# Consumed in Satire:

## A Study of the Final Satires of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift

by

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A Thesis submitted to

The Victoria University of Manchester

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

In the Faculty of Arts

October, 1997

Department of English and American Studies

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# ABSTRACT

This thesis is about how satire destroys its creator. For the proponents of satire, satire is supposed to be constructive in its purpose, by being a means of guarding the public weal. Yet, there is an essential prerequisite for satirists to achieve this goal: that is, their norm should be shared by the general public; in other words, satirists should be at the heart of society for their satires to be effective in occasioning reform. If they happen to be isolated from society, their satires can be in great danger of being dismissed as deriving from the imagination of malignant social misfits.

Through a discussion of Alexander Pope's and Jonathan Swift's satiric careers, I aim to establish that they indeed came to recognise the futility of their satires resulting from their painful acknowledgement of their isolation from a society which they so wanted to reform. Yet, I also try to demonstrate that not only did they acknowledge their sombre situation, but also their satires were a record of their reassessment of their relationship with the world—in other words, a record of their changing attitudes towards satire. Through a discussion of how their attitudes towards satire came to be changed and how this change was manifested in their satires, I try to demonstrate that in the end both satirists came to write satires for their personal satisfaction, a motive which they strenuouly denied, and thus were consumed in satire.

To illustrate the gradual change in their attitudes towards satire and the corresponding change in the nature of their satires—in other words, the process of their consumption in satire—I discuss in chapter 1 both satirists' final satires to prove their 'tragic' nature. In chapter 2, I discuss their apologias for satire, written in the middle of their satiric careers, to prove that both satirists acknowledged the problems they were facing within an apparently confident defence of satire. In chapter 3, to provide a point of reference, I deliberate on their earlier satires to inquire into what were their ideals in satire and their difficulty in transforming those ideals into practice. In chapter 4, I discuss those poems which provide us with vital clues to their reassessment of their relationship with society and of the validity of satire as a means of public reform, which

lead to their valediction to the public function of satire. Their valediction to one kind of satire (a satire which can indeed occasion a reform), which eventually led them to write their final, 'tragic' satires, I discuss in chapter 5.

# Declaration:

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualificaiton of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

In-Han Jeon

# Acknowledgement

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr. William Hutchings. As my supervisor he has given me all the support, guidance, and understanding throughout the preparation of this thesis, without which this thesis would have been impossible. Most of all, I would like to thank him for his patience in understanding my shortcomings and encouraging me to overcome them with his kind, intellectual criticism.

I also want to thank my parents for their never-flagging support for their son. As for my father, I would like thank him for his unconditional love for me that even the most difficult hardship which has befallen him cannot take away. As for my mother, I thank her for her calm equanimity that made me feel secure through every crisis from which any student of English cannot be free.

My last, but not least, thanks go to my wife, Sook-Young. It would be impossible to thank her with mere words, but the best I can do here is to express my gratefulness in these words: 'Thank you for just being there for me.'

# List of Abbreviations

*ECS* *Eighteenth-Century Studies*

*ELH* *Journal of English Literary History*

*ELN* *English Language Notes*

*Expl* *Explicator*

*HLQ* *Huntington Library Quarterly*

*JEGP* *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*

*MLN* *Modern Language Notes*

*MLQ* *Modern Language Quarterly*

*MLR* *Modern Language Review*

*MP* *Modern Philology*

*NLH* *New Literary History*

*PLL* *Papers on Language and Literature*

*PMLA* *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*

*PQ* *Philological Quarterly*

*RES* *Review of English Studies*

*RMS* *Rennaissance Modern Studies*

*SAQ* *South Atlantic Quarterly*

*SEL* *Studies in English Literature*

*SP* *Studies in Philology*

*SR* *Sewanee Review*

*UTQ* *University of Toronto Quarterly*

*YES* *Year Book of English Studies*

# Introduction

Is satire destructive? This question, I believe, cannot be answered definitively. For those people, who happen to be at the receiving end of it, the answer to this question would be a definite 'yes'. Even for those who are not the victims of satire, the answer could be the same if they are unhappy with its attack on other people's reputations or humankind in general. They may object to the validity of satire, asking with what authority the satirist can disturb others' lives. Yet, this accusation of satire's destructiveness may be denied by satirists who argue for the constructiveness of satire. They can claim that a satire may prove constructive by destroying. Even though they may not be able to argue for the complete harmlessness of satire, they can justify it as a guardian of the public weal by warning people about the consequences of aberrant behaviour.

However, by what criteria do satirists judge other people? Can they really take it for granted that their norms are accepted and advocated by society in general? Is there not a danger that they will be regarded as pariahs of society who disturb its peace by their own singular standard? In this case, is satire not destructive not only of its victims, but also of its creators, turning them into malignant, discontented social outcasts?

This thesis is a quest for such a hidden destructiveness of satire—that is, its destructiveness of the satirist. Satirists cannot be sure of their relationship with the world outside. They hope, or believe, that the relationship is ideal and thus that their ideal or norm is shared by the general world, but there is no guarantee of this. Thus, if they happen to be in a hostile environment, the hostility shown by the outer world can have an adverse effect on them, influencing their self-confidence as guardians of public morality.

My contention in this thesis is that this was the case with Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift. They were satirists who believed in the public function of satire, strenuously arguing against the accusation that they wrote satires out of their personal malice. If they had simply produced one or two satires, the validity of this thesis could not have been tested, since there could have been no way of telling how the hostility

shown to their satires caused fundamental changes in their views of satire. Yet, this was not the case. For our great benefit, they devoted a considerable part of their literary careers, covering decades, to writing satire. What is important for us is that the nature of their satires did change towards the end of their careers, and this change was brought about not unconsciously but through their reassessment of their relationship with the outer world.

In a way, we can regard the end of their careers as a sombre finale, because, as I shall argue later, for all their ideals, they came to recognise painfully how their satires were ineffective in bringing about the reform they desired and thus came to write what may be termed 'pessimistic' satires.[1] If they had written pessimistic satires right at the beginning of their careers, the phrase 'consumed in satire' in my title would be inappropriate as a description of the final phase of their careers. Yet, while we can locate their efforts to make their satires publicly useful in their early careers, their final satires show them as having been forced to write a kind of satire which they had been strenuously denying their work to be: satire for private satisfaction, an empty echo in a society which regards them as, as Pope's adversarius in Dialogue II of the *Epilogue to the Satires* points out, men 'who wear their strange old Virtue as they will' (l. 44).[2] We should recognise that, as I shall demonstrate in chapter 1 and chapter 5, even though they continued to write satires right towards the very end of their literary careers, these came to be written rather for private satisfaction—that is, for prophesying the end of civilisation to an unlistening world or even, to put it harshly, for self-gratification. Then, we can say that they were indeed consumed in satire, about which they at first held so high an ideal, but whose futility they, sadly, came to recognise.

It would be very presumptuous of us if we pretend to a general understanding of satire's destructiveness of its creator from a discussion of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift. My purpose in this thesis is merely to explore the possibility of that destructiveness of satire: if I can prove this, this understanding can be valuable, I hope, in pointing towards a general recognition of that hidden destructiveness of satire.[3]

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[1]I shall discuss what a 'pessimistic' or 'tragic' satire is in chapter 1.

[2]The quotation is from *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, Volume, IV, *The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope*, 12 vols. (London: Methuen, 1939; repr. London: Routledge, 1993), p. 301.

[3]In this respect, my thesis is about discussing their satires on their own terms, not considering them in terms of our general understanding of all kinds of satire and thus not judging them from hindsight. It

A discussion of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift together, in this respect, can be more valuable than to discuss them separately. This is because, not only did they show a similar change of view of satire, but also their satires revealed undeniable differences between each satirist's manifestation of that attitude. It is not difficult for us to recognise that Pope and Swift shared the same view of contemporary society. As their stinging attacks on contemporary society reveal, both satirists viewed their society as in a dire state and in urgent need of reform. That they were close friends, fellow Scriblerians and eventually opposition satirists, who frequently exchanged their views of satire and its relationship with contemporary society could support the argument that it is better to discuss them together in order to understand how the hostility of society forced them, as they became more and more isolated, to change their views of satire. Yet, it is also my contention that we should not ignore the differences between them: despite their similar understanding about the ideal function of satire in occasioning a reform but its impossibility in contemporary society, their efforts to bring about improvement through the vehicle of satire were different in their early satires and the manifestations of their pessimism were different in their late satires. These differences, I hope, can support the argument that Pope and Swift are not too identical, localised cases to serve as examples for an understanding of satire's destructive effect on isolated satirists.

As Pope's and Swift's final pessimistic satires were written in the form of verse satire—in Pope's case, the final *Dunciad*, and in Swift's case *The Legion Club*—in this thesis I shall demonstrate how they manifested their changing views of satire and what was the reason for this change through a study of their verse satires, which were written over a sufficiently long period of time to make it possible to pursue their changing views.[4] The first step in our quest for both satirists' consumption in satire shall be a discussion of their final satires in order to discover what became of their satires in the end, despite the initial high hopes, which is the subject of chapter 1. In chapter 2, I shall discuss their apologias for satire, written in the middle of their satiric careers, to prove

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accepts both satirists' claim that their satires were written for a public purpose, and then inquires whether indeed they justified their claim through their practice.

[4]As my purpose in this thesis is to demonstrate how the satirists' direct engagement with contemporary corruption led to a destructive effect upon themselves, such poems as Pope's *Rape of the Lock* and Swift's scatological poems, which do not have a direct bearing upon the relationship between satirists and society as an object of attempted reform, will be excluded. I shall discuss more extensively the reason behind my exclusion of Swift's scatological poems in chapter 4.

that both satirists acknowledged the problems they were facing within an apparently confident defence of satire. Then, to provide a point of reference, in chapter 3, I shall deliberate on their earlier satires to inquire into what were their ideals of satire and the difficulties they experienced in transforming those ideals into practice. In chapter 4, I shall discuss those poems which provide us with vital clues to their reassessment of their relationship with society and of the validity of satire as a means of public reform, which lead to their valediction to the public function of satire. Their valediction to one kind of satire (a satire which can indeed occasion a reform), which eventually led them to write their final, 'tragic' satires, will be discussed in chapter 5.

# Chapter I

## The Tragic Outlook: The Final Satires of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift

### I

The starting point of my analysis of Alexander Pope's satires is the final lines of *The Dunciad* of 1743. The reason why I want to begin this thesis with a discussion of Pope's last poem is that a discussion of the final lines of this work will bring into focus the main concern of this thesis, which is the changing outlook of a satirist. In discussing *The Dunciad* of 1743, we cannot ignore the existence of the earlier version of this work, *The Dunciad Variorum* of 1729.[1] Inevitably the existence of this early version invites us to compare the final version with it. As I shall demonstrate later in this chapter, there is a considerable difference between the two versions of the poem in the underlying outlook in the final lines. If this difference can be clarified, we can ask valuable questions such as why this change of outlook happened and how this change was manifested in Pope's other works, mostly his verse satires, in the period between 1729 and 1743, which will be the concern of the next chapters. For this chapter, my primary concern is to demonstrate the difference of outlook behind the final lines of the two versions of *The Dunciad.*

An interpretation of *The Dunciad* of 1743 is quite problematic in that it is very difficult to decipher the meaning of the final vision of this work. When the poem ends as follows,

> In vain, in vain,—the all-composing Hour
> Resistless falls: The Muse obeys the Pow'r.
> She comes! she comes! the sable Throne behold
> Of *Night* Primæval, and of *Chaos* old!
> Before her, *Fancy*'s gilded clouds decay,
> And all its varying Rain-bows die away.
> *Wit* shoots in vain its momentary fires,
> The meteor drops, and in a flash expires.
> As one by one, at dread Medea's strain,

[1]As *The Dunciad* of 1728 was expanded to become *The Dunciad Variorum* in the next year, I shall ignore the 1728 version in this thesis.

The sick'ning stars fade off th'ethereal plain;
As Argus' eyes by Hermes' wand opprest,
Clos'd one by one to everlasting rest;
Thus at her felt approach, and secret might,
*Art* after *Art* goes out, and all is Night.
See skulking *Truth* to her old Cavern fled,
Mountains of Casuistry heap'd o'er her head!
*Philosophy*, that lean'd on Heav'n before,
Shrinks to her second cause, and is no more.
*Physic* of *Metaphysic* begs defence,
And *Metaphysic* calls for aid on *Sense*!
See *Mystery* to *Mathematics* fly!
In vain! they gaze, turn giddy, rave, and die.
*Religion* blushing veils her sacred fires,
And unawares *Morality* expires.
Nor *public* Flame, nor *private*, dares to shine;
Nor *human* Spark is left, nor Glimpse *divine*!
Lo! thy dread Empire, CHAOS! is restor'd;
Light dies before thy uncreating word:
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall;
And Universal Darkness buries All.[2] (ll. 627-656)

it remains unclear whether Pope's enemies—the dunces—are ridiculed and defeated, or whether he is lamenting their eventual triumph. At first glance, it seems that this poem ends with the triumph of the dunces. The dunces seem to succeed in spreading the dullness all over the world without being humiliated. As light can be interpreted as a symbol of reason and civilisation, the dunces' final defeat of civilisation is signified by extinguishing its symbol. As Thomas R. Edwards aptly puts it, with the triumph of the dunces, 'the critical intelligence that made the poem possible must bow before the onslaught of *nature*—a nature no longer seen as a synonym for light and order but as a ceaseless mutability destroying everything that makes life dignified or even possible'.[3] Yet, these lines may be putting emphasis on the dunces' dullness by ending the poem with darkness, which can be regarded as a symbol of the dullness. Then, one might argue that these lines are another example of Pope's ridicule of the dunces. Donald T. Siebert demonstrates such an interpretation, emphasising the theatrical implication of these lines:

[2]*The Dunciad*, ed. by James Sutherland, Volume V, *The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope*, 3rd edn., 11 vols. (London: Methuen, 1963; repr. London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 407-409.
[3]Thomas R. Edwards, *This Dark Estate: A Reading of Pope* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 129.

> I simply cannot read these last two lines and feel intimidated by an image of ultimate burial, as some critics have described it. The name "great Anarch" fails to make me tremble. The image striking me is that of a stage curtain falling, with perhaps too resounding a crash. We are reminded again of the Pope-Warburton note that "it is the common effect of Dulness (even in her greatest efforts) to defeat her own design" (to l. 584). It would appear these fools of Dulness have performed even the grand finale of this end of civilization with their distinguishing ineptitude and bathos. We are perhaps back again in the theater of John Rich (see III, 253-64), probably not utterly overwhelmed by the clatter, and smoke of the special effects.[4]

However, what is also being emphasised is the sense of ending which cannot be ignored. In these lines, something is ending, and something else is beginning. This change is being reported by the poet with awe: the phrase 'She comes! she comes!', as can be seen in the repetition and exclamation marks, is being uttered not with calm control of mind but with urgency and horror. In these lines, the goddess Dulness becomes far greater than an ordinary hero of epic: she is not a mere human or a semi-god, but a rival of the creator God who vies with Him and eventually defeats Him by uncreating the existing world and creating another. The existing world, which began with the God's word 'Let there be light' (Genesis 2. 1), is uncreated by Dulness's universal darkness.[5] Here, there is no sudden deflation following the inflation of the dunces and Dulness, which might have endowed these lines with a comic undertone. Inflation remains at its highest level towards the end. At least on the surface level, Pope seems to be pessimistic about the future of the existing world, which forces the readers to be reserved in their laughter at the dunces. OED defines pessimism as '1. The worst condition possible 2. The tendency to look at the worst aspect of things 3. The doctrine that this world is the worst possible, or that everything naturally tends to evil'. Pope can be described as pessimistic in these lines, because he regards the existing world as unable to redeem itself from its end and himself as a mere observer of the finale, thus holding no hope for the future: here, the coming of the worst, the beginning of the reign of the darkness, is being described as inevitable.

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[4]Donald T. Siebert, Jr., 'Cibber and Satan: *The Dunciad* and Civilization', *ECS*, 10 (1976), 203-221, (pp. 219-220).

[5]I use *The Bible: Authorized King James Version*, ed. by Robert Carrol and Stephen Prickett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) in this thesis.

Because of this seemingly pessimistic ending, there emerges a tension between these lines and the comic descriptions in the previous books. Thus, there have been contradicting interpretations about whether this work is pessimistic or not.[6] However, the existence of *The Dunciad Variorum* of 1729 can be turned into a great advantage in interpreting the final vision of *The Dunciad* of 1743:[7] for, in *The Dunciad* A, a similar vision which might be at odds with the rest of the work appears at the end of the poem. The existence of a similar vision at the end of each version enables us to compare one version with the other and, in so doing, to see if the relationship between the final vision and the rest of the work is different in each version. Such a comparison will enable us to focus on the meaning of any significant revision. While there is not much difference between each version in Book I, II, and, III, except that Pope changed his hero from Theobald to Cibber and added some notes in the 1743 version, the real difference is Book IV of the 1743 version. What I shall do is to observe what change of meaning Book IV brings to the whole *Dunciad* of 1743.

It seems to me that an interpretation of the final vision of *The Dunciad* (A or B) or even of the whole work can vary according to whether or not we accept that Pope himself considered the dunces as a manifestation of some theological or metaphysical evil, as a real threat to the existing world. However, it seems to be pre-judging the issue if we asseverate that this work is either totally pessimistic or not. The real value of this work may possibly result from the tension between two impulses: one to point a finger and giggle at the absurdity and even deformity of the dunces, and the other to point a finger of prophetic warning at the threat which the dunces manifest. What we should do in the comparison of the two versions of *The Dunciad* is to examine how the tension between these two impulses changes.

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[6]For the critics who regard Pope's final vision of *The Dunciad* as a very pessimistic one and interpret the existence of the dunces as a threat to the existing world, see Aubrey L. Williams, *Pope's Dunciad: A Study of its Meaning* (London: Methuen, 1955), John V. Regan, 'The Mock-epic Structure of the *Dunciad*', *SEL*, 19 (1979), 459-473, Harold Weber, 'The Tragic Satirist in Pope's final Works', *Criticism*, 22 (1982), 25-39. For the critics who interpret the final vision as Pope's ridicule of the dunces, see R. G. Peterson, 'Renaissance Classicism in Pope's *Dunciad*', *SEL*, 15 (1975), 431-445, Donald T. Siebert, Jr., 'Cibber and Satan: *The Dunciad* and Civilization', Tony Tanner, 'Reason and the Grotesque: Pope's *Dunciad*', *Critical Quarterly*, 7 (1965), 145-160. R. B. Gill, 'Dryden, Pope, and the Person in Personal Satire', *Essays in Literature*, 13 (1986), 219-30, can be included in the latter group, as Gill argues that, amid his bitter attacks on the dunces, Pope calls attention to himself as a critical intelligence who 'demonstrates his own poetic prowess by exposing the errors of others.' (p. 204)

[7]For convenience, hereafter, I shall call *The Dunciad Variorum* of 1729 *The Dunciad* A and *The Dunciad* of 1743 *The Dunciad* B. If I do not specify, it is *The Dunciad* B on which critics make comments.

To assist our examination of *The Dunciad* A, we can find evidence of Pope's complex attitude toward the dunces in his letter to Swift, which was written before the first *Dunciad* (1728) was published:

> But I am much the happier for finding (a better thing than our *Witts*) our *Judgments* jump, in the notion of entirely passing all Scriblers by in silence: To vindicate ones self against such nasty Slanders, is much as wise, as it was in your Countryman when people said he was besh— to show the contrary by showing his A— so let Gildon and Philips rest in peace. What Virgil had to do with Mævius, that he shou'd wear him upon his Sleeve to all eternity, I don't know? but I think a bright author should put an end to Slanders only as the Sun does to Stinks; by shining out, exhale 'em to nothing. . . .
>
> I wish as warmly as you, for the Hospital to lodge the *Despisers of the world* in, only I fear it would be fill'd wholly like Chelsea with Maim'd Soldiers, and such as had been dis-abled in *its* Service. And I wou'd rather have those that out of such generous principles as you and I, despise it, Fly in its face, than Retire from it. Not that I have much Anger against the Great, my Spleen is at the little rogues of it: It would vexe one more to be knockt o' the Head by a Pisspot, than by a Thunderbolt. As to the great Oppressors (as you say) they are like Kites or Eagles, one expects mischief from them: But to be Squirted to death (as poor Wycherley said to me on his deathbed) by *Potecaries Prentices*, by the under Strappers of Under Secretaries, to Secretaries, who were no Secretaries—this would provoke as dull a dog as Ph—s himself.
>
> But I beg your pardon, I'm tame agen, at your advice. I was but like the Madman, who on a sudden clapt his hand to his Sword of Lath, and cry'd, *Death to all my Enemies*! when another came behind him and stopt his wrath, by saying, *Hold! I can tell you a way worth twenty on't: Let your Enemies alone, and they will dye of themselves*.[8]

In this letter, Pope is caught between his rage and contempt for the 'Scriblers', as he vacillates from the one to the other. At one moment, he is so angered at the 'nasty Slanders' that he desires to cry '*Death to all my Enemies*!'. When he sees himself as one of the 'Maim'd soldiers' who have been 'disabled in Service' and identifies himself with 'poor Wycherley' on his deathbed, Pope imposes on himself the role of a hero who should wage a war against formidable enemy in a world becoming rapidly more corrupt.[9]

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[8]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, ed. by George Sherburn, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), II, pp. 349-350, Pope to Swift, 14 December 1725.

[9]By mentioning 'maim'd soldiers' and then relating him to them, it seems that Pope is putting emphasis on the heroic nature of the battle with the dunces, stressing that the battle is not a play in that there are serious casualties. For Pope's friendship with William Wycherley (he as a young poet who needs a guidance and Wycherley who wants to revitalise his flagging literary career with the help of a young talent), see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 94-100.

However, at another moment, he regards feeling such anger as being like a 'madman', because he sees the whole race of 'Scriblers' as little nothings, 'the under Strappers of Under Secretaries, to Secretaries, who were no Secretaries', who 'will dye of themselves'.[10] Thus, in this letter, Pope reveals his own complex attitude towards the dunces. They are nothings who will die of themselves and who do not even deserve his attention, but if they are really nothing, why should he bother to write about them? And why does he recognise that something should be done to deal with the dunces, as he prefers the 'Despisers of the World' who 'Fly in its face than Retire from it'?

The tension that arises from the contradiction between Pope's anger and his contempt for the 'Scriblers' finds its way into *The Dunciad* A, so that much of the poem is caught up in the same inextricable tangles of his attitude toward the dunces, as revealed in his letter above.

Pope's contempt for the dunces' impotence and nothingness results from the fact that the dunces' efforts are always self-defeating and self-denying. For an example, we can look at the following lines from the publisher's poet-chasing race:

> Full in the middle way there stood a lake,
> Which Curl's Corinna chanc'd that morn to make,
> (Such was her wont, at early dawn to drop
> Her evening cates before his neighbour's shop,)
> Here fortun'd Curl to slide; loud shout the band,
> And Bernard! Bernard! rings thro' all the Strand.
> Obscene with filth the Miscreant lies bewray'd,
> Fal'n in the plash his wickedness had lay'd; (A, II, ll. 65-72)

Curl's disaster shows us how the dunces' action is self-defeating. He fails to grasp the phantom when he nearly succeeds in catching it: moreover, it is doubly humiliating for him because the cause of his failure is that he slips and disgraces himself in the pool of urine made by his mistress Corinna. His humiliation is not caused by someone else but

[10]The overall purpose of using terms such as 'understrappers' and 'undersecretaries' is to denote persons of no importance, as 'understrapper' means 'An underling; a subordinate agent; an assistant. (In common use from c 1710.)' (OED) 'undersecretary' 'Used esp. as the specific title of a secretary immediately subordinate to, or ranking below, a principal secretary of state.' (OED)

by himself: for, it is by his own will that he participates in this game and fouls himself. Also the dunces' competition for Eliza causes Chetwood's following humiliation:

> First Chetwood lean'd against his letter'd post;
> It rose, and labour'd to a curve at most:
> So Jove's bright bow displays its watry round,
> (Sure sign, that no spectator shall be drown'd).
> A second effort brought but new disgrace,
> For straining more, it flies in his own face;
> Thus the small jett which hasty hands unlock,
> Spirts in the gard'ner's eyes who turns the cock. (A, II, ll. 163-170)

This competition is won by Curl who 'Thro' half the heav'ns pours th' exalted urn;' (A, II, l. 175). Chetwood's action is self-defeating in two ways. First, the very fact that he participates in this childish game reveals his folly; and secondly, even in this game he cannot perform, thus disgracing his manhood. However, does it make any difference who won the competition and who did not? This ludicrous competition about who can pass water most strongly may matter to the dunces, but for the readers the eventual outcome of the competition does not make any difference to their self-defeating act. It is one of the characteristics of the dunces that they lose at the moment of their triumph. This is the kind of joke Pope plays in *The Dunciad* A that lets the dunces participate in their own reduction, under his complete control, as if he and his readers are all looking down on the ridiculous shows played by the dunces. When Curl disgraces himself in the poet-chasing race as he fails to grasp the phantom of poet, 'Heav'n rings with laughter' (A, II, l. 113). Of course, this scene can be interpreted as one in which the dunces are laughing at Curl's misery boisterously enough to make the heaven ring. However, as Donald T. Siebert, Jr. argues, there is also an implication 'of a heavenly laughter of contempt directed downward at the absurd antics of the dunces' in this scene.[11] As in the lines discussed above, there is always implied 'a puppeteer's control' and, of course, it is Pope who 'is pulling the strings'.[12]

[11]Donald T. Siebert, Jr., p. 210.
[12]Donald T. Siebert, Jr., p. 210.

Yet, if he is totally confident in controlling the action of the dunces and certainly enjoys his contempt for them, why should he add the following remark on this work in appendix I in the disguise of the Publisher?

> It is styled *Heroic*, as being *doubly* so; not only with respect to its nature, which according to the best Rules of the Ancients and strictest ideas of the Moderns, is critically such; but also with regard to the Heroical disposition and high courage of the Writer, who dar'd to stir up such a formidable, irritable, and implacable race of mortals. (Appendix I, p. 205)

If the dunces are always self-defeating and thus harmless, why are they regarded here as a 'formidable, irritable, and implacable race of mortals', and how can the battle with the self-denying dunces be heroic? It seems to me that this paragraph typically reveals Pope's conflicting attitude towards the dunces. If we regard Pope as being ironic in describing the dunces as 'formidable', this paragraph explains the mock-heroic nature of this work: the first half of the passage comments on the high style of the work and the second half remarks on its low subject-matter.[13] However, to interpret this passage exclusively as such seems not to be compatible with Pope's emphasising the double heroic nature of this poem—in style and in the writer's disposition and courage—by italicising the word 'doubly'. If we focus on the word 'doubly', this passage seems to reveal Pope's concern, behind his contempt for the dunces, that they might be a real threat to the public weal. If we understand that one purpose of Appendix I is to defend Pope's integrity, this kind of interpretation suits better to Pope's defence.[14] Also, we should take notice of the purpose Appendix II serves in helping us to comprehend Pope's seriousness in this passage. By enumerating the dunces's attacks on him, about 34

[13]Pope actually did not use the term 'mock-heroic'. He used the term 'heroi-comical', as he described his *Rape of the Lock* by this term in its subtitle. Yet, it seems safe for us to assume that, whatever the exact term, the characteristics of the term 'mock-heroic' were well understood in the contemporary age, as OED cites Addison's *Spectator*, No. 273 as the first use of the term 'mock-heroic': 'We find in Mock-heroic poems, particularly in the *Dispensary* and the *Lutrin*, several Allegorical Persons of this Nature, which are very beautiful in these Compositions, and may, perhaps, be used as an Argument, that the Authors of them were of Opinion, such Characters might have a Place in an Epic Work', *The Spectator*, ed. by Donald F. Bond, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), II, p. 564.

[14]As we can see in the following passage, what Pope does in Appendix I is to vindicate himself : 'The only exception is the *Author* of the following Poem, who doubtless had either a better insight into the grounds of this clamour, or a better opinion of Mr. *Pope*'s integrity, join'd with a greater personal love for him, than any other of his numerous friends and admirers.' (p. 203) By giving the impression that Appendix I was written by a third party, Pope attempts to give the vindication of himself the advantage of an objective opinion.

examples, Pope not only justifies his attack on the dunces by demonstrating that he is provoked to this attack for his defence, but also implies that there are too many dunces to remain unconcerned about them.

In this respect, this remark reiterates Pope's complex attitude shown in his letter to Swift discussed above, which makes it difficult for us to conclude it to be exclusively ironic. Final proof for this interpretation comes from the poem itself. Though it is impossible to find a direct remark by Pope on the real threat of the dunces in *The Dunciad* A, nevertheless an apprehension of this kind is hinted at in the work. It seems to me that behind Pope's contempt for the dunces, there is also anxiety that artistic deterioration is not confined to art itself, but rather spreads to a wider deterioration. When he satirises contemporary theatrical absurdities in Book III, Pope adds the following note: 'All the extravagancies in the sixteen lines [ll. 229-244] following were introduced on the Stage, and frequented by persons of the first quality in *England* to the twentieth and thirtieth time.' (A, III, l. 229n) Here, we can detect Pope's concern that bad art is not self-denying but becomes triumphant throughout contemporary society, perverting the public sense.

Moreover, in this work, we can find a lot of Miltonic allusions which might point at the moral sins of the dunces' bad art. For example, the following lines which describe Tibbald in the opening of Book II,

> HIGH on a gorgeous seat, that far outshone
> Henley's gilt Tub, or Fleckno's Irish Throne,
> Or that, where on her Curlls the Public pours
> All-bounteous, fragrant grains, and golden show'rs;
> Great Tibbald sate: (A, II, ll. 1-5)

apparently echo Milton's description of Satan in the opening of Book II of *Paradise Lost*:

> High on a throne of a royal state, which far
> Outshone the wealth of Ormus and of Ind,
> Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand
> Showers on her kings barbaric pearl and gold,

Satan exalted sat,[15] (II, ll. 1-5)

This is not a simple example of the technique of inflation in mock-heroic poetry: Satan is not an object of comparison against which the protagonist of a mock-heroic looks tiny and ridiculous. Because of the theological enormity of Satan's sinfulness, to compare someone to him is to emphasise that person's sinfulness. In other words, the purpose of comparing someone to Satan is not to make him look tiny, not to emphasise the difference between them, but to stress the similarity between them. Thus comparing Tibbald with Satan can be regarded as imbuing his dullness with the more sinister sin of satanic quality, as well as inflating him beyond proportion to look ridiculous. This kind of allusion pervades *The Dunciad* A and it can be seen as an example of theological and moral comment that possibly points to the enormity of the dunces' sin and identifies them as a real threat to the existing world.[16]

The unresolved tension in Pope's complex attitude seems to be paradigmatic of *The Dunciad* A. As Dennis Todd remarks, one characteristic of *The Dunciad* A is 'a giving and then a taking away, a saying and unsaying that first emphasized the harmlessness of the Dunces and then hints at a hidden power, a frightening possibility'.[17]

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[15]*Paradise Lost*, ed. by Alastair Fowler (London: Longman, 1971), pp. 90-91.

[16]We can find another example of Miltonic allusion in Book I. At the beginning of Book I, Dulness is introduced as follows:

> In eldest time, e'er mortals writ or read,
> E'er Pallas issu'd from the Thund'rer's head,
> Dulness o'er all possess'd her ancient right,
> Daughter of Chaos and eternal Night: (A, I, ll. 9-12)

This description which emphasises Dulness's descent from Chaos and Darkness reminds us of Milton's description of Satan, who, in his desperate and erratic flight from Hell in search of the earth, hears 'At length a universal hubbub wild/ Of stunning sounds and voices all confused' ( II, ll. 951-952) and soon

> behold the throne
> Of Chaos, and his dark pavilion spread
> Wide on the wasteful deep; with him enthroned
> Sat sable-vested Night, eldest of things,
> The consort of his reign; (II, ll. 959-963)

In these two passages, the connection between Dulness and Satan becomes clear in their sharing connection with Chaos and Darkness.

[17]Dennis Todd, 'The "Blunted Arms" of Dulness: The Problem of Power in the *Dunciad*', *SP*, 79 (1982), 177-204 (p. 189).

When Pope presents the following apocalyptic vision at the end of *The Dunciad* A, this tension is not resolved, but strengthened:

> Thus at her felt approach, and secret might,
> Art after Art goes out, and all is Night.
> See sculking Truth in her old cavern lye,
> Secur'd by mountains of heap'd casuistry:
> Philosophy, that touch'd the Heavens before,
> Shrinks to her hidden cause, and is no more:
> See Physic beg the Stagyrite's defence!
> See Metaphysic call for aid on Sence!
> See Mystery to Mathematicks fly!
> In vain! they gaze, turn giddy, rave, and die.
> Thy hand great Dulness! lets the curtain fall,
> And universal Darkness covers all."
> "Enough! enough!" the raptur'd Monarch cries;
> And thro' the Ivory Gate the Vision flies. (A, III, ll. 345-358)

Despite its powerful message, this vision, which is told by Settle, cannot be totally justified because this version does not portray a full scale corruption: there has been no demonstration of the corruption of the sciences and philosophy. The decay of 'Art after Art' has not been fully established, except in the case of literature. Though it presents a compelling sense of threat, the conclusion can be interpreted either way: as Dennis Todd argues, it can be either interpreted as 'a proclamation of triumph' of the dunces and Dulness, or, if we take notice that the final two lines stress that after all this vision is nothing but a dream, as 'an expression of maddened impotence, rebellion thwarted in fact and so fulfilled in the imagination'.[18] The final two lines of this poem are even more puzzling. Traditionally, the dream through the ivory gate has been regarded as false, and the one through the horned gate as true.[19] Pope seems to point to this tradition, when he

[18]Dennis Todd, p. 190

[19]For the point about the ivory gate I am much indebted to Daniel P. Deneau, 'Pope's "Iv'ry Gate": *The Dunciad*, III, 340', *MLN*, 74 (1959), 208-211. The symbolism of the gate of ivory and that of horn is explained by Virgil in the *Aeneid* as follows, here in Dryden's translation: 'Two gates the silent house of Sleep adorn;/ Of polish'd iv'ry this, that of transparent horn:/ True visions through transparent horn arise;/ Through polish'd iv'ry pass deluding lies.' (VI, ll. 1235-1258), from *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. by H. T. Swedenberg, Jr. and others, 19 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), V, p. 568. Pope himself refers to this notion in his translation of the *Odyssey*, Book XIV when he adds the following note to line 656: 'this seems to be a bold fiction, and Commentators have labour'd hard to shew the reason of it: Some imagine that by the horn is meant a tunic of the eye, which is call'd horny; and that the ivory represents the teeth; and that by these allusions the Poet intended to express that what we hear spoken may be false, but what we see must infallibly be true: that is, according to this fable, the ivory gate emits

affixes the Virgilian original as a note to line 358. With this note alone, we can conclude comfortably the vision as wild, ungrounded, and fictitious and can throw aside the dunces' threat. However, there are two other notes concerning the ivory gate in Book III. First is the one which Pope adds to lines 5-6 in the name of Scriblerus:

> Hereby is intimated that the following Vision is no more than the Chimera of the Dreamer's brain, and not a real or intended satire on the Present Age, doubtless more learned, more inlighten'd, and more abounding with great Genius's in Divinity, Politics, and whatever Arts and Sciences, than all the preceding. For fear of any such mistake of our Poet's honest meaning, he hath again at the end of this Vision, repeated this monition, saying that it all past thro' the *Ivory gate*, which (according to the Ancients) denoteth Falsity. (A, III, ll. 5-6n)

To line 337, he, also in the name of Scriblerus, affixes the following note:

> Do not gentle reader, rest too secure in thy contempt of the Instruments for such a revolution in learning, or despise such weak agents as have been described in our poem, but remember what the *Dutch* stories somewhere relate, that a great part of their Provinces was once overflow'd, by a small opening made in one of their dykes by a single *Water-Rat*.
>
> However, that such is not seriously the judgment of our Poet, but that he conceiveth better hopes from the diligence of our Schools, from the regularity of our Universities, the discernment of our Great men, the encouragement of our Patrons, and the genius of our Writers in all kinds, (notwithstanding some few exceptions in each) may plainly be seen from his conclusion; where by causing all this Vision to pass thro' the *Ivory Gate*, he expressly in the language of poesy declares all such imaginations to be wild, ungrounded, and fictitious. (A, III, l. 337n)

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falshood, that of horn, truth. Others explain *Homer* by referring to the nature of horn and ivory, horn being pervious to the sight, and ivory impenetrable. *Dacier*, from *Eustathius*, gives us a very different solution; by horn which is transparent, *Homer* means the air, or heavens which are translucent; by ivory, he denotes the earth, which is gross and opake: Thus the dreams which come from the earth, that is, thro' the gate of ivory, are false; those from heaven, or thro' the gate of horn, true. But it may be thought that there are no grounds, from the words of *Homer*, for such an interpretation. I imagine that this fable is built on a real foundation, and that there were places called the gates of falshood and truth:', *The Odyssey of Homer: Books XIII-XXIV*, ed. by Maynard Mack and others, Volume X, *The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope*, 11 vols. (London: Methuen, 1967; repr. London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 227-228. For more explanations about this matter, see William R. Benét, *The Reader's Encyclopedia* (New York: Harrap, 1948) , p. 316 and Ebenezer C. Brewer, *A Dictionary of Phrase and Fable* (London: Cassell, 1923), pp. 306-307.

Yet, we cannot accept that these notes are completely sincere. Our doubt about their sincerity stems from the fact that they are presented with the name of Scriblerus.[20] In the first note, does Pope really believe Scriblerus's conviction that 'the present age' is 'doubtless more learned, more inlighten'd'? The word 'doubtless' actually can ironically evoke our doubt, because *The Dunciad* A is an attack on the dunces' pedantry and dullness. And, in the second note, does Pope really accept Scriblerus's belief in 'the diligence of our Schools', 'the regularity of our Universities', 'the discernment of our Great men', and 'the encouragement of our Patrons'? Scriblerus's belief in these is juxtaposed with his belief in 'the genius of our Writers in all kinds': as we know that *The Dunciad* A is largely an attack on contemporary writers, his belief in other institutions is rendered questionable as well. Pope is actually exploiting the possibility of his notes here. Especially, the note to line 337 is a typical case of Pope's 'saying' and 'unsaying'. The threat of the dunces demonstrated in the first paragraph through the example of a dyke collapsed by a single water-rat seems to be brushed away by the examples in the second paragraph upon which Scriblerus validates the falsity of the final vision. However, on close inspection, this facile comfort proves to be unfounded as soon as we realise that those examples are not reliable at all. In this respect, Daniel P. Deneau is quite right in noting that, in the case of the ivory gate, Pope 'is carrying irony so far as to supply ironic notes which, in turn, nullify the traditional meaning of a symbolic allusion in the poem itself'.[21]

Thus, the tension in Pope's complex attitude towards the dunces remains throughout *The Dunciad* A and is, in fact, most extreme at the end. It is impossible to interpret this work from an 'either/or' perspective. Rather, this work should be understood from a 'both/and' perspective.

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[20]For Pope and his fellow Scriblerians, Scriblerus is a symbol of abuses in learning, who cannot arrive at true understanding through his obsession with details and mechanical reasoning. For the understanding of the Scriblerians' undermining of him to advocate true scholarship, see Brean S. Hammond, 'Scriblerian Self-Fashioning', *YES*, 18 (1988), 108-124, Roger D. Lund, 'Martinus Scriblerus and the Search for the Soul', *PLL*, 25 (1989), 135-150. We can find an example of this undermining in the *Dunciad* A in the note to Book III, l. 272, in which Scriblerus demonstrates his myopic knowledge in his discussion of Shakespeare which, despite its extensive detail, does not provide the readers with any purposeful understanding of Shakespeare.

[21]Daniel P. Deneau, p. 210.

Our next task, then, is to examine whether this tension remains the same in *The Dunciad* B. Our conclusion must be that this is not so. It seems to me that the tension in Pope's complex attitude has broken down by 1742, when he wrote *The New Dunciad.* We cannot ignore the fact that, between 1729 and 1743, lie Pope's major satires. In fact, Pope provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of his satires in reforming the world in his final note to the *Epilogue to the Satires,* Dialogue II:

> This was the last poem of the kind printed by our author, with a resolution to publish no more; but to enter thus, in the most plain and solemn manner he could, a sort of PROTEST against that insuperable corruption and depravity of manners, which he had been so unhappy as to live to see. Could he have hoped to have amended any, he had continued those attacks; but bad men were grown so shameless and so powerful, that Ridicule was become as unsafe as it was ineffectual. [22]

Having concluded his satires to have been 'ineffectual', Pope seems not to maintain his double attitude towards the dunces any more, for now he thinks 'bad men were grown shameless and so powerful': they are no longer regarded as nothings upon whom he can look down comfortably.

In the final vision of this work, the emphasis is clearly shifted to the apocalyptic quality. Before Book IV, Pope adds the following remark to the note to lines 5-6 of Book III, borrowing Bentley's name: 'How much the good Scriblerus was mistaken, may be seen from the Fourth book, which, it is plain from hence, he had never seen.' (B, III, ll. 5-6n) This note quite restrains the meaning of the preceding note by Scriblerus, so that the tension in Pope's complex attitude does no longer exist. Of course we might doubt the sincerity of this note, since it is provided in the name of Richard Bentley, who, for Pope, is another example of the abuse of learning.[23] However, as Bentley is provided as an example of the sad collapse of education and scholarship in Book IV, he cannot be lamenting the fallacy of Scriblerus's remark on the ivory gate; rather he is celebrating it. In this note, Pope proves Scriblerus's fallacy not with Bentley's authority, but at his expense. The vision through the ivory gate proves to be no longer false: it is real and supported by the evidences of contemporary corruption in 1743. Most importantly, it is

[22] *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 327.
[23] For Pope's relationship with Richard Bentley, see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*, pp. 481-485.

no longer presented as the mad dream of Tibbald, but delivered by the poet himself. It seems to me that Book IV of *The Dunciad* B carefully lays the groundwork for a broad indictment of society which dramatically justifies its apocalyptic vision. Book IV differs from the previous three books in that it uses real names in only a few instances and an identification of the pseudonym—Annius, Silenus, Paridel, and the like—with real people is impossible. This fact means that, as Aubrey Williams suggests, the presentation of this book is 'an emblem of the greater human spectacle, a dramatic imitation thoroughly representative of the human situation', not of a localised matter.[24] The objects of Book IV are not restricted to the dunces: they come to represent the common phenomena of contemporary society. In the note to line 337 of Book III in *The Dunciad* A, Pope feigns to have a hope from 'the diligence of our Schools', 'the regularity of our Universities', 'the discernment of our Great men', and 'the encouragement of our Patrons'. Of course, as I have noted earlier, this hope is Scriblerus's not exactly Pope's, and there is an undeniable trace of irony. However, if we consider the 'saying' and 'unsaying' nature of the Scriblerian note, and thus understand that it is not possible to interpret it exclusively as ironic, Pope should have some share in this hope, however small it might be. Thus, at least on the surface level, this note serves in favour of proving the falsity of the final vision. However, what Pope does before he writes the final vision in *The Dunciad* B is to make this remark totally ironic—that is, to deny any possibility of hope in this note, as if he denies himself any lingering optimism in face of reality.

The pessimistic aspect of Book IV is revealed from the start in Pope's new invocation:

> Yet, yet a moment, one dim Ray of Light
> Indulge, dread Chaos, and eternal Night!
> Of darkness visible so much be lent,
> As half to shew, half veil the deep Intent.
> Ye Powr's! whose Mysteries restor'd I sing,
> To whom Time bears me on his rapid wing,
> Suspend a while your Force inertly strong,
> Then take at once the Poet and the Song. (B, IV, ll. 1-8)

[24]Aubrey Williams, p. 90.

In this invocation, the dominance of Dulness becomes apparent, because, for the completion of this book, Pope depends not on the traditional Muse but on a reprieve from 'dread Chaos and eternal Night'. This petition wins a temporary reprieve from the final darkness, thus making the completion of Book IV possible. However, at the same time, if I may borrow Howard Erskine-Hill's words, 'the magnificently dramatic nature of the lines (the opening: "Yet, yet a moment . . ." seemingly almost fend off night) confirms the powerful imminence of the end'.[25]

The collapse of Pope's hope can be found through the dunces' speeches to the goddess Dulness. In their speeches, the dunces are no longer self-defeating: rather, they are very proud of extending the territory of Dulness. In Book IV, the dunces are not failing to do something: they are achieving their goals.

The first frustration of Pope's hope is presented through a schoolmaster's speech, which is well contrasted with the fact that Pope places his first hope on 'the diligence of our Schools'. When the schoolmaster makes his speech to Dulness as follows,

> "Since Man from beast by Words is known,
> Words are Man's province, Words we teach alone.
> When Reason doubtful, like the Samian letter,
> Points him two ways, the narrower is the better.
> Plac'd at the door of Learning, youth to guide,
> We never suffer it to stand too wide.
> To ask, to guess, to know, as they commence,
> As Fancy opens the quick springs of Sense,
> We ply the Memory, we load the brain,
> Bind rebel Wit, and double chain on chain,
> Confine the thought, to exercise the breath;
> And keep them in the pale of Words till death.
> Whate'er the talents, or howe'er design'd,
> We hang one jingling padlock on the mind:
> A Poet the first day, he dips his quill;
> And what the last? a very Poet still. (B, IV, ll. 149-164)

he actually shows how perverted education has become in the kingdom of George and Dulness through the dunces' '"narrowing" potency, their enmity to dubiety and

[25]Howard Erskine-Hill, *Pope: The Dunciad* (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), p. 61.

speculation, their command of rote learning and formulaic language'.[26] In this passage, the schoolmaster's concept of a word is quite different from ours. Usually when we think of a word, we regard it as a combination of thought and phoneme. However, the schoolmaster's word is the word without thought, thus a hollow phoneme. Therefore, the youth who are taught by a schoolmaster of this kind are bound to disregard the right use of words, which cannot be the goal of the education proper, but which Dulness desires:

> "Oh (cry'd the Goddess) for some pedant Reign!
> Some gentle JAMES, to bless the land again;
> To stick the Doctor's Chair into the Throne,
> Give law to Words, or war with Words alone,
> Senates and Courts with Greek and Latin rule,
> And turn the Council to a Grammar School!
> For sure, if Dulness sees a grateful Day,
> 'Tis in the shade of Arbitrary Sway.
> O! if my sons may learn one earthly thing,
> Teach but that one, sufficient for a King;
> That which my Priests, and mine alone, maintain,
> Which as it dies, or lives, we fall, or reign:
> May you, may Cam, and Isis preach it long!
> 'The RIGHT DIVINE of Kings to govern wrong.'" (B, IV, ll. 175-188)

In Dulness's speech, the hollow flattery resulting from the abuse of words is not confined to the public schools: it is also extended to senates, courts, universities, and the Royal Council. Also, as Aubrey Williams notes, the sovereign is diminished to a 'royal pedagogue' through giving 'law to Words, or War with Words alone'.[27] He is supposed to rule the nation with right command, which is the combination of words and its just content. However, in this passage, he is only interested in words alone, lacking the justness which should back his command. Thus, wordy servitude and royal pedantry open a way for a new tyranny, as phrases such as 'Arbitrary Sway' or 'The RIGHT DIVINE of Kings to govern Wrong' indicate.

The perversion of education is again well revealed in Bentley's account of the academic process. His account of scholarship can be summarised in terms of pride and the idolatry of minute details. Bentley is so proud that he boasts of having humbled

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[26]B. L. Reid, 'Ordering Chaos: *The Dunciad*', in *Quick Springs of Sense: Studies in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. by Larry S. Champion (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1974), pp. 75-96 (p. 93).
[27]Aubrey Williams, p. 118.

Milton and Horace, turning their verse to prose, and esteems himself superior to ancient grammarians (ll. 209-218). But this proud critic who takes pride in spending time in 'Disputes of *Me* or *Te*, of *aut* or *at*,/ To sound or sink in *cano*, O or A,/ Or give up Cicero to C or K' (ll. 220-222) reveals how he is preoccupied with minute details which have nothing to do with scholarship proper. In his studies, Bentley concentrates only on a part of the whole experience, thus his learning cannot teach 'How parts relate to parts, or they to whole,/ The body's harmony, the beaming soul' (ll. 235-236). For him, the proper study of mankind—the whole man, body's harmony, and the beaming soul—will be possible only 'when Man's whole frame is obvious to a *Flea*' (l. 238). Bentley's method of study is an example of man trespassing beyond his proper status in the whole creation. In the *Essay on Man*, Pope asserts that the bliss of man

> Is not to act or think beyond mankind;
> No pow'rs of body or of soul to share,
> But what his nature and his state can bear.[28] (I, ll. 190-192)

For Pope, man does not need and must not have a microscopic eye, because 'Man is not a Fly' (I, l. 194). However, in *The Dunciad* B, Bentley shows man's presumptuous trespassing of the order of creation when his 'microscope of Wit,/ Sees hairs and pores, examines bit by bit' (I, ll. 233-234). Pope shows his contempt for this kind of attitude in the *Essay on Man*, as he stresses that it is of no use for man to acquire 'finer optics given' if he is only 'T'inspect a mite, not comprehend the heav'n' (ll. 195-196).

The speech of a young fop who has returned from the Grand Tour completes the destruction of education, as his experience is contrasted with the traditional concept that the Grand Tour completes the education of gentlemen. Far from being ripened by commerce with men and cities, what the young fop has achieved from the Grand Tour is only the complete loss of his rhetorical training:

> Dropt the dull lumber of the Latin store,
> Spoil'd his own language, and acquir'd no more;
> All Classic learning lost on Classic ground;
> And last turn'd *Air*, the Echo of a Sound!

[28] *An Essay on Man*, ed. by Maynard Mack, Volume III i, *The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope*, 11 vols. (London: Methuen, 1950; repr. London: Routledge, 1993), p. 38.

See now, half-cur'd, and perfectly well-bred,
With nothing but a Solo in his head; (B, IV, ll. 319-324)

and moral corruption:

As much Estate, and Principle, and Wit,
As Jansen, Fleetwood, Cibber shall think fit;
Stol'n from a Duel, follow'd by a Nun,
And, if a Borough chuse him, not undone;
See, to my country happy I restore
This glorious Youth, and add one Venus more. (B, IV, ll. 325-330)

While, in the first half of Book IV, Pope has been steadily describing the collapse of learning through concentration on word without thought and obsession with part without whole, in the latter half he is concerned with the perverted and irrational obsession with material objects. After the episode of the Grand Tour, Pope shows this kind of obsession in the examples of coin collectors, virtuosi, and dogmatic reasoners. We should notice that, in these examples, an exclusive obsession with material objects leads to irreligion and profanity.

The portrait of Annius, a coin collector, is a good example of preoccupation with material objects leading to irreligion. As can be seen in the following lines, in the kingdom of George and Dulness, through the obsession with coins, gold is apotheosised, taking the place of God:

Then taught by Hermes, and divinely bold,
Down his own throat he risqu'd the Grecian gold;
Receiv'd each Demi-God, with pious care,
Deep in his Entrails—I rever'd them there,
I bought them, shrouded in that living shrine,
And, at their second birth, they issue mine." (B, IV, ll. 381-386)

In the portraits of virtuosi, we can find a perverted misunderstanding of nature through the obsession with material objects. The florist misunderstands the function of nature in the flower which he prizes so highly as his own. Because of his obsession with the flower, he cannot recognise that nature, not he, has 'suckled, and chear'd, with air,

and sun, and show'r' (l. 406), believing that he, not nature, has engendered a blossom: 'Did Nature's pencil ever blend such rays,/ Such vary'd light in one promiscuous blaze?' (ll. 411-412) In the florist's appreciation of nature, there is no room for the real Creator. Through the example of the entomologist, Pope demonstrates how the aimless desire of possession replaces 'the contemplative understanding of nature'.[29] The entomologist is not interested in whether the butterfly is dead or alive: all he is interested in is his possession of the butterfly: 'Whose spoils this paper offers to your eye,/ Fair ev'n in death! this peerless *Butterfly*.' (ll. 435-436) As Aubrey Williams explains, both virtuosi 'focus extravagantly upon nature itself and grant to the thing the devotion properly given to God, instead of looking "thro' Nature up to Nature's God"'.[30] Unlike in the *Essay on Man* where man admires nature and recognises his proper status in the Great Chain of Being, in *The Dunciad* B, man's understanding of nature is so perverted that he cannot recognise his proper status in the whole creation and, through his vain pride, even tries to occupy the Creator's status.

