. Average change between elections appears to differ across systems and referenced to Appendix A.8 suggests no particular patterns to be identifiable, in terms of predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation, costs of opposition, disproportionality, thresholds for office and impact of direct subsidy rankings: indeed the extent of this volatility is born out in Appendix A.9. These suggest that parties do not appear to have limited their competitive behaviour on the left-right dimension: this calls the primary claim of the cartel model into question and suggests that inter-party rivalry remains evident in traditional politics.

---

<sup>66</sup> Pre and post 1970 differences are not compared here (as in Chapter 4 ) as competition in the catch-all era is thought to have been more aggressive than in the mass era.

Table 4.10 Average mainstream left and right volatility on the left-right dimension by decade

	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Denmark	12.65	10.39	9.06	16.76	14.64	18.87
Norway	3.60	3.10	6.95	7.90	9.58	9.45
Sweden	-	11.85	25.88	13.14	11.40	14.85
Italy	30.5	12.54	6.12	12.71	6.50	11.59
the Netherlands	3.80	9.77	8.28	11.50	6.70	14.60
Austria	-	7.07	5.75	23.05	18.95	15.97
Ireland	-	21.27	26.45	24.7	12.73	8.62
Germany	-	17.05	14.12	7.50	9.30	17.82
Belgium	32.10	12.82	10.58	11.74	6.82	6.01
France	-	9.60	12.32	8.63	13.57	13.94
Britain	-	9.93	11.10	12.29	11.08	15.02
Total	16.53	11.37	12.92	14.13	11.00	13.80

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: volatility was determined through calculating the difference in policy from election-to-election in the mainstream left and right and averaging the sum.

As it is not possible to identify any evidence of policy cartelisation – convergence and subsequent stabilisation – overall levels of competition since 1970 are examined. Table 4.11 lists displays non-parametric bivariate correlations measuring developments (year-on-year policy change averages) since 1970 in the mainstream. While the first column lists coefficients, the second provides information relating to convergence or divergence as reported in Table 4.8. Aggregate levels show that since 1970 competition has reduced slightly. However, an insignificant coefficient of  $-.049$  shows an extremely weak relationship and suggests variance across systems. This is clearly the case. Competition has decreased in six cases (Denmark, Norway, Italy, Austria, Ireland, Belgium), increased in five (Sweden Germany, France and Britain) and remained static in one (the Netherlands). Three relationships are significant; two reductions (Belgium and Ireland), one increase (Germany). A number of coefficients are low appearing to confirm the volatility shown in Appendix A.10. On the whole, coefficients do not appear to show any relationship with convergence or divergence. Nevertheless, while it might be expected that steep convergence or divergence may be associated with high levels of competition, or year on year change this is not the case and significant reductions in competition do appear to be evident in systems where convergence has been the dominant trend (Belgium and Ireland). Surprisingly, and in contrast to all other reported results, this does provide some support for the cartel model in that converging systems are less competitive. In addition to this, the one instance of significantly increased competition (Germany) shows divergence. Appendix A.8 demonstrates no obvious link between competition and predicted incentives for policy cartelisation.

Table 4.11 Bivariate correlations between mainstream left and right left-right competition and election date 1970-1998

	Mainstream competition and election date	n	Post 1970 convergence divergence
Total	-.055	96	C
Denmark	-.049	12	D
Sweden	.333	10	D
Norway	-.179	7	D
Italy	-.143	8	C
Netherlands	.000	9	C
Austria	-.467	9	C
Ireland	-.617*	9	C
Germany	.690*	8	D
Belgium	-.733*	9	C
France	.214	7	C
Britain	.238	8	D

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level  
 Source: CMP Dataset (2001); Table 4.8.

#### 4.5 Implementation and efficiency: the new ideology?

The final issue investigated here is the cartel model's claim that the mainstream has substituted ideologies of 'principle' for those of 'managerial competence' (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 46). It is suggested that the burgeoning global agenda and knowledge economy as well as 'profound' societal change (Giddens, 2001: 3) have bought about a situation characterised by an absence of policy differences and 'a qualitative change in ...[left-right] relevance' (Giddens, 1998: 43): this has seen competition shift towards what has come to be understood as progressive politics (Giddens, 1998).<sup>67</sup> Heralded as the new politics and more commonly known as the Third Way agenda, it was initially considered a major component of Social Democracy's regeneration (Giddens, 1998: viii) yet recent evidence has suggested that throughout the post-war era many of these topics have been adopted by both the mainstream left and right in a relatively 'synchronised' fashion (Volkens, 2001b). Previously characterised by ideological battles (mass era) followed by a race to meet voter requirements (catch-all era), antagonism between parties has it seems, turned to valence issues that do not facilitate oppositional politics and by virtue of their emphasis on proof of efficiency, allow the mainstream to dominate. Though it has been

<sup>67</sup> Giddens describes the Third Way Programme as the radical centre; the new democratic state; active civil society; the democratic family; the new mixed economy; equality as inclusion; positive welfare; the social investment state; the cosmopolitan nation and cosmopolitan democracy (1998: 70).

suggested that Third Way politics may eventually be incorporated into ‘left/right semantics’ (Volkens, 2001b: 3) they signify an important departure from traditional models of competition.

This process has actually been part of a wider regeneration of democracy. In an era characterised by scepticism of politicians, bureaucracy and the tools of democracy (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Dalton, 2004) states have had to re-legitimise themselves. One feature of this has been the adoption of behaviours that seek to prove competence and efficiency.<sup>68</sup> Centred around good practice and the ability to deliver, this model has become the new focus for inter-party competition (Giddens, 1998: 74). Using CMP data Volkens has demonstrated a universal uptake of administrative efficiency throughout party families since the 1960s, also providing evidence of almost all party families doubling the attention they devoted to the issue in the 1980s (Volkens, 2001b: 15). First adopted by the centre right as early as the 1970s, the spread of this issue – in contrast to others linked with the Third Way agenda and, according to Giddens, originating from the centre left – seems to have been a result of contagion from the right (Volkens, 2001b: 16).

Here the final section of the chapter investigates the extent to which policy cartelisation can be linked with this new managerial politics. While it has not been possible to detect a single instance of full policy cartelisation, investigation has been able to identify convergence, accordingly it is asked whether this politics of competence can be linked to a decline in that of ideology? The former is identified and measured through the ‘Administrative Efficiency’ variable provided in the CMP Dataset.<sup>69</sup> Described as the ‘[n]eed for efficiency and economy in government and administration; cutting down civil service; improving governmental procedures; general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more effective’ (Budge et. al, 2001: 224) it is assumed that the more cartelised a policy environment the more likely parties will compete over this issue. It is proposed therefore that mainstream emphasis on administrative efficiency increases as that on the left-right dimension decreases.

---

<sup>68</sup> Giddens describes administrative efficiency; devolution; double democratization: renewal of the public sphere – transparency; mechanisms of direct democracy and governments as risk managers (Giddens, 1998: 77).

<sup>69</sup> The Administrative Efficiency variable is listed under the general domain of ‘Political System’ and labelled as ‘per 303’ (Budge et al. 2001: 224).

*H<sub>6</sub> The greater the convergence in the mainstream on the left-right dimension, the greater the uptake in administrative efficiency.*

In a sense this relationship is confirmed statistically. While it is not possible to show that attention to administrative efficiency increases with convergence, a negative coefficient of -.285 that is significant at the level of 0.01 suggests that decreasing attention is associated with divergence.<sup>70</sup> While not confirming the replacement of ideology with competence, these findings strongly suggest a relationship between the amount of emphasis parties place on older and more modern issues at the same time.

Systems cannot be investigated statistically as too many readings register as 0. Table 4.12 illustrates decade-based calculations of joint mainstream emphasis on administrative efficiency since the 1940s. A generalised uptake of the topic is evident after 1950 and in line with the literature, the prominence it is given appears to increase throughout the 1980s and 1990s across all systems. Reference to Appendix A.10 shows that with the exception of the mainstream left in Sweden, and a certain amount of fluctuation elsewhere, all parties seem to increase their attention to administrative efficiency over time and in line with Volken's findings (2002), stress on the topic has not been confined to the mainstream left.

Systems are ranked according to their joint emphasis on the topic in the 1990s. It can be seen that Belgium provides the most emphasis followed by Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Britain, Denmark, France, Norway and finally Sweden. Reference back to Table 4.7 suggests that on the face of it, there is some link between convergence and emphasis on administrative efficiency: while a number of systems showing convergence appear to devote higher levels of attention to the topic, what is particularly interesting and seemingly confirming the hypothesis is that some, especially those that show divergence such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden appear to place substantially less importance on the issue.

---

<sup>70</sup> Source CMP Dataset (2001): n = 96.

Table 4.12 Average mean mainstream administrative efficiency by decade

Country	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Belgium	1.05	1.59	2.03	2.24	3.79	12.65
Italy	2.56	1.16	3.83	4.72	12.20	9.94
Austria	0.00	0.60	1.48	0.38	7.75	8.10
the Netherlands	2.35	1.92	1.53	2.93	6.00	5.08
Ireland	2.05	1.10	6.67	5.51	6.41	4.71
Germany	0.34	2.37	4.67	3.89	2.59	4.31
Britain	1.10	0.64	2.50	2.66	3.66	4.12
Denmark	0.40	0.31	2.41	1.54	2.82	3.26
France	1.92	0.96	0.57	0.78	0.43	2.93
Norway	1.70	1.03	1.37	3.08	3.27	2.79
Sweden	0.60	0.97	0.08	0.51	2.07	1.37

Source: CMP Dataset (2001); Administrative Efficiency variable per 303.

#### 4.6 Concluding comments

The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the extent to which policy cartelisation between the mainstream left and mainstream right has taken place in eleven western European systems since 1970. Understood as an office-seeking behaviour characterised by convergence between the mainstream left and mainstream right that is then followed by stabilisation, the only conclusion that it has been possible to reach is that that policy cartelisation – as a relatively consistent behaviour – has not taken place, or is undetectable through use of the CMP Dataset.

While Blyth and Katz suggested that the process was more likely to occur in majoritarian systems prone to adversarial politics, this chapter built on and extended the prediction suggesting that it – a function of office-seeking behaviour – would be more likely to occur where costs of opposition, disproportionality, thresholds for office and impact of direct subsidies were high. Each system was ranked for these factors and an average measure of all three provided overall predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation; this rank was considered the most sensitive predictor. It was hypothesised that the greater the cost of opposition, ‘the greater the disproportionality of a system, the higher the threshold for office, the higher the impacts of direct subsidies, and, the greater the predicted incentives for office-seeking, the greater the likelihood of policy cartelisation.

First, the chapter examined convergence. Bivariate correlation coefficients between the mainstream left and right and each of the aforementioned predictors provided relatively weak results. In contrast to expectations predicting some convergence to be associated with high costs of opposition and disproportionality, the opposite was in fact shown and relationships were weak

and insignificant. It was then demonstrated by a low but significant coefficient that as thresholds for office have increased since 1970, the distance between the mainstream left and mainstream right has decreased. The relationship between direct subsidies and distance between the mainstream left and right was also disappointing. Retrospective subsidies were chosen specifically as it was thought that they would, by nature of their distribution, favour cartel parties. While findings suggested that decreasing subsidies were linked to divergence, the relationship was so weak it provided no real insight into the relationship. Finally, the aggregate predictor of office-seeking was shown to increase as range decreased: though congruent with expectations, the coefficient was insignificant and so weak that the relationship could only be determined as negligible.

These findings encouraged further investigation of the convergence process. First, the extent to which there has been a constriction of mainstream policy space since 1970 was examined. While some reduction was expected in all systems, eight were shown to exhibit a decline in policy space while three were shown to exhibit an increase. The chapter then proceeded to try and detect trends of mainstream convergence in each system. While steep coefficients were not predicted as post-convergence stabilisation was expected to mitigate against this, a number were particularly strong and almost half the trends did not show trends of convergence after 1970. These findings were explained through the examination of range and policy trajectories which illustrated that flux and volatility have been the most common trends in the mainstream left and mainstream right since 1970. Throughout, little if any link was shown between findings and the ranked predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation.

The extent to which policy trajectories had shown any stabilisation at all after 1970 was explored. In term of decade to decade averages, there was little evidence to suggest that they had. An average measure of mainstream left and right change between elections, showed that on both an election-to-election and decade-to-decade basis, few systems showed long-term reductions in volatility and most episodes of stabilisation were directly followed by increases. However, bivariate correlations did show some evidence of overall trends throughout the post-1970 period. While a number were very weak suggesting volatility, some were stronger and the two systems that showed significant reductions were shown to have also converged on left right policy thus

suggesting that reductions in policy difference can be associated with reduced competition. It was not possible to demonstrate any connection between ranked predicted incentives for office-seeking policy cartelisation and change from election to election.

So a number of questions are posed. Are convergence and stabilisation suitable measures of policy cartelisation? Are costs of opposition, disproportionality and thresholds for office appropriate predictors for these behaviours? Were these dependent and independent variables operationalised correctly and was the statistical methodology employed the most appropriate? Finally, is the CMP Dataset an appropriate vehicle with which to investigate these questions? Clearly there is little evidence to support the role costs of opposition, disproportionality and thresholds for office play in the cartelisation process and the systems most expected to display cartelisation have not. Indeed there is some evidence for convergence, albeit not always occurring where expected, yet there is little of policy stabilisation which suggests that policy environments have not cartelised: however, qualitative evidence appears to provide evidence that the process is taking place (Blyth and Katz, 2005). How can we explain these apparent contradictions? Though the cartelisation process started to take place in the 1970s, a number of the policy changes described by Blyth and Katz would not have been evident before the 1990s (Blyth and Katz, 2005). This investigation expected that some change would be evident throughout the 1970s and 1980s, yet, it is conceivable that the lions' share of policy cartelisation has taken place since then and after 1998, thus not being detectable by this data set.

Of course, it is possible that policy cartelisation is taking place and the CMP Dataset has failed to detect it. Theoretically, one purpose of the process is to supply the electorate with fixed choices so measurement of manifesto data would appear to be the most appropriate vehicle through which to study it. If, for example, these changes were more detectable through positional rather than valence data the cartelisation question would be more related to changes in party identity rather than their public face: this would question the importance that cartel theories place on electoral choice. However, it may well be that the problem here is the reliance on manifestos. While clearly linked to decisions within the electorate (Volkens, 2001a), strong arguments suggest that dealignment has brought about a situation where voter decisions are more likely to

be influenced by other party out-puts and media effects. Therefore, it is possible that policy cartelisation maybe more detectible through other material.

Finally, the chapter looked for evidence of increased attention to competence-based issues. Specifically it examined whether convergence and a reduction of policy options on the on the left-right dimension was associated with increased emphasis on administrative efficiency. It was not, however, what was shown was that decreased attention to these issues was correlated with divergence in the mainstream the left-right dimension. This, it was suggested indicated a relationship between party emphasis on traditional and non-traditional politics.

It is clear from this investigation that a number of changes have taken place since 1970 that are congruent with the cartel model's description of party cartelisation. Mainstream policy space has shown an overall constriction and there has been some evidence of convergence. However, prior to 1998 these developments have not been universal and the analysis in this chapter has been unable to demonstrate that policy cartelisation has taken place in the post-1970 environments it was most predicted to. While the findings in this chapter could suggest that this investigation has not been able to tap into the cartelisation process, the possibility that *it*, as a universal phenomenon, has been grossly overestimated must be considered. Moreover, it important to acknowledge that cartelisation *must* be associated with reduced aggregative capacities on the part of parties. If this cannot be demonstrated policy changes cannot necessarily be attributed to cartelisation. Future research would benefit from investigating beyond 1998, engaging in more qualitative case study analysis, examining alternative measures of left-right policy as well as other policy issues and finally investigating alternative materials that articulate party policy.

## Chapter 5

### **System cartelisation: a consolidation of seats and office?**

Party cartels form so that their members can control their operational environments and ensure survival (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). The model appears to suggest that a stabilisation of party options (Katz and Mair, 1995: 21) and electability (Blyth and Katz, 2005) are the ultimate goals of the process, and previous chapters have proposed that cartelised systems are identifiable through their apparent control of vote, seats and government options. The majority of empirical research has chosen to concentrate on features of the cartel process, the extent to which they have occurred, and the validity of the model. Somewhat surprisingly, however, minimal attention has been paid to cartel goals and their achievement, although it has been suggested that recent fortunes of green and extreme right-wing parties highlight a failure of cartel politics. (Kitschelt, 2000). This chapter seeks to determine whether systemic cartelisation – votes seats and government options – has been achieved; particularly in the environments CPT II describes as being most conducive to the process.

Elsewhere in this dissertation, the cartelisation process has been described as cyclical and self-perpetuating in nature.<sup>71</sup> Predominantly taking place amongst two groups of parties that have been termed as mainstream and secondary elsewhere in this dissertation,<sup>72</sup> it is dependent on access to state subsidies, the freedom to negate demands from within the electorate, cartelise policy – convergence and stabilisation – and subsequently cartelise votes, seats and office. However, empirical findings presented so far seem to indicate that reality is somewhat different from theory. The previous chapter looked for evidence of policy cartelisation between 1970 and 1998. Though some convergence on the left-right dimension was found, divergence was seen to be almost as prevalent. Some instances of generalised policy stabilisation were noted, but volatility was also present and on no occasion was a post-convergence stabilisation identified.

Irrespective of these findings however, it is suggested that incentives for systemic cartelisation remain and parties that have access to the cartel continue, as a group rather than as individual

---

<sup>71</sup> Refer to Chapter 2, Table 2.1 for a diagrammatic representation of this cyclical process.

<sup>72</sup> Refer to Chapter 3 for a description of parties that do and do not have access to the cartel.

entities, to hold a preference for exerting dominance over electoral, parliamentary and governmental options. It is recognised that factors such as electoral system, cleavage dominance, competition, system openness and political culture – amongst other factors – influence the extent to which parties can secure parliamentary and governmental representation. Given this fact, trends identifying the impetus for cartelisation may be diminished somewhat: however, if the developments predicted by the cartel model are correct, they should still be evident at some level. The focus here converges on national parliaments in the same eleven countries studied in the previous chapter examining the extent to which seats and government portfolios have been cartelised. It must be acknowledged that the purpose here is not try and identify functional cartels: such an endeavor is beyond the scope of this contribution. Rather it seeks to discover whether options enabling cartel formation have been achieved. Most importantly, the chapter enquires as to whether developments show an association with changes in the mainstream's policy environment.

Increased levels of voter mobility and the ensuing insecurity experienced by mainstream parties are thought to have been catalytic in the cartel process. Born out of social, cognitive and generational change, altered public values and concomitant decline in the saliency of cleavage politics (Flanagan and Dalton, 1984; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992), it has been argued that westernised party politics have undergone an almost cataclysmic change and entered a period of instability. The mainstream vote has become increasingly volatile (Pedersen, 1979); escalating considerably between the 1980s and 1990s (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006: 294). Electoral participation has deteriorated (Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006: 291) and there has been a substantial erosion of socio-psychological ties ( Daalder and Mair, 1983) as demonstrated in data provided by the Eurobarometer surveys (Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006: 289). New political cleavages have benefited at the expense of old ones (Inglehart, 1977) and support bases for traditional politics have become less predictable. Yet, given the enormity of these predictions, decline does not appear to have been as extensive as one might expect. By and large, volatility has been confined to taking place within, rather than between ideological blocs (Bartolini and Mair, 1990) and while all party families have borne losses to some extent and Christian Democrats have lost out the most, the social democrats, conservatives and liberals have proven

themselves to be relatively resilient; even increasing their vote in elections (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006: chapter 8).

Outcomes are disputed however and there seems to be some debate as to whether these changes have resulted in a realignment or not. While developments have been interpreted to suggest deep-seated change in the 'old order' (Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck 1984: 451) and a new era characterised by flux and change (Blondel, 2002); they have also been construed as interruptions punctuating a 'pervasive continuity' that have instigated 'fundamental party system realignment' (Bartolini and Mair, 1990: 75). However, it seems to be the case that systems vary, and while some exhibit dealignment and volatility others reflect realignment and a new – albeit less certain – stability (Dalton, Flanagan and Allen Beck, 1984).

One factor that has been indisputably consistent throughout this period has been the proliferation of new parties; particularly so in the case of the green and extreme-right party families. Successfully consolidating what appear to be relatively durable levels of support over the last two or three decades, both party families now operate at the parliamentary level in the majority of westernised industrial party systems, and recent years have also seen both participate in governing coalitions. While new parties have been a consistent feature of the Post-war era and are by no means a novel phenomenon (Harmel, 1985; Hug, 2001) the extent of their success is, and this has had a substantial impact on traditional parties in both a real and psychological sense. In spite of electoral results seeming to bear out an apparent resilience of the mainstream, the developments described above clearly suggest that it now operates in environments that are less resistant to disruption and because of this their positions are neither predictable nor assured: modern day politics sees increased levels of participation in government, wider access to office than ever before and increasingly innovative governmental formulae (Katz and Mair, 1995). The cartel model explains how parties have tried to address these challenges and it is hypothesised that cartelised systems have had more success.

The argument is as follows. Traditional and established parties now operate in environments characterised by real (or an increased threat of) instability. To re-assert their control over government options they have tried to extract the majority of ideological difference from inter-

party competition in order to respond to the policy challenges imposed by globalisation or the threat of it (Blyth and Katz, 2005). The aim has been to establish 'social stability' rather than 'social change' (Katz and Mair, 1995: 22) and provide a 'fixed menu of parties' for election, parliament and office (Katz and Mair, 1995: 21), thus guaranteeing continued survival and ensuring the primacy of cartel as opposed to competitive politics (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005).

Viewing incumbency as an end in itself, rather than an opportunity to effect policy change as mass parties did, or implement voter demands, maintain favour and monopolise the electoral market as catch-all parties did, cartel parties seek office for intrinsic reasons and they value it over and above all other goals (Wolinetz, 2002). This is so they can maximise their position of dominance and secure goods that would otherwise not be available to them. Indeed government is the locus of power in any society (Downs, 1957: 23) and whoever controls it 'has the last word' (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953: 42). Office provides parties with the most opportunity to pursue their own specific goals (Ware, 1996: 349) and shape voter preferences in the direction they wish (Dunleavy, 1991).

This chapter is particularly concerned with establishing the extent to which mainstream and secondary parties – parties that have access to the cartel – were able to consolidate parliamentary and governmental options between 1970 and 1998, and the following sections investigate this question. First section 5.1 operationalises the framework introduced in Chapter 3 identifying the parties that do and do not have access to the cartel in each of the eleven systems that this dissertation is concerned with. Section 5.2 follows by discussing the variables considered representative of systemic cartelisation and section 5.3 then proceeds to test the hypotheses that have been made. The final section, section 5.4 provides a number of concluding comments.

### **5.1 Operationalisation of the cartel framework**

Chapter 3 introduced a generalisable and heuristic framework that facilitates identification of parties that do and do not have access to cartels. Hierarchical and applicable to institutionalised party systems, it primarily differentiates between parties on the basis of their access to government and whether they display establishment status or not – pro-system, responsible

behaviour that promotes the political status quo and facilitates access to restricted goods and 'elite' working relationships. It also identifies the nature of power dispersion amongst parties differentiating between them on the basis of relative power and the extent of their coalition potential. Since standing for election can be interpreted as office seeking behaviour (Wolinetz, 2002: 154), and most 'organisation[s] purport... to have as one of ...[their] goals the placement of avowed members in governmental office' (Harmel, 1985: 406), identifying this goal as being prioritised above any other – policy or vote seeking – is particularly difficult. However, it is assumed that incentives and strategies vary (Wolinetz, 2002: 154) and it is on the basis of these three that parties are distinguished between here. Here we deploy the four main types identified in Chapter 3: 'mainstream', 'secondary', 'semi-status', and 'non-governing', emphasis being confined to the former three.<sup>73</sup>

The framework is operationalised in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. With the overall premise that majoritarian, as opposed to consensual democracies are more likely to cartelise (Blyth and Katz, 2005), the sample incorporates a fairly even mix of majoritarian, consensual and intermediate democracies; according to Lijphart's typology.<sup>74</sup> Though a deductive approach based on quantitative and qualitative assessment of party profiles, priorities, strategies as well as parliamentary and legislative power<sup>75</sup> would be preferable and enable the most accurate classification, sample size and available tools prevent this and therefore the allocation is rather more inductive in nature. Utilising a priori criteria the classification is primarily determined by age, size, party family, possession of establishment status, primary goal and office experience.

It is assumed that older parties from traditional party families with a strong record of leading governments demonstrate pro-system characteristics – not least as they had a stake in the institutionalisation of their party system and desire maintenance of the status quo – and display

---

<sup>73</sup> Here, non-governing parties are ignored because of their lack of coalition potential. For a diagrammatic interpretation of the framework and descriptions of mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties refer to Chapter 3, Figure 3.1.

<sup>74</sup> Parties are assessed on the primary dimension relating to competition: minimal winning cabinets; executive dominance; effective number of parties; number of issues dimensions; electoral disproportionality (Lijphart, 1984).

<sup>75</sup> For descriptions of cartel party attributes refer to Katz and Mair (1995), priorities and strategies (Wolinetz, 2002, 153-159) and methods for calculating effective legislative and cabinet power (Blau, forthcoming; see also Powell, 2000; Felsenthal and Machover 2004; Dumont and Caulier, 2005).

legitimacy and 'establishment status'.<sup>76</sup> It is also assumed that new parties articulating non-traditional cleavages with little attachment to the systems they operate in are less likely to display these characteristics. Somewhat in the middle of these two polar types are also a variety of organisations that display a mixture of these characteristics.

Focusing on age, size, party family, possession of establishment status, primary goal and office experience, Table 5.1 outlines the set of criteria – more elaborately described in Chapter 3 – that have been used to distinguish between mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties. Mainstream parties articulate established cleavages and tend to exhibit origins that date back to the early post-war years. These parties are, by virtue of their genetic origins assumed to be pro-system, legitimate and in possession of establishment status. Exceptions to these criteria are made when new party formations clearly represent a continuation of an old mainstream party or when party system change reorganises a system to such an extent that a new hierarchy develops. These parties display strong histories of high vote and seat shares as well as consistent leading positions in government. They are office holders as opposed to office seekers (Wolinetz, 2002: 153; 155).

Secondary parties tend to articulate established cleavages and show evidence of having competed in elections and entering government before 1960 (Mair, 2002). They have exhibited regular inclusion in post-war governments throughout the whole period of interest or for clearly defined periods and should they seek inclusion in the cartel, their activities are low risk and aimed at increasing their coalition potential; these parties are office-seeking as opposed to office holding parties (Wolinetz, 2002: 153; 155). However, parties in this layer, particularly larger ones, have the option to exchange access to the cartel for policy and/or vote maximisation and this behaviour can be used to restrain the activities of their mainstream opponents and challenge the viability of cartels.