These perversions of the dunces in the realm of nature eventually lead to theological perversions. In the portrait of a gloomy clerk who is a

> Sworn foe to Myst'ry, yet divinely dark;
> Whose pious hope aspires to see the day
> When Moral Evidence shall quite decay,
> And damns implicit faith, and holy lies,
> Prompt to impose, and fond to dogmatize:) (B, IV, ll. 460-464)

we can find a hint of profanity, which results from his perverted obsession with nature in which there is no room for spiritual revelation. The profanity of this gloomy clerk also results from his pride, as can be seen in the following lines:

> All-seeing in thy [Dulness's] mists, we want no guide,
> Mother of Arrogance, and Source of Pride!
> We nobly take the high Priori Road,
> And reason downward, till we doubt of God: (B, IV, ll. 469-472)

[29]Aubrey Williams, p. 127.
[30]Aubrey Williams, p. 127.

This profanity reaches its culmination when he, as a representative of the dunces, denies man's proper status in creation and makes man its sole purpose:

> Make God Man's Image, Man the final Cause,
> Find Virtue local, all Relation scorn,
> See all in *Self*, and but for self be born:
> Of nought so certain as our *Reason* still,
> Of nought so doubtful as of *Soul* and *Will*. (B, IV, ll. 478-482)

When Pope describes all the nation succumbing to the sleep caused by Dulness, he is actually symbolising that now contemporary society is so corrupt that it has no power and will to resist Dulness. Not only the dunces, but also all the important national figures—churches, chapels, schools, convocations, Palinurus (Robert Walpole), and so on—surrender to sleep. (ll. 605-618) Thus 'drown'd was Sense, and Shame, and Right, and Wrong—' (l. 625).

When Pope has finished describing the nation's surrender to sleep, the reprieve that the poet has won temporarily in the start of this book at last ends, and Chaos begins to come: soon 'Universal Darkness buries all' (l. 656). Unlike the final vision in *The Dunciad* A, this vision is securely supported, and there is no final twist of meaning as in the mention of the ivory gate in the earlier version. In Book IV, the corruption in the private sphere in the previous three books—that is, bad writing of the dunces—is extended to the corruption in the public sphere, such as the collapse of a proper education. Thus, Pope's vague and ironic hope in the note to lines 5-6 and line 337 in *The Dunciad* A is completely denied through this book. In one sense, we may say that *The Dunciad* B is a poem about the fulfilment of Satan's vow to restore all creation to chaos. What the dunces do in this poem—that is, pervert men's sense through deforming art—is to negate the creation, thus it can be identified with Satan's design to return to chaos. When, at the end of this work, 'CHAOS! is restor'd' (l. 653) and 'Universal Darkness buries All' (l. 656), Satan's vow seems to be achieved. The creation is again uncreated by the restoration of 'Night Primæval' and 'Chaos old'. The creation begins by God's word, 'Let there be light' (Genesis 2: 1), yet in this work the creation comes to an end by the destruction of the light in Genesis. Even this dark apocalyptic future seems

not distant: it seems so close to Pope that he should write his vision not in the future tense, but in the present tense.

Of course, to interpret this poem as a whole as totally pessimistic is to do it an injustice. As a large amount of *The Dunciad* B is a repetition of *The Dunciad* A, especially Books I, II, and III, there still remains Pope's complex attitude towards the dunces. However, this complex attitude is a legacy from *The Dunciad* A. What we should give more attention to in *The Dunciad* B is its general and onward movement toward the final apocalyptic end and its progressive preparation of the basis for the horror in the final lines. Though there do exist some local differences, the slow movement of this work is toward the final end.

Then we may conclude that *The Dunciad* B is a pessimistic poem. If we consider what resolves the tension in Pope's complex attitude, we should recognise that this consists of what Pope added to *Dunciad* A, mainly Book IV. What is added to *Dunciad* A in 1743 is Pope's pessimistic vision of the future.

## II

Having established the pessimism of *The Dunciad* B, it is time for us to turn to Jonathan Swift. It is my contention that, if we interpret Swift's satires written towards the end of his literary career, we can detect a pessimistic outlook, even though its manifestation is quite different from Pope's. The characteristic shared by *On the Day of Judgement* and *A Character, Panegyric, and the Description of the Legion Club* is Swift's eruption of anger which cannot be said to be under the firm control of his reason. This is a clue to the fact that, in the end, Pope and Swift arrived at similar places along the road of satirical poetry.[31]

*On the Day of Judgement* could have caused a great uproar against Swift, if it had been published in his lifetime. For, this poem contains implications too unorthodox for an Anglican priest to have written it, though God in this poem is thinly disguised as Jove:

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[31]*On the Day of Judgement* is conjectured to have been written in 1731, 1732, or 1733; *The Legion Club* was written in 1736 and was first published in the same year. For the tangled provenance and the different versions of *On the Day of Judgement* and its publication history, see *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers (London: Penguin, 1983), pp. 863-864, Leland D. Peterson, 'The Spectral Hand in Swift's "Day of Judgement"', *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, 70 (1976), 189-219, Sidney L. Gulick, 'No "Spectral Hand" in Swift's "Day of Judgement"', *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, 71 (1977), 333-336.

merciless and unforgiving God. To expound this point, I shall begin my discussion by quoting the entire poem:

> With a whirl of thought oppressed,
> I sink from reverie to rest.
> An horrid vision seized my head,
> I saw the graves give up their dead.
> Jove, armed with terrors, burst the skies,
> And thunder roars, and lightening flies!
> Amazed, confused, its fate unknown,
> The world stands trembling at his throne.
> While each pale sinner hangs his head,
> Jove, nodding, shook the heavens, and said,
> 'Offending race of humankind,
> By nature, reason, learning, blind;
> You who through frailty stepped aside,
> And you who never fell — *through pride*;
> You who in different sects have shammed,
> And come to see each other damned;
> (So some folks told you, but they knew
> No more of Jove's designs than you)
> The world's mad business now is o'er,
> And I resent these pranks no more.
> I to such blockheads set my wit!
> I damn such fools! - Go, go you're bit.'[32]

By line 4, the readers will understand that this poem is about the Judgement Day, as the phrase 'the graves give up their dead' clearly indicates. However, a sensible reader might detect a disturbing hint in Swift's version of the Judgement Day: for, it is a 'horrid vision', which is not quite what the reader wants and expects it to be. Nevertheless, the poem builds up the readers' expectation and suspense, as Swift plays the mood up by setting the scene right for it: 'each pale sinner', representative of all humankind, waits for God's word, God's salvation as 'the world stands trembling'. However, the readers are in for a shock as they read through the final four lines. They expect the Judgement Day to

[32] *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 507. In this thesis, I use Pat Rogers's edition for Swift's poems. My decision is not without reservation, as there is another excellent edition of Swift's poems by Harold Williams, *The Poems of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Harold Williams, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958). However, even though, unlike Harold Williams, Pat Rogers modernises typography, which I am not so happy about because in so doing he seems to miss some ironic point manipulated by italics, I decided that the benefit of its being the later edition should be given more weight than original typography. As there are some textual differences between the two editions, I shall point out the differences if they bear some importance.

be a solemn occasion on which the fate of salvation will be revealed to humankind. However, quite contrary to our religious belief that the faithful shall be saved, in this poem there is not one saved by Jove/God. What is more appalling for the readers is the way Jove speaks—that is, his colloquialism. We expect God to speak solemnly especially when the occasion is a serious one such as the Judgement Day, but, contrary to our expectations, he speaks colloquial, even slangy language: as we can see clearly in the terms 'pranks', 'blockheads', and the expression 'Go, go you're bit'. What is worse for the readers is the verbal play of Jove's jokes: the blindness comes from 'nature, reason, learning', which are expected to be related to spiritual awakening, and he attributes 'never fell' to pride, which would be normally related to man's downfall. In this way, Jove, God, is mocking the reader. It is humiliating for the reader, as Nora C. Jaffe observes, to be compelled to 'accept as his judge a god who cares nothing about human dignity or his due process'.[33]

However appalling this is, there is no escape for the readers. For, the narrator includes himself in the damned, right from the start using the first person pronoun: 'I sink from reverie to rest', 'I saw the graves give up their dead'. In this poem, the 'I' attacks all the readers and makes sure that there is no escape by ensuring that he is also included in the damned. As W. B. C. Watkins puts it, when the narrator 'lashes first himself', the readers can hardly claim exception from the satire, or dissociate themselves from the satirist on grounds that he is prideful or partial.[34]

Then, this poem differs from what proponents of satire claim it to be. Contemporary defenders of satire, including Pope and Swift, justified satire on the grounds of its reformative function against the charges of maliciousness.[35] Yet this poem does not quite fit well with the reformative function of satire proposed by its defenders. There is no reformative will in this satire, but rather a desire to lash out at its victims. Whoever its victims are—general humankind or the non-conformist[36]—Swift shows no

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[33]Nora C. Jaffe, *The Poet Swift* (Hanover, New Hampshire: The University Press of New England, 1977), p. 30.

[34]W. B. C. Watkins, *Perilous Balance: The Tragic Genius of Swift, Johnson, & Sterne* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 6.

[35]The contemporary debate for and against satire, and their bases, will be discussed extensively in the first part of chapter 3. Pope's and Swift's remarks on the reformative functions of satire will be presented mainly in part IV of this chapter and part I of chapter 3.

[36]For those who prefer to interpret the target of satire as dissenters, the clue comes from line 2. For them, the word 'reverie' may denote the fanaticism of the dissenters, which was the frequent target of attack from the orthodox church. For the critical opinion which interprets this poem as directed primarily at the

sign of will to correct his victims' vice or folly: to incriminate the readers, the potential reformers, and tell them that they will be damned without exception, rather than that they are in danger of future damnation, is not the way in which a reformative satire would operate.[37]

We can find Swift's desire to lash out at his victims again in the *Epistle to a Lady*, which was written in a similar period.[38] In this poem, even though Swift pretends to Horatian calm, his rage asserts itself and lets him confess what he would do if he only had the power:

> Safe within my little wherry,
> All their madness makes me merry:
> Like the waterman of Thames,
> I row by, and call them names.
> Like the ever-laughing sage,
> In a jest I spend my rage.
> (Though it must be understood,
> I would hang them if I could:) (ll. 173-180)

As in *On the Day of Judgement*, in these lines there is no will to reform, but rather to punish his victims, as the final two lines clearly demonstrate. As we can see in the following lines, what dominates Swift is his sadistic desire to inflict as much pain as possible on his victims:

> Let me, though the smell be noisome,

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dissenters, not at humanity in general, see Maurice Johnson, 'Text and Possible Occasion for Swift's "Day of Judgement"', *PMLA*, 86 (1971), 210-217. For a different interpretation, see Nora C. Jaffe, pp. 26-30. For me, this debate stems from the question of the identification of the narrator with the author, in other words, the problem of persona. This is to decide whether Swift undermines the butt of his satire—the dissenters—by assuming their identity or whether Swift lashes his anger towards mankind in general in *propria persona*. Unfortunately, it seems to me that this poem is too short and evidence too scarce to resolve the matter comfortably. However, as far as my discussion is concerned, there is no difference whether its target is the dissenter or mankind in general: for, my concern here is the collapse of the reformatory relationship between Swift and his victims, rather than deciding who his victims are. The problem of persona, especially its relationship with the author, will be discussed in the part I and II of chapter 4, where its discussion bears direct importance for my discussion of Pope's Horatian imitations and Swift's poems to Stella and the Markethill poems.

[37]For the various relationship between the satirist and the readers, and for the changing emphasis in the eighteenth century from the relationship between the satirist and the audience (the readers) to that between the satirist and his victim, see Thomas Lockwood, 'The Augustan Author-Audience Relationship: Satiric Vs Comic Forms', *ELH*, 36 (1969), 648-658.

[38]*Epistle to a Lady* was written between 1728 and 1733, and published in 1733. For detailed history of writing, see *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 867.

Strip their bums; let Caleb hoise 'em;
Then apply Alecto's whip,
Till they wriggle, howl, and skip. (ll. 187-190)

In these lines, as well as in *On the Day of Judgement*, satire is not reformative, but destructive in its motivation. Behind satires of this kind, there looms the satirist's pessimism about the future, when he regards his victims as unable to reform themselves.[39] Swift does not even bother to seek the general readers' approval, as his attacks on the victims come close to sadism, causing the readers' disgust, regardless of whether they may agree with him or not. Swift simply seems to enjoy his sadistic desire. We can find the fully fledged destructive desire of this kind in Swift's later poem *A Character, Panegyric, and Description of the Legion Club*, written and published in 1736.

The desire to scourge his enemies totally overshadows *The Legion Club* to the verge of sadism. We, as the readers, recognise that this poem is always on the brink of becoming an uncontrolled outburst. Our first encounter with Swift's rage at the Irish MP occurs in the following lines, where Swift invents the most terrible and torturing punishment imaginable for his victims:

Could I from the building's top
Hear the rattling thunder drop,
While the devil upon the roof,
If the devil be thunder-proof,

[39]Some might argue that punitive satire can be reformative even though its author regards his satiric butt as unredeemable, since the target of reform can be the readers rather than its satiric butts. Actually, Dryden, in his *Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire* made a remark on this reformative function of satire as follows: ''Tis an Action of Virtue to make Examples of vicious Men. They may and ought to be upbraided with their Crimes and Follies: Both for their own amendment if they are not yet incorrigible; and for the Terrour of others, to hinder them from falling into the Enormities, which they see are so severely punish'd, in the Persons of others;', *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. by H. T. Swedenberg, Jr. and others, IV, p. 60. However, we should note that not all of the attacks on the unredeemable persons can be approved by the public. This is to say that there should be some kind of justification on the part of the satirist for his attack on the satiric victim to persuade the readers to his argument, as he should not take the readers' approval for granted in his attack. As Dryden pointed out in his *Discourse*, the satirist's attack on the victim should be controlled (emotionally and rhetorically) not to cause the readers' disgust in getting their approval: 'Yet there is still a vast difference betwixt the slovenly Butchering of a Man, and the fineness of a stroak that separates the Head from the Body, and leaves it standing in its place. A man may be capable, as *Jack Ketch*'s Wife said of his Servant, of a plain piece of Work, a bare Hanging; but to make a Malefactor die sweetly, was only belonging to her Husband.' (p. 71) I shall discuss in more detail the satirist's control of his emotion towards his victim for the reformative function of satire in part III of chapter 3.

Should with poker fiery red
Crack the stones, and melt the lead;
Drive them down on every skull,
While the den of thieves is full, (ll. 21-28)

At the end of these lines, Swift tries to endow this kind of punishment with logic by citing authorities as follows:

For divines allow, that God
Sometimes makes the devil his rod:
And the gospel will inform us,
He can punish sins enormous. (ll. 31-34)

However, these lines are not convincing as a defence of Swift's verbal violence towards his victims: even according to Swift's logic, God 'sometimes' not 'always' makes the devil his rod, thus to avoid the accusation of disproportionate punishment, what Swift needs is to substantiate his claim that this is the time to punish sins 'enormous'. However, there is no verification of this kind, and in this poem Swift 'always' punishes his victims enormously.

When he enters the building of Parliament, his rage becomes murderous and is only checked by Clio's interruption, who argues for scorn and contempt instead of anger and violence:[40]

By this odious crew beset,
I began to rage and fret,
And resolved to break their pates,
Ere we entered at the gates;
Had not Clio in the nick,
Whispered me, 'Let down your stick';
'What,' said I, 'is this the madhouse?'
'These,' she answered, 'are but shadows,
Phantoms, bodiless and vain,
Empty visions of the brain.' (ll. 93-102)

[40]As Clio is the creation of Swift, we can assume that she represents another attitude towards the Irish MP, which temporarily checks his burst of rage.

However, Clio's check on Swift's anger does not last long. When Clio has to retreat herself because she is 'stifled with the smell,/ Into spleen and vapours fell' (ll. 121-122), the poet remains alone without any check on his rage. In his portrait of Richard Tithe and Richard Bettesworth, Dick Fitz-Baker and Dick the player, the poet himself admits that this poem is not about correction, but about the complete destruction of his enemies:

> Tie them, keeper, in a tether,
> Let them stare and stink together;
> Both are apt to be unruly,
> Lash them daily, lash them duly,
> Though 'tis hopeless to reclaim them,
> Scorpion rods perhaps may tame them. (ll. 153-158)

Here, Swift's enemies are regarded as mad and incurable, thus lashing his victims may be justified as the only way to tame them. However, this kind of logic presents us, the readers, with some problems. As Nora C. Jaffe rightly argues, if the victims of satire are not able to reform, 'the end of satire—so far as the victims are concerned—is purely punitive, and the punishments proliferate here with such speed and vividness that the reader has every right to suspect Swift of diabolic glee'.[41] In this respect, what is demonstrated in these lines is only 'the need to hurt, in the absence of a more helpful motive'.[42] In these lines, even the reason for this sort of punishment is not provided.[43] The poet carries out his attack so hastily, becoming enraged at the moment he sees his enemy, that he ignores the readers' right to know why these victims are being punished: in this respect, this poem seems to be written for the sole satisfaction of the poet, not for sharing his views with the readers.

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[41]Nora C. Jaffe, p. 151.

[42]Richard H. Rodino, 'Notes on the Developing Motives and Structures of Swift's Poetry', in *Contemporary Studies of Swift's Poetry*, ed. by John I. Fischer and Donald C. Mell, Jr. (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981), pp. 87-100 (p. 97).

[43]Of course, Swift did not have to provide some contemporaries (who understood the occasion for his attack on the Irish MPs—the removal of the pasturage tithes in March 1736—and had similar views to him upon the matter) with detailed explanation for his attack. However, for the reformative function of this poem, the important readers were not Swift's allies who were quite ready to approve any kind of action, but more neutral readers whose support Swift needed to turn the tide for him. It is for the readers of the latter kind that the justification of his attack should have been provided. For more detailed information on the affair of the pasturage tithes, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, 3 vols. (London: Methuen, 1962-1983), III, pp. 819-831.

Yet, though on the verge of outburst, Swift does not plunge into chaos in this poem. He does not totally lose control of himself, though sometimes very close to it.[44] The final 12 lines of this poem are a little out of place in comparison with the rest of the poem. As we can see in the following lines,

> Keeper, I must now retire,
> You have done what I desire:
> But I feel my spirits spent,
> With the noise, the sight, the scent.'
>
> 'Pray be patient, you shall find
> Half the best are still behind:
> You have hardly seen a score,
> I can show two hundred more.'
> 'Keeper, I have seen enough,'
> Taking then a pinch of snuff;
> I concluded, looking round 'em,
> May their god, the devil confound 'em. (ll. 231-242)

Swift's rather hasty and tame withdrawal from the Parliament building seems to be out of place with all the violent animus he has been expressing toward his victims. However, even though these lines are spoken with a subdued tone, there is actually a more pessimistic outlook behind them than there is behind his previous violent animus in the rest of the poem. To understand this point, we should ask why he has to make such a hasty exit. It seems to me that it is because the poet comes to recognise that it is no longer possible for him not to become mad if he stays and continues to scourge his enemies. At this point, we need to go back to the discussion of lines 93-102. In these lines, we can recognise Swift's involvement with the madness he is attacking in his enemies. Clio's words have a double meaning when she says 'These. . . are but shadows,/ Phantoms bodiless and vain/ Empty visions of the Brain' (ll. 100-102). As David Ward observes, on the surface level, these words can be interpreted as meaning

[44]I think that there are two kinds of control operating in the poem: the one rhetorical and the other emotional. Swift does not lose rhetorical control, because, if he indeed had lost it, the existence of this work—especially that of the verse form—would have been impossible. It seems to me that Swift succeeds in maintaining the joking atmosphere through his light style of prosody, that is, his use of racy octosyllabics. However, what I am concerned about is his emotional control—that is, the question of whether Swift succeeds in curbing his emotion not to put off the neutral readers by unnecessary outburst of rage, about which I am doubtful. For Swift's rhetorical control of his emotion throughout the poem, see Nora C. Jaffe, pp. 145-157.

that 'the inmates of the parliament or madhouse are unreal and meaningless', but they can also question the sanity of the poet who sees them, because it is he who sees these 'shadows' and 'phantoms': thus, Swift 'is involved in a curious way with the chaos; a chaos which drains him of his spirit and energy just as the careless visitor seeking amusement in Bedlam may be more deeply involved in the madness than he would care to admit'.[45] In this poem, the enemies which the poet sadistically tortures possess a strange power. They can contaminate their attacker in their madness. They may be mad and may be scourged, but contact with them will make one infected: in other words, they are strangely dangerous and powerful. Swift may for the time being fulfil his sadistic desire, but in the end it is his victims who get the upper hand.

In *The Dunciad* B and Swift's two poems, *On the Day of Judgement* and *The Legion Club*, a common feature can be found. Both Pope and Swift recognise that the reformative power of satire does not exist any more: behind Pope's apocalyptic final vision and Swift's scourging of his victims is this sense of the helplessness of a satirist and of the powerlessness of satire. In this sense, the perspective of these poems is pessimistic about the future and thus even tragic.

III

Having mentioned 'tragic', I had better define the term, which I shall be using in relation to the discussion of satire. OED defines 'tragic' as '1. of, pertaining, or proper to tragedy as a branch of the drama; composing, or acting in, tragedy; befitting, or having the style of, tragedy 2. Resembling tragedy in respect of its matter; relating to or expressing fatal or dreadful events; sad, gloomy 3. Resembling the notion or conclusion of a tragedy; characterized by or involving "tragedy" in real life; calamitous, disastrous, terrible, fatal'. What I am interested in is not definition 1, which closely links the term to the tragedy as a drama, but definitions 2 and 3: what is the 'matter' of 'tragedy' and what characterises its conclusion? As there can be various kinds of outlook which underlie a satire, I want to use 'tragic' or 'comic' each to describe one of these outlooks.

Such an emphasis on the fundamental significance of the terms, as distinct from their generic application, has been made by some distinguished critics. For example, Susanne Langer, in her classic study of aesthetics, *Feeling and Form*, emphasises the

[45]David Ward, *Jonathan Swift: An Introductory Essay* (London: Methuen, 1973), p.196.

sense of life in comedy, arguing that the pure sense of life is the underlying feeling of comedy. For her, it is the

> realization in direct feeling of what sets organic nature apart from inorganic: self-preservation, self-restoration, functional tendency, purpose. Life is teleological, the rest of nature is, apparently, mechanical.[46]

Langer regards the essence of the comic sense of life as the individual's successful survival of its unpredictable environment. In contrast, in the tragic sense of life, the emphasis is put on the sense of ending:

> Tragedy is a cadential form. Its crisis is always the turn toward an absolute close. This form reflects the basic structure of personal life, and therewith of feeling when life is viewed as a whole. It is that attitude—"the tragic sense of life," as Unamuno called it—that is objectified and before our eyes in tragedy. But in a drama it is not presented as Unamuno presents it, namely by an intellectual realization of impending death which we are constitutionally unable to accept and therefore counter with an irrational belief in our personal immortality, in "immortalizing" rites and supernatural grace. Irrationalism is not an insight, but despair, a direct recognition of instincts, needs, and therewithal of one's mental impotence. (pp. 351-352)

The sense of survival in the comic outlook and that of ending in the tragic outlook are again mentioned and put into a longer perspective when Helen Gardner discusses comedy and tragedy as follows:

> The great symbol of pure comedy is marriage by which the world is renewed, and its endings are always instinct with a sense of fresh beginnings. Its rhythm is the rhythm of the life of mankind, which goes on and renews itself as the life of nature does. The rhythm of tragedy, on the other hand, is the rhythm of the individual life which comes to a close, and its great symbol is death. The one inescapable fact about every human beings is that he must die. No skill in living, no sense of life, no inborn grace or acquired wisdom can avert this individual doom. A tragedy, which is played out under the shadow of an inevitable end, is an image of the life pattern of every one of us. A comedy, which contrives an end which is not implicit in the beginning, and which is, in itself, a fresh beginning, is an image of the flow of human life. The young wed, so that they may become in turn the older generation, whose children will wed, and so on, as

[46]Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form* (London: Routledge, 1953), pp. 327-328.

> long as the world lasts. Comedy pictures what Rosalind calls "the full stream of the world."[47]

From these two critics, we can extract a meaning of the terms 'comic' and 'tragic'. The 'comic' outlook emphasises the survival of life: life overcomes the harsh trial of its environment and is continued in a person's offspring even after his or her own death. On the contrary, in the 'tragic' outlook the sense of ending is stressed: one cannot escape from eventual death, so that everything will be dissolved in the end. This description of the terms 'comic' and 'tragic' bears a close relationship to Alvin Kernan's explanation of 'comedy' and 'tragedy':

> Despite early trials, life turns out well in the end for individuals in comedy, and if some individuals are unluckily sacrificed, their children survive and life goes on. There are exceptions, of course, but where tragedy usually contains a sense of the shortness of life and the confinement of choice, comedy manages to convey, most often, a sense of openness in space and time.[48]

Then, it is the definition of 'tragedy' which emerges from the discussion of these critics that I wish to appropriate for my thesis: it is about ending, about the inevitability of ending, about man's helplessness to escape from ending.

We can observe what can form the characteristics of 'tragic' satire in Northrop Frye's discussion of six phases of satire.[49] Defining satire as a parody of romance, which 'is nearest of all literary forms to the wish-fulfilment dream' (p. 186), he describes the first phase of satire as follows, naming it the satire of the low norm:

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[47]Helen Gardner, '*As You Like It*', in *More Talking of Shakespeare*, ed. by John Garrett (London: Longman, 1959), pp. 17-32 (p. 21).

[48]Alvin Kernan, *The Plot of Satire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 196.

[49]In his discussion of comedy, romance, tragedy, and irony and satire in *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), Northrop Frye divides each genre into six phases. He argues that the top half of the natural cycle is the world of romance and the analogy of innocence and the lower half is the world of realism and the analogy of experience. He remarks that there are thus four main types of mythical movement: within romance, within experience, down and up. Thus the four genres which he calls *mythoi* or generic plots: comedy, romance, tragedy, and satire. His division of each genre into six phases comes from the three phases of downward movement and the three phases of upward movement. For instance, he summarises downward movement as the wheel of fortune falling from innocence toward harmartia, from harmartia to catastrophe. The upward movement is from threatening complications to a happy ending and a general assumption of post-date innocence, p. 162. He regards irony and satire as basically similar things, the chief distinction between them being that satire is militant irony: its moral norms are relatively clear, and it assumes standards against which the grotesque and absurd are measured, p. 223.

> It [the satire of the first phase] takes for granted a world which is full of anomalies, injustices, follies, and crimes, and yet is permanent and undisplaceable. Its principle is that anyone who wishes to keep his balance in such a world must learn first of all to keep his eyes open and his mouth shut. . . . What is recommended is conventional life at its best: a clairvoyant knowledge of human nature in oneself and others, an avoidance of all illusion and compulsive behavior, a reliance on observation and timing rather than on aggressiveness. (p. 226)

He argues that the second phase of satire differs from the first in that it challenges the conventions of society, the main frame of it being 'the picaresque novel, the story of the successful rogue who makes conventional society look foolish without setting up positive standard' (p. 229). He notes that the satire of this phase shows

> literature assuming a special function of analysis, of breaking up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that impede the free movement (not necessarily, of course, the progress) of society. Such satire is the completion of the logical process known as the *reductio ad absurdum*, which is not designed to hold one in perpetual captivity, but to bring one to the point at which one can escape from an incorrect procedure. (p. 233)

The satire of the third phase, the satire of high norm, is different from the second phase satire in that, while this may make a tactical defence of the pragmatic against the dogmatic, in this phase, even ordinary common sense cannot hold as a standard. The satirist of this phase, Northrop Frye argues,

> will show us society suddenly in a telescope as posturing and dignified pygmies, or in a microscope as hideous and reeking giants, or he will change his hero into ass and show us how humanity looks from an ass's point of view. This type of fantasy breaks down customary associations, reduces sense experience to one of many possible categories, and brings out the tentative, *als ob* basis of all our thinking. (pp. 234-235)

Northrop Frye stresses that from the fourth phase of satire, satire begins to recede and tragic elements emerge. He asserts that the satire of this phase

> stresses the humanity of its heroes, minimizes the sense of ritual inevitability in tragedy, supplies social and psychological explanations for catastrophe, and makes as much as possible of human misery seem, in Thoreau's phrase, "superfluous and evitable." (p. 237)

Yet the most important phases of satire which suit our current concern, tragic satire, are the fifth and sixth. In his discussion of the following phases of satire, we can understand what can be the characteristics of 'tragic' satire. Northrop Frye discusses the fifth and sixth phases of satire as follows:

> The fifth phase, corresponding to fatalistic or fifth-phase tragedy, is irony in which the main emphasis is on the natural cycle, the steady unbroken turning of the wheel of fate or fortune. It sees experience, in our terms, with the point of epiphany closed up, and its motto is Browning's "there may be heaven; there must be hell." Like the corresponding phase of tragedy, it is less moral and more generalized and metaphysical in its interest, less melioristic and more stoical and resigned. (p. 237)
>
> The sixth phase presents human life in terms of largely unrelieved bondage. Its settings feature prisons, madhouses, lynching mobs, and places of execution, and it differs from a pure inferno mainly in the fact that in human experience suffering has an end in death. (p. 238)

These descriptions fit well to Pope's *Dunciad* B and Swift's *On the Day of Judgement* and *The Legion Club*, where there is no will to reform remaining in the poet who is surrounded by ominous madness in which even he may be entangled. Behind these poems, there is a 'tragic' outlook of the satirist: he is resigned to the fact that he is powerless in the unrelenting movement of the world, which, as he understands, is closing to an end.[50]

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[50]It seems to me that this kind of understanding about 'tragic' and 'comic' satire was shared by contemporary literary minds in discussions of Horace and Juvenal. John Dennis, for instance, remarked that Horace 'endeavours to correct the Follies and Errors, and epidemick Vices of his Readers, which is the Business of Comedy' while Juvenal 'attacks the pernicious outrageous Passions and the abominable monstrous Crimes . . . which is the Business of Tragedy.', John Dennis, 'To Matthew Prior, Esq: Upon the Roman Satirists', in *The Critical Works of John Dennis*, ed. by Edward N. Hooker, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943), II, pp. 218-219. It is important to notice that, for John Dennis, it is the reformability of the world which differentiates the comic satire of Horace from the tragic satire of Juvenal. Dryden also used the terms 'tragical' and 'comical' in *Discourse* in his description of Horace's and Juvenal's satires, even though he did not elaborate on what is the difference between them: 'what disreputation is it to *Horace*, that *Juvenal* Excels in the Tragical Satyre, as *Horace* does in the Comical?' (pp. 73-74)

## IV

It is interesting and appropriate, considering that they were close literary allies, to notice that, at the end of their careers, both Pope and Swift wrote satires of tragic outlook. We should note that they did not write satires intermittently, but devoted to satire a considerable part of their literary careers, which covered decades. In this respect, it is of great importance for us to understand that they did not have the 'tragic' outlook in relation to satire from the beginning of their satiric careers. We can observe this if we investigate how their understanding of satire changed in the course of their careers.

In the beginning of his article 'Swift's Satiric Logic', Daniel Eilon poses a very difficult question: 'Is a satirist a judge or a vigilante, a public hangman or an assassin?'[51] I wonder whether there is any one who can possibly answer this question once and for all. To a satirist in defence of his satire, he is a judge who wants to protect the public weal: but to the victim of a satire or an unfavourable critic of satire, a satirist is an assassin who does irreparable damage to a person's reputation. What is interesting in Daniel Eilon's question is that he actually defines the possible roles for a satirist in a parallel set of terms according to the public sanction—that is, judge/public hangman versus vigilante/assassin. A satirist wants to believe himself and be regarded by the public as a judge, or, if it is not possible, at least as a public hangman who has a licence to kill even though his profession cannot be regarded as honourable. He does not want to be regarded as a vigilante, who acts on his own judgement without public approval, and the least thing he wants to be regarded as is an assassin.

The reason why I quoted Eilon's question rather abruptly is that we can find traces of fluctuation among these roles in Pope's and Swift's remarks on satire. Whether they acknowledged it or not, they certainly underwent a change of attitude towards satire throughout their satiric career. Their change of attitude may not seem clear cut, but if seen with a long term view, yields a linear development from optimistic and comic towards a pessimistic and tragic outlook. I shall trace this change in Swift's and Pope's remarks, relating to Eilon's question when suitable, concentrating on their

[51]Daniel Eilon, 'Swift's Satiric Logic: On Parsimony, Irony, and Antinomian Fiction', *YES*, 18 (1988), 18-40 (P. 18).

correspondence and prose works, which will be later collated with their verse satires in the chapters that follow.

Although the point would require some qualification, it seems to me that in the early phase of their satiric careers, Swift's and Pope's remarks on satire show that they strongly oppose being regarded as assassins. As we can see in the following remark of Pope on *The Rape of the Lock*

> This whimsical piece of work, as I have now brought it up to my first design, is at once the most a satire, and the most inoffensive, of anything of mine. People who would rather it were let alone laugh at it, and seem heartily merry, at the same time that they are uneasy. 'Tis a sort of writing very like tickling.[52]

his emphasis is on the inoffensiveness of his satire. In this stage of his career, Pope seems to believe that it is possible for a satire to be satiric and at the same time to be inoffensive. Of course, we should notice that, by the time Pope wrote this remark, *The Rape of the Lock* is the closest thing to satire he had written, and this poem is quite different from the opposition satires he will be writing in the 1730s. However, this appeal for the harmlessness of his satire can be found even as late as in 1731, in his letter to John Gay:

> I could not but hope better for this small and modest Epistle [*Epistle to Burlington*], which attacks *no one Vice* whatsoever; which deals only in *Folly* and not Folly in general, but a single Species of it; that only Branch, for the opposite Excellency to which, the Noble Lord to whom he writes must necessarily be celebrated, I fancied it might escape Censure, especially seeing how tenderly he treated these Follies, and seemed less to accuse them, than to make their Apology.[53]

In this letter written under the cover of William Cleland's name,[54] what Pope tries to do is to emphasise his innocence as a satirist: his satire only attacks small folly not vice, and

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[52]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, I, p. 211, Pope to Mrs. or Miss Marriot, 28 February 1713/4.
[53]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 255. [William Cleland] to Gay, 16 December 1731.
[54]George Sherburn clarifies that the letter was indeed written by Pope, not by William Cleland, and thus written for public reading: 'The letter first appeared as here given in *The Daily Post-Boy*, and it was reprinted on 23 Dec. in *The Daily Journal*, where the postcript (not found in any of Pope's editions) was printed as a separate letter immediately following the other. The second letter had a date of 19 Dec. In Pope's texts of 1735 the heading was 'To J Gay, Esq;' and in these editions, as in the news papers, there was no mention of Cleland. In the octavos of 1737-1743 the heading was 'Mr. Cleland to Mr. Gay'. The

he rather apologises for it than attacks it, so that there is no harm done by his satire. It is possible for us to conclude that in these remarks on his satire, Pope is objecting to the claim that, as a satirist, he inflicts some irreparable damage.

In view of these remarks, Swift's comment on the relationship between satire and law needs to be examined. For Swift, satire does not exist only to complement the role of the law. Rather, satire is far superior to the law in its power. As we can see in *The Examiner*, No. 38, 1711, for Swift the law is too deficient to punish wrong-doers:

> Besides, to confess the Truth, our Laws themselves are extremely defective in many Articles, which I take to be one ill Effect of our best Possession, Liberty. Some Years ago, the Ambassador of a great Prince was arrested, and Outrages committed on his Person in our Streets, without any Possibility of Redress from *Westminster-Hall*, or the Prerogative of the Sovereign; and the Legislature was forced to provide a Remedy against the like Evil in Times to come. A Commissioner of the Stamped Paper was lately discovered to have notoriously cheated the Publick of great Sums for many Years, by counterfeiting the Stamps, which the Law had made Capital: But the Aggravation of his Crime, proved to be the Cause that saved his Life; and that additional heightning Circumstance of betraying his Trust, was found to be a legal Defence.[55]

From this defect of the law, there arises a need for 'some discretionary Power safely lodged, to exert upon Emergencies'.[56] For Swift, satire is what can supply this defect of the law, as we can see in the following paragraph:

> I am apt to think, it was to supply such Defects as these, that Satyr was first introduced into the World; whereby those whom neither Religion, nor natural Virtue, nor fear of Punishment, were able to keep within the Bounds of their

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belated occurrence of this ascription to Cleland, together with the nature of *apologia*, has led to the belief that Warburton was right when in 1751 (footnote) he remarked: "This was written by the same hand that wrote the *Letter to the Publisher* prefixed to the Dunciad." Warburton means that while both effusions are ascribed to Cleland officially, Pope wrote both.', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III. p. 254, n. 1. Pope seems to use the name of William Cleland to endow his claim about the *Epistle to Burlington* with objectivity. If this subterfuge succeeds, Pope can get a literary ally, even though illusory, who can vindicate his satire just as he wishes, without provoking his enemy's antipathy toward the name Alexander Pope.

[55]*The Examiner*, No 38, 26 April 1711, in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, 16 vols. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1939-74), III, p. 138.

[56]*The Examiner*, No. 38, in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, III, p. 139.

> Duty, might be with-held by the Shame of having their Crimes exposed to open View in the strongest Colours, and themselves rendered odious to Mankind.[57]

For Swift, a satirist becomes superior to a judge and clergy, because he has the power to punish those wrong-doers who can evade the law and the church. More importantly, his power is conceived as a legal one, as satires perform the public function which the law and the church cannot provide. This view is quite different from those expressed by John Dryden and Joseph Addison. Through Dryden's and Addison's remarks, we can understand how Swift champions satire as a guardian of the public weal more than anybody else.[58]

Dryden could not resolve the conflict between satire and the Christian norm of charity while equating the power of satire with that of the secular law, when he tried to justify personal satire in his *Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire*. Dryden's dilemma in his defence of satire is that he recognises personal satire and the Christian doctrine of charity as incompatible, as we can see in the following paragraph:

> The first [justification for personal satire] is Revenge, when we have been affronted in the same Nature, or have been any ways notoriously abus'd, and can make our selves no other Reparation. And yet we know, that, in Christian Charity, all Offences are to be forgiven; as we expect the like Pardon for those which we daily commit against Almighty God. And this Consideration has often made me tremble when I was saying our Saviour's Prayer; for the plain Condition of the forgiveness which we beg, is the pardoning of others the Offences which they have done to us: For which Reason I have many times avoided the commission of that Fault; even when I have been notoriously provok'd. (p. 59)

Dryden seems to be less uncomfortable when he endows personal satire with a public function:

> and proceed to give the Second Reason, which may justifie a Poet, when he writes against a particular Person; and that is, when he is become a Publick Nuisance. All those, whom *Horace* in his Satires, and *Persius* and *Juvenal* have mention'd in theirs, with a Brand of infamy, are wholly such. 'Tis an Action of

[57] *The Examiner*, No. 38, in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, III, p. 141.

[58] We can regard the remarks of Swift and Addison as contemporary, as Swift's *Examiner*, No. 38 was published in 26 April 1711 and Addison's *Spectator*, No. 34, which I shall comment on, was published in 9 April 1711.

> Virtue to make Examples of vicious Men. They may and ought to be upbraided with their Crimes and Follies: Both for their own amendment, if they are not yet incorrigible; and for the Terrour of others, to hinder them from falling into those Enormities, which they see are so severely punish'd, in the Persons of others: The first Reason was only an Excuse for Revenge: But this second is absolutely of a Poet's Office to perform: (p. 60)

In this paragraph, he justifies personal satire, according to Edward P. Nathan's argument, as 'an adjunct to the secular court system' in punishing malefactors.[59] However, we cannot say that Dryden is fully confident in his defence, because, in the beginning of this paragraph, he does not say 'the second Reason, which should justifie a poet', but says 'the second Reason, which **may** justifie a poet' (my emphasis). Edward P. Nathan's explanation about this matter helps us to understand Dryden's problem in his defence of satire. As we can see in Nathan's following argument, Dryden seems to be stuck in an inescapable dilemma:

> Dryden then, is confronted with a contradiction, a crux which is ineluctable in Christian society, the tension between collectivist and individualist values. On one hand satire, like many other classical art forms (epic, oratory) can be defended in terms of its civic utility. If one pursues this line of reasoning, and defines satire as a punitive, quasi-legal force, then one can also argue that the most personal satire is the best, since it would exert the sharpest disciplinary power. On the other hand, however, Christian charity precludes the exercise of human justice, and therefore forbids retributive poetry. Thus when Dryden proposes to defend satire in classical, collectivist terms, he cannot help but run afoul of Christian values.[60]

Dryden does recognise that satire has a public function in correcting the vice and folly of the age. However, despite his recognition of the reformative side of satire, this recognition does not seem to develop into a conviction, as he is still not sure whether satire is an absolute necessity in society.

For Addison, the power of satirist is below the law and outside the church, because satire should be used only to 'reprehend those vices which are too trivial for the chastisement of the law and too fantastical for the cognizance of the pulpit'.[61] Addison

[59]Edward P. Nathan, 'The Bench and the Pulpit: Conflicting Elements in the Augustan Apology for Satire', *ELH*, 52 (1985), 375-396 (p. 375).
[60]Edward P. Nathan, p. 376-7.
[61]*The Spectator*, I, p. 144. No. 34, Monday, 9 April 1711.

does not have to face a Dryden-like dilemma, only because he limits the power of satire to trivial matters.

However, in Swift's view, there is neither a limitation of power allowed to satire as in the case of Addison, nor a Dryden-like dilemma between satire and Christian charity, in advocating satire as the last resource to secure the public interest: satire has a superior power to that of the law or religion, because it can punish the crimes which other sanctions cannot.

From these remarks of Swift and Pope, we conclude that their understanding of satire was idealistic: for Pope, satire could be effective without being offensive and, for Swift, it had the power to correct and deter the malefactors. However, we should notice that these notions about satire came to change as time went by. We can detect this change, as their doubts about the public approval of their satires emerge in their defence of satire in the late 1720s and 1730s.[62]

It is quite a well known fact that Pope and Swift not only did not hesitate to write personal satire, but also quite actively advocated its use. As I have discussed above, Swift endowed personal satire with a power superior to the law and religion. Pope too defended his writing of personal satires quite boldly in the letters to his friends, which were published later for public reading.[63] However, it is in his defence of personal satire that we can find Pope's doubt about public approval, as he showed a not so simple and confident attitude towards personal satire.

In his letter to John Gay under the cover of William Cleland's name which I discussed earlier, we can find Pope's complicated attitude towards personal satire:

> But they say the Satire [*Epistle to Burlington*] is *Personal*. I thought it could not be so, because all its Reflexions are on *Things*; unless the Pictures, Statues, trimmed Trees, and Violins, are *Persons*. His Reflections are not on the *Man*, but his House, Garden, &c. Nay, he respects (as one may say) the *Persons* of the Gladiator, Amphitrite, the Nile, and the Triton: He is only sorry to see them (as he might be to see his best Friends) ridiculous, by being in the wrong Place, and in bad Company. Some fancy, that to say a Thing is *Personal*, is the same as to say it is *Injust*, not considering, that nothing can be *Just* that is not *Personal*: I am

[62]The doubt seems to emerge from late 1720s in the case of Swift and 1730s in the case of Pope.

[63]Actually, as in the case of his letter to John Gay dated 16 December 1731, some letters were written for public reading, not for private correspondence.

> afraid that all such Writings and Discourses as touch no Man, will mend no Man. The *Good Natured* indeed are apt to be alarmed at any thing like Satire; and the *Guilty* readily concur with the *Weak* for a plain Reason, because the Vicious look upon Folly as their Frontier.[64]

What is interesting in this paragraph is the shift in Pope's attitude towards personal satire. At first, he seems to object to personal satire, as he tries to deny that his satire is personal. However, the change of attitude comes when he says that 'Some fancy, that to say a Thing is *Personal*, is the same as to say it is *Injust*, not considering, that nothing can be *Just*, that is not *Personal*'. Now, only personal satire can be just, because only this can mend men. We may regard the first argument against personal satire as a diversion before the real argument for personal satire. However, if he feels confident in personal satire, why does he in the first place try to persuade or divert Gay and the public readers into believing that the *Epistle to Burlington* is not a personal satire? Can we not sense in this paragraph that Pope is not comfortable in his defence of personal satire? Is it too far-fetched for us to believe that, in this letter, Pope understands that the best way to defend his satire against its opponents is to prove its inoffensiveness, denying its being personal, even though he could justify personal satire? Considering that Pope does insist on the inoffensiveness of the *Epistle to Burlington* in the same letter, as we have discussed earlier, this idea seems not too far-fetched. Then, this letter shows Pope's complex understanding of satire: there is his desire to assert the inoffensiveness of his satire, contrary to his acknowledgement of the inevitability of the offensiveness of satire.

The burden Pope feels in writing personal satire can be found even in the later stage of his career, when Pope strongly vindicates personal satire. One example can be shown in his exchange of views about satire with Dr. Arbuthnot in 1734. When Dr. Arbuthnot wrote the following letter to Pope,

> And I make it my Last Request, that you continue that noble *Disdain* and *Abhorrence* of Vice, which you seem naturally endu'd with, but still with a due regard to your own Safety; and study more to reform than chastise, tho' the one often cannot be effected without the other.[65]

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[64] *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 255, [William Cleland] to Gay, 16 December 1731.
[65] *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 417, Dr. Arbuthnot to Pope, 17 July 1734.

Arbuthnot's request seems to put personal satire at odds with the reformatory function of satire: it is more agreeable to reform without chastisement—that is to say, it is more agreeable to mend men without doing some damage to their reputations. Even though he concedes that this is often impossible, Dr. Arbuthnot does not say it is totally impossible: more importantly, he acknowledges that it is more agreeable.

We can find Pope's most famous vindication of personal satire in his reply to this letter. However, even when he defends personal satire most fervently, his uneasiness about it can still be detected:

> I would indeed do it with more restrictions, & less personally; it is more agreeable to my nature, which those who know it not are greatly mistaken in: But General Satire in Times of General Vice has no force, & is no Punishment: People have ceas'd to be ashamed of it when so many are joined with them; and tis only by hunting One or two from the Herd that any Examples can be made. If a man writ all his Life against the Collective Body of the Banditti, or against Lawyers, would it do the least Good, or lesson the Body? But if some are hung up, or pilloryed, it may prevent others. And in my low Station, with no other Power than this, I hope to deter, if not to reform.[66]

The message of the first two sentences is clear: that he did not want to write personal satire in the first place: rather he was forced to write it by the general vice of the world. Thus even though he neatly justifies his use of personal satire for its public function after the first two sentences, this paragraph is still shadowed by the traces of his reluctance to pursue personal satire. The reason for this sentiment can be found even in this paragraph. From the sentence 'if some are hung up, or pilloryed', we can understand what kind of role Pope fears that he assumes as a satirist, if he writes personal satire. To use Eilon's terms, Pope, as a satirist, can no longer be an impeccable judge; rather he becomes a public hangman who does the job by staining his hands with blood. Even though it is not disgraceful, for a satirist, the role of public hangman cannot be quite honourable like that of a judge, and can be regarded as a degradation: for, once he begins to write personal satire, his hands are tainted by blood and he inevitably becomes involved in bloody battle, even endangering his own safety.

[66] *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 423, Pope to Dr. Arbuthnot, 2 August 1734.

When he published a revised version of this reply to Dr. Arbuthnot's letter, we should notice that the tone is not confident; it is rather apologetic for his use of personal satire:[67]

> But sure it is as impossible to have a just abhorrence of Vice, without hating the Vicious, as to bear a true love for Virtue, without loving the Good. To reform and not to chastise, I am afraid is impossible, and that the best Precepts, as well as the best Laws, would prove of small use, if there were no Examples to inforce them. To attack Vices in the abstract, without touching Persons, may be safe fighting indeed, but it is fighting with Shadows. General propositions are obscure, misty, and uncertain, compar'd with plain, full, and home examples: Precepts only apply to our Reason, which in most men is but weak: Examples are pictures, and strike the Senses, nay raise the Passions, and call in those (the strongest and most general of all motives) to the aid of reformation. Every vicious man makes the case his own; and that is the only way by which such men can be affected, much less deterr'd. So that to chastise is to reform. The only sign by which I found my writings ever did any good, or had any weight, has been that they rais'd the anger of bad men. And my greatest comfort, and encouragement to proceed, has been to see, that those who have no shame, and no fear, of any thing else, have appear'd touch'd by my Satires.[68]

Even though this letter is full of fervent vindication of personal satire, if we examine this paragraph structurally, it can be found that its basic tone is apologetic. There is one sentence in the beginning of this paragraph which should be noted: 'To reform and not to chastise, I am afraid is impossible'. As we can see from the expression 'I am afraid', the tone of this sentence is apologetic, admitting that the most desirable thing is to reform without chastising. It may be claimed that we cannot be sure whether the phrase 'I am afraid' bears any importance or is just a mode of expression. However, significantly, there emerges a sentence which uses the same term towards the end of this paragraph: 'So that to chastise is to reform'. If we consider that Pope's justification of personal satire is put between these two sentences—'To reform and not to chastise, I am afraid is impossible. . . . So that to chastise is to reform', it is clear that the purpose of this paragraph is after all to prove the inevitability, not the absolute necessity, of personal satire: then the phrase 'I am afraid' cannot be put aside as simply Pope being rhetorical,

[67]For the dubiousness of the letter dated 26 July 1734 as an actual reply to Dr. Arbuthnot, see *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, pp. 418-419, n. 5.
[68]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 419, Pope to Dr. Arbuthnot, 26 July 1734.

and the overall tone of this paragraph can be regarded as quite apologetic. Also, even though the anger of bad men could be taken as a proof of the effectiveness of his satires, by saying this Pope admits that there has been some blood (even though mental rather than physical) shed in writing satire, which shows that he as a satirist cannot command the unanimous approval of the public, having made some enemies.

Having spoken of 'the unanimous approval of the public', we should understand the relationship a satirist has with his audience. We must distinguish between the fictive and historical audience. A satirist, who wants his satire to be reformative, assumes that his readers agree with his views, expecting them to laugh at his victims. The readers of this kind can be called the fictive ones. However, there is no guarantee that this fictive audience represents the actual historical audience. The historical audience may disagree with his view. Then it can be the satirist himself, not his victim, upon which he brings the remonstrance and laughter of the historic audience. As Thomas Lockwood notes, a distinction should be recognised 'between the author's conventionalized relationship with his *audience* and his (also conventionalized) attitude toward the *world*': 'the more hostile or "gloomy" his attitude toward the world, the less representative of the world his audience seems', and on the other hand, 'the less hostile the author's attitude toward the world, the more representative of it his putative audience seems'.[69] This possibility of a rift between the fictive and historical audience can put a satirist into a self-defeating position. As far as a satirist is concerned, the approval of the public is a vital matter for the success of his satire. He wants to believe that he has public approval behind him when he attacks his victim: yet, there is no guarantee of it. This is to say that, once a satirist begins to inflict some damage on a person's reputation, it becomes possible for him to alienate the real audience from him, beginning to make some enemies by his personal attack. If this happens, the satirist inflicts damage on himself rather than on the victims: he degrades himself into an assassin, to borrow Daniel Eilon's term, who harms someone else (in this case that person's social reputation) without any right to do so, and in so doing, becomes hated by the general public. This is the worst nightmare for a satirist, which Swift once seemed to express in his *Letter of Advice to a Young Poet* in 1721:

[69]Thomas Lockwood, pp. 648-9.

> Neither do I make any Exceptions as to *Satyrical Poets* and *Lampoon-Writers*, in Consideration of their Office: For tho' indeed, their Business is to rake into Kennels, and gather up the *Filth* of *Streets* and *Families*, in which Respect, they may be, for ought I know, as necessary to the Town as *SCAVENGERS*, or *CHIMNEY SWEEPS*, yet I have observed they too have themselves, at the same Time, very foul clothes, and, like dirty *Persons*, leave more *Filth* and *Nastiness* than they sweep away.[70]

To get dirty by contact with the object of cleaning and eventually to become dirtier than it becomes a neat parallel for the worst scenario for any satirist to imagine. This is to lose the public function as a satirist: in other words, to use Eilon's terms again, to be degraded to the shameful status of assassin from the honourable position of judge.

This threat always existed for Pope and Swift, once they began to write their very personal opposition satires. One paragraph which Swift wrote in his *Intelligencer*, No. 3 in 1728 is very revealing:

> There are two Ends that Men propose in writing Satyr; one of them less noble than the other, as regarding nothing further than the private Satisfaction, and Pleasure of the Writer; but without any View towards *personal Malice*: The other is a *publick Spirit*, prompting Men of *Genius* and Virtue, to mend the World as far as they are able. And as both these Ends are innocent, so the latter is highly commendable. With regard to the former, I demand, whether I have not as good a Title to laugh, as Men have to be ridiculous; and to expose Vice, as another hath to be vicious. If I ridicule the Follies and Corruptions of a *Court*, a *Ministry*, or a *Senate*, are they not amply paid by *Pensions, Titles,* and *Power*; while I expect, and desire no other Reward, than that of laughing with a few Friends in a Corner?[71]

At first sight, this seems to be a perfectly ordinary defence of his satire, which stresses its innocence: his satire is, according to Swift, without any trace of personal malice, written for private satisfaction to be shared among the small group of friends. However, if we examine this paragraph carefully, there can be found a clue which admits the possibility of 'satire as invective, created on behalf of a self-regarding minority'.[72] The key sentence is the last one, especially the phrase 'that of laughing with a few Friends in a

[70]*The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift,* ed. by Herbert Davis and others, IV, p. 342.
[71]*The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift,* ed. by Herbert Davis and others, VII, p. 34.
[72]David Eilon, p. 36.

Corner'. The surface meaning of this sentence is that his motive for writing satire is innocent, for he writes for no reward other than the amusement of a small coterie. However, this sentence has a possible poisonous meaning. I have said previously that it takes very little for a satirist to become a laughing stock or a hated pariah in society, which is the loss of public approval. If his satire is only for laughing with a few friends in a corner, this means that his satire is not for wider public approval, but for private entertainment: in this case, the reformative side of satire is gone. Thus this paragraph opens the possibility of his isolation from society, which is fatal for him as a public-spirited satirist.

The potentially self-destructive meaning of this sentence becomes clearer if we examine the usage of the phrase 'in a Corner'.[73] As Daniel Eilon points out, in his earlier works, Swift used this phrase in a negative sense to point at 'local heroes and private-spirited parasites' or 'a writer in a ruined cause':[74]

> I have always heard and understood, that a King of England, possessed of his People's hearts; at the Head of a Free Parliament, and in full Agreement with a great Majority, made the true Figure in the World that such a Monarch ought to do; and pursued the real Interest of himself and his Kingdom, will they allow her Majesty to be in those Circumstances at present? And was it not plain by the Addresses sent from all Parts of the island, and by the visible Disposition of the People, that such a Parliament would undoubtedly be chosen? And so it proved, without the Court's using any Arts to influence Elections.
>
> **What people then, as these in a Corner, to whom the Constitution must truckle?** If the whole Nation's Credit cannot supply Funds for the War, without humble Application from the entire Legislature to a few *Retailers* of Money; it is high time we should sue for a Peace.[75] (my emphasis)

> I am thinking, what a mighty Advantage it is to be entertained as a Writer to a *ruined Cause*. . . . If you write in Defence of a fallen Party, you are maintained by Contribution as a necessary Person; you have little more to do than to carp and cavil at those who hold the Pen on the other side; you are sure to be celebrated and caressed by all your Party to a Man. You may affirm and deny what you please, without Truth or Probability, since it is but Loss of Time to contradict you. *Commiseration* is often on your Side; and you have a Pretence to be thought and disinterested, for adhering to Friends in Distress. After which, if your

[73] I am indebted to Daniel Eilon for the potential meaning of the phrase 'in a Corner' and the relating point. Richard H. Rodino also makes a brief remark on the phrase in his article 'Notes on the Developing Motives and Structures of Swift's Poetry', p. 48.
[74] David Eilon, p. 37.
[75] *The Examiner*, No. 37, 19 April 1711, in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, III, p. 134.

> Friends ever happen to turn up again, you have a strong Fund of *Merit* towards making your Fortune. Then, you never fail to be well furnished with Materials; every one bringing his *Quota*; and Falsehood being naturally more plentiful than Truth. **Not to mention the wonderful Delight of libelling Men in Power, and hugging yourself in a Corner with mighty Satisfaction for what you have done.**[76] (my emphasis)

Thus if we consider that the phrase 'in a corner' was used by Swift to describe his enemies as hiding (in the first passage) or isolated (in the second one) in these earlier writings, the potential danger in Swift's paragraph in *The Intelligencer*, No. 3 becomes more apparent. By describing himself laughing with a few friends in a corner, Swift not only advocates the innocence of the motive of his satire, which is the original purpose of this sentence, but also inadvertently admits that his satire has no longer a reformative side, and that he may be a writer 'to a ruined cause'. We should notice how wonderfully the last quotation, which was originally written against his enemies in 1710, can be used against Swift himself by his enemies to denounce him after the 1720s.

This negative attitude of Swift towards his satire in 1728 is quite different from that of 1725. In his reply to Pope's letter dated 14 November 1725, which proposed diverting themselves rather than vexing themselves or others, Swift shows us his determination to vex the world—thus to write personal satire, which is very similar to Pope's attitude in 1734 shown in the letter to Dr. Arbuthnot:

> I like your Schemes of our meeting after Distresses and dispertions but the chief end I propose to my self in all my labors is to vex the world rather then to divert it, and if I could compass that design without hurting my own person or Fortune I would be the most Indefatigable writer you have ever seen without reading.[77]

The attitude shown in this paragraph is that of the defiant satirist who aims for the public function of his satire despite the possible damage to his reputation, in not fearing 'to vex the world', which is quite different from the attitude of 'laughing with a few friends in a corner'. However, when we examine Swift's letters in the 1730s, we can find his

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[76]*The Examiner*, No. 26, 1 February 1710, in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, III, p. 75

[77]*The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Harold Williams, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963-1965), III, pp. 102-103, Swift to Pope, 29 September 1725.

recognition of being isolated, thus losing his audience. When he wrote to Pope as follows,

> As to those papers of four or five years past, that you are pleased to require soon [for the 1732 volume of the Pope and Swift *Miscellanies*], they consist of little accidental things writ in the country; family amusement, never intended further than to divert our selves and some neighbours; or some effects of anger, or publick Grievances here, which would be insignificant out of this kingdom.[78]

it is clear that he recognises his audience to be confined to himself and a few friends. What he can recommend to Gay in writing is only 'domestick libels to divert the family and the Neighboring Squires for five-miles round'.[79]

If a satirist realises the dismal state he is in—that is, not to be recognised by the public, his choice can be either of the following: the one is to give up his writing and the other is to carry on writing, venting his personal malice to an unrepenting world. Pope's choice seems to have been to give up writing personal satire, as we can see in his letter to the Earl of Marchmont in 1741:

> For I may tell you, that I am determined to publish no more in my life time, for many reasons; but principally thro' the Zeal I have to speak the *Whole Truth*, & neither to praise or dispraise by halves, or with worldly managements.[80]

Swift's choice seems to be more of the second case, as we can see in his venting his rage on his victims in *On the Day of Judgement* and *The Legion Club*. We must recognise that, even though each satirist reacted differently, at this stage, they came to share the same understanding of satire, which could be described as 'tragic'.

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[78]*The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, p. 30, Swift to Pope, 12 June 1732.
[79]*The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, p. 15, Swift to John Gay, 4 May 1732.
[80]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 364, Pope to the Earl of Marchmont, 10 October 1741. Of course, Pope did not stop writing satire, as he went on to write his apocalyptic final *Dunciad*. What Pope stops writing is personal satire which aims at public reform. One might argue against this point, because *The Dunciad* B has a nature of personal satire. However, again, we should notice that what is inherited from *The Dunciad* A and what is newly added. As I have examined earlier, what is added has the tone of apocalyptic and prophetic strain.

At the 'tragic' stage, satire may be regarded as destructive not only of its victim, but also of its creator. This is to say, satire can backfire on its author, when its reformatory side is lost. As a result of the 'tragic' satire, a satirist can be regarded as a misanthrope or even as a lunatic: in this case, the damage is done not to its supposed victim, but to the creator. Losing a sympathetic audience has this dire consequence on a satirist.

In this chapter, I have tried to establish that, at the end of their satiric careers, Pope and Swift came to write 'tragic' satires, and that there certainly occurred a change of outlook in their understanding of satire. Now we can ask what happened in their careers which led to this tragic outlook. Pope's and Swift's satiric careers can be a great advantage in pursuing this line of inquiry, as the fact that they both wrote satires over a considerable period of time makes it likely that they would register a change in their outlook toward the effectiveness of satires. Then, there should be an interaction between their changing outlook and their satires, satires being a mirror or manifestation of the changing outlook.

In observing this interaction, we should keep in mind that their changing outlook might be due to not only external pressure, but also internal frailty. The audience might be hostile to their satires and there might be a physical threat to them from their victims or the authorities, which forced them to realise that their satires were futile as attempts to reform the vice and folly of the world. However, there also could be some internal frailty in their satires. This is to say that we cannot rule out the possibility that both satirists could not quite put their ideal about reformative satire into firm practice. Because of their inability to transform the ideal into the reality, they might assess their satiric attempts as incomplete and inefficient.

My contention in this thesis is that Pope's and Swift's changing views of satire were indeed due to the combination of these two factors. In other words, Pope and Swift came to develop a pessimistic view of satire not only because of the hostility shown towards their satires, such as physical threats to themselves and a significant number of contemporary outcries against their satires, but also because of their inner doubt about the possibility of writing reformative satires in their isolated situation, which becomes more and more apparent to them. What I shall do in the next chapters is to observe how

they sought to put their ideals into practice and how their satires became a manifestation of their changing outlook.

# Chapter 2

## The Imperfect Defence: The Apologias for Satire of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift

The starting point of our quest for 'why' Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift came to take a tragic view of the future and 'how' their pessimistic outlook found expression in their satires will be a discussion of their apologias for satire. In an apologia, defending the cause of his satire, a satirist can reveal to us a lot about his view of satire and himself as a satirist—that is, what is his motive for writing satire, with what role does he endow his satire. Pope and Swift were not exceptions in defending their satires and themselves against strong contemporary opposition to satire. Among their various resources for the defence of satire—letters, prose works, and so on—we can regard Pope's *First Satire of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated*, and *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*, and Swift's *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift* as their formal apologias for satire in that the main purpose of these poems for both poets is to take on a defence of their satires, vindicating their motives as well as their personal integrity as satirists.[1]

However, these poems are important for our understanding of their satires not only because both satirists reveal their views on satire, especially their belief in the public function of satire, but also, more significantly, because doubts or reservations about the value of their satires emerge from within an ostensible defence of satire. As P. K. Elkin points out in his discussion of apologias for satire,

[1]Pope's *First Satire of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated* and *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot* were published in 1733 and 1735 respectively. Swift's *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift* is conjectured to have been written in 1731, on the basis of his letter to John Gay in 1 December 1731: 'I have been severall months writing near five hundred lines on a pleasant Subject, onely to tell what my friends and enemyes will say on me after I am dead. I Shall finish it soon, for I add two lines every week, and blott out four, and alter eight, I have brought in you and my other friends, as well as enemyes and Detractors.', *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 506. Pope must have been informed of this poem because he wrote in his letter to Swift on the same date as follows: 'I am much pleased with your design upon Rochefoucault's maxim, pray finish it.', *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 510. For various versions of this poem in relation with another poem *The Life and Genuine Character of Dr. Swift* and the history of their publication, see *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, pp. 846-849.

> It seems that, in countering the image of the malignant satirist, which was painted by some critics of satire, apologists went to the opposite extreme, whether they were writing in prose or poetry, and whether they were writing apologias, essays, or biographies, or simply making genial comments in passing. In place of the malignant and envious scribbler, they drew the portrait of a paragon: no satirist could possibly live up to it. . . . the apologists, in putting this portrait before the public, were not attempting to be realistic. Their pretences to realism, to be telling the simple prosaic truth, were largely rhetorical. What they were endeavouring to do was to counterbalance the exaggerations of their opponents.[2]

apologias for satire could turn into propaganda on the satirist's behalf. We can understand and tolerate to a certain extent some idealisation of the satirist himself or his satires, if we regard him as one who is desperately seeking some vindication for himself in a hostile environment. On the other hand, what is less understandable is the appearance of elements of doubt within an explicit apologia. This kind of reservation is not supposed to be projected in an apologia, for, after all, we cannot expect the satirist to undermine his own cause while, at the same time, defending it. However, it is my contention that this kind of self-contradiction is shown in the apologias of Pope and Swift, so that it is vital for us to recognise the difference between what is supposed to be happening in these poems and what is actually happening.

1. *The First Satire of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated*[3]

When we try to interpret Pope's *Sat. II. i*, we should keep in mind its two special features. The first is that this poem is written in the form of a dialogue. The dialogue form of this poem has an important relationship with its theme—that is, Pope's defence of satire—in that such a form provides a more effective means of strengthening the poet's argument than any other structural pattern. As John M. Aden argues, the dialogue form itself permits 'an enlivening of the satiric discourse, a diversification of style, tone and statement; promotes dramatic immediacy; and affords at least the appearance of objectivity'.[4] By employing an adversarius figure, the poet can provide the readers with a potential opposition which he can play against and undermine, and so define himself more sharply, as he can manipulate the adversarius figure to present the readers with an

[2]P. K. Elkin, *The Augustan Defence of Satire* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), p. 117.
[3]From now on, for convenience, I will call this poem *Sat. II. i.*
[4]John M. Aden, *Something Like Horace: Studies in the Art and Allusion of Pope's Horatian Satires* (Kingsport, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), p. 3.

alternative viewpoint which is in turn put in an unattractive light. All this, the poet can do with 'an air of objectivity', not by directly delivering his argument to the readers, but by letting the readers grasp it through their assessment of the dialogue between the two participants.

Of course, one can argue that the air of objectivity is a bogus one. We, as readers, know from the first that both participants of a dialogue are nothing but imaginary creations of one poet—that is, they originate from the same person—so that they cannot be regarded as separate entities. When Thomas R. Edwards provides us with an interesting interpretation of Pope's adversarius in the *Epilogue to the Satires*, he has this quality in mind. For him, both speakers in that poem represent contrasting views within Pope himself:

> Both he [Fr.] and P. are versions of Pope himself, or of any man aware of the conflict between his social identity and his secret image of himself as autonomous moral hero. The dialogue form articulates the inner debate between that skeptical self that 'knows better' which like Fr. stands by one's indiscretions murmuring 'alas' with the sympathetic disapproval that identifies our elders and betters, and that other self which, passionately committed to its own free perception of truth, allows no concessions.[5]

In other words, 'Fr.' is the Pope that is cautious, wary, alert to what is safe or politic in Walpole's England, while 'P.' is the morally fervent Pope that declaims against the vicious world, ignoring its power to strike back. In the light of this interpretation, the dialogue symbolises the inner conflict between Pope's cautious and moral selves.

However, when we are considering a dialogue which is also an apologia, the theory that the participants represent different aspects of the same poet raises problems. For the purpose of self-defence, it is no good for the satirist to reveal his inner conflict to the world. Rather, the logic of the argument suggests that he should dramatise the outside conflict between himself and the world and represent the conflict by that between the two participants of the dialogue. In this respect, the fact that Fortescue is a historically identifiable person is important for an understanding of his

[5]Thomas R. Edwards, *Imagination and Power: A Study of Poetry on Public Themes* (London: Chatto, 1971), p. 110.

representativeness of the world outside Pope.[6] Because of his relationship with both Pope and the Walpole administration—that is, he was on friendly terms with Pope despite his participation in the administration—to win him over to his argument is vital for Pope's defence of satire.[7] By making a friend of his who has a broader appeal for the readers—that is, because he did not belong exclusively to either camp—the adversarius of his poem, Pope is attempting to defend his cause by demonstrating to the readers that their representative can be persuaded.[8] Thus, it is of great importance for Pope to demonstrate how neatly and fairly Fortescue is convinced of Pope's cause: for the readers' interest lies in the process of arguments by which Fortescue—their representative—is being won over.[9]

The second important feature of this poem is that it is an imitation. It is not a translation, in which the translator must be bound strictly by the original, but an imitation, where the author has a freedom to contextualise and differ from the original if

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[6]Even though this poem is often called *To Fortescue*, actually Fortescue is not designated in any of Pope's editions. When first published, L (probably the abbreviation for lawyer) was used to designate the adversarius. Warburton is responsible for the designation of Fortescue. However, Warburton was not without authority. As we can see in his following letter to Fortescue, Pope clearly kept Fortescue in mind when he wrote this poem: 'have you seen my Imitation of Horace? I fancy it will make you smile; but though, when I first began it, I thought of you; before I came to end it, I considered it might be too ludicrous, to a man of your situation and grave acquaintance, to make you Trebatius, who was yet one of the most considerable lawyers of his time, and a particular friend of a poet. In both which circumstances I rejoice that you resemble him, but am chiefly pleased that you do it in the latter.', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 351, Pope to Fortescue, 18 February 1732/3.

[7]'Fortescue, William (1687-1749), master of the Rolls, 1741; introduced by his friend Gay to Pope; barrister, Inner Temple, 1715; private secretary to Walpole; MP for Newport (Isle of Wight), 1727-36; KC, 1730; attorney-general to Frederick, prince of Wales, 1730; baron of the Exchequer, 1736; justice of common pleas, 1738; legal adviser to Pope, who addressed to him his first satire.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*, 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). For Fortescue's relationship with Pope and his efforts for the reconciliation of Pope and Robert Walpole, see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*, pp. 189-191, 503-504, 578, 588.

[8]Of course, Fortescue cannot be a representative of all the readers. However, he can be one for the readers who have an open mind for this poem and thus the most important target of Pope's apologia, even though not for those who are really hostile enough to be ready to reject all of Pope's arguments regardless of their worth.

[9]One might argue that some contemporary readers might not have been able to identify L with Fortescue if they did not have first-hand knowledge of the relationship between Pope and Fortescue. However, the broader appeal of the adversarius does not disappear for this kind of reader, because the adversarius L still demonstrates his open-mindedness about the matter by showing his concern for Pope's safety as well as his reluctance to accept the poet's argument, as I shall demonstrate later. In other words, even though some readers might have not identified L with Fortescue, still they could understand that the adversarius is not so hostile to Pope as to be not concerned about the poet's safety while he is not so much the poet's ally as to readily accept any argument. For me, L might have a broader appeal for the readers than Fortescue for its added benefit of anonymity and generality.

necessary.[10] Thus it is important for us not to overlook that Pope prints Horace's original on the opposite page: for, in so doing, he invites the readers to compare the two poems. It becomes the reader's duty to observe how Pope builds his material on the original, how he makes his poem differ from it, and what meaning the difference, if there is any, makes for an interpretation of *Sat. II. i.*[11]

In *Sat. II. i*, the adversarius Fortescue has duplicate characters. He is a friend of Pope's in that he provides advice and suggestions on Pope's request and always worries about Pope's safety. However, in respect to Pope's justification of satire, he is not Pope's ally at all. Even though occasionally he agrees with Pope in his observations on contemporary England, he repeatedly objects to Pope's contention that he should write satire. In a word, Fortescue is a representative of the impartial readers of Pope's satires who, despite their lack of irreconcilable hostility towards Pope, remain to be persuaded of the justness and necessity of his satires.

In a sense, the dialogue of this poem consists of each participant's endeavour to make his partner accord to his argument. As for Pope, he repeatedly appeals to Fortescue to permit him to continue to write satire; as for Fortescue, he constantly advises Pope to

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[10]Of course, Pope was not the first to use the form of imitation, and *Sat. II. i* was not Pope's only imitation, as he went on to imitate 11 of Horace's satires and epistles and 2 of John Donne's. There did exist the tradition of imitation in English literature from the Restoration period, as practised by authors such as John Oldham, the Earl of Rochester and Thomas Sprat. For various kinds of imitation, such as the translational imitation in which 'the imitator aims mainly at recreating in modern English terms the essential meaning of some ancient or foreign poem', and the creative imitation in which 'the imitator aims not so much at lively translation, as at the creation, with the aid of his original, of a largely new meaning, application, or effect', and their tradition exemplified in authors such as John Oldham, the Earl of Rochester, and Swift, before Pope's use of it, see Leonard A. Moskovit, 'Pope and the Tradition of the Neoclassical Imitation', *SEL*, 8 (1968), 445-462. See also Frank Stack, *Pope and Horace: Studies in Imitation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 18-26.

[11]When he recounted the occasion for the writing of the poem to Joseph Spence in 1744, Pope seems to have emphasised only the similarity between his case and Horace's, implying that he was utilising Horace's original import to highlight his case: 'When I had a fever one winter in town that confined me to my room for five or six days, Lord Bolingbroke came to see me, happened to take up a Horace that lay on the table, and turning it over dipped on the First Satire of the Second Book. He observed how well that would hit my case, if I were to imitate it in English. After he was gone,, I read it over, translated it in a morning or two, and sent it to the press in a week or fortnight after. And this was the occasion of my imitating some other of the Satires and Epistles afterwards.', Joseph Spence, *Observations, Anecdotes, and Characters of Books and Men*, ed. by James M. Osborn, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), I, p. 143. However, as I shall demonstrate later, there do exist some differences of meaning when Pope transforms Horace's original. By sometimes differing from the original, Pope makes the whole poem, not just the parts that differ from the original, represent his argument. This is to say that Pope makes even the parts in which he follows the original faithfully his own, because by sometimes differing from it, he lets the readers understand that he follows the original only because it fits his case well, not because he is obliged to follow it.

give up satire, even though he recognises that Pope has justification for his writing. In the beginning of the poem, when Fortescue advises Pope not to write any more, Pope rejects this advice, appealing that he cannot sleep when he does not write:

> *F.* I'd write no more.
> *P.* Not write? but then I *think*,
> And for my Soul I cannot sleep a wink.
> I nod in Company, I wake at Night,
> Fools rush into my Head, and so I write. (ll. 11-14)

As Richard Steiger argues, Pope, in these lines, emphasises his different concept of writing from Fortescue's: 'To Fortescue the distinction is between writing and doing something else, as his facile advice indicates. Pope, however, can make no such distinction because the poem is created with his mind involuntarily'.[12] As he stresses the word 'think', which is in the same line as 'write', by putting it in italics, he invites the readers to recognise the different concept he has about writing from Fortescue's. For Pope, writing and thinking are inseparable activities: for him, not to write means also not to think, and this leads to the disruption of his physical rhythm, resulting in insomnia, while, for Fortescue, thinking poetry mentally and transcribing it on the paper physically are quite different matters. However, Fortescue cannot understand and accept this line of argument. In the following lines (ll. 15-20), he advises only physical treatment for Pope's sleeplessness, not recognising the real nature of Pope's problem.

When Fortescue advises Pope, if he really insists on writing, to write heroic or lyric panegyrics on the Royals, he not only shows his concern for Pope's well-being, but also tempts Pope to participate actually in the ways of contemporary life. When Pope responds as follows,

> What? like Sir *Richard*, rumbling, rough and fierce,
> With ARMS, and GEORGE, and BRUNSWICK crowd the Verse?
> Rend with tremendous Sound your ears asunder,
> With Gun, Drum, Trumpet, Blunderbuss & Thunder?
> Or nobly wild, with *Budgell*'s Fire and Force,
> Paint Angels trembling round his *falling Horse*? (ll. 23-28)

[12]Richard Steiger, 'Pope's "Augustan" Horace', *Arethusa*, 10 (1977), 321-352 (p. 326).

he is actually demonstrating that flattery under George Augustus is virtually impossible and even can result in satire, when the object of panegyric patently lacks the quality for which he is praised. When he aurally imitates the sound of battle by crowding the verse with consonants in line 26, the poet is actually pointing out the difference between Augustus Caesar's heroic exploits and George Augustus's lack of them despite the similarity of their names. The lack of George's quality becomes more apparent when we compare this passage with Horace's original, which Pope provides on the opposite page. Horace's excuse not to write panegyric is that he simply lacks the talent to handle the subject:

> *Cupidum, pater optime! vires*
> *Deficiunt: neque enim quivis* horrentia pilis
> Agmina, *nec* fracta pereuntes cuspide Gallos,
> *Aut* labentis equo *describat vulnera Parthi.* (ll. 12-15)
> (Would that I could, good father, but my strength fails me. Not everyone can paint ranks bristling with lances, or Gauls falling with spearheads shattered, or wounded Parthian slipping from his horse.)[13]

In these lines, we cannot find any criticism of Augustus Caesar: the heroic deed, the object of panegyric, is there, and what is lacking is only the poet's ability to handle it. However, in Pope's rendering, the case becomes different, because, opposite the example of Augustus Caesar, the quality of George Augustus as an object of praise becomes suspicious. As Thomas E. Maresca says, Pope is insisting here that, in contemporary England, 'heroic panegyric ends in a ridiculous farce, in which George is denigrated by simple juxtaposition to Augustus'.[14] The same argument is employed when Pope is advised next to write lyric panegyric. When Pope says about writing lyric panegyric,

> Alas! few Verses touch their nicer Ear;
> They scarce can bear their *Laureate* twice a Year:

[13]For Latin original, I use Pope's text on the opposite page to his imitation, because I think that we are obliged to follow Pope's invitation to compare his Latin texts and imitation. I collated Pope's text and that of the Loeb edition, and if there occurs any notable difference between these two texts, I shall point out the difference and discuss the meanings of the variance. For the translations provided throughout the thesis, they come from the Loeb edition, *Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica*, trans. by H. R. Fairclough, *The Loeb Classical Library*, ed. by G. P. Gould and others, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929; repr. 1991).

[14]Thomas E. Maresca, 'Pope's Defense of Satire: The First Satire of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated', *ELH*, 31 (1964), 366-394 (p. 387).

And justly CÆSAR scorns the Poet's Lays,
It is to *History* he trusts for Praise. (ll. 33-36)

he is actually elucidating why lyric panegyric on the Royals cannot even be attempted when he and Fortescue realise George's notorious lack of interest and judgement in literature.

After this initial exchange of arguments, Pope's more serious defence of his satire begins when he proposes that every one has the right to their particular pleasure—in his case, writing satire: 'I love to pour out all myself, as plain/ As downright *Shippen*, or as old *Montagne*.' (ll. 51-52) This seemingly innocent plea for the pursuit of his private pleasure develops to a more serious argument. In the following lines, the key word for Pope's justification of satire is 'impartial Glass':

In me what Spots (for Spots I have) appear,
Will prove at least the Medium must be clear.
In this impartial Glass, my Muse intends
Fair to expose myself, my Foes, my Friends; (ll. 55-58)

This 'impartial Glass', referring to Pope's satire, emphasises its objectivity: it has objectivity in that it mirrors not only his foes and his friends but also Pope himself as exactly as they are. This passage utilises the reflecting quality of glass, and thus invokes the defence of satire as a mirror or glass which exposes to the readers the reality about themselves.[15] The fairness of his satire is further strengthened by Pope's admission that

[15]Pope was not the first who defended satire by comparing it to a mirror or glass. The accuracy of reflection of a mirror or glass was often used to justify the reformative function of satire. For example, in the Restoration period, Dr. James Drake remarked on the reformative power of satiric comedy as follows: '*Dramatic Poetry*, like a Glass, ought neither to flatter, nor to abuse in the Image which it reflects, but to give them their true colour and proportion, and is only valuable for being exact.', *The Ancient and Modern Stages Survey'd. Or, Mr. Collier's View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage Set in a True Light* (London, 1699), pp. 118-119, from Edwin E. Williams, 'Dr. James Drake and Restoration Theory of Comedy', *RES*, XV (1939), 180-191 (p. 184). However, we should notice that comparison of satire to a mirror or glass did not always have a positive meaning in contemporary society, as this comparison was often used to denote the futility of satire. For example, even Swift made remarks on the ineffectiveness of satire using this metaphor: for him, satire is 'a sort of Glass, wherein beholders do generally discover everybody's Face but their Own.', *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, I, p. 140. Swift also casts doubt on whether the quality of reflection of a glass can be accepted as a source of the reformative power of satire. When he lets the persona in *A Tale of a Tub* speak about a glass in *A Digression concerning Madness* as follows, he seems to admit that, for the people who prefer living in delusion, the exact reflection of themselves on a glass is not a welcome matter: for them, it is the glass, not them, that distorts reality: 'How fade and insipid do all Objects accost us that are not

he too has his weak side ('Spots'): for, while, on the one hand, he avoids his critics' accusation of pride or arrogance by admitting his weakness, in so doing, he emphasises that it is he who has 'Spots', not the medium, his satire.

Pope's strong emphasis on the impartiality of his satire becomes more apparent when we compare this passage to Horace's original. In Horace's poem, the corresponding word to 'impartial Glass' is 'votiva tabella' ('votive tablet' [l. 33]), which does not carry the meaning of 'reflection' or 'transparency', for all its religious connotation.[16] Of course, Horace uses the image of 'votiva tabella' to imply that he reveals himself honestly without disguise like Lucilius, his satiric ancestor:

> *me pedibus delectat claudere verba,*
> *Lucili ritu, nostrum melioris utroque.*
> *Ille, velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim*
> *Credebat libris; neque si male gesserat, usquam*
> *Decurrens alio, neque si bene: quo fit ut omnis*
> *Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella*
> *Vita senis.* (ll. 28-34)
> (My own delight is to shut up words in feet, as did Lucilius, a better man than either of us. He in olden days would trust his secrets to his books, as if to faithful friends, never turning elsewhere for recourse, whether things went well with him or ill. So it comes that the old poet's whole life is open to view, as if painted on a votive tablet.)

However, Pope has at his disposal a more useful metaphor for satire which can highlight its objectivity—satire as a glass or mirror. As Richard Steiger notes, the 'votiva tabella' 'presents itself to the external world as a self-contained entity, whereas the mirror (the traditional emblem of art) makes no distinction between its own subject matter and the condition of the external world it reflects'.[17] Thus, when Pope transforms the phrase

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convey'd in the vehicle of *Delusion*? How shrunk is every Thing, as it appears in the Glass of Nature? So, that if it were not for the Assistance of Artificial *Mediums*, false Lights, refracted Angles, Varnish, and Tinsel; there would be a mighty Level in the Felicity and Enjoyments of Mortal men.', *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift,* ed. by Herbert Davis and others, I, p. 109. However, it is my opinion that Pope does not use the metaphor of a mirror or glass in a negative sense in this passage, as he utilises its positive quality to defend, not undermine, his satire. For Pope's use of the mirror metaphor in some poems other than *Sat. II. i*, see Melinda A. Rabb, 'Lost In a House of Mirrors: Pope's *Imitations of Horace*', *PLL*, 18 (1982), 291-309.

[16]'votive tablet, an inscribed panel anciently hung in a temple in fulfilment of a vow, e. g. after deliverance from shipwreck or dangerous illness', OED.

[17]Richard Steiger, p. 339.

'votiva tabella' to 'impartial Glass', he uses the quality of the word—its reflection, transparency—to the full in emphasising the objectivity, thus the fairness of his satire.[18]

It is on this basis of the impartiality of his satire that Pope can justify his pursuit of pleasure, which is to write satire, distinguishing himself from odious people such as 'Page' (l. 82), 'Sappho' (l. 83), 'Waters' (l. 89), and 'Chartres' (l. 89) who, in their pursuit of pleasure, do serious harm to other people. We can even sense a tone of missionary zeal when Pope finally presents his argument for his pursuit of pleasure in the following lines:

> Then learned Sir! (to cut the Matter short)
> What-e'er my Fate, or well or ill at Court,
> Whether old Age, with faint, but chearful Ray,
> Attends to gild the Evening of my Day,
> Or Death's black Wing already be display'd
> To wrap me in the Universal Shade;
> Whether the darken'd Room to muse invite,
> Or whiten'd Wall provoke the Skew'r to write,
> In Durance, Exile, Bedlam, or the Mint,
> Like *Lee* or *Budgell*, I will Rhyme and Print. (ll. 91-100)

The surface meaning of these lines is Pope's pledge that he will continue to pursue his pleasure. However, it does not cease there: as we can see in the last two lines, his pursuit of pleasure becomes a mission, which is to hold the 'impartial Glass' up to anyone, anywhere, whenever it is necessary, regardless of the hardship which may befall Pope himself because of that.

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[18]Thomas E. Maresca even goes further, as he interprets the word 'impartial Glass' as having a Christian connotation: 'The glass to which Pope's context has immediate reference is the human mind, and particularly poetry as a creative work of the mind which mirrors God's own art of creation. The relevance of such an idea to Pope's view of satire can be readily grasped; like Horace, he places satire in the perspective of a religious act, an almost sacramental self-revelation and confession. He goes far beyond the pagan poet, however, by suggesting that in so doing he discharges fully his duty as man, by thus faithfully reflecting the image of God within him and reproducing in little, God's creation of universe through the agency of the Word. The classical *votiva tabella* to which Horace refers depicted episodes in the suppliant's life which showed the active intervention of the gods in his affairs. Its presence on the facing page of Pope's editions and in the minds of his readers would have provided sufficient clue to the religious nature of his own "impartial Glass": satire becomes for him very literally a sacred tablet, the medium through which he reveals the continuing presence of God in his soul.', Thomas E. Maresca, p. 371. Interesting though this interpretation is, I am not quite sure that Pope goes this far in using the glass metaphor. What he is describing is the reflection of the object on a glass, thus the relationship between satire and its object, the satiric victim, not the relationship between satire and God's creation.

However, despite this justification of the objectiveness and fairness of his satire, Pope cannot persuade Fortescue. When Fortescue says 'Alas young Man! your Days can ne'er be long,/ In Flow'r of Age you perish for a Song!' (ll. 101-102), his concern for Pope's safety is tinged with some mockery of Pope's moral fervour when he calls the forty-five-year-old Pope a 'young man'. For Fortescue, at the age of forty-five, a man should be worldly wise, thus should compromise with the world, instead of persisting with the ideals of younger age: in a word, a man at this age should know which is more important, his life or 'a Song'. For Fortescue, satire is nothing more than a 'Song' which cannot be compared with life. Also by warning Pope that somebody—'Plums', 'Directors', '*Shylock*', and 'his Wife' (l. 103)—would try to take his life, Fortescue is actually pointing out to Pope the reality that there does exist threatening disapproval of the satirist and his work in contemporary society.

Pope's retort in lines 105-142 attempts to reverse this malevolent judgement of society on himself and his satire by demonstrating both his personal integrity and his social worth—that is, to show himself as a moral man and his satire as an aid to society rather than a threat. When he says

> What? arm'd for *Virtue* when I point the Pen,
> Brand the bold Front of shameless, guilty Men,
> Dash the proud Gamester in his gilded Car,
> Bare the mean Heart that lurks beneath a Star;
> Can there be wanting to defend Her Cause,
> Lights of the church, or Guardians of the laws? . . .
> I will, or perish in the gen'rous Cause.
> Hear this, and tremble! you, who 'scape the Laws.
> Yes, while I live, no rich or noble knave
> Shall walk the World, in credit, to his grave.
> TO VIRTUE ONLY and HER FRIENDS, A FRIEND,
> The World beside may murmur, or commend. (ll. 105-110, 117-122)

Pope is stressing his personal integrity by insisting on his commitment to virtue, which is being emphasised by being put in italics and in capitals: he insists that he writes satire for the cause of virtue and for it he is prepared to die.[19] Pope's vindication of his personal

[19]Thomas E. Maresca even finds here a reference to the apostolic injunction that it is Christian duty to fight against evil, citing Paul's exhortation to 'Put on the whole armour of God' (Euphesians 6. 11), Thomas E. Maresca, p. 381.

integrity gains more strength when put in juxtaposition with Horace's original. In the original, Horace turns to Lucilius for his defence: it is Lucilius whose commitment to virtue (and thus whose personal integrity) is advocated. Horace is pleading his case behind the authority of Lucilius, hoping that the readers will equate himself with Lucilius. It is important for us to note that, whereas, in lines 23-28, George Augustus's lack of quality was revealed in juxtaposition with the original, it is Pope who emerges with superiority, in comparison with Horace, for he demonstrates to the audience that he has the conviction and courage to defend his personal integrity in his own person.

Pope also vindicates his integrity by describing his relationships with worthy noblemen who are believed to possess public esteem. For this purpose, he selects two persons, Bolingbroke and Peterborough, whose approval, he hopes, can outweigh the petty cavils of the mob:

> Know, all the distant Din that World can keep
> Rolls o'er my *Grotto*, and but sooths my Sleep.
> There, my Retreat the best Companions grace,
> Chiefs, out of War, and Statesmen, out of Place.
> There *St. John* mingles with my friendly Bowl,
> The Feast of Reason and the Flow of Soul:
> And He, whose Lightning pierc'd th' *Iberian* Lines,
> Now, forms my Quincunx, and now ranks my Vines,
> Or tames the Genius of the stubborn Plain,
> Almost as quickly, as he conquer'd *Spain*. (ll. 123-132)

The surface subject of this passage is the poet's indifference to worldly business and his enjoyment of his retreat with some friends. However, beneath the surface, this passage is written not towards himself but towards the audience outside his retreat who, Pope hopes, would recognise his relationship with worthy men. It is on the basis of his belief in the public's approval of himself that Pope can make the following vindication of his private integrity and his public worth:

> *Envy* must own, I live among the Great,
> No Pimp of Pleasure, and no Spy of State,
> With Eyes that pry not, Tongue that ne'er repeats,
> Fond to spread Friendships, but to cover Heats,
> To help who want, to forward who excel;
> This, all who know me, know; who love me, tell;

And who unknown defame me, let them be
Scriblers or Peers, alike are *Mob* to me. (ll. 133-140)

However, we readers cannot be completely persuaded by this argument: for, the persons whom Pope selects as the evidence of public approval of himself cannot match the status of 'Scipio' and 'Laelius' (l. 72), who protected Lucilius and his satires, and who in turn imply Augustus Caesar and Maecenas whose relationship with him Horace takes pride in:[20]

—*Quicquid sum ego, quamvis*
*Infra Lucili censum, ingeniumque, tamen me*
*Cum* magnis vixisse *invita fatebitur usque*
*Invidia, & fragili quærens illidere dentem,*
Offendet solido;— (ll. 74-78)
(Such as I am, however far beneath Lucilius in rank and native gifts, yet Envy, in spite of her self, will ever admit that I have lived with the great, and while trying to strike her tooth on something soft, will dash upon what is solid.)

However, unlike the choice of 'Scipio' and 'Laelius' who could command universal public esteem in their times, the choice of Bolingbroke and Peterborough seems quite

[20]'Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, known as Africanus Minor (c. 185-129 BC), Roman general and statesman. He was the second son of L. Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Macedonia, and was adopted by P. Scipio, the son of Scipio Africanus Major. He fought under his father at the battle of Pydna in 168 BC, to end the Third Macedonian War, and brought the long and costly war in Spain against the Numantines to a successful conclusion in 133. . . . He was a great orator, the leading figure in the philhellenic circle at Rome, and a patron of Greek and Latin literature and learning; his friends included Polybius, Panaetius, Lucilius, Terence, and Laelius. His combination of intellectual and active virtues, of high culture with outstanding military and political success, moved Cicero to unbound admiration of him as the ideal statesman.', *The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, ed. by M. C. Howatson and Ian Chilvers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 485.

'Laelius, Gaius, consul at Rome in 140 BC, and close friend of Scipio Aemilianus. He was a good soldier and led the decisive assault on Carthage as a legate under Scipio in the third Punic War (149-146 BC). He was a prominent member of the intellectual, philhellenic circle of Scipio and his friends; Cicero (in *Brutus*) considered him the outstanding orator of his day, and he was given the name Sapiens, 'the wise', for his wide learning and philosophical attainments (or according to Plutarch, for dropping his proposal for agrarian reform in the face of senatorial opposition).', *The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, p. 304.

'Maecenas, Gaius (d. 8 BC), the most famous Roman literary patron, descended from a Etruscan family, an equestrian by birth. He was the trusted counsellor of the emperor Augustus and the enlightened patron of a literary circle which included Virgil, Horace, Propertius, and Varius. The rewards for these protégés were great: Horace owed his Sabine farm and Virgil his independence to him, and both poets addressed him in terms of admiration and gratitude; they made a substantial return by supporting the imperial regime in their poetry.', *The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, p. 330

partisan.[21] Moreover, as we can see in the phrases 'out of War' and 'out of Place', these two men have fallen out of public favour: thus, for Pope, his being approved by these two men cannot demonstrate that he is being supported by the general public. Bolingbroke and Peterborough are believed to command public esteem only by Pope himself, whose view cannot be shared by the general public.

Then, it is not surprising that even Pope's demonstration of his integrity and worth cannot persuade Fortescue to recognise his cause for writing satire. When Fortescue says

> Your Plea is good. But still I say, beware!
> Laws are explain'd by Men — so have a care.
> It stands on record, that in *Richard*'s Times
> A Man was hang'd for very honest Rhymes.
> Consult the Statute: *quart.* I think it is,
> *Edwardi Sext.* or *prim. & quint. Eliz:*
> See *Libels*, *Satires*—here you have it—read. (ll. 144-149)

he reveals his true character. Even though he appreciates Pope's justification of his satire, he still cannot agree with Pope's contention that he should write satire risking his life for virtue: for, as a lawyer, Fortescue is too worldly wise and practical to ignore the

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[21]'Saint-John, Henry, first Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751), statesman; . . . MP for family borough of Wootton-Bassett, 1701; supported Harley and Tory party; . . . secretary at war, 1704-1708; secretary of state, 1710; . . . created Viscount Bolingbroke and Baron St John of Lydiard Tregoze, 1712; went to Paris to make final arrangements for peace, 1712; again took charge of peace negotiations, Treaty of Utrecht being signed, 1713; . . . dismissed from office on accession of George I; . . . a motion for his impeachment carried, bill of attainder passed, and his name erased from roll of peers, 1714; fled to France; secretary of state to James the Pretender, . . .; dismissed from the Old Pretender's service, 1716; . . . pardoned, 1723; returned to London and joined Walpole's party; enabled, by act passed 1725, to inherit and acquire real estate, though still excluded from House of Lords; became estranged from Walpole owing to his opposition to this act; . . . attacked the Walpoles and the government's foreign policy in papers contributed to *Craftsman*, and in other writings, from 1726; wrote *c.* 1730, philosophical fragments partly versified by Pope in *Essay on Man*; . . . gave up the contest with Walpole, 1735, and retired to Chanteloup in Touraine, wrote essays in history in form of letters to friends, and upon political subjects (including *Patriot King*, 1738), but after 1739 ceased to influence politics.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. For Pope's friendship with Bolingbroke and Bolingbroke's influence on him, see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*, especially pp. 505-513, and Brean S. Hammond's book-length study, *Pope and Bolingbroke: A Study of Friendship and Influence* (Columbus, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1984)

'Mordaunt, Charles, third earl of Peterborough and first earl of Monmouth of the second creation (1658-1735), admiral, general and diplomat; . . . active member of the parliamentary opposition, 1680-6; . . . privy councillor on William III's accession, 1689; . . . surprised Montjuich and compelled the surrender of Barcelona, deemed impregnable, 1705, on which the Archduke Charles made a formal entry and was proclaimed King of Spain, 12 Oct. 1705; . . . recalled on the accession of George I, 1714; corresponded with and addressed verses to Mrs Howard; patron of letters and science; numbered among his friends Swift, Pope, Arbuthnot, and Gay;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. For Pope's friendship with Peterborough, see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*, pp. 373-375, 620-622, 649-651.

reality that laws are explained by men, not on the basis of virtue. And his reaching for an actual statute book in lines 147-149 indicates how the legal system works by men's interpretation of laws, illustrated by the precedent of a man hanged despite his 'honest' poem. Even though he is a friend of Pope, he lives in a different kind of world from Pope's, and he insists Pope should realise that he lives in the 'real' world, not in the imaginary one where virtue has the final say.

When Pope replies to Fortescue in the final passage that, instead of 'lawless' 'libels and satires', he will write

> grave *Epistles*, bringing Vice to light,
> Such as a *King* might read, a *Bishop* write,
> Such as Sir *Robert* would approve — (ll. 151-153)

he is playing on the definitions of libel and satire: for Fortescue, they denote satire in general, but Pope restricts the category of satire to actionable libel or lampoon while excluding his satiric works from this category by calling them 'epistles'. Even though he calls some of his poems, such as the *Epistle to Burlington* and the *Epistle to Bathurst*, epistles, emphasising the epistolary nature of the works, the readers know that they are in nature satires.[22] However, because of Pope's cunning play on the words 'satire' and 'epistle', his satiric works come to be excluded from the category which Fortescue warns might be punished by the law interpreted by men. Yet, Pope not only tries to persuade Fortescue by this distortion of definition: he also tries to win Fortescue over by emphasising the distinction between verses which attack indiscriminately, that is lampoons and libels, and his satires (according to his definition, his epistles) which serve the useful social function of uncovering vice, utilising Horace's distinction between 'mala' and 'bona' (l. 83). The emphasis of this passage is also placed on the moral aspect of his satire that even a King, a Bishop, and Walpole would approve. However, there appears a strong irony in these lines. When Pope writes not the definite 'the king' but the indefinite 'a king', it seems that even Pope himself is doubtful whether the king,

[22]Pope called his satires epistles again, when he said that '*The Occasion of publishing these* Imitations *was the Clamour raised on some of my Epistles*' in his advertisement to the edition of his collected works in 1735, *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 3. As the clamour and the epistle clearly refer to the *Epistle to Burlington* and the fuss about the identification of Timon's villa, it can be found that Pope sometimes evades the term 'satire' by preferring the term 'epistle'.

George II, would eventually approve of his satire; and when we consider the fact that Walpole is the last man to approve of Pope's satire, the irony of this passage grows stronger.

Consequently, Fortescue's final reply is also ironic. When he says

> Indeed?
> The Case is alter'd — you may then proceed.
> In such a Cause the Plaintiff will be hiss'd,
> My Lords the Judges laugh, and you're dismiss'd. (ll. 153-156)

it is difficult to find a reason for his sudden approval of Pope's satire. Does Fortescue believe 'the Case is alter'd' because he has finally been won over by the moral sanction of Pope's satire? Thomas E. Maresca seems to believe that he has when he interprets this final dialogue of the poem:

> Fortescue's acceptance of this argument involves his simultaneous acceptance of that larger world order which Pope has defended throughout the poem, the world wherein theoretic distinctions between genres and the theoretic roles of language and literature are meaningful and accurate indices of the ultimate realities. Thus his final lines are also the conclusion of Pope's theory of satire: in the ideal world, the satiric butt *is* hissed off the stage, and satire *does* successfully wage war on vice with morally therapeutic laughter. In this manner Pope's critics are vanquished, and *adversarius* is metamorphosed into *coadjutor*.[23]

John M. Aden also seems to believe that Fortescue is finally persuaded when he argues for his transformation from sceptical adviser to fellow satirist:

> Horace pits himself against a stubborn adversary and wrings from him a concession at best; Pope recruits a partisan, who shared his ideals, adds the force of his reputation and wit into the bargain, and sanctions his perseverance in the cause. Pope's adversary has, without sacrificing any of the tensional value of Horace's, become a powerful ally.[24]

However, this kind of argument seems to be based upon a very shaky assumption, which is that Fortescue is won over by Pope's argument: and that is why we cannot agree with

[23]Thomas E. Maresca, p. 394.
[24]John M. Aden, p. 13.

both critics' arguments. We should consider the possibility that Fortescue gives his final approval of Pope's satire because he comes to believe Pope is going to write epistles favourable to Walpole's administration following his earlier advice. There are not sufficient reasons to believe that Fortescue, who has been persistently objecting to Pope's writing satire despite his approval of Pope's cause, suddenly surrenders to Pope's final argument. If we consider the sudden interruption and rather hasty and relieved approval of Fortescue even before Pope finishes his words in the following lines

> Such as Sir *Robert* would approve —
>
> F. Indeed?
>
> The Case is alter'd — (ll. 153-154)

it becomes apparent that he is not surrendering to Pope's moral cause: rather he becomes satisfied with hearing the eagerly awaited words 'Sir *Robert*' at last. While Pope's emphasis is on so 'moral' a satire that Walpole would approve, Fortescue's interest is obviously in so moral a satire that 'Walpole' would approve. If we compare this passage with Horace's original, the irony becomes more apparent. In the original, when Horace says as follows,

> *Esto, siquis* mala; *sed* bona *siquis*
> *Judice condiderit laudatur* CÆSARE: *siquis*
> *Opprobrijs dignum laceraverit, integer ipse,*
> *Solventur risu tabulæ; tu missus abibis.* (ll. 83-86)
> (To be sure, in case of ill verses. But what if a man compose good verses, and Caesar's judgement approve? If he has barked at someone who deserves abuse, himself blameless? The case will be dismissed with a laugh. You will get off scot-free.)

he is playing on the meanings of the words 'bona' and 'mala'. When the word 'mala' was first used by Trebatius, Fortescue's counterpart, who quotes it from the statute book—'Si mala condiderit in quem quis carmina jus est Judiciumque.' ('If a man writ ill verses against another, there is a right of action and redress by law' [l. 82])—'mala' denotes 'libellous'. However, when Horace uses the word in contrast with 'bona', even though the phraseology is the same—'*siquis* mala . . . *condiderit*'—it not only means 'libellous': it also means 'of poor quality', thus extending the meaning of the word

'bona' to signify 'good quality', which in turn comes to have a moral connotation as well as an aesthetic one. In this sense, Richard Steiger is quite right in observing Horace's extension of the meanings of the word 'bona' from statutory through aesthetic to moral:

> Horace's third repetition of the "si quis" formula of the law makes it clear that by "bona" he means more than "well-made," and that "judice Caesare" does not refer exclusively to esthetic judgement. "Si quis / Opprobriis dignum laceraverit, integer ipse" extends the meaning of "bona" into the realm of moral judgement, and the contrast between "mala" and "bona" takes on a new significance. According to Horace, poems which describe evil people may be defined as "mala carmina" because "mala" may refer either to the poem or to the persons described. By retaining the evil subject ("Opprobriis dignum") while changing the description of his verse to "bona," Horace points out that what distinguishes "mala carmina" from "bona carmina" is not the nature of the subject matter, but the accuracy of its depiction. Hence the formulation "opprobriis dignum" makes even "laceraverit" a positive term. The esthetic meaning of "bona" remains and is indistinguishable from its moral meaning.[25]

Then, in this passage, Horace is advocating the moral and aesthetic quality of his satire, which, he is sure, has the backing of Augustus Caesar. There is no sign of irony here: Horace shows his confidence in his satire whose moral import has wide approval. It is important to note that Pope renders the final line—'solventur risu tabulae; tu missus abibis'—to be assigned to Fortescue, thus departing from his own printed Latin text which gave the line to Horace. Following Bentley's suggestion in rendering this passage, Pope gives the final say to Fortescue and, in so doing, emphasises the difference of situation between Horace and himself.[26] While Horace confidently shows the moral aspect of his satire and can predict the final triumph of his satire in his own person, Pope, in his rendering, shows his doubt about whether the world, here represented by Fortescue, can ever be persuaded to his side, and indeed whether his voice can be heard.

We readers cannot but be surprised and perplexed by Pope's own scepticism about his satire: for, in this apologia, he sets out to defend his satire, arguing for his integrity and for the public worth of his satire, only to end on a note of uncertainty about whether his argument can be accepted by the audience at all. What is more interesting to

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[25]Richard Steiger, p. 347.

[26]'Pope's Latin text of the two lines is the old version, found in Heinsius, Dacier, Desprez, and Baxter, and used in Creech's standard translation. Bentley, followed by Cunningham, repunctuated the lines in what is now the accepted way giving the last line to Trebatius:', Frank Stack, p. 287, n. 3.

us is that this note of scepticism was not a one-off phenomenon, for it was to be repeated two years later in his other apologia, *An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot.*

2. *An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*

In his advertisement to *An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*, Pope clarifies what this poem is about as follows:

> *This Paper is a Sort of Bill of Complaint, begun many years since, and drawn up by snatches, as the several Occasions offer'd. I had no thoughts of publishing it, till it pleas'd some Persons of Rank and Fortune to attack in a very extraordinary manner, not only my Writings (of which being publick the Publick judge) but my* Person, Morals, *and* Family, *whereof to those who know me not, a truer Information may be requisite.*[27]

This passage clearly reveals the main intention of this poem: *To Arbuthnot* is a sort of apologia for satire, in that Pope wants to defend his satires and himself against some unjust charges made against himself. Even though its epistolary title suggests that this poem is a personal letter to his intimate friend, actually its content is far different from what the title suggests. In this poem, Pope's eyes are set towards the outside world, not towards the private sphere of friendship. What Pope sets out to do in this poem is to provide his side of story and let 'the Publick judge' the difference between Pope's true self, which he is about to present, and the distorted image of him which his enemies provided in their attacks on him, notably Lord Hervey and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's *Verses Address'd to the Imitator of Horace*, and Lord Hervey's *Epistle to a Doctor of Divinity from a Nobleman at Hampton Court.* Thus, through an imagined conversation with his friend Dr. Arbuthnot, Pope invites the world to witness how he refutes the claims made against him, such as those in Lord Hervey's and Lady Mary's poems.