In order to obtain secondary status, new parties – those that have competed in elections since 1960 (Mair, 2002) – must have been part of a governing coalition for three consecutive terms

---

<sup>76</sup> For a definition of establishment status refer to Chapter 1.

(Smith, 1989), or similar given the nature of ideological alternation;<sup>77</sup> they must also display qualitative acceptability and continuing utility (coalition potential).<sup>78</sup>

*Table 5.1* Features of parties that do and do not have access to the cartel

	M	S	S-S	N-G
Age	Post-war or pre 1960	Post-war, pre 1960 or new parties that have shown three continuous terms in government or similar (Smith, 1989) Exhibition of qualitative relevance and utility	Mainly post 1960	Mainly post 1960
Size	Large	Moderate or small	Mainly small	Mainly Small
Party family	Traditional	Traditional, only pre 1960	All	All
Establishment status	Yes	Yes		
Primary goal	Office: Office holders (Wolinetz, 2002)	Office: Office seekers (Wolinetz, 2002)	Vote or policy seekers. May hold office as a long-term goal	Varied but irrelevant
History in government	Office holders Long continuous history of leading government; dominant position in government; possession of prime-ministerial posts	Office seekers Substantial history of playing supporting role in government; varied influence	Intermittent supporting role	No role

*Source:* Adapted from information in Chapter 3; Katz and Mair. (1995); Blyth and Katz. (2005); Wolinetz, (2002).  
*Notes:* M = mainstream, S = secondary, S-S = semi-status. N-G = non-governing.

Semi-status parties have intermittent access to office. While a small number operated before 1960 and can be considered 'old' parties, the conservative governmental formulae of this period meant that the majority of governments prior to this date comprised mainstream and secondary parties: accordingly, most semi-status parties are new, a number do not articulate traditional cleavages, and most did not compete in elections before 1960 (Mair, 2002). Some semi-status parties tend not to articulate traditional cleavages and do not hold office as their primary goal – although that

<sup>77</sup> The term 'consecutive' is relative as the nature of governmental make-up is such that parties are often excluded on the basis of ideological incompatibility rather than a failure to exhibit cartel-friendly characteristics.

<sup>78</sup> Refer to Chapter 3 section 3.2 for definitions of qualitative acceptability and utility.

may be their long-term aim – and their prioritisation of policy influence or vote maximisation – often involving controversial topics or unconventional techniques – tends to separate them somewhat from mainstream politics. When not in office these parties are relegated to non-governing status.

Classifications are made on the basis of all post-war governments. Governments are understood to be any administration that formed after an election or resulted from a change in party composition between two elections (see Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, 2000). All classifications are listed in Appendix B.1. While most systems exhibit two mainstream parties throughout the post-war period (Austria, Britain, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands), four do not. These systems fall into one of three categories: those which display a particularly strong centre left party and two weaker parties on the right (Sweden); a centre party that has moved rightwards and is now in direct competition with the traditional centre-right (Denmark); and party system change that has transformed a system to the extent that the mainstream organisations have changed (France, Italy).

All systems display mainstream parties. In most cases the same ones remain dominant throughout; however, Belgium, France, the Netherlands (right) and Italy (left and right) see mainstream parties die out and be replaced: varying levels of mainstream alternation are evident in Denmark and Sweden (right), Italy (left). Secondary parties are found in all systems except Austria and Sweden; while the larger ones seem to maintain their positions quite comfortably, smaller ones appear to have lost access to government over time. Britain is an exception here in that it is the only system that displays a secondary party which does not have post-war experience of office. Britain and Norway are the only two systems that do not display semi-status parties most of whose access to government is minimal.

Utilising the framework discussed above, the following paragraphs measure power dispersion within the group of parties that have had access to government between 1945 and 1998. Specifically looking for evidence supportive of the cartel thesis, the primary focus is on the post-1970 period. Theoretically considered the final stage of the process and the *raison d'être* for

policy cartelisation, this chapter seeks to answer two questions.<sup>79</sup> First, is there any evidence to suggest that mainstream and to a lesser extent secondary parties have been able to cartelise parliamentary and governing options between 1970 and 1998? Second, have systems showing evidence of mainstream left and right policy cartelisation on the left-right dimension been more successful?

The following sections seek to answer these questions. Section 5.2 identifies a number of indicators that are representative of systemic cartelisation subsequently hypothesising where the process is most likely to have manifested. Providing a combination of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, section 5.3 presents the results reviewing them in the context of findings discussed in Chapter 4, and throughout, the suggested link between policy and system cartelisation is investigated. With the continued premise that the former facilitates the latter (Blyth and Katz, 2005), the fact that this dissertation failed to successfully identify full policy cartelisation must be taken into account. Though it entails policy convergence and subsequent stabilisation, analysis could not identify the complete process at any point: accordingly measures of mainstream left and right convergence on the left-right dimension – calculated using data from the Comparative Manifesto Party Project (Budge, et al. 2001) – are used as a substitute measure.<sup>80</sup>

## **5.2 Gauging system cartelisation: indicators and predictions**

The extent to which parties are able to control and influence their environments is largely determined by the amount of power that they can access and the influence they have. In terms of national politics, these factors seem most identifiable through parliamentary presence, legislative influence, access to and power within government. Parliaments are responsible for overseeing the work of government (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006: 67) and provide an almost exclusive resource for office. Accordingly, it is in a party cartel's interests to dominate this arena because in doing so it controls access to government. With stability, survival and electability as primary goals, it is reasonable to assume that successfully cartelised systems see mainstream and

---

<sup>79</sup> It is suggested that policy cartelisation enables systemic cartelisation (cartelisation of votes, seats and office). Refer to Chapter 2 Figure 2.1 for a description of the cyclical cartel process forwarded in this dissertation.

<sup>80</sup> For a description and operationalisation of the mainstream left and right as well as range calculations refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.2.

secondary parties control parliamentary and governmental options. Systems would be insulated against challenges from non-cartel parties and those with mainstream and secondary status would dominate. Such environments would display stable, even declining numbers of parties in parliament, a concentration of parliamentary power and government portfolios within the group of parties that have access to the cartel – mainstream and secondary – as well as stability, even expanded primacy of the mainstream. Congruent with cartel theory, we would also expect policy cartelisation – the necessary pre-cursor – to be more evident where systemic cartelisation is noted.

As reported above, the previous chapter identified some evidence of convergence and policy stabilisation on the left-right dimension in mainstream left and right trends; full policy cartelisation however – convergence followed by stabilisation – was undetectable. Constricted policy environments represent the first stage of policy cartelisation and are indicative of a desire to stabilise competition: therefore, convergence is used as a replacement measure of policy cartelisation throughout this chapter. As seen in Table 4.8 from the previous chapter, virtually no relationship was noted between the sum of mainstream left and right ranges on the left-right dimension between 1970 and 1998, Austria, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands converged while Britain, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden diverged. A number of coefficients were particularly low suggesting volatility, and two were significant (France and Italy both of which converged). A proclivity for convergence or divergence, albeit weak in some cases, was evident throughout the period and systems have been classified accordingly.

Numerical measurement of party systems provides valuable insight into features such as power dispersion and the number of communication channels that are operating at any given time between parties (Sartori, 1976: 120). It is designed to count in an ‘intelligent’ manner (Sartori, 1976: 120) and capture the important features of party systems (Dumont and Caulier, 2005: 3). In one sense measurements indicate how party systems may develop and in another they provide information on the shaping effects other factors such as electoral systems (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Taagepera and Grofman, 1985; Lijphart, 1994; 1999; Cox, 1997), cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Lijphart, 1999), party system types, governmental formulae (see Sartori, 1976: 124) have possibly had (Dumont and Caulier, 2005:

2). In most cases, the effective number of parties remains the criterion of choice (Mair, 1997; 2001) and a number of 'classificatory schemas' are available.

Two methodologies purport to provide practical and informative techniques for identifying parties that should and should not be counted in a political arena. Quantitative indices calculate levels of relevance or effectiveness while qualitative ones assess competition for government (Blau, forthcoming: 1).<sup>81</sup> Sartori provides the most commonly used qualitative technique. Based on Duverger's 'pioneering but un-systematic approach' this method distinguishes between parties on the basis of their relevance or coalition and blackmail potential, governing history and acceptability and influence over the direction of competition as they compete for office (Blau, forthcoming: 3 see Sartori, 1976). However, there is an equivalence problem here in that this method appears to imply that all relevant parties are equally relevant and they are not; parties differ (Lijphart, 1999: 66; Siaroff, 2003: 286). The problem factor here is 'relative size' (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979: 3).

While the half-party criterion was introduced to overcome this problem (Epstein, 1964; Blondel, 1968; Siaroff, 2003), the measure has been accused of being rather arbitrary (Dumont and Caulier, 2005: 4) and unable to capture the relative importance of 'half' (Blau, forthcoming: 3). By virtue of their automatic self-weighting ability that provides each party with a relative measure of effectiveness, quantitative approaches claim to address short-comings found in the qualitative literature (Blau, forthcoming: 4): the most commonly utilised index being that of Laasko and Taggepera's effective number of parties (1979) (Blau, forthcoming: 4). The effective party criterion is applicable to both votes and seats,<sup>82</sup> is generalisable, can be uniformly applied across systems (Blau, forthcoming: 4) and identifies the number of organisations which although of unequal size, can be considered to exert the same 'total' effect on levels of fractionalisation as

<sup>81</sup> For a comprehensive review of methods for counting parties refer to Blau (forthcoming).

<sup>82</sup> Attempts to measure relative power are seen in Shapely-Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965) indices that measure bargaining power; Laver and Hunt's index of oppositional power (1992); estimates of government and opposition influence, and cabinet power in relation to the effective number of parties (Powell, 2000). Blau has also extended the effective number of parties to legislative and cabinet power (forthcoming).

if they were of equal size (Laakso and Taagepera 1979: 3), providing them with a relative measure of between 0 and 1 (Blau, forthcoming: 4).<sup>83</sup>

While it is suggested that an increase in the number of effective parties is indicative of change, volatility, dealignment and instability (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg, 2000). It is also argued that that fragmentation and stability are not necessarily incompatible (Sani and Sartori, 1983: 307) and factors such as party system type, governmental formulae (see Sartori, 1976: 124) and level of polarisation must be taken into account when assessing party system stability (Sani and Sartori, 1983: 336-337). Here developments in the number of effective parliamentary parties (ENPP), are measured but in reference to policy ranges between the mainstream left and right. With the expectation that the process is facilitated by policy cartelisation, it is expected that reductions in ENPP figures are associated with a convergence in mainstream policy while an increase is associated with divergence. The following hypothesis is proposed.

*H<sub>1</sub> The effective number of parliamentary parties is more likely to reduce where there has been evidence of mainstream policy convergence rather than divergence between 1970 and 1998.*

It has been suggested throughout this dissertation that cartels solely comprise mainstream and secondary parties. These parties aim to provide an exclusive resource for government; therefore it is reasonable to expect them to exert a collective dominance over the parliamentary arena with the mainstream holding a majority. We would expect these circumstances to be enhanced in environments characterised by mainstream convergence and reduced in those characterised by divergence. The following hypotheses are proposed.

*H<sub>2</sub> Mainstream and secondary parties hold a higher collective majority of seats where there has been evidence of mainstream policy convergence rather than divergence between 1970 and 1998.*

---

<sup>83</sup> It must be noted that the effective party measure has been labeled spurious in cases of single party government as it is designed to measure relevance with regards to coalition potential and calculations always total more than 1 (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003; see also Dumont and Caulier, 2005).

*H<sub>3</sub> Mainstream parties hold a higher majority of seats where they converged rather than diverged between 1970 and 1998.*

Finally the chapter examines the extent to which mainstream and secondary parties were able to cartelise governmental formulae between 1970 and 1998. Though it is generally recognised that more parties have secured access to government in recent decades and governmental formulae have become more inventive, it is suggested that this is likely to be less so in systems where options have been cartelised. It is suggested that it is in their interests, particularly the mainstream's, to provide an exclusive resource for office at best and where this is not possible exert control over government make-up. Therefore, they would – where possible – be expected to eschew all inclusive behaviour towards parties that do not display establishment status or have access to the cartel. While Chapters 2 and 3 discussed normative qualitative levels of exclusion, here we are looking for quantitative evidence of it. Table 5.2 summarises the state of play regarding the openness of government between 1945 and 1970 in all eleven systems, examining access to office, most common governmental type (single party majority, minimal winning coalition, surplus majority coalition, minority), patterns of alternation (full, non or partial) and proclivity for innovative composition (likelihood of new and uncommon parties being included in government). While Britain is the only system to most commonly govern by single party majority throughout the period, the sample is equally spread across other governing formulae as well as access to office, patterns of alternation and proclivity for innovation; albeit to varying degrees. With the assumption that systemic cartelisation would be characterised by the incentives discussed above, we would expect the time period between 1970 and 1998 to see closed systems maintaining the status quo and open systems becoming increasingly more conservative. Moreover, we would expect these circumstances to be more strongly exhibited in systems showing policy convergence. The following hypotheses are proposed.

*H<sub>4</sub> Systems prone to closed governmental dynamics maintained the status quo between 1970 and 1998 while systems prone to open dynamics became more conservative.*

*H<sub>5</sub> Governmental formulae showed more evidence of cartelisation between 1970 and 1998 where there was also evidence of mainstream policy convergence as opposed to divergence.*

Table 5.2: Governmental dynamics 1945-1970

	Access to office	Pattern of alternation	MCGF	Innovation
Austria	C	N	MWC	N
Belgium	O	P	MWC	Y
Britain	C	F	SPM	N
Denmark	O	P	MG	Y
France IV & V	O	P	SPC	Y
Germany	C	P	MWC	N
Ireland	C	F	MWC	N
Italy	O	P	SPC	Y
Norway	C	F	MG	N
Sweden	C	P	MG	N
the Netherlands	O	P	SPC	Y

Source: Adapted from Mair (1996:95).

Other sources. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2006: 401); Woldendorp, J., Keman, H., Budge, I., (2000); Nordsick, (2006); Zarate (2006).

Notes: For more information on classifications refer to Mair (1996).

Access to office: O = open, C = closed; Pattern of alternation: F = full, N = none, P = partial;

MCGF = most common governmental formula, MWC = minimal winning coalition. SPM = single party majority. SMC = surplus majority coalition. SPM = single party minority, MC = minority coalition.

MG = minority government; Innovation: N = no. Y = yes.

### 5.3 Findings: systemic cartelisation as a function of convergence in the mainstream

Party cartels form in order to create stable and predictable surroundings, ensure survival and supply the electorate with fixed sets of party alternatives (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). Moreover, they seek to maximise their electability, pursuing office as an end in itself, prioritizing it over and above all other goals (Wolinetz, 2002). This chapter is concerned with identifying the extent to which parliamentary and governmental options have been cartelised, and it has been suggested that these ends are more achievable in environments characterised by mainstream policy convergence on the left-right dimension. It has specifically been suggested that environments characterised by mainstream convergence between 1970 and 1998 are more likely to exhibit a decrease in the number of effective parliamentary parties (ENPP) and higher collective seat majorities held by mainstream and secondary parties, particularly the mainstream. Finally it has been suggested that converged environments are more likely to see increased control of mainstream and secondary parties over government formulae. In summary, this chapter will test the following hypotheses.

*H<sub>1</sub> The effective number of parliamentary parties is more likely to reduce where there has been evidence of mainstream policy convergence rather than divergence between 1970 and 1998.*

*H<sub>2</sub> Mainstream and secondary parties hold a higher collective majority of seats where there has been evidence of mainstream policy convergence rather than divergence between 1970 and 1998.*

*H<sub>3</sub> Mainstream parties hold a higher majority of seats where they converged rather than diverged between 1970 and 1998.*

*H<sub>4</sub> Systems prone to closed governmental dynamics maintained this approach between 1970 and 1998 while systems prone to open dynamics became more conservative.*

*H<sub>5</sub> Governmental formulae showed more evidence of cartelisation between 1970 and 1998 where there was also evidence of mainstream policy convergence as opposed to divergence.*

In terms of effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) measurements we expect systems that have shown convergence throughout the period (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands) to show a decrease in ENPP and divergent systems (Britain, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Sweden) to show an increase. The first column in Table 5.3 reports the relationship between ENPP and mainstream ranges on the left-right dimension between 1970 and 1998 while the second provides information on the progression of ENPP figures between 1970 and 1998. For comparative purposes, the final column reports systems' overall convergence or divergence as reported in Table 4.8 Chapter 4. Directional relationships are established through best lines of fit.<sup>84</sup> While negative but suggesting some reduction to be associated with divergence, an insignificant coefficient of -.071 indicates a weak relationship between ENPP and mainstream range when all eleven systems are analysed as a group. Individually, findings are mostly contrary to expectations and coefficients suggest that convergence is not associated with a decline in ENPP. Of those expected to show reductions only three do (Austria, Belgium and Ireland) and they do so in association with divergence. The remaining systems show an increase associated with divergence. Of the systems expected to show an increase in ENPP associated

---

<sup>84</sup> Source CMP Dataset (2001); Siaroff data set (2000). Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests to determine the normality of data. Throughout the chapter Pearson's Product Moment is used to correlate data of a normal distribution while Spearman's Rho is used to correlate data that is not a normal distribution.

with divergence, four out of five do (Britain, Germany, Norway and Sweden), Denmark is the only one that does not, and against all expectations, it shows a significant relationship between declining ENPP and divergence. Overall, the findings do not support the stated hypothesis as only one coefficient is significant and only four out of eleven trends are consistent with predictions.

Table 5.3 Bivariate correlations between effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) and election date 1970-1998.

	ENPP and mainstream left and right range	ENPP and election date	Post 1970 convergence or divergence	n
Total	-.071	.154	C	96
Austria	-.134	.979**	D	9
Belgium	-.185	.900**	C	9
Britain <sup>85</sup>	.319	.190	D	8
Denmark	-.581*	-.315	D	12
France	.632	-.500	C**	7
Germany	.472	.952*	D	8
Ireland	-.390	.783**	C	9
Italy	.409	.905**	C**	8
Netherlands	.352	-.450	C	9
Norway	.473	.536	D	7
Sweden	.189	.782**	D	10

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: ENPP calculations obtained from Siaroff (2000).

Notes: Effective number of parties calculations weight parties by size first taking the seat share of each party as a decimal, squaring this value, and summing these values for all parties. Independents are ignored. The figure obtained is then inverted (that is,  $1/X$ ) (Siaroff, 2000: 28).

Dependent variable: ENPP. Independent variables election date and mainstream left and right range.

Correlations in column 2 are one tailed with the exception of those where coefficients measuring the relationships between ENPP and mainstream range contradict the direction of range development reported column 3.

C = convergence; D = divergence.

Decade-based measurements of ENPP calculations in Appendix B.2 shed some light on these findings. Virtually all calculations are at odds with expectations; all but one system (the Netherlands), show averages after 1970 to be higher than those in the 1960s. Five systems report increased averages throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Italy); only France declines over the two decades; and the remaining five fluctuate (Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden). Coefficients in the second column of Table 5.3 illustrate changes in ENPP figures between 1970 and 1998 and the final column reports

<sup>85</sup> Britain's proclivity for single party majorities, suggests that ENPP calculations should be interpreted only in the sense of change not real figures as only one party ever has access to government at any given time (Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003).

systems' overall convergence or divergence as reported in Table 4.8, Chapter 4. Collectively, all eleven systems show a slight increase but the coefficient is weak and insignificant suggesting that the relationship is poor and there is variance amongst cases. Individual systems show an increase in all but three cases (Denmark, France and the Netherlands). The overwhelming trend here appears to be raised ENPPs and in six instances coefficients prove to be significant (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Sweden). With the exception of Britain (which provides a spurious result; Dunleavy and Boucek, 2003), coefficients are moderate or high and suggestive of quite significant change.

The findings favour suggestions that dealignment rather than realignment has been the norm (see Blondel, 2002). The overall picture appears to be one of volatility and there does not appear to be evidence of convergence or a cartelising of environments being associated with increased stability.

Seat distributions between the 1970s and 1990s tell a story that seems relatively congruent with findings discussed thus far. While it was predicted that converging systems would see parties with access to the cartel more successful at retaining or increasing seats between 1970 and 1998, this does not appear to have been the case. Table 5.4 illustrates these developments. Directional relationships are established through best lines of fit. While the first column tracks developments over the period in relation to mainstream range, the second does so in terms of election date. The final column reports systems' overall convergence or divergence as reported in Table 4.8, Chapter 4.

While it was predicted that total seat shares of mainstream and secondary parties together would be more likely to increase in environments characterised by mainstream convergence, this has not been case and an insignificant coefficient of  $-.108$  shows that seats decrease with divergence. Collective seat shares across all eleven systems have decreased with mainstream divergence and there are no examples of both parties collectively increasing seat shares in constricted policy environments. Instances that have shown a rise have, in all circumstances, been associated with divergence (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway). The only system

expected to increase its seat shares which didn't was France; here a decrease was associated with divergence as it was in Sweden although the latter was predicted.

In total, seats significantly decrease over the period and this is borne out in a negative coefficient of  $-.176$  that is significant at the 0.05 level. Of the convergent systems, only three meet predictions showing an increase in collective seats over the period (Belgium, France, the Netherlands). However all these relationships are weak and insignificant. The other convergent systems (Austria, Ireland, Italy) all show a decline in mainstream and secondary seat percentages between 1970 and 1998; two significantly so (Austria and Ireland). Divergent systems are less varied in their results. While three show increases (Britain,<sup>86</sup> Norway and Sweden), only one does not (Denmark). A single relationship is shown to be significant here (Ireland).

Table 5.4 Bivariate correlations between mainstream and secondary party seat percentages 1970-1998

	Joint mainstream and secondary party seat percentages			
	Mainstream range	Date	Post 1970 convergence or divergence	N
Total	-.108	-.176*	D	96
Austria	.154	-.979*	C	9
Belgium	.451	.126	D	9
Britain <sup>87</sup>	.445	-.857**	C	8
Denmark	.155	.336	D	12
France	-.175	.036	D	7
Germany	.575	-.299	C**	8
Ireland	.660*	-.783*	D	9
Italy	.168	-.190	C	8
Netherlands	.243	.267	C**	9
Norway	-.754	-.750	C	7
Sweden	-.355	-.455	D	10

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: Dependent variable joint mainstream and secondary seat percentages. Independent variables: mainstream range and election date.

The direction of relationships is calculated by best lines of fit.

Secondary party (Liberals and Liberal Democrats are omitted from the analysis on Britain as the purpose of the measure is to examine control over seats for office and governments in Britain are single party majority cabinets.

Table 5.5 provides decade-based calculations of seat percentages across the post-war decades: the changes are interesting. While the mainstream lost around 5 percent of its seats after the

<sup>86</sup> While Britain showed a slight increase but these findings are counter intuitive as increased power of secondary parties has a marginalising rather than consolidating effect on mainstream parties by virtue of the system's governmental formula.

<sup>87</sup> Only the mainstream in Britain are included here. Refer to footnote 85.

1970s, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties appear to have consolidated their shares somewhat at the mainstream's expense, though secondary gains did not manage to absorb mainstream losses and collectively parties with access to the cartel lost seats in the 1990s.

Seat percentages on a system-to-system basis appear to bear this pattern out: representations of this can be found in the tables and graphs in Appendices B.3 and B.4 respectively. Whilst suffering some loss, the mainstream appeared to be relatively resilient between the 1970s and 1980s; however, the 1990s saw them experience a seat decline in all instances except Denmark: Austria, the Netherlands and Norway, on average haemorrhaging over 15 percent of their seats in this decade. Secondary parties appeared to consolidate their position as did semi-status organisations, thus confirming Katz and Mair's suggestion that governmental make-up has become more innovative (1995); similarly, non-governmental parties increased their seat shares thus exerting a progressively increased presence in parliament. In line with findings discussed above, no pattern appears evident across convergent or divergent systems and the former do not show any evidence of mainstream and secondary parties being able to hold onto or increase their seats.

*Table 5.5* Numerical distribution of decade-based collective seat percentages across mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties 1945-1998

Party Group	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
M	74.4	79.2	77.1	71.8	73.7	66.2
S	14.9	12.7	12.8	12.6	11.2	14.3
S-S	-	0.1	0.3	2.1	2.1	3.3
N-G	10.7	8.0	9.8	13.5	13.0	16.2

*Source:* CMP Dataset (2001).

*Notes:* M = mainstream; S = Secondary; S-S = semi-status; N-G = non-government.

Table 5.6 investigates the mainstream positions further. It has been suggested that the power of parties this dissertation has termed as mainstream is central to the cartel model. The more consolidated and stable their position, the greater the probability of them having the power to cartelise their system and the model suggests this is more likely to take place in environments where they engaged in policy convergence. Directional relationships are established through best lines of fit. While the first column tracks changes in mainstream seat percentages in relation to

mainstream range, the second does so in terms of election date. The final column reports systems' overall convergence or divergence as reported in Table 4.8, Chapter 4.

Coefficients report findings that are somewhat contradictory to the hypotheses. A negative and insignificant coefficient of  $-.017$  shows that overall, seats declined in situations characterised by divergence and at no point were seat shares shown to increase with convergence and where they did increase divergence correlated (Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands). Seats decreased in four instances, twice with convergence (France and Italy) and twice with divergence (Norway and Sweden). The only significant relationship between mainstream seats and range was seen in Germany and a number of coefficients were particularly weak suggesting no dominant relationship was really evident. These findings have quite significant implications. With the exception of Norway and Sweden they indicate that the most dominant relationship between seats and range is at odds with the overall range changes throughout the period studied. Moreover, they indicate that the relationship between seats and mainstream range is relatively weak and rather different to that implied by cartel theory and predicted in this dissertation.

Table 5.6 Changes in mainstream seat percentages between 1970 and 1998.

	Mainstream seat percentages			
	Mainstream left and right range	Election date	Post 1970 convergence or divergence	N
Total	-.017	-.135	D	96
Austria	.154	-.979**	C	9
Belgium	.341	-.467	D	9
Britain	.059	-.857**	C	8
Denmark	.093	.462	D	12
France	-.115	.250	D	7
Germany	.743*	-.429	C**	8
Ireland	.395	-.644*	D	9
Italy	-.275	-.747*	C	8
Netherlands	.010	.143	C**	9
Norway	-.481	-.500	C	7
Sweden	-.418	-.455	D	10

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: Dependent variable mainstream seat percentages. Independent variables: mainstream range and election date. The direction of relationships is calculated by best lines of fit.