The opening part of this poem (ll. 1-68) shows Pope as the victim of pestering by the dunces. As we can see in the following lines,

> What Walls can guard me, or what Shades can hide?
> They pierce my Thickets, thro' my Grot they glide,

[27] *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 95.

By land, by water, they renew the charge,
They stop the Chariot, and they board the Barge.
No place is sacred, not the Church is free,
Ev'n *Sunday* shines no *Sabbath-day* to me:
Then from the *Mint* walks forth the Man of Ryme,
Happy! to catch me, just at Dinner-time. (ll. 7-14)

Pope is describing himself as one who is constantly pestered by the dunces who seek his advice and favour. This part of the poem serves two purposes. It demonstrates that Pope is the one who is provoked: thus if he inadvertently happens to offend the dunces, it is because he is forced to, for all he does is to give the dunces a frank counsel, which they request but actually cannot accept:

I sit with sad Civility, I read
With honest anguish, and an aking head;
And drop at last, but in unwilling ears,
This saving counsel, "Keep your Piece nine years."
  Nine years! cries he, who high in *Drury-lane*
Lull'd by soft Zephyrs thro' the broken Pane,
Rymes e're he wakes, and prints before *Term* ends,
Oblig'd by hunger and Request of friends: (ll. 37-44)

Pope is insisting here that he is the victim, not the offender, of the dunces: for, if the dunces are offended by him, it is because they force Pope to judge their works. Pope is appealing to the readers that, if the offence did occur, it was done involuntarily and was due to the poor quality of the dunces which he cannot feign to recommend.

The second and more important function of this part is to strike against the claims made against him by Lord Hervey and Lady Mary in *Verses Address'd to the Imitator of Horace*. When Lord Hervey and Lady Mary claim that the public

Shall shun thy Writings like thy Company;
And to thy Books shall ope their Eyes no more
Than to thy Person they wou'd do their Door.
  Nor thou the Justice of the World disown,
That leaves Thee thus an Out-cast, and alone;[28] (ll. 98-102)

[28]Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, *Essays and Poems, and 'Simplicity', a Comedy*, ed. by Robert Halsbrand and Isobel Grundy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 269.

their charge is that Pope will be ostracised by the world for his satires. Pope strongly denies this charge by starting *To Arbuthnot* as follows:

> Shut, shut the door, good *John*! fatigu'd I said,
> Tye up the knocker, say I'm sick, I'm dead,
> The Dog-star rages! nay 'tis past a doubt,
> All *Bedlam*, or *Parnassus*, is let out:
> Fire in each eye, and Papers in each hand,
> They rave, recite, and madden round the land. (ll. 1-6)

It is he, not the world, who wants to shut the door. He is not lonely: all the world throngs around him, desperately seeking his advice. Pope is describing himself as a victim of his status in the literary world. However, in this passage, Pope is not only pleading his torture by the dunces. As Frederic Bogel notes, the description of his predicament not only demonstrates that he is 'a nearly helpless victim', but also 'testifies to the immense power that every one attributes to him', thus reveals his dual status as both 'savior and scape goat, a literary ruler yet the victim of countless hacks'.[29] In a way, he is enjoying this torture, for, by showing off his predicament, he is denying emphatically Lady Mary and Lord Hervey's charge.

Having confirmed his supreme status in the literary world, Pope sets out to defend his satires and personal integrity. When Lady Mary and Lord Hervey accuse Pope in the *Verses Address'd to the Imitator of Horace* as follows,

> Like the first bold Assassin's be thy Lot,
> Ne'er be thy Guilt forgiven, or forgot;
> But as thou hate'st, be hated by Mankind,
> And with the Emblem of thy crooked Mind,
> Mark'd on thy Back, like *Cain*, by God's own Hand;
> Wander like Him, accursed through the Land. (ll. 107-112)

they take issue with Pope's personal integrity. Their strategy is to relate Pope's physical deformity with his mind. For them, Pope's satires are vile lampoons, which reflect his

[29]Frederic V. Bogel, *Acts of Knowledge: Pope's Later Poems* (London: Associated University Presses, 1981), p. 203.

crooked mind that is already manifested by his body. From line 68, Pope defends the soundness of his satire and his personal integrity, in a way inviting the readers to compare the crude charges made against himself and his masterful defence. The first strategy in defending his integrity is to assert the inoffensiveness of his satire. As we can see in the following lines,

> You think this cruel? take it for a rule,
> No creature smarts so little as a Fool.
> Let Peals of Laughter, *Codrus!* round thee break,
> Thou unconcern'd canst hear the mighty Crack.
> Pit, Box and Gall'ry in convulsions hurl'd,
> Thou stand'st unshook amidst a bursting World.
> Who shames a Scribler? break one cobweb thro',
> He spins the slight, self-pleasing thread anew;
> Destroy his Fib, or Sophistry; in vain,
> The Creature's at his dirty work again;
> Thron'd in the Centre of his thin designs;
> Proud of a vast Extent of flimsy lines.
> Whom have I hurt? has Poet yet, or Peer,
> Lost the arch'd eye-brow, or *Parnassian* sneer?
> And has not *Colly* still his Lord, and Whore?
> His Butchers *Henley*, his Free-masons *Moor*?
> Does not one Table *Bavius* still admit?
> Still to one Bishop *Philips* seem a Wit? (ll. 83-100)

his defence is that the dunces are not affected by his satires. It is quite interesting to notice that Pope's defence of the inoffensiveness of his satire is rather unusual. He does not assert that his satires do not mean to offend: he argues that his satires are inoffensive, because the dunces do not know and feel the attack made on them. As we can see by the name-calling in these lines, Pope is actually attacking the dunces offensively in the very lines which are supposed to be a defence of the mildness of his satires, so demonstrating in this example the insensitivity of the dunces. In a way, Pope does not hold back the desire to attack his enemies. However, the purpose of this passage is not confined to a defence of the inoffensiveness of his satires: the insensitivity of the dunces described in these lines invites the readers to compare the character of the dunces with Pope's. While he stresses the cold insensitivity of the dunces here, in other lines Pope emphasises the dunces' emotional eruption, which they cannot control: 'If I

dislike it, "Furies, death and rage!'" (l. 57), 'How did they fume, and stamp, and roar, and chafe?' (l. 191). Against this violent fluctuation of the dunces' emotion, Pope quietly presents his control of his feelings. Against the dunces' cold insensitivity, Pope presents his warmth as a human: he can feel tiredness (l. 1), and he can suffer headache (l. 38)—that is, he can feel pain when it occurs. Against the dunces' uncontrolled burst of emotions, Pope contrasts his cool control of them in the following lines:

> Yet then did *Gildon* draw his venal quill;
> I wish'd the man a dinner, and sate still:
> Yet then did *Dennis* rave in furious fret;
> I never answer'd, I was not in debt: (ll. 151-154)
>
> Were others angry? I excus'd them too;
> Well might they rage; I gave them but their due. (ll. 173-174)

Thus, Pope is presenting himself as one who exhibits self-control, in contrast with his enemies, who, as Ian Donaldson points out, are 'fixed in one state or another: as forever emotionally unresponsive, or forever emotionally out of control'.[30] What Pope tries to demonstrate in these lines is his control of emotions, which would convince the readers of his integrity if set against the dunces' emotional turmoil. This strategy seems to pay off, at least in the case of a modern critic, for this demonstration is enough for U. C. Knoepflmacher to regard Pope in this poem as 'an ironic writer who has mastered his hostilities; the speaker who is that writer's self-representation can therefore call my attention to the identity he has assumed as a token of his achieved control.'[31]

Another defence of his integrity is to stress his literary talent, thus distinguishing himself from the dunces, who try to do things which they are not meant to do. As the following lines show,

> Why did I write? what sin to me unknown
> Dipt me in Ink, my Parents', or my own?
> As yet a Child, nor yet a Fool to Fame,
> I lisp'd in Numbers, for the Numbers came.
> I left no Calling for this idle trade,

[30]Ian Donaldson, 'Concealing and Revealing: Pope's *Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot*', *YES*, 18 (1988), 181-199 (p. 190).
[31]U. C. Knoepflmacher, 'Impersonations of Alexander Pope: Current Views Within a Nineteenth-Century Perspective', *MLQ*, 34 (1973), 448-61 (p. 459).

No Duty broke, no Father dis-obey'd.
The Muse but serv'd to ease some Friend, not Wife,
To help me thro' this long Disease, my Life,
To second, ARBUTHNOT! thy Art and Care,
And teach, the Being you perserv'd, to bear. (ll. 125-134)

Pope emphasises that he has a natural talent as a poet, his verse coming involuntarily, unlike the dunces who have to labour to write. Pope also stresses his literary talent by demonstrating that his works have the backing of worthy men. By demonstrating the approval of worthy men—Granville, Walsh, Garth, Swift, Talbot, Somers, Sheffield, Atterbury, and Bolingbroke—in lines 135-146, Pope insists that his literary talent has public approval.[32] It is in line with this strategy that Pope adds the following note to line 141:

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[32]'Granville (or Grenville), George, Baron Lansdowne (1666-1735), poet and dramatist; . . . MP, Fowey, 1702, Cornwall, 1710-1711; secretary at war, 1710; one of the twelve peers created for the peace, 1711; . . . imprisoned in the Tower on suspicion of Jacobitism, 1715-1717; . . . His poems were praised by Pope (of whom he was an early patron), but declared by Johnson mere imitations of Waller.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

'Walsh, William (1663-1708), critic and poet; . . . Whig MP for Worcestershire, 1698, 1701, 1702, Richmond, Yorkshire, 1705-1708; . . . friend and literary adviser of Alexander Pope, whom he advised to be a "correct" poet, that being the "only way left of excellency", 1706;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*, III, p. 3116. For William Walsh's influence on Pope in his formative years, see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*.

'Garth, Sir Samuel (1661-1719), physician and poet; . . . physician-in-ordinary to George I, and physician-general to the army; . . . wrote many occasional verse, and was a member of the Kit-Cat Club;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. For Pope's relation with him, see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*, pp. 100-104.

'Talbot, Charles, twelfth earl and only duke of Shrewsbury (1660-1718), . . . made secretary of state, 1689, but resigned, 1690, on the refusal of the Tory Parliament to pass the Abjuration Bill; . . . at the great crisis on the death of Queen Anne, 1714, acted a courageous part as treasurer and lord justice, it being chiefly owing to his conduct that the Hanoverian succession was assured; became lord Chamberlain to the new king, but was not included in the Cabinet council.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

'Somers (or Sommers), John, Baron Somers (1651-1716), lord Chancellor of England; . . . MP, Worcester, 1689; asserted virtual abdication of James II, and presided over the drafting of the Declaration of Rights; . . . member of the Kit-Cat Club and friend and patron of Addison, Congreve, Steele, Vertue, Tindal, Rymer, and for a time, Swift, who dedicated to him the *Tale of a Tub* (1704); . . . possessed great Influence, second only to that of Sunderland, with William III, and was one of the Council of Regency during William III's absence in Holland;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

'Sheffield, John, third earl of Mulgrave, afterwards first duke of Buckingham and Normandy (1648-1721), patron of Dryden and friend of Pope; . . . submitted to William III, but joined opposition; . . . lord president of the council, 1710-1714; a lord justice, 1714; . . . He published *Essay on Poetry* and (probably) *Essay on Satire*, *Account of the Revolution*, and poetic works, including a recast of *Julius Caesar* into two plays.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

'Atterbury, Francis (1662-1732), bishop of Rochester; . . . bishop of Rochester and dean of Westminster, 1713; took part in coronation of George I; leant towards the Jacobite cause; held direct communication with the Jacobites, 1717; imprisoned in the Tower for alleged connection with an attempt to restore the Stuarts, 1720; deprived of his offices and banished; went to Brussels, 1723, and then to

> These are the persons to whose account the Author charges the publication of his first pieces: Persons with whom he was conversant (and he adds belov'd) at 16 or 17 years of age; an early period for such acquaintance! The catalogue might be made yet more illustrious, had he not confined it to that time when he writ the *Pastorals* and *Windsor Forest*, on which he passes a sort of Censure in the lines following,
>
> *While pure Description held the place of Sense, &c*

The purpose of this note is to let the readers know that approval of his talent is not confined to the nine men whom he enumerated, and so he is actually approved by a lot more worthy men. In these lines, Pope is quietly taking pride in his noble friends, whose approval has quite a contrasting quality from the cavils of '*Burnets*, *Oldmixons*, and *Cooks*' (l. 146).

Having established the quality of his literary talent, and thus of his satires, which his enemies accuse as symbols of his crooked mind, Pope then demonstrates his personal integrity by emphasising his independence:

> Oh let me live my own! and die so too!
> ("To live and die is all I have to do:")
> Maintain a Poet's Dignity and Ease,
> And see what friends, and read what books I please.
> Above a Patron, tho' I condescend
> Sometimes to call a Minister my Friend:
> I was not born for Courts or great Affairs,
> I pay my Debts, believe, and say my Pray'rs,
> Can sleep without a Poem in my head,
> Nor know, if *Dennis* be alive or dead. (ll. 261-270)

In asserting his independence from patrons, whose favour and taste one cannot guarantee, Pope is demonstrating here the difference between independent him and dependent 'them', the dunces. For Pope, his independence becomes a basis of his integrity, for he

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France; entered the service of James II's son, James Francis Edward Stuart, the Old Pretender;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. For Pope's friendship with Atterbury and his view on the Atterbury trial, see Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*, pp. 399-402.

This list of friends is quite impressive, because it is not restricted by partisan interest. Even though it includes staunch Tories, such as Bolingbroke and Atterbury, it also includes friends from the other spectrum of politics such as Walsh, Garth, Somers, and Talbot, thus demonstrating the wide approval his literary talent enjoyed.

does not have to compromise his dignity for a patron. This independence enables him to be on friendly terms with a minister as equals, while the dunces have to sacrifice their conscience and dignity, if they have any, for a patronage.

The establishment of his literary talent and independence enables Pope to invite the readers to witness the contrast between himself and his arch-enemy, Lord Hervey ('Sporus'). In this portrait of Sporus in lines 305-333, Pope is showing the readers the difference between the quality of his attack and that of Lord Hervey's. In the *Verses Address'd to the Imitator of Horace*, Lord Hervey and Lady Mary's attack on Pope does not develop well. Even though they try to establish the link between Pope's physical deformity and his alleged inward crookedness, they do not establish how and why Pope's hunchback can be a symbol of his evils: they are simply asserting their argument without backing, as his evils are simply taken for granted. In contrast, in the portrait of Sporus, Pope demonstrates how to relate outward physicality to inward quality. At first, Sporus is likened to a bug as follows:

> Yet let me slap this Bug with gilded wings,
> This painted Child of Dirt that stinks and stings;
> Whose Buzz the Witty and the Fair annoys,
> Yet Wit ne'er tastes, and Beauty ne'er enjoys, (ll. 309-312)

What Pope tries to establish in this image of Sporus as a bug is his duality: 'gild' not only means 'gold' but also, by its association of colour, can invite the allusion to excrement, which insinuates that, beneath the finely painted face of Sporus, there is dirt and odour.[33] This duality sets the tone of the whole portrait and is exploited to the full

[33]Pope was not alone in associating gold with excrement. Swift also used this analogy in the part of 'A Panegyric on the Dean' in which he jokingly describes his construction of outhouse:

> Yet some devotion still remains
> Among our harmless northern swains;
> Whose offerings placed in golden ranks,
> Adorn our crystal river's banks: (ll. 299-302)

J. Paul Hunter interprets 'Bug with gilded wings' differently. For him, the pun on gild indicates not the excremental odour of Sporus but his sexual perversion: 'Bug, for Pope's contemporaries, usually meant bedbug, but Pope immediately begins to play with, and qualify, that expectancy as he identifies just what kind of buggery is here involved. Pope's lily-gilding swiftly introduces two major motifs in the portrait: the perversion of Sporus (the oral pun on "gild" combines with Roman allusion to clarify Sporus' bed-side manner), and his absurd willingness to be more than one thing at once.', J. Paul Hunter, 'Satiric Apology as Satiric Instance: Pope's *Arbuthnot*', *JEGP*, 68 (1969), 625-647 (pp. 638-639). Whether 'gild' is

extent to implicate Sporus in moral sin. However, in these lines, Sporus is not described as dangerous. He is annoying, for he buzzes around the ear; yet, he is harmless, for he only buzzes, not realising his intention to sting. The descriptions of Sporus as spaniel, shallow stream, and puppet in the following lines (ll. 313-318) are the reinforcement of his impotence as described in this bug imagery. Like spaniels, he dares not bite the object of his desire; even though it looks like a smile, the dimple can only be an indication of the shallowness of a stream, while a deep river never makes any dimple; like a puppet, even though he seems to be alive, he has no identity or will of his own, but is just dangling on a string.

Up to this point, Sporus is being described as harmless, even though he is annoying. However, the description of him as a toad changes the tone of the portrait. When Sporus is described as follows,

> Or at the Ear of *Eve*, familiar Toad,
> Half Froth, half Venom, spits himself abroad,
> In Puns, or Politicks, or Tales, or Lyes,
> Or Spite, or Smut, or Rymes, or Blasphemies. (ll. 319-322)

the quality of Sporus as a manifestation of evil emerges: having a close kinship to a snake, he as a toad is likened to Eve's tempter who corrupted mankind. Then, we should ask why Pope chooses the image of a toad rather than that of a snake. It is because Pope wants to develop the duality of Sporus suggested in his image of a bug and, in so doing, he wants to strike home his attacks on Lord Hervey, exploiting his effeminacy: 'Fop at the Toilet, Flatt'rer at the Board,/ Now trips a Lady, and now struts a Lord.' (ll. 328-329) Here, we should notice that, as Sporus's duality becomes associated with a moral implication, the tone of the portrait changes as well: the easy fluency of the couplet disappears as 'the abrupt, ejaculatory rhythms', created by alliteration in lines 321-322 and alliteration and crowding consonants in lines 328-329, take over.[34] The poet no longer regards him as a harmless nuisance, as he extends Lord Hervey's effeminacy to the amphibian quality of toads to attack him, relating his outside physicality to his innate

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associated with excrement or sexual perversion does not affect Pope's main intention in this passage, which is to emphasise Sporus's duality, his other self under the fine surface.

[34]Thomas R. Edwards Jr., *This Dark Estate*, p. 107.

quality, his moral sinfulness. J. Paul Hunter is right when he notes how Pope uses the amphibian quality of toads in his attack on Lord Hervey:

> As an amphibian, the toad is a dramatically successful symbol, not only in received moral terms, but as a perverted philosophic animal extension of the characteristic vacillation of Sporus. Pope's satire is sharp and precise; the term amphibian had long been standard to describe man's proper place in creation, but Sporus, like the other dunces in *Arbuthnot*, misunderstands the implications of the term, trying to be amphibian between sexes, not between orders.[35]

When he compares Sporus to a toad, Pope picks on the ambiguous quality of toads which belong neither to land nor to water, thus implying the dubiousness of Sporus's effeminacy which makes him like a woman despite the fact that he is a man. However, Pope does not dwell on Sporus's physical ambiguity, as he extends it to signify his moral enormity—that is, his nothingness between extremes:

> His Wit all see-saw between *that* and *this*,
> Now high, now low, now Master up, now Miss,
> And he himself one vile Antithesis. (ll. 323-325)

Lord Hervey becomes nothing, because, in trying to be everything, he loses his identity between the extremes which cannot be compromised, and finally ends up failing to be anything he tries to be. When he is shown to 'combine extremes of beauty and corruption in himself, with nothing but "Emptiness" at the centre of his personality', not only does his duality signify his nothingness, but it also indicates his evil nature.[36] The key word here is 'Antithesis', which sums up Lord Hervey's lack of centre, in other words his lack of wholeness. As G. Wilson Knight rightly observes, this word 'Antithesis' indicates Lord Hervey's 'ever-lasting self-contradictory Nothingness' which results from an 'utter lack of self-realization, of psychic wholeness . . . together with a failure to fuse the masculine and feminine elements in the personality'.[37] On the basis of

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[35]J. Paul Hunter, p. 640.
[36]Yasmine Gooneratne, *Alexander Pope* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 129.
[37]G. Wilson Knight, *Laureate of Peace: On the Genius of Alexander Pope* (London: Routledge, 1955), p. 68.

this argument, Pope develops the toad allusion, by which he established the moral enormity of Sporus's duality, to its next of kin, a snake:

> *Eve*'s Tempter thus the Rabbins have exprest,
> A Cherub's face, a Reptile all the rest;
> Beauty that shocks you, Parts that none will trust,
> Wit that can creep, and Pride that licks the dust. (ll. 330-333)

Thus, Sporus's failure to 'distinguish between his adroit indefiniteness — which lacks a center — and the flexibility of a true self' comes to represent an enormous moral sin, that of a snake, 'Eve's Tempter', which was the cause of the mankind's original sin.[38] Then, we should notice the quality of Pope's attack on Lord Hervey in this portrait: in Lady Mary and Lord Hervey's attack on Pope, his hunchback as a symbol of his inner nature is nothing more than a sort of declaration, for it does not have the backing of any other imagery or allusion. However, on the other hand, Pope successfully exploits Lord Hervey's effeminacy to make its every aspect illustrative of its inner evil.

It is this Sporus portrait on which Pope builds the vindication of his personal integrity. Immediately following the Sporus portrait, thus inviting the readers' contrast between Sporus and himself, Pope finally strikes home the vindication of his integrity:

> Not Fortune's Worshipper, nor Fashion's Fool,
> Not Lucre's Madman, nor Ambition's Tool,
> Not Proud, nor servile, be one Poet's praise
> That, if he pleas'd, he pleas'd by manly ways;
> That Flatt'ry, ev'n to Kings, he held a shame,
> And thought a Lye in Verse or Prose the same:
> That not in Fancy's Maze he wander'd long,
> But stoop'd to Truth, and moraliz'd his song: (ll. 334-341)

By using anaphora, through the emphatic use of 'not' three times in the beginning of this passage and through the use of symmetric structure in the first three lines, Pope tries to emphasise the contrast between what he is not and what he really is, and, in so doing, vindicates his virtue, demonstrating the falsity of Lady Mary and Lord Hervey's claim:

[38]Frederic V. Bogel, p. 215.

thus, he uses this self-portrait 'as a standard against which to measure the evil he condemns.'[39]

Then, Pope's defence of himself and his satire seems to respond well to the charges made against them: against the claim that he is ostracised, he demonstrates his popularity; against the claim that his verse is vile, he establishes its quality contrasting it with his enemy's; against the charges made against his personal self, he points out the evils of his enemy and builds the vindication of his integrity on the portrait of that enemy. Then, can we regard *To Arbuthnot* as Pope's confident apologia for his satire? My contention is that the answer has to be no. As I discussed earlier, Pope admits that the satiric victims will not respond to his satire because of their insensitivity while defending the inoffensiveness of his satire in lines 83-100. Not only are the dunces insensitive, however, but they are also described as having a strange reproductive power. It is of no use to attack and try to destroy their vice or folly, because, despite the satirist's attack, they will 'spin[s] the slight, self-pleasing thread anew' (l. 90) and be 'at his[their] dirty work again' (l. 92). The dunces are recognised here as not only beyond reformation but also disturbingly tenacious.

Then, the reformative side of his satire must come from the satirist-audience relationship. In other words, Pope should be confident about persuading the readers of his argument. However, despite his masterful defence of his satire and personal integrity, curiously enough, there appear some passages which indicate Pope's serious doubt about the possibility of his being understood and approved by the public. Elements of Pope's doubt about his satire can be found in the following lines:

> 'Tis sung, when *Midas*' Ears began to spring,
> (*Midas*, a sacred Person and a King)
> His very Minister who spy'd them first,
> (Some say his Queen) was forc'd to speak, or burst.
> And is not mine, my Friend, a sorer case,
> When ev'ry Coxcomb perks them in my face?
> "Good friend forbear! you deal in dang'rous things,
> "I'd never name Queens, Ministers, or Kings;
> "Keep close to Ears, and those let Asses prick,
> "Tis nothing"—Nothing? if they bite and kick?

[39]Lillian Feder, 'Sermo or Satire: Pope's Definition of His Art', in *Studies in Criticism and Aesthetics 1660-1800: Essays in Honor of Samuel Holt Monk*, ed. by Howard Anderson and John S. Shea (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967), pp. 140-155 (p. 152).

Out with it, *Dunciad*! let the secret pass,
That Secret to each Fool, that he's an Ass:
The truth once told, (and wherefore shou'd we lie?)
The Queen of *Midas* slept, and so may I. (ll. 69-82)

At first sight, the use of Midas story is simply to enforce Pope's argument about why he has to speak and attack his enemies: if he does not speak, he may burst. However, we should notice why Midas's ear began to spring. It is because he misjudged in a singing contest between Pan and Apollo, and thus we can say that Midas in these lines represents bad taste in art.[40] So when Pope likens 'every Coxcomb' to Midas, he is expressing his concern that bad judgement in art is rife in contemporary society. Thus, in the background of this passage, there is Pope's concern that he might not be listened to, because the public cannot judge properly what is wrong and right and what is superior and what is base. Also, what should be noticed is that, in Ovid's version, after he witnessed Midas's ass-like ear, a slave could not keep the secret to himself and thus had to dig a hole and relieve himself of the secret.[41] (Here, in Pope's story, a slave is replaced by the Queen.) Thus, in the case of the secret-bearer represented by the Queen or a slave, the emphasis is on letting the secret out, not on letting the public know, thus on the private satisfaction, not on the public weal. Once Pope likens himself as a satirist to a secret-bearer, a fundamental question arises: for whom does the satirist speak out? Does he still speaks for the public or for his personal pleasure? In this passage, the answer has to be that Pope may speak for the sake of his personal pleasure or relief.

When Pope picks up this ear metaphor once again later in the poem in the following lines, the answer becomes clearer:

"But why insult the Poor, affront the Great?"
A Knave's a Knave, to me, in ev'ry State,
Alike my scorn, if he succeed or fail,
*Sporus* at Court, or *Japhet* in a Jayl,
A hireling Scribler, or a hireling Peer,
Knight of the Post corrupt, or of the Shire,
If on a Pillory, or near a Throne,
He gain his Prince's Ear, or lose his own. (ll. 360-367)

[40]For a full story of Midas, see *Ovid: Metamorphoses, Book IX-XV*, trans. by Frank Justus Miller, 2nd edn., *The Loeb Classical Library*, ed. by G. P. Goold and others (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984; repr. 1994), XI, ll. 85-193.
[41]*Ovid: Metamorphoses, Book IX-XV*, XI, ll. 172-193.

Again, these lines, on the surface level, seem to enforce Pope's personal integrity by declaring that he would never make a distinction in rank when attacking vice or folly. However, we should notice Pope's pun on 'gain' in line 367. As J. Paul Hunter points out, 'gaining' means not only 'getting access to', but also 'acquiring'.[42] If we interpret the final couplet assuming that 'gain' means 'getting access to', it strengthens Pope's surface argument: Pope will attack a knave whoever he is, whether he loses his ears in a pillory or he has the confidence of a prince. Yet, if we interpret 'gain' as 'acquire', a whole new meaning emerges from this couplet. In this case, from the fact that Midas's story appears earlier in the poem, the prince's ear come to be associated with King Midas's ear, the symbol of bad judgement in art. We should also notice that the phrase 'lose his own [ear]' can be interpreted metaphorically as 'losing one's ability to listen', not just 'having cut one's ear physically'. Because these lines follow immediately the Sporus portrait and Pope's vindication of his integrity, the implication would appear to be that a choice has to be made between what Sporus personifies and what Pope represents. However, if we interpret the final couplet in the second meaning of 'gain' and 'lose one's ear', Pope seems to know the result already, because, in line 367, he presents the choice as one between getting Midas's ear through bad judgement or losing one's ability to listen, not as one between himself, a superior satirist, and Sporus, the symbol of evil. In this way, Pope seems to put himself in a no-win situation: in either case, he will not be properly judged and listened to. It is as if Pope predicts that his voice will not be listened to, while the public will get Midas's ears, and he will let them know about it simply for his own personal relief. Pope is being sceptical about the reforming power of satire, as he is uncertain whether the public will ever listen to his counsel.

Then, *To Arbuthnot* is a strange poem for an apologia for satire. Even though the irony is not so strong as that in the final lines of *Sat. II. i,* Pope's defence of satire is undermined from inside the poem through some passages which invite the readers' doubt, despite his impressive defence elsewhere of his satire and personal integrity. He reveals, in the very defence of his satire, that, in the world of Midas, it is Sporus, not he, who gets the upper hand. We are not sure by the end of this poem for whom Pope writes

[42]J. Paul Hunter, p. 642.

his satire: the poem begins as a defence against the charge that Pope writes satires for his own pleasure, but after all the masterful defences, the poem seems to be heading back to square one.

3. *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift*

We cannot regard Swift's *Verses* as a typical apologia for satire, unlike Pope's *Sat II. i* and *Arbuthnot*, of which whole purpose is the defence of Pope's satires and his integrity as a satirist, because the proposed subject of the *Verses* is something else: its original or proposed purpose is to prove La Rochefoucauld's maxim that mankind is basically a selfish species. However, even though it might seem that over half of the poem is not devoted to the defence of satire, there emerges a strong vindication of Swift himself as a satirist and his satire in the second part of the poem, which is delivered by the imagined 'impartial speaker'. If we can accept A. B. England's explanation of the traditional apologia for satire,

> the primary function of the satirist's *apologia* is that it establishes an ethical standpoint from which his attacks are launched. Traditionally, the attribution of an ideal *persona* to the satirist provides a moral basis that justifies his aggressive engagement with a corrupt world and establishes his own spiritual strength. It thus creates an area of firm ground amidst the chaos that he confronts.[43]

we can understand that the latter part of the *Verses* does have the function of an apologia for satire: as we shall see later, we can even call the whole poem an apologia in the sense that the first part prepares for the second. We cannot deny the presence of Swift's vindication of himself, even though it is disguised as being spoken by the 'impartial speaker'.

However, Swift's vindication of himself or self-eulogy in the second part has occasioned a lot of contradictory interpretations, because its tone is not regarded as consistent: there is passionate, even exaggerated, vindication of Swift himself, whereas, on the other hand, there do seem to exist some unmissable ironic remarks which undermine this vindication of himself. Then, to conceive the nature of this poem as an

[43]A. B. England, *Energy and Order in the Poetry of Swift* (London: Associated University Presses, 1981), p. 187.

apologia, it is essential for us to understand what Swift wants to tell us in the second part of the poem and how this part is related to the first.

If we consider the inconsistent nature of the second part, it is not surprising for us to find that there have been quite various and contradictory interpretations of this poem. Some critics, such as John Middleton Murry, read the second part as a poetically destructive personal vanity and 'an unqualified eulogy' set down 'in flat contradiction to the first part'.[44] However, critics such as Barry Slepian seem to save Swift from the imputation of a poetically destructive vanity by reading the alleged incriminating passages as Swift's intentional exhibitions of self-irony, the purpose of which is 'to complete his thesis that all mankind is egotistical, selfish, and proud', including himself.[45] Yet, another critic interprets the second part of this poem as Swift's manipulation of his autobiography to present himself as a champion of virtue. Robert Uphaus argues that, in the second part, Swift 'offers an image to posterity that dares us to challenge his integrity. He does not conceal himself through the manipulation of irony: rather, the irony gives way to autobiographical self-revelation, providing a complex perspective of a highly complicated man'.[46]

These contradictory interpretations of this part seem to be closely related to the question of how Swift consistently pursues the proposed subject of this poem, which is set by La Rochefoucauld's maxim:

> As Rochefoucauld his maxims drew
> From nature, I believe 'em true:
> They argue no corrupted mind
> In him; the fault is in mankind.
>
> This maxim more than all the rest
> Is thought too base for human breast;
> 'In all distresses of our friends
> We first consult our private ends,
> While nature kindly bent to ease us,

[44]John Middleton Murry, *Jonathan Swift: A Critical Biography* (London: Cape, 1954), pp. 457-459.
[45]Barry Slepian, 'The Ironic Intention of Swift's Verses on His Own Death', *RES*, 14 (1963), 249-256 (p. 256).
[46]Robert W. Uphaus, 'Swift's "Whole Character": The Delany Poems and "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift"', *MLQ*, 34 (1973), 406-416 (p. 414). For a similar point of view, which interprets the second part as Swift's vindication of himself as a satirist, see Marshall Waingrow, '*Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift*', *SEL*, 5 (1965), 513-518, John I. Fischer, 'How to Die: *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift*', *RES*, 21 (1970), 422-441, Edward E. Said, 'Swift's Tory Anarchy', *ECS*, 3 (1969), 48-66.

Points out some circumstance to please us.'

If this perhaps your patience move
Let reason and experience prove. (ll. 1-12)

If we interpret Swift's self-eulogy in terms of self-irony, the whole argument of this poem is well consistent with this proposed subject: Swift proves this maxim first in the examples of his friends, and then in the case of his foes, and finally, in the second part, in the example of himself. However, even though we cannot deny the possible existence of irony in Swift's self-eulogy, we also cannot deny the fact that there are many examples of Swift's vindication of his personal integrity which have no relation with irony, as we shall see later. It seems that this problem of interpretation is related to the way Swift presents his own identity in a special way in the second part. Unlike Pope in *Sat. II. i* and *To Arbuthnot* who speaks about himself plainly *in propria persona*, Swift does not talk about himself in the second part in his own person. The supposition of his own death actually provides Swift with a context for talking about him. However, he lets an 'impartial speaker' in the Rose Tavern talk about him. Even though we know that this 'impartial speaker' is a creation of Swift, thus a sort of mouth-piece for Swift, we cannot deny that the use of a separate speaker is a device which allows for the possibility of a gap between him and Swift the author, and thus the exaggerated self-eulogy and self-irony can be said to exist in the space between Swift the author and his persona.[47] In a way, Swift treats his identity as a separate entity to be dealt with in a detached way, thus an interpretation of this poem should acknowledge this detachment, however uncertain, if it is to deal properly with the self-eulogy or self-irony. Letting the 'impartial speaker' speak about himself opens a road for Swift to treat his identity as a separate entity, and, in so doing, Swift is manipulating the portrait of 'Swift the man' to a certain purpose. Thus to interpret the second part properly is to understand to what purpose Swift manipulates, through his persona, his identity, not to accept the second part at face value. In a way this interpretation is to determine whether Swift uses his own identity to prove La Rochefoucauld's maxim, or, on the contrary, he uses La Rochefoucauld's maxim to talk about himself for the purpose of vindicating his integrity as a satirist.

[47]This problem of the distance between the author and his persona and that of the possible distance between the author's historical self and his artistic self will be discussed in full in part I of chapter 4.

It is my contention that Swift uses his own identity to prove that there is an exception to La Rochefoucauld's maxim and thus to vindicate his integrity as a satirist.[48] If we divide this poem into two parts—the first part spoken *in propria persona* and the second part by the 'impartial speaker'—we can find quite a contrast of tones between them. While the second part is dominated by the eulogy (a bit exaggerated) of Swift, the first can be characterised by Swift's self-deprecating tone. However, it seems to me that, despite their contrasting tones, the purposes of these two parts are actually the same—the vindication of Swift's own integrity.

We can easily find Swift's self-deprecation in the first part in the example of his supposed attitude towards his friends while he proves La Rochefoucauld's maxim. When he says about himself,

> In Pope, I cannot read a line,
> But with a sigh, I wish it mine:
> When he can in one couplet fix
> More sense than I can do in six:
> It gives me such a jealous fit,
> I cry, 'Pox take him, and his wit.'
>
> Why must I be outdone by Gay,
> In my own humorous biting way?
>
> Arbuthnot is no more my friend,
> Who dares to irony pretend;
> Which I was born to introduce,
> Refined it first, and showed its use. (ll. 47-58)

Swift seems to involve himself in the universal charge that all men are envious and selfish. However, in fact, these lines eventually serve as a compliment, indeed a greater compliment to himself, than to Pope, Gay, or Arbuthnot: for these lines show that he can

[48]Robert W. Uphaus, in his article 'Swift's "Whole Character": The Delany Poems and "Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift"', makes a useful observation that this poem is not the only one in which Swift uses his identity as a positive model to be set against the folly or vice he locates around himself. He argues that Swift's *Epistle upon an Epistle* and *Libel on the Reverend Dr Delaney and His Excellency John, Lord Carteret*, which were prompted by Delaney's *Epistle to Lord Carteret*, provide examples of Swift using his identity as a positive model to rebuke his friend for his venality. Written at the similar period to the *Verses* (*An Epistle upon an Epistle* in 1729 and *A Libel on the Reverend Dr Delaney* between 1729 and 1730), Uphaus argues that Swift's use of his identity as a positive model can be a reference to Swift's use of it in the *Verses*. For more detailed discussion, see Robert W. Uphaus, pp. 406-411.

generously recognise their merits, whether he really envies them or not. In fact, the exaggerated expression in such lines as 'It gives me such a jealous fit, / I cry, "Pox take him, and his wit"' (ll. 51-52) shows that Swift's envy for the talents of his friends is rather overstated, notwithstanding his recognition of it. This indicates the purpose of the self-deprecation in the first part of the poem. It is not to prove La Rochefoucauld's maxim that there is no exception in mankind's selfishness: rather, it is to insist that there does exist an exception, himself, by showing both his generous recognition of other people's merits and his acknowledgement of his weak side, his comically presented envy. These qualities are set against other people's blind selfishness, which is well propounded in the behaviour of the people upon hearing of his supposed death, the culmination of which is that of the ladies at the card table, as they show their cold selfishness by carrying on their game, expressing only fake sympathy: even, in this first part, Swift implicitly distinguishes himself from the selfish 'others'. The purpose of the introduction of La Rochefoucauld's maxim thus becomes clearer: it is to provide an occasion for vindicating his own integrity, not to prove its universal applicability. We should keep this fact in mind when we try to interpret the second part.

Critics who interpret the second part as Swift's manipulation of self-irony have in support of their opinion the fact that there do seem to be a number of instances of irony in this part. In fact, it is not difficult for us to find examples. We are told that in Swift's satire,

> Yet, malice never was his aim;
> He lashed the vice but spared the name.
> No individual could resent,
> Where thousands equally were meant. (ll. 463-466)

We cannot accept this claim, because not only is this simply untrue of most of Swift's satires, but, as Barry Slepian observes, 'he had just finished attacking thirteen people by name'.[49] Most of all, we cannot believe the sincerity of the claim that 'To steal a hint was never known,/ But what he writ was all his own.' (ll. 317-318) because, as David M. Vieth rightly observes, the second line is stolen from Denham's elegy on Cowley: 'To

[49]Barry Slepian, p. 255.

him no author was unknown, / Yet what he wrote was all his own'.[50] In these two examples, Swift himself must be aware that the claims made by the 'impartial speaker' are untrue, because there are too strong proofs at hand in the same poem for him not to be conscious of this. However, we should not assume that, even though the untruthfulness of these claims can be interpreted as wry self-irony, this self-irony so dominates the second part of the poem as to make its overall tone self-deprecating.

To call the second part ironic and no more seems a misjudgement, as Swift's conviction in his integrity comes across too strongly for us to dismiss the second part simply as Swift's ironic manipulation of his identity. Swift certainly does believe in the moral aim of his satire when he lets the 'impartial speaker' say

> As with a moral view designed
> To cure the vices of mankind:
> His vein, ironically grave,
> Exposed the fool, and lashed the knave: (ll. 313-316)

Also, his pride in his efforts on Ireland's behalf seems perfectly genuine. When the 'impartial speaker' claims that 'But, not a traitor could be found,/ To sell him for six hundred pound' (ll. 357-358), this claim cannot be regarded as ironically intended, as we can see in the note Swift adds to line 355:

> In the Year 1713, the late Queen was prevailed with by an address of the House of Lords in England, to publish a proclamation, promising three hundred pounds to whatever person would discover the author of a pamphlet called, *The Publick Spirit of the Whigs*; and in Ireland, in the year 1724, my Lord Carteret and his first coming into the government, was prevailed on to issue a proclamation for promising the like reward of three hundred pounds, to any person, who could discover the author of a pamphlet called, *The Drapier's Fourth Letter, & c.* writ against that destructive project of coining halfpence for Ireland; but in neither kingdoms was the Dean discovered.

[50]David M. Vieth, 'The Mystery of Personal Identity: Swift's Verses on His Own Death', in *The Author in His Work: Essays on a Problem in Criticism*, ed. by Louis L. Martz and Aubrey Williams (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 242-265 (p. 254).

Swift is supporting this claim with the historical account as he conceives it.[51] Then, there is no reason for us to doubt that, in these lines, Swift genuinely believes that the people in Ireland trust in his patriotic deeds, with the note not undermining but reinforcing the claim made in these lines.

When we compare the claims made in the second part with his correspondence, it seems that Swift really believes in most of them, though they are not always consistent with objective factuality. As to the claim that he

> Without regarding private ends,
> Spent all his credit for his friends:
> And only chose the wise and good;
> No flatterers; no allies in blood;
> But succoured virtue in distress,
> And seldom failed of good success; (ll. 331-336)

we can find a similar assertion in his correspondence:

> This I will venture to say, that in the time when I had some little credit I did fifty times more for fifty people, from whom I never received the least service or assistance. Yet I should not be pleased to hear a relation of mine reproaching them for ingratitude, although many of them well deserve it; for thanks to party, I have met in both kingdoms with ingratitude enough.[52]

It is difficult for contemporaries or for us to believe without any reservation the following claim that

> 'Had he but spared his tongue and pen,
> He might have rose like other men:
> But, power was never in his thought;
> And, wealth he valued not a groat: (ll. 359-362)

[51]For the account of the incidents from a modern point of view, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *The Man, His Works, and the Age*, II, pp. 708-713, III, pp. 264-271. According to Ehrenpreis's account, there is nothing upon which we can doubt the truth of Swift's claim.
[52]*The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 126, Swift to Viscount Palmerston, 29 January 1725/6.

as historically truthful.[53] However, as can be seen in the following letter, that is what Swift believes about himself: 'I confess the Queen's death cured all ambition in me, for which I am heartily glad, because I think it little consists either with ease or with conscience.'[54]

It appears, then, that the second part of the poem contains an undeniable inconsistency arising from the co-existence of self-vindication and self-irony. The problem of interpretation in the second part does depend on how we as readers reconcile these two extremes. It seems to me that this contradiction is an inevitable characteristic of this poem and so we should not try to impose consistency where there is none. We can interpret this poem neither as an unqualified self-eulogy, nor solely as self-irony, because such interpretations cannot overcome the contradiction. Peter J. Schakel does provide us with an interesting interpretation of the second part, which actually can impose consistency on the whole poem. For him, the second part is Swift's demonstration of the impartial speaker's selfishness. As he points out, the speaker cannot be seriously regarded as 'impartial' because of his partisan attitude:

> Anyone in the early 1730s who would level attacks that implicitly strike Walpole and even George II (339-342), who would praise Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Ormond (373-74), and who would refer to the later years of Queen Anne's reign as a "golden" dream (372) and to the Whigs as a "dangerous Faction" (379) would immediately be identified as a member of the Opposition. Swift supports this identification by giving the eulogist the loaded term *liberty*. The eulogist uses the word only once, but its importance is emphasized by the drumlike effect of its context:
>
> "Fair LIBERTY was all his Cry;
> "For her he stood prepar'd to die;
> "For her he boldly stood alone;

[53]For Swift's ambition in politics and in church, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *The Man, His Works, and the Age*, II, pp. 369, 381, 761, III, p. 114.

[54]*The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 462, Swift to Knightley Chetwode, 8 May 1732. Of course, one might argue that the claim in this letter is not historically true, considering his participation in party politics and church affairs, even after the collapse of the Tory government in 1714. Yet, we should understand that a man's concept of himself cannot be always identical with other people's concept of him and that a man's understanding of himself cannot be always consistent. We should also be aware that a man is prone to project himself as what he wants to be rather than what he conceives himself to be. If we wish to impute an ironical intention to the letter quoted above, we would need to find clear evidence that Swift is presenting himself as different from his real conception of himself. However, as the passage above appears in the context of his gentle chiding of Chetwode's ambition, we cannot find any evidence of irony. Thus, we can be reasonably sure that this passage is not ironically intended, despite its historical inaccuracy.

"For her he oft expos'd his own.
(347-50)

> The term, which earlier had been a Whig political slogan, came to be used in the late 1720s and the 1730s as the rallying cry for the anti-Walpole Opposition.[55]

In this respect, if we regard the 'impartial speaker' as a selfish partisan who wants to use Swift for his cause, the reason for all the non-factuality in his speech can be understood:

> The conjunction of the eulogist's devotion to Opposition politics with an overly complimentary opinion of Swift suggests that the eulogy is not an objective recognition of Swift's merits and achievements, but an idealized portrait of Swift as the embodiment of the values the eulogist associates with the Opposition. It is a political speech, delivered to an already convinced audience, in a tavern whose disrepute should have been warning enough to regard the speaker with suspicion. Before his speech it could be said of the eulogist, as it was said earlier of other persons, "It is hardly understood, / Which may my Death can do [him] good" (77-78), but the eulogist too has "private Ends" (76). The eulogist becomes a further, concrete, dramatic example of the self-love and selfish interests exemplified throughout the first half of the poem, a final illustration of the truth of La Rochefoucauld's maxim, as he uses Swift's death as the occasion, not for an unselfish bestowal of the praise Swift's life deserves, but for a speech which invokes Swift's image in order to advance the eulogist's continuing campaign against the Whig party and the Walpole administration.[56]

Even though this interpretation has its merits in that it removes all the inconsistency presented by the 'impartial speaker', and even though we do recognise his partisan tendency, it seems to me that it does lack one fundamental understanding. That is, it fails to recognise the overall purpose of the *Verses* which becomes apparent even from the first part of the poem: as I have mentioned earlier, Swift uses La Rochefoucauld's maxim to promote his integrity in the first part, not to prove the universal selfishness of mankind, La Rochefoucauld's maxim thus being only an occasion for him. Even though very coherent in its overall interpretation of this poem—that is, everyone is selfish

[55]Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift: Allusion and the Development of a Poetic Style* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. 144. In his book, Schakel uses Harold Williams's edition for the text.
[56]Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift: Allusion and the Development of a Poetic Style*, p. 145.

including Swift himself—this interpretation only imposes consistency on the surface level while ignoring the deeper argument.[57]

It is my contention that there is, as we have seen above while comparing the claims made in the *Verses* and his correspondence, a difference between what Swift actually is and what Swift believes himself to be. This recognition opens the road to the possibility that there can also be a difference between what Swift recognises himself to be and what Swift wants himself to be recognised as by other people. If we accept this possibility, we can understand that, in the second part of the poem, Swift is presenting not an autobiography, but a portrait of himself through the mouth of the 'impartial speaker'. Through his persona, Swift can have such freedom as to part from the restraint of factuality and thus to make an idealised portrait of himself. In relation to this, Alan S. Fisher presents a useful view about Swift's verse portraits:

> Portraits have this importance because they are a specially rich kind of metaphor. On the surface, they do not seem metaphoric at all, they seem biographical—statements based on a set of facts about a man. (Such "facts" may actually be legends, half-truths, or outright lies, but whether they are true or false, all portraits rely upon the reader's willingness not to challenge them.) Metaphors, on the other hand, deal in analogies, not in facts: the biographical character sketch becomes a portrait, in the sense I use the term, only when its details become analogical—that is when they fall into a pattern, or concept, or essence, some entity which exists in imagination, largely free from the pressure of objective factuality. To study portraits, therefore, is to study the way an author transforms the facts of the world he inhabits into the patterns of his imagination—in short, it is to study how his mind works.[58]

Even though Fisher uses this concept of portrait only in the interpretation of Swift's satiric portraits—such as those of John Lord Cutts in 'The Description of Salamander' and the Duke of Marlborough in 'A Satirical Elegy on the Death of a late Famous

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[57]We have to accept that the setting of Rose Tavern is not so convincing an arena for a political debate, if we accept Pat Rogers's tentative identification. See, *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, pp. 853-854. However, if we do interpret the second part as proving the selfishness of the 'impartial speaker' together with its dubious setting, it could also be interpreted as Swift's criticism of the Opposition with which he had sympathy. In my opinion, this interpretation is question-begging: do we have to ignore all the positive points Swift makes about himself just to maintain the consistency of the surface subject, La Rochefoucauld's maxim? Does Swift really go the distance to prove the maxim even by ridiculing the Opposition?

[58]Alan S. Fisher, 'Swift's Verse Portraits: A Study of His Originality as an Augustan Satirist', *SEL*, 14 (1974), 343-356 (p. 343).

General'—I think this idea can also be applied to the interpretation of Swift's identity in the second part of the *Verses*. This is to suggest that we should distinguish a portrait from a strict autobiography. If we interpret the second part as Swift's autobiography, there arise many problems which result from inconsistency with objective factuality, and these historical inaccuracies can be interpreted as Swift's intended self-irony or blatant self-eulogy. However, if we adopt the concept of the metaphoric portrait, the factual inaccuracy does not matter as much. As long as we regard the second part as a myth-making process, Swift can be free from the pressure of absolute objective factuality because, as James Woolley says, the myth 'is made out of intractable materials of fact, though he would hardly be human if he had not let some self-deception, some lapse of memory, some self-indulgent clarification of ambiguity color the story'.[59] Even though there are some historical inaccuracies in vindicating himself, what Swift does in this poem through the mouth of the 'impartial speaker' is to emphasise the spirit in which his satire should be taken: 'Yet, malice never was his aim;/ He lashed the vice but spared the name.' (ll. 463-464) and the end which his satire hopes to accomplish: 'His satire points at no defect,/ But what all mortals may correct;' (ll. 467-468). After all, this is to put forward a myth about himself who tried 'with a moral view designed/ To cure the vices of mankind.' (ll. 313-314) We can assume that the factual inaccuracies arise not from Swift's intention of self-irony, but from his hope to present himself as a flawless and virtuous model to posterity. In the process of vindication of himself and his satires, Swift blurs the distinction between objective factuality and fiction: as Louise K. Barnett points out, in the second part of the *Verses*, 'at times the real is incorporated into the fiction'.[60]

The importance of this poem's last lines is that they embody a distinctively non-ironic and positive affirmation of Swift's personal integrity, and they are also Swift's definite answer to those who might believe that he is 'privileg'd to rail' by some persons of distinction such as Lord Carteret, then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland:[61]

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[59]James Woolley, 'Autobiography in Swift's Verses on His Death', in *Contemporary Studies of Swift's Poetry*, ed. by John I. Fischer and Donald C. Mell, Jr. (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981), pp. 112-122 (p. 120).

[60]Louise K. Barnett, *Swift's Poetic Worlds* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981), p. 89.

[61]The Phrase 'privileg'd to rail' appears in Delaney's *Epistle to Lord Carteret*, implying Swift's indebtedness to Lord Carteret's favour for his satire, which provoked Swift's rebuke in his reply *An Epistle upon an Epistle* and *A Libel on Reverend Dr Delaney*.

'He gave the little wealth he had,
To build a house for fools and mad:
And showed by one satiric touch,
No nation wanted it so much:
That kingdom he hath left his debtor,
I wish it soon may have a better.' (ll. 483-488)

Swift's last will is the symbolic capstone of his career as a satirist: public uses, not private ends is his code as a satirist and in this respect the myth made in the last lines of this poem for the unimpeachability of Swift's integrity cannot be intended to stand alongside the examples of self-irony. In this sense, the claim made in these lines is a direct rebuttal of La Rochefoucauld's maxim: there is indeed one who does not take comfort in the distresses of others. We should notice Swift's clever strategy in this myth-making. He does not idealise himself in his own person: he lets the third party make a myth about himself. Swift recognises that it is inevitable to distort some objective fact in order to make a myth, so he lets the third party do this distortion and, in so doing, evades the accusation of historical inaccuracy behind his persona.

Then, two questions remain: that is, does Swift confidently present himself as an ideal model of integrity, which will be well remembered by posterity? Further, if he is confident, why should he present such an idealisation of himself, which is at times over-stretched to the point where it risks being regarded as self-irony? Louise K. Barnett points out Swift's motive behind his idealisation of himself through his persona:

> Swift and the reader share the knowledge that he does not, indeed cannot, live up to what is claimed for him by the eulogist, but the poet has created such a spokesman because, like all men, he would prefer to be remembered at his best rather than his worst. Whatever Swift conceived the reality of his character to be, we must not expect to find it directly expressed in his poetry. What the poems of fictive self-portraiture reveal is an attempt to counter what Henry James called "clumsy life" with art: fictive Swift is a foil for the man who is prey to time and death; to the distortions of himself promulgated by others, both friends and enemies; to his own weaknesses; and—through his exposure in poetic self-portraiture—to the reader's laughter.[62]

[62]Louise K. Barnett, p. 89-90.

She is quite right to point out that, as I shall illustrate soon, Swift's idealisation of himself, indeed over-idealisation of himself, is a manifestation of his will to counter the outside world's attitude towards himself, which threatens his integrity as a poet and a satirist. What we should notice, however, is that Swift is reacting not to specific attacks on himself or his satires, as Pope is, but to a more general concern recognised by himself. This is to say that he is reacting not to outside attacks, but to his own fear inside himself. If we look into the scene in Lintot's bookshop, which is the last of the first part, thus the transition section between the first part and the second, we can understand what is Swift's inner fear, to which he reacts in the second part by idealising himself.

In the imaginary scene one year after his supposed death, Swift lets Lintot say to some country squire who comes to enquire for him:

> 'I have heard the name:
> He died a year ago.' The same.
> He searcheth all his shop in vain;
> 'Sir, you may find them in Duck Lane:
> I sent them with a load of books,
> Last Monday to the pastry-cook's.
> To fancy they could live a year!
> I find you're but a stranger here.
> The Dean was famous in his time;
> And had a kind of knack at rhyme:
> His way of writing now is past;
> The town hath got a better taste: (ll. 255-266)

At first sight, Swift seems to be indulging in a high-spirited prank. Along with the general exaggerated tone of self-deprecation, we should notice that this passage is spoken by Lintot, one of Pope's victims in the *Dunciad*. Similarly, the writers who replace Swift are not writers such as Pope or Gay, but writers like Stephen Duck, Colley Cibber, and John Henley, the second rate-writers who depended for their livelihood on their flattery of the administration and the Royals.[63] Thus, the target of the seemingly self-deprecating

[63]'Duck, Stephen (1705-1756), poet; agricultural labourer in Wiltshire; made yeoman of the guard by Queen Caroline, 1733; published *Poems on Several Occasions* (1736); . . . drowned himself in a fit of dejection.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. We can find Swift's contempt for him in his letter to Gay: 'But the vogue of our few honest folks here is that Duck is absolutely to Succeed Eusden in the Lawrell, the contention being between Concannan or Theobald, or some other Hero of the Dunciad.', *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 421, Swift to Gay, 19 Nov. 1730.

tone of this passage seems to be the literary culture of the town, not Swift himself. However, we should notice that, even though Swift satirises the vulgar taste of the town, he recognises here that the taste of the literary world will not change: after all, despite his efforts, the world will remain just as it is now. John I. Fischer feels that these lines 'verge almost on despair for this world and everything in it'.[64] To interpret that Swift is desperate in these lines seems a little extreme, yet Swift's concern about the oblivion of his works through the all-levelling power of time and the eventual ineffectiveness of his satires does loom in this passage.

Swift's fervent self-idealisation in the second part can be regarded as his reaction to this concern. It is vital for us to understand that the self-idealisation in the second part is not Swift's triumphant vindication of himself as a satirist, but his desperate attempt to let the world recognise his integrity and not forget it. Thus there is an equilibrium between Swift's self-doubt and self-idealisation in this poem. However, to understand how Swift's satires change towards the end of his career, we should remember that, in this poem, there is present Swift's grave concern that his voice might not be heard. After all, Swift does not let us know when the 'impartial speaker' eulogises Swift: it may be just after his supposed death, and so it remains as a definite possibility that one year after even this eulogist will forget what Swift stands for and regard him as a has-been.

As we have seen above, it is of great importance for us to notice that, in their apologias, which are supposed to be confident defences of their integrity and their satires, Pope and Swift express their concern about their satires: they are not sure whether their voices will be listened to, even in their apologias. If we consider that satire belongs to the public domain in its orientation, unlike some other literary genres, not to be listened to, to be dismissed as merely giving vent to personal malice or discontent, is to destroy

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For Swift's contempt for Stephen Duck and Colley Cibber, we can find its evidence in his wry joke in his letter to the Duchess of Queensbury while commending her in not following the luxurious fashion: 'That you pretend to be respected for qualityes which have been out of fashion ever since you were almost in your cradle; that your contempt for a fine petticoat is an infalible mark of disaffection, which is further confirmed by your ill tast for wit, in preferring two old fashioned Poets before Duck or Cibber;', *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, p. 73, Swift to the Duchess of Queensbury, 3 Oct. 1732.

'Henley, John (1692-1756), "Orator Henley"; . . . employed by Walpole to write in Whig *Hyp Doctor*, 1730-9; his claims as restorer of church oratory ridiculed in the *Dunciad*; caricatured by Hogarth;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

[64]John I. Fischer, 'How to Die: Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift', p. 426.

the reason for its existence.[65] It is my contention that, as I shall argue later, the recognition of this problem was indeed a pivotal point by which the character of their satires changes towards the end of their careers. Yet, from the fact that both Pope and Swift reveal their doubt about satire in apologias which ought to be the most confident defence of them, we might suspect the existence of an inner problem as well as outside pressure. Because these apologias were written in the middle of their careers as satirists, they can be regarded as an implicit estimation of their past efforts as well as their defence.[66] What I shall do in the next chapter is to discuss whether they indeed confidently put their ideals of satire into firm practice. This is to examine whether they experienced some difficulty or doubt in transforming ideal into practice, which might have contributed to their changing outlook in addition to any hostility encountered from outside.

[65]The contemporary defence of satire based on its public function will be discussed in detail in part I of chapter 3.

[66]Swift's career as a verse satirist spanned from the 1700s well into the 1730s, and Pope's career as an opposition satirist from 1728 (the year of the first *Dunciad*) to 1744 (the year of the final *Dunciad*). Of course, dividing their satires strictly according to a certain date is impossible, as their change of outlook in satire did not happen in a linear pattern. However, it is possible for us to divide them roughly around the time when they began to express doubt about the effectiveness of satire seriously, which was around the time of their apologias for satire. Thus, when I say early satires, I mean the satires written before apologias and later satires after them.

# Chapter 3

## A Fragile Balance: The Early Satires of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift

### I

In his article 'Crisis Rhetoric and Satiric Power', Michael Seidel makes a very useful observation on the relationship between satire and crisis. As we can see in the following paragraphs, he points out that one of the characteristic features of satire is that it is deeply rooted in 'sustained irony':

> Crisis is a moment, variably measured, of sequential strangeness. It involves contingencies loosed upon habitual expectations, and it lasts until its expressions are modified, that is, until the causes that effect it return to a more or less latent rather than a more or less manifest phase. In the normative use of the word, whether in politics, economics, or psychology, the full measure of crisis is its resolution as well as its manifestation. As in medical crisis, the patient either dies or recovers. It is my contention, however, that satire sets a scene in which the measure of decisiveness in crisis is frustrated and the opportunity for resolution virtually nil. The parodic quality (irony) of so much satire resides in the fact that satiric action prolongs crisis at the very time that the action mocked and parodied would or could, in other circumstances and in other literary modes, resolve it: . . .
>
> If crisis is positively imagined as a decisive step into new action, satire either makes that new action another crisis or it snuffs the potential that might accrue from crisis opportunity. It also represents the processes or action by which opportunity is lost and the nature of those upon the human scene who help lose it. . . .
>
> The bias toward sustained crisis is the modal mark that distinguishes satiric action from that of comedy or tragedy. These latter are also bred in crisis, but comedy and tragedy demand crisis resolution (one can almost read *plot* resolution) as part of their aesthetic being, their literary design. This is not the same as saying satire has no plot, but it is to say that satire subverts the resolving or ameliorating impulses of plot.[1]

Michael Seidel's acknowledgement of satire's strong relationship with crisis is quite valuable, because satire basically originates from a satirist's reaction to a social

[1]Michael Seidel, 'Crisis Rhetoric and Satiric Power', *NLH*, 20 (1988), 165-186 (pp. 166-167).

phenomenon of some kind or to an individual person whom he regards as a threat to society (or, less grandly, to himself). In other words, a satirist reacts to the crisis perceived by himself, so that, in this respect, we can say that satire has its origin in crisis. However, even though we can accept this aspect of Michael Seidel's argument, we need to qualify another aspect, his argument for satire's relationship with 'sustained crisis'. He proposes that satire's inability, even reluctance, to resolve crisis is its modal mark which distinguishes it from other literary modes such as comedy or tragedy. However, even though we may accept that the crisis in satire is not easily resolved, we should make a difference between 'sustained crisis' as an end result and as a basis for it. This is to say that we should ask whether this 'sustained crisis' is the result of the satirist's failure to resolve the crisis in his satire or whether it is a prerequisite condition for the satirist to write satire. We can accept that the threat to which a satirist reacts might remain the same throughout and after his satire. Yet we should enquire whether the satirist writes satire to resolve the perceived crisis or to lash out towards this threat from despair or panic due to his recognition of a dire situation which he cannot think a way out of. Thus the inability to solve a crisis should be recognised as different from the abandonment of any attempt to resolve it.

It is my contention that an acknowledgement of the difference between the 'sustained crisis' as the eventual end-result and as the starting point for satire should play an important part in our understanding of the satires of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift. As far as eighteenth-century satire is concerned, especially those of Pope and Swift, the will or imperative to resolve crisis seems to have been the focal point by which the validity of satire or its *raison d'être* was justified. The importance of this will towards the resolution of crisis can be gauged through an examination of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century debates for and against satire.

If we look at the attacks on satire in this period, they seem to have emphasised the satirist's ill nature and satire's inefficacy to effect any change. In other words, the critics of satire opposed satire on account of its purposeless destructiveness. As we can see in the following comment of Dryden in his *Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire*, even he admitted that there is undeniably a destructive side to satire: 'Some Witty Men may perhaps succeed to their Designs, and mixing Sense with Malice, blast the Reputation of the most Innocent amongst Men, and the most Virtuous amongst

Women.' (p. 9)[2] Dryden's qualm about satire seems to concern personal satire rather than general satire. As he admits that 'We have no Moral Right on the Reputation of

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[2]Dryden is here discussing lampoons, rather than more proper satire. However, even though nominal definitions of lampoon, libel and satire existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it seems to have been entirely up to individual interpretation of a satiric work whether it was conceived as a libel, lampoon, or a satire. Thus, we can interpret this passage as Dryden's warning about the destructiveness of a satiric work in general, not just lampoon in particular.

B. N. Defoe's *Compleat English Dictionary* defined libel as 'a little Book, also a scandalous and invective Pamphlet', B. N. Defoe, *A Compleat English Dictionary*, (1735). However, it was entirely up to individual opinion to decide whether a satiric work is scandalous or invective. Ephraim Chambers's *Cyclopaedia* illustrates this problem well. In 1728, *Cyclopaedia* defined libel as 'a Writing containing Injuries, Reproaches, or Accusations against the Honour and Reputation of any Person, particularly a Superior, or Governour', Ephraim Chambers, *Cyclopaedia: or Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences*, 2 vols. (1728). Yet, Chambers acknowledged the contemporary ambiguity concerning the term 'libel' and 'satire' when he instructed the readers to 'see SATYR' in his definition of libel in the 1738 edition. 'Chambers, Ephraim (d. 1740), encyclopaedist; apprenticed to a London map-maker; published his *Cyclopaedia, or . . . Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* (1728, two vols., folio); visited France; translated French scientific treatises.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

Similarly, there also existed confusion around the term 'lampoon'. Earlier in the eighteenth century, 'lampoon' was defined as 'a Drolling Poem or Pamphlet in which some Person or Persons are treated with Reproach or abusive Language' and 'to lampoon' as 'to abuse or satirize virulently in writing', N. Baily, *An Universal Etymological Dictionary* (1721). But, by Samuel Johnson's time, it came to have a negative connotation, for in his *Dictionary*, Johnson defined 'lampoon' as 'a personal satire; abuse; censure written not to reform but to vex' and 'to lampoon' as 'to abuse with personal satire'. However, it was up to individual to decide which is 'abusive' and which is not.

Thus, as libel and lampoon denoted abusive or scurrilous writing which does damage a person's reputation without sanction, it was quite common that critics of satirists branded them as 'libellers' or 'lampooners'. This ambiguity or confusion can be exemplified in John Dennis's attitude towards Pope. What we should notice is that Dennis himself did not confuse the term 'satire' with 'libel' or 'lampoon', as he pointed out the difference between them when he put 'lampoon' or 'libel' below personal satire as well as general satire, which he regards as the best satire, in his *Essay Upon Publick Spirit*: 'Yet are particular Satires, if they are just Satires, preferable by much to Lampoons or Libels; that only can be call'd a just Satire, whose Censures are always true; but that which endeavours to decry true merit, out of Malice, or Passion, or Interest, is in spite of popular Applause a Lampoon, and infamous Libel.', *The Critical Works of John Dennis*, II, pp. 396-397. Yet, it was his 'subjective' opinion to decide whether a satiric work is 'just' or not. Thus, for him who viewed Pope with hostility, Pope's satire was a libel or a lampoon rather than a proper satire: 'He [Pope] has been so far from making that Distinction which he ought to have done, that his Malice has been levell'd most at those who have most Merit; which is a certain Proof, that this little envious Creature knows nothing of the Nature of Satire, which can never exist where the Censures are not just. In that case the Versifyer, instead of a Satirist, is a Lampooner, an Infamous Libeller.', *The Critical Works of John Dennis*, II, p. 325.

When Richard Steele tried to distinguish satire from libel as follows, his concern was based on the contemporary confusion of the terms 'libel' and 'satire': 'It is from this that Libel and Satyr are promiscuously joined together in the Notions of the Vulgar, though the Satyrist and Libeller differ as much as the Magistrate and the Murderer. In the Consideration of human Life, the Satyrist never falls upon Persons who are not glaringly faulty, and the Libeller on none but who are conspicuously commendable. Were I to expose any Vice in a good or great Man, it should certainly be by correcting it in some one where that Crime was the most distinguishing Part of the Character; as Pages are chastized for the Admonition of Princes. When it is performed otherwise, the Vicious are kept in Credit, by placing Men of Merit in the same Accusation.', *The Tatler*, ed. by Donald F. Bond, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), II, pp, 74-75, No. 92, 10 November 1709. Pope seems to have acknowledged the confusion (sometimes intentional) when he protests in his *To Arbuthnot* that some men debase his satire to lampoon intentionally with misapplication: 'Who reads but a Lust to mis-apply,/ Make Satire a Lampoon, and Fiction, Lye.' (ll. 301-302)

other Men. 'Tis taking from them, what we cannot restore to them' (p. 59), satire, especially personal satire, was regarded by its critics as doing its business through destroying the reputation of its victim, whether its aim is to simply take another person's reputation away from him or to correct other people's behaviour by showing them someone's shame, thus making them beware of their behaviour. The destructiveness of satire of this kind was strongly criticised by Joseph Addison, when he and Richard Steele made several arguments concerning satire in their journals, such as *The Spectator* and *The Tatler*. As we can see in the following argument of Addison from *The Spectator*, No. 23,

> There is nothing that more betrays a base, ungenerous Spirit, than the giving of secret Stabs to a Man's Reputation. Lampoons and Satyrs, that are written with Wit and Spirit, are like poison'd Darts, which not only inflict a Wound, but make it incurable. For this Reason I am very much troubled when I see the Talents of Humour and Ridicule in the Possession of an ill-natured Man. There cannot be a greater Gratification to a barbarous and inhuman Wit, than to stir up Sorrow in the Heart of a private Person, to raise Uneasiness among near Relations, and to expose whole Families to Derision, at the same time that he remains unseen and undiscovered. (No. 23)

he sternly opposed the harm which can be done to the reputation of an individual, at times innocent, by satire. For this reason, satire in the hand of an indiscreet man was regarded as more dangerous than that in the hand of a malicious one:

> I have indeed heard of heedless, inconsiderate Writers, that without any Malice have sacrificed the Reputation of their Friends and Acquaintance to a certain Levity of Temper, and a silly Ambition of distinguishing themselves by a Spirit of Raillery and Satyr: As if it were not infinitely more honourable to be a Good-natured Man, than a Wit. Where there is this little petulant Humour in an Author, he is often very mischievous without designing to be so. For which Reason I always lay it down as a Rule, that an indiscreet Man is more hurtful than an ill-natured one; for as the one will only attack his Enemies, and those he wishes ill to, the other injures indifferently both Friends and Foes. (No. 23)

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In my opinion, Samuel Johnson sums up the contemporary confusion of the terms when he defined 'satire' as follows in his *Dictionary*: 'Proper *satire* is distinguished, by the generality of the reflections, from a *lampoon,* which is aimed against a particular person; but they are too frequently confounded.' I am gratefully indebted to P. K. Elkin, *The Augustan Defence of Satire* for the information about contemporary material. For more detailed information about the contemporary understanding of the term 'satire', see P. K. Elkin, pp. 11-25.

The ridicule of Socrates inflicted by Aristophanes seems to have been the favourite example of satire's unjust destructiveness in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For instance, Richard Allestree wrote that 'Thus the enemies of *Socrates* when they could no other waies suppress his reputation, hired *Aristophanes* a Comic Poet to personate him on the stage. . . .', and by this means brought him first into contempt, then hatred.[3] Addison, in *The Spectator*, made his attack on the malicious destructiveness of satire by portraying Socrates as a tragic hero who talked about Aristophanes at the moment of his death as follows:

> I have often observed a Passage in *Socrates*'s Behaviour at his Death, in a Light wherein none of the Critics have considered it. That excellent Man, entertaining his Friends a little before he drank the Bowl of Poison with a Discourse on the Immortality of the Soul, at his entering upon it says, that he does not believe any the most Comick Genius can censure him for telling upon such a Subject at such a Time. This Passage, I think, evidently glances upon *Aristophanes*, who writ a Comedy on purpose to ridicule the Discourses of that Divine Philosopher: It has been observed by many Writers, that *Socrates* was so little moved at this piece of Buffoonry, that he was several times present at its being acted upon the Stage, and never expressed the least Resentment of it. But with submission, I think the Remark I have here made shows us that this unworthy Treatment made an Impression upon his Mind, though he had been too wise to discover it. (No. 23)

As Socrates is described here as an 'Excellent Man', 'Divine Philosopher' while Aristophanes's attack on him is branded as 'Buffoonry' and 'unworthy Treatment', Addison is presenting Socrates as an example of a just man who suffered by the malicious nature of satire. For one more example, Giles Jacob, in his essay 'An Introductory Essay, on the Rise, Progress, Beauty, etc. of All Sorts of Poetry', stated without any reservation that a 'little Wit, and a great deal of Ill-Nature, will qualify a Man for a Satirist'.[4]

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[3]Richard Allestree, *The Government of the Tongue* (1674), p. 131. 'Allestree, Richard (1619-1681), Royalist divine; BA and moderator in philosophy, . . .; took arms for the king and served under John Biron, 1642, and was present at Edgehill; . . . entered holy orders and became censor of his college; expelled from Oxford by Parliamentarians, 1648; . . . canon of Christ Church and DD, 1660; chaplain in ordinary to the king, 1663;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

[4]Giles Jacob, *An Historical Account of the Lives and Writings of Our Most Considerable English Poets, whether Epick, Lyrick, Elegiack, Epigramatists, etc.* (London, 1720), p. xxiii. From Thomas B. Gilmore, 'The Reaction to Satire in England from 1693 to 1761' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Illinois,

Another point which the critics of satire in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries picked on was satire's inefficacy to effect any change. It is very difficult for the defenders of satire to justify its *raison d'être* even if the accusation of destructiveness is considered alone.[5] Then, it becomes even more difficult for them to justify satire if it proves to be ineffective despite its destructiveness. For Daniel Defoe, satire cannot

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1964), p. 122. 'Jacob, Giles (1686-1744), compiler of the *Poetical Registar* (1719-20), and *New Law Dictionary* (1729); introduced in the *Dunciad*.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. We can find plenty examples of late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century remarks which attacked satire and satirists for their maliciousness. For example, Walter Charleton likened a satirist to a 'malignant wit' 'which is indeed quick of Apprehension, but *void* of *Humanity*: being prone to exercise it self chiefly in researching into the Defects, Errors, and even the Infortunes[ill-fortunes] of Others, such especially who by their Virtues have rendered themselves Conspicuous; and to delight both aggravating and publishing them to their dishonour.', Walter Charleton, *A Brief Discourse Concerning the Different Wits of Men: Written . . . in the year 1664* (1669), p. 112, from P. K. Elkin, p. 52. 'Charleton, Walter (1619-1707), physician; entered Magdalen Hall, Oxford, 1635; MD, by king's mandate, 1643; nominally physician to Charles I and Charles II; . . . published medical, philosophical, and antiquarian tracts (1650-1705), including *Chorea Gigantum* (1663), to prove that Stonehenge was made by the Danes', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. As he made the following remark on satire,

> *Satyr*, which was a wholesome Remedy,
> Prescrib'd to cure a People's malady,
> When prudently apply'd doth Good produce;
> But as all Goods are subject to abuse,
> So this of Late no Publick Cure intends,
> But only serves to black Malicious ends.
> We dip our Pens in Gall when e'er we Write.
> And all our *Inspiration* is but *Spite*.

Ambrose Philips doubted the motives behind contemporary satire, despite his recognition of its ideal use in the past, Ambrose Philips, *A Reflection on Our Modern Poesy* (1695), p. 7, from P. K. Elkin, p. 58. Also, when he declared in 'Some Characters of the Present Age' that 'Satire is not my Talent, no more than Il-Nature is my inclination', Thomas Gordon revealed the contemporary suspicion about the ill nature of the satirist, Thomas Gordon, *The Humorist: Being Essays upon Several Subjects*, 2 vols. (London, 1725), II, p. 267. 'Gordon, Thomas (1691?-1750), author; reputed the Silenus of the *Dunciad*; with his patron John Trenchard issued a weekly paper called *Independent Whig*, . . . ; employed by Walpole; published translation of Tacitus (1728) and Sallust (1744), and miscellaneous works.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. John Tillotson regarded satire as coming from man's base instinct, thus locating satire's origin in the satirist's viciousness: 'The Wit of Man doth more naturally vent it self in *Satire* and Censure, than in Praise and *Panegyrick*. When Men set themselves to commend, it comes hardly form them, and not without great force and straining; and if any thing be fitly said in that kind, it doth hardly relish most men: But in the way of *Invective*, the Invention of men is a plentiful and never-failing Spring. . . .', John Tillotson, *Works*, 3 vols. (1728), I, p. 397. For the information about some of the contemporary materials in this chapter, I am indebted to P. K. Elkin, *The Augustan Defence of Satire*, and Thomas B. Gilmore, 'The Reaction of Satire in England from 1693 to 1761'.

[5]For this point, we need to look at the dilemma faced by the satirist that satire, however effective it might be in correcting people's behaviour, is not compatible with the Christian principle of benevolence, which advocates mercy and pity rather than indignation before people's faults. I discussed this problem faced by satirists in the examples of Dryden when he revealed his dilemma about the incompatibility of personal satire with Christian charity in his *Discourse*, and of Addison who denied satire the power to supplement law and religion in chapter 1, pp. 51-53.

correct the general vices which all mankind share, and is thus ineffective to induce any change:

> As for the general Vices which we find
> They're [Englishmen] guilty of in common with Mankind,
> *Satyr*, forbear, and silently endure;
> We must conceal the crimes we cannot cure.[6]

For Richard Steele, particular satire did have an effect, yet it was for the worse: when he quoted Richard Allestree in *The Tatler*, No. 74, he observed that it drives a miscreant deeper into crimes by which, having been publicly branded, he feels he has nothing to lose:

> I am naturally led to that celebrated Author of *The Whole Duty of Man* [Richard Allestree], who hath set this matter in a true Light in his Treatise of the Government of the Tongue; where, speaking of uncharitable Truths, he says, a Discovery of this Kind *serves not to reclaim, but enrage the Offender, and precipitate him into farther Degree of Ill. Modesty and Fear of Shame is one of those natural Restraints, which the Wisdom of Heav'n has put upon Mankind; and he that once stumbles, may yet by a Check of that Bridle recover again: but when by a publick Detection he is fallen under that Infamy he fear'd, he will then be apt to discard all Caution, and to think he owes himself the utmost Pleasures of Vice; as the Price of his Reputation. Nay, perhaps he advances farther, and sets up for a revers'd Sort of Fame, by being eminently wicked, and he who was before was but a clandestine Disciple, becomes a Doctor of* Impiety, *&c.* (No. 74)

Richard Blackmore was more straightforward in asserting the ineffectiveness of satire when he claimed in his *Essays upon Several Subjects* that neither comic dramas nor *The Spectator* and *The Tatler* have 'reduc'd any Libertine, or improv'd any Coxcomb': they have not, for all their 'fine Raillery and Satire, . . . reclaim'd one Vicious Man, or made one Fool depart from his Folly'.[7] For him, the Christian repentance for sin was far more effective in correcting folly or vice, when he asked 'Can the Stings of Satire, and the Reproaches of a Man of Wit, pierce deeper into his [satiric victim's] Heart, than those of

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[6]Daniel Defoe, 'The True Born Englishman', in *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters and Other Pamphlets, The Shakespeare Head Edition of the Novels and Selected Writings of Daniel Defoe* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1927), p. 51.

[7]Richard Blackmore, *Essays upon Several Subjects* (London, 1716), p. xlviii, from Thomas B. Gilmore, p. 132.

Remorse and conscious Reflection, and the painful Sense of wasting Diseases, the sad Fruits of his vicious Courses?'.[8]

We can understand, then, that the critics of satire in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries based their charges on the notion that satire is nothing but the violent expression of personal rage, which cannot effect any change for the better. However, we should understand that the will to correct vice or folly, thus the desire to resolve crisis, was the main line of the defence for the *raison d'être* of satire in the contemporary world. As we can see in the following arguments, the contemporary defenders of satire seem to have based their defence on satire's ability to change the world for the better. Even though he expressed his qualm about satire's destructive side in the *Discourse* in 1693, twelve years earlier Dryden confidently advocated the public function which satire can perform in 'To the Reader' to *Absalom and Achitophel*:

> The true end of *Satyre*, is the amendment of Vices by correction. And he who writes Honestly, is no more an Enemy to the Offendour, than the Physician

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[8]Richard Blackmore, *Essays upon Several Subjects*, pp. xxxix-xl, From Thomas B. Gilmore, p. 132. For another example of the contemporary doubt about the efficacy of satire to effect any change, we can see Thomas Paget's remark on it. Even though he was not hostile to Alexander Pope and he admitted that he enjoyed reading his satires, Thomas Paget advised to Pope in his *Epistle to Mr. P—* that satire does not change the course of the world, as 'Most things are just as you take 'em,/ And good or bad as Customs make 'em.', Thomas Paget, *An Epistle to Mr. P— in Anti-Heroicks* (London, 1738), p. 15, from Thomas B. Gilmore, p. 360. 'Paget, Thomas Catesby, Baron Paget (d. 1742), son of Henry Paget, first earl of Uxbridge; MP, Staffordshire, 1715 and 1722; write several pieces in prose and verse', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. William Whitehead, in his poem *An Essay on Ridicule* (1743), also expressed his concern about the ineffectiveness of satire to correct vice or folly. He was sceptical about satire's public function, as he feared that satire may make men hypocrites: for, men will conceal those follies they are reluctant to abandon to avoid pubic ridicule:

> Or should, perhaps, some softer clay admit
> The sly impressions of instructive wit,
> The virtue's side in conscious silence steal,
> And glow with goodness, ere we find they feel;
> Yet, more, 'tis fear'd, will closer methods take,
> And keep with caution what they can't forsake;
> For fear of man, in his most mirthful mood,
> May make us hypocrites, but seldom good.

He also questioned the wisdom of attacking satiric victims because he regards them as unable to comprehend the reason for their being attacked, thus unable to reform: 'Hope we mend him? hopes, alas how vein!/ He feels the lash,, not listens to the rein.', *Essay on Ridicule*, p. 13. The quotations are from *Minor English Poets 1660-1780*, ed. by David P. French, 10 vols. (New York: Benjamin Blom, 1967). 'Whitehead, William (1715-1785), poet laureate; . . . produced at Drury Lane, tragedies the *Roman Father* (1750), and *Creusa* (1754); . . . poet laureate, 1757; produced the *School for Lovers* (comedy) at Drury Lane, 1762; subsequently became Garrick's reader of plays. His productions as poet laureate met with much unfriendly comment, to which he replied in *A Charge to the Poets* (1762), but his earlier writings are not without merit.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

> to the Patient, when he prescribes harsh Remedies to an inveterate Disease: for those, are only in order to prevent the Chyrurgeon's work of an *Ense rescindendum*, which I wish not to my very Enemies.[9]

While, for Dryden, the destructive side of satire is inevitable to effect any change, for Addison and Steele, satire can perform its public function by eliminating that aspect. For them, if satire is written with good nature, which Steele emphasised in *The Tatler* as follows

> When I had ran over several such in my Thoughts, I concluded, (however unaccountable the Assertion might appear at first Sight) that Good-Nature was an essential Quality in a Satyrist, and that all the Sentiments which are beautiful in this Way of Writing must proceed from that Quality in the Author. Good-Nature produces a Disdain of all Baseness, Vice, and Folly, which prompts them to express themselves with Smartness against the Errors of Men, without Bitterness towards their Persons. This Quality keeps the Mind in Equanimity, and never lets an Offence unseasonably throw a Man out of his Character. (No. 242)

and does not target any specific person, but is 'directed against Vice, with an Air of Contempt of the Fault, but no ill Will to the Criminal' (*The Spectator*, Addison, No. 422), it certainly has the function of letting the readers recognise their faults, as Addison argued in No. 45 of *The Freeholder*. In this essay, in which he refuted Richard Blackmore's claim that *The Spectator* and *The Tatler* were ineffective in bringing about any change, he argued that good-natured satire indeed can have a positive effect on a wide range of readers, by exposing vice and folly along with some useful diversions:

> Such Productions of Wit and Humour [good-natured satire], as have a Tendency to expose Vice and Folly, furnish useful Diversions to all kinds of Readers. The good or prudent Man may, by these Means, be diverted, without Prejudice to his Discretion or Morality. Raillery, under such Regulations, unbends the Mind from serious Studies and severer Contemplations, without throwing it off from its proper Byass. It carries on the same Design that is promoted by Authors of a graver Turn, and only does it in another manner. It also awakens Reflection in those who are the most Indifferent in the Cause of Virtue or Knowledge, by setting before them the Absurdity of such Practices as are generally unobserved, by Reason of their being Common or Fashionable: Nay, it sometimes catches the Dissolute and Abandoned before they are aware of it; who are often betrayed to

[9] *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. by H. T. Swedenberg, Jr. and others, II, p. 5. Italics and normal types are reversed. For Dryden's uneasiness about satire's destructiveness, see chapter 1, pp. 51-52.

laugh at themselves, and upon Reflection find, that they are merry at their own Expense. I might further take Notice, that by Entertainments of this Kind, a Man may be cheerful in Solitude, and not be forced to seek for Company every Time he has a Mind to be merry.[10]

Edward Young also advocated the public function of satire in his *Love of Fame, The Universal Passion*, when he endowed satire the power to supplement the law as Swift did in *The Examiner*, No. 38:[11]

> Instructive satire, true to virtue's cause!
> Thou shining supplement of publick laws!
> When flatter'd crimes of a licentious age
> Reproach our silence, and demand our rage; . . .
> Shall panegyrick reign, and censure cease?[12] (Satire I, ll. 11-14, 26)

From these contemporary examples, then, the *raison d'être* of satire can be found—that is, its proposed ability to correct the vice and folly of the world. This belief that crisis can be resolved by way of satire demonstrates that, as far as the defenders of the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century satire were concerned, satire was not a literary mode which originates from the satirist's despair from the recognition of dire reality. Rather, from their point of view, contemporary satire should be construed as the satirist's effort to resolve the strained situation, no matter how his attempt might end up.[13]

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[10]*The Freeholder*, ed. by James Leheny (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), p. 236.

[11]For Swift's concept of the relationship between satire and law and of that between satire and religion, see chapter 1, pp. 50-51.

[12]*The Poetical Works of Edward Young*, 2 vols. (London: Bell and Dandy), II, pp. 59-60.

[13]As there were plenty of examples of the attacks on satire, there also can be found a lot of remarks which advocated the effectiveness of satire to occasion reform. For example, Anthony Collins, after recording the anecdote of a satirical remark made by Waller on Charles II at which the King laughed without any anger, argued for the usefulness of satire because 'it can convey an Instruction to a vicious, evil, and tyrannical Prince, highly reflecting on his Conduct, without drawing on his Resentment', Anthony Collins, *A Discourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing* (1729), pp. 16-17, from *Augustan Reprint Society*, 142 (1970). 'Collins, Anthony (1676-1729), deist; . . . published political tracts, 1707-10; attacked the first clause ('the authority in controversies of faith') of the twentieth Article of Religion, 1709 and 1724; . . published his *Discourse of Freethinking* (1713); ridiculed by Bentley and Swift; published *Enquiry Concerning Human Liberty* (1715), *The Grounds of the Christian Religion* (1724), and *Literal Scheme of Prophecy* (1726).', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. When he explained the origin of satire as follows,

> T' Exalt the Soul, or Make the Heart Sincere,
> To arm our Lives with honesty severe,

Clearly, this belief in satire's constructiveness was shared by Pope and Swift, if not more ardently, even though their view about satire came to change in the later stage of their careers. As I have discussed earlier in chapter 1, Swift argued for the public function of satire by advocating its superiority to law and religion in *The Examiner*, No. 38, 1711. Yet, this was not the only remark Swift made on the public function of satire. In *The Intelligencer*, No 3, even though he admitted that the satirist may derive some personal satisfaction from writing satire, Swift again advocated adamantly the role satire can play in the defence of the public weal:

> *There* are two Ends that Men propose in writing Satyr, one of them Noble than the other, as regarding nothing further than personal Satisfaction, and Pleasure of the Writer, but without any View towards *Personal Malice*; the other is a *Publick Spirit*, prompting Men of *Genius* and Virtue, to mend the World as far as they are able. And as both these Ends are innocent, so the latter is highly commendable. . . .
>
> But if my Design be to make mankind better, then I think it is my Duty; at least I am sure it is the Interest of those very *Courts* and *Ministers*, whose Follies or Vices I ridicule, to reward me for my good Intentions: For if it be reckoned a high Point of Wisdom to get the Laughters on our Side, it is much more Easy, as

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To shake the wretch beyond the reach of Law,
Deter the young, and touch the bold with awe,
To raise the fal'n, to hear the sufferer's cries,
And sanctify the virtues of the wise,
Old Satire rose from Probity of mind,
The noblest Ethicks to reform mankind.

Walter Harte argued for the reformative role of satire, strongly emphasising the relationship between satire and virtue, Walter Harte, *An Essay on Satire, Particularly on the Dunciad* (London, 1730), pp. 5-6, from *Augustan Reprint Society*, 132 (1968). 'Harte, Walter (1709-1774), author; . . . friend of Pope and Arthur Young; . . . vice-principal of St Mary Hall, Oxford, 1740; canon of Windsor, 1750; published *History of the Life of Gustavus Adolphus* (1759), *Essays on Husbandry* (1764), and religious poems', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. William King made a similar remark, in 'The Translator's Preface' to *The Toast, An Heroick Poem*, to that of Swift in *The Examiner*, No. 38, on the supplementary function of satire for law: 'But there are Crimes of a very high Nature, which are not cognisable in the ordinary Courts of Justice, such as Ingratitude, the denying a Deposit, the betraying a Friend's Secrets; and among these I may reckon such Frauds, as for want of legal Evidence escape with Impunity. These and all other Evils, which are not punishable by the Civil Magistrate are surely proper Objects of Satire; nor is the Satirist obliged to stop short, because the Criminal may happen to die, while he is telling his Story.', William King, *The Toast, An Heroick Poem* (1736), p. xxxix, from P. K. Elkin, p. 75. 'King, William (1685-1763), principal of St Mary Hall, Oxford; . . . wrote several satires highly praised by Swift, as well as *The Toast*, a mock-heroic poem (Dublin, 1732); supported Jacobitism; collected editions of his writings published (1760), *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. Henry Fielding, in his article in *The Champion* 10 June 1740, also defended the reformative side of satire by arguing that satiric examples have more impact on the readers than examples of good actions in advising them to shun the wrong road of life: 'I shall venture to carry this speculation a little farther, and to assert that we are much better and easier taught by the examples of what are we to shun, than by those which would instruct us what to pursue.', *The Complete Works of Henry Fielding, Esq.*, 16 vols. (repr. Frank Cass, 1967), XV, p. 330.

> well as Wise to get those on our Side, who can make Millions laugh when they please.[14]

In the same journal, he again advocated the public function of satire by expressing his preference for Horatian satire over Juvenalian satire while defending John Gay's *Beggar's Opera*: 'Taste of Humour is certainly the best Ingredient towards that Kind of Satyr, which is most useful, and gives the least Offence; which, instead of lashing, laughs Men out of their Follies, and Vices; and is the Character that gives *Horace* the Preference to *Juvenal*.' (No. 3) In this paragraph, his judgement is clearly based on the constructive side of satire, its function to force 'Men out of their Follies, and Vices'. This emphasis on the positive function of satire was again repeated in his letter to Charles Wogan even as late as in 1732: 'I followed what I thought to be my Talent, and charitable People will suppose I had a Design to laugh the Follies of Mankind out of Countenance, and often to lash the Vices out of Practice.'[15] In contrast to his journal on *The Beggar's Opera* (*The Intelligencer*, No. 3) in which he proposed satire's function as to laugh men out of their follies and vices, in this letter, satire is thought to laugh men out of their follies, but to lash men out of their vices. Yet, the bottom line is the same: satire can be constructive in its ability to correct the world.

When Pope defended his preference for personal satire in his letter to Dr. Arbuthnot, his abiding concern with the public function of satire was certainly present when he pointed out that 'it was under the greatest Princes and best Ministers, that moral Satyrists were most encouraged; and that then Poets exercised the same jurisdiction over the Follies, as Historians did over the Vice of men.'[16] This conviction of the reformative power of satire was not a one-off for Pope either, as it was a repetition of his claim that satire does supplement law and morality made in the name of William Cleland in 'A Letter to the Publisher, Occasioned by the Present Edition of the Dunciad [*Dunciad* A]': 'Law can pronounce judgment only on open Facts, Morality alone can pass censure on Intentions of Mischief; so that for secret calumny or the arrow flying in the dark, there is

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[14]The Intelligencer, No. 3, 25 May 1728, in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, XII, p. 34. We should, however, notice that this essay contains the phrase 'in a Corner' which qualifies Swift's justification of his satire, as I discussed in chapter I, pp. 58-60.

[15]*The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, p. 33. Swift to Wogan, 2 August 1732.

[16]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 420, Pope to Dr. Arbuthnot, 26 July 1734. For Pope's not-so-confident defence of personal satire for its reformative function, see chapter 1, pp. 53-57.

no publick punishment left, but what a good writer inflicts.'[17] This kind of argument was repeated later when Pope, in a letter to Swift, defended the superiority of satire to other social institutions in performing a public function by placing it above law and religion, as he remarked on the ineffectiveness of philosophy, politics, and divinity to reform the age: 'Let Philosophy be ever so vain, it is less vain now than Politicks, and not quite so vain at present as Divinity: I know nothing that moves strongly but Satire, and those who are sham'd of nothing else, are so of being ridiculous.'[18]

We should keep in mind, then, that the will to resolve crisis is, for its proponents, one of the main features of Augustan satire. It is my contention that this will to resolve crisis, in other words, this will not to give in to the perceived crisis but to control it, is a distinctive feature of the relatively early satires of Pope and Swift. The purpose of the remaining part of this chapter is to demonstrate how this will was realised in the satires of Pope and Swift, and to examine whether they put their ideals of satire into practice confidently and efficiently.

## II

In this chapter, I want to discuss Pope's epistles to several persons in the 1730s, that is the *Epistle to Burlington*, the *Epistle to Bathurst*, the *Epistle to Cobham*, and the *Epistle to a Lady*, which are otherwise commonly classified and termed as Moral Essays.[19] The reasons why I decide not to call this set of poems Moral Essays are as follows. The first is that this term was not chosen by Pope, but by William Warburton in his edition of Pope's *Works* in 1751, and was thus actually never used in Pope's lifetime.[20] The second reason is that the term Moral Essays strongly emphasises these poems' relationship with Pope's Opus Magnum plan. Of course, we cannot deny that

[17]*The Dunciad*, ed. by James Sutherland, p. 14.

[18]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 276, Pope to Swift, March 1731/2.

[19]*To Cobham* (1734) and *To a Lady* (1735) were published later than *Sat II. i*, which might raise some objection to my including these poems in the category of Pope's earlier satires. Yet, as there is not much time difference of publication between these poems and *Sat. II. i*, and they share their characteristics more with *To Burlington* (1731) and *To Bathurst* (1733), which were published before *Sat. II i*, than with Pope's imitations of Horace's satires and epistles, I think it more appropriate to follow the similarity of characteristics than to be restricted by the strict chronological criterion.

[20]For Warburton's role as commentator on Pope's texts and advisor to Pope in amending or worsening Pope's texts in the so called 'death-bed' edition of 1744, see F. W. Bateson's introduction to *Epistles to Several Persons (Moral Essays)*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, Volume III ii, *The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope*, 11 vols. (London: Methuen, 1951; repr. London: Routledge, 1993).

these poems, along with his *Essay on Man*, were written as parts of Pope's Opus Magnum plan.[21] Actually, we can see how these poems were conceived together with the *Essay on Man* as an integral part of this plan, if we look at Joseph Spence's transcript of the rough notes that he took of Pope's table-talk during the period from 1st to 7th May 1730.[22] However, what I wish to emphasise in these poems is their nature as satires, not their quality as ethical essays. An approach of this kind—that is, to concentrate chiefly on their satiric quality—might not be justified if Pope's Opus Magnum were indeed fully realised and finished. Yet, as it remains unfinished and fragmentary, it seems to me that it is valuable to investigate them chiefly as satires, if the study of them as Pope's early satires can provide us with a valuable point of comparison with his later satires.

As I shall argue in more detail later, the distinctive feature of these epistles to several persons is that they have a bi-partite structure: while some folly or vice is criticised, Pope presents praise of a counteractive virtue in the form of an invocation to his addressee towards the end of these poems. Before directly entering into a discussion of these poems, it is essential for us to discuss the relationship between this bi-partite structure and Augustan formal verse satire in order to understand the importance of Pope's adoption of this structure. Mary Claire Randolph, in her essay 'The Structural Design of the Formal Verse Satire', seems to define formal verse satire by this structure when she argues

> the formal verse satire, as composed by Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, was evidently bi-partite in structure, that is, some specific vice or folly, selected for attack, was turned about on all its sides in Part A (if one may arbitrarily call it so) in something of the way premises are turned about in the octave of a sonnet; and its opposing virtue was recommended in Part B.[23]

For her, virtue praised in Part B, as directly opposed to vice criticised in Part A, seems to be a prerequisite part of formal verse satire, when she emphasises its importance as follows:

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[21]For a detailed knowledge of the nature and the change of Pope's plan for his 'ethic works', see Miriam Leranbaum, *Alexander Pope's 'OPUS MAGNUM' 1729-1744* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), especially chapter 1.

[22]*Epistles to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, Introduction, pp. xxi-xxiii.

[23]Mary Claire Randolph, 'The Structural Design of the Formal Verse Satire', *PQ*, 21 (1942), 368-384, (p. 369).

> Often the admonition to virtue, never psychologically pleasing at best, is only implied throughout Part A or perhaps cleverly introduced by way of quotable proverb and maxim throughout that portion. But it is there, it must be there, spoken or unspoken, if the piece is to be more than mere virulence and fleeting invective. (p. 373)

Her view of bi-partite structure as the defining feature of formal verse satire seems to be accepted by Howard D. Weinbrot without any qualification when he differentiates Augustan formal verse satire from revelatory satire as follows: 'Revelatory satire, then, is primarily concerned with depicting a grim situation rather than both attacking vice and presenting a clearly workable norm. Augustan formal verse satire, however, adopts the latter method.'[24] However, when he argues as follows, there arises some question from his definition of formal verse satire:

> In formal verse satire achievement of the norm is difficult — sometimes incredibly so — but possible; there is generally a living example and often a benevolent, actively engaged God. He may reject the depraved world but, like God in the Biblical tale, He preserves order as long as there is one good man. In the revelatory *Dunciad* the last good man dies with the final word of the poem; and in comic satire like *Mac Flecknoe* normative benevolence is submerged under comic hostility. (p. 7)

His argument that the *Dunciad* is a revelatory or apocalyptic satire which does not belong to formal verse satire, we can accept. Yet, when he dismisses *MacFlecknoe* as comic satire, not formal verse satire, on the ground that 'normative benevolence is submerged under comic hostility', his argument is not convincing at all. He previously argued that 'praise might be implicit in the vice attacked' (p. 6) in formal verse satire; then, can we not interpret that Dryden's superior literary talent and standard are implied in his ridicule of Thomas Shadwell? In so doing, can we not include *MacFlecknoe* in the category of formal verse satire? Randolph and Weinbrot argue that, to be a formal verse satire, bi-partite structure must be present whether it is overtly spoken or just implied: yet, how can we be sure in which one the praise is implicit and in which one it is not? In

[24]Howard D. Weinbrot, 'On the Discrimination of Augustan Satires', in *Proceedings of the Modern Language Association Neoclassicism Conferences 1967-1968*, ed. by Paul J. Korshin (New York: AMS Press, 1970), pp. 5-9 (p. 6).

other words, how can we be sure that we are not forcing the theory if we try to find this structure in a poem where it is not overtly detected through our 'subjective' interpretation?

With this doubt in mind, we should look into Peter J. Schakel's observation concerning formal verse satire in his article, 'Dryden's *Discourse* and "Bi-partite Structure" in the Design of Formal Verse Satire'. In this article, he points out Randolph's fault in advocating bi-partite structure as the defining feature of formal verse satire. He argues that, when she accepts Isaac Casaubon's and more importantly Dryden's ideas about bi-partite structure, Randolph mistakes Dryden's idea as descriptive rather than as prescriptive:

> each section of the *Discourse* plays its part in the achievement of Dryden's wider purpose. His broad interest is not descriptive but prescriptive, not just analysis of a literary type, but an effort to turn contemporary satire from personal assault toward general themes which instruct as well as chastize, and, in so doing, ultimately to raise the level of contemporary culture as a whole. . . .
> Bi-partite structure is not a consistent and defining characteristic of Roman verse satire, as Miss Randolph asserts. Casaubon found it in Persius and stressed it (as he stressed Horace's low birth) in order to elevate Persius's status *vis-à-vis* Juvenal and Horace. Dryden accepts that emphasis, admits it is not found in Horace but imposes it upon Juvenal, and stresses it in order to establish it as a criterion for contemporary satire.
>
> Bi-partite form, then, is less a characteristic of Roman satire in general than a seventeenth-century theory about Roman satire; and Miss Randolph quite misses Dryden's point about that theory. He sets it forth in the final section of the *Discourse*, the "Thoughts, how a Modern Satire shou'd be made" (II, 661), as an expectation, not just of formal verse satire, but of *all* satire. His first recommendation, singleness of theme ("a perfect Satire . . . ought only to treat of one Subject; to be confin'd to one particular Theme"—II, 661) is illustrated from Persius, but is discussed as a general principle of all art; he proceeds to illustration in drama ("in a Play of the *English* Fashion, which we call a *Trage-comedy*, there is to be but one main Design"—II, 661), in pastoral, and in ancient critical theory ("Sit quodvis simplex duntaxat & unum"—II, 662 [*Ars Poetica*, I. 23]). His second recommendation, the pairing of virtues with vices, has a similarly broad applicability: "The Poet is bound, and that *ex officio*, to give his Reader some one Precept of Moral Virtue; and to caution him against some one particular Vice or Folly" (II, 662). That Dryden has the office of *satirist*, not of *formal verse satirist*, in mind is shown in the following paragraphs, where he brings *Hudibras* and *le Lutrin* into his discussion of versification.[25]

[25]Peter J. Schakel, 'Dryden's *Discourse* and "Bi-Partite Structure" in the Design of Formal Verse Satire', *ELN*, 21 (1984), 33-41 (pp. 35-38). For his discussion of Dryden's *Discourse,* Peter J. Schakel uses *The Poems of John Dryden*, ed. by James Kinsley, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958).

It seems to me that his observation that bi-partite structure is not a universal feature of Roman verse satire is accurate.[26] Also, I agree with Schakel's argument that Dryden's idea of bi-partite structure is prescriptive rather than descriptive. After all, bi-partite structure should by definition refer to the structural pattern of satire, in other words, its formal design. If a satire can be clearly divided into part A of vice and Part B of virtue opposed to the vice attacked, then we can accept that this satire has, in form, a bi-partite structure. Yet, if we force this pattern on a satire which is not clearly divided into two parts, arguing that there is a submerged insinuation of virtue opposed to the vice openly criticised throughout the poem, then, in this case, bi-partite structure becomes a thematic concern, not a structural, nor formal one. As Schakel argues, we should distinguish between 'structural design' and 'thematic formulas'. (p. 40) What, then, is the defining feature of formal verse satire? It seems to me that Schakel's description of formal verse satire towards the end of his article answers this question well because he defines it as concerning the form of a satire, rather than its thematic matter:

> Here she [Randolph] describes in a valuable way the genuinely *formal* designs of the genre: it is a non-narrative satire, usually in heroic couplets, usually quasi-dramatic in form, with two actors or participants, a Satirist and his Adversarius

[26]For example, we can see Horace's satire I. ii, which Pope imitated as *Sober Advice From Horace*. I do not think that we can find any trace of bi-partite structure in this poem, in which Horace talks about the dangers of adultery, advising that it is safer and more enjoyable to have a sexual relationship with women from 'classe seconda' ('second class' [l. 47]) than to commit adultery with 'matrona' ('other men's wives' [l. 63]). We cannot be sure how sincere Horace is in this counsel. If we are to apply Randolph's and Weinbrot's theory about formal verse satire, this advice of Horace's cannot be construed as virtue in contrast to vice (in this case, adultery), thus we have to look somewhere else for the virtue implied. Then, can we interpret this poem as Horace's implicit presentation of himself as virtuous foil against the vice he ridiculed? In view of his hedonistic personal life, which his contemporaries also took notice of, it is very difficult to accept that Horace is so blatant as to present himself as a moral and chaste example of virtue. In his letter to Swift, Bolingbroke said that, while comparing Pope's imitation of this poem with the original, 'it is impossible to talk so much of philosophy, and forget to speak of Pope. . . . The Daemon of verse sticks close to him. He has been imitating the Satire of Horace which begins Ambubaiarum Collegia, Pharmacopolae, & c. and has chose rather to weaken the images than to hurt chaste ears overmuch.', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, pp. 413-414, Bolingbroke to Swift, 27 June-6 July 1734. Also, Dryden expressed his opinion about Horace's dubious moral standards in the *Discourse* when he commented on the law which forbade libellous poetry in Roman time: 'It was not for a Clodius to accuse Adulterers, especially when *Augustus* was of that number: So that though his Age was not exempted from the worst of Villanies, there was no freedom left to reprehend them, by reason of the Edict. And our poet [Horace] was not fit to represent them in an Odious character, because himself was dipt in the same Actions.' (p. 69)

Thus, if we are to force the bi-partite structure as a definition of Roman formal verse satire, we end up in a very awkward position of excluding this poem from that category.

> (although the latter is sometimes only implied), arguing in a vaguely identifiable setting. It absorbs a variety of forms and techniques to give strength and liveliness to its presentation: sententious proverbs, compressed beast fables, brief sermons, sharp debates, series of vignettes, swiftly sketched satiric characters or portraits, little fictions and apologues—"anything and everything to push his argument forward to its philosophical and psychological conclusions" (Randolph, p. 373). (p. 40)

Understood as above, bi-partite structure in formal verse satire noticed by and advocated by Randolph and Weinbrot comes to have a new dimension of meaning, even though it cannot be its defining feature. As Dryden's purpose in prescribing this structure is to 'instruct as well as chastize', this structure can be construed to be the realisation of a satirist's effort to resolve the crisis he perceives as a threat to society. Indeed, this bi-partite structure, more than any other form, can provide a satirist with a clear-cut structure in which he can present to his readers a workable norm as opposed to his criticism of the threat to society. If a satirist can provide the example of virtue in contrast to the vice he attacks, he is presenting a workable norm which his readers can follow in the reformation of their behaviour and thus of society.[27] Whether the norm presented is accepted by the readers is another matter. As long as a satirist provides his audience with an achievable norm in which he believes, he is not giving in to the situation which he interprets as crisis: rather, he is making an effort to rescue the situation, taking an initiative. Thus, the fact that Pope adopts Dryden's prescription in his epistles to several persons takes on a greater importance than before. When he adopts this structure by choice, he is indeed taking an initiative to resolve a crisis.