Mainstream seat development between 1970 and 1998 is at odds with cartel expectations. As a group, they decline but the coefficient of  $-.135$  is neither robust nor significant. On a system-to-system basis, reductions are evident in eight out of eleven cases (Austria, Belgium, Britain, Germany, Ireland, Italy Norway and Sweden). The trend is mixed in terms of their proclivity for convergence or divergence and four relationships are significant (Austria, Britain, Ireland and Italy). In three instances mainstream seats increase (Denmark, France, the Netherlands) but coefficients are insignificant. Overall the dominant trend is decline. These findings do not suggest a consolidation of the mainstream and do not support the hypothesis set out at the start suggesting that that mainstream parties increase their seats in systems where they converge. This suggests that governments are now led with smaller majorities and mainstream parties are more likely to have lost rather than gained power in office situations.

Finally, the chapter examines the extent to which government options have been cartelised. While it is commonly acknowledged that access to government has increased, this chapter has argued that this is likely to be less evident in environments where options have been cartelised. Cartel parties seek office for its intrinsic benefits. In order to maintain a primacy of cartel politics, it is in mainstream and to a lesser extent secondary parties' interests to ensure that they provide an exclusive resource for office, or failing that, control its make-up. This provides them with an opportunity to exert control over their operational environments. Few parties ever win an overall majority of votes and seats and because of this most governments are coalitions and constitute a formula that the electorate did not explicitly choose (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006: 382). Therefore, most governments are a function of traditional, inter-party relationships and the alliances that arise from them.

Maintenance is very much reliant upon successful negotiation and the bargaining systems operating between parties (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006: 382); while a variety of institutional and party system variables exert significant influence here, factors such as coherence and ideological compatibility are particularly important (Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, 2000: 80-83). Therefore, it is suggested that it is in the interests of cartel parties to keep government make-up as homogenous and cartel-friendly as possible. It has been suggested that systems prone to closed government characterised by few parties with access to office, full or non alternation and

low or absent levels of levels innovation in terms of formulae (Mair, 1996) are expected to maintain this equilibrium, whereas those more open before 1970 will show a progressively more conservative attitude. It is expected that these features will be enhanced in environments characterised by mainstream convergence as opposed to divergence.

Overall, the mainstream and to a much lesser extent secondary parties continue to dominate government, although smaller secondary parties have been marginalised somewhat. Mainstream seat percentages appear more volatile and have lessened, particularly so in the case of the Christian democrats; accordingly, governments are being led with smaller majorities which has marginalised mainstream control somewhat and increased the bargaining capabilities of other parties in government as well as opposition.

Reference back to Table 5.3 provides information on pre-1970 levels of openness in each system. In contrast to the prediction that governments became more closed after 1970, an increased number of parties now have access to office and government make-up seems more innovative (see Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, 2000; Zarate, 2006). Table 5.7 lists the fifteen parties that obtained semi-status after 1970; mostly new, a small number operated before 1960. They are mix of what Rochon (1985) has termed challengers and mobilisers, articulating traditional and new politics cleavages respectively. Three parties are somewhat unusual inclusions: the Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance or AN), the previously the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), and the former Communist party (Democratic party of the left or PDS formerly the Communist Party) all acquired political relevance and vital positions in office following the clean hands investigations that saw the First Republic fall. Forza Italia is also a new party. It filled the vacuum on the right and appropriated mainstream status at the beginning of the Second Republic: taking these parties into account eighteen obtained governing status between 1970 and 1998.

In terms of openness, Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands appear markedly more open, so does Ireland but markedly less so. France – taking into account its unique proclivity for party alliances – and Sweden remain relatively unchanged while Austria, Britain, Germany and Norway maintain their closed characteristics. Italy is the exception here as the party system change it underwent in the early 1990s makes it especially difficult to assess. Still open, the

Second Republic is rather less so than the first was, not least for the reason that it does not have to be: obtaining (relatively) stable governmental majorities has been less of a problem since the system bipolarised and (relatively) strong parties on both the centre left and centre right arose. There is no apparent evidence linking levels of post-1970 government openness and mainstream party range. They do not appear to be linked. In reality it is more likely that traditional practices, institutional constraints and necessity drive the nature of government make-up.

Table 5.7 Parties obtaining semi-status 1970-1998

	Parties obtaining semi-status since 1970
Austria	-
Belgium	Front Démocratique des Bruxellois Francophones (Flemish National League (FDF); De Volksumie (People's Union or VU); Rassemblment Walloon (Walloon Rally, RW).
Britain	-
Denmark	Centrum-Demokraterne (Centre Democrats or CD); Kristeligt Folkeparti (Christina People's Party or KD); Venstresocialisterne (Left Socialist party (VS); Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (Danish Communist Party or DKP); Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's Party SF).
France	Generation Écologie (Ecology Generation).
Germany	Die Grünen (Greens).
Ireland	Progressive Democrats (PD).
Italy	Lega (Northern League LN); Fedrazione dei Liste Verdi (Green Federation). Forza Italia (Go Italy or FI) entered the system but at mainstream level and Alleanza Nazioal (National Alliance, formerly the Italian Social Movement) and Partito Democratic della Sinistra (Democratic party of the left or PDS formerly the Communist Party) obtained relevance.
the Netherlands	Democraten '66 (Democrats'66 or D'66); Democratische Socialisten '70 (Democratic Socialists :70 or D'70).
Norway	-
Sweden	Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet (Christian Democratic Community or KdS).

Source: adapted from Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Zarate, (2006).

In sum it does not appear that parties have cartelised government. There is more access and make-up appears to have become increasingly innovative. There does not seem to be any evidence that parties with access to the cartel have been successful at consolidating their control over office makeup; convergence does not appear to have had any closing effect and divergence does not appear to have brought about more conservative behaviour. However, while informative, it is beyond the remit of this investigation to ascertain the forces that influence government make-up. It is suggested that institutional and party system characteristics are likely to be more influential.

While the predictions made in this chapter were perfectly rational and it was reasonable to assume that given the cartel model's aims, convergent rather than divergent environments had exhibited more success in closing the market for office, Katz and Mair's reference to the increasing openness of government and a generalised innovation of governable formulae (1995) mean that the findings, though contrary to expectations, were not all that surprising. If it is not possible to cartelise government options in quantitative terms then, it must be achieved through qualitative methods. This possibility was introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 which discussed how the inclusion of new parties in the cartel is dependent first on their utility, but second on them displaying acceptable, cartel-friendly qualitative characteristics. While it is in the interests of cartels to extend their membership and increase their majority (Katz and Mair, 1996), they have the ability to marginalise parties that are unacceptable by relegating them to semi-status whilst in government; or they can merely marginalise them (for example the Belgian government's behaviour towards Vlaams Belang). It seems therefore, that their power base lies in their ability to co-opt or not into the cartel rather than government. In this sense it is possible to see how cartel politics really do create stability within environments characterised by volatility and change and it explains why this aspect of systemic cartelisation has not been detected.

However, the premise of cartel theory is that it is always in the interests of mainstream parties to cartelise government options because stability is always preferable to competition – even when maximum gains are achievable. This is debatable and a pertinent example is provided in the behaviour of the Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People's Party or ÖVP) after the 1999 election. Along with the Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (Austrian Socialist Party or SPÖ) and the extreme right-wing Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party or FPÖ), the party secured a third of the vote (Nordsiek, 2006). Hitherto condemned to secondary status in government despite its almost permanent post-war position as a junior partner in grand coalition with the SPÖ, it rejected national and international pressure to maintain the usual governmental formulae and prioritised its desire for power over that for stability, entering into office with the FPÖ in 2000 (Luther, 2003). This example suggests that where maximum gains are assured, parties will seek them, even at the expense of stability: in other words parties are rational creatures which seek the most desired *and* most achievable goals. This possibility requires further investigation,

but it implies that parties are as competitive as ever and the cartel model has mistaken a desire for stability for a willingness to take second best when that is the only achievable option.

#### **5.4 Concluding comments**

Based on the premise that power is quantifiable, this chapter investigated whether mainstream and secondary parties were able to cartelise parliamentary and government options between 1970 and 1998. It must be stressed that it was not within the goals or capabilities of the investigation to determine whether or not systemic cartelisation actually occurred and whether operating cartels were identifiable; such an endeavour would have required extensive knowledge of inter-party relationships as well as access to information on the specific strategies and behaviour of all organisations considered.

First, the framework introduced in Chapter 3 was operationalised in all eleven systems of interest. Four different types of parties were identified: mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing. Through it party systems were disaggregated and it was possible to provide a cross-system comparison of developments between 1970 and 1998.

It was predicted that environments characterised by mainstream policy convergence rather than divergence would be associated with a cartelisation of parliamentary and government options. This was shown not to be the case. Convergence did not correlate with reduced numbers of ENPP, increased seat percentages of parties with access to the cartel, or a consolidation of the mainstream and trends noted were indicative of increased volatility and dealignment. Effective number of parliamentary parties increased and seat percentages of the mainstream alone, and together with and secondary parties were shown to be in decline, particularly throughout the 1990s. Finally government options showed evidence of not having cartelised in a quantitative sense. More parties obtained access to government and formulae became more innovative; systems characterised by convergence did not show any evidence of becoming more closed. However, it was suggested that in a qualitative sense parties with access to the cartel still have the ability to marginalise those that threaten it.

The overriding outcome was that party systems did not consolidate between 1970 and 1998 and as a group, parties with access to the cartel became less powerful throughout the time period. Most importantly, the link between policy cartelisation – or convergence here – and systemic cartelisation was weak to non-existent. While it is possible that the methodology employed and the data used did not capture the process; the findings seem to indicate that they did not take place and it may be – as suggested at various points throughout this chapter – that while incentives to cartelise parliamentary and governmental options are greater in converging systems, the sheer power of other party system factors negate any attempts. Therefore, the most obvious route for this investigation would be multivariate causal modelling. Taken in conjunction with the results presented in the previous chapter, findings so far call the validity of the cartel model into question and suggest a need for further examination of the factors discussed.

## Chapter 6

### Cartel politics and the extreme right-wing

The purpose of party cartelisation is to exert mainstream control over electoral markets in order to cartelise policy and thus votes, parliament, government portfolios and subsequent state goods. The previous two chapters investigated eleven party systems for evidence of the process since 1970 predominantly examining developments in the mainstream, and to a lesser extent, secondary parties. While it was not possible to confirm hypotheses in full, indicators of some policy and competitive change consistent with the model were noted. In terms of systemic cartelisation (parliamentary and government proportions) there was little evidence to support the hypotheses that were made and overall the power of cartel parties, specifically the mainstream, was shown to be in decline. This chapter turns to examine semi-status parties and non-governing parties, the third and fourth layer of parties that were identified in Chapter 3 and operationalised in Chapter 5. The seemingly most successful group of parties found in these two layers, the extreme right-wing, is investigated here. The cartel model suggests that the presence and recent fortunes of this party family are an inherent by-product of party cartelisation: this chapter investigates the proposition within the context of claims made in Cartel Party Theory II (CPT II).

The majority of industrialised democracies have witnessed a rejuvenation of extreme right-wing politics in recent decades. Various factors combine to explain this development (for an overview see Eatwell 2003),<sup>88</sup> the party family's fortunes generally being considered a result of socio-economic or political conditions (Carter, 2005). Scholarly research tends to rationalise them through the facilitation of demand or the exploitation of pre-existing disaffection – supply – (Eatwell, 2003: 48) and while research has been extensive in terms of volume, the lion's share has concentrated on demand-related explanations (Carter, 2005:3).<sup>89</sup> Publications have highlighted the effects of globalisation (Stone, 1989), social breakdown (Eatwell, 2003), economic conditions (Kitschelt with McGann, 1995),<sup>90</sup> the reverse post-material thesis or 'silent counter revolution' (Ignazi, 1992), immigration-related issues (Betz, 2002), perceptions of

<sup>88</sup> Eatwell specifically refers to individual motivations, local factors and global influences (2003).

<sup>89</sup> For a synthesis of demand and supply-related arguments relating to the recent successes of the extreme-right refer to Norris (2005).

<sup>90</sup> Recent work has negated the importance of socio-structural conditions in explaining the extreme right vote (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 2005: 537).

discontent (see, Lipset and Raab, 1978) or as Taggart suggests, a particular post-war trajectory (1996:38).

Alternatively, and somewhat neglected as an area (Carter, 2005:3), supply-orientated theories have shown more of a proclivity to explain the fortunes of the extreme right-wing by concentrating on the importance of opportunity structures within parties' operational environments (Carter, 2005: 3 van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 2005: 539). Through this lens, they have been linked to institutional settings (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2002; 2004; 2005), organisational capabilities (see, Panebianco, 1988; Harmel and Svåsand, 1993; Pedahzur and Brichta, 2001; also Carter, 2005) age, ideology and policy emphases (Ignazi, 1992; Ignazi and Ysmal, 1992; Kitschelt with McGann, 1995; Taggart, 1995; Mudde, 1999; Carter, 2005) and the competitive environment (Abedi, 2002; Carter, 2002; 2004; 2005; Meguid, 2005; van der Brug et.al., 2005.). Finally, the supply approach has linked the party family's fortunes to media skills in shaping public perceptions (Eatwell, 2003).

It is thought that party cartelisation has provided a number of opportunity structures for the extreme right-wing. To be precise, the properties credited with ensuring stability in these environments have also been charged with encouraging the extremist sentiments that are linked to extreme right-wing politics (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005); indeed, the post-1970 period – that associated with party cartelisation – has seen the third and most successful wave of post-war right-wing extremism (see von Beyme, 1988).<sup>91</sup> While most democracies have experienced some manifestation of extreme right-wing politics, a number have seen the development of party organisations, some of which have been able to pass the thresholds of representation, relevance (Pedersen, 1982),<sup>92</sup> even government thus providing the party family with increased influence and bargaining power. Without establishment status and prone to fluctuation in terms of their trajectory through the party life-cycle, these organisations have operated at the interface between cartels and the rest of their respective party systems: their

---

<sup>91</sup> von Beyme identifies the first wave as 'post war neo-fascism', the second wave as a response to 'social deprivation', and the third wave as a xenophobic response to a surge in unemployment (1988: 7-13).

<sup>92</sup> Pedersen identifies four thresholds in the party lifecycle: declaration, authorisation, representation and relevance (Pedersen, 1982). He defines relevance in Sartorian terms: blackmail and coalition potential (Sartori, 1976).

presence has altered the status quo and presented a specific set of challenges to modern-day politics.

The cartel's facilitation of extreme right-wing parties can be investigated from the extent to which it encourages the party family's presence, aids its entry onto the political stage, assists in its success, and influences its strategies. The latter two issues are investigated here. Section 6.1 provides a theoretical discussion on extreme-right politics since 1980, considering them in light of the overall propositions made in Cartel Party Theory I (CPT I) and particularly those made in Cartel Party Theory II (CPT II) (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). From this, the chapter then proceeds to develop a number of theoretically-based hypotheses in section 6.2, testing them in sections 6.3 and 6.4. The broad suggestion here is that extreme right-wing politics are an inherent feature of cartel environments and because of this it is possible to predict a number of behaviours they will exhibit. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on how the party family may develop within cartelised environments and the effects it is likely to exert on mainstream politics.

### **6.1 The third wave of extreme right-wing politics and party cartelisation: a theoretical overview.**

Since the 1980s a number of extreme right-wing parties have achieved remarkable levels of success in electoral and parliamentary and more recently governmental arenas. Though the fortunes of some have been transient, those of others have been sustained enough for them to now appear as relatively permanent features of the political landscape. Focusing only on the systems with which this dissertation is concerned, the electoral results of the extreme right-wing since 1980 are displayed in Appendix C.1 and their full titles are provided in Appendix C.2. It can be seen that the party family's fortunes have varied quite substantially throughout the third wave and with the exception of the Irish Republic – most probably because of its unusual cleavage structure – the extreme right-wing has been represented in all systems. While parties such as the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party or FPÖ),<sup>93</sup> Vlaams Bloc (VB presently

---

<sup>93</sup> The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party or FPÖ) fractured in April 2006; the breakaway group – led by Jörg Haider – adopting the title of Bündes Zukunft Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria or BZÖ). The BZÖ remained junior party in the coalition – formed following the election in 2002 – with the (Peoples Party or

Vlaams Bellang) and Alleanza National, (Italian National Alliance, or AN, formerly Movimento Sociale Italiano or MSI) have consecutively secured high vote shares in recent elections, the majority have struggled – more often than not unsuccessfully – to achieve representation; in many cases being consigned to ‘flash party’ status.

While electoral gains have been linked to a number of party and non-party related factors, an area that has been especially linked to the party family’s success has been ideology: specifically the changes that took place throughout the 1980s. Until this time, the ideological corpus of the extreme right-wing was primarily concerned with the reinterpretation of historical fascism (Ignazi, 2003: 21). However, the 1980s ushered in a new ‘cultural discourse’ fostered by neo-conservatism and the *Nouvelle Droite*<sup>94</sup> thus altering the extreme right-wing’s terms of reference (Ignazi, 2003: 22). Providing amongst other things a meritocratic mass appeal, market individualism and a rejection of post-materialism, the influence of neo-conservatism was an *unconscious*<sup>95</sup> one, fostered by changes in the established political climate (Ignazi, 2003: 24-25). Its spread across western democracies, introduced a more radical interpretation of politics on the right and forged environments where traditionalism, national pride, communitarianism and exclusion became the norm while developments such as multiculturalism were questioned for their rationality and benefits (Ignazi, 2003: 25).

In contrast to the almost ‘*unconscious*’ influence of neo-conservatism, that of the *Nouvelle Droite*’s was somewhat more cognizant on the part of the extreme right-wing in that they actively chose to appropriate its ideology (Ignazi, 2003: 240). Grounded in the rejection of liberalism and egalitarianism, the *Nouvelle Droite* voiced opposition to the dismantling of ‘natural communities’ and called for a ‘*positive*’ evaluation of ... differences’ claiming that as a movement it was non-racist but against the homogenization of society. Recent years have seen the *Nouvelle Droite* reject modernity, become concerned with ‘anti-utilitarianism’ (Ignazi, 2003: 22-23) and call for ‘organic’ ‘bottom-up communities’ that facilitate the “‘true essence” of

---

ÖVP) while the FPÖ moved into opposition (Luther, K.R., 2006a; Luther, K.R., 2006b). My thanks to Kurt Richard Luther for advice on recent developments within the extreme-right in Austria.

<sup>94</sup> The *Nouvelle Droite* was a small intellectual grouping that emanated from France, Italy and then Belgium, Germany and Austria. It distanced itself from neo-fascism and argued for new thinking on the right (Taguieff, 1983; Tassani, 1986). It gained a significant audience after 1970 when Alain de Benoist (French philosopher) became editor of the conservative magazine *Figaro*.

<sup>95</sup> Author’s italics.

democracy' (Ignazi, 2003: 23). These modes of thinking were adopted by the extreme right-wing: the 'right to difference' became the corner-stone for new racist interpretations and perceptions of exclusion (Taguieff, 1994), nationalism and the preservation of homogenous organic communities fuelled ideological development (Ignazi, 2003: 24).

Adopting new interpretations of society (Ignazi, 2003), the party family has now assumed ownership of extreme perspectives on racism, nationalism, xenophobia, law and order and welfare chauvinism (Mudde, 1995; 1996a; see also Mudde, 1999) and shown a party-wide articulation of anti-system politics (see for example Mudde, 1996b; Shedler, 1996; Keren, 2000). Associated with irresponsible opposition, out-bidding behaviour (Sartori, 1976) and varying degrees of anti-system politics (Capoccia, 2002; Carter, 2005) the most successful members of the extreme right-wing have shown a tendency to articulate a populist strain of politics (Taggart, 1995; 1996; 2000; Mény and Surel, 2002) that stresses corruption and collusion in mainstream politics (Taggart, 2000). They have also tended to reject the 'dominant model' of organisation as personified by the main cases included in the 'Katz / Mair Project' (Katz and Mair, 1992) and rely upon their differences as sufficient indicators of need for change (Taggart, 2000: 75). With an emphasis on the importance of participatory democracy (Papadopoulos, 2002: 45), public initiatives (Canovan, 2002) and 'politics of resentment' (Betz, 1994; 1998a,b) this particular strain of far-right politics has successfully managed to mobilise sizable portions of the electorate.

What makes their fortunes so salient is that they have taken place during a period characterised by volatility and change in mainstream politics (Merkl, 1988: 562). The cartel thesis explains this link by suggesting that the political environment specific to this model has encouraged an increase in far-right sentiment and mobilised support for the party family. Seen partly as a policy response by social democracy to the constraints or indeed perceived constraints imposed by globalisation, policy cartelisation much like the rest of the cartel process is also the product of bilateral efforts on the part of established parties to replace competition for voters with a tacit cartel that controls and distributes goods – votes, seat, government portfolios and subsequent state goods – as well as ensuring survival (Blyth, 2003). However, it is suggested that '[r]egardless of ... strategy employed, cartels invite challengers' (Blyth, 2003: 16), particularly those from the far-right. Disparaged for their collusive behaviour, monopolisation of state

resources and active exclusion of those from outside the cartel (see Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005; see also Blyth, 2003) the extreme-right has been labelled a 'genuine anti-cartel phenomenon' (Katz and Mair, 1995:24) and to some extent for them to perceive themselves excluded, a cartel of sorts must be present (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 55).

This chapter investigates whether party cartelisation can be linked to the behaviour and electoral success of the extreme-right since 1980. While empirical research provided so far in this dissertation has not been strongly supportive of party cartelisation,<sup>96</sup> one particularly important finding that has been suggestive of the process has been that as access to state subsidies become more restrictive, the mainstream left and right tend to converge. Both indicative of a mainstream desire to close the market, it is suggested that a relationship exists between them and the behaviour and success of the extreme right-wing.

Utilising data from the Comparative Manifesto Party (CMP) Project seven systems and eight extreme right-wing parties are investigated here: each organisation studied has secured 5 percent or more of their national vote on one or more given occasion since 1980.<sup>97</sup> Parties examined are the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs the (recently the Bündes Zukunft Österreich, Alliance for the Future of Austria or BZÖ broke away from the Freedom Party or FPÖ.)<sup>98</sup>, Vlaams Bloc (Vlaams Bloc or VB, Belgium, presently Vlaams Bellang)<sup>99</sup>, Fremkridspartiet (Progress Party or FRPd, Denmark), Front National (Front National or FN, France), Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance or AN, formerly the Movimento Sociale Italiano, Italian Social Movement or MSI, Italy), Lega (Northern League or LN, Italy), Fremskrittspartiet, (Progress Party or FRPn, Norway) and Ny Demokrati (New Democracy or NyD, Sweden).<sup>100</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Though post convergence stabilisation – as opposed to a reduction in policy differences – is actually indicative of policy cartelisation, findings from Chapter 4 suggest that it has not been possible to identify this aspect of the process.

<sup>97</sup> The Comparative Manifesto Party Project does not provide data on smaller parties with lower scores. Those omitted from the study are Agir, FN, PFNB (Belgium), DVU, NPD, Republikaner (Germany), CD, CP, CP '86, NVU (Netherlands), FLP, (Norway), SDK (Sweden), BNP, NF (UK), therefore, it has not been possible to include these parties in the analysis.

<sup>98</sup> By virtue of the time period under study, the party will be referred to by Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Freedom Party or FPÖ. For some elaboration on this split, refer to footnote 93.

<sup>99</sup> By virtue of the time period under study, the party will be referred to by Vlaams Bloc or VB.

<sup>100</sup> The sample is limited to these eight parties as data is only available for those that have secured 5% or more of the national vote.

Sections 6.3 and 6.4 investigate the aforementioned question, however, prior to this the chapter justifies state subsidies – in fact state goods – and policy distances in the mainstream as satisfactory indicators of systems' proclivity for cartelisation. It then proceeds to identify and operationalise anti-cartel policy in the extreme right-wing further ascertaining that they are in fact vote-winning behaviours.

### *6.1.1 State subsidies and convergence: two indicators of cartelisation*

Increased accessibility to state subsidies provided the larger parties – particularly those on the left – with an opportunity to extract themselves from voter and membership demands and pursue policies more in keeping with environmental reality. With access tending to be retrospectively proportional to votes or seats (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 9) allocation has worked in favour of the larger parties at the expense of the weak (Katz, 1996:131; Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003:88) and while the majority of regulatory changes have extended access, they have, by and large, continued to favour the mainstream (Katz, 1996: 130; Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003: 95). Charged with creating false and distorted environments, perpetuating the status quo and interfering with parties' natural life-cycles (Pierre, Svåsand and Widfeldt, 2000: 3) the suggestion is that this skewed access to state subsidies limits the opportunities of smaller parties.

State goods however cannot just be confined to financial subsidies, and of the factors most likely to influence the electoral fortunes of the extreme-right – and thus their perception of fair game – laws governing access to state media as well as entrance to the political process are also particularly important<sup>101</sup> (Carter, 2005: 162; see also Katz, 1997; Bowler Carter and Farrell, 2003; Abedi, 2004; Carter 2005). By virtue of society's increased reliance on the media for both education and entertainment, parties have been forced to look beyond traditional campaign techniques to reach and mobilise their electorates (Carter, 2005: 169) and rather than door-to-door canvassing and constituency meetings they have turned to the broadcast media as a tool through which to garner support (Holtz-Bacha and Kaid, 1995, Farrell, 1996, Semetko, 1996). However, while the mainstream secures daily coverage by virtue of its status smaller parties do

---

<sup>101</sup> Carter constructs this proposal from a set of thirteen features relevant to the analysis of electoral laws as identified by Grofman and Lijphart (1986).

not. Compounded by the fact that access – for example in the run up to elections – tends to be allocated much in the same way as state subsidies, small parties are again left at a disadvantage.

Ballot access constitutes the ‘first hurdle’ that candidates and parties must pass if they wish to stand for election (Carter, 2005: 163). Regulations are intended to restrict electoral process to ‘serious candidates’ and generally fall under one or a selection or all of the following three categories: demonstration of support, monetary deposit and nomination by a recognised political party (Katz, 1997: 255). Indeed, requirements are particularly important to smaller parties such as the far-right as the higher and more restrictive they are, the greater their chance of exclusion from the electoral process. It is suggested, in line with the cartel model, that the more restrictive barriers are to state subsidies, the broadcast media and ballot access, the more likely a system is to cartelise.

The distance between mainstream left and right policy is the second factor examined here. Instigated by a number of globalisation-related changes and facilitated – in part – by the introduction of state subsidies, thus reducing party reliance on membership subventions and enabling them to limit their aggregative responsibilities (Blyth and Katz, 2005; Katz and Mair, 1995), policy convergence is the first step in the cartelisation process. In contrast to the centripetal convergence associated with catch-all politics what has characterised the cartel era is a convergence of the mainstream left on their counterparts from the right. Symptomatic of parties’ desire to restrict electoral choice and control the electorate’s policy options, amongst other things, convergence represents an attempt to restrict and confine electoral choice, while excluding more extreme options (Blyth, 2003). It is suggested that the greater the convergence between the mainstream left and right, the greater its desire to cartelise.