1. *Epistle to Burlington* (first published in 1731) and *Epistle to Bathurst* (first published in 1732)

Pope's concern in the *Epistle to Burlington* is, as its half title—'Of the Use of Riches'—suggests, the bad use of riches, especially in architecture. Pope's satiric butts in this satire are the 'Imitating Fools;/ Who random drawings from your [Burlington's]

[27]When I say bi-partite structure, I mean the structure of a poem in which two clearly-divided parts deal with the criticism of vice and the recommendation of virtue respectively, not that in which the virtue of the poet might be vaguely implied in his attack on vice. In respect to the presentation of a workable norm, to imply a virtue is a rather less effective way of influencing readers than to provide them with unmissable examples of virtue.

sheets shall take,/ And of one beauty many blunders make;' (ll. 26-28), who do not have any understanding of the architectural rules and, in mistaking purposeless pomposity as grandeur, become 'A standing sermon, at each year's expense,/ That never Coxcomb reach'd Magnificence!' (ll. 21-22)[28]

Timon's Villa, which Pope presents in lines 99-168, can be regarded as the epitome of Pope's attack on bad taste in architecture, through the examination of which we can understand why Pope criticises bad taste and practice in architecture.

Since the *Epistle to Burlington* was published in 1731, the identification of Timon and his villa has been the constant concern of Pope's contemporaries and later generations. However, whether Timon's Villa can be identified with the Duke of Chandos's Cannons or Sir Robert Walpole's Houghton, its identification seems to me much less important than to understand what Timon and his villa symbolise. As Pope reveals in his unpublished *A Master Key to Popery, or A True and Perfect Key to Pope's Epistle to Burlington*, his concern in Timon's portrait is to attack the more general feature of tastelessness in the use of riches by making him, as James A. Aubrey puts it, 'a satirical inversion of the typical man of taste and his villa a synthesis of offensive objects':[29]

> I shall enumerate the several opinions of all others, & shew the Malice & Personal Reflection to extend much farther than has hitherto been imagin'd by any. It is shewing the Author great & undeserv'd Indulgence to confine it to any One, tho' that one were the Best Man in the world: There are so many By-peeps

[28]*Epistles to Several Persons (Moral Essays)*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, pp. 135-136. In this chapter, I follow F. W. Bateson's text, which is chiefly based on the 1744 'death-bed' edition of *Epistles to Several Persons*. Yet, as my chief concern in this chapter is to provide a point of comparison with Pope's later satires by regarding these poems as earlier examples of Pope's satire, I follow Bateson's text with caution. I decide to follow his text on the condition that the meaning of the poem does not change significantly from Pope's other important edition of these poems in his *Works, vol. II* of 1735 and 1736. I decide to give more weight to Pope's 1735 and 1736 edition of *Works, vol. II*, than to Pope's original poems. This is because, as there is not much time difference between the original publication of these poems and the publication of Pope's edition of *Works, vol. II*, I think it better to respect Pope's intention in revising his lines, while maintaining these poems' status as earlier examples of Pope's satire. Of course, I shall be attentive to any significant difference between the text of the death-bed edition and that of *Works, vol. II*: if such a difference occurs, I shall follow the earlier version. However, in the case of some added lines in the death-bed addition, if they were written with the other lines of the original edition at the same time but suppressed for some reason and reinstated to their original place, of which the chief examples are the Philomedé and Atossa portraits in the *Epistle to a Lady*, I decide to give these lines the status of earlier examples of Pope's satire. For the textual history of Pope's *Epistles to Several Persons*, see Bateson's introduction.

[29]James A. Aubrey, 'Timon's Villa: Pope's Composite Picture', *SP*, 80 (1983), 325-348 (p. 327).

& squinting Glances, besides the main View, that instead of twenty things aim'd at one, every Circumstance is aim'd at twenty.[30]

As this passage shows, for his literary picture of Timon and his villa, Pope seems to take the worst features of many estates and to compose from them a kind of deformed whole by which he can strike many with a single stroke.[31]

Before we investigate Pope's attacks on Timon's Villa as a representative example of bad taste in architecture, it seems appropriate to examine Pope's own ideas about architecture, which can be gathered from this poem. We can infer Pope's ideas from lines 13-38, in which he gives the example of those who demonstrate false taste and ignorance of architectural rules. It can be understood from these lines that the standards by which architecture should be examined are 'use' and 'decorum':

You show us, Rome was glorious, not profuse,
And pompous buildings once were things of Use. (ll. 23-24)

Load some vain Church with old Theatric state,
Turn Arcs of triumph to a Garden-gate;
Reverse your Ornaments, and hang them all
On some patch'd dog-hole ek'd with ends of wall,
Then clap four slices of Pilaster on't,
That, lac'd with bits of rustic, makes a Front; (ll. 29-34)

For Pope, this 'use' and 'decorum' can be achieved by following 'sense' and 'nature':

Oft have you hinted to your brother Peer,
A certain truth, which many buy too dear:
Something there is more needful than Expence,
And something previous ev'n to Taste—'tis Sense:
Good Sense, which only is the gift of Heav'n,
And tho' no science, fairly worth the seven: (ll. 39-44)

To build, to plant, whatever you intend,

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[30] *Epistles to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, p. 177.

[31] In this passage, Pope is also revealing his embarrassment at the contemporary fuss caused by the identification of Timon's Villa with the Duke of Chandos's Cannons. He actually took the trouble of writing a letter to the duke explaining the maliciousness of that identification, which the duke accepted. For more detail, see *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, pp. 262-263. For the composite nature of Timon's Villa—the impossibility of its identification with any definite building—see James A. Aubrey, 'Timon's Villa: Pope's Composite Picture'.

To rear the Column, or the Arch to bend,
To swell the Terras, or to sink the Grot;
In all, let Nature never be forgot. (ll. 47-50)

Pope's conception of architectural principles was not original to him: his idea was shared by his contemporaries and supported by classical architectural theories. For Pope's emphasis on 'use', we can find a number of treatises in which the notion of beauty is related to utility. Shaftesbury, in his *Miscellaneous Reflections* (1711), insisted that 'the same shape and proportions which make beauty afford advantage by adapting to activity and use', and thus concluded that 'beauty and truth are plainly joined with the notion of utility and convenience, even in the apprehension of every ingenious artist, the architect, the statuary, or the painter'.[32] Similarly, George Berkeley, in his *Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher* (1732), rejected the idea that beauty is inherent in mathematical proportions pleasing to the eye. He insisted that a door is not beautiful simply because it is 'of a beautiful proportion, when its height is double of the breadth': if one 'invert a well-proportioned door, making its breadth become the height, and its height the breadth, the figure would still be the same, but without that beauty in one situation which it had in another' because 'the door would not yield convenient entrances to creatures of a human figure'.[33]

Pope's idea of 'decorum' is firmly based upon the architectural theory developed by Vitruvius. This is suggested by the lines in which he supplicates Burlington to be 'whate'er Vitruvius was before' (l. 194), an English Vitruvius. In his *De Architectura*, here in Frank Granger's translation, Vitruvius defined the word 'decor' as follows: 'Decor demands the faultless ensemble of a work composed, in accordance with precedent, of approved details. It obeys convention, which in Greek is called *thematismos*, or custom or nature.'[34] In obeying 'convention' ('*statione*'), he expected

[32]Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, ed. by John M. Robertson, 2 vols. (London: Grant Richards, 1900), II, p. 267.
[33]*The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. by Alexander Campbell Fraser, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1901), II, p. 134.
[34]*Vitruvius: De Architectura*, trans. by Frank Granger, 2 vols., *The Loeb Classical Library*, ed. by T. E. Page and others (London: Heinemann, 1931-1934), I, pp. 27, 29. Pope's familiarity with Vitruvius can be demonstrated by his mention of him in the following letter, in addition to the phrase 'be whate'er Vitruvius was before'(l. 194): 'My Building rises high enough to attract the eye and curiosity of the Passenger from the River, where, upon beholding a Mixture of Beauty and Ruin, he [the passenger] enquires what House is falling, or what church is rising? So little taste have our common Tritons of *Vitruvius*;', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, II, p. 44, Pope to Robert Digby, 1 May 1720.

that there should be some analogy between a building's appearance and its function, including correspondences between its style or ornaments and the gods or persons to whom it was dedicated:

> Convention is obeyed when buildings are put up in the open and hypethral to Jupiter of the Lightning, to Heaven, the Sun, the Moon; for of these gods, both the appearance and effect we see present in the open, the world of light. (p. 29)

'Fashion' ('*consuetudine*') demanded that a building should be uniform in style inside and out, that neither 'low' and 'high' styles be mixed, nor the ornaments of one order be confused with another:

> when to magnificent interiors vestibules also are made harmonious and elegant. For if the interior apartments present an elegant appearance, while the approaches are low and uncomely, they will not be accompanied by fitness. Again, if, in Doric entablatures, dentils are carved on the cornices, or if with voluted capitals and Ionic entablatures, triglyphs are applied, characteristics are transferred from one style to another: the work as a whole will jar upon us, since it includes details foreign to the order. (p. 29)

In obeying 'natural decor' ('*natura*'), he required that temples be erected on healthy sites and also that buildings be placed and their rooms arranged to take advantage of available light:

> if for all temples there shall be chosen the most healthy sites with suitable springs in those places in which shrines are to be set up; . . . and generally for those gods by whose medical power sick persons are manifestly healed. For when sick persons are moved from a pestilent to a healthy place and the water supply is from wholesome fountains, they will more quickly recover. (p. 31)

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Probably Pope became conversant with Vitruvius's *De Architectura* through his friend Lord Oxford's library, which owned three manuscripts of the book including one of the earliest. From the fact that Pope was an intimate friend of Lord Oxford's, and frequented his library, in all likelihood, he must have gained a knowledge of Vitruvius there. For more detailed information about Pope's familiarity with *De Architectura*, see Philip Ayres, 'Pope's *Epistle to Burlington*: The Vitruvian Analogies', *SEL*, 30 (1990), 429-444. See also Morris R. Brownell, *Alexander Pope and the Arts of Georgian England* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), p. 286.

It is in respect of this decorum that Timon's Villa is principally criticised. Timon's basic fault is that he ignores the demands of nature (natural decorum) and the due respect between the inhabitant and the habitation (decorum of convention). There is nothing in the villa's 'situation' conducive to the comfort that the architectural theory above dictates. The house is placed on an open plain, unprotected from the wind. The fact that 'a Lake behind/ Improves the keenness of the Northern Wind' (ll. 111-112) is an example of the violation of 'natural decorum' which otherwise would help to avoid the dangers of chilling or noxious winds. Wherever Timon is required to follow the rule of 'natural decorum', he seems to fail to do so. Against the 'natural decorum' which demands the architect to 'Call in the Country' (l. 61), in Timon's Villa the garden is walled off from the countryside: 'On ev'ry side you look, behold the Wall!' (l. 114). In his garden, instead of varying 'shades from shades,/ Now breaks or now directs, th' intending Lines' (ll. 62-63), there are only rigid regularity and bilateral symmetry by which

> No pleasing Intricacies intervene,
> No artful wildness to perplex the scene;
> Grove nods at grove, each Alley has a brother,
> And half the platform just reflects the other. (ll. 115-118)

The most representative example of breaking the 'natural decorum' in Timon's garden may be the waterless fountains and urns in which 'Un-water'd see the drooping sea-horse mourn,/ And swallows roost in Nilus' dusty Urn' (ll. 125-126), because he erected them where water cannot follow.

Nor is there at the villa any due respect between the inhabitant and the habitation (decorum of convention). The Brobdignagian scale of the villa and its site (ll. 103-106) is actually never in harmony with its master: rather, the villa's pomp diminishes its master's stature instead of aggrandising it as he is described as 'A puny insect, shiv'ring at a breeze' (l. 108) in comparison with his villa. Similarly, in Timon's Villa, there is no correspondence between architectural design and human forms. In the following lines, in which Pope describes the visitors' approach to the house from the garden,

> First thro' the length of yon hot Terrace sweat,

And when up ten steep slopes you've dragg'd your thighs,
Just at his Study-door he'll bless your eyes. (ll. 130-132)

he demonstrates well how Timon's Villa ignores human comfort in its structural design through the visitors' predicament. As William A. Gibson puts it, in Timon's Villa, 'even walking—a simple activity, believed conducive to a virtuous and healthful life, that the villa is to encourage—demands inordinate exertion', which is well illustrated by 'Pope's verbs "sweat" and "dragg'd" and the laborious slowness of the heavily-accented monosyllabic verse (l. 131)'.[35]

The three rooms in Timon's Villa, the study, the chapel, and the dining hall, represent the human life there—the intellectual, the spiritual, and the social respectively—which is distorted in addition to its building and garden being perverted from the classical rules of architecture. In Timon's study, only the external features of books are emphasised, while their internal qualities are ignored: Timon collects books according to their printing and binding—'These Aldus printed, those Du Suëil has bound' (l. 136)— and even does not care if they are dummy books (l. 138) as long as their appearances are good. In Timon's chapel and dining-hall, we can find a complete distortion of human behaviour. The conduct in Timon's chapel is more appropriate for a dining-hall or a dancing room than for a religious place, as it is governed by frivolity instead of solemnity: 'Light quirks of Musick, broken and uneven,/ Make the soul dance upon a Jig to Heaven.' (ll. 143-144) On the other hand, there is no trace of conviviality in the dining-hall: instead, conduct there seems more like a religious rite:

Is this a dinner? this a Genial room?
No, 'tis a Temple, and a Hecatomb.
A solemn Sacrifice, perform'd in state,
You drink by measure, and to minutes eat. (ll. 155-158)

Thus, in Timon's Villa, human behaviour becomes distorted, as the proper relationship between a building and human life is lost. This is where Pope's criticism of the violation of architectural decorum takes on a more serious dimension. Timon's Villa is not only

[35]William A. Gibson, 'Three Principles of Renaissance Architectural Theory in Pope's *Epistle to Burlington*', *SEL*, 11 (1971), 487-505 (pp. 500-501).

an example of the bad taste in architecture and the ensuing waste of riches, but also, as human life in Timon's Villa is distorted, an example of how bad use of riches results in moral depravity.

In conjunction with the moral implication of Timon's Villa, Aubrey Williams, in his Article 'A Hell for "Ears Polite": Pope's *Epistle to Burlington*', explains how Timon's Villa can be seen as a representative of the Christian Hell. Quoting St. Thomas, John Donne, and Reverend William Dodwell, for his theological authority, he explains the two kinds of punishment in Christian theology, that is, two kinds of Hell, as follows:

> In the traditional Christian formulation of the nature of Hell, the punishment there due to sin is expressed by way of two phrases: *poena damni*, the pain of loss or separation from the presence of God, and *poena sensus*, afflictions in this life and also bodily torments in the next.[36]

For Aubrey Williams, Timon's Villa is an example of *poena sensus*, where 'the venal, the vain, and the prodigal are shown to be joyless amidst riches, afflicted amidst splendor, stupefied amidst luxury' (p. 487), as his waterless fountain, shadeless summer house, and the guests' torture in his dining hall suggest. In this respect, we can accept his argument that Timon's Villa is an example which demonstrates that 'an inordinate turning to material things may become a profanation of the creation man is blessed with, may lead to perversions of true religion', as his chapel clearly shows, and 'may place one in a "hell" of one's own making' (p. 490). It seems to me that Aubrey Williams's interpretation of Timon's Villa, in view of its Christian implication, does strengthen our understanding of the moral dimension implied in Pope's description of Timon's Villa.

However, I cannot agree with Williams's argument that *To Burlington* is solely an orthodox Christian vision of the world, not reminiscent of Mandevillian ethics (p. 485). Actually, it is my contention that, in this poem, there does exist a tension between a rigorous moral view of Timon's Villa and a proto-utilitarian acceptance of its value, a tension which Pope quite cannot resolve. Immediately after the description of a day in Timon's Villa, Pope presents to the readers the following passage, which is quite problematical to interpret:

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[36]Aubrey Williams, 'A Hell for "Ears Polite": Pope's *Epistle to Burlington*', *ELH*, 51(1984), 479-503 (p. 481). For the argument of St. Thomas, John Donne, and Reverend William Dodwell, see pp. 481-482.

Yet hence the Poor are cloath'd, the Hungry fed;
Health to himself, and to his Infants bread
The Lab'rer bears: What his hard Heart denies,
His charitable Vanity supplies. (ll. 169-172)

This passage does recognise the ultimate charitable nature of Timon, emphasising the end result of his action, not his motive. After all the previous criticisms of his villa, these lines come rather unexpectedly, and seem to nullify the preceding moral implication of his villa. We cannot find any obvious trace of irony in these lines, and Pope's note attached to them from the 1735 octavo edition of the *Works, vol. II.* does not seem to contradict the meaning of the text either: 'The *Moral* of the whole, where PROVIDENCE is justified in giving wealth to those who squander it in this manner. A bad Taste employs more hands and diffuses Expence more than a good one.'[37] The lines above seem to echo Mandeville's strict utilitarian view of luxury as expressed in his *Fable of the Bees*, which exempts luxury from a moral burden:

The root of Evil, Avarice,
That damn'd ill-natur'd baneful Vice
Was Slave to Prodigality
That noble Sin; whilst Luxury
Employ'd Million of the Poor,
And odious Pride a Million more.
Envy it self, and Vanity,
Were Ministers of Industry.[38]

If Pope's lines cited above were placed in the middle of the Timon's Villa passage, Aubrey Williams's view might be justified, in that the strong moral implication in the later lines of Timon's Villa might bury the proto-utilitarian implication. However, as they are placed at the end of the Timon's Villa lines, they certainly contradict the previous moral criticism.

[37]*Epistles to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, p. 148, 169n.
[38]Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits*, ed. by F. B. Kaye, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924), I, p. 25.

We can infer where Pope's sympathy lies between a rigorous moral view and a proto-utilitarian one, as he predicts that eventually Timon's misapplication will be reassumed by nature:

> Another age shall see the golden Ear
> Imbrown the Slope, and nod on the Parterre,
> Deep Harvests bury all his pride has plann'd,
> And laughing Ceres re-assume the land. (ll. 173-176)

If Pope does have a sympathy with a proto-utilitarian view of luxury, he does not have to predict the eventual disappearance of Timon's Villa. Yet, as he does predict its disappearance, we can infer that Pope does not approve its existence, however useful it might be in creating jobs for the poor. Yet, these lines cannot be interpreted as Pope's confident and direct rebuttal of Timon's Villa, since they are not only a prophecy about the eventual fate of Timon's Villa, but also a demonstration of the existence of Divine Providence which will eventually work out the errant extremes toward the ultimate, desirable state. From the viewpoint of Divine Providence, Timon's Villa is nothing but a local matter. Thus, although these lines demonstrate Pope's hope for the eventual reconciliation of the extremes, they do harm his previous criticism of Timon's Villa: if every local vice is resolved towards the general good by God, why does individual man have to be responsible for his actions?; what is the relationship between eventual universal harmony and the individual's responsibility in it?[39]

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[39]Of course, if we are to interpret this poem in connection with the Opus Magnum plan, we can justify the existence of lines 169-176, as they repeat what Pope advocates in the *Essay on Man*—that is, his conviction on the existence of Divine Providence:

> Each individual seeks a sev'ral goal;
> But HEAV'N's great view is One, and that the Whole:
> That counter-works each folly and caprice;
> That disappoints th'effect of ev'ry vice:
> That happy frailties to all ranks apply'd,
> Shame to the virgin, to the matron pride,
> Fear to the statesman, rashness to the chief,
> To kings presumption, and to crowds belief,
> That Virtue's ends from Vanity can raise,
> Which seeks no int'rest, no reward but praise;
> And build on wants, and on defects of mind,
> The joy, the peace, the glory of Mankind. (Epistle II, ll. 237-248)

Yet, for the purpose of this poem which is to advocate the right use of riches through satiric method, the passage does not support and develop its theme, as it lessens Timon's moral implication. As I shall argue

Without resolving the problem created by lines 169-176, Pope proceeds to the praise of his addressee Burlington, in which he clearly demonstrates what his ideal is concerning the use of riches:

> Who then shall grace, or who improve the Soil?
> Who plants like Bathurst, or who builds like Boyle.
> 'Tis Use alone that sanctifies Expence,
> And Splendour borrows all her rays from Sense.
> His Father's Acres who enjoys in peace,
> Or makes his Neighbours glad, if he encrease;
> Whose chearful Tenants bless their yearly toil,
> Yet to their Lord owe more than to the soil;
> Whose ample Lawns are not asham'd to feed
> The milky heifer and deserving steed;
> Whose rising Forests, not for pride or show,
> But future Buildings, future Navies grow:
> Let his plantations stretch from down to down,
> First shade a Country, and then raise a Town. (ll. 177-190)

In these lines, Pope advocates the benevolent use of riches based on the 'use' and the 'sense', by which the bond between landlord and tenants is consolidated, and, on the more general level, the healthy state of the national economy is strengthened. Pope's supplication to Lord Burlington in the final lines of the poem takes on the national level. In these lines, Pope hopes that Burlington will advance a programme for which existing works are absurdly inadequate, a programme of 'imperial works' requiring Burlington's direction in resurrecting Royal works, which will be akin to what they had been under Inigo Jones and Christopher Wren, or even better, which can be compared to the Augustan works under Vitruvius:

> You too proceed! make falling Arts your care,
> Erect new wonders, and the old repair,
> Jones and Palladio to themselves restore,
> And be whate'er Vitruvius was before:
> Till Kings call forth th' Idea's of your mind,
> Proud to accomplish what such hands design'd,
> Bid Harbors open, public Ways extend,
> Bid Temples, worthier of the God, ascend;

---

later, it is in his *To Bathurst* that Pope clarifies his argument about the relationship between eventual good in God's creation and the individual's responsibility in it.

Bid the broad Arch the dang'rous Flood contain,
The Mole projected break the roaring Main;
Back to his bounds their subject Sea command,
And roll obedient Rivers thro' the Land;
These Honours, Peace to happy Britain brings,
These are Imperial Works, and worthy Kings. (ll. 191-204)

In this paragraph, Pope's supplication to Burlington rises to a new plane after the phrase 'Till Kings call forth' (l. 195), as the lines following this phrase become more of a prophecy rather than a supplication to Burlington. Moreover, the works to be done are sublimated to a god-like level, emphasising the prophetic quality of these lines. The emphatic placement of the word 'Bid' in lines 197-199 strongly hints at a sublime and god-like fiat, as these lines echo Genesis 1: 9: 'God said, Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together unto one place, and let the dry *land* appear: and so it was.'

Can we, then, regard these lines as Pope's confident presentation of an achievable norm in a bi-partite structure? The answer has to be no. As well as the problem raised by lines 169-176 concerning Timon's moral responsibility being still unresolved, the tone of the final passage itself is undermined by Pope's consciousness of the derelict state of Royal works and the contrast in public spiritedness between Augustus Caesar and George II, as he reveals in his added note to lines 195-204 in 1735:

> The poet after having touched upon the proper objects of Magnificence and Expence, in the private works of great men, comes to those great and public works which become a Prince. This Poem was published in the year 1732 when some of the new-built Churches, by the act of Queen Ann, were ready to fall, being founded in boggy land (which is satirically alluded to in our author's imitation of Horace Lib. ii. Sat. 2.
>
> *Shall half the new-built Churches round thee fall*)
>
> others were vilely executed, thro' fraudulent cabals between undertakers, officers, *& c.* Dagenham-breach had done very great mischiefs; many of the Highways throughout England were hardly passable, and most of those which were repaired by Turnpikes were made jobs for private lucre, and infamously executed, even to the entrances of London itself: The proposal of building a Bridge at Westminster had been petition'd against and rejected; but in two years after the publication of this poem, an Act for building a Bridge past thro' both houses. After many debates in the committee, the execution was left to the carpenter above mentioned, who would have made it a wooden one;[40]

[40] *Epistles to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, p. 150, 195-204n.

As this note shows that Ripley, who was then Comptroller of the Board of Works, whom Pope despised as carpenter,[41] was commissioned to build a much needed bridge at Westminster, Pope is painfully aware of the fact that, unlike Vitruvius, Burlington has no power to direct or suggest public works. The most ironical expression in this passage is 'Till Kings call forth th' Idea's of your mind' (l. 194), as our attention should be paid to the plural noun 'Kings'. If Pope had used the singular form 'King', its indication might have been George II. However, the plural form indicates that the reference is broader. They are the kings of the future, but, in this poem, it seems to be impossible for Pope to tell what kings of the future would call forth the ideas of Burlington. Fraught with uncertainty, Pope's presentation of an achievable norm in accordance with a bi-partite structure seems to be too fragile to counterbalance his accusation of architectural folly.[42]

The *Epistle to Bathurst* can be regarded as a companion piece to the *Epistle to Burlington* in that both satires deal with the use of money. The difference is that, while *To Burlington* deals with the use of money in one specific field, architecture, *To Bathurst* concerns the more general use of money. Also, we can regard *To Bathurst* as being closely related to the *Essay on Man* as well, especially Epistle IV. The relationship between these poems can be explained by the fact that *To Bathurst* deals with the problem of how man can achieve the virtuous and happy life, which is the theme of Epistle IV of the *Essay on Man*, through the right use of riches.

In Epistle IV of the *Essay on Man*, Pope argues that riches cannot make any man happy if they are not accompanied by virtue, which is emphasised here by the phrases 'healthful life' and 'clear conscience':

> To whom can Riches give Repute, or Trust,
> Content, or Pleasure, but the Good and Just?

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[41] For Pope's disapproval of Ripley, see Pope's note to line 18 in *Epistles to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, p. 133.

[42] That the air of uncertainty is created by Pope consciously can be proved by looking at his unpublished *Master Key to Popery*, in which he indicates ironically that he does not have any substantial hope about George II being persuaded to follow the example of Burlington: 'After all, it would seem unfair not to own, there is something at the end of his Epistle which looks like a Compliment to the King: But sure 'tis a very strange one! just to single out the only Good & great things which his Majesty has *Not* done for his Subjects.', *Epistles to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, p. 182.

Judges and Senates have been bought for gold,
Esteem and Love were never to be sold.
Oh fool! to think God hates the worthy mind,
The lover and the love of human-kind,
Whose life is healthful, and whose conscience clear;
Because he wants a thousand pounds a year. (Epistle IV, ll. 185-192)

What Pope advocates here is that, as he suggests in the examples of riches, honours, nobility, greatness, fame, and superior talents which cannot bring happiness, virtue is the only means to the happy life:

Know then this truth (enough for Man to know)
"Virtue alone is Happiness below."
The only point where human bliss stands still,
And tastes the good without the fall to ill;
Where only Merit constant pay receives,
Is blest in what it takes, and what it gives;
The joy unequal'd, if its end it gain,
And if it lose, attended with no pain:
Without satiety, tho' e'er so blest,
And but more relish'd as the more distress'd:
The broadest mirth unfeeling Folly wears,
Less pleasing far than Virtue's very tears.
Good, from each object, from each place acquir'd,
For ever exercis'd, yet never tir'd;
Never elated, while one man's oppress'd;
Never dejected, while another's bless'd;
And where no wants, no wishes can remain,
Since but to wish more Virtue, is to gain. (Epistle IV, ll. 309-326)

However, it should be noticed here that, even though Pope advocates the merit of the virtuous life enthusiastically and at length, he actually does not suggest the way in which man can arrive at this state of life. He only advocates here that the virtuous life is the sole means of achieving happiness in the life here below. In this sense, the nature of the relationship between *To Bathurst* and Epistle IV of the *Essay on Man* becomes clear. In *To Bathurst*, Pope suggests one way in which man can achieve a virtuous life, if he has got riches at his disposal, and that is through the right use of them.[43]

[43]Some may argue that it is absurd to regard *To Bathurst* as a kind of answer to Epistle IV of the *Essay on Man*, because the latter's publication date was later (January 1734) than the former's publication date (January 1733). However, as there is not much time difference between them, along with our

Pope's vindication of charity as the only right way to use riches is based upon two kinds of argument. The first argument is the refutation of the doctrine that wealth is the sign of election:

> Both fairly owning, Riches in effect
> No grace of Heav'n or token of th' Elect;
> Giv'n to the Fool, the Mad, the Vain, the Evil,
> To Ward, to Waters, Chartres, and the Devil. (ll. 17-20)

Pope is emphasising here the indifference of wealth to virtue, as he illustrates in lines 19-20 that it can be distributed to anyone regardless of his virtue, through the catalogue of rich men who do not deserve wealth if it is the sign of divine favour.

This is why he criticises people who despise the poor and neglect their duty to them:

> Perhaps you think the Poor might have their part?
> Bond damns the Poor, and hates them from his heart:
> The grave Sir Gilbert holds it for a rule,
> That "every man in want is knave or fool:"
> "God cannot love (says Blunt, with tearless eyes)
> "The wretch he starves"—and piously denies:
> But the good Bishop, with a meeker air,
> Admits, and leaves them, Providence's care. (ll. 101-108)

For Pope, money is not a measure by which we estimate man's worth: it is not money itself, but its use by which we should estimate it. Pope admits that the invention of money is the main reason for man's corruption, especially when the money is converted to paper-credit. Pope shows his qualm about the corruption and danger which paper money can bring about when he criticises it as follows:

> Blest paper-credit! last and best supply!
> That lends Corruption lighter wings to fly!
> Gold imp'd by thee, can compass hardest things,
> Can pocket States, can fetch or carry Kings;

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understanding that this poem was planned at the same time as the *Essay on Man*, as Spence's record of conversation with Pope during the period 1-7 May 1730 (*Epistles to Several* Persons, ed. by F. W. Bateson, pp. xxi-xxiii) reveals, it seems to me that there is no need for us to be very strict on the publication date.

A single leaf shall waft an Army o'er,
Or ship off Senates to a distant Shore;
A leaf, like Sibyl's, scatter to and fro
Our fates and fortunes, as the winds shall blow:
Pregnant with thousands flits the Scrap unseen,
And silent sells a King or buys a Queen. (ll. 69-78)

As James Engell argues, in these lines, Pope painfully demonstrates 'how money in the form of the written word can be misused with particular ease and stealth', as this money 'offers opportunities for an empire without bound of deception and avarice'.[44] Yet, however Pope detests money in paper form, he does not regard money as inherently connected to vice. He also recognises that money does have a useful function, as he reveals in the following lines:

Useful, I grant, it serves what life requires,
But dreadful too, the dark Assassin hires:
Trade it may help, Society extend;
But lures the Pyrate, and corrupts the Friend:
It raises Armies in a Nation's aid,
But bribes a Senate, and the Land's betray'd. (ll. 29-34)

It is important for us to recognise that here, though his focus is on the negative side of money as it is placed in the second half of each couplet, Pope acknowledges the useful function of money as well. Thus, what makes money seem odious is not inherent in itself. It is use which makes money productive or pernicious. This understanding that money itself is indifferent to virtue or vice anticipates his vindication of charity as man's moral responsibility in the use of his riches.

Pope's other argument is that, even though God in His perfection harmoniously reconciles extremes, this fact does not mean that man is free from moral responsibility. As Earl E. Wasserman argues, God's perfection is not contingent on man's pursuing the extremes: for this would imply that perfection depends upon evil.[45] In *To Bathurst*, there appears a passage which reveals Pope's belief in God's general Providence working with

[44]James Engell, 'Wealth and Words: Pope's *Epistle to Bathurst*', *MP*, 85 (1988), 433-446 (p. 438).
[45]Earl E. Wasserman, *Pope's Epistle to Bathurst: A Critical Reading with an Edition of the Manuscripts* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), p. 34.

two extremes, such as prodigality and avarice, reconciling them to sustain the 'Balance of things':

> Hear then the truth: "'Tis Heav'n each Passion sends,
> "And diff'rent men directs to diff'rent ends.
> "Extremes in Nature equal good produce,
> "Extremes in Man concur to gen'ral use." (ll. 161-164)

In His economy, God employs misers and prodigals in the same way that He

> bids the Ocean ebb and flow,
> Bids seed-time, harvest, equal course maintain,
> Thro' reconcil'd extremes of drought and rain,
> Builds Life on Death, on Change Duration founds,
> And gives th' eternal wheels to know their rounds. (ll. 166-170)

However, it must be noticed that in thus accounting for God's all-balancing Providence, Pope refers only to the moral condition of mankind as a whole, not the morality requisite for individual man. Moreover, this reconciliation of extremes, as Pope argues in the *Essay on Man*, is God's supernatural act which man can never understand and should not dare to take over: man's way in the universe should be different from God's.[46]

This is why Pope, after expressing his belief in God's all reconciling ability, criticises the two extremes in the use of riches in the example of the Cottas. Old Cotta, the miser, does not lay up money that in other hands would be hurtful: he withholds money which should be used for charity and for the support and cheerful entertainment of his tenants:

> Tenants with sighs the smoakless tow'rs survey,
> And turn th' unwilling steeds another way:
> Benighted wanderers, the forest o'er,
> Curse the sav'd candle, and unop'ning door;

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[46]In the *Essay on Man*, Pope argues that God's way is on the different plane from man's as follows:

> All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
> All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see;
> All Discord, Harmony, not understood;
> All partial Evil, universal Good: (Epistle I, ll. 289-292)

In these lines, Pope implies that, while God reconciles the extremes, this cannot be man's concern as this is not known to and understood by him.

While the gaunt mastiff growling at the gate,
Affrights the beggar whom he longs to eat. (ll. 193-198)

Nor does his son, the prodigal, escape Pope's criticism, even though he scattered abroad money that would have been useful in other hands. Pope describes in the following lines that young Cotta's bankruptcy and final ruin are due to his waste of money on senseless extravagances:

Yet no mean motive this profusion draws,
His oxen perish in his country's cause;
'Tis GEORGE and LIBERTY that crowns the cup,
And Zeal for that great House which eats him up.
The woods recede around the naked seat,
The Sylvans groan—no matter—for the Fleet:
Next goes his Wool—to cloathe our valiant bands,
Last, for his Country's love, he sells his Lands.
To town he comes, completes the nation's hope,
And heads the bold Train-bands, and burns a Pope.
And shall not Britain now reward his toils,
Britain, that pays her Patriots with her Spoils?
In vain at Court the Bankrupt pleads his cause,
His thankless country leaves him to her Laws. (ll. 205-218)

The 'receding woods' and the 'groaning Sylvans' symbolise the destruction of the country house ideal which Pope advocated in *To Burlington* and of which young Cotta is an opposite example.[47] We cannot deny that, in so doing, he did contribute to the

[47]Of course, Young Cotta is not the only opposite example of the country house ideal. Both Cottas, in their respective avarice and senseless profusion, exemplify the opposite to that ideal where the hospitality through sensible housekeeping is the landlord's responsibility and the tenants' right by which the happy country life can be maintained. For one example, we can look into the following lines from Ben Jonson's 'To Penshurst':

And though thy walls be of the country stone,
They are reared with no man's ruin, no man's groan;
There's none that dwell about them wish them down;
But all come in, the farmer and the clown,
And no one empty-handed, to salute
Thy lord and lady, though they have no suit. . . .
But what can this (more than express their love)
Add to thy free provisions, far above
The need of such? whose liberal board doth flow
With all that hospitality doth know; (ll. 45-50, 57-60)

imperialist cause; however, we also cannot overlook the fact that this contribution was based on the destruction of his country seat. It is important for us to understand that Pope does not make his portraits of the Cottas as morally indifferent as his description of avarice and profusion as a 'reservoir' and a 'fountain' preceding the portraits:

> Who sees pale Mammon pine amidst his store,
> Sees but a backward steward for the Poor;
> This year a Reservoir, to keep and spare,
> The next a Fountain, spouting thro' his Heir,
> In lavish streams to quench a Country's thirst,
> And men and dogs shall drink him 'till they burst. (ll. 173-178)

In these lines, Pope's explanation that Divine Providence works to reconcile extremes uses the images of reservoir and fountain, which are terms devoid of any moral implication.[48] However, Pope makes the Cottas portrait operate on a different plane: by emphasising the sufferings inflicted by them, he presents them as two extreme uses of riches, who ought to be morally responsible.

This is why we cannot regard the Cottas portrait as Pope's demonstration of a proto-utilitarian view, contrary to Laura Brown's suggestion. She argues that Pope does have a sympathy towards the Cottas as they are useful from such an angle:

> The Cottas belong to this proto-utilitarian system. Old Cotta is avarice. He hosts no feasts, slights his tenants and turns away 'Benighted wanderers' (195). But in the longer perspective, his avarice serves the vital positive function of a 'reservoir' for the profusion of later generations: . . . Young Cotta, the fountain, matches his father's avarice with an equivalent profusion. As we saw, his passion serves not simply the general welfare, but the specific cause of imperialist expansion. That is, his profusion directly supports the economic system that

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There do exist several seventeenth-century poems which described this ideal, such as Thomas Carew's 'To Saxham', Robert Herrick's 'A County Life', and Andrew Marvell's 'Upon Appleton House'. The quotation is from *The Norton Anthology of English Literature*, ed. by M. H. Abrams and others, 5th edn., 2 vols. (New York: Norton, 1986). For more information, see Howard Erskine-Hill, *The Social Milieu of Alexander Pope* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 279-287. David B. Morris uses the term 'Tudor moral economy' instead of country house ideal when he points out that the Cottas represent the decline of the 'Tudor moral economy' that he defines as one in which 'landlord and tenant were bound together in reciprocal assistance, with charity a tenant's right and landlord's duty that eased the hardship resulting from poor harvests': 'the moral economy old Cotta had neglected, his son now wholly disavows.', David B. Morris, *Alexander Pope: The Genius of Sense* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 182-183.

[48]If there is any trace of irony here, it is not on man as a reservoir or a fountain, but on the rapacity of those who feed on the luxury of man as a fountain, as line 178 suggests.

defines his vice as a public virtue; we don't even have to wait, like Mandeville, for his luxury eventually to employ the 'working poor'.[49]

We may accept that the Cottas have merit in the proto-utilitarian interpretation of economy. Indeed, Pope admits, in lines 169-172 of *To Burlington*, the proto-utilitarian value of Timon's Villa. However, there is no hint of Pope's approval of the Cottas in this poem: his emphasis is firmly on the suffering inflicted by them, not on their merit which might appear from an economical viewpoint. We may locate a proto-utilitarian value in the Cottas, but it is one thing for us to find it from our viewpoint, yet it is quite another to force it into Pope's criticism of the moral implications of the Cottas. Thus, for me, Pope's portraits of the Cottas should be interpreted not as an example of God's reconciliation of extremes, nor as an example of Pope's proto-utilitarian view, but as his sharp criticism on the two extremes in the use of riches, which demonstrates his belief that individual morality should operate on a different plane from God's. It is here where *To Bathurst* is different from *To Burlington*. In *To Burlington*, the lack of Pope's clarification on this matter does damage his criticism of Timon's moral responsibility. Yet, in this poem, Pope strengthens his criticism of the misuse of riches by elucidating that, whatever Divine Providence, the individual does have his moral obligation in the use of riches. He stands in this poem not as a political economist, but as a moralist.

The two arguments of Pope I have hitherto examined, that wealth is indifferent to virtue and that man should be responsible for his use of money, are based upon his recognition that, after the invention of money, mankind has fallen into the postlapsarian world, as Adam and Eve have fallen after eating the forbidden fruit. In the following lines, money can be compared to the forbidden fruit, as the discovery of gold by 'Man's audacious labour' symbolises another breaking of God's law.

> But I, who think more highly of our kind,
> (And surely, Heav'n and I are of a mind)
> Opine, that Nature, as in duty bound,
> Deep hid the shining mischief under ground:
> But when by Man's audacious labour won,
> Flam'd forth this rival to, its Sire, the Sun,
> Then careful Heav'n supply'd two sorts of Men,

[49]Laura Brown, *Alexander Pope* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 112.

To squander these, and those to hide agen. (ll. 7-14)

However, in this poem, Pope does not fall into pessimism about the current state of man. For him, as Adam should admit his fallen state and find paradise in his own mind, man should submit to this fallen state and make the best of it. Behind the ridiculous description of a return to a barter economy in lines 35-54, there is Pope's bitter recognition that the monetary economy is an irreversible fact and is here to stay. When he asks Bathurst 'Since then, my Lord, on such a World we fall,/ What say you?' (ll. 79-80), he is actually insisting that there is no way but to submit to our fallen state and make the best use of it.

Thus, after his criticism of the Cottas, Pope begins to suggest workable norms through his supplication to Bathurst and through the portrait of the Man of Ross. First, Pope suggests the right way of using riches through his praise of Bathurst. In his supplication to Bathurst, Pope argues that the right way to use riches lies between the extremes—that is, between avarice and prodigality. For him, the first step towards it is to have

> The Sense to value Riches, with the Art
> T'enjoy them, and the Virtue to impart,
> Not meanly, nor ambitiously pursu'd,
> Not sunk by sloth, nor rais'd by servitude;
> To balance Fortune by a just expence,
> Join with Œconomy, Magnificence;
> With splendour, charity; with plenty, health; (ll. 219-225)

Pope supplicates Bathurst to teach this 'sense' and, in so doing, implies that the example of Bathurst is an achievable norm to counteract the wrong use of riches he criticised in the previous part of the poem. However, Bathurst is subjected to qualification as a model for the right use of riches. The first clue to this comes from the following lines:

> Oh teach us, BATHURST! yet unspoil'd by wealth!
> That secret rare, between th' extremes to move
> Of mad Good-nature, and of mean Self-love. (ll. 226-228)

The fact that Bathurst is '**yet** unspoil'd by wealth' (my emphasis) opens the way to the possibility that eventually he may also be spoiled by wealth. And when he praises Bathurst and Oxford for their charity—'Who copies Your's, or OXFORD's better part,/ To ease th' oppress'd, and raise the sinking heart?' (ll. 243-244)—the phrase 'better part' indicates that Pope is well aware of not only their virtue, but also their deficiency, which may in the end undermine their quality as a model for the right use of riches. Pope first suggests that the way to the right use of riches is the golden mean between two extremes, as exemplified by Bathurst. Yet, as he admits that the way to the golden mean is a 'rare secret', which is quite difficult to find and very difficult to uphold because of his recognition of the limitations of Bathurst, the validity of Pope's first suggestion of the workable norm is overtly undermined by himself. In these lines, Pope reveals that the golden mean between the extremes is not enough for this corrupt world, as he recognises that, to borrow Earl E. Wasserman's words, 'the moral virtues have no safeguard in themselves'.[50]

Pope's more viable suggestion of a workable norm is presented in the portrait of the Man of Ross, which follows Pope's supplication to Bathurst. Through the portrait of the Man of Ross, Pope shows us that, through Christ-like charity and renunciation of the self, we can arrive at the right use of riches that is beyond the danger of being spoiled by wealth.

Quite different from Bathurst's human and fallible quality, the life of the Man of Ross in his charitable deeds is shown by scriptural echoes to have been an *Imitatio Christi* which seems beyond the extent of human limitations. For example, the Man of Ross did not merely plant a grove of elm: he 'hung with woods yon mountain's sultry brow' (l. 253). His virtuous charity indeed seems to have had the power to raise inanimate nature to a human level. He did not merely build a local waterworks: 'From the dry rock' he 'bade the waters flow' (l. 254) like the miracle of Moses. Nor did he merely contribute to the building of a church steeple: he 'taught that heav'n directed spire to rise' (l. 261). Also he drove out the 'Quacks' and 'vile Attornies', thus was praised for his virtuous charity, as Christ drove out the money-changers from the temple and was greeted by children who exclaimed, 'Hosanna to the Son of David' (Matthew 21: 1-16). In this respect, the Man of Ross is described not as a mere human but as a Christ-like

[50]Earl E. Wasserman, p. 41.

figure: as Earl E. Wasserman argues, 'the essence of the wifeless, childless Man of the Ross's portrait has beneath the surface language references to Christ's life and miracles'[51]. Through the portrait of the Man of Ross, Pope suggests that only self-denying charity like that of the Man of Ross, who could do all his charity with only five hundred pounds a year, can be the real right way to use riches to arrive at happiness.

However, we can find irony in Pope's modulation of this portrait. The Man of Ross was a historically identifiable person named John Kyrl, and all Pope's description of the Man of Ross's charity is based on the historic deeds of this man.[52] Then why does Pope impose a God-like character upon the Man of Ross? Of course, by doing so, Pope makes this man the ideal paragon: yet this also makes his example unattainable for ordinary men. Even the example of Bathurst seems quite difficult for ordinary men to achieve as his golden mean is described as 'the secret rare'. Even though Pope can be sure of the incorruptibility of the Man of Ross by making him seem almost like Christ, as his suggestion for the right use of riches changes from praise of Bathurst to that of the Man of Ross, the chance of achieving it for mere mortals becomes rarer and rarer.

The ending of the poem, which comprises the satiric portraits of Villiers, Cutler, and Sir Balaam, also seems to undermine Pope's theory of charity as an achievable norm. Pope's surface purpose in ending this poem with satirical portraits seems to me to contrast the blessed life of the Man of Ross with the miserable ends of Villiers, Cutler, and Sir Balaam, who could not live charitable lives, thus emphasising the value of the Man of Ross as a norm. In the case of the portraits of Villiers and Cutler, I think that Pope serves this purpose well by describing their unworthy life and ensuing miserable death. However, it is my contention that the Sir Balaam story does contradict this purpose. By making Sir Balaam an overall emblem of the satirical portraits, Pope not only shows the devastating end of one whose life was subjected to the current corrupt monetary system: he also reveals how contemporary society is unlikely to follow his theory of charity.

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[51]Earl E. Wasserman, p. 42

[52]For the information about John Kyrl, see the notes in *Epistle to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, pp. 110-112, 250n, 253n, 254n, 259n, 263-4n, 265-6n, 268-70n, 271-4n, 279n, 280n. For more information and Pope's research on him for this poem, see Howard Erskine-Hill, *The Social Milieu of Alexander Pope*, pp. 15-41.

Sir Balaam's downfall is not from innocence, as Pope makes clear even from his choice of the name Balaam. As he was the man who cursed the Israelites because of the rewards offered to him (Num. 22: 6) and in another story was the man who was killed by the Israelites because he seduced the Israelites from their faith (Num. 31: 16),[53] Pope's choice of this name points us to his intention to present him as a corrupt and irreligious man. Also, when Pope describes him in the beginning of his portrait as 'Religious, punctual, frugal, and so forth;/ His word would pass for more than he was worth.' (ll. 343-344), we should notice Pope's delicate satire upon him. In the commercial world, where Balaam lives in the centre,[54] the degree to which one's credit ('word') exceeds his assets ('worth') is the established measure of success. The more he is esteemed in the capitalist world, the more his credit is greater than his real assets; so in the commercial world, Balaam is a 'respected' man. However, in the moral domain, a man's public reputation ('word') should be directly proportional to his private virtue ('worth'). Thus, these lines criticise 'the capitalistic standards as the inverse of the true ethical code' and show that, even though Balaam is a respected man in the commercial world, he is actually a hypocrite if we are to value him morally.[55] Contrary to Balaam, the Man of Ross proves his value not by words but by deeds, as James Engell notices:

> The Man of Ross helps to build a church and raise its steeple. But in the church he "Will never mark the marble with his Name." In fact, as Pope explains, his "true name was almost lost," and Pope had to write Jacob Tonson to ascertain "his Xtian and surname." By his virtuous works, and by the simple lines in the Parish Register, the Man of Ross is instead "prov'd, by the ends of being, to have been."[56]

Also, in the description that he was 'Religious, punctual, frugal, and so forth' (l. 343), the quality of words such as 'religious', 'punctual', and 'frugal' is undermined and slighted by the matter-of-fact implication of the phrase 'and so forth': this implies that Balaam regards these as merely expected virtues and thus reveals Pope's criticism that they are no deeper than merely fulfilling expectation.

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[53]For more details on the scriptural implication of the name Balaam, see Earl E. Wasserman, pp. 46-47.
[54]The fact that he lived near the Monument of the Fire of London indicates that he lived in the centre of the City, the representative of new capitalism.
[55]Earl E. Wasserman, p. 48.
[56]James Engell, pp. 440-441.

However, the disturbing fact is that, as the line 'The Devil was piqu'd such saintship to behold' (l. 349) suggests, the devil regards him as a saint and thus his enemy whom he must destroy. Of course, there is no trait in Balaam which can make him seem like a saint: his offerings to the poor, as indicated in the line 'His givings rare, save farthings to the poor' (l. 348), can hardly be called true charity. Behind the devil's regard for Balaam as a saint, there is Pope's sneer at this man's hypocritical charity. However, on the other hand, we should also recognise Pope's scepticism about so corrupt a society in which even Balaam's hypocritical charity can be regarded as saintly. This kind of painful recognition is supported by the fact that the process of Sir Balaam's downfall is not that of deviation from the ordinary social norm, but that of being absorbed into the usual social norm of the corrupt monetary system: after the devil makes him rich, 'Sir Balaam, now, he lives like other folks' (l. 357).

The rapid succession of the events which occurs during Sir Balaam's downfall—that is, his wife's sudden death, his ensuing marriage to a 'Nymph of Quality' (l. 385), the death of his son in a duel, the daughter's corruption, his wife's gambling, the indictment of him, and his death in just 20 lines (ll. 383-402)—makes Pope a calm observer of his downfall as a matter of course which is predicated on his rising once he is subsumed firmly into the monetary world. Indeed, the readers anticipate his downfall from the beginning and thus it does not come quite as a surprise. Yet, once we know the complicated implication of Balaam as a saint, we also should recognise Pope's unease about the downfall of Balaam and his fear of the society which can corrupt and destroy someone once he is involved in it. Thus, despite his effort to present a workable norm, which is itself unattainable, Pope reveals in the end of the poem that he and Bathurst are outnumbered by a society so corrupt that it is unlikely to follow his presented norm: they are, to borrow Paul J. Alpers's expression, 'the pained observers of a corrupt aristocracy and a middle class driven mad by gold'.[57]

2. *Epistle to Cobham* (first published in 1734) and *Epistle to a Lady* (first published in 1735)

*To Cobham* and *To a Lady* can be closely related to Epistle II of the *Essay on Man* in that they deal with the Ruling Passion as a means of overcoming human

[57]Paul J. Alpers, 'Pope's *To Bathurst* and the Mandevillian State', *ELH*, 25 (1958), 23-42 (p. 38).

inconsistency and contrariety. In Epistle II of the *Essay on Man*, the Ruling Passion is not only a means of overcoming this inconsistency, but also a means by which man arrives at virtue if 'our best principle [reason]', though it is 'at distance, and in prospect lie' (l. 72), is well grafted on it:

> Th' Eternal Art educing good from ill,
> Grafts on this Passion our best principle:
> 'Tis thus the Mercury of Man is fix'd,
> Strong grows the Virtue with his nature mix'd;
> The dross cements what else were too refin'd,
> And in one interest body acts with mind. (Epistle II, ll. 175-180)

However, in the *Essay*, though Pope shows that the Ruling Passion is a means to virtue, he does not show how this Ruling Passion can arrive at virtue through the assistance and the check of reason. He only shows that 'the surest Virtues thus from Passions shoot':

> As fruits ungrateful to the planter's care
> On savage stocks inserted learn to bear;
> The surest Virtues thus from Passions shoot,
> Wild Nature's vigor working at the root.
> What crops of wit and honesty appear
> From spleen, from obstinacy, hate, or fear!
> See anger, zeal and fortitude supply;
> Ev'n av'rice, prudence; sloth, philosophy;
> Lust, thro' some certain strainers well refin'd,
> Is gentle love, and charms all womankind:
> Envy, to which th' ignoble mind's a slave,
> Is emulation in the learn'd or brave:
> Nor Virtue, male or female, can we name,
> But what will grow on Pride, or grow on Shame. (Epistle II, ll. 181-194)

These lines are Pope's demonstration of his belief that the Ruling Passion, such as lust, envy, avarice or sloth, will be refined to a virtuous state: yet he does not show how these negative Ruling Passions will be so refined and thus contribute to virtue.

In this context, we can examine *To Cobham* and *To a Lady* to see how Pope deals with the Ruling Passion as a means to virtue. For me, what Pope chiefly does in *To Cobham* is to introduce the Ruling Passion as a means of understanding man's character despite his inconsistency and contrariety. Through this poem before the introduction of

the theory of the Ruling Passion, Pope criticises men's vain efforts to arrive at a lasting knowledge of human nature. Pope's realisation of the difficulty in achieving any viable knowledge of human nature is illustrated by his emphasis on the violent fluctuation of man's mental phenomena:

> Our depths who fathoms, or our shallows finds,
> Quick whirls, and shifting eddies, or our minds?
> Life's stream for Observation will not stay,
> It hurries all too fast to mark their way.
> In vain sedate reflections we wou'd make,
> When half our knowledge we must snatch, not take.
> On human actions reason tho' you can,
> It may be reason, but it is not man;
> His principle of action once explore,
> That instant 'tis his Principle no more.
> Like following life thro' creatures you dissect,
> You lose it in the moment you detect. (ll. 29-40)

The difficulty in understanding man is well illustrated here by Pope's emphasis on the ephemerality of that knowledge. This knowledge must be acquired in a hurry, should be 'snatched' rather than 'made', but the moment it is 'snatched', man's endless fluctuation makes that knowledge a thing of the past, thus invalid.

However hard we try to understand man, all our efforts prove wrong until we conceive the theory of the Ruling Passion. When we try to understand man through his actions as a guide to his motives, this proves a vain effort, because we tend to interpret 'what we chanc'd' as 'what we meant to do' (l. 54), and man's motives do not necessarily have any reasonable or predictable connection with his actions, as is demonstrated in the following lines:

> Behold! If Fortune or a Mistress frowns,
> Some plunge in bus'ness, others shave their crowns:
> To ease the Soul of one oppressive weight,
> This quits an Empire, that embroils a State:
> The same adust complexion has impell'd
> Charles to the Convent, Philip to the Field. (ll. 55-60)

However hard historians attribute exalted motives to persons of high social status, their efforts are ridiculed and dismissed by Pope when he observes that the motive for some consequential behaviour may indeed be trivial:

> Ask why from Britain Cæsar would retreat?
> Cæsar himself might whisper he was beat.
> Why risk the world's great empire for a Punk?
> Cæsar perhaps might answer he was drunk. (ll. 81-84)

Also, human opinion of others cannot be a way to arrive at any lasting knowledge of men, as Pope illustrates how human opinion is fickle and can rapidly change according to the shift of the situation, as in the example of Scoto:

> Ask men's Opinions: Scoto now shall tell
> How Trade increases, and the World goes well;
> Strike off his Pension, by the setting sun,
> And Britain, if not Europe, is undone. (ll. 158-161)

Thus, also as in the example of the one who is moral and grave but prefers 'a Rogue with Ven'son to a Saint Without' (l. 139), or Patritio who, with 'comprehensive head' saved all Europe but is incomprehensibly obsessed with cards ('Picquette') and gaming ('Bett') (ll. 130-145), most men are too puzzlingly inconsistent to allow an understanding of their characters.

When Pope compares man to 'a bird of passage' in the following lines,

> Know, God and Nature only are the same:
> In Man, the judgment shoots at flying game,
> A bird of passage! gone as soon as found,
> Now in the Moon perhaps, now under ground. (ll. 154-157)

he is demonstrating the difficulty of understanding man when his elusive character changes as fast as 'a bird of passage', as is marked by the repetition of the adverb 'now' between places as distant from each other as they could be. What Pope emphasises in this passage is, as Christopher Fox argues, man's ever fleetingly fluctuating nature in life's inexorable swiftness:

> the flying bird, of course, has long been a figure of the transient quality of all human life. "What, among the things which rush past," asks Aurelius, "can a man hold in high honor? It is as if one has vanished out of sight. Such indeed is life itself for every man." Pope's lines more than capture this same sense of the inexorable swiftness of life. His repetition in "*Now* in the Moon perhaps, *now* underground" seems to collapse the whole of man's journey through life into a few fleeting seconds. And the place of this swift passage (which ends "under ground") is suggested in Pope's reference to the "Moon," with its evocations of change and mutability, the whirls and eddies of the sublunary world.[58]

After demonstrating the difficulty of understanding man's character and the futility of the attempts which try to understand man through nature, actions, passion, and opinion, Pope introduces the Ruling Passion as a means of fixing man's inconsistency. In this poem, this utility of the Ruling Passion appears through Pope's quest to arrive, in a changeable world, at any lasting knowledge of the characters of men. For Pope, only the Ruling Passion enables men to be consistent in their seeming inconsistencies:

> Search then the Ruling Passion: There, alone,
> The Wild are constant, and the Cunning known;
> The Fool consistent, and the False sincere;
> Priests, Princes, Women, no dissemblers here.
> This clue once found, unravels all the rest,
> The prospect clears, and Wharton stands confest. (ll. 174-179)

The Ruling Passion, in Pope's view, is the only consistent quality man maintains throughout his changeable life. If we are to attempt any lasting estimate of a man's character, we must therefore know him by it.

However, this poem does not go any further beyond the introduction of the Ruling Passion. All this poem does is to demonstrate its utility as a means of understanding man's character. If we interpret this poem as a part of the Opus Magnum plan, neither the *Essay on Man* nor this poem verifies Pope's argument about the relationship between the Ruling Passion and virtue, or the quest for it.

[58]Christopher Fox, '"Gone as Soon as Found": Pope's "Epistle to Cobham" and the Death-Day as Moment of Truth', *SEL*, 20 (1980), 431-448 (p. 445).

Also, it is my contention that this poem is flawed as a satire as well. As this poem concerns the Ruling Passion, to be a proper satire there should be some kind of moral implication in Pope's discussion of it. However, in this poem, we cannot find any serious moral accusation or expostulation in his discussion of the Ruling Passion. Of course, the Duke of Wharton is portrayed negatively immediately after the introduction of the Ruling Passion. Wharton is presented as a man whose Ruling Passion, the 'Lust of Praise' (l. 181), has driven him to be 'the scorn and wonder' (l. 180) of his days and to die a 'sad out-cast of each church and state' (l. 204). When John E. Sitter comments on the portrait of Wharton as follows, he interprets that Pope's description of Wharton's Ruling Passion has a moral dimension:

> The goal of such knowledge is not able to gloat over Wharton, whose problem is not that he *has* a ruling passion but his failure to understand that "same spirit" with which he adores and whores (188-189). His is a failure of self-knowledge, since with both eyes on the audience ("Enough if all around him but admire") Wharton makes no attempt to view his own life.[59]

However, we cannot find any accusation of Pope's which points to Wharton's lack of self-knowledge in his portrait. Pope's portrait of him is concentrated on how his fluctuating and flagitious behaviour can be explained to be consistent by his Ruling Passion. We should understand that Wharton is described here as having behaved iniquitously because of his Ruling Passion, not because he lacks the understanding of his Ruling Passion. As there is no mention of the possibility of man's control over his Ruling Passion, Wharton stands innocent as far as the Ruling Passion theory is concerned.

The lack of a moral implication in conjunction with the Ruling Passion becomes more apparent when Pope introduces seven miniature portraits after Wharton's portrait. When he introduces the portraits of 'a reverend sire', 'Helluo', 'Crone', 'Narcissa', 'the Courtier', and 'Euclio', his purpose is not to implicate them morally in connection with the Ruling Passion, but to demonstrate that their Ruling Passions—lust, gluttony, parsimony, love of luxury, obedience, and avarice—are best shown on their death-beds, demonstrating that this is the most appropriate moment to understand a person's

[59]John E. Sitter, 'The Argument of Pope's *Epistle to Cobham*', *SEL*, 17 (1977), 435-449 (p. 445).

character.[60] These six portraits may be called satiric, because they show men's negative Ruling Passions. However, as far as the Ruling Passion is concerned, they are not morally responsible, because they are negative just because they happen to have negative Ruling Passions. Likewise, even though Cobham is praised for his patriotism in the last lines of the poem as follows,

> And you! brave COBHAM, to the latest breath
> Shall feel your ruling passion strong in death:
> Such in those moments as in all the past,
> "Oh, save my Country, Heav'n!" shall be your last. (ll. 262-265)

Pope's portrait of him does not show any hint which indicates that his patriotism is due to his efforts to improve on his Ruling Passion: Cobham is also described here as a man who just happens to possess patriotism as his Ruling Passion.

As Pope's portrait of Cobham is presented in contrast to the previous satiric portraits, it can be regarded as a praise of virtue in the bi-partite structure format of satire. Yet, as his criticism of the previous portraits lacks a firm moral ground, his invocation of virtue cannot have any impact. This lack of connection between any moral implication and the Ruling Passion makes this poem satirically under-achieved. If Pope is to criticise man seriously, he should demonstrate that man is responsible for his own moral depravity. However, in this poem, man needs not have any responsibility for his moral depravity, as he is described as being swayed by the Ruling Passion while Pope fails to suggest any way in which man can make 'prudence' from 'avarice', 'philosophy' from 'sloth' (*Essay on Man*, Epistle II, l. 188). If we are to find the Ruling Passion theory developed in any moral direction, we should turn to the *Epistle to a Lady*.

In *To a Lady*, which concerns the characters of women, we can find a more satiric pattern than in *To Cobham*. In *To Cobham*, Pope's efforts are concentrated on how to find a consistent knowledge of man despite his ever-changing inconsistency. However, even though *To a Lady* also concerns our understanding of women's characters despite

[60]The notion that the character of a man can be best understood on his death-bed was not Pope's original thought. This notion was widely believed, as several modern writers such as Montaigne and Phillippe Ariés as well as classical authors such as Suetonius, Tacitus, and Plutarch mentioned it. For more information, see Christopher Fox, pp. 433-443.

their inconsistency, Pope does not try to impose consistency on every woman. Rather, he divides women into the ones who are inconsistent and forever fickle, and his addressee Martha Blount who is consistent.

Thus, in *To a Lady*, we can find a rather typical pattern of bi-partite structure: almost two thirds of this poem consists of Pope's attacks on women's moral depravity through the presentation of their portraits; and directly contrary to these portraits, at the end of the poem, there appears Pope's praise of the ideal woman, Martha Blount. The constitutive difference between other women and Martha Blount is consistency. Unlike Martha Blount's *semper eadem*, as we shall see later, Pope's other women have no consistency at all. For Pope, women are so changeable that it is impossible for them 'a lasting mark to bear' (l. 3): therefore, if a painter wants to draw a woman, he should 'Chuse a firm Cloud, before it fall, and in it/ Catch, ere she change, the Cynthia of this minute' (ll. 19-20). As this painting metaphor shows, to understand women's character is described as an impossible task because of their ever-changing nature, as to 'Chuse a firm Cloud' is naturally impossible.

In the early part of these portraits, woman's lack of consistency seems to be a subject of only light-hearted raillery. In the portrait of Rufa (ll. 21-23), Silia (ll. 29-36), Papillia (ll. 37-40), Pope's description of these women's inconsistency does not carry the serious accusation of their moral responsibility resulting from their inconsistency: of course, we recognise their inconsistency as a fault, but, as Thomas A. Stumpf argues, there seems to be a kind of indulgent attitude towards them in their not-so-harmful fickleness:

> In a couplet like "Whether the Charmer sinner it, or saint it,/ If Folly grows romantic, I must paint it" (15-16), the speaker manages—with his almost burlesque rhymes and the slang expressions "sinner it" and "saint it"—to convey the impression that female folly is a fairly weightless thing altogether, that whatever there is of it is pretty well submerged by female charm.[61]

This kind attitude on the part of the poet, however, changes as the poem goes on. As the object of the poet's criticism changes from socially insignificant or fictitious

[61]Thomas A. Stumpf, 'Pope's *To Cobham*, *To a Lady*, and the Traditions of Inconstancy', *SP*, 67 (1970), 339-358 (p. 355).

women to socially influential duchesses, princesses, or queen, Pope's attack on these women's inconsistency implies more and more a moral tone. When we come to Narcissa who 'to make a wash would hardly stew a child' (l. 54), the playfulness of tone has disappeared. As is seen in the following lines, Narcissa's sudden change between religious devotion and philistine behaviour implies not only her inconsistent behaviour but her profanity, a moral collapse resulting from it:

> Now deep in Taylor and the Book of Martyrs,
> Now drinking citron with his Grace and Chartres.
> Now Conscience chills her, and now Passion burns:
> And Atheism and Religion take their turns;
> A very Heathen in the carnal part,
> Yet still a sad, good Christian at her heart. (ll. 63-68)

Similarly, Philomedé's portrait is also charged with Pope's accusation of her immorality. As she fluctuates from 'a teeming Mistress' to 'a barren Bride' (l. 72), and 'in another fit/ sins with Poets thro' pure Love of Wit' (ll. 75-76), her inconsistency is closely connected with her moral corruption, adultery and infidelity, as the verb 'sins' suggests. When it comes to Atossa, her violent inconsistency—'Scarce once herself, by turns all Womankind' (l. 116), which makes 'all her life one warfare upon earth' (l. 118)—has devastating effects not only upon others but also upon herself:

> Strange! by the Means defeated of the Ends,
> By Spirit robb'd of Pow'r, by Warmth of Friends,
> By Wealth of Follow'rs! without one distress
> Sick of herself thro' very selfishness!
> Atossa, curs'd with ev'ry granted pray'r,
> Childless with all her children, wants an Heir. (ll. 143-148)

Cloe's portrait seems to be different from the others', for at first sight she may seem an example of consistency, not of inconsistency.[62] When she is described as follows,

> "Yet Cloe sure was form'd without a spot—"

[62]Cloe's portrait was added at the 'death-bed' edition, thus does not qualify as an early example of Pope's satire. See, *Epistles to Several Persons*, ed. by F. W. Bateson, pp. 38-42. Yet I decide to include the discussion of her portrait, for Pope shows another kind of inconsistency in women, which may supplement the moral implication in the portraits of other women.

Nature in her then err'd not, but forgot.
"With ev'ry pleasing, ev'ry prudent part,
"Say, what can Cloe want?"—she wants a Heart. (ll. 157-160)

the interlocutor suggests that she is a consistent woman, as his or her repetition of the word 'every' suggests. However, even though she does not exhibit the ceaseless irrational change of character which the others do, she is far from consistent. Her inconsistency comes from her lack of heart, her loving care for others, resulting in the inconsistency between the outer nicety and the inner apathy towards others. When she is described as 'So very reasonable, so unmov'd,/ As never yet to love, or to be lov'd' (ll. 165-166), this inconsistency of hers does not seem to have any moral implication. But later as she is described as

Of all her Dears she never slander'd one,
But cares not if a thousand are undone.
Would Cloe know if you're alive or dead?
She bids her Footman put it in her head. (ll. 175-178)

her inner apathy is presented in startling contrast with her outer nicety. When she is described as ordering her footman to remind her of the death of a friend, her nicety is no longer presented as a positive quality: rather, it highlights her inner apathy. Thus, through a stark contrast between her inner and outer qualities, Pope's criticism of her moral depravity is presented, the total lack of the concern for other people resulting from, to borrow Rebecca P. Parkin's expression, her 'egocentric absorption'.[63]

At the end of these satiric portraits of women's inconsistencies, Pope presents the Ruling Passions, the love of pleasure and the love of sway, which enable us to understand women's characters in their mutability. However, in this poem, Pope seems to use his theory of the Ruling Passion to a very different purpose. Quite differently from Epistle II of the *Essay on Man* and *To Cobham*, Pope does not describe women's Ruling Passions as positive or neutral, even though they provide us with consistency in women's character, when he describes how women lead worthless lives through their pursuit of the Ruling Passions:

[63]Rebecca P. Parkin, 'The Role of Time in Alexander Pope's *Epistle to a Lady*', *ELH*, 32 (1965), 490-501 (p. 499).

Yet mark the fate of a whole Sex of Queens!
Pow'r all their end, but Beauty all the means.
In Youth they conquer with so wild a rage,
As leaves them scarce a Subject in their Age:
For foreign glory, foreign joy, they roam;
No thought of Peace or Happiness at home.
But Wisdom's Triumph is well-tim'd Retreat,
As hard a science to the Fair as Great!
Beauties, like Tyrants, old and friendless grown,
Yet hate Repose, and dread to be alone,
Worn out in public, weary ev'ry eye,
Nor leave one sigh behind them when they die. (ll. 219-230)

As we have seen in the *Essay on Man*, the two important functions of the Ruling Passion are to give our lives consistency and to enable us to arrive at virtue with the help of reason. However, in this poem, Pope presents only one of these functions; and instead of presenting the other function Pope only demonstrates how the Ruling Passions of women lead them onto a miserable and devastating end:

See how the World its Veterans rewards!
A Youth of frolicks, an old Age of Cards,
Fair to no purpose, artful to no end,
Young without Lovers, old without a Friend,
A Fop their Passion, but their Prize a Sot,
Alive, ridiculous, and dead, forgot! (ll. 243-248)

Pope's use of the Ruling Passion for a different purpose becomes more explicit when Pope praises Martha Blount as an ideal woman at the end of the poem. As we shall see later, Pope's ideal woman, an achievable norm in the bi-partite structure, is not built upon her Ruling Passion. Instead, Martha Blount is an ideal woman through the renunciation of her Ruling Passions—that is, as a woman, the love of sway and the love of pleasure.

Martha Blount's charm as an ideal woman rises from her *semper eadem* as we can see in the word 'Temper' when Pope praises her as the one who is 'blest with Temper, whose unclouded ray/ Can make to morrow chearful as to day' (ll. 257-258). For Pope, her even temper, thus her consistency, is what makes her an ideal woman,

because as Taylor Corse argues, 'in a universe where everything is subject to change, an even "Temper" assures some measure of stability and continuity. A Blessing in itself and a blessing to others, it "Can make to morrow chearful as to day."'[64] In maintaining her even temper, one of her strong merits is her renunciation of the love of sway, thus her renunciation of one of her Ruling Passions as a woman, which leads to her submission to men:

> She, who ne'er answers till a Husband cools,
> Or, if she rules him, never shows she rules;
> Charms by accepting, by submitting sways,
> Yet has her humour most, when she obeys; (ll. 261-264)

Of course, her renunciation of the love of sway does not mean blind obedience. What Pope emphasises here is her wisdom: as she renounces other women's purposeless desire for power which results in misery for them and others, Martha Blount is described as ruling by submitting wisely, thus not causing any unhappiness for her and the other people.[65] Similarly, the following couplet implies her renunciation of the love of pleasure, the other Ruling Passion of women: 'Let Fops or Fortune fly which way they will;/ Disdains all loss of Tickets, or Codille;' (ll. 265-266). In this sense, it is very appropriate for Martha Blount to be compared to the moon:

> So when the Sun's broad beam has tir'd the sight,
> All mild ascends the Moon's more sober light,
> Serene in Virgin Modesty she shines,
> And unobserv'd the glaring Orb declines. (ll. 253-256)

When we compare the sun with the moon, we relate things flashy and masculine to the sun, and less showy and feminine to the moon. In one respect, the moon has the definite advantage over the sun, in that it is more consistent, whereas the sun not only gives life to nature but also sometimes takes it away by burning up everything. Thus, when Martha

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[64]Taylor Corse, 'Heaven's "Last Best Work": Pope's "Epistle to a Lady"', *SEL*, 27 (1987), 414-421 (p. 420).

[65]It is not surprising that this argument which prizes women's wise submission attracts feminist readings of the poem. For feminist approaches to this poem, see Felicity A. Nussbaum, 'Pope's "To a Lady" and the Eighteenth-Century Woman', *PQ*, 54 (1975), 444-456, Ellen M. Pollack, 'Pope and Sexual Difference: Women as Part and Counterpart in the "Epistle to a Lady"', *SEL*, 24 (1984), 461-481.

Blount is revered for her even and mild temper, she must be compared to the moon, the less showy but more even and milder. Thus, while the woman who wants to dazzle all day is a sun who 'Flaunts and goes down, an unregarded thing' (l. 252), Martha Blount is a moon who shines 'Serene in Virgin Modesty' (l. 255).[66] Also as Rebecca P. Parkin points out, comparing her to the moon implies the identification of her with Diana, the goddess of chastity: the most appropriate praise for her as a virgin .[67]

However, the question is, can Martha Blount be regarded as a viable norm for other women? Though she is an ideal woman for Pope, his way of idealising Martha Blount makes her an impossibility in the real world. We should recognise that Martha Blount becomes Pope's ideal woman only through her renunciation of women's characteristic Ruling Passions. As the phrases 'a softer Man' (l. 272) and 'exception to all gen'ral rules' (l. 275) imply, it should be understood that Martha Blount is a very rare, exceptional woman who has nothing in common with the rest of her sex. She can even be regarded as unnatural, a neutral sex who is between man and woman, as Pope idealises her only by exonerating her from most characteristics of her sex. In this respect, for the women who are criticised for their pursuit of the Ruling Passions, there seems to be no way out, for, as Felicity A. Nussbaum points out, 'the unexampled portrait of Martha Blount does not ease or negate the moral earnestness of the earlier portraits; it intensifies the disdain the narrator affects toward the sex':[68] there is no viable choice left to them between being damned for being a woman and not to be a woman.

As a part of Pope's Opus Magnum plan, this poem does not contribute to the Ruling Passion theory, if it does not undermine it, because in this poem Pope uses the Ruling Passion to attack women in general, instead of showing how this Ruling Passion can be improved upon to enable women to arrive at the virtuous life. As a satire, even though Pope does provide a bi-partite structure in this poem, this structure is very frail, as

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[66]It is worth noticing that Pope compared Belinda, in *The Rape of the Lock*, to the sun in Canto II: 'Bright as the Sun, her Eyes the Gazers strike,/ And, like the Sun, they shine on all alike.'(Canto II, ll. 13-14) Even though comparing her eyes to the sun is not inherently condemnatory, it proves to be quite an appropriate comparison, considering her unreasonable behaviour in rejecting Clarissa's counsel in Canto V. The quotation is from *The Rape of the Lock and Other Poems*, ed. by Geoffrey Tillotson, Volume II, *The Twickenham Edition of the Poems of Alexander Pope*, 3rd edn. (London: Methuen, 1962; repr. London: Routledge, 1993).
[67]Rebecca P. Parkin, p. 501.
[68]Felicity A. Nussbaum, p. 453.

Pope's presentation of the ideal woman cannot provide all women with a viable option to follow.

Then, we should understand that, in the epistles to several persons, Pope's attempts to enhance the reformative function of his satire is not successful. Of course, we cannot deny that the poems contain elements of such a function, as he employs the bi-partite structure through which he presents a supposedly workable norm. Yet, as this workable norm is undermined consciously by Pope himself, as in *To Burlington*, or subconsciously by the poem's own logic, we must conclude that Pope's satires are not so successful, to borrow Seidel's phrase, as a means of escaping from the perceived crisis.

III

The bi-partite structure, which indicates a satirist's active attempt to resolve crisis, is a pattern not found in Swift's verse satire. However, the absence of this structure cannot be construed as Swift's resignation to inescapable reality, because, as I have argued earlier, a satirist's adoption of this structure is only one means, even though quite an active one, of resolving crisis.

If we turn to another apparatus, we can understand that Swift attempted to resolve crisis in his early satires in his own way. The hint of this apparatus comes, I believe, from his later satire, *The Legion Club*, which I have discussed in chapter I. One of the distinctive characteristics of this poem is Swift's burst of anger towards his satiric butts. In a way, we can regard this burst of anger as uncontrolled, because it does not have any purpose but to be immersed in surrogate punishment of his enemies in his imagination which he cannot inflict in reality, as can be seen in the following lines:

> Could I from the building's top
> Hear the rattling thunder drop,
> While the devil upon the roof,
> If the devil be thunder-proof,
> Should with poker fiery red
> Crack the stones, and melt the lead;
> Drive them down on every skull,
> While the den of thieves is full, (ll. 21-28)

This detailed graphic description of punishment which Swift wants to inflict on his victims is very different from making them ashamed of their behaviour. Swift does not explain why they deserve to be chastised and does not skilfully relate their shame to their actual vices. What concerns Swift in these lines, is to inflict as much punishment and pain as possible on his satiric butts in his literary world, thus to reason with them has no place in his almost sadistic desire. As he later admits that 'Though 'tis hopeless to reclaim them,/ Scorpion rods perhaps may tame them.' (ll. 157-158), he regards his satiric butts and the world in which they live as incorrigible, thus his focus is firmly on the symbolic castigation of them in his own world, which is his satire. I mention the world as well as his satiric butts, because the main focus of this poem is on his own inner satisfaction or maybe that of some small coterie which already shares his opinion, not on the larger body of neutral readers. For it to be regarded as Swift's effort to persuade a more general readership to his side, this poem is too full of diatribe against his victims; and its demonstration of his sadistic desire without much justification for his attack is likely to put off neutral readers instead of persuading them.[69] In this respect, we cannot find any hint of the satirist's control of his emotion here:[70] if we accept Dryden's argument in the *Discourse* that there is 'a vast difference betwixt the slovenly Butchering of a Man, and the fineness of a stroak that separates the Head from the Body, and leaves it standing in its place' (*Discourse*, p. 71), this poem surely belongs to the former category, which cannot have much impact on the readers other than inducing repulsion from them. Hence, the importance of the satirist's control of his emotion.

At this point, it is very helpful to an understanding of the importance of controlled passion for us to look into Edward Bloom's argument concerning it in his article 'Apotropaic Visions: Tone and Meaning in Neoclassical Satire'. In this article, discussing the various ways in which a satire makes an impact on the readers, he explains how satiric laughter alone can work to a positive effect, in other words, how satire can be constructive without suggesting any achievable norm:

> For some satirists, then, laughter is analogous to propitiatory sacrifice: it is an instrument of vicarious disintegration by which the discomfiture (if not indeed

[69] I explained what I mean by neutral readers in my discussion of the poem in chapter 1, p. 41, n. 43.
[70] I also discussed two kinds of control operating in this poem (the one rhetorical which is maintained throughout the poem and the other emotional which gets out of control sometimes) in chapter 1, p. 42, n. 44.

> the destruction) of a scapegoat paradoxically reintegrates a community fragmented by shame and guilt. . . . The scapegoat becomes an agent of transference onto whose person are concentrated whatever threaten totemic well-being and health. Comparably the butt of satire may have a surrogate duty as a convenient receptacle for the expulsion of social vice or folly. His availability is perhaps an acknowledgment of man's sadistic instincts, but it is equally a source of therapeutic transference. Very much as the patient is said to benefit from an apotropaic relationship with his analyst—the tendency of the doctor to share the parent's suffering—the reader transfers his own sense of inadequacy to a proximate satiric target. Instead of being whipped he places himself in the role of the whipper.[71]

In this paragraph, he argues that satire can be constructive by destroying its target by means of satiric laughter, which transfers society's guilt to its target and transforms the readers from passive by-standers to active participants in purging the vice and folly of society. In other words, satire can be constructive in its destroying process. We do not need to construe this satiric laughter as its narrow definition—that is, the laughter which comes from a satirist's mild raillery: as a satirist can have a vast range of feeling towards his victims, ranging from a mild frown to rage, his satire also can induce a wide spectrum of emotion in the readers. In this respect, we need to understand this satiric laughter as a more general concept, such as the emotion induced in the readers orchestrated by the satirist's intention. However, whatever kind of emotion a satirist has towards his satiric butt, for Edward Bloom there is a prerequisite for a satire to be successfully constructive, which is the satirist's rational control of his emotion. When he explains a satirist's passions such as indignation, rage, and fury, he emphasises the satirist's control of emotion which enables his passion to have any constructive power:

> The feeling intimated by a Savage is at least partially one of indignation, and in the evocations of Swift, Johnson, and Juvenal a heightening of indignation into rage. The difference is essentially one of degree. Rage, virtually physical in its concentration, is an emotion more compelling than indignation, but both alike are actuated by a moral anger and pity which bring us to the edge of tragedy. In the Aristotelian idiom pity is an ameliorating, median faculty that underscores the tragic. For Hobbes, who built upon this concept, pity extends the affective limits of indignation so that the two passions are combined in the single one of fury. But call it indignation or rage or fury, the passion in successful satire is never permitted to slip from the author's rational control. . . .

[71]Edward Bloom, 'Apotropaic Visions: Tone and Meaning in Neoclassical Satire', *HLQ*, 38 (1974-75), 35-52 (p. 40).

> When well used in satire, indignation, whatever its thermal degree, serves as moral cautery, a figurative, linguistic resource that can embrace extremes of feeling without doing violence to the creative design. Heightened indignation, for example, implies an exceptional overflow of emotion. Within the metaphoric frame of the satire, nevertheless, emotional eruption may be contained; it may be made to approximate outraged sensibility and yet remain accessible to rational judgment. (pp. 45-46)

As noted in phrases such as the 'creative design' and the 'metaphoric frame of satire', what is repeatedly emphasised here is the satirist's guiding control of reason over his emotion: even though he writes satire from his indignation about some situation, he also should utilise this emotion if he wants to appeal to the readers to correct the situation to his liking. In this respect, in a successful satire, a satirist's emotion is not only its source, but also the main device for a satirist in orchestrating some desired response from the readers. If a satirist fails to utilise his emotion and rather is consumed by it, his satire fails to be constructive, as Edward Bloom explains:

> Controlled passion is dramatic, and it is calculated to make aesthetic and moral demands of the reader far in excess of more temperate forms of address. The satirist may give the impression of unburdening himself to an auditor whose good will he esteems and whose sympathies he would like to enlist. Often seeking to impart a sense of the personal worth he attaches to his cause, the satirist also undertakes to win over an audience by deliberately titillating mind and imagination. When control is faulty, however, the stated violence of satiric feeling may be construed as irrational hyperbole, or even as invective. Not all satirists enjoy a talent for control that will make their work emerge as anything other than diatribe. (p. 46)

I concur with his argument about a satirist's control of his emotion, which will lead us to our discussion of Swift's early poems. When Edward Bloom quotes from John Oldham's *Upon a Printer* as an example of a satirist's sadistic scourge of his victim, we can find a significant similarity between these lines and the lines from Swift's own *Legion Club* which I discussed above:

> strait to Thrusts I go,
> And pointed Satyr runs him through and through. . . .
> Torn, mangled, and expos'd to Scorn and Shame,

I mean to hang, and gibbet up thy Name.[72] (ll. 37-38, 43-44)

In these lines as well as those from *The Legion Club*, the satirist's desire to inflict torture on his victim overpowers his supposed control over the emotion. We as the readers do not know why this satiric butt is being abused in the satirist's imagination, because we are given nothing but the description of the satirist's torture of the victim. Thus, despite their violent images and imaginative torture of the victim, these satires have to be interpreted as a failure in two respects. First, as the punishment of its victim becomes the end not the means, they fail to effect any change not only in the victims, but also in the readers, who can be put off and thus biased against the satirist's intention by their suspicion of the satirist's sadistic desire; secondly, they also fail to inflict any damage outside the poems on their victims, as their victims come to evoke the sympathy, not the antagonism, of the readers.

In this respect, we must notice two relationships a satirist should keep in mind in writing satire. As satire belongs to the public domain, the satirist's relationship with his audience should be taken into account as well as the relationship with his satiric butt. The satirist may or may not be able to reform his victim, but he should have a constructive effect on his audience. As Edward Bloom remarks, a satirist depends on the 'good will and sympathy' of his audience to justify the *raison d'être* of his satire. We can assume that a satirist writes for a neutral audience whom he must take to his side: thus he should not take the sympathy of the audience for granted. He may regard the satiric butt as totally vicious and incorrigible, and thus punish him as much as he can in his satire: but to be constructive, he should explain or insinuate to the readers, who maybe are not aware of the whole situation, why his victim deserves to be treated in that way. If he estranges the audience by a sadistic and desperate attack upon his victim, the *raison d'être* of his satire is lost. To be constructive, a satirist should control his passion by regulating and modifying it to persuade the neutral audience. Keeping this fact in mind, in interpreting Swift's early satires, we can utilise this idea of controlled emotion as a critical apparatus to provide a point of comparison with his later satires: for it is my contention that, unlike *The Legion Club*, his early satires do show some form of controlled emotion which has an eye on the persuasion of the audience.

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[72]*The Composition in Prose and Verse of Mr. John Oldham*, 3 vols. (London, 1770), II, pp. 104-106.

1. *Toland's Invitation to Dismal to Dine with the Calves' Head Club* (published in 1712) and *The First Ode of the Second Book of Horace Paraphrased and Addressed to Richard Steele, Esq.* (published in 1714)

In examining Swift's early satires, we can find the clearest examples of aesthetic (and emotional) control in his poems which loosely imitate Horace. This literary mode of imitation can provide a satirist with a means of modulating his antagonism towards his satiric butts. Whether he repeats the theme of the original, or deliberately contradicts it to undermine his satiric object, the original is there, waiting to be rendered to the purpose of its imitator. In a way, finding an apt precedent which can be tailored to his own purpose itself indicates the writer's deliberation, which thus necessitates a degree of control. Thereby, an act of imitation should guarantee some kind of participation of reason on the part of the imitator, for he needs to refer to the original in the writing of his imitation. Of course, the imitator does not have to be subservient to the original: he can actively utilise it ruthlessly to his own purpose. It is my contention that Swift demonstrates this kind of control to the readers in his imitations of Horace's Epistle I. 5 and Ode II. 1, using the non-satiric original as a basis for the moral implication of his satire.

Horace's Epistle I. 5, which is the original of *Toland's Invitation to Dismal*, is not at all a satiric piece: its theme is Horace's invitation of his friend Torquatus to a harmless and carefree evening, which would be accompanied by decent food, good wine, and respectable guests, thus a celebration of a long-lasting, true friendship. However, when Swift imitates this poem, contextualising Horace's invitation of Torquatus to Toland's invitation of Dismal (the Earl of Nottingham), the theme of the original is completely transformed to Swift's own purpose, that is, the accusation of the Whigs.[73] Being written

[73]'Toland, John (1670-1722), deist; . . . published *Christianity not Mysterious* (1696), the first act of warfare between the deists and the orthodox; returned to Ireland, 1697; coupled with Locke as a Socinian, and denounced from the pulpit, his book ordered to be burnt by the House of Commons, and himself arrested; retreated to England; . . . wrote *Vindicius Liberius*, and recanted his former opinions; . . . wrote pamphlets against Sacheverell and Jacobitism, and the *Art of Restoring* (1714), accusing Oxford of intending to play the role of Monck;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. For Swift's detest of free-thinking and reason for it, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works and the Age*, II, p. 589.

'Finch, Daniel, second earl of Nottingham and sixth of Winchilsea (1647-1730), statesman; . . . after the flight of James II proposed a regency and opposed the motion declaring the throne vacant; obtained modification of oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and accepted the Revolution; secretary of

for a highly charged situation, this poem demonstrates how Swift's excited feeling can be transformed to a well ordered piece of work through an act of imitation.[74]

Swift insinuates the moral implication in the act of Toland's invitation of Dismal right from the opening lines of the poem. Unlike Horace's hearty invitation of Torquatus to an evening of simple pleasure,

> Si potes Archiacis conviva recumbere lectis
> nec modica cenare times holus omne patella,
> supremo te sole domi, Torquate, manebo. . . .
> mitte levis spes et certamina divitiarum
> et Moschi causam: cras nato Caesare festus
> dat veniam somnumque dies; impune licebit
> aestivam sermone benigno tendere noctem.[75] (ll. 1-3, 8-11)

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state, 1689-93; carried the Toleration Act; . . . throughout the reign of Anne was active as the head of high-church Tories, and (1711) carried an act of forbidding the occasional conformity of Dissenters; opposed preliminaries of peace with France, 1711;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. We can find Swift's anger at Nottingham in his *Journal* entry for 5 December 1711: 'Lord Nottingham, a famous Tory and speech-maker, is gone over to the Whig side: they treat him daily, and Lord Wharton says, It is *Dismal* (as they call him from his looks) will save England at last.', *Swift: Journal to Stella*, ed. by Harold Williams, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1948), II, p. 430.

Prompted by Nottingham's defection to the Whigs for his opposition to the peace proposed by the Tory ministry, this poem can be said to be a companion piece to *An Excellent New Song* (1711), in which Swift speaks in the person of Nottingham and thus ironically criticises him for his stance against the peace-process, claiming that his defection is due to his greed:

> Now my new benefactors have brought me about,
> And I'll vote against peace, with Spain, or without:
> Though the court gives my nephews, and brothers, and cousins,
> And all my whole family, places by dozens;
> Yet since I know where a full purse may be found,
> And hardly pay eighteen pence tax in the pound:
> Since the Tories have thus disappointed my hopes,
> And will neither regard my figures nor tropes;
> I'll speech against peace while Dismal's my name,
> And be a true Whig, while I am not in game. (ll. 45-54)

[74]'During the critical period at the end of 1711, the [Tory] ministry had begun negotiations with France for a peace to end the ten-year-old war. The Whigs, however, opposed to the peace for many reasons, one of the most powerful being the threat of a Stuart restoration. In the fall of 1711, Nottingham, then a Tory, deserted to the Whig side because of his fanatical allegiance to high Church causes, promising to vote against the peace in return for Whig support to defeat the Occasional Conformity bill then coming before Parliament. . . . Nottingham was influential enough so that his conversion threatened an anti-administration vote on the peace question in the House of Lords. Despite an assured Tory majority in Commons, the highly-charged situation was not resolved until the end of December when the Queen, in an unprecedented move, created twelve new lords, finally guaranteeing the necessary votes to defeat the Whigs. . . . In the early months of 1712, the complicated peace negotiations with the European powers continued, accompanied by constant harassment from the Whigs.', from Noel D. Sterne, 'Jonathan Swift's Imitations of Horace' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 1969), pp. 169-171. As it was published on 1 July 1712, this poem can be understood to be intended to rally public opinion to the support of the Tory government.

(If you can recline at my table on couches made by Archias, and are not afraid of "a dinner of herbs" only, from a modest dish, I shall expect you, Torquatus, at my house at sunset. . . . Dismiss airy hopes and the struggle for wealth, and Moschus's cause. To-morrow, the festal day of Caesar's birth, gives excuse for sleeping late; without penalty shall we be free to prolong the summer night in genial converse.)

the purpose of Toland's invitation of Dismal is to discuss the treason, which stems from their Republican ideal that justifies regicide:

Tomorrow we our mystic feast prepare,
Where thou, our latest proselyte, shalt share:
When we, by proper signs and symbols tell,
How, by brave hands, the royal traitor fell;
The meat shall represent the tyrant's head,
The wine, his blood, our predecessors shed:
Whilst an alluding hymn some artist sings,
We toast confusion to the race of kings:
At monarchy we nobly show our spite,
And talk what fools call treason all the night. (ll. 7-16)

The hint of treason alone is enough to make the Calves' Head Club and Nottingham morally reprehensible: yet Swift's charge does not cease there, as these lines are tinctured with the insinuation of impiety, or even blasphemy. As Peter J. Schakel rightly points out, there is a hint of religious significance in the wording of the original which Horace uses for the meal to which he is inviting Torquatus, as 'patella' has as its second meaning 'a vessel used in sacrifices, an offering dish'.[76] Swift adopts this religious overtone in the original to criticise his satiric butts: as words such as 'mystic feast' and 'proselyte' imply, what Toland invites Nottingham to is a mock-Mass whose rites are for the

[75] Swift invites the readers to compare the non-satiric original with his satiric rendering, thus to grasp his criticism of his satiric butts in this poem as well as in *The First Ode of the Second Book of Horace Paraphrased and Addressed to Richard Steele, Esq.* Even though he did not provide the full Latin text like Pope—in *Toland's Invitation to Dismal*, the Latin text was provided as footnote except lines 4-7 and 12-15 for which there is no equivalent in Swift, and in *To Steele*, he provided as a footnote some Latin texts which bear some direct allusion to his imitation—it was enough for the readers to be reminded of the existence of the original. Thus, it was possible for some contemporary readers who were conversant with the Latin original to compare Swift's imitation with the full Latin text of their own. The Latin text and translation provided are from *Horace: Satires, Epistles, Ars Poetica*, trans. by H. R. Fairclough, *The Loeb Classical Library* and from *Horace: The Odes and Epodes*, trans. by C. E. Bennett, *The Loeb Classical Library*, ed. by T. E. Page and others (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947). There is no significant difference between the Loeb text and the text provided by Swift except spelling.
[76] Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift*, p. 61.

celebration of regicide of Charles I, thus a perversion of a Communion sacrament. In so doing, Swift echoes the political and pseudo-religious clichés repeatedly applied to criticism of the Whigs, of which a representative example is the Calves-Head Club. If we look into the following paragraph from *The Secret History of the Calves-Head Club: Or the Republican Unmasked*, we can find that Swift's attack echoes this Tory pamphlet:

> the Religion of the Calves-Head heroes, in their anniversary thanksgiving-songs on the 30th of January, by them called Anthems . . . now published to demonstrate the restless, implacable spirit of a certain party still among us, who are never to be satisfied, till the present establishment in church and state is subverted . . . the anniversary anthem, as they impiously called it, was sung, and a calf's skull, filled with wine or other liquor, and then a brimmer went about to the pious memory of those worthy patriots that had killed the tyrant, and delivered the country from his arbitrary sway. . . .[77]

The content of Swift's lines is quite similar to this anti-Whig tract: the treacherous nature of the Calves' Head Club is revealed through irony, as they call a King traitor, and the Regicides patriots. However, Swift's lines become more acidic because of the parallel with which the club is compared. Horace invites Torquatus on the day of Augustus's birthday, a holiday which commemorates one who, except for ardent republicans, ended the civil war and brought in the beginning of law, order, and good government. In contrast to this, Toland's invitation is occasioned by 30th January, the anniversary of the day when Charles I was executed in 1649, thus for the royalists, a symbol of anarchy. Leaning on his original, Swift makes the moral implication for Toland and Nottingham more damning, as the club's appeal for treason, to borrow Schakel's words, 'uses, rather than affirms, the past, making past evils a model for present and future conduct'.[78]

As the theme of Horace's epistle is friendship, the 'conviva' among 'fidos . . . amicos' (l. 24), Swift also utilises this theme to undermine the club. Toland calls the club members 'trusty friends' (l. 4), yet Swift invites the readers to question this doubtful claim: how can men, the existing members of the club, who are to discuss treason and celebrate the execution of a monarch, be trusted by a man such as Nottingham, who

[77]*The Secret History of the Calves-Head Club: Or the Republican Unmasked*, in *Harleian Miscellany*, ed. by T. Park, 12 vols. (London, 1808-1811), XII, pp. 216-220. This piece first came out in 1703 and was attributed to Ned Ward. It was a very popular Tory propaganda piece, as, by 1714, it reached the eleventh edition.
[78]Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift*, p. 64.

betrays his former allies to pursue his own interest? Their lack of trust becomes more apparent later when they stand in comparison with the original. While the meeting of Horace's friends is carefree, the gathering of the club reveals their suspicion of each other: 'From our mysterious club to keep out spies,/ And Tories (dressed like waiters) in disguise.' (ll. 29-30)

The real *coup de grâce* comes when Toland says that 'Wharton, unless prevented by a whore,/ Will hardly fail, and there is room for more:' (ll. 35-36) The participation of Thomas Wharton itself is enough to make the club morally disreputable:[79] however, here, the club's business is weighed against Wharton's meeting a whore. In the original, when Horace says that Sabinus will come if he is not prevented by a previous engagement or prettier company ('nisi cena prior potiorque puella Sabinum/ detinet adsumam;' [ll. 27-28]), there is no trace of irony except some kind of light banter implied in 'potior puella'. As Peter J. Schakel points out, Horace's suggestion of the possibility of Sabinus's not coming should be taken as bantering self-depreciation, for 'Horace would not consider seriously the possibility that his friends might choose some casual, superficial relationship over the deeper, more lasting joys of the friendship'.[80] However, by switching Sabinus to Wharton and 'puella' to a whore, Swift is debasing the club's business to a level of prostitution and, in so doing, demonstrates the moral debasement of Wharton as well as the club.

Swift's last blow at Nottingham and the club comes when Toland gives Nottingham the following advice about how to evade visitors and come to the meeting:

> Let no pretence of business make you stay,

[79]'Wharton, Thomas, first Earl (1648-1715). Politician. Brought up as a puritan, he was one of the founders of the Whig party; M. P. from 1673 until he succeeded as fifth Baron in 1696. Held court offices under William III. Dismissed by Queen Anne and took a leading part in the activities of Junto. Became a great election magnate and led opposition to Occasional Conformity bills. Created Earl, 1706. Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1708-1710, with Addison as his secretary. It was suggested that Swift should become his chaplain, but some frigid meetings in 1709 put a complete end to this fragile possibility. Thereafter Wharton was bitterly attacked by Swift as a profligate, unbeliever, and racketeer, notably in 1710/11 when Wharton had lost his places.', *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 940. Swift's detestation of Wharton can be observed in his prose *A Short Character of Thomas Earl of Wharton* (1710): 'He hath sunk his Fortune by endeavouring to ruin one Kingdom, and hath raised it by going far in the Ruin of another. With a good natural Understanding, a great Fluency in Speaking, and no ill Taste of Wit, he is generally the worst Companion in the world; his Thoughts being wholely taken up between Vice and Politics, so that Bawdy, Prophaneness, and Business, fill up his whole Conversation.', *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, III, p. 180. This is the Wharton whom Pope criticises for his Ruling Passion in *To Cobham*.

[80]Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift*, p. 66.

Yet take one word of counsel by the way:
If Guernsey calls, send word you're gone abroad;
He'll tease you with King Charles and Bishop Laud,
Or make you fast, and carry you to prayers:
But if he will break in, and walk upstairs,
Steal by the back-door out, and leave him there;
Then order Squash to call a hackney chair. (ll. 39-46)

Utilising Horace's counsel that Torquatus put aside business and avoid the clients ('rebus omissis' [l. 30]), Swift lets Toland advise Nottingham to elude his brother Guernsey, who would wish to attend an orthodox service on account of his loyalty to royalism, because Toland thinks that Guernsey only will act as an unnecessary spur to his conscience as he will mention King Charles and Bishop Laud.[81] Thus, by letting Toland advise Nottingham to betray not only his party but also his very blood-relation, Swift's condemnation of the Calves' Head Club is completed.

This kind of technique—that is, using the original to enlarge and highlight Swift's satiric intention in imitation—is again well demonstrated in his other Horatian imitation, *The First Ode of the Second Book of Horace Paraphrased: and Addressed to Richard Steele, Esq.* In this poem, by reminding the readers of the existence of the Latin original in which Horace praises Pollio as a historian, tragedian, and counsellor, Swift leans on Horace to supply the solid basis on which he builds his criticism of Richard Steele.[82] Peter J. Schakel remarks that 'Swift uses similarities to and differences from Horace to reinforce his attacks on Steele', yet to be more precise, Swift's attack is built on Steele's pseudo-similarities to and fundamental differences from Pollio.[83]

As the opening lines of this poem show,

[81]'Guernsey, Heneage Finch, Baron (*c.* 1650-1719). Younger brother of the Earl of Nottingham (q. v.). King's Counsel, 1677; Solicitor-General, 1679; dismissed by James II, 1686. Leading counsel to the seven Bishops in 1688. M. P. Created Baron in 1703; Earl of Aylesford, 1714.', *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 917. 'traditionally, the High Church clergy brought out their strongest royalist sentiments in sermons commemorating Charles's martyrdom on 30 January. The names invoked in l. 42 imply loyalty to High Anglicanism: William Laud (1573-1645) supported the king in his struggles with the Commons, both as Bishop of London and as Archbishop of Canterbury from 1633, until he was beheaded for alleged treason.', *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 655, 41n.

[82]Swift provided some, not all, Latin texts which bear more direct allusion to his imitation. Yet, as I have argued earlier, this could invite the readers to go beyond his Latin text and to compare his imitation with the full Latin original.

[83]Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift*, p. 67.

Dick, thou'rt resolved, as I am told,
Some strange arcana to unfold,
And with the help of Buckley's pen
To vamp the 'good old cause' again:
Which thou (such Burnet's shrewd advice is)
Must furbish up and nickname 'Crisis'. (ll. 1-6)

the occasion for this poem is the impending publication of Steele's much advertised tract *Crisis*.[84] In these lines, he is ridiculing Steele's attempt, as the phrase 'good old cause' and words such as 'vamp' and 'furbish up' insinuate that Steele's cause is vapid and bathetic. In this poem, Swift is affecting to give advice to Steele as a true friend, as the term of endearment 'Dick' suggests, that his attempt to turn the tide to the Whig side will not succeed because he is not up to the task, and if he does go on publishing *Crisis*, he 'May bring in jeopardy thy bacon' (l. 30). Swift's criticism of Steele's lack of qualification is not new, as it can also be found in the following passage from his tract *The Importance of the Guardian Considered*, which was published in 1713 during his quarrel with Steele:

> I ask, what shadow of a Pretence has he [Steele] to offer his crude Thoughts in Matters of State? *to lay them before the Queen and Ministry*? and to reprove both for Mal-Administration? How did he acquire these Abilities of directing in the Councils of Princes? Was it from *Publishing Tatlers* and *Spectators*, and Writing now and then a *Guardian*? . . . .
> Mr. *Steele* . . . thinks he *knows the World* as well as the Prime Minister; and upon the Strength of that Knowledge, will needs direct Her Majesty in the weightest Matters of Government.[85]

Yet, the difference is that while this tract criticises Steele straightforwardly, Swift's imitation of Horace operates more cunningly and thus makes his argument far more appealing and convincing to the readers: by deliberately inducing the comparison with

[84]'Steele had been extensively advertising since October [1713] the imminent publication of his *Crisis*, in which he promised final enlightenment on the true dangers of the succession problem and its relation to the Tory peace.', from Noel Sterne, p. 197. This poem, published January 1714, can be regarded as Swift's pre-emptive strike on Steele to nullify the impact of *Crisis*, which finally appeared 19 January 1714. For more information on the matters surrounding the publication of *Crisis*, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, II, pp. 698-699.
[85]*The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, VIII, pp. 15-16, 19-20.

Pollio in the Horatian original, Swift ridicules Steele's aspiration and, in so doing, demonstrates his shortcomings to the readers.

In the original, Pollio is mainly praised as a historian who writes of the civil wars for a good reason, that is, to remind the readers of their horrors and thereby to avoid future strife:

> MOTVM ex Metello consule civicum
> bellique causas et vitia et modos
> ludumque Fortunae gravesque
> principum amicitas et arma
>
> nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus, (ll. 1-5)
> (THOU art treating of the civil strife that with Metellus' consulship began, the causes of the war, its blunders, and its phases, and Fortune's game, friendships of leaders that boded ill, and weapons stained with blood as yet unexpiated,)

In his imitation, feigning to acknowledge Steele's pretension to be a historian, Swift actually demonstrates how Steele's claim is preposterous if set against the example of Pollio, as he describes what Steele is going to write in *Crisis*:

> Thou pompously wilt let us know
> What all the world knew long ago,
> (E'er since Sir William Gore was mayor,
> And Harley filled the Commons' chair)
> That we a German prince must own
> When Anne for heaven resigns her throne. (ll. 7-12)

By implying that Steele knows no better than the readers—'what all the World knew long ago'—Swift undermines Steele's claim to be a historian who should be able to provide a new insight into the past. Similarly, Swift's argument that Steele's professed opposition to the Tory peace and his pretension as a qualified statesman are misconceived, as shown in the following lines,

> Thou'lt rail devoutly at the peace,
> And all its secret causes trace,
> The bucket-play 'twixt Whigs and Tories,
> Their ups and downs, with fifty stories
> Of tricks, the Lord of Oxford knows,

And errors of our plenipo's.
Thou'lt tell of leagues among the great
Portending ruin to our state,
And of that dreadful *coup d'éclat*,
Which has afforded thee much chat,
The Queen forsooth (despotic!) gave
Twelve coronets, without thy leave! (ll. 15-26)

is made more convincing to the readers because this argument is based on his disqualification of Steele as a respectable judge of history. When Horace asks the following rhetorical questions concerning the tragedy of war,

quis non Latino sanguine pinguior
campus sepulcris impia proelia
testatur auditumque Medis
Hesperiae sonitum ruinae?

qui gurges aut quae flumina lugubris
ignara belli? quod mare Dauniae
non decoloravere caedes?
quae caret ora cruore nostro? (ll. 29-36)
(What plain is not enriched with Latin blood, to bear witness with its graves to our unholy strife and to the sound of Hesperia's fall, heard even by the Medes! What pool or stream has failed to taste the dismal war! What sea has Italian slaughter not discoloured! What coast knows not our blood!)

Pollio's status as a respected historian is again strengthened, for here Horace presents himself as one of many who recognise the dire consequences of war through the effort of Pollio. However, Steele's claim to be a historian is deflated when he is made, in the corresponding lines in Swift's imitation, to warn against the hackneyed and by then empty Catholic threat in his proposed work, thus in fact, unlike Pollio, having no impact on the readers of his history:

Now manfully thou'lt run a tilt
'On popes, for all the blood they've spilt,
For massacres, and racks, and flames,
For lands enriched by crimson streams,
For inquisitions taught by Spain,
Of which the Christian world complain.' (ll. 93-98)

In the Horatian original, writing history is conceived of as difficult and dangerous:

> periculosae plenum opus aleae,
> tractas et incedis per ignes
> suppositos cineri doloso. (ll. 6-8)
> (a task full of dangerous hazard — and art walking, as it were, over fires hidden beneath treacherous ashes.)