### *6.12 Operationalising anti-cartel politics*

If the third wave of right-wing extremism has been a reaction to party cartelisation,<sup>102</sup> the process will have stimulated specific anti-cartel behaviours in the party family. It is predicted that where

---

<sup>102</sup> The cartel argument has been accused of mistaking long standing resistance to the politics of patronage, for example in countries such as Austria and Italy, with opposition to cartel behaviour (Kooze, 1996; Kitschelt, 2000: 174). It has also been criticised for perceiving critique of the status quo to be a tactic exclusive to the extreme right-

there is a perception of disadvantage and/or a mobilisation opportunity, the extreme-right will exhibit anti-cartel vote-maximising behaviours. Well equipped to criticise the political elite by virtue of its anti-system characteristics and populist tendencies, it is suggested that perceptions of cartel behaviour will encourage the extreme-right to accuse the political elite of corruption, and, where it has identified limited mainstream policy options it will have chosen to portray this as corrupt non-democratic behaviour and articulate more radical policies.

Here the extreme right-wing's emphasis on political corruption is measured through the 'Political Corruption' variable provided in the CMP Dataset.<sup>103</sup> Described as the '[n]eed to eliminate corruption and associated abuse in political and public life' (Budge et. al, 2001: 224) it is assumed that the more extreme right-wing parties perceive political corruption to be evident the more they will emphasise the variable in their manifestos. Radicalisation of extreme right-wing policy is measured through the left-right indicator again provided in the CMP Dataset (Budge et. al. 2001).<sup>104</sup>

*Table 6.1* Decade-based emphases on political corruption in the extreme right-wing

Party	Minimum-maximum emphases on political corruption in the extreme right-wing 1980-1998	1980s	1990s	Mean	Rank
NyD	0.0-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.00	1
FRPn	0.0-.30	0.20	0.0	0.10	2
FRPd	0.0-2.67	0.81	0.21	0.51	3
FN	1.19-1.33	1.23	1.30	1.27	4
MSI/AN	0.77-4.88	0.85	3.39	2.12	5
VB	2.92-2.93	2.92	2.92	2.92	6
LN	1.53-18.37	3.39	8.64	6.02	8
FPÖ	4.20-21.11	7.00	11.08	9.04	7

*Source:* Political Corruption (per 304) CMP Dataset (2001).

*Note:* Measured against an overall range in the data set of 0.0-28.79, the first column provides the range of each party's emphasis on political corruption throughout the period, the overall range of the set being 0.0-21.11.

wing when in fact it is a behaviour often employed by the majority of smaller and less successful parties (Koole, 1996).

<sup>103</sup> The Political Corruption variable is listed under the general domain of 'Political System and labelled as 'per 304' (CMP data set, 2001: 224).

<sup>104</sup> For information on the compilation of the left-right variable labelled as 'rile', refer to p11 and footnote 7 chapter 4. For a full discussion on the left-right dimension and the CMP Dataset refer to Chapter 4, section 4.2.

Table 6.1 provides information relating to political corruption emphasis in each extreme right-wing party in the 1980s and 1990s. Reference to the first column shows that attention to it has varied across the eight parties of interest the range measuring from 0.0-21.11 across the two decades. While some parties have paid very little attention to the subject others have devoted substantially more and with a maximum emphasis of 28.79 in the dataset,<sup>105</sup> it can be seen that though these parties vary, as expected some provide rather high readings. The second two columns in the table show decade-based averages, while the final two respectively provide an average and overall rank that increases with extremity: the higher the rank the greater the emphasis on political corruption between 1980 and 1998. In terms of emphasis on political corruption, substantial variance is evident between parties, decades and, in the case of Italy, the system. While NyD, FRPd and FRPn showed no or virtually no reference to political corruption throughout the two decades, we can see higher levels articulated by FN, the MSI/AN, VB, FPÖ and LN. Ranked from the party showing the least to most references, NyD is lowest followed by FRPd, FRPn, FN, MSI/AN, LN and FPÖ.

A positive and significant correlation confirms the importance of political corruption in the extreme right-wing's agenda. With a coefficient of .392<sup>106</sup> that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, it is shown that as emphasis on political corruption increases in this group of parties, so does its vote.<sup>107</sup>

While Elizabeth Carter has shown the extreme right-wing to perform the best at the polls when more ideologically moderate (2005: 140), it is suggested here that cartelised environments can also provide mobilisation opportunities and encourage the extreme-right to provide increased choice where the mainstream fails to. The first column in Table 6.2 provides the range of each party's emphasis on the left-right dimension throughout the 1980s and 1990s. While some parties clearly fall on the right and the VB appears to remain left-wing throughout the entire period,

<sup>105</sup> Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Britain, US systems are taken into account here.

<sup>106</sup> Source: CMP Dataset (2001). Political Corruption (per 304) and left-right dimension (rile); n = 35. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests to determine the normality of data. Throughout the chapter Pearson's Product Moment is used to correlate data of a normal distribution while Spearman's Rho is used to correlate data that is not a normal distribution.

<sup>107</sup> The nature of this and subsequent relationships are determined by a best line of fit.

other parties exhibit ranges that span both the left and right sides of the spectrum. The second and third column provide averages for the two decades and the fourth ranks them from least to most right-wing. Again substantial variance is evident. Excluding those not competing across both decades, the VB, and MSI/AN are the only two parties not to radicalise in the 1990s. Average emphases vary, and readings range from -2.92 to 42.81. Interestingly the CMP Dataset varies from -74.30-85.00 on the left-right dimension, accordingly, the parties under investigation here do not, in any sense, constitute the most radically right-wing parties on this dimension.<sup>108</sup> The least right wing party is the VB followed by LN, MSI/AN, the FPÖ, FRPd, FRPn, FN and finally NyD. Perhaps the most interesting readings are those displayed by the VB which are negative and left-wing.

*Table 6.2* Decade-based left-right emphasis in the extreme right-wing

Party	Minimum-maximum left-right emphases 1980-1998	1980s	1990s	Mean	Rank
VB	-3.00- -2.92	-2.92	-2.96	-2.93	1
LN	8.64-17.47	NA	11.58	11.58	2
MSI/AN	0.67-53.66	27.16	13.26	18.82	3
FPÖ	-5.90-55.7	4.60	39.46	25.52	4
FRPd	10.34-44.89	29.91	38.47	33.58	5
FRPn	24.20-43.57	30.10	43.57	35.49	6
FN	29.25-50.67	34.61	45.31	39.96	7
NyD	42.81-42.81	NA	42.81	42.81	8

*Source:* Left-right dimension (rile) CMP Dataset (2001).

*Note:* Measured against an overall range in the data set of -74.30-85.00, the first column provides the range of each party's emphasis on the left-right dimension throughout the period.

As with political corruption, left-right emphases in the extreme right-wing correlates with vote. This is shown in a positive coefficient of .300<sup>109</sup> that is significant at a level of 0.05. A best line of fit confirms the relationship demonstrating that the extreme right-wing's vote increases as it becomes more right wing. It must be noted however that this finding contrasts with Carter's assertions (2005: 140): it may be because the data set used here is smaller and comprising – unlike her more comprehensive set – only the more successful, even relevant members of the party family and by virtue of this, their fortunes may not conform to the collective experience of the party family .

<sup>108</sup> Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Britain, US systems are taken into account here.

<sup>109</sup> *Source:* CMP Dataset (2001; left-right dimension (rile); n = 35.

These readings suggest that for this data set, both political corruption and left-right policy are vote-winning topics for the extreme right-wing: the more parties stress political corruption among the elite and the more right-wing their policies, the more their votes increase. Though it may be rational for parties to focus their policies on areas that maximise support, it cannot be assumed that they are always able to discriminate between vote-winning and vote-losing policies. For less sophisticated organisations with limited access to information on voter behaviour, the nature and emphasis of their policy could be influenced more by their perceptions than the reality of what successful vote-winning tactics are. It is with perception-influenced tactics that we are concerned. It is suggested that the more parties perceive themselves to be disadvantaged by cartelisation and/or identify a mobilisation opportunity the more likely they are to engage in anti-cartel behaviour. The chapter now turns to the tasks of operationalising the two indicators identified to be suggestive of cartelisation: state goods and policy distances between the mainstream left and right. It then proceeds to propose a number of hypotheses.

## **6.2 Developing and testing the theory**

The two central mechanisms this dissertation proposed as the driving forces behind cartelisation are the proliferation of state subsidies and externally imposed constriction of available policy space (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). What is particularly important here is that parties have internalised these processes by penetrating the state themselves and further curbing the available policy space. Accordingly, it is suggested that they can both be considered accurate measures of a system's proclivity for cartelisation as well as indicators of parties' desire to cartelise.

With both imposed, the former by the state and the latter by globalisation, parties have played no small part in contributing to them, particularly in the case of the latter. For the purposes of this chapter, both state embeddedness and reduced policy space are used to identify behaviour suggestive of cartelisation.

Making use of data provided by Katz (1997) state embeddedness is measured by way of three indicators commonly used to identify its direct and indirect support: state subsidies, media access and ballot access (Katz, 1997; Bowler Carter and Farrell, 2003; Abedi, 2004; Carter 2005), the

former two have been collapsed into a single measure of state support. The extent to which mainstream policy space has reduced is identified through election-to-election. As in Chapter 4, reductions here are understood as being party system specific and therefore, no critical measure of convergence has been identified.

State subsidies and broadcasting rights can be seen as providing a collective measure of state support. To succeed in modern day politics it has become apparent that parties must be able to thrive in state-dominant environments where capital-intensive politics flourish and the broadcasting media have become important and influential vehicles of communication (see Farrell, 1996; Semetko, 1996; Holz-Bacha and Kaid, 1995). While the cartel model considers state subsidies and broadcasting access – by virtue of their distributive mechanisms – as primary benefits to the established mainstream, it has been shown that where the extreme right-wing can access them both they benefit at the polls (Carter, 2005: 168; 176).

Table 6.3 provides information on parties' access to state support in the seven systems of interest, the first column illustrating financial subsidies, the second access to the broadcast media. It can be seen that while Austria and Sweden restrict monies on the basis of performance in previous elections, Belgium and Denmark do not provide any direct support (Abedi, 2004: 95). In terms of the second dimension, Austria and Belgium appear particularly restrictive in terms of broadcasting time favouring only parties with representation whereas Denmark and France provide equal time to all parties (Abedi, 2004: 95). Overall, rankings show that Denmark appears to be the least restrictive in terms of state support; it is followed by France, Norway, Belgium and Italy, Sweden. Austria is the most restrictive. It is suggested that the greater a system's restrictiveness the more open it is to cartelisation.

It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that where laws determining access to these instruments are exclusionary and the extreme right-wing perceives that they are disadvantaged they are likely to critique them, irrespective of ability to circumvent or pass thresholds. It is predicted therefore that the higher the thresholds for state subsidies and access to the broadcast media, the more likely extreme right-wing parties will emphasise political corruption.

*H<sub>1</sub> The higher the thresholds for state support, the more emphasis extreme right-wing parties will place on political corruption.*

Table 6.3 Impact of state support

	Financial support	Broadcasting	Indicator of cartelisation measured by state support
Denmark	No direct monetary campaign support	Recognised parties receive equal amounts of free radio and television time.	1
France	Presidential candidates with at least 5% of the vote receive FF100,000 and costs of printing and sending platform to each voter as well as printing campaign posters. Parliamentary candidates with at least 5% of the vote reimbursed costs of printing ballots and posters for polling places.	Presidential candidates receive equal amounts of free radio and television time in each round of voting.	2
Norway	Nkr 22.10 (1991) per vote received; 2.5% of vote required to qualify.	Equal shares for parties participating in elections in all electoral subdivisions.	3
Belgium	None.	French media: 8 minute programmes awarded on the basis of seats in the Conseil Culturel. 1 programme for groups with 2% of seats, 2 for groups with 5% of the seats, 4 for groups with 10% of the seats, 6 for groups with 15% of the seats, 8 for groups with 20% of the seats, 10 for groups with 30% of the seats; 12 for groups with 40% of the seats. Flemish media: every group represented by 10 members in the Nederlandse Cultuurraad can create an organisation with the right to make programmes. Political groups with 2 members in the Cultuurraad can also be recognised. Time allocated 50% equally, and 50% in proportion to strength in the Cultuurraad.	4
Italy	Lit. 15 million lira divided among all parties (a) with lists in at least two-thirds of the constituencies; (b) which elect at least one member and have at least 300,000 votes or 2% of votes cast; 15% is divided equally, the remained in proportion to votes obtained.		5
Sweden	Skr 274,850 (1989) per seat in the Riksdag.	Time allocated to all parties represented in at least on of the last two parliaments, nominating candidates in a majority of constituencies and having a national organisation.	6
Austria	ÖS 85 million (1991) divided among parties in Nationalrat in proportion to vote at last election.	Shares given in proportion of party strength in the Nationalrat.	7

Source: Katz (1997: 267-270); Abedi (2004: Table 4.5 96-97).

Note: The third column ranks them by lowest to highest level of state support adapting the rankings provided by Abedi (2004: Table 4.5 96-97).

Ballot access is a particularly influential state-led factor because it can make or break a party's chance of penetrating a political system (Carter, 2005: 168). While Carter has not been able to show that the variable influences electoral success in the extreme right-wing (2005:168), it is an

incontestable fact that this particular barrier does affect the fortunes of all parties (Carter, 2005: 168; see also Bowler, Carter and Farrell, 2003).

Table 6.4 describes the requirements of ballot access in each system of interest, providing information relating to recognition of candidacy, requirement for monetary deposit, and conditions for no return. The table shows that Sweden, Italy, Norway, Austria and Belgium require large numbers of voters to endorse a candidacy, Austria demands high a monetary deposit and the most restrictive conditions of return. Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Sweden do not require a deposit at all (Abedi, 2000: 95). Systems are ordered by increasing level of restriction, the highest rank depicting the most restriction and the higher indicator of openness to cartelisation. It can be seen that the system with the least debilitating conditions for ballot access is Denmark, followed by France, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Sweden and Austria. It is suggested, therefore, that the higher the ballot access requirements, the more extreme right-wing parties will consider a system to mitigate against its opportunities and thus the more they will be inclined to criticise it. To be precise: it is predicted that the greater the conditions of candidacy, the more likely the extreme right-wing will emphasise political corruption.

*H<sub>2</sub> The higher the thresholds for ballot access, the more emphasis extreme right-wing parties will place on political corruption.*

Table 6.4: Impact of ballot access

	Requirements for recognition of candidacy	Deposit	Conditions for return of deposit	Indicator of cartelisation measured by ballot access
Denmark	Parties: representation in the outgoing Folketing or petition of a number of voters equal to 1/175 of the total valid vote in the last election. Candidates: petition of 25-50 voters.	None		1
France	President: Nomination by 500 elected officials from at least 30 departments. Parliament: declaration of candidacy.	Parliament. FF 1,000	Receipt of 5% of the votes cast.	2
Belgium	Signatures of 500 (Brussels), 400 (Antwerp, Ghent, Charleroi, Liege) or 200 (elsewhere) electors or three outgoing members.	None		3
Norway	Lists may be submitted by 500 registered voters or by a registered party.	None		4
Italy	Chambers of Deputies: petition of 500 -1,000 electors.	None		5
Sweden	Registered parties may submit lists of candidates. To register a party for Rikstag elections requires signatures of 1,500 voters. Parties with members are re-registered automatically.	None		6
Austria	Petition of three members of the national parliament or 200-500 voters.	ÖS6,000	Not returned.	7

Source: Katz (1997: 256-258); Abedi (2004: Table 4.5 96-97).

Note: The fourth column ranks them by lowest to highest level of ballot access adapting the rankings provided by Abedi (2004: Table 4.5 96-97).

The claim is that policy cartelisation has created an environment that the extreme-right benefits from; environments characterised by mainstream centre-left and centre-right convergence (see also, Kitschelt with McGann, 1995; Hainsworth, 1992; Eatwell, 1998; Carter, 2005; Meguid, 2005).<sup>110</sup> Specifically, the model claims – and strongly emphasises in CPT II – that the mainstream left's policy convergence towards that of the right's has narrowed policy options to such an extent that voters have begun to reject their core constituencies and favour more extreme policies and the extreme-right has capitalised on this supplying policies that fill the ideological void (Blyth, 2003). What is particularly important about this claim is that it suggests – contrary to previous thought – that parties – in this case the extreme-right – react not just to the behaviour of those operating within or proximal to their spatial location, but also to those commonly thought to operate outside of it and on the other side of the political spectrum.<sup>111</sup> Making use of data from the Comparative Manifesto Party Project, Chapter 4 has shown that the centre-left and centre-right has, in some instances, shown significant and quite substantial policy constriction and

<sup>110</sup> It has also been suggested that they benefit by their divergence (Ignazi, 2003).

<sup>111</sup> See Meguid for an in-depth discussion on this issue (2005).

convergence on the left-right dimension<sup>112</sup> thus providing fertile ground upon which to test these predictions.

The data in Table 6.5 describe mainstream left and right ranges throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The first column provides information on the extent to which the distance between them has varied over the two decades and it can be seen that while they have stayed relatively static, in some instances this has not always been the case. The second and third columns provide decade averages, the fourth their overall mean and the fifth ranks them from the highest to lowest range; the lowest range displaying the highest rank and the highest indicator of cartelisation. Comparison of the 1980s and 1990s shows an overall decrease in five out of seven cases (Sweden, France, Austria, Norway, Belgium) while showing an increase in two (Italy, Denmark). Mean ranges vary quite extensively throughout the period. Denmark shows the highest range and Italy the lowest (despite its divergence in the 1990s). Systems are ranked from highest to lowest mean range throughout the two decades, the lower the range the higher the indicators of parties' preference for cartelisation. Denmark exhibits the highest range followed by Sweden, France, Norway, Austria, Belgium, and finally Italy. It is predicted that the greater the convergence between the mainstream centre left and centre-right the greater the extreme right-wing's emphasis on political corruption will be and the more radical it will become in an attempt to provide more policy choice.

*H<sub>3a</sub> The greater the policy convergence between the centre left and right, the more emphasis extreme right-wing parties will place on political corruption.*

*H<sub>3b</sub> The greater the policy convergence between the centre left and right, the further the extreme-right will move to the right.*

---

<sup>112</sup> For a description and operationalisation of the mainstream left and right as well as range calculations refer to Chapter 4.

Table 6.5 Distances between the centre-left and centre-right on the left-right dimension 1980-1998

	Minimum maximum mainstream ranges 1980 – 1998	1980s	1990s	Post 80 mean	Indicator of cartelisation measured by mainstream range
Denmark	21.40-78.40	51.39	56.16	53.43	1
Sweden	6.70-80.90	61.70	35.75	49.9	2
France	16.57-58.30	43.13	17.53	30.31	3
Norway	17.60-34.10	25.80	34.10	26.5	4
Austria	11.40-47.50	29.20	22.54	25.2	5
Belgium	5.58-31.05	26.20	11.40	20.28	6
Italy	0.01-43.75	2.07	24.69	19.04	7

Source: Left-right dimension (rile), CMP Dataset (2001).

Note: The first column provides information on the extent to which mainstream ranges on the left-right dimension varied in the 1980s and 1990s. The second and third columns provide decade-based averages. The fourth column provides an overall mean and the final ranks each system based on the mean ranges provided in the fourth column.

Table 6.6 brings all three variables together to provide an aggregate indicator of cartelisation across all seven systems. All three factors are presumed to hold the same weight and are treated as so: they are expected to exert a summed influence over policy strategies in the extreme-right. While the first three columns provide rankings for mean range, state support and ballot access, the fourth sums the ranks and the final one provides a calculated rank of cartelisation. Relatively little variation is notable across the ranks, with the score increasing in line with cartelisation. It can be seen that Denmark shows the lowest score followed by France, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, Italy and Austria. It is suggested that high levels of cartelisation will encourage extreme right-wing parties to criticise the status quo and articulate political corruption.

*H<sub>4</sub>: The higher the rank of cartelisation the more emphasis extreme right-wing parties will place on political corruption.*

Table 6.6 Overall impact of state imposed barriers

	Indicator of cartelisation measured by state support	Indicator of cartelisation measured by ballot access	Indicator of cartelisation measured by mainstream range	Sum	Aggregate indicator of cartelisation
Denmark	1	1	1	3	1
France	2	2	3	7	2
Norway	3	4	4	11	3
Belgium	4	3	6	13	4
Sweden	6	6	2	14	5
Italy	5	5	7	17	6
Austria	7	7	5	19	7

Source: Rankings provided in the first three columns are taken from the rankings provided in Tables 6.3-6.5.

### 6.3 Findings

It has been suggested that by virtue of their exclusive and collusionary characteristics, indicators suggestive of cartelisation – state support, ballot access, convergence and collective barriers – encourage the extreme right-wing to place more emphasis on political corruption and more radically right wing policies.

Table 6.7 displays coefficients exploring the relationship between each of the proposed indicators of cartelisation, political corruption and/or left-right policy. Political corruption is addressed first. Best lines of fit confirm that that in all cases the expected relationships are evident; three of the four coefficients are robust and all are significant. State support, ballot access, and the overall indicator of cartelisation all exhibit positive relationships with political corruption showing that high levels of one exist with high levels of the other. Still congruent with expectations, centre-left and centre-right range shows a negative relationship with political corruption: here, emphasis on political corruption is shown to decrease as range increases. In other words, references to political corruption increase when state embeddedness is high, they decrease as the distance between the mainstream centre-left and centre-right goes up and increase where overall indications of cartelisation are high. These findings provide very strong support for the stated hypotheses and appear to corroborate the cartel argument which suggests that state embeddedness and inter-party collusion stimulate extreme right-wing sentiment.

Turning to the relationship between range and left-right emphasis in the extreme right-wing we can see that the coefficient is less strong and insignificant. A best line of fit shows that the relationship is opposite to that hypothesised, and while it was expected that convergence would co-exist with extreme-right radicalisation this has not been shown to be the case. In contrast the extreme right-wing shows some evidence of becoming more radical as the distance between the centre-left and centre-right increases.

*Table 6.7* Correlations between indicators of cartelisation and political corruption and left-right emphases in the extreme right-wing

Independent variables	Indicator of cartelisation measured by state support	Indicator of cartelisation measured by ballot access	Indicator of cartelisation measured by mainstream Range	Aggregate indicator of cartelisation	n
Extreme right-wing emphases 1980-1998					
Political corruption	.650**	.520**	-.318*	.693**	35
Left-right	NA	NA	.282	NA	35

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

*Sources:* Extreme-right emphases on Political Corruption (per 304) and the left-right dimension (rile) : CMP Dataset (2001); Indicators of cartelisation: refer to Tables 6.3-6.6.

*Notes:* Dependent variables: political corruption (per 304) and left-right (rile) emphases in the extreme right-wing between 1980 and 1998. Independent variables: indicators of cartelisation measured by state support, ballot access, mainstream range and aggregate.

Rather than being centripetal in nature, convergent behaviour in recent decades has seen the centre-left converge on the right (Kitschelt with McGann, 1995; Blyth, 2003) and this has been empirically demonstrated by Andrea Volkens (2001b; Blyth and Hopkin, 2004). This suggests that competition has shown a universal shift to the right. Reference to Appendix C.3 confirms this showing that while the majority of centre-left parties centralised in the 1980s and 1990s, the reverse was true for much of the centre-right.

Though the extreme-right's appropriation of blue collar votes in recent years has indicated a process of proletarianisation taking place in the party family (Ignazi, 2003), inter-party competition has, by and large, always been thought to take place within rather than between blocs (Bartolini and Mair, 1990) and voters migrating to the extreme right-wing have been thought do so from other parties on the right (Evans, 2001). It is reasonable to suggest therefore that between 1980 and 1998, the extreme right-wing's left-right policies responded to centre-right

positioning *within* the mainstream relationship as opposed to the relationship *per se* or indeed the positioning of the centre-left. So in an attempt to capture the right wing market we might expect extreme right-wing parties to become more radical if their centre-right opponents do. Indeed, Carter has shown that although the extreme right-wing tends to do better at the polls when its ideology is comparatively restrained, the benefits of normalisation tend to be neutralised in the event of centre-right radicalisation (Carter, 2005: 131) as when given the choice, voter preferences tend to favour larger established parties above smaller less established ones. This is because the former lend legitimacy to issues – even those somewhat radical and controversial – and also exhibit past records of competence in areas such as policy formulation, promulgation and office (Meguid, 2005: 349). Indeed, work by van der Brug et. al. concurs with this suggesting that the electoral success of the extreme right-wing is – aside from being dependent upon voters choosing to evaluate parties by way of policy (as opposed to an alternative variable) and environments characterised by a concentration sympathetic voters – contingent upon an absence of competition from the centre-right (2005).

The first two columns in Table 6.8 display centre-right left-right policy in the 1980s and 1990s. They show that between the 1980s and 1990s, the centre-right radicalised in five out of the seven systems investigated here, only normalising in Belgium and France. Displaying substantial variability, the third column aggregates means for the two decades and the fourth ranks them from least to most right-wing. Throughout the period, the centre-right is the least right-wing in Belgium and is followed by Norway, France, Italy, Austria, Denmark and Sweden. For comparative purposes, the final columns respectively display left-right rankings for extreme right-wing parties (highest figures depict most radical parties) and centre-left and centre-right ranges (highest figures depict lowest ranges but most cartelised systems). These rankings compare across countries rather than within them but suggest, with the exception of France and Norway, that the extreme right-wing tends to be more radical where the centre-right is more radical. These findings suggest that the party families are in direct competition for the same vote. Moreover they strongly imply that both party families exhibit policies that are responsive to one another: this goes some way in explaining for example why the VB exhibited left-wing policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, the association between mainstream range and extreme right-wing policy is less evident thus implying the reverse and suggesting that while

extreme right-wing policy maybe linked to that of the centre-right this does not appear to be the case in terms of mainstream range.

Table 6.8 Decade-based left-right emphases in the centre-right

Country	Minimum-maximum 1980-1998	1980s	1990s	Mean	Rank	Extreme right-wing left-right rank	Indicator of cartelisation measured by mainstream range
Belgium	-19.75-14.21	6.44	-3.47	1.49	1	1	6
Norway	-18.10-14.39	-2.27	14.39	6.06	2	6	4
France	-4.72-40.50	26.47	0.72	13.6	3	7	3
Italy	-6.29-59.26	0.82	35.32	18.07	4	2 -LN 3 -MSI/AN	7
Austria	-17.10-40.42	15.05	23.27	19.16	5	4	5
Denmark	4.49-54.07	31.72	39.41	35.57	6	5	1
Sweden	-24.00-59.80	40.53	40.46	40.5	7	8	2

Source: Left-right dimension (rile): CMP Dataset (2001); extreme right-wing left-right rank: refer to Table 6.2; indicator of cartelisation measured by mainstream range: refer to Table 6.5.

Note: Measured against an overall range in the data set of -40-50, the first column provides the range of each party's emphasis on the left-right (rile) dimension throughout the period. The second and third columns display averages for the 1980s and 1990s, the fourth provides an overall mean and the fifth column ranks them from least to most right wing. For comparative purposes the final two columns provide rankings of left-right emphasis in the extreme right-wing and mainstream range on the left-right dimension, as provided in Tables 6.2 and 6.5 respectively. Extreme right-wing left-right is listed from least to most right-wing; range is listed from highest to lowest, the highest number indicating the lowest range.

However, these rankings provide no insight into the direction of these competitive dynamics. Comparison of data between Tables 6.8 and 6.2 shows that where decade-based change can be compared across both party families, four instances see both the centre and extreme right-wing radicalise in the 1990s: NyD and LN did not compete in the 1980s, the VB shows static averages and the MSI/AN de-radicalised. Accordingly, it is predicted that instances seeing the centre-right radicalise also see the extreme right-wing radicalise.

*H<sub>3c</sub>: The extreme right-wing will move to the right as the centre-right does.*

A positive coefficient of .359 that is significant at the level of 0.05 verifies the predicted relationship and it is confirmed by a best line of fit showing that as the mainstream-right radicalises so does the extreme right-wing.<sup>113</sup> These findings appear to confirm that extreme right-wing politics peg

<sup>113</sup> \*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level.

themselves on those of the centre-right; they seem to confirm that both party families target the same market: However, given the fact that this study considers some of the most electorally successful members of the extreme right-wing, this result also questions – and demand in-depth analysis of – the assumption that the electoral fortunes of the extreme right suffer in environments characterised by mainstream radicalisation (see Carter, 2005: 131); in this instance future research could benefit by distinguishing between electorally successful and non-successful extreme right-wing parties. In view of Meguid's proposal that centre-left policy can be responsive to that of the extreme-right (2005), future research in this area would benefit from investigating the policy relationship between the two.

#### 6.4 Suffering from cartel environments: true or false?

While much of what has been discussed above could be interpreted as suggesting that these parties suffer as a result of most cartel indicators, the reality is in fact a little more muddy. Table 6.9 provides information relating to the relationship between extreme right-wing votes and each indicator of cartelisation. Coefficients and best lines of fit show that not only do parties' votes increase as conditions for state subsidies and ballot access increase, they also increase in line with increased cartelisation. Though not very strong, the coefficients reported are moderate and significant at the 0.05 level suggesting a positive and beneficial relationship between state embeddedness and extreme right-wing vote. This implies that the extreme right-wing is circumventing barriers. Similarly the positive relationship between extreme right-wing vote and political corruption (as shown in Table 6.2 ) suggests that while we can only speculate how much more the extreme right-wing vote would prosper in circumstances with non-exclusionary barriers, this particular sample of the extreme right-wing does not appear to have been overwhelmingly disadvantaged by state embeddedness.

Though the sample provided here is skewed and un-representative of the extreme right-wing's electoral fortunes *en masse* (as the majority are electorally marginal), it may well be the case – as argued above but in a different context – that parties are formulating their policies on the basis of *perception rather than reality*. Irrespective of whether they are disadvantaged by barriers or not, they believe themselves to be and identify with those that are: as a result they formulate policies which mobilise against the

---

*Source:* CMP Dataset (2001); Left-right dimension (rile); n = 35.

*Notes:* Dependent variable: extreme right-wing and left-right emphases between 1980 and 1998. Independent variable: mainstream-left-right range.



status quo. If so, this has significant implications for extreme right-wing policy developments and future experiences of the mainstream and state, and, could be interpreted to suggest that until these parties consider themselves to part of the cartel or the mainstream, they will, irrespective of their fortunes, consider themselves to be disadvantaged and act accordingly.

Table 6.9 Correlations between extreme right-wing vote and indicators of cartelisation

	Cartelisation by state support	Cartelisation by ballot access	Cartelisation by range support	Aggregate indicator of cartelisation	Centre-right left-right	n
<i>Extreme right-wing votes 1980-1998</i>	.289*	.353*	-.007	.299*	.06	35

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level.

Sources: Left-right dimension (rile: CMP Dataset (2001); Indicators of cartelisation: refer to Tables 6.3-6.6.

Notes: Dependent variable: extreme-right vote. Independent variables: indicators of cartelisation measured by state support, ballot access, mainstream range and aggregate; centre-right left-right.

Table 6.9 also provides information on the extreme right-wing vote's relationship with the mainstream range indicators. As might be expected it is exceptionally weak and non-significant. It also describes the relationship with centre-right policy. Weak and insignificant, this inconclusive finding – while in some respects surprising – is understandable considering the numerous factors – aside from other parties' ideological positioning – that influence electoral fortunes (see van der Brug et. al. (2005) as discussed above). However, it is important to acknowledge that while no direct relationship exists here, the extreme right-wing has been shown to radicalise as the centre-right does and as in shown in Table 6.3 the vote of this set of extreme right-wing parties appears to benefit from more radical policies. Accordingly, it could be said that an indirect relationship exists between extreme right-wing vote and centre-right policy, thus providing some support for Ignazi's suggestion that the extreme right-wing responds well to more polarised environments (2003).

It would appear from these results that cartel practices stimulate specific reactions in the extreme right-wing that then proceed to be articulated by way of their policy profiles. Moreover, the vote-winning nature of these policies suggests that the party family has been able to marshal a critical mass of discontent within the electorate that threatens the political status quo, thus highlighting a perception of mainstream corruption in the electorate and its susceptibility to radical politics on the right. This is not

to say that cartel environments exert even a significant factor on policy strategies and extreme right-wing success; associations have only been demonstrated here; findings do not imply causality. Numerous factors influence these outcomes and such questions exceed the remit of this chapter. However, at some level, it does appear that 'the cartel inevitably creates its own opposition' (Katz and Mair, 1995: 24).

## 6.5 Discussion

If extreme right-wing politics are an inherent feature of cartel environments and the cartel model is the preferred type in modern day industrialised democracies (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005) it follows that this party family should be considered a permanent feature of modern-day politics. Contrary to previous thought (Panebianco, 1986), it has been argued that they are in fact capable of successful institutionalisation (Pedazur and Brichta, 2002) also displaying systemic (governing or blackmail potential), temporal (uninterrupted persistence) and spatial (systemic pervasion) importance (Veuglers, 1995). Indeed, few members of the extreme right-wing are still considered pariahs (Bale, 2003: 67) and recent years have seen a number participate in government. Yet what is their relationship with the cartel? This final section of the chapter attempts to answer this question.

Kitschelt suggests that access of challenger parties – for these purposes the extreme right-wing – is contingent upon three achievements: successful appeal to and mobilisation of new electoral groups, effective strategies that thwart the cartel's attempts to isolate and exclude them, and the successful overcoming of electoral, financial and publicity barriers (Kitschelt, 2000: 170-174). It is argued however, that while necessary, these qualities are not sufficient: they are criteria for entrance but are not provisional for full membership. As initially proposed in Chapter 3, it is suggested that in addition to these three qualities, a party's membership of the cartel is dependent upon two factors which ultimately determine its cooptability: first its ability to exhibit a profile that meets the qualitative criteria for membership (see Katz and Mair, 1995) and second its ability to present goods suggesting that the maximum utility it offers can only be gained by its incorporation. Under the sub-heading of 'cooption' two additional thresholds are suggested: 'qualitative acceptability' and 'utility'.

Confined to operating at the edges of the cartel by virtue of their non-establishment status, fluctuating electoral relevance and often tenuous coalition potential, when in office these parties are what Hans Keman terms 'parties in government' not 'parties of government' (Keman, 2004). Generally speaking ,

non-cooptable parties experience both choice and challenge in terms of achieving ‘qualitative acceptability’ and ‘utility’. First, they can normalise, thus enabling the cartel to regain control of government make-up, or they can retain their anti-cartel qualities and competitive status but risk a return to marginality (see Blyth and Katz, 2005: 53). Second they can try and obtain goods (generally seats) that will assure their incorporation into the cartel. However, the paradox is this: to become qualitatively acceptable parties must normalise, but to procure maximum utility (generally seats) they must often engage in vote maximisation techniques necessitating the use of political tools that are incompatible with the other requirements of cooption.

These parties may find normalisation is as likely to confine them to marginality as irresponsible outbidding and a full-blown revival of anti-system politics. Organisations such as the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), Danish Dansk Folkeparti (DF) and Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FRPn) passed the thresholds of relevance (Pederson, 1982) after securing impressively significant vote shares on the back of quite radical platforms. Unless they become able secure pivotal niches that are not based on electoral and parliamentary relevance, they could find that more moderate policies will not represent an attractive alternative to the more mainstream right.

As suggested, the likelihood of cooption is influenced by internal qualities and willingness to tow the cartel line (Katz and Mair, 1995; 1996); it is also dependent upon a party’s utility and the magnitude of cartel need. Though the mainstream have had the option of ignoring; isolating; co-opting; collaborating or imposing legal restrictions on the far right (Downs 2001: 24) in many instances they have increased the opportunity structure of the centre-right (Heinisch: 2005:103): much like when the greens provided the centre-left with legislative majorities and increased alliance options, the extreme right-wing have done much the same of the centre right (Heinisch, 2005). For example, the break away group from the Freedom Party or FPÖ – the Alliance for Austria’s Future or BZÖ – presently in its second term of office – albeit as a slightly different party – provided the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) with an opportunity to end its long-term marginalisation in government and revise the power dispersion within the existing cartel (see, Luther, 2003: 136).<sup>114</sup> Despite having increased its competence and successfully proven its ability to govern (2004: 125), the party currently finds itself

---

<sup>114</sup> For some elaboration on this split, refer to footnote 93. At the time of this dissertation’s submission the General Election in Austria (1<sup>st</sup> October) saw the BZÖ poll 4.20% of the vote and the FPÖ poll 11.21% (Foundation Robert Schuman, 03. 10. 2006).

faced with the dilemma of whether to shed the remnants of its anti-system qualities and become a cartel party or retain its hitherto vote-winning identity but remain confined to the fringe of legitimate politics (Blyth and Katz, 2005: 53); this is also the case for the Danish Fremskridspartiet (DF) and Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet (FRPn) both of which support their respective bourgeois governments but without portfolio. The Alleanza National (AN) and to a significantly lesser extent Lega (LN) – in government with Forza Italia 1994-1996 and 2001-2005 – also present an interesting case which suggests cooption is as much a product of opportunity structure as that of party modification. These two parties enjoy membership of the cartel in Italy; not because of their legitimacy or establishment status, but as a result of Forza Italia's inability to secure a majority, their strength on the right side of the spectrum, the absence of a strong and established centre-right party, and the Second Republic's immature status. While Italy may be an exception, in general, the mainstream right appears to have benefited substantially by these new legislative arrangements, while the extreme-right, appears to have fared rather more badly experiencing what Bale terms as the 'black widow affect' whereby they have been subjected to an 'unceremonious cannibalisation' having outlived their usefulness (Bale, 2005: 85).

So what effect are these parties having on cartel and mainstream politics? Extreme right-wing politics have already left their mark on the political agenda: as traditional parties are allied to, and articulate traditional cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), the extreme right-wing asserts new issues, is inextricably linked with a controversial stance on immigration (Betz, 2002), and has influenced the agenda of the mainstream right on this issue (Kitschelt, 2000: 173). As this issue, and related developments continue to dominate policy and discourse, it is hard to conceive of their normative separation. Moreover, when there is obviously so much political mileage to be gained from the topic, it is even harder to imagine the party family choosing to distance itself from it for the long-term. Even if these parties chose to normalise, their roots and genetic history suggest that their efforts could not be sustained without massive electoral losses.

The relatively recent success of the new-populist element in the extreme right-wing makes it impossible to conduct rigorous analysis, make predictions, or draw conclusions about its future place in governing and cartel politics. However, evidence so far suggests that, as it is, the party family will be unable to commit to a future of full legitimacy and establishment status and is thus confined to a future

of limited cooption. For reasons both within and outside of its control, extreme right-wing politics are likely to remain a salient, influential but relatively unchanged factor at the extremities of the cartel, reliant upon the freedom to meet and mobilise new challenges. Its seeming ability to meet the protest needs of the electorate suggests that it will remain capable of achieving sizable vote shares and even office but similarly will require regular terms in opposition in order to distance itself from the failures of those it criticises, and engage in aggressive vote-seeking behaviour. The irony of the extreme right-wing and populist politics is that their self-limiting nature will in all probability ensure their survival (Taggart, 2000; Mény and Surel, 2002).

So, are these parties a threat to the cartel and the traditional parties within it? While it is suggested that they pose a significant threat to the foundations of liberal democracy and pluralism (Betz, 1994; 2003), they have in a more immediate sense presented the political elite with a cooption-related set of challenges and instigated normative and behavioural change within mainstream politics. Their presence also poses a number of questions about how politics may develop in the future as these parties have extended the concept of political relevance and questioned conventional assumptions about party life-span trajectories. First, it is indisputable that the politics of the extreme right-wing have encouraged a movement to the right within established politics (Kitschelt, 2000), so while rejecting these organisations and attempting to exclude them, established parties have simultaneously been incorporating their policies, thus legitimising them (Bale, 2003: 103; Meguid, 2005: 349) and securing their place within normalised political discourse (Bale, 2003: 103; Meguid, 2005: 349). Second, despite familiarity breeding contempt, it also desensitises and leads to acceptance. In environments characterised by more than one norm of behaviour, it is likely that parties, both traditional and non-traditional, will become more experimental with the use of populist techniques (Decker, 2003: 7) while their interaction becomes more confrontational (Heinisch, 2005: 103).

Finally, it may be that consistent political relevance will become less of an expected norm within governing politics. The thresholds often associated with traditional parties – declaration; authorisation; representation; relevance (Pedersen, 1982) and government – have become the benchmarks against which all parties are measured, and for the most part, parties passing all thresholds (predominantly those with establishment status) proceeded through them in a linear or uni-modal manner. Parties depicting multi-modal curves, i.e. those which pass some or all the thresholds more than once have, in

general, been uncommon deviant cases – parties without establishment status. It is suggested that the nature of the extreme right-wing is such that the trajectory of these parties is likely to be multi-modal as they fluctuate between the thresholds of government, representation and relevance, experiencing electoral and parliamentary peaks and troughs. This will bring organisations with multi-modal life spans in and out of government and even the cartel on a reasonably regular basis thus introducing an element of transience and perhaps increased instability into elite level politics whereby coalitions become even more diverse and safe established positions in governing politics become increasingly under threat.<sup>115</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup> For a discussion on some of these topics with reference to the Netherlands, see Pennings and Keman (2003).

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion: a cartelisation of party politics?

While a plethora of typologies have been developed to capture and explain party types (Gunther and Diamond, 2003), a number have been considered as particularly pivotal contributions to our understanding of 'party'. The most recent of these is the cartel model, seen as the fourth phase in party development following the cadre, mass and catch-all types. This model describes how parties have acknowledged and addressed shortcomings in the catch-all model and responded to developments in their political environments at intra- and inter-party level (Katz and Mair, 1996: 526), instigating change in their organisational profiles, role and competitive behaviour (Detterbeck, 2005). Thought to have manifested across all westernised industrial democracies to varying extents, the cartel model is considered to have become the preferred party form since 1970 (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005). Section 7.2 discusses the extent to which this was the case between 1970 and 1998. Section 7.3 then proceeds to make suggestions for further research; however, a brief review of the central findings from each chapter is provided first in section 7.1.

#### 7.1 Findings in context: movement towards a cartelisation of politics?

The purpose of this dissertation has been to identify, operationalise and measure a number of elements associated with the systemic aspect (Pelizzo, 2003a) of the cartel model (Katz and Mair, 1995; Blyth and Katz, 2005) across eleven west European party systems. Largely ignoring the organisational component of the theory, we have focused on changes in competition and the party system and adopted the methodology of Blyth and Katz (2005) – Cartel Party Theory II or CPT II – presuming that the process was more likely to be found in environments showing proclivity for majoritarian as opposed to consensual politics. Grounded in rational choice theory but fully acknowledging the structural constraints that parties operate within, universal change was predicted, but those exhibiting features of majoritarian and adversarial politics were expected to approximate the model rather more closely.

The dissertation sought to unravel the behavioural concept of party cartelisation and shed light on a number of its features. Thought to represent a number of fundamental changes in party

competition, it suggests that parties have exchanged unilateral goal-seeking behaviour for that more suggestive of a multilateral approach, albeit a tacit one. Rather than seeking to achieve electability single handedly, it suggests that they have chosen to work together in the belief that they are more effective operating as a group rather than as single entities. The suggestion is that parties have begun to behave much in the same way as business cartels or oligopolies. While business cartels restrict competition in order to capture a given market, divide it up, supply goods and share profits in order to ensure survival, it is suggested that party cartels mimic this behaviour in order to control their environments and ensure their own survival. The theory is as follows: parties have limited competition, divided up the electoral market, supplied the electorate with unresponsive policies and fixed party options in order to capture the market for votes, parliamentary seats and governmental portfolios. While failure to compete has prevented parties from achieving maximum gains, this particular behaviour has, we are told, assured survival and electability (Blyth and Katz, 2005). The dissertation has examined this possibility from an empirical perspective.

In this dissertation we have not sought to ascertain whether party cartelisation has actually occurred; rather, our aim has been to determine whether parties – predominantly mainstream parties – with access to the cartel, have shown behaviour suggestive of cartelisation. Chapter 1 introduced the challenges of modern day politics and cartel theory, also identifying the concept of ‘establishment status’, a characteristic of elite, legitimate and pro-system politics, and describing how such status was no longer a necessary feature for government. Chapter 2 reviewed the available literature on the cartel model, highlighting a number of shortcomings in available interpretations. In contrast to both Katz and Mair (1995) (Cartel Party Theory I or CPT I) as well as Blyth and Katz (2005) (Cartel Party Theory II or CPT II) it was suggested that though uptake of the organisational profile is relatively fluid and party specific, the party system component of the process is staged, cyclical, and iterative in nature. Firmly adopting the predictions made by CPT II the chapter attempted to clarify exactly what the purpose of party cartelisation was, suggesting that for parties engaging in the process, their primary goal was office and this necessitated a them successfully cartelising electoral, parliamentary and governmental options. Their achievement was described as follows: access to state subsidies facilitate a retreat from aggregative responsibilities, which enable policy cartelisation – should all

parties desire it and voters accept it – and, this in turn, enables the cartelisation of votes, seats and governmental options.

Chapter 3 attempted to provide a heuristic framework to capture the nature of party cartels; which has, so far, been relatively elusive (Koole, 1996). Identifying parties likely to have access to them, it described four types: two displaying establishment status that had access to government and the cartel – ‘mainstream’ and ‘secondary’ – and two without establishment status, one, ‘semi-status’ with access to government, and another, ‘non-governing’ without access to government. Describing the features likely to be exhibited by each of the four types and suggesting an a priori and deductive method of classification based on age, size, party family, possession of establishment status, primary goal and office experience, it was also suggested an accurate method of classification would be one that was deductive and able to weight party power in the legislature. This chapter provided the context for the remainder of the dissertation.

The subsequent three chapters were empirical and adopted the premise forwarded by CPT II which suggested that party cartelisation was more likely to take place in majoritarian environments prone to adversarial behaviour: each chapter was grounded in the assumption that party strategy is very much a product of its environment (Hay, 1996; Jessop, 1990). Chapter 4 concentrated on policy cartelisation – the process forwarded by CPT II as the primary indicator of cartelisation – and examined party incentives for engaging in the process, it then looked for evidence of it in mainstream left and right trends on the left-right dimension. Chapter 5 then proceeded to search for systemic cartelisation – votes, seats and office – by mainstream and to a lesser extent secondary parties. It suggested that the process was more likely to be evident where policy cartelisation had taken place. Chapter 6, the final empirical contribution to the dissertation, turned its attention to the impacts of cartel politics. It explored the proposal – as suggested by both Katz and Mair (1995) and Blyth and Katz (2005) – that in their attempts to stabilise political environments, cartels have engendered radical politics and introduced new forms of instability; particularly those associated with extreme right-wing politics.

Based on the assumption that parties are more likely to engage in aggressive office-seeking behaviour (policy cartelisation) where the power of opposition is limited, chances of exclusion

from office is high, likelihood of significant challenge is low and opportunity for disengagement from electoral responsibilities is high; Chapter 4 introduced four independent variables: costs of opposition, disproportionality, thresholds for office and restrictions and generosity of direct subsidies. It was suggested that the higher the costs of opposition, the greater the disproportionality, the higher the threshold for office and the more generous *and* restrictive direct subsidies were, the greater the impetus to cartelise would be. Here we looked at their relationship with policy distances between mainstream left and right policy trends on the left-right dimension. It was suggested that convergence, the first part of the cartel process, would be associated with high rankings on all four independent variables and a composite measure of their aggregate. Overall, the findings were mixed. In contrast to expectations, high costs of office and high disproportionality were shown to be associated with divergence not convergence, although, as predicted, increased thresholds for office were associated with convergence. While not suggesting that high levels of direct subsidies *and* high barriers were associated with convergence, lower levels of each were shown to be associated with divergence; together, the composite measure of all variables was shown to increase with divergence. All coefficients were weak and only that relating to thresholds for office was significant. Aside from high thresholds for office appearing to coexist with convergence, mainstream trends did not show any evidence of converging in environments where they were predicted to. Moreover coefficients were too weak to indicate any real evidence to the contrary.

Mainstream policy cartelisation – policy convergence followed by a subsequent stabilisation – was not detected in any sense on a system-to system basis; in fact much variation was evident. Investigation of mainstream policy space showed that in the majority of cases, the available space for competition had reduced since 1970 (four significantly: Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway), though only just over half of mainstream trends studied showed an actual proclivity for convergence and few coefficients were significant (France and Italy). The overwhelming norm appeared to be volatility on the left-right policy dimension. However, coefficients suggested that just over half of mainstream trends showed a tendency – however small – for some level of policy stabilisation after 1970. None of these calculations appeared to show any relationship with the aforementioned independent variables thought likely to be associated with policy change. Overall, the chapter concluded that while some features

suggestive of cartelisation had been identified, none of the findings suggested that policy cartelisation – as a process – was taking place at either an individual or collective level.

Chapter 5 showed conclusively that systemic cartelisation – votes, seats and government portfolios – has not taken place since 1970. On the assumption that the process would be more likely to be evident in systems showing some evidence of policy cartelisation; here convergence, it was predicted that such environments would be associated with reduced effective numbers of parliamentary parties (ENPP) and a consolidation of mainstream and to a lesser extent secondary seat shares. Moreover it was predicted that governmental formulae would become more conservative and less innovative in converged environments. None of these predictions were borne out. All changes – mostly increases – in ENPP were associated with divergence and in over half the systems studied, calculations showed numbers to rise after 1970. Overall, the majority of parties with access to the cartel did not increase their share of seats but instances that did were associated with divergence as opposed to convergence. This was predominantly the case with seats for mainstream parties, although two instances showed their seats to decrease in environments characterised by convergence. Finally, governmental formulae were shown to have become increasingly innovative and open throughout the period and there was no evidence of any move towards conservatism in converging environments: in sum, no evidence of successful systemic cartelisation was found.

Table 7.1 brings all these findings together. It is clear that there is no confirmation of any movement towards party cartelisation – in general or on a system-to-system basis – can be provided. Not a single instance bears out the dissertation's predictions in full and there is no evidence of systemic cartelisation (votes, seats and governmental portfolios) at all. In terms of policy change, systems where constricted competitive space, convergence, reduced competition and raised levels of administrative efficiency all co-exist, they have not done so to a level that is indicative of substantial change. However, most cases do not display these characteristics together and the findings appear to suggest that most systems do not approximate the features of policy cartelisation. To conclude, the predictions made by the model – specifically CPT II – and set out in Chapters 4 and 5 cannot be confirmed: contrary to expectations, it must be suggested

that parties with access to the cartel do not appear to be cartelising in terms of policy, votes, seats or office.

However, findings relating to the extreme-right and the cartel model were somewhat more promising and it was shown that high *and* restrictive direct subsidies, high ballot access, mainstream convergence and an aggregate measure of all three were associated with high levels of extreme-right emphasis on political corruption in their manifestos. Yet, these parties were shown to become more radical in divergent rather than convergent environments. While at odds with the assumption that these parties benefit by convergence, it was subsequently shown that they became more radical as the mainstream right did, thus suggesting that the extreme-right directly competes with the mainstream right for the same vote. These findings appear to provide some support for predictions made in the cartel model suggesting a link between the two. What is particularly interesting however is that even when parties were able to overcome the barriers imposed by the system, they seemed to perceive themselves to suffer as a result of them and it was suggested that as far as the eight parties investigated here were concerned, it was their perception of unfairness rather than the reality of it that fuelled their policies.

## **7.2 Politics post 1970: cartel or catch-all?**

The question that is now posed is whether any of the findings presented in this dissertation provide enough evidence to confirm that politics between 1970 and 1998 were sufficiently different from those in the 1960s to qualify the introduction of a new party model as an alternative term of reference? While this cannot be answered in relation to the organisational profile and aggregative role of the cartel party, as far as competitive change and party system dynamics go the answer has to be in the negative. Though features of cartel politics were shown to co-exist with vote-winning policies of the extreme right-wing, the extent to which their policies were a response to cartel as opposed to elite politics is questionable and requires further investigation.

Table 7.1 Overall display of behaviour suggestive of cartelisation

Type of System	Country	Mainstream range	Convergence/divergence	Competition	ENPP convergence/divergence	ENPP vs. divergence	Cartel seats vs. divergence	Cartel Seats	Mainstream seats vs. divergence	Mainstream seats
N/A	Total	-	C	-	- D	+	- D	-	- D	-
M	Austria	-	C	-	- D	+	+ D	-	+ D	-
C	Belgium	-	C	-	- D	+	+ D	+	+ D	-
M	Britain	+	D	+	+ D	+	+ D	-	+ D	-
C	Denmark	+	D	-	- D	-	+ D	+	+ D	+
I	France	-	C	+	+ D	-	- D	+	- C	+
M	Germany	+	D	+	+ D	+	+ D	-	+ D	-
M	Ireland	-	C	-	- D	+	+ D	-	+ D	-
I	Italy	-	C	-	+ D	+	+ D	-	- C	-
C	The Netherlands	-	C	-	+ D	-	+ D	+	+ D	+
I	Norway	-	D	-	+ D	+	- D	-	- D	-
I	Sweden	-	D	+	+ D	+	- D	-	- D	-

Source: Tables 2.2; 4.8; 4.10; 4.11; 5.3; 5.4; 5.6.

Notes: M = majoritarian; C = consensual; I = intermediate; - = decrease; + = increase; C = convergence; D = divergence; ENPP = Effective number of parliamentary parties.

The extent to which mainstream policies have cartelised and been associated with a consolidation of mainstream and secondary vote seats and office is clear, however: it has not taken place. Indeed, convergence was associated with the catch-all era, and policy stabilisation has not been sufficient enough to signify substantial change. While parties have begun to emphasise the importance of issues such as administrative efficiency, this appears to have been a progressive development that started before 1970 and therefore is not necessarily a feature of the model under investigation here.

It was suggested that the overall purpose of cartelisation has been to capture and control the market for votes, seats and office. This clearly has not been achieved and it has not been possible to link any gains that have been noted to policy changes consistent with predictions made in the cartel model: if parties have attempted to cartelise then the evidence presented throughout this dissertation suggest that their efforts have been unsuccessful. These findings cast doubt upon the validity of the cartel model – particularly CPT II – and its claims.

It is hard to investigate the utility of the cartel party model even as a metaphor as the findings have not been supportive enough of the theory to engage in debate about its utility. It is fair to suggest that its usage established particular expectations consistent with economic theory and the reality of business cartels; however, it is not possible to develop this discussion as findings have just been too inconsistent with expectations. Albeit an extremely attractive and inviting metaphor, it has proven somewhat redundant when put to the test and therefore its utility must be questioned.

### **7.3 Concluding comments and recommendations for future research**

For the most part, findings in this dissertation do not support the existence of cartel politics as understood by CPT II and it has not been possible to provide evidence that substantiates the claims it makes: in this instance that vote, seat or office cartelisation took place between 1970 and 1998. However, despite all evidence appearing to suggest parties have not been able to cartelise these goods, the finding does not rule out the possibility that they have tried: indeed,

the attempts of one party can be negated by the refusal of another to participate. Moreover, it could be the case that parties have partially cartelised but been able to progress further.<sup>116</sup>

However, it must be recognised that the conclusions forwarded here can only be considered in relation to findings from this particular piece of research; while indicators appear to point to increased dealignment since the end of the 1990s (Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2006) and an increasing inability of parties with access to the cartel to consolidate power in their respective systems, without further investigation it is impossible to speculate on what mainstream and secondary responses have been to their operational environments since 1998. Therefore it is suggested that future research would benefit greatly by investigating the post-1998 period. Furthermore, a broader sample including more majoritarian systems would be particularly beneficial – given claims made by CPT II – as would a greater and more diverse set of extreme right-wing parties.

The first chapter of this dissertation introduced the qualitative concept of ‘establishment status’ and suggested that while it initially separated parties with access to government from those without, over time it has come to separate parties within the group that had access to office, thus serving predominantly to highlight the penetration of elite politics by non-traditional parties as well as the increasing heterogeneity of government. Future research would benefit from investigating this area. To what extent have new parties tried to adopt establishment status? Is it seen as a valuable route to legitimacy and power, or now that it is no longer essential for office, is it a less attractive as a characteristic? Does a party’s ability to eschew it and remain on the margins of the cartel while maintaining access to movement highlight a failure of established politics but a significant achievement and flexibility on their part? An investigation to the nature of governing politics and the extent to which their composition has qualitatively changed would be particularly beneficial given the current political climate.

In term of data it is suggested that a broader approach should be taken in identifying and understanding party goals strategy and behaviour. While party manifestos appeared to be the most appropriate route through which to identify evidence of cartelisation because they

---

<sup>116</sup> Refer to Blyth and Katz’s account of the Swedish party system’s attempt to cartelise (2005).

represented the public face of the party, no evidence supporting the process was found. Therefore it is suggested that research should be extended to party publications, speeches and primary data from all three faces of party organisations as well as media output: through this more qualitative approach to analysis, a rich source of information that cannot be obtained from empirical investigation would be provided thus facilitating insights into the 'black box' of politics which quantitative analysis is unable to tap into. Of particular value to such studies would be an examination of inter-party relationships; such endeavours could identify behaviour suggestive of overt or tacit collusion.

From a quantitative point of view this author would advise future research to concentrate on causal modelling rather than the proof of association. As suggested earlier, parties' inability to consolidate control over votes, seats and office since 1970 is in all probability down to the overriding influence that other factors exert over their fortunes: confirmation of this would be an extremely important contribution to the research area as would be work ascertaining the extent to which, if at all, the cartel model can explain any developments appearing to support the thesis.

Finally, this author would like to appeal for a more eclectic approach to studying parties in general. Echoing the plea of Ruud Koole made in response to the introduction of the cartel model in 1996, rather than aiming to establish the presence of one party type or not, perhaps it would be a more fruitful endeavour to try and identify which characteristics from which models parties tend to approximate, for how long and why at any given time.

*Appendix A.1* Mainstream left and right left-right averages by decade

	Centre L/R	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	Change
Austria	L	-13.6	-16.47	-16.45	-23.18	-14.15	0.73	+14.33
	R	32.2	33.13	8.5	1.13	15.05	23.27	-8.93
Belgium	L	-31.75	-21.33	-16.66	-26.23	-19.76	-14.86	+16.89
	R	16.25	0.66	-8.79	-7.83	6.44	-3.47	-19.72
Britain	L	-31.3	-32.2	-19.3	-28.23	-26.37	-11.16	+20.14
	R	15.2	-13.78	0.75	11	29.73	26.82	+11.62
Denmark	L	-16.9	-12.95	-16.75	-13.58	-19.67	-16.74	+0.16
	R	9.85	18.25	14.33	32.1	31.72	39.41	+29.56
France	L	-14.44	25.35	-43.33	-40.35	-16.67	-18.24	-3.8
	R	25.48	23.94	17.3	14.35	26.47	0.72	-24.76
Germany	L	-18.37	-24.23	-6.42	-17.62	-13.8	-16.15	+2.22
	R	-11.56	21.69	-1.45	9.83	20.34	14.95	+26.51
Ireland	L	-11.6	14.53	22.43	26.45	-10.2	0.7	+12.3
	R	51.7	44.83	-2.03	-17.55	2.83	9.33	-42.37
Italy	L	-22.81	-17.77	-24.97	-20.59	-1.26	10.63	+33.44
	R	18.15	-11.21	-8.32	0.15	0.82	35.32	+17.17
the Netherlands	L	-17.3	-23.93	-27.6	43.27	-22.53	-8.91	+8.39
	R	5.2	6.4	-3.05	-17.27	-10.95	-2.11	-7.31
Norway	L	-34.7	-31.65	-33.63	-34.1	-28.07	-19.71	+14.99
	R	17.4	15.45	0	-14.15	-2.27	14.39	-3.01
Sweden	L	-33.4	-32.4	-45.97	-18.93	-21.17	4.71	+38.11
	R	22.9	18.3	-17.3	-8.43	40.53	40.46	+17.56

*Source:* CMP Dataset (2001).

*Appendix A.2* Disproportionality by decade

Country	1970s	1980s	1990s
Britain	12.15	19.17	15.19
Austria	1.54	1.69	1.87
Belgium	2.41	3.57	3.12
Germany	0.62	0.86	3.38
Ireland	3.57	3.13	5.39
the Netherlands	1.45	1.23	1.58
France	8.79	11.17	21.37
Italy	2.89	2.54	7.00
Denmark	1.6	1.85	1.55
Norway	5.47	4.44	3.92
Sweden	1.39	2.05	2.13

*Source:* Bowler, Carter and Farrell (2003). Data kindly supplied by E. Carter.

*Note:* Disproportionality calculated by the Gallagher Index. Vote-seat differences for each party are squared and then added. This total is then divided by two and finally the square root of this is taken as the disproportionality score.

*Appendix A.3* One Sample t test calculations measuring the difference between inter-party ranges before and after 1970

Country	t	df	sig
Total	-1.418	95	0.160
Britain	3.212	7	0.005
Austria	-3.033	8	0.008
Belgium	-2.360	8	0.023
Germany	3.630	7	0.004
Ireland	-1.341	8	0.1085
the Netherlands	-2.975	8	0.009
France	-2.2243	6	0.033
Italy	.853	7	0.211
Denmark	4.353	11	0.0005
Norway	-5.986	6	0.0005
Sweden	-1.159	9	0.276

*Source:* CMP Dataset (2001).

## Appendix A.4 Centre-left and centre-right left-right ranges before and after 1970

*Predicted incentives for cartelisation*

	Pre 1970	Post 1970	Difference	Percentage change	PIFOSPC
Total	33.42	30.69	-2.73	-8.2	NA
Denmark	30.26	50.2	+19.94	+66.0	1
the Netherlands	26.44	16.84	-9.6**	-36.3	2
Ireland	32.51	21.62	-10.89	-33.5	3
Sweden	46.43	38.04	-8.39	-18.0	4
Norway	48.50	34.10	-14.44**	-29.8	4
Belgium	26.57	19.45	-7.12*	-26.8	6
Italy	23.17	17.55	-5.62	-24.3	6
Germany	18.93	31.33	+12.4**	+65.5	8
Austria	40.15	27.34	-12.81**	-31.4	9
France	52.82	39.12	-13.70*	-26.0	10
Britain	22.90	43.14	+20.24**	+88.4	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: PIFOSPC = predicted incentive for office-seeking policy cartelisation.

Norway and Sweden share rank of 4 so the rank of 5 has been omitted. Belgium and Italy share the rank of 6 so the rank of 7 has been omitted.

Listing by PIFOSPC rank.

*Costs of Opposition*

	Pre 1970	Post 1970	Difference	Percentage change	COO
Italy	23.17	17.55	-5.62	-24.3	1
Norway	48.50	34.10	-14.44**	-29.8**	2
Denmark	30.26	50.2	+19.94	+66.0	3
Sweden	46.43	38.04	-8.39	-18.0	4
Austria	40.15	27.34	-12.81**	-31.4**	5
Ireland	32.51	21.62	-10.89	-33.5	5
the Netherlands	26.44	16.84	-9.6**	-36.3**	7
Germany	18.93	31.33	+12.4**	+65.5**	8
France	52.82	39.12	-13.70*	-26.0*	9
Belgium	26.57	19.45	-7.12*	-26.8*	10
Britain	22.90	43.14	+20.24**	+88.4**	11
Total	33.42	30.69	-2.73	-8.2	NA

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: COO = cost of opposition.

Austria and Ireland share the same of rank of 5 and because of this the rank of 6 has been omitted.

Listing by COO rank.

*Disproportionality*

	Pre 1970	Post 1970	Difference	Percentage change	D
Total	33.42	30.69	-2.73	-8.2	NA
Italy	23.17	17.55	-5.62	-24.3	8
Germany	18.93	31.33	+12.4**	+65.5	2
Austria	40.15	27.34	-12.81**	-31.4	3
Denmark	30.26	50.2	+19.94	+66.0	3
Belgium	26.57	19.45	-7.12*	-26.8	5
Sweden	46.43	38.04	-8.39	-18.0	6
Ireland	32.51	21.62	-10.89	-33.5	7
Norway	48.50	34.10	-14.44**	-29.8	9
the Netherlands	26.44	16.84	-9.6**	-36.3	1
France	52.82	39.12	-13.70*	-26.0	10
Britain	22.90	43.14	+20.24**	+88.4	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: D = disproportionality.

Austria and Denmark share the same of rank of 3 and because of this the rank of 4 has been omitted. Listing by D rank.

*Threshold for office*

	Pre 1970	Post 1970	Difference	Percentage change	TFO
Total	33.42	30.69	-2.73	-8.2	NA
Denmark	30.26	50.2	+19.94	+66.0	1
Sweden	46.43	38.04	-8.39	-18.0	2
Norway	48.50	34.10	-14.44**	-29.8	3
France	52.82	39.12	-13.70*	-26.0	4
Italy	23.17	17.55	-5.62	-24.3	5
the Netherlands	26.44	16.84	-9.6**	-36.3	6
Ireland	32.51	21.62	-10.89	-33.5	7
Belgium	26.57	19.45	-7.12*	-26.8	8
Austria	40.15	27.34	-12.81**	-31.4	9
Germany	18.93	31.33	+12.4**	+65.5	10
UK	22.90	43.14	+20.24**	+88.4	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: TFO=threshold for office.

Listing by TFO rank.

*Impact of direct subsidies*

	Pre 1970	Post 1970	Difference	Percentage change	IDS
Total	33.42	30.69	-2.73	-8.2	NA
Belgium	26.57	19.45	-7.12*	-26.8	1
Britain	22.90	43.14	+20.24**	+88.4	1
Denmark	30.26	50.2	+19.94	+66.0	1
the Netherlands	26.44	16.84	-9.6**	-36.3	1
Ireland	32.51	21.62	-10.89	-33.5	1
France	52.82	39.12	-13.70*	-26.0	6
Germany	18.93	31.33	+12.4**	+65.5	7
Norway	48.50	34.10	-14.44**	-29.8	8
Italy	23.17	17.55	-5.62	-24.3	9
Sweden	46.43	38.04	-8.39	-18.0	10
Austria	40.15	27.34	-12.81**	-31.4	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: IDS = impact of direct subsidies

Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Britain share rank of 1 so the ranks of 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been omitted.

Listing by IDS rank.

*Appendix A.5* Bivariate correlations between centre-left and right left-right range and election date 1970-1998

*Predicted incentives for office seeking policy cartelisation*

	Mainstream range and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	PIFOSPC
Total	-0.067	96	D	NA
Denmark	.165	12	I	1
Netherlands	-.333	9	D**	2
Ireland	-.533	9	D	3
Sweden	.455	10	D	4
Norway	.703	7	D**	4
Belgium	-0.050	9	D*	6
Italy	-.943**	8	D	6
Germany	.214	8	I**	8
Austria	-.467	9	D**	9
France	-.929**	7	D*	10
Britain	.095	8	I**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

PIFOSPC = predicted incentives for office-seeking; I = increase; D = decrease.

Norway and Sweden share rank of 4 so the rank of 5 has been omitted. Belgium and Italy share the rank of 6 so the rank of 7 has been omitted.

Listing by PIFOSPC rank.

*Costs of opposition*

	Mainstream range and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	COO
Total	-0.067	96	-2.73	NA
Italy	-.943**	8	-5.62	1
Norway	.703	7	-14.44**	2
Denmark	.165	12	+19.94	3
Sweden	.455	10	-8.39	4
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	5
Ireland	-.533	9	-10.89	5
Netherlands	-.333	9	-9.6**	7
Germany	.214	8	+12.4**	8
France	-.929**	7	-13.70*	9
Belgium	-0.050	9	-7.12*	10
Britain	.095	8	+20.24**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: COO = cost of opposition.

Austria and Ireland share the same of rank of 5 and because of this the rank of 6 has been omitted.

Listing by COO rank.

*Disproportionality*

	Mainstream range and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	D
Total	-0.067	96	-2.73	<i>NA</i>
Netherlands	-.333	9	-9.6**	1
Germany	.214	8	+12.4**	2
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	3
Denmark	.165	12	+19.94	3
Belgium	-0.050	9	-7.12*	5
Sweden	.455	10	-8.39	6
Ireland	-.533	9	-10.89	7
Italy	-.943**	8	-5.62	8
Norway	.703	7	-14.44**	9
France	-.929**	7	-13.70*	10
Britain	.095	8	+20.24**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP data set (2001).

Notes: D = disproportionality

Austria and Denmark share the same of rank of 3 and because of this the rank of 4 has been omitted.

Listing by D rank.

*Threshold for office*

	Mainstream range and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	TFO
Total	-0.067	96	-2.73	NA
Denmark	.165	12	+19.94	1
Sweden	.455	10	-8.39	2
Norway	.703	7	-14.44**	3
France	-.929**	7	-13.70*	4
Italy	-.943**	8	-5.62	5
Netherlands	-.333	9	-9.6**	6
Ireland	-.533	9	-10.89	7
Belgium	-0.050	9	-7.12*	8
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	9
Germany	.214	8	+12.4**	10
Britain	.095	8	+20.24**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP data set (2001).

Notes: TFO = threshold for office.

Listing by TFO rank.

*Impact of direct subsidies*

	Mainstream range and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	IDS
Total	-0.067	96	-2.73	NA
Britain	.095	8	+20.24**	1
Belgium	-0.050	9	-7.12*	1
Denmark	.165	12	+19.94	1
Ireland	-.533	9	-10.89	1
Netherlands	-.333	9	-9.6**	1
France	-.929**	7	-13.70*	6
Norway	.703	7	-14.44**	8
Germany	.214	8	+12.4**	7
Italy	-.943**	8	-5.62	9
Sweden	.455	10	-8.39	10
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP data set (2001).


Notes: IDS = threshold for direct subsidies.

Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Britain share rank of 1 so the ranks of 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been omitted.


Listing by IDS rank.

Appendix A.6 Post war mainstream left and right ranges on the left-right dimension 1945-1998


Denmark




Netherlands




Ireland




Norway




Sweden




Belgium




Italy




Germany




Austria



France



Britain




Source: CMP Dataset (2001).


Notes: graphs are listed in order of predicted incentives for office seeking.

Appendix A.7 Mainstream left and right left-right trajectories 1945-1998


Denmark




the Netherlands




Ireland




Norway




Sweden




Belgium




Italy




Germany




Austria



France



Britain



Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: graphs are listed in order of predicted incentives for office seeking.

*Appendix A.8* Bivariate correlations between centre-left and right left-right competition and election date 1970-1998

*Predicted incentives for office seeking policy cartelisation*

	Mainstream competition and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	PIFOSPC
Total	-.55	96	D	NA
Denmark	-.049	12	I	1
Netherlands	.000	9	D**	2
Ireland	-.617*	9	D	3
Sweden	.333	10	D	4
Norway	-.179	7	D**	4
Belgium	-.733*	9	D*	6
Italy	-.143	8	D	6
Germany	.690*	8	I**	8
Austria	-.733*	9	D**	9
France	.214	7	D*	10
Britain	.238	8	I**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

PIFOSPC = predicted incentives for office-seeking; I = increase; D = decrease.

Norway and Sweden share rank of 4 so the rank of 5 has been omitted. Belgium and Italy share the rank of 6 so the rank of 7 has been omitted.

Listing by PIFOSPC rank.

*Costs of opposition*

	Mainstream competition and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	COO
Total	-.055	96	-2.73	NA
Italy	-.143	8	-5.62	1
Norway	-.179	7	-14.44**	2
Denmark	-.049	12	+19.94	3
Sweden	.333	10	-8.39	4
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	5
Ireland	-.617	9	-10.89	5
Netherlands	.000	9	-9.6**	7
Germany	.690*	8	+12.4**	8
France	.214	7	-13.70*	9
Belgium	-.733*	9	-7.12*	10
Britain	.238	8	+20.24**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: COO = cost of opposition.

Austria and Ireland share the same of rank of 5 and because of this the rank of 6 has been omitted.

Listing by COO rank.

*Disproportionality*

	Mainstream competition and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	D
Total	-.055	96	-2.73	NA
Netherlands	.000	9	-9.6**	1
Germany	.690*	8	+12.4**	2
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	3
Denmark	-.049	12	+19.94	3
Belgium	-.733*	9	-7.12*	5
Sweden	.333	10	-8.39	6
Ireland	-.617	9	-10.89	7
Italy	-.143	8	-5.62	8
Norway	-.179	7	-14.44**	9
France	.214	7	-13.70*	10
Britain	.238	8	+20.24**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP data set (2001).

Notes: D = disproportionality.

Austria and Denmark share the same of rank of 3 and because of this the rank of 4 has been omitted.

Listing by D rank.

*Threshold for office*

	Mainstream competition And election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	TFO
Total	-.055	96	-2.73	NA
Denmark	-.049	12	+19.94	1
Sweden	.33	10	-8.39	2
Norway	-.179	7	-14.44**	3
France	.214	7	-13.70*	4
Italy	-.143	8	-5.62	5
Netherlands	.000	9	-9.6**	6
Ireland	-.617*	9	-10.89	7
Belgium	-.733*	9	-7.12*	8
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	9
Germany	.690*	8	+12.4**	10
Britain	.238	8	+20.24**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP data set (2001).

Notes: TFO = threshold for office.

Listing by TFO rank.

*Threshold for direct subsidies*

	Mainstream competition and election date	n	Post 1970 increase or decrease in range	IDS
Total	-.055	96	-2.73	NA
Britain	.238	8	+20.24**	1
Belgium	-.733*	9	-7.12*	1
Denmark	-.049	12	+19.94	1
Ireland	-.617*	9	-10.89	1
Netherlands	.000	9	-9.6**	1
France	.214	7	-13.70*	6
Norway	-.179	7	-14.44**	8
Germany	.690*	8	+12.4**	7
Italy	-.143	8	-5.62	9
Sweden	.333	10	-8.39	10
Austria	-.467	9	-12.81**	11

\*coefficient significant at the 0.05 level; \*\*coefficient significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: CMP data set (2001).


Notes: IDS = threshold for direct subsidies.

Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Britain share rank of 1 so the ranks of 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been omitted.


Listing by IDS rank.

Appendix A.9 Post-war mainstream volatility on the left-right dimension 1945-1998


Denmark




Netherlands




Ireland




Norway




Sweden




Belgium




Italy




Germany




Austria



France



Britain



Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: graphs are listed in order of predicted incentives for office seeking.

*Appendix A.10* Mainstream left and right mean administrative efficiency emphases by decade

Country	Centre L/R	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	L	0	0.67	1.65	0	2.05	8.32
	R	0	0.53	1.3	0.75	12.85	7.89
Belgium	L	0.6	0.43	1.04	0.65	2.17	12.15
	R	1.5	2.75	3.02	3.83	5.4	13.15
Denmark	L	0	0	0.73	0.76	1.37	2.46
	R	0.8	0.63	4.1	2.32	4.27	4.07
France	L	3.02	0.87	0.5	0.4	0.57	2.25
	R	0.82	1.05	0.63	1.15	0.3	3.61
Germany	L	0	1.85	4.85	3.22	2.61	4.25
	R	0.68	2.89	4.5	4.55	2.59	4.38
Ireland	L	1.7	1.27	2.03	4.65	7.38	4.56
	R	2.4	0.93	11.3	5.65	5.45	4.86
Italy	L	5.11	0.56	4.95	3.8	14.39	7.74
	R	0	1.75	2.7	5.64	10	12.14
the Netherlands	L	2.1	1.97	1.75	2.4	5.75	4.04
	R	2.3	1.87	1.3	3.47	6.25	6.11
Norway	L	2.25	1.45	1.63	3.2	2.3	2.07
	R	1.15	0.06	1.1	2.95	4.23	3.51
Sweden	L	0	0	0.7	0	2.5	0
	R	1.2	1.93	0.1	1.03	2.13	2.75
UK	L	1.19	0	1.8	1.4	0.72	3.68
	R	0.3	1.28	3.2	3.93	6.59	4.55

Source: CMP Dataset (2001). Administrative Efficiency variable per 303.

*Appendix B.1* Operationalisation of parties that do and do not have access to the cartel*Austria*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1949-1995
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs <sup>117</sup>	Austrian Freedom Party	4 3 1983-1986
Greens	Die Grünen	Greens	4
LIF	Liberales Forum	Liberal Forum	4
ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei	Austrian People's Party	1
SPÖ	Sozialistische Partei Österreichs	Social Democratic Party	1

*Source:* Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*Belgium*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1946-1995
BSP/PSB	Belgische Socialistische Partij/Parti Socialiste Belge	Belgian Socialist Party	1
SP	Socialistische Partij	Socialist Party	1
PS	Parti Socialiste	Francophone Socialist Party	1
PSC/CVP	Parti Social Chrétien/Christelijke Volkspartij	Francophone Christian Social Party and Flemish Christian People's Party	1
CVP	Christelijke Volkspartij	Christian People's Party	1
PSC	Parti Social Chrétien	Christian Social Party	1
PVV/PLP	Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang/Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès	Party of Liberty and Progress	2
VLD	Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	2
PRL	Parti Réformateur Libéral	Francophone Liberals	2
Agalev	Anders Gaan Leven	Live-Differently – Flemish-speaking Ecologists	4
Ecolo	Écologistes Confédérés pour l'Organisation de Luttes Originales	Francophone Ecologists	4
FDF	Front Démocratique des Bruxellois Francophones	Flemish National League	4 3 1977-1980
PLDP	Parti Libéral Démocrate et Pluraliste	Liberal Democratic and Pluralist Party	4
PRL-FDF	Parti Réformateur Libéral – Front Démocratique des Francophones	Liberal Reformation Party- Francophone Democratic Front	4
RW	Rassemblement Walloon	Walloon Rally	4 3 1974-1977
VB	Vlaams Blok	Flemish Block	4
VU	De Volksunie	People's Union	4 3 1977-1981

*Source:* Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*Denmark*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1945-1998
CD	Centrum-Demokraterne	Centre Democrats	4 3 1984-1988 2 1988-1998
PDK	Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti	Danish Communist Party	4 3 1975-1977
DS	Dansk Samling	Danish Union	4
DU	De Uafhængige	Independents' Party	4
EL	Enhedslisten-De Rød-Grønne	Red-Green Unity List	4
FK	Fælles Kurs	Common Course	4
FRPd	Fremskridtspartiet	Progress Party	4
KD	Kristeligt Folkeparti	Christian People's Party	4 3 1984-1988 2 1988-1994
KF	Konservative Folkeparti	Christian People's Party	1
LC	Liberalet Centrum	Liberal Centre	4
RF	Retsforbund	Justice Party	4 3 1957-1964
RV	Det Radikale Venstre	Radical Party	2
SD	Socialdemokratiet	Social Democratic Party	1
SF	Socialistisk Folkeparti	Socialist People's Party	4 3 1975-1977
V	Venstre	Liberals	1
VS	Venstresocialisterne	Left Socialist Party	4 3 1975-1977

Source: Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate, (2006).

*France*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1946-1997
	Parti Républicain de la Liberté Independants Républicain Party Paysan	Conservatives	1 2 1962-1981 4 1981-1988
CNIP	Centre National de Indépendants et Paysans Action Républicaine et Sociale Centre Républicain Centre National des Indépendents Français		
CD	Centre du Progrès et de la Démocratie Moderne	Democratic Centre	4
CDP	Centre Démocratie et Progrès	Centre Democracy and Progress	2
Écologistes	Écologistes	Greens	4
FN	Front National	National Front	4
GE	Generation Écologie	Ecology Generation	3
MR	Mouvement Réformateur	Reformers' Movement includes	4
MRP	Mouvement Républicain Populaire	Popular Republican Movement	1
PCF	Parti Communiste Français	French Communist Party	2
Poujadists	Poujadists		4
PS	Parti Socialiste	Socialist Party	1
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République	Rally for the Republic	1
RRRS	Parti Républicain Radical et Radical Socialiste	Radical Socialist Party	2
UDF	Union pour la Démocratie	Union for French Democracy	2
UNR	Union Pour la Nouvelle République	Gaullists	2
UDT	Union Démocratiqu du Travail		
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République		1 1958-1988

*Source:* Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*Germany*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1949- 1998
90` Greens	Bündnis'90/ Die Grüne	Alliance/Greens '90	4 3 1998
BP	Bayernpartei	Bavarian Party	4
CDU/CSU	Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	1
Die Grünen	Die Grünen	The Greens	4
DP	Deutsche Partei	German Party	4
DRP	Deutsche Reich Partei	German Reich Party	4
DZ	Deutsche Zentrumpartei	Centre Party	4
FDP	Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands	Free Democratic Party	2
GB/BHE	Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen	Refugee Party	4
Greens '90	Grüne/Bündnis'90	Greens/Alliance '90	4
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands	Communist Party of Germany	
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus	Party of Democratic Socialism	4
SPD	Sozialdemokratischen Sozialismus	Social Democratic Party of Germany	1
SSW	Südschleswigscher Wählerverband-Sydslevsk Vaelgerforening	South Schleswig Voter's Union	4
WAV	Wirtschaftliche Aufbauverein	Economic Reconstruction League	4

Source: Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*Ireland*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1948-1997
CnP	Clann na Poblachta	Republican Party	2 1948 4
CnT	Clann na Talmhan	Party of the Land	2 4 1957-1961
DLP	Democratci Left Party		4
Fianna Fáil	Fianna Fáil	Soldiers of Destiny	1
Fine Gael	Fine Gael	Family of the Irish	1
Greens	Ecology Party/Comhaontas	Party/Green Greens	4
LP	Páirtí Lucht Oibre	Labour Party	2
PD	Progressive Democrats		4 3 1982-1997
WP	Parti nOiri	Workers' Party	4

Source: Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*Italy*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1946-1996
AD	Alleanza Democratica	Democratic Alliance	4
AN	Alleanza Nazionale	National Alliance	2
CCD	Centro Cristiano Democratico	Christian Democratic Centre	4
DC	Democrazia Cristiana	Christian Democrats	1
DP	Democrazia Proletaria	Proletarian Democracy	4
FdV	Federazione dei Liste Verdi	Green Federation	4
			3 1996
FI	Forza Italia	Go Italy	1 1994 -1996
LN	Lega Nord	Northern League	4
			3 1994-1998
LR	La Rete/Movimento per la Democrazia	The Network/Movement for Democracy	4
MSI	Movimento Sociale Italiano	Italian Social Movement	4
PCI	Partido Comunista Italiano	Communist Party	4
PDS	Partito Democratico della Sinistra	Democratic Party of the Left	1
PdUP	Manifest/Partito di Unità Proletaria per il Comunismo	Manifesto/Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism	4
PI	Patto per l'Italia	Pact for Italy	
PLI	Partito Liberale Italiano	Liberal Party	2
PR	Partito Radicale	Radical Party	4
PRI	Partito Repubblicano Italiano	Republican Party	2
PSDI	Partido Socialista Democratico Italiano	Italian Democratic Socialist Party	4
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano	Socialist Party	1
			4 1964
PSU		United Socialist Party	1
RC	Rifondazione Comunista	Newly Founded Communists	4
RI	Rinnovamento Italiano	Italian Renewal	4

*Source:* Wolendorp, Keman and Budge. (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsieck, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*the Netherlands*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1946-1998
ARP	Anti-Revolutionaire Partij	Anti-Revolutionary Party	2
CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appel	Christian Democratic Appeal	1
CHU	Christelijk-Historische Unie	Christian Historical Union	2
D'66	Democraten '66	Democrats '66	4 3 1981, 1982, 1994 2 1998
DS'70	Democratische Socialisten '70	Democratic Socialists '70	4 3 1971
GL	Groen Links	Green Left	4
KVP	Katholieke Volkspartij	Catholic People's Party	1
PPR	Politieke Partij Radicalen	Radical Political Party	4
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid	Labour Party	1
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid En Democratie	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	1

Source: Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*Norway*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1945-1997
DLF	Det Liberale Folkeparti	Liberal People's Party	4
DNA	Det Norske Arbeiderparti	Norwegian Labour Party	1
FRPn	Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party	4
H	Høyre	Conservative Party	1
KrF	Kristelig Folkeparti	Christian People's Party	2
NKP	Norges Kommunistiske Parti	Norwegian Communist Party	4
Sosialistisk Venstreparti	Sosialistisk Venstreparti	Socialist Left Party	4
SP	Senterpartiet	Centre Party	2
V	Venstre	Liberal Party	2

Source: Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate (2006).

*Sweden*

Party	Full name	English translation	Party type 1948-1998
	Arbetarepartiet		
CP	Centerpartiet	Centre Party	1
FP	Folkpartiet Liberalerna	Liberal People's Party	1
KdS	Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet	Christian Democratic Community Party	4 3 1991-1994
Miljöpartiet Gröna	de Miljöpartiet de Gröna	Green Ecology Party	4
MSP	Moderata Samlingspartiet	Moderate Coalition Party	1
NyD	Ny Demokrati	New Democracy	4
SdaP	Socialdemokratiska	Social Democratic Labour Party	1
Vp	Vänsterpartiet	Left Party	4

*Source:* Wolendorp, Keman and Budge, (2000); Budge et al. (2001); Nordsiek, (2006); Zarate, (2006).

*Appendix B.2* Effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) averaged by decade

Country	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	post 1970 average
Total	3.41	3.21	3.34	3.67	3.7	4.26	3.88
Austria	2.54	2.30	2.29	2.17	2.45	3.40	2.67
Belgium	2.83	2.53	3.74	5.89	7.26	8.85	7.33
Britain	2.11	2.04	2.04	2.18	2.14	2.20	2.17
Denmark	4.02	3.81	3.83	5.26	5.29	4.54	5.03
France	4.32	5.03	3.27	4.25	3.58	2.76	3.53
Germany	4.01	2.59	2.38	2.32	2.58	2.82	2.57
Ireland	3.62	3.01	2.63	2.48	2.72	3.23	2.81
Italy	3.48	3.50	3.64	3.40	4.05	6.71	4.72
the Netherlands	4.58	4.29	5.03	5.50	3.73	4.09	4.44
Norway	2.92	3.04	3.30	3.56	3.51	4.20	3.76
Sweden	3.06	3.14	3.08	3.40	3.39	4.02	3.60

*Source:* ENPP calculations obtained from Siaroff (2000).

*Notes:* Effective number of parties were calculated by weighting parties by size, first taking the seat share of each party as a decimal (for example, 42.2 percent = 0.427), squaring this value, and summing these values for all parties. Independents are ignored (Siaroff, 2000: 28). Listing is alphabetical.

*Appendix B. 3* Numerical distribution of seat percentages across mainstream, secondary, semi-status and non-governing parties by decade


Country		1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Austria	M	87.2	92.8	95.8	94.8	87.1	69.0
	S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	S-S	-	-	-	-	8.3	5.5
	N-G	12.8	7.2	4.2	5.2	4.6	25.5
Belgium	M	79.7	86.8	70.8	63.7	61.8	56.0
	S	11.8	10.2	17.9	15.0	22.8	17.6
	S-S	-	-	-	8.5	-	-
	N-G	8.5	3.0	11.3	12.8	15.4	26.4
Britain	M	92.1	98.2	98.1	95.2	92.6	90.9
	S	2.0	1.1	1.5	1.8	2.5	4.8
	S-S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	N-G	5.9	0.7	0.4	3.0	4.9	4.3
Denmark	M	79.4	81.2	78.5	42.8	53.5	71.8
	S	7.3	8.1	8.7	11.2	9.2	9.3
	S-S	-	1.3	2.9	7.3	5.3	-
	N-G	13.3	9.4	9.9	38.7	32.0	18.9
France	M	58.1	60.2	63.8	53.3	67.9	59.6
	S	41.9	33.5	21.4	34.4	26.0	33.2
	S-S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	N-G	-	6.3	14.8	12.3	6.1	7.2
Germany	M	67.4	84.3	86.6	86.3	85.2	82.9
	S	12.9	9.3	9.5	7.1	8.9	8.6
	S-S	-	-	-	-	-	2.4
	N-G	19.7	6.4	3.9	6.6	5.9	6.1
Ireland	M	67.3	77.5	83.5	85.7	84.8	72.9
	S	21.3	13.2	13.0	12.5	8.8	14.7
	S-S	-	-	-	-	-	4.5
	N-G	11.4	9.3	3.5	1.8	6.4	7.9
Italy	M	60.0	58.4	49.1	51.3	49.8	42.0
	S	11.6	6.8	9.3	7.7	9.6	14.0
	S-S	-	-	-	-	-	13.7
	N-G	28.4	34.8	41.6	41.0	40.6	30.3
Netherlands	M	60.6	63.8	57.8	54.4	64.0	48.6
	S	28.5	29.0	28.2	24.2	18.1	27.9
	S-S	-	-	-	7.3	9.0	8.1
	N-G	10.9	7.2	14.0	14.1	8.9	15.4
Norway	M	69.8	70.4	68.0	67.4	71.7	56.0
	S	26.7	28.5	31.2	25.0	17.2	26.8
	S-S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	N-G	3.5	1.1	0.7	7.6	11.1	17.2
Sweden	M	96.7	97.6	96.2	94.9	92.5	79.0
	S	-	-	-	-	-	-
	S-S	-	-	-	-	-	2.5
	N-G	3.3	2.4	3.8	5.1	7.5	18.5

*Source:* CMP Dataset (2001).


*Notes:* listing is alphabetical.




Denmark




France




Germany




Ireland




Italy




the Netherlands



Norway



Sweden



Source: CMP Dataset (2001).

Notes: graphs are listed in alphabetical order.

Appendix C.1 Electoral scores of the extreme-right-wing 1980-1998

	Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
FPO	Austria				5.0			9.7			
VB	Belgium		1.6				2.0		2.7		
Agir	W*		*				*		*		
FN(b)	W*		*				0.1		0.3		
PFNb	W*		-				0.3		0.3		
DF	Denmark		*			*			*	*	
FRPd	France		8.9			3.6			4.8	9.0	
FN			0.2					9.8		9.8	
MNR	Germany		*					*		*	
DVU									0.6 <sup>b</sup>		
NPD			0.2		0.2				0.6 <sup>b</sup>		
Republikaner	Italy		*						-		
LN					*				0.5 <sup>c</sup>		
Ms-Ft					*				*		
MSI/AN					6.8				5.9		
CD	The Netherlands		*	*				0.1			0.9
CP			0.1	0.8				0.4			*
CP'86			*	*				*			-
NVU	Norway		0.1	0.0				*			*
FLP			*								*
FRPn	Sweden		4.5	*			3.7				13.0
DNP				*			*				*
NyD				*			*				*
SDk				*			*				*
BNP	UK			*	0.0						0.0
NF					0.1						0.0

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
FPÖ Austria	16.6				22.5	21.9			
VB Belgium		9.5				11.9			
Agir W		0.4				0.8			
FN(b) W		2.4				6.9			
FNB W		*				*			
PFNB W									
DF Denmark	*				*			7.4	
FRPd	6.4				6.4			2.4	
FN France				12.7				14.9	*
MNR				*					
DVU Germany	0.3 <sup>b</sup>				-				1.2
NPD	0.3 <sup>b</sup>				0.3				0.3
Republikaner	2.1				1.9				1.8
LN Italy			8.7		8.4		10.1		
Ms-Ft		*	*		*		0.9		
MSI/AN		5.4	5.4		13.5		15.7		
CD					2.5				0.6
The Netherlands									
CP					*				*
CP'86					0.4				*
NVU					*				*
FLP Norway				0.5				0.2	
FRPn				6.3				15.3	
DNP Sweden		*			*				0.5
ND		6.7			1.2				0.2
SDk		0.1			0.2				0.4
BNP Britain			0.0					0.1	
NF			0.0					0.0	

Source: Carter (2005: 4-5).

Notes: For far-right parties names see Abbreviations (Appendix C.2). \* Party did not exist at this time. - Party did not contest election.

<sup>a</sup> Flanders and Wallonia are listed as two separate systems as the Belgian parties only compete in one region; results are reported accordingly.


<sup>b</sup> Between 1987 and 1990 the DVU and NPD contested elections as the DVU-Liste D. <sup>a</sup> Lega Lombarda (Lombard League), Lega Lombarda joined with other forces and formed Lega Nord. Source: Carter (2005: 4).

*Appendix C.2 Full titles, translations and abbreviations of extreme-right-wing parties*

Party	Country	Full name	English translation
Agir	Wallonia (Belgium)	Agir	To Act
AN	Italy	Aleanza Nazionale	National Alliance
BNP	Britain	British National Party	NA
BZÖ	Austria	Bündes Zukunft Österreich	Alliance for the Future of Austria
CD	Netherlands	Centrumdemocraten	Centre Democrats
CP	Netherlands	Centrumpartij	Centre Party
CP'86	Netherlands	Centrumpartij '86	Centre Party '86
DF	Denmark	Dansk Folkpartei	Danish People's Party
DNP	Sweden	Det Nya Partiet	The New Party
DVU	Germany	Deutsche Volkunion	German People's Union
FLP	Norway	Fedrelandspartiet	Fatherland Party
FN	France	Front National	National Front
FN(b)	Wallonia (Belgium)	Front/Front voor	National Front
FNB	Wallonia (Belgium)	Front Nouveau de Belgique	New Belgian Front
FPÖ	Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Freedom Party of Austria
FRPd	Denmark	Fremskridtspartiet	Progress Party
FRPn	Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	Progress Party
LN	Italy	Lega Nord	Northern League
MNR	France	Mouvement Nationale Républicain	National Republican Movement
Ms-Fi	Italy	Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore	Social Movement-Tricolour Flame
MSA	Italy	Movimento Sociale Italiano	Italian Social Movement
NF	Britain	National Front	NA
NPD	Germany	Nationaldemokratische	National Democratic Party
NVU	Netherlands	Nederlandse Volksunie	Dutch People's Union
NyD	Sweden	Ny Demokrati	New Democracy
PFNB	Wallonia Belgium	Parti des Forces Nouvelles	Party of the New Forces
Republikaner	Germany	Die Republikaner	The Republicans
SDk	Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	Swedish Democrats
VB	Flanders Belgium	Vlaams Blok <sup>118</sup>	Flemish Bloc

Source: Carter (2005: xiii )

<sup>118</sup> Presently called Vlaams Belang.



*Appendix C.3 Mainstream right left-right averages by decade*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Centre L/R</i>	<i>1970s</i>	<i>1980s</i>	<i>1990s</i>
Austria	L	-23.18	-14.15	0.73
	R	1.13	15.05	23.27
Belgium	L	-26.23	-19.76	-14.86
	R	-7.83	6.44	-3.47
Denmark	L	-13.58	-19.67	-16.74
	R	32.1	31.72	39.41
France	L	-40.35	-16.67	-18.24
	R	14.35	26.47	0.72
Italy	L	-20.59	-1.26	10.63
	R	0.15	0.82	35.32
Norway	L	-34.1	-28.07	-19.71
	R	-14.15	-2.27	14.39
Sweden	L	-18.93	-21.17	4.71
	R	-8.43	40.53	40.46

*Source:* CMP Dataset (2001) Left-right dimension (rile).

### Bibliography

Abedi, A., (2002), 'Challenges to established parties: the effects of party system features on the electoral fortunes of anti-political establishment parties', *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 551-583.

Abedi, A., (2004), *Anti-political establishment parties. A comparative analysis*, London; New York: Routledge.

Bale, Tim. Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and extreme right in Europe's bipolarising party systems. *West European Politics*, Volume 26, Number 3 (July 2003), pp.67-90.

BBC News, (17.04.2006), 'Haider party launched in Austria',  
[<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4454057.stm>, (24.01.2007).

Banzhaff, J.F., (1965), 'Weighted voting doesn't work: a mathematical analysis', *Rutgers Law Review*, 19, (winter), 317-343.

Barnes, S.H., (1967), *Party democracy: politics in an Italian socialist federation*, New Haven; CT: Yale University Press.

Bartolini, S., Mair, P., (1990), *Identity, competition and electoral availability*, Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press.

Beer, S., (1969), *Modern British politics*, London: Faber.

Beetham, D., (1991), *The legitimation of power*, Basingstoke, London: Macmillan.

Bell, D., (1962), *The end of ideology*, New York: Random House.

Berelson, B., (1952), *Content analysis in communications research*, Glenco. Ill: Free Press.

- Berelson, B., (1954), 'Content analysis', in, L. Gordon, (ed.), *Handbook of social psychology, Volume I*, Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- Betz, H.-G., (1994), *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*, New York: St. Martin's Press – now Palgrave.
- Betz, H.-G., (1998a), 'Introduction', in H.-G. Betz and S. Immerfall, (eds.), *The new politics of the right*, London: Macmillan – now Palgrave.
- Betz, H.-G., (1998b), 'Against Rome: the Lega ', in H.-G. Betz and S. Immerfall, (eds.), *The new politics of the right*, London: Macmillan – now Palgrave.
- Betz, H.-G., (2002), 'Conditions favouring the success and failure of radical right-wing populist parties in contemporary democracies', in Y. Mény and Y. Surel, (eds.), *Democracies and the populist challenge*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Betz, H.-G., (2003), 'The growing threat of the radical right', in P. Merkl, and L. Weinburg, (eds.), *Right-wing extremism in the twenty first century*, London, Portland: Frank Cass.
- Beyme von, K., (1988), 'Right-wing extremism in post war Europe', in K. von Beyme, *Right-wing extremism in Western Europe*, London: Frank Cass.
- Bille, L., (1990), 'Denmark: the oscillating party system', P. Mair, *Understanding party system change*, London: Frank Cass.
- Blair, T., Schroeder, G., (1998), *Europe the Third Way, die neue mitte*, [[http://www.iedm.org/library/blair\\_en.html](http://www.iedm.org/library/blair_en.html)].
- Blau, A., (forthcoming), 'The effective number of parties at four scales: votes, seats, legislative power and cabinet power', *Party Politics*.

Blondel, J., (1968), 'Party systems and patterns of government in Western democracies', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1, (2), 180-203.

Blondel, J., (2002), 'Party government, patronage, and party decline in Western Europe', in, R. Gunther, J. Ramón Montero, J.J. Linz, (eds.), *Political parties. Old concepts and new challenges*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Blyth, M., (2002), *Great transformations, economic ideas and political change in the twentieth century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blyth, M., (2003), 'Globalisation and the limits of democratic change. Social democracy and the rise of political cartelisation', *International Politics and Society*, 3.

Blyth, M., Hopkin, J., (2004), 'Globalisation didn't make you do it! Party politics and the transformation of European left parties', paper presented to the Conference of Europeanists, Chicago, 15<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> March.

Blyth, M., Katz, R., (2005), 'From catch-all politics to cartelisation', *West European Politics*, 28, (1), 33-60.

Bowler, S., Carter, E., Farrell, D.M., (2003), 'Changing party access to elections', in B. Cain, R.J. Dalton and S.E. Scarrow, *Democracy transformed? Expanding political opportunities in advanced industrial democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Budge, I., (2001a), 'Theory and measurement of party policy positions', in I. Budge, H-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, E. Tanenbaum, (eds.), *Mapping policy preferences. Estimates for parties, electors and governments 1945-1998*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Budge, I., (2001a), 'Validating the manifesto research approach: theoretical assumptions and empirical confirmations', in, M. Laver, (ed.), *Estimating the policy position of political actors*, London and New York: Routledge.

Budge, I., Fairlie, D.J., (1983), *Explaining and predicting elections*, London; Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.

Budge, I., Laver, M., (1986), 'Office seeking and policy pursuit in coalition theory', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 11, (4), 485-506.

Budge, I., Robertson, D., Hearl, D.J., (1987), *Ideology, strategy and party change: spatial analysis of post-war election programmes in 19 democracies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Budge, I., Bara, J., (2001a), 'Introduction: content analysis and political texts', in, I. Budge, H-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, E. Tanenbaum, (eds.), *Mapping policy preferences. Estimates for parties, electors and governments 1945-1998*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Budge, I., Bara, J., (2001b), 'Manifesto based research: a critical review', in, I. Budge, H-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, E. Tanenbaum, (eds.), *Mapping policy preferences. Estimates for parties, electors and governments 1945-1998*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D, (2001), 'Finally! Comparative over-time mapping of party policy movement', Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Tanenbaum, E., (eds.) *Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945-1998*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Tanenbaum, E., (2001) *Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945-1998*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Callaghan, J., (2003), 'Symposium on Globalisation and Social Democracy', *European Political Science*, Spring, 31-41.

Canovan, M., (2002), 'Taking politics to the people: populism as the ideology of democracy', in, Y. Mény, Y. Surel, *Democracies and the populist challenge*, New York: Palgrave.

Cappocia, G., (2002), 'Anti-system parties. A conceptual reassessment' *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 14, (1), 9-35.

Carter, E., (2002), 'Proportional representation and the fortunes of extreme right wing parties', *Western European Politics*, 25, (3), 125-146.

Carter, E., (2004), 'Does PR promote political extremism? Evidence from the West European parties of the extreme right', *Representation*, 40, (2), 82-100.

Carter, E. (2005) *The extreme right in Europe, success or failure*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Carty, K., (2004), 'Parties as franchise systems. The stratarchical organisational imperative', *Party Politics*, 10, (1), 5-24.

Castles, F. G., Mair, P., (1984), 'Left-right political scales. Some expert judgements', *European Journal of Political Research*, 12, (1), 73-88.

Caul, M., Grey, M., (2000), 'From platform declaration to policy outcome: changing party profiles and partisan influence over policy', in R.J. Dalton, M.P. Wattenberg, (eds.), *Parties without partisans*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Cerny, P., (1995), 'Globalisation and the changing logic of collective action', *International Organisation*, 49, (4), 595-626.

Chambers Dictionary, (1999), Edinburgh: Chambers.

Comparative Manifesto Data Set, (2001), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daalder, H., Mair, P., (eds.), (1983), *Western European party systems: continuity and change*, London: Sage.

Daalder, H., van der Geer, J.P., (1977), 'Partijafstanden in de Tweede Kamer' *Acta Politica*, 12, (3), 289-345.

Dahl, R., Lindblom, C., (1953), *Politics, economics and welfare*, New York: Harpers and Brothers.

Dalton, R.J., (2000), 'The decline of party identifications', in, R.J. Dalton, M.P. Wattenberg, (eds.), *Parties without partisans*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R., (2004), *Democratic challenges, democratic choices: the erosion of political support in advanced industrial democracies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R.J., Flanagan, S.C., Allen Beck, P., (1984), 'Electoral change in advanced industrial democracies', in, R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan, P. Allen Beck, *Electoral change in advanced industrial societies*, New Jersey; Guildford: Princeton University Press.

Dalton, R.J., McAllister, I., Wattenberg, M.P., (2000), 'The consequences of party dealignment', in R.J. Dalton, M.P. Wattenberg, (eds.), *Parties without partisans*, Oxford, New York: University Press.

Dalton, R.J., Wattenberg, M.P., (eds.), (2000), *Parties without partisans*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Decker, F., (2003), 'The populist challenge to liberal democracy', *International Politics and Society*, 3, 1-12, [<http://www.fes.de/ipg/INDEXE.HTM>].

Detterbeck, K., (2005), 'Cartel parties in Western Europe', *Party Politics*, 11, (5), 173-191.

De Vries, M., Giannetti, D., Mansergh, L., (2001), 'Estimating policy positions of the computer coding of political texts: results from Italy, the Netherlands and Ireland', in, M. Laver, (ed.), *Estimating the policy position of political actors*, London and New York: Routledge.

Dodd, L.C., (1976), *Coalitions in parliamentary government*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dowding, K., (1996), *Power*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

Downs, A., (1957), *An economic theory of democracy*, New York: Harper.

Drummond, A.J., (2006), 'Electoral volatility and party decline in Western democracies: 1970-1995', *Political Studies*, 54, 628-647.

Dumont, P., Caulier, J-F., (2005), 'The "effective number of relevant parties": how voting power improves Laakso-Taagepera's index', Working paper, <http://centres.fusl.ac.be/CEREC/document/people/caulier/enrp.pdf>.

Dunleavy, P., (1991), *Democracy, bureaucracy, and public choice*, London: Macmillan.

Dunleavy, P., Boucek, F., (2003), 'Constructing the number of parties', *Party Politics*, 9, 291-315.

Duverger, M., (1954), *Political parties*, London: Methuen; New York: Wiley and Sons.

Eatwell, R., (1998), 'The dynamics of right-wing electoral breakthrough', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 32, (3), 3-31.

Eatwell, R., (2000), 'The rebirth of the extreme right' in Western Europe', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53, (3), 407-425.

Eatwell, R., (2003), 'Ten theories of the extreme right', in P. Merkl, and L. Weinburg, *Right-wing extremism in the twenty first century*, London, Portland: Frank Cass.

Epstein, Leon (1964) 'A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties', *American Political Science Review* 58: 46-59.

Evans, G., Norris, P., (eds.), (1999), *Critical elections: British parties and voters in long term perspective*, London: Sage.

Evans, J., (2001), 'Les bases sociales et psychologiques du passage gauche-extrême droite. Exception français ou mutation européenne?', in P. Perrineau, (ed.), *Les croisés de la société fermée: l'Europe des extremes droites*, La Tour d'Aigues: Editions de l'Aube.

Fallend, F., (2004), 'Are right wing populism and government participation incompatible?' *Representation*, 40: 2, 115-130.

Farrell, D., (1996), 'Campaign strategies and tactics', in L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris, P., (eds.), *Comparative democracies, elections and voting in global perspective*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Farrell, D., Webb, D., (2000), 'Political parties as campaign organisations', in R.J. Dalton, M.P. Wattenberg, (eds.), *Parties without partisans*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Felsenthal, D., Machover, M., (2004), 'A priori voting power: what is it all about?', *Political Studies Review*, 2, 1-23.

Finegold, K., Swift, E.K., (2001), 'What works? Competitive strategies of major parties out of power', *British Journal of Political Science*, 31, 95-120.

Fiorina, M., (1981), *Retrospective voting in American national elections*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Flanagan, S.C., Dalton, R.J., (1984), 'Parties under stress: realignment and dealignment in advanced industrial democracies, *West European Politics*, 7, 7-23.

Fondation Robert Schuman, European Elections Monitor, (03.10.2006), 'Surprise victory by the Social Democrats in the General Elections', [<http://www.robert-schuman.org/anglais/oeo/autriche/legislatives/resultat.htm>], (24.01.2007).

Franklin, M., Mackie, T., Valen, H., (eds.), (1992a), *Electoral change: responses to evolving social structures in Western countries*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Franklin, M., Mackie, T., Valen, H., (1992b), 'Introduction', in, M. Franklin, T. Mackie, H. Valen, *Electoral Change. Responses to evolving social structures in Western countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Franzmann, Kaiser, A., (2006), 'Locating political parties in policy space: a reanalysis of party manifesto data', *Party Politics*, 12, (2), 163-188.

Gabel, M., Huber, J.D., (2000), 'Putting parties in their place: inferring party left-right ideological positions from party manifesto data', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44, (1), 94-103.

Gallagher, M., Laver, M., Mair, P., (2001), *Representative government in modern Europe*, London: McGraw Hill.

Gallagher, M., Laver, M., Mair, P., (2006), *Representative government in modern Europe*, London: McGraw Hill.

Garry, J., (2001), 'The computer coding of political texts: results from Britain, Germany, Ireland and Norway', in, M. Laver, (ed.), *Estimating the policy position of political actors*, London and New York: Routledge.

Gibbons, M. (2000), 'Election programmes in New Zealand politics', unpublished PhD. Thesis University of Waikato, New Zealand.

Giddens, A., (1998) *The Third Way. A renewal of social democracy*, Cambridge: Polity.

Giddens, A., (2001), (ed.), *The global Third Way debate*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Granovetter, M., 'The strength of weak ties', *The Journal of Sociology*, 78, (6), 1360-1380.

Grofman and Lijphart, A., (1986), 'Introduction', in B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, New York: Agathon Press.

Gunther, R., Diamond, L., (2003), 'Species of political parties: a new typology', *Party Politics*, 9, (2), 167-199.

Hainsworth, P. (1992), 'Introduction. The cutting edge: the extreme right in post war Western Europe and the USA', in P. Hainsworth, (ed.), *The extreme right in Europe and the USA*, New York: St Martin's Press.

Hainsworth, P., (2000), 'Introduction: the extreme right', in P. Hainsworth, (ed.), *From the margins to the mainstream*, London, New York: Pinter.

Harmel, R., (1985), 'On the study of new parties', *International Political Science Review*, 6, 403-418.

Harmel, R., (2002), 'Party organisational change: competing explanations', in R., Luther, F. Müller-Rommel, (eds.), *Political parties in the new Europe*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Harmel, R., Svåsand, L., (1993), 'The institution of extreme right-wing charismatic parties: a paradox?', *Party Politics*, 8, (2), 31-49.

Harmel, R., Janda, K., (1994), 'An integrated theory of party goals and party change', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 6, (3), 259-287.

Harmel, R., Janda, K., Tan, A., (1995), 'Substance vs. packaging: an empirical analysis of parties' issue profiles', Paper presented to Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago.

Hay, C., (1996), *Restating social and political change*. Buckingham: Open University Press

Hay, C., (2001), 'Globalisation, competitiveness and the future of the welfare state in Europe, European Community Studies Associations' International Conference paper, Madison, Wisconsin, May 31-June 2.

Hay, C., (2005), 'Globalisation's impact on states', in, J. Ravenhill, (ed.), *Global political economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hay, C., Marsh, D., (2000), *Demystifying globalisation*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Hay, C., Smith, N.J., (2005), 'Horses for courses? Discourse of globalisation as European integration in the UK and Ireland', *West European Politics*, 28, (1), 124-158.

Hearl, D., (1988), 'Ambivalence revisited: an analysis of Liberal Party manifestos since 1945', in E. Kirchner, (ed.), *Liberal parties in western democracies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heidar, K., Saglie, J., (2003), 'Predestined parties: organisational change in Norwegian parties', *Party Politics*, 9, (2), 167-199.

Reinhard Heinisch. Success in opposition - failure in government: explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. *West European Politics*, Volume 26, Number 3 (July 2003), pp. 91-130.

Herzog, M., (1987), 'Minor parties: the relevancy perspective', *Comparative Politics*, 19, 317-327.

Hillebrand, R., Meulman, J., (1992), 'Afstand en nabijheid: verhoudingen in de Tweede Kamer', in J.J.A. Thomassen, M.P.C.M. van Schendelen and M.L. Zielonka-Goei, (eds.), *De Geachte Afgevaardigde...hoe kamerleden denken over het nederlandse parlement*, Muiderberg: Coutinho.

Holz-Bacha, C., and Kaid, L.L., (1995), 'A comparative on political advertising: media and political system characteristics' in L.L. Kaid, C. Holz-Bacha, *political advertising in western democracies: parties and candidates on television*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hopkin, J., (2003), 'The emergence and convergence of the cartel party: parties, state and economy in Western Europe', Department of Political Science, University of Birmingham. Paper presented at London School of Economics, 30/01/2003.

[[www.bham.ac.uk/POLISIS/departement/staff/publications/hopkin\\_%](http://www.bham.ac.uk/POLISIS/departement/staff/publications/hopkin_%)].

Huber, J. Inglehart., R., (1995), 'Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies', *Party Politics*, 1, (1), 73-111.

Hug, S., (1996), 'The emergence of new political parties from a game theoretic perspective', *European Journal of Political Research*, 29, 169-190.

Hug, S., (2001), *Altering party systems, strategic behaviour and the emergence of new parties in Western democracies*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Ignazi, P., (1992), 'The silent counter revolution: hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right wing parties', *European Journal of Political Research*, 22, 3-34.

Ignazi, P., (2003), *Extreme right wing in Western Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ignazi, P., Ysmal, C., (1992), 'New and old extreme right-wing parties', *European Journal of Political Research*, 22, 101-121.

Inglehart, R., (1977), *The silent revolution*, New Jersey, Surrey: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R., Klingeman, H-D., (1976), 'Party identification, ideological preference and the left-right dimension among Western mass publics', in, I. Budge, et. al., (eds.), *Party identification and beyond: representation of voting and party competition*, New York: Wiley.

Janda, K., (1980), *Political parties: a cross national survey*, New York; London: Free Press; Collier Macmilan.

Janda, K., (1990), 'Towards a performance theory of change in political parties', paper presented in at the World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Madrid, 9-13 July.

Janda, K., Harmel, R., Edens, C., Goff, P., (1995), 'Changes in party identity : evidence from Party Manifestos', *Party Politics*, 1, 171-196.

Jessop, B., (1990), *State theory: putting the capitalist state in its place*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Katz, R., (1986), 'Party government: a rationalistic conception', in F.G. Castles and R. Wildemann, (eds.), *Visions and realities of party government*, Berlin: de Gryter.

Katz, R., (1990), Party as linkage: a vestigial function?', *European Journal of Political Research*, 8, 143-161.

Katz, R., (1996), 'Party organisations and finance', in L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris, (eds.), *Comparative democracies, elections and voting in global perspective*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Katz, R., (1997), *Democracy and elections*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Katz, R., (2001), 'The problem of candidate selection and models of party democracy', *Party Politics*, 7, (3), 277-296.

Katz, R., Mair, P., (1992), *Party organisations. A data handbook on party organisations in Western Democracies, 1960-1990*, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage.

Katz, R., Mair, P., (1993), 'The evolution of party organisations in Europe: the three faces of party organisation', *American Review of Politics*, 14, 593-617.

Katz, R., Mair, P. (1995), 'Changing models of party organisation and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party', *Party Politics*, 1, 5-28.

Katz, R., Mair P., (1996), 'Cadre catch-all or cartel? A rejoinder', *Party Politics*, 2, (4), 525-534.

Katz, R., Mair, P., (2000), 'The ascendancy of the party in public office: party organisational change in twentieth century democracies', R. Gunther, J. Ramón Montero, J.J. Linz, (eds.), *Political parties. Old concepts and new challenges*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Katz, R., Mair, P., (2002), 'The ascendancy of the party in public office: party organisational change in twentieth-century democracies' in, R. Gunther, J. Ramón Montero, J.J. Linz, (eds.), *Political parties. Old concepts and new challenges*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kavanagh, D., (1980), 'Political culture in Great Britain, the decline of civic culture', in, G. Almond and S. Verba, *The civic culture revisited*, Boston: Little Brown.

Keman, H., (2004), 'A party *in* government is not [yet] a party *of* government', prepared for the 10<sup>th</sup> Finer Lecture, 31<sup>st</sup> March, University of Keele.

Keren, M., (2000), 'Political perfectionism and the 'anti-system' party', *Party Politics*, 6, (1), 107-116.

Key, V.O., (1966), *The responsible electorate*, New York: Vintage.

Keynes, J.M., (1964), *The general theory of employment, interest and money*, New York: Harcourt Brace.

Kim, H.M., Fording, R.C., (1998), 'Voter ideology in Western democracies 1946-1989', *European Journal of Political Research*, 33, 73-97.

Kirchheimer, O., (1966), 'The transformation of the Western European party systems', in J. La Palombara and M. Weiner, (eds.), *Political parties and political development*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, H., (1984), *The transformation of social democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, H., with McGann, A., (1985), *The radical right in Western Europe: a comparative analysis*, London: University of Michigan Press.

Kitschelt, H., (1989), 'The internal politics of parties: the law of curvilinear disparity revisited', *Political Studies*, 37, (3), 400-421.

Kitschelt, H., (2000), 'Citizens, politicians and party cartelization: political representation and state failure in post industrial democracies', *European Journal of Political Research*, 37, 149-179.

Klingemann, H-D., Fuchs, D., (1995), *Citizens and the state*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klingemann, H-D., Hofferbert, R.I., Budge, I., et. al., (1994), *Parties, policy and democracy*. Boulder Co: Westview.

Klingemann, H-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Tanenbaum, E., (eds.), *Mapping policy preferences. Estimates for parties, electors and governments 1945-1998*, Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press.

Knigge, P., (1998), 'The ecological correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 34, 249-279.

Knutsen, O., (1998), 'Expert judgements of the left-right location of political parties in West European countries: a comparative longitudinal study', *West European Politics*, 21, (2), 63-94.

Koole, R., (1994), 'The vulnerability of the modern cadre party in the Netherlands', R. Katz, P. Mair, (eds.), *How parties organise*, London: Sage.

Koole, R., (1996) 'Cadre, catch-all or cartel? A comment on the notion of the cartel party', *Party Politics*, 2, (4), 507-523.

Krouwel, A., (1998), *The catch-all party in Western Europe: a study in arrested development*, Amsterdam: CT Press.

Laakso, M., Taagepera, R., (1979), ' 'Effective' number of parties. A measure with application to West Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 12, (1), 3-27.

Landman, T., (2000), *Issues and methods in comparative politics*, London and New York: Routledge.

Laver, M., Budge, I., (1992), 'Introduction', *Party Policy and government coalitions*, London: Macmillan; New York: St Martins.

Laver, M., Hunt, B., (1992), *Policy and party competition*, New York: Routledge.

Laver, M., Garry, J., (1999), 'Estimating policy positions from party manifestos', Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mannheim.

Laver, M., Garry, J., (2000), 'Estimating policy positions from political texts', *American Journal of Political Science*, 44, (3), 619-634.

Laver, M., Shepsle, K., (2000), 'Ministrables and government formation: munchkins, players and big beasts of the jungle', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 12, (1), 113-124.

Laver, M., Benoit, K., Garry, J., (2003), 'Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data', *American Political Science Review*, 97, (2), 311-331.

Laver, M., Schofield, N., (1990), *Multiparty government: the politics of coalition in Europe*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Lawson, K., (1988) 'When linkage fails', in, K. Lawson and P. Merkl, (eds.), *When parties fail*, New Jersey: Princeton.

Lawson, K., Merkl, P., (1988), 'Alternative organisations: environmental, supplementary, communitarian and authoritarian', in K. Lawson and P. Merkl, (eds.), *When parties fail*, New Jersey: Princeton.

Lijphart, A., (1984), *Democracies: patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty one countries*, New Haven, CT: Yale.

Lijphart, A., (1999), *Electoral systems and party systems: a study of twenty-seven democracies 1945-1990*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, A., (1999b), *Patterns of democracy. Government forms and performance in thirty six countries*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Lipset, S.M., Rokkan, S., (eds.), (1967), *Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives*, New York: The Free Press.

Lipset, S.M., Raab, E., (1978), *The politics of unreason: right-wing extremism in America 1790-1977*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago.

Lucardi, P., (1991), 'Fragments form pillars, small parties in the Netherlands', in, F. Müller-Rommel, and G. Pridham, (eds.), *Small parties in comparative and national perspective*, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage.

Luther, K.R., (2000), 'Austria: a democracy under threat from the Freedom Party', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53, (3), 426-442.

Luther, K. R., (2003), 'The self-destruction of a right-wing populist party? The Austrian parliamentary election of 2002', *West European Politics*, 26 (2), 136-151.

Luther, K.R., (2006a), 'Strategien und (Fehl-)Verhalten: Die Freiheitlichen und die Regierungen Schüssel I und II', in E. Tálos, (ed.), *Umbau in Schwarz-Blau (-Orange). Eine Bilanz*, Vienna: Lit Verlag, 19-37.

Luther, K.R., (2006b), 'Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) und das Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)' in H. Dachs, P. Gerlich, H. Gottweis, H. Kramer, V. Lauber, W.C. Müller and E. Tálos (eds.), *Politik in Österreich. Ein Handbuch*, Vienna: Manz, pp.364-388.

McDonald, M.D., Mendes, S.M., (2001), 'Checking the party policy estimates: convergent validity', in, I. Budge, H-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara, E. Tanenbaum, (eds.), *Mapping policy preferences. Estimates for parties, electors and governments 1945-1998*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

- MacIvor, H., (1996), 'Do Canadian parties form a cartel?', *Canadian Journal of Political Studies*, 29, (2), 317-534.
- Mair, P., (1987), *The changing Irish party system: organisation, ideology, and electoral competition*, London: Pinter.
- Mair, P., (1993), 'Myths of electoral change and the survival of political parties', *European Journal of Political Research*, 24, 121-133.
- Mair, P., (1995), 'Political Parties, popular legitimacy and public privilege', *West European Politics*, 18: 40-57.
- Mair, P., (1996), 'Party systems and structures of competition', in, L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris, P., (eds.), *Comparative democracies, elections and voting in global perspective*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Mair, P., (1997), *The West European Party System*, Oxford; Oxford University Press.
- Mair, P., (1999), 'Party competition and the changing party system', in, J. Coakley and M. Gallagher, *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*, London, New York: PSAI Press.
- Mair, P., (2001), 'Searching for the positions of political actors: a review of approaches and a critical evaluation of expert surveys, in, M. Laver, (ed.), *Estimating the policy position of political actors*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Mair, P., (2002), 'In the aggregate: mass electoral behaviour in Western Europe, 1950-2000', in, H. Keman, (ed.), *Comparative democratic politics. A guide to contemporary theory and research*, London: Sage.
- May, J. D., (1973), 'Opinion structure of political parties: the special law of curvilinear disparity', *Political Studies*, 21, (2), 135-151.

McAllister, I., Moore, R., (1991), 'The issues that divided parties, 1991-1996', in I. McAllister and R. Moore, (eds.), *Party strategy and change: Australian electoral speeches since 1946*, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.

McAnulla, S., (2002), 'Structure and agency', in, D. Marsh and G. Stoker, (eds.), *Theory and methods in political science*, Basingstoke; New York; Palgrave Macmillan.

Meguid, Bonnie M. (2005) 'Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success' *American Political Science Review*, Volume 99, Number 3 (August 2005), pp. 347-359.

Mény, Y., Surel Y., (eds.), (2002), *Democracies and the populist challenge*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Merkel, P., (1988) 'The challengers and the party systems', in, K. Lawson, and P. Merkel, (eds.), *When parties fail*, New Jersey: Princeton.

Merkel, P., (2003), 'Stronger than ever', in, P. Merkel, and L. Weinburg, *Right-wing extremism in the twenty first century*, London, Portland: Frank Cass.

Michels, R., (1962), *Political Parties*, New York: Free Press.

Miller, R., (2003), *New Zealand's multi-party system: consolidation of the cartel model under proportional representation*, Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, School of Government, University of Tasmania, 29<sup>th</sup> -1<sup>st</sup> October.

Morgan, M.J., (1976), 'The modelling of government coalition formations: a policy-based approach with interval measurement', Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan, Ph.D. Thesis.

Mudde, C., (1995), 'Right-wing extremism analysed. A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86), *European Journal of Political Research*, 27, 203-224.

Mudde, C., (1996a), 'The war of words, defining the extreme right wing party family', *West European Politics*, 12, (2), 225-248.

Mudde, C., (1996b), 'The paradox of the anti-party party', *Party Politics*, 2, (2), 265-276.

Mudde, C., (1999), 'The single issue party thesis: extreme right parties and the immigration issue', *West European Politics*, 22, (3), 182-197.

Müller, W., Strøm, K.M., (1999), 'Political parties, hard choices', in, W.C. Müller, and K.M. Strøm, *Policy, office or votes? How political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nordsieck W., (2006), *Parties and elections in Europe* [<http://www.parties-and-elections.de/indexe.html>].

Norris, P., (1995), May's law of curvilinear disparity revisited, *Party Politics*, 1, (1), 29-47.

Norris, P., (2005), *Radical right: voters and parties in the electoral market*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Norton, P., (1994), *The British polity*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, New York: Longman.

Panebianco, A., (1988), *Political parties: organisation and power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Papadopoulos, Y., (2002), 'Populism the democratic question and contemporary governance', in Y. Mény and Y. Surel, (eds.), *Democracies and the populist challenge*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

- Pedahzur, A., Brichta, A. (2001), 'The institutionalisation of extreme right-wing charismatic parties: a paradox?', *Party Politics*, 8, (2), 31-49.
- Pedersen, H., (1982), 'Towards a new typology of party life spans and minor parties', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 5, (1), 1-16.
- Pedersen, K., (2001), 'Cartel responsiveness? The Danish case', 2, Copenhagen University Political Studies Press. [[http://www.polisciku.dkpublications/publications\\_dk.htm](http://www.polisciku.dkpublications/publications_dk.htm)].
- Pedersen, M., (1979), 'The dynamics of European party systems: changing patterns of electoral volatility', *European Journal of Political Research*, 7, (1), 1-26.
- Pedersen, M. N., Damsgaard, E., Nannesstad Olsen, P., (1971), 'Party distances in the Danish Folketing 1945-1968', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 6, 87-106.
- Pelizzo, R., (2003a), Cartel parties and cartel party systems, unpublished PhD dissertation, The John Hopkins University.
- Pelizzo, R., (2003b), 'Party positions or party direction? An analysis of party manifesto data', *Party Politics*, 12, (2), 67-89.
- Pennings, P., Hazan, R., (eds.), (2001), 'Democratising candidate selection', *Special Issue of Party Politics*, 7, (3), 267-275.
- Pennings, P., Keman, H., (2003), 'The Dutch parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2003: the rise and decline of the Fortuyn Movement', *Acta Politica*, 38, 51-68.
- Pesonen, P., (1999), 'Politics in Finland', W. Phillips Shiveley, (ed.), *Comparative Governance*, McGraw-Hill.

Pierre, J., Svåsand, L., Widfeldt, A., (2000), 'State subsidies to political parties: confronting rhetoric with reality', *West European Politics*, 23, (3), 1-24.

Powell, G.B., (2000), *Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Puhle, H-J., (2002), 'Still the age of catch-allism? *Volksparteien* and *Parteienstaat* in crisis and reequilibration' in R. Gunther, J. Ramnon Montero, J.J. Linz, *Political parties: old concepts and new challenges*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ray, L., (2001), 'A natural sentences approach to computer coding of party manifestos', in, M. Laver, (ed.), *Estimating the policy position of political actors*, London and New York: Routledge.

Rochon, T. R., (1985), 'Mobilizers and challengers: towards a theory of new party success', *International Political Science Review*, 6, 419-439.

Rodrik, D., (1997), 'Has globalisation gone too far?', Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.

Rosamond, B., (1999), 'Discourses of globalisation and the social construction of European identities', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6, (4), 652-658.

Sani, G., Sartori, G. (1983), Polarisation, fragmentation and competition in Western Democracies, in, H. Daalder and P. Mair, (eds.), *Western European party systems: continuity and change*, London: Sage.

Sartori, G., (1976), *Parties and party systems*, Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Sartori, G., (2005), 'Party types, organisation and functions', *West European Politics*, 28, (1), 5-32.

Scarrow, S., (2000), 'Parties without members? Party organisation in a changing electoral environment', in R.J. Dalton and M.P. Wattenberg, (eds.), *Parties without partisans*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Scharpf, F.W., (1991), *Crisis and choice in European social democracy*, Ithaca; New York: Cornell University Press.

Schäffner, C., (2002), 'Auf der Suche nach dem Feind. Anmerkungen zum NATO-Diskurs im Lichte ihrer Metaphern', in O. Panagl, H. Stürmer, (eds.), *Politische Konzepte und verbale Strategien. Brisante Wörter – Begriffsfelder – Sprachbilder*, Frankfurt a.M.

Semetko, H.A., (1996), 'The media', in L. LeDuc, R.G. Niemi, P. Norris, (eds.), *Comparative democracies, elections and voting in global perspective*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Shapely, L.S., Shubik, M.S., (1954), 'A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system', *American Political Science Review*, 48, (7), 87-92.

Shedler, A., (1996), 'Anti-political establishment parties', *Party Politics*, 2, (3), 291-312.

Siaroff, A., (2000), *Comparative European party systems: an analysis of parliamentary elections since 1945*, New York: Garland Publishing.

Siaroff, A., (2003), 'Two-and-a-half-party systems and the comparative role of the "half"', *Party Politics*, 9, 267-90.

Siegelman, L., Yough, S.N., (1978), 'Left-right polarisation in national party systems: a cross national analysis', *Comparative Political Studies*, 11, (3), 355-379.

Smith, G., (1987), 'Party and protest: the two faces of opposition in Western Europe', in E. Kolinsky, (ed.), *Opposition in western Europe*, London, Sydney: Croom Helm.

- Smith, G., (1989), 'Core persistence: change and the 'people's party'', *West European Politics*, 12, (4), 157-169.
- Smith, G., (1991), 'In search of small parties: problems of definition, classification and significance', in, F. Müller-Rommel, and G. Pridham, (eds.), *Small parties in comparative and national perspective*, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi: Sage.
- Stigler, G., (1964), 'A theory of oligopoly', *Journal of Political Economy*, 72, (1), 44-61.
- Stone, D., (1989), 'Causal stories and the formation of policy agendas' *Political Science Quarterly*, 104, (2).
- Strøm, K., (1990), 'A behavioural theory of competitive parties', *American Journal of Political Science*, 34, 565-598.
- Strøm, K., Liepart, J., (1989), 'Ideology, strategy and party competition in post-War Norway. *European Journal of Political Research*, 17, 262-288.
- Taagepera, R., Soberg Shugart, M., (1989), *Seats and votes: the effects and determinants of electoral systems*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Taggart, P., (1995), 'New-populist parties in western Europe', *Western European Politics*, 18, (1), 34-51.
- Taggart, P., (1996), *The new-populism and the new politics*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Taggart, P., (2000), *Populism*, Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Taggart, P., (2002), 'Populism and the pathology of representative politics', in Y. Mény, and Y. Surel, *Democracies and the populist challenge*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

- Tagguief, P.A., (1983), 'La strategies culturelle de la Nouvelle Droite en France (1968-1983)', in, Union des Ecrivains, *Vous avez dit fascisme ?*, Paris : Arthaud/Montalba, 13-152.
- Tagguieff, P.A., (1994), *Sur la nouvelle droite. Jalons d'une analyse critique*, Paris: Descartes et Cie.
- Tassani, G., (1986), *Vista da sinistra. Ricognizioni sulla Nuova destra*. Fierenze : Arnaud.
- Taylor, M., Herman, V., (1971), 'Party systems and government stability', *American Political Science Review*, 65, (1), 28-37.
- Taylor, M., Laver, M., (1973), 'Government coalitions in western Europe', *European Journal of Political Research*, 1, (3), 205-248.
- Thomas, J.C., (1975), *The decline of ideology in western political parties: a study of changing policy orientations*, London: Sage.
- Thomas, J.C., (1979), 'The changing nature of partisan divisions in the west: trends in domestic policy orientation in ten party systems', *European Journal of Political Research*, 7, 397-413.
- Verzichelli, L., Cotta, M., (2000), 'Italy from 'constrained coalitions' to alternative governments' in W.C. Müller, K. Strøm, *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Veuglers, J.W.P., (1995), 'The institutionalisation of France's Front National', PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Princeton University.
- Volkens, A., (2001a), 'Manifesto research since 1979: from reliability to validity', in, M. Laver, (ed.), *Estimating the policy position of political actors*, London and New York: Routledge.

Volkens, A., (2001b), 'Changes in party positions of European Social Democrats, 1945-1998', paper prepared for the 29<sup>th</sup> ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble 6<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> April, Workshop 11: Third Ways in Europe.

Volkens, A., Klingemann, H-D., (2002), 'Parties, ideologies and issues', in, K.R. Luther and F. Müller-Rommel, *Political parties in the new Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vowles, J., et al., (1995), *Towards consensus*, Auckland: Auckland University Press.

Walter, J., Helmig, J., (2005), 'Metaphors as agents of signification. Towards a discursive analysis of metaphors', European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) Granada Workshop, (April).

Ware, A., (1996), *Political parties and party systems*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Watson, M., (2002), 'Sand in the wheels, or oiling the wheels, of international finance? New Labour's appeal to a new Bretton Woods', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 4, (2), 193-221.

Woldendorp, J., Keman, H., Budge I., (2000), *Party government in 48 democracies (1945-1998). Composition-duration-personnel*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Wolinetz, S., (2002), 'Beyond the catch-all party: approaches to the study of parties and party organisation in contemporary democracies', in, R. Gunther, J. Ramón Montero, J.J. Linz, (eds.), *Political parties. Old concepts and new challenges*, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Yanai, N., (1999), 'Why do political parties survive', *Party Politics*, 5, (1), 5-17.

Yishae, Y., (2001), 'Bringing society back in: post cartel parties in Israel', *Party Politics*, 7, (6), 667-688.

Young, L., (1998), 'Party state and political competition in Canada: the cartel model reconsidered', *Canadian Journal of Political Studies*, 31, (2), 339-358.

Zarate, (2006), *Zarate's political collection*

[<http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/00europa.htm>].