Before writing this poem, Swift already pointed out Steele's inability to handle a grave matter in his *Importance of the Guardian Considered*:

> a Lad just fit for the University, and sent early from thence into the wide World . . . . the most imprudent Man alive . . . . wholly at the mercy of Fools and Knaves, or hurried away by his own Caprice; by which he hath committed more Absurdities in Oeconomy, Friendship, Love, Duty, good Manners, Politicks, Religion and Writing, than ever fell to one Man's share.[86]

Yet, this straightforward claim is more sharpened and Steele more ridiculed, as he stands, in contrast with Pollio who accomplished this difficult task successfully, as an example of 'madmen, children, wits and fools' who 'should never meddle with edged tools' (ll. 31-32).

After debunking Steele's claim to be a proper historian, Swift continues to devalue him, using his pseudo-similarities to Pollio. While Pollio was a renowned tragedian, Steele also has a claim to be recognised as a writer, being a playwright. However, being offset against Horace's praise of Pollio as a tragedian,

> paulum severae Musa tragoediae
> desit theatris: mox, ubi publicas
> res ordinaris, grande munus
> Cecropio repetes cothurno, (ll. 9-12)
> (for a brief time let it be that thy stern tragic muse is missing from the stage; but soon, when thou hast chronicled events of state, renew thy lofty calling in the Attic buskin,)

[86] *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, VIII, pp. 5-6.

Steele's quality as a playwright is ridiculed as he is advised 'no longer deal in farce,/ Nor pump to cobble wicked verse' (ll. 35-36). As the terms 'pump' and 'cobble' emphasise the physical side of writing, instead of its imaginative or creative nature, Swift questions here Steele's ability as a playwright, who works laboriously only to produce under-quality literary works. Also, Steele's role as a counsellor to the distressed is debunked by Swift's deliberate juxtaposition of him with Pollio. Paralleling Horace's tribute to Pollio as a counsellor, 'insigne maestis praesidium reis' ('famed support of anxious clients' [ll. 13-14]), Swift exposes Steele's quality as a counsellor as follows:

> When first I knew thee, Dick, thou wert
> Renowned for skill in Faustus' art,
> Which made thy closet much frequented
> By buxom lasses — some repented
> Their luckless choice of husbands — others,
> Impatient to be like their mothers,
> Received from thee profound directions
> How best to settle their affections;
> Thus thou, a friend to the distressed,
> Didst in thy calling do thy best. (ll. 49-58)

As all of Steele's 'anxious clients' are described here to happen to be ladies, indeed 'buxom lasses', and their source of predicament and the nature of his 'profound directions' somewhat dubious, these lines do have sexual implications and thus reveal Steele's doubtful quality as a counsellor.

Thus demonstrating to Steele and the readers that he cannot be compared to Pollio, Swift's advice to Steele is simple: 'as you do not have the quality of Pollio, do not try to be like him when you can only pretend to know about history and politics'. Instead know yourself and do what you are capable of, as shown in the lines towards the end of this poem:

> But, if I may with freedom talk,
> All this is foreign to thy walk:
> Thy genius has perhaps a knack
> At trudging in a beaten track,
> But is for state affairs as fit,
> As mine for politics and wit.
> Then let us both in time grow wise,

Nor higher than our talents rise; (ll. 101-108)

If the poem ended here, this might seem genuine advice from a sincere and worried friend, yet it is not to be. Once more invoking a comparison with the original, Swift describes the proper task for Steele so as to give him one more and final humiliation. Paralleling Horace's desire of escaping from the horrors of war to a peaceful life (ll. 37-40), Swift advises Steele to retreat from the public sphere of life, for which he is not fit, to a private life: however, his retreat is not to the like of 'Dionaeo sub antro' ('in the shadow of some Dionean grotto' [l. 39]), but to a disreputable 'some snug cellar' (l. 109). As the following closing lines demonstrate,

> To some snug cellar let's repair
> From duns and debts, and drown our care;
> Now quaff of honest ale a quart,
> Now venture at a pint of port,
> With which inspired we'll club each night
> Some tender sonnet to indite,
> And with Tom D'Urfey, Philips, Dennis,
> Immortalize our Dolls and Jennies. (ll. 109-116)

Swift is ridiculing here Steele that he is only fit for the life of a dunce, as the words 'some snug cellar' and 'debts' strongly insinuate, and his talent should be limited to writing trivial love songs to 'Dolls and Jennies' like his brother scribblers. Even though Swift seems to include himself in this category of writers by saying 'let's' (l. 109), it is nothing but a patronising expression to feign to end the poem as his hearty and sincere advice, which it is not, to a troubled friend.

2. *An Elegy on the Supposed Death of Mr Partridge, the Almanac Maker* (Written in 1708), 'The History of Vanbrug's House' (written in 1706), and *Vanbrug's House* (written in 1708)

In the two imitations discussed above, Swift demonstrates the artistic control of his emotion by utilising non-satiric Horatian originals to his satiric purpose. In these poems, the form of imitation provides him with an occasion to demonstrate to the readers the existence of his critical intelligence which enables him to face and try to resolve a

charged situation. However, the form of imitation is not the only means which enables him to retain control over his emotions. In *An Elegy on Mr Partridge*, 'The History of Vanbrug's House', and *Vanbrug's House*, he uses the idea of metamorphosis to undermine Partridge and Vanbrugh: he does not hit his satiric butts directly with some diatribe, rather he lets the satirical implication emerge from his description of their metamorphoses. In these poems, the concept of metamorphosis does act as the centre which checks the possible centrifugal tendency of his emotion.

In *An Elegy on Mr Partridge*, Swift uses Partridge's metamorphosis from a cobbler to an astrologer as a means of undermining him.[87] In this poem, Swift undermines John Partridge as an astrologer by keeping on reminding the readers of his humble origin—a cobbler: in so doing, Swift demonstrates that, for all its claim to foreseeing the future, actually astrology is a hoax, which even such a humble cobbler like Partridge can take up. In other words, by constantly linking shoe-making and astrology, Swift is pulling the astrology down, for all its claim, to the level of shoe-making, emphasising that the metamorphosis from cobbler to astrologer is not a radical change. When, in the beginning of the poem, Swift questions as follows,

> Strange, an astrologer should die,
> Without one wonder in the sky;
> Not one of all his crony stars,
> To pay their duty at his hearse?
> No meteor, no eclipse appeared?
> No comet with a flaming beard? (ll. 5-10)

Swift is undermining both the importance of Partridge as an astrologer and astrology itself. Of course, nothing exceptional would happen when a human, even a great one, dies. Yet, by asking these questions, Swift ridicules him as an astrologer by questioning his trade's claim to predicting future events. Partridge claimed to be able to predict some

[87] *An Elegy on Mr Partridge* is one of several offspring of Swift's contempt for John Partridge. Swift waged a satiric campaign against this cobbler turned astrologer, starting from his *Predictions for the Year 1708* in which he, in the name of Bickerstaff, predicted the death of Partridge, intending to criticise the astrologer's claim to the ability to foresee the future. Later, he published *The Accomplishment of the First of Mr. Bickerstaff's Predictions*, which reported the death of Partridge, thus turning the living Partridge into a dead man. For more detailed knowledge about Swift's Bickerstaff hoax and his contempt for astrology, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, II, pp. 197-209, G. P. Mayhew, 'Swift's Bickerstaff Hoax as an April Fools' Joke', *MP*, 61 (1964), 270-280.

event or someone's death by probing the change of the stars, but if this is true, Swift is asking, why is it that nothing happens in the sky even though such a prominent astrologer as Partridge has died?

What Swift keeps harping on in this poem is the metamorphosis of Partridge from a cobbler to an astrologer, and in so doing, the debunking of astrology as a proper science. When he presents the following lines,

> Some wits have wondered what analogy
> There is 'twixt cobbling and astrology;
> How Partridge made his optics rise,
> From a shoe-sole to reach the skies. (ll. 19-22)

Swift is asking the readers what possible connection there is between the trade of cobbler and that of astrologer. It is by providing the answer to this question that Swift ridicules Partridge's metamorphosis. When he presents the readers with the following lines,

> The hornéd moon, which heretofore
> Upon their shoes the Romans wore,
> Whose wideness kept their toes from corns,
> And whence we claim our shoeing-horns,
> Shows how the art of cobbling bears
> A near resemblance to the spheres. (ll. 35-40)

Swift feigns to provide a genuine answer: he is saying that 'there is such a connection between the two trades if you readers look at the similarity of the shape between the moon and the crescent-shaped clasp on the Roman shoes'. Of course this answer is not sincere, and actually is being used to discredit Partridge as an astrologer and his trade.

The ridiculing of Partridge becomes more apparent when Swift says

> Thus Partridge, by his wit and parts,
> At once did practise both these arts:
> And as the boding owl, or rather
> The bat, because her wings are leather,
> Steals from her private cell by night,
> And flies about the candle-light;
> So learned Partridge could as well

Creep in the dark from leathern cell,
And in his fancy fly as far,
To peep upon a twinkling star. (ll. 47-56)

In these lines, Swift finally strikes home directly his attack on Partridge as an astrologer. By comparing him to a bat, Swift firmly links the two trades, as not only is a bat active only in the night like an astrologer, but also it has a leather-like wing which evokes the trade of shoe-making. What is brilliant here is Swift's quick change for the symbol of both trades from an owl to a bat. An owl can be a fitting symbol for an astrology: for, it is active only in the night as well as being a bird of ill-omen. Yet, Swift cannot link both trades and debunk astrology at the same time, because an owl is indeed believed to have an ability to 'bode', making it difficult to debunk astrology's claim to foreseeing the future, and there is no means of linking it to shoe-making. However, by quickly changing his comparison from owl to bat, Swift gets the fitting symbol which not only links the two trades, but also undermines the astrologer's claim: the bat having useless eyes, thus its inability to see, thus to fore**see**. Thus, by answering the mock-curious question 'what analogy/ There is 'twixt cobbling and astrology' (ll. 19-20), Swift proves that the metamorphosis is indeed possible, not because cobbling provides a sufficient training for astrology, but because astrology does not need any proper education at all, being a shady trade.

The epitaph is Swift's final ridiculing of Partridge as he is described as

Here, five foot deep, lies on his back
A cobbler, star-monger, and quack;
Who to the stars in pure good will,
Does to his best look upward still. (ll. 95-98)

It is not unusual, indeed quite normal that the dead man is buried on his back. However, this normal burial mode provides Swift with an opportunity for the final humiliation of him. By showing the readers that Partridge is not in the sky, but under the ground still looking at the sky, Swift reveals Partridge's vain aspiration which can never be properly realised. After all, for Swift, Partridge's metamorphosis is an example of man's vain aspiration beyond his proper state in the creation.

Swift's other utilisation of the theme of metamorphosis can be found in his attack on John Vanbrugh, dramatist turned architect and then the Comptroller of the Works, in 'The History of Vanbrug's House' and *Vanbrug's House*.[88] The transformation of the ruins of Whitehall to Vanbrugh's house, the so-called 'Goose-Pie House', provides Swift with an arresting example of the wrong metamorphosis, which he utilises to attack Vanbrugh's inferior quality as an architect.[89] In these poems, two kinds of metamorphosis undermine Vanbrugh: the one is the metamorphosis of Whitehall to 'Goose-Pie House', and the other that of Vanbrugh from dramatist to architect.

In 'The History of Vanbrug's House', Swift uses the metamorphosis of Vanbrugh as a basis for satiric implication. What Swift wants to point out to the readers in this short poem is Vanbrugh's inferiority as an architect, because he is described here as one who turns to architect without any training or qualification. In this respect, this poem is similar to *An Elegy on Mr Partridge* in that in both poems Swift criticises his satiric victim on the basis of their presumptuous aspiration.[90]

When Swift describes how Vanbrugh came to decide to become an architect as follows,

> When Mother Clud had rose from play,
> And called to take the cards away;
> Van saw, but seemed not to regard,
> How Miss picked every painted card;
> And busy both with hand and eye,
> Soon reared a house two storeys high;

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[88]'Vanbrugh (or Vanburgh), Sir John (1664-1726), dramatist, architect, and herald; Comptroller of the Board of Works, 1702-12, and again, 1715; . . . brought out *The Country House* (1705, adapted from the French of Carton Dancourt), *The Confederacy*, one of the most licentious pieces of the comic drama after the Restoration (1705, also from Dancourt), and *The Mistake* (1705, adapted jointly with Betterton, from Molière); . . . designed Castle Howard, 1701 (completed 1714), his own Haymarket Theatre, London, 1705, and Blenheim Palace, Woodstock, 1705. . .; 'restored' Kimbolton Castle, 1707 . . .; . . . worked on country seats in a ponderous style of architecture;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

[89]A fire in January 1698 destroyed a large part of the palace of Whitehall. Even though it was planned that Sir Christopher Wren should design a building to replace it, this was not realised. Instead, Vanbrugh, who turned to architect from dramatist without any formal education, was given permission as a Comptroller of Works, to build a lodging for himself on part of its site. It was called 'Goose-Pie House', because it was very small and very odd. For more information about John Vanbrugh as an architect, see John Summerson, *Architecture in Britain 1530-1830*, 9th edn. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 255-268.

[90] Of course, in the case of Partridge, the object of his presumptuous aspiration is not to become an astrologer, which is in any way disreputable trade, but to foresee the future, which is not a proper domain of man's ability.

Van's genius, without thought or lecture,
Is hugely turned to architecture:
He saw the edifice, and smiled,
Vowed it was pretty for a child:
It was so perfect in its kind,
He kept the model in his mind. (ll. 1-12)

his intention is to mock Vanbrugh's lack of proper training, as his inspiration is described as coming from a house made of cards. In lines 7-8, Vanbrugh's 'genius' is claimed to be the basis for his transformation. However, Swift is exploiting the different meanings of the word 'genius' here. It can denote 'native intellectual power of an exalted type, such as is attributed to those who are esteemed greatest in any department of art, speculation, or practice; instinctive and extraordinary capacity for imaginative creation, original thought' (OED, sb. 5), so it may not need 'a thought or lecture' (thus proper training or learning). However, as it can also mean simply 'natural ability or capacity; quality of mind; the special endowments which fit a man for his peculiar work' (OED, sb. 4), so with its qualification with the phrase 'without thought or lecture', it does imply Vanbrugh's lack of qualification, as in this case 'genius' becomes mediocrity and 'hugely' the degree of his self-delusion.[91]

[91]Actually OED indicates that the definition of 'genius' sb. 5 was a mid eighteenth-century development, citing for its first example from Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749): 'by the wonderful force of genius only, without the least assistance of learning'. In this case, as this poem was written well before 1749, we have to disregard the meaning sb. 5 and thus the pun on the word 'genius'. However, it is my opinion that this might be a pre-OED usage for the meaning sb. 5, because, quite strikingly, Swift juxtaposes 'genius' with 'thought or lecture' just as Fielding does 'genius' with 'learning', making a distinction between the two words. Of course, Swift's ultimate intention is to use the word in its meaning sb. 4, but, given the ironic nature of this work, Swift's surface usage can be sb. 5 meaning which is in turn changed to sb. 4 to undermine Vanbrugh. If we look into Swift's other usages of the word 'genius', even though it is not clear-cut, the meaning seems to be bent towards the meaning sb. 5 rather than sb. 4. When he called Pope 'a Genius for all Stations fit' in his *Libel on Doctor Delaney and a Certain Great Lord* and Bolingbroke a 'superior universal Genius' (*The Correspondence of Jonathan* Swift, V, p. 119), Swift's usage of the 'genius' in these examples does not quite fit into the sb. 4 meaning. A much clearer example can be found in his letter to Pope. When he talked about 'the morality of Poets' as follows,

> I know not whether virtue can possibly find a corner to retire, except in the Hearts of men of Genius and Learning, and what you call their Levityes have not the least tincture of impiety, but directly otherwise, tend to drive vice out of the world.

Swift is clearly distinguishing genius from learning, thus using 'genius' more in sb. 5 meaning, *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, p. 134, Swift to Pope, 30 March 1733.

Swift's ridicule of Vanbrugh's lack of qualification continues, as all of his training as an architect is described as having been gained from merely watching children building a house with mud:

> But when he found the boys at play,
> And saw them dabbling in the clay;
> He stood behind a stall to lurk,
> And mark the progress of their work:
> With true delight observed 'em all
> Raking up mud to build a wall;
> The plan he much admired, and took
> The model in his table-book;
> Thought himself now exactly skilled,
> And so resolved a house to build; (ll. 13-22)

It is no wonder then that Vanbrugh's attempt to build a house ended in a 'monstrous pile' (l. 28). By so describing Vanbrugh's house, Swift is pointing out to the readers the falsity of Vanbrugh's realisation of his aspiration: since we should interpret 'pile' as 'a large group, clump, or collection of things, without reference to height' (OED, sb. 3.b) rather than as 'a heap of things (of some height) laid or lying one upon another in a more or less regular manner' (OED sb. 3.a) because it is insinuated to be quite small in lines 29-30, the 'monstrous pile' comes to mean that his house is a sort of mutant which has no proper form or harmony with the surrounding atmosphere. When Swift ironically praises that Vanbrugh's 'Goose-Pie House' is 'Five times at least as big as theirs [boys' clay house]' and 'Taller than Miss's [house made of cards] by two yards' (ll. 24-25), so that 'all the little schoolboys' are seen to 'run/ Envyng to see themselves outdone' (ll. 33-34), he is implying where Vanbrugh stands as an architect: as, in these lines, his work holds a rivalry with at best a house of cards or a clay-house made by children and so his chief architectural rivals are schoolboys, the proper place for him should be the playground not the site of serious architecture.

However, unlike in *An Elegy on Mr Partridge*, in this poem we can sense Swift's serious concern behind his light ridicule of Vanbrugh. As Vanbrugh comes to be recognised as 'Vitruvius the second' (l. 38) at court, his success seems to symbolise for Swift the debased state of the world in which the presumptuous metamorphosis of Vanbrugh is not condemned but actually accepted as genuine. When Swift predicts at

the end of the poem that in this world 'We might expect to see next year/ A mousetrap-man chief engineer' (ll. 47-48), his tone of light ridicule seems to be disappearing, as the target of his criticism becomes widened from Vanbrugh the individual to the general world which cannot distinguish between the genuine and the fake, and so readily accepts and praises the likes of Vanbrugh. In this poem, Vanbrugh and his 'Goose-Pie House' at the site of Whitehall stand as a symbol for Swift's warning that, as Louise K. Barnett points out, in contemporary society, 'the transformation of the things of value into the small and insignificant is paralleled by the elevation of the trivial'.[92]

In *Vanbrug's House*, Swift's criticism of Vanbrugh's metamorphosis takes another turn, as he relates it to literature. By establishing the connection between architecture and literature, Swift attacks him not only as an architect, but also as a writer. When he opens this poem with the following lines,

> In times of old, when time was young,
> And poets their own verses sung,
> A verse could draw a stone or beam,
> That now would overload a team;
> Lead 'em a dance of many a mile,
> Then rear 'em to a goodly pile.
> Each number had its different power;
> Heroic strains could build a tower;
> Sonnets, or elegies to Chloris,
> Might raise a house about two storeys;
> A lyric ode would slate; a catch
> Would tile; an epigram would thatch. (ll. 1-12)

Swift is preparing the basis by which he can relate architecture and literature. Vanbrugh's being both dramatist and architect makes him comparable to the mythical figure of Amphion, whose skill of playing the harp was such that the very stones obeyed his will. The purpose of the above lines is to invoke the myth and then transform it for its application to Vanbrugh. In so doing, Swift criticises the modern way of thinking which cannot discern the metaphorical meaning of the myth, when he describes how the myth of Amphion is understood by the moderns in a form of vulgar literalisation: as Alan

[92]Louise K. Barnett, p. 139.

S. Fisher points out, 'the attitude of these lines is a matter of the present debunking the past, and although Swift truly intends the debunking—Amphionism being an impossible concept—we also see this process as a paradigm of the way the present recasts the world of the past in its own paltry mode'.[93] The brilliance of Swift's artistic skill in this poem is that he destroys Vanbrugh's presumption in the modern way: he feigns to accept the modern way of reasoning and then lets it destroy Vanbrugh and eventually itself.

When Vanbrugh expresses his resolution to revive Whitehall as follows,

> 'Great Jove!' he cried, 'the art restore
> To build by verse as heretofore;
> And make my muse the architect;
> What palaces shall we erect!
> No longer shall forsaken Thames
> Lament his old Whitehall in flames:
> A pile shall from its ashes rise
> Fit to invade, or prop the skies.' (ll. 43-50)

Swift indeed makes him the modern Amphion, who from his misconception tries to revive Whitehall with his adapted, thus not genuine, plays, with pathetic results. Thus, by making Vanbrugh the modern Amphion, the ground on which Swift leads his two-way criticism of Vanbrugh is firmly prepared. When he describes Vanbrugh's process of writing as follows,

> So Van resolved to write a farce;
> But well perceiving wit was scarce,
> With cunning that defect supplies;
> Takes a French play as lawful prize;
> Steals thence his plot, and every joke,
> Not once suspecting Jove would smoke;
> And (like a wag) sat down to write,
> Would whisper to himself, 'A bite.'
> Then from his motley mingled style
> Proceeded to erect his pile. (ll. 55-64)

Swift not only demonstrates Vanbrugh's inferiority as a writer through the insinuation of plagiarism, but also prepares the readers for what to expect from the architectural project

[93]Alan S. Fisher, p. 346.

which will be realised by this inferior dunce. As Swift lays the ground so carefully, the readers cannot find it surprising that his building is not a 'palace' (l. 100) or 'gilded spires' (l. 102), but 'a thing resembling a goose pie' (l. 104), which reveals his poor architectural quality.

There are to be added some fine finishing touches to this criticism. By having one of the poets who throng to view Vanbrugh's house praise his achievement, Swift lets this dunce ridicule inadvertently another dunce, Vanbrugh himself:

> 'Thrice happy poet, who may trail
> Thy house about thee, like a snail;
> Or harnessed to a nag, at ease,
> Take journeys in it like a chaise;
> Or in a boat, whene'er thou wilt
> Canst make it serve thee for a tilt.
> Capacious house! 'tis owned by all,
> Thou'rt well contrived, though thou art small;
> For every wit in Britain's isle
> May lodge within thy spacious pile. (ll. 109-118)

By making him emphasise the smallness of Vanbrugh's house, and thus Vanbrugh's inferior literary talent, by words such as 'snail', 'nag', 'chaise', and 'tilt', and then praise it for its being large enough to contain all the 'wit' in Britain, Swift lets him debase Vanbrugh, himself, and all the modern writers at one stroke. Here, Swift does not attack these modern follies from the high ground of his standard, rather he comes down to the level of the modern writers and destroys them from within while feigning to accept it.

However, as in 'The History of Vanbrugh's House', Swift's fear about the present state of the world can also be found in this poem. When the same dunce praises Vanbrugh's achievement, his house, as follows,

> Like Bacchus thou, as poets feign,
> Thy mother burnt, art born again;
> Born like a Phoenix from the flame,
> But neither bulk nor shape the same:
> As animals of largest size
> Corrupt to maggots, worms and flies. (ll. 119-124)

Swift not only ridicules it: he also suspects that the process of decay might be a natural course of the universe, as the decay of an animal corpse to maggots and worms is quite natural and irreversible. Here, he reveals to the readers the state of the world in which he and they have to live: this world is not a world of value, truth, and creation but one of worthlessness, falsehood, and decay, because, as Louise K. Barnett points out, in this world 'Whitehall is burnt, the Phoenix is mythically remote, large animals are corrupted to vermin, and ancient poetry is a looted heap'.[94] For Swift, the metamorphosis of Whitehall to Vanbrugh's house poses a serious threat, for in this process the valuable past does not simply disappear, rather it is revived by the moderns like a Phoenix, but as a false, inferior one: for him, 'more fearful than the eclipse or disappearance of value is its metamorphosis into its opposition, with an ensuing confusion of true and false'.[95]

However, even though this work of Swift's is dark in its perception of the present state of the world, Swift is not reacting from some kind of panic here: rather, skilfully debunking the false metamorphosis, he demonstrates to the readers the existence of a critical intelligence which presents this crisis in its true state. In a way, Swift has done all that is in his power: the remainder is up to the readers.

3. 'The Progress of Poetry' (written in 1719), 'Satirical Elegy on the Death of a Late Famous General' (written in 1722), and *The Journal of a Modern Lady* (written in 1729)

One of the characteristics which Swift shows when he is in control of the emotion is that he never rushes into condemnation of his satiric butts. Rather, he painstakingly lays the ground on which he can persuade the readers to agree with his satiric implication. It may be some kind of allusion or imagery on which he develops his argument, but whatever it is, its existence demonstrates his poetic skill in devising a subtle strategy.

In 'The Progress of Poetry', Swift's eventual purpose is to criticise a particular set of poets—the Grub-Street dunces—by ridiculing their poverty ensuing from their inferior literary talent. To achieve this goal, Swift develops a conceit that poetic activity is predicated on the physical state of the poet. Of course, this conceit is absurd and so cannot literally be accepted by the readers. However, Swift's satiric attack on the dunces

[94]Louise K. Barnett, p. 138.
[95]Louise K. Barnett, p. 139.

emerges when he makes this improbable notion seem probable by linking the case of the dunces with that of the goose.

When Swift introduces the story of the goose in the opening lines of the poem,

> The farmer's goose, who in the stubble,
> Has fed without restraint, or trouble;
> Grown fat with corn and sitting still,
> Can scarce get o'er the barn-door sill:
> And hardly waddles forth, to cool
> Her belly in the neighbouring pool:
> Nor loudly cackles at the door;
> For cackling shows the goose is poor. (ll. 1-8)

his purpose is to utilise this story as the dominating theme in this poem: that is, heavy things cannot fly. If a thing wants to fly, it must become light, as he demonstrates in the story of the goose that becomes 'lank and spare' (l. 12) by being forced to graze on the 'barren common' (l. 10), thus 'scorns the ground, and thus upward springs' (l. 14). This story of the goose's flight itself is not satiric at all: yet, it is transformed into a very deadly means of undermining the dunces when applied to their case.

Having established the basic ground of his satiric argument, Swift applies the goose analogy to the dunces:

> Such is the poet, fresh in pay,
> (The third night's profits of his play;)
> His morning-draughts till noon can swill,
> Among his brethren of the quill:
> With good roast beef his belly full,
> Grown lazy, foggy, fat, and dull:
> Deep sunk in plenty, and delight,
> What poet e'er could take his flight?
> Or stuffed with phlegm up to the throat,
> What poet e'er could sing a note? (ll. 17-26)

The surface purpose of these lines is to prove the applicability of the goose analogy to the case of the dunces. However, the real satiric thrust comes when, in so doing, Swift literalises and physicalises the goose analogy. The 'flight' of a poet should be interpreted as a metaphorical and thus a spiritual one, but in applying the goose analogy,

the flight of a poet becomes physical. As he goes on elaborating this analogy in the following lines,

> Nor Pegasus could bear the load,
> Along the high celestial road;
> The steed, oppressed, would break his girth,
> To raise the lumber from the earth. (ll. 27-30)

Swift ridicules the wit of the dunces, as theirs is described as a physical thing, 'the load', 'the lumber', which has to lose weight to take flight.

After he has established the fact that the 'flight' of the dunces is predicated on their physical weight, their poverty, such as 'His guts and belly full of wind' (l. 38), is not presented as a case for pity but as the basis for ridicule of them, as their success is defined as depending on the lightness of their bodies. The process of literalisation and physicalisation continues and indeed is strengthened when the dunce is described as taking a flight after losing weight:

> Now his exalted spirit loathes
> Incumbrances of food and clothes;
> And up he rises like a vapour,
> Supported high on wings of paper;
> He singing flies, and flying sings,
> While from below all Grub Street rings. (ll. 41-46)

The poetical flight of this dunce is not carried out in his imagination, but in physical reality: he is 'exalted' not in his fancy but in his physicality as he rides high 'on wings of paper'. Thereby the improbable notion that poetic activity of a dunce is dependent on his physical condition is given a comic 'reality' by Swift's rigorous literalisation of the flight imagery. Of course, we readers recognise it as a comic *jeu d'esprit*, not the literal truth. Yet the validity of this kind of reasoning is not dependent on our acceptance of it: rather it comes from the readers' recognition that, in the process of Swift's imaginative analogy, the inferiority of the dunces is exposed and ridiculed. What the readers should notice in this poem is Swift's control of his satiric emotion which enables him to find

some imaginative similarity between the flight of the goose and that of the dunces and then utilise it comically in the criticism of the Grub-Street dunces.

In 'A Satirical Elegy on the Death of a Late Famous General', Swift uses the form of elegy to criticise the Duke of Marlborough. Elegy as a literary genre requires its author to follow certain conventions, such as praise of the achievements of the dead, lamentation of the living, or emphasis on the transience of earthly things. In this poem, Swift follows all these conventions for the wrong reason: for he writes this elegy not from respect for the dead but from hatred of him.[96] In so doing, his criticism of Marlborough is well contained in the form of elegy, which otherwise might slip away from his control, as he, through brilliant plays on words, demonstrates the unworthiness of Marlborough to deserve a proper elegy.

From the following opening of this elegy,

> His Grace! impossible! what, dead!
> Of old age too, and in his bed!
> And could that Mighty Warrior fall?
> And so inglorious, after all! (ll. 1-4)

Swift's satiric intention is well grasped by the readers. His lamentation 'impossible' is supposed to indicate his sorrow about Marlborough's death: but, in fact, as Swift's feigned surprise in the second line suggests, the word 'impossible' proves to be not the expression of lamentation but that of disbelief that Marlborough died peacefully in such an old age. Swift thus begins this poem with an expression of lamentation, only to twist

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[96]'Swift's efforts to discredit Marlborough had their base in political issues [as they belonged to the opposing parties], but were buttressed by a dislike for the Duke's alleged vices (avarice, ingratitude, duplicity, pride).', *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 923. Swift's hatred of the Duke of Marlborough, as can be seen in his journal to Stella,

> I am of your opinion, that Lord Marlborough is used hardly: I have often scratched out passages from papers and pamphlets sent me before they were printed; because I thought them too severe. But, he is certainly a vile man, and had no sort of merit besides the military.

has found literary expression in *The Fable of Midas* (for his greed), which I shall discuss later in this chapter, as well as in this poem, *Jonathan Swift: Journal to Stella,* II, p. 472, 25 January 1711/2. Swift also attacked him in his prose works such as *The Publick Spirit of Whigs* and *The Conduct of Allies*.

it immediately. Yet, even this ironic shred of lamentation disappears quickly and is replaced by mockery:

> And could he be indeed so old
> As by the newspapers we're told?
> Threescore, I think, is pretty high;
> 'Twas time in conscience he should die.
> This world he cumbered long enough;
> He burnt his candle to the snuff;
> And that's the reason, some folks think,
> He left behind *so great a stink.* (ll. 9-16)

In these lines, Marlborough is ridiculed as one who has done good by dying at last, as he is perceived as a man whose existence was a burden on the earth rather than a blessing: here, his death is not lamented, but welcomed.[97] What Swift is doing throughout this poem is, to borrow Louise K. Barnett's words, 'to question its subject[Marlborough]'s ability to live up to the honors conferred upon him', while he is pretending to follow the surface logic of conventional elegy.[98] There appear many words, such as 'His Grace' (l. 1), 'Mighty Warrior' (l. 3) and 'honours' (l. 22), which denote the positive values of a man. However, these words actually emphasise his failure to live up to what they claim for him: 'His grace' is countered by 'How very mean a thing's a Duke' (l. 30), 'the honours' actually proves later to be 'ill-got honours' (l. 31), and 'Mighty Warrior' becomes a ridicule of one who is described as dying 'ingloriously' of old age. The most acidic attack on him comes from Swift's play on 'widow's sighs' and 'orphan's tears' (l. 18). In conventional elegy, the sigh and tear should be the expression of the sadness of

[97]Alan S. Fisher seems not to reject Charles Peake's suggestion in 'Swift's "Satirical Elegy on a Late Famous General"', *REL*, 3 (1962), 80-89, that the above lines are spoken not by Swift but by the Town itself, when he proposes the following interpretation of the paragraph: 'One critic asserts that this is not the voice of Swift speaking, but the voice of the Town itself. Seen this way, the passage becomes meaningful in two respects: in the first place, the Town giveth and taketh away such greatness as Marlborough has—"Marlborough's reputation will be quickly destroyed by the very men who praise him while he was alive and powerful"; secondly, the passage is an example of devaluative criticism in the hands unworthy of it—true though it may be, we need not admire it. There is an ironic poetic justice in all this; Marlborough exposed in his true paltriness by minds whose own paltriness once made him great.', Alan S. Fisher, p. 348. However, even though there might be a conversational quality in the lines in question, I do not accept this suggestion. As traditional elegy sets a scene in which a single man praises the dead and laments the loss, and as Swift's method of achieving the satiric implication is to utilise the traditional form of elegy, it seems to me far more appropriate to interpret the whole poem as being spoken by Swift. My argument may be strengthened by the fact that Swift makes it clear when he transfers other people's words in lines 21-24 ('his friend may say,/ He had . . .').
[98]Louise K. Barnett, p. 128.

losing its subject, but it is quite different in the case of Marlborough. As can be seen in the following lines,

> Behold his funeral appears,
> Nor widow's sighs, nor orphan's tears,
> Wont at such times each heart to pierce,
> Attend the progress of his hearse.
> But what of that, his friends may say,
> He had those honours in his day.
> True to his profit and his pride,
> He made them weep before he died. (ll. 17-24)

the lack of widow's sighs and orphan's tears becomes a symbol of Marlborough's vice in his pursuit of 'profit' and 'pride', as he is described here as the cause (through his destructive military campaigns) of creating so many widows and orphans during his life time that no one will now lament his death. Thus, Swift follows the basic requirement of elegy by employing the sighs and tears of the living, but the emphasis is not on their expression of sadness but the lack of them when Marlborough is dead.

Swift's final twist of the convention of elegy comes in the lines that conclude the poem:

> Come hither, all ye empty things,
> Ye bubbles raised by breath of kings;
> Who float upon the tide of state,
> Come hither, and behold your fate.
> Let pride be taught by this rebuke,
> How very mean a thing's a Duke;
> From all his ill-got honours flung,
> Turned to that dirt from whence he sprung. (ll. 25-32)

Swift is here using his condemnation of Marlborough's shameful life to fulfil one of the conventions of elegy: as Marlborough returns to dirt from which he came, the vanity of human pride and desire is demonstrated and presented as a lesson. While, in the rest of the poem, Swift uses the elegy form to satirically implicate Marlborough, in this part, he, in reverse, uses the satirical accusation of Marlborough to fulfil the form of elegy. However, there is yet another twist here. Even though the word 'dirt' has a similarity to

'dust', thus invoking the burial service from the Book of Common Prayer, referring to Genesis 3. 19—'for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return'—'dirt' has a negative connotation here. Unlike the general applicability of 'dust to dust' which has no satirical implication, 'dirt to dirt' in the case of Marlborough not only serves the general maxim that all things are mortal and thus should return to nothingness, but also emphasises Swift's moral accusation of him: for, as Louise K. Barnett argues, Marlborough's return to dirt demonstrates the moral depravity of 'the specific case of the king's favourite, whose undeserved elevation from obscurity is a violation of order—a great man should not spring from the lowliness and uncleanliness of dirt'.[99] As can be seen in this poem in general, especially in the last passage, the grave moral accusation is buried in the form of elegy, which demonstrates Swift's reasoned, analytical exercise of mind which enables him to sublimate the emotion, his hatred of Marlborough, into a fine piece of incisive satire.

As late as in 1729, Swift's control of his feelings can be found to be operating in *The Journal of a Modern Lady*. Unlike the poems I have discussed above, there seems to be no specific analogy, imagery or conventional form of a genre which can be used to operate as a check on his emotion. However, if we look into this poem carefully, we can notice that there is a similarity of tactics between this poem and the other poems. That is, Swift lets the satirical implication lurk under the surface meaning of each work: in other words, he achieves his satiric purpose while feigning to talk about other things. This poem shares this strategy in that Swift's moral accusation of 'a modern lady' is well implanted in his report of a day in this lady's life.

In a way, the concept of a journal may itself provide a check on his satiric emotion. The form of a journal can be characterised by enumeration or miscellaneousness without any thematic arrangement. Thus, when Swift proposes to write a journal about a modern lady, the form does require him to follow one prerequisite: that is, it should not be so overtly organised by thematic concern as to destroy the appearance of randomness: in other words, it should report things as they are without imposing any order on them. To abide by this rule, even though Swift does want to present a satirical view of a modern lady's life, he needs to let such an organised aim

[99]Louise K. Barnett, pp. 128-129.

lurk under the miscellaneousness of the events. In this respect, the formless form of journal, without any abiding thematic concern, is Swift's self-imposed restraint on his satiric feeling. Following this restraint, his satiric intention in this poem becomes not an overtly imposing feature, but a latent intelligence which finds some kind of meaning in the meaninglessly spent day of a modern lady's life: in other words, it becomes a centre by which the centrifugal force of the orderless details of a modern lady's life is not lost in total chaos.

What Swift tries to do in the early part of the poem is to establish that the piece is going to exhibit the characteristics of a journal. When he says

> I but transcribe, for not a line
> Of all the satire shall be mine.
> Compelled by you to tag in rhymes
> The common slanders of the times,
> Of modern times; the guilt is yours,
> And me my innocence secures.
>
> Unwilling muse begin thy lay
> The annals of a female day. (ll. 28-35)

Swift defines his role in this poem as that of an essentially passive figure who is to record the succession of the events that happen in a day of the modern lady's life, thus to make an 'annal of a female day', as the phrases 'I but transcribe', 'compelled', and 'unwilling muse' indicate his passive stance in this poem. In other words, here he is insisting that, to borrow A. B. England's words, 'he does not intend to impose any kind of authorial pressure upon the materials with which he is dealing'.[100] However, in these lines, we can notice that there does emerge a hint of Swift's satirical attitude towards the life of the modern lady. Actually, Swift does not write this journal without any kind of pre-disposed attitude of mind: for, as he admits that the poem will be 'satire' (l. 29) even before the start of the journal, he already has some kind of set attitude towards the modern lady. In these lines, the pose of passivity is nothing but spurious, because, as Swift clandestinely will choose what event to report and with what cunning insinuation,

[100]A. B. England, *Energy and Order in the Poetry of Swift*, p. 120.

it is only a means by which the satirical implication is gathered by the readers, not seemingly imposed on them by him.

When he begins to report the incidents that happen on a day in this lady's life, in his seemingly passive report according to the passing of the time, Swift's critical evaluation of each event does emerge. For example, when he describes the lady's awakening as follows,

> She stretches, gapes, unglues her eyes,
> And asks if it be time to rise;
> Of headache, and the spleen complains;
> And then to cool her heated brains,
> (Her nightgown and her slippers brought her,)
> Takes a large dram of citron-water. (ll. 42-47)

we are given the impression from the direct, bare, and unelaborated description of this scene that Swift is passively reporting the event as it is. However, Swift manipulates these lines to ensure that the readers will evaluate the scene satirically. As it is indicated that this scene occurs at around 'noon' (l. 38) or 'not so quite soon' (l. 39), Swift's mock-serious reporting of the time of the lady's awakening and his description of her gracelessness make her a comic representation of a disordered life-style. When Swift reports the conversation between the lady and her maid Betty,

> 'Madam, the goldsmith waits below,
> He says, his business is to know
> If you'll redeem the silver cup
> He keeps in pawn? — 'Why, show him up.'
> Your dressing-plate, he'll be content
> To take, for interest *cent percent*.
> And, Madam, there's my Lady Spade
> Hath sent this letter by her maid.' (ll. 56-63)

his apparent lack of authorial intervention in reporting a conversation as it happens seems to accord with his declaration of himself as an untransforming recorder of events at the beginning of the poem. However, again, the content of this conversation clearly conveys the lady's corrupt mode of life, as she is reported to pawn her expensive crockery to pay for her gaming debts. In this respect, A. B. England is quite right when he points out that

'the poem in large part involves an attempt to render that multiplicity, without seeming to impose an artistic order upon it, yet at the same time to effect a significant evaluation of it'.[101]

Swift's tactic of this kind is best demonstrated in his description of the lady and her friends at the card game. When an argument develops between these modern ladies about cheating, the exchange makes its own points about the pettiness and depravity of the ladies, without any need for authorial interpretation:

> 'Lord, madam, you have lost codille,
> I never saw you play so ill.'
> 'Nay, madam, give me leave to say,
> 'Twas you that threw the game away;
> When Lady Tricksy played a four,
> You took it with a matador;
> I saw you touch your wedding-ring
> Before my Lady called a king.
> You spoke a word begun with H,
> And I know whom you meant to teach,
> Because you held the king of hearts:
> Fie, madam, leave these little arts.'
> 'That's not so bad as one that rubs
> Her chair to call the king of clubs,
> And makes her partner understand
> A matador is in her hand.' (ll. 246-261)

However, a more striking satiric implication is yet to come:

> While thus they rail, and scold, and storm,
> It passes but for common form;
> And conscious that they all speak true,
> They give each other but their due;
> It never interrupts the game,
> Or makes 'em sensible of shame. (ll. 270-275)

When we read the earlier lines, we expect some dramatic incident to happen as a result of the serious nature of the accusations. Yet, as we are simply and calmly informed by the poet that this is 'but a common form' which never interrupts the game, we come to

[101] A. B. England, *Energy and Order in the Poetry of Swift*, p. 122.

acknowledge their moral turpitude, as insinuated by Swift's matter-of-fact reporting of the event.

The poem ends when the lady goes to bed:

> Unlucky madam, left in tears,
> (Who now again quadrille forswears,)
> With empty purse, and aching head,
> Steals to her sleeping spouse to bed. (ll. 290-293)

As he promised in the beginning, Swift fulfils his duty as a passive observer to report a day of the modern lady's life from her waking up to her going to bed. As the report of the events ends, the poem's satiric implication is also completed, as we readers recognise that there will be no change in this lady's debased life-pattern. When this lady goes to bed, she swears not to play cards again, but we already know that she swore the same oath immediately after she woke up—'Well, if I ever touch a card:' (l. 51)—and then goes on to play cards through the night. We are reasonably sure that she will play again tomorrow, and even though she 'steals to her sleeping spouse' today, it will not be long before she will be forced to 'steal from her sleeping spouse'. However, in this poem, this moral truth is not directly mentioned by Swift: it is to be discovered by the readers from his seemingly factual report.

In the discussions of the poems above, I have demonstrated Swift's control of his satiric emotion towards the satiric butts through some poetic strategy. Indeed, the use of classical models, the use of some metaphor (metamorphosis), or the use of some conventional genre form (elegy) for ironic points of reference did provide Swift with a useful means of containing his satiric anger in his early verse satires. However, we cannot say that all the poems written in this period, the 1700s, 1710s, and 1720s, show his firm grip on the emotion. Even in some of the poems written as early as the 1710s, it can be found that sometimes the emotion does take control from the poetic devices, which are elsewhere used to ensure a check on the emotion. Of course, even these poems cannot be regarded as very similar to *The Legion Club* in which we can sense Swift's desperate and unrestrained aggression towards his victims. However, the seeds of loss of control which led to violent emotional eruption can be found even in this period. My

purpose in the remaining part of this chapter is to acknowledge that we can observe signs of Swift's losing grip on his emotion in the struggle between reason and emotion, which eventually resolves in favour of the latter in his final satires.

4. 'The Description of a Salamander' (written 1705 or 1706), *The Fable of Midas* (written in 1712), and *The Virtues of Sid Hamet the Magician's Rod* (written in 1710)

In my opinion, 'The Description of a Salamander' and *The Fable of Midas* do not belong to the category of Swift's poems of lack of control. Rather, these two poems do show a similarity to the poems I discussed above, such as *An Elegy on Mr Partridge* or 'The Progress of Poetry', in that, in these poems, Swift undermines the victims of his satire while feigning to follow the surface logic of the poem. Yet, I decide to discuss these two poems in this part for the purpose of preparing the ground for the discussion of *The Virtues of Sid Hamet the Magician's Rod.* While these three poems are similar in that Swift's attack on a contemporary political figure is carried out through his manipulation of some concept or analogy, such as Pliny's description of the salamander, the fable of Midas, and the rod analogy, *The Virtues of Sid Hamet* alone shows Swift's control of emotion slipping out of his grip. In a way, these three poems are good examples of the fact that Swift's intention to utilise some analogy or imagery, which proves usually to be a good means of checking emotion, is not always guaranteed to deliver restraint.

In 'The Description of a Salamander', we notice that Swift's hatred of John Cutts is well sublimated to the restrained and masterful criticism of him through the exploitation of his nickname and the use of Pliny as authority.[102] John Cutts gained his nickname for his bravery under fire, for the salamander was believed to have the ability to withstand fire. Swift's manipulation of this nickname starts by ignoring the metaphorical nature of the allusion. By explaining it entirely in physical terms, Swift indeed proves that Cutts is like a salamander, for all the wrong reasons. Swift's

[102]'Soldier; fought for William III at the Boyne (1690); created Baron the same year; his bravery at the siege of Namur (1695) earned him the nickname of 'Salamander'. Fought at Blenheim and was Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, 1705. M. P. A Tory, he was disliked by Swift for his inordinate vanity and perhaps for some personal reasons now unclear.', *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 913. For more information and possible reasons for Swift's hatred of him, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, II, pp. 162-164.

literalisation of the allusion starts when he excludes the metaphorical nature of the word 'fire':

> But e'er since men invented guns,
> A different way their fancy runs:
> To paint a hero, we inquire
> For something that will conquer fire.
> Would you describe Turenne or Trump,
> Think of a bucket or a pump.
> Are these too low? Then find out grander,
> Call my Lord Cutts a salamander. (ll. 15-22)

In these lines, by Swift's literalisation of the term 'fire', 'to conquer fire' loses all its metaphorical meaning and simply becomes 'to extinguish fire', as can be done by 'pump' or 'bucket'. In so doing, the comparison of Cutts to a salamander is rendered in Swift's hands strictly physical. Swift is saying to the readers that 'you call Cutts a salamander because he conquered fire. I agree with you because he has all the traits (physical) of a salamander. I shall demonstrate to you that, let alone his ability to extinguish fire, there are a lot of identical traits which justify your comparison of him to a salamander.' This devaluation of the analogy is not carried out on his own. As we can see in the following lines,

> Who may object against the term,
> Pliny shall prove what we affirm:
> Pliny shall prove, and we'll apply,
> And I'll be judged by standers-by. (ll. 25-28)

by emphasising the authority of Pliny by repeatedly placing his name at the beginning of lines, Swift pre-empts the possible opposition to his literal thus satirical identification of Cutts with a salamander.

When he quotes from Pliny to explain the salamander's characteristic traits, Swift chooses all the negative and even disgusting traits of this animal:

> First, then, our author has defined
> This reptile, of the serpent kind,
> With gaudy coat, and shining train,

But loathsome spots his body stain:
Out from some hole obscure he flies
When rains descend, and tempests rise,
Till the sun clears the air; and then
Crawls back, neglected, to his den. (ll. 29-36)

The distortion of the contemporary comparison of Cutts to a salamander thus comes when Swift decides to choose the negative physical traits of the salamander and then demonstrates their applicability to him. The habit of the salamander of being active only in the rain is neatly equated with that of Cutts, as he is described to

Burnish and make a gaudy show,
Become a general, peer and beau,
Till peace hath made the sky serene,
Then shrink into its hole again. (ll. 41-44)

Swift's criticism of him as a figure who flourishes in war, but is useless in peace time does not stop here. As Cutts's personal history is neatly likened to the salamander's habits, Swift's physical comparison of him to a salamander also gains force: thereby, Cutts becomes 'a snake in human form/ All stained with infamy and vice' (ll. 38-39) as the salamander is an animal with 'loathsome spots'.

As he already literalised the word 'fire' in the early part of the poem, when Swift explains the salamander's ability to withstand fire, he emphasises its extreme coldness which even extinguishes fire:

Farther we are by Pliny told,
This serpent is extremely cold;
So cold, that put it in the fire,
'Twill make the very flames expire: (ll. 47-50)

So, when he equates this trait with Cutts, Swift can put his emphasis on Cutts's coldness:

So have I seen a battered beau
By age and claps grown cold as snow,
Whose breath or touch, where'er he came,
Blew out love's torch, or chilled the flame: (ll. 57-60)

Here, we can find Swift's brilliant management of the analogy. The surface meaning of this passage is of course the physical coldness of Cutts, but also the metaphorical meaning of the coldness emerges from words such as 'love' and 'flame'. Swift makes it possible to equate the coldness of the salamander with that of Cutts by excluding the metaphorical meaning of 'fire'. However, in these lines he revives the metaphorical meaning of the coldness, thus accusing Cutts of moral depravity. In so doing, 'coldness under fire' goes through several changes of meaning through literalisation and re-metaphorisation until it finally comes to denote immorality . Thus, even though Swift's accusation of Cutts for his transfer of venereal disease in lines 61-68 is quite cruel, it is justified on the basis of the moral depravity of his victim which is proven already.

When Swift asks the readers the question, 'Then I'll appeal to each bystander,/ If this be not a salamander?' (ll. 69-70), he is rounding up his argument confidently: in the earlier part of the poem, he said that he would be judged by 'standers-by' (l. 28), and now as his transformation of Cutts from a war hero to moral enormity is completed, he shows his confidence that the readers will indeed verify his satirical comparison. In proving that people's endowing Cutts with the nickname salamander is right, Swift lets the readers recognise Cutts's moral depravity, while this poem, to borrow Alan S. Fisher's words, 'does not so much deal with a finished concept, like Salamanderism, as with putting that concept through a process of redefining, and what is left after reading the poem is not a sense that now we understand the concept better, but a sense that before we understood it very falsely'.[103]

Poetic skill of the same kind can also be found in *The Fable of Midas*, one of Swift's attacks on the Duke of Marlborough. As he utilises the people's comparison of Cutts to a salamander to reveal Cutts's moral depravity, in this poem Swift works out a debasing analogy of Marlborough to Midas, emphasising his greed.

[103]Alan S. Fisher, p. 345.

In the first half of the poem, Swift establishes a set of details on which he can later construct a satirical analogy with Marlborough, when he explains how Midas gained and lost the power of transforming all he touched into gold:[104]

> He chipped his bread; the pieces round
> Glittered like spangles on the ground:
> A codling e'er it went his lip in,
> Would straight become a golden pippin:
> He called for drink, you saw him sup
> Potable gold in golden cup. (ll. 3-8)

To this transforming power of Midas, Swift adds how he gained asses' ears when he failed to judge correctly a musical contest between Apollo and Pan:

> This fool had got a lucky hit,
> And people fancied he had wit:
> Two gods their skill in music tried,
> And both chose Midas to decide;
> He against Phoebus' harp decreed,
> And gave it for Pan's oaten reed:
> The god of wit to show his grudge,
> Clapped asses' ears upon the judge,
> A goodly pair, erect and wide,
> Which he could neither gild nor hide. (ll. 23-32)

In these lines, Swift is already building up some satirical implications: he is called 'fool' who was wrongly recognised by people to have wit, but proved to be the opposite by getting asses' ears. In this part of the poem, Swift lays the ground carefully to ensure that the similarity between Midas and Marlborough alone can implicate Marlborough.

When he describes Marlborough's transforming power as a parallel to Midas's as follows,

> This tale inclines the gentle reader,
> To think upon a certain leader,
> To whom from Midas down, descends

[104]While Pope utilises Midas's getting asses' ears due to his misjudgement in a musical contest between Pan and Apollo in *To Arbuthnot*, Swift chiefly uses Midas's golden touch. For more detail, see *Ovid: Metamorphoses*, XI, ll. 85-193.

That virtue in the fingers' ends:
What else by perquisites are meant,
By pensions, bribes, and three per cent?
By places and commissions sold,
And turning dung itself to gold? (ll. 41-48)

the analogy is established as Midas's gold is transformed to the modern gold. Swift's satiric accusation of Marlborough comes in this process of changing Midas's gold in its literal sense to modern gold: for, instead of equating Midas's gold with its modern counterpart, he compares it to the corrupt means of getting it, such as 'perquisites', 'pensions', 'bribes', 'places', and 'commissions'. Here, Swift demonstrates not only the analogy between the two, but also the difference. As Swift demonstrated earlier in lines 3-8, Midas's golden touch did do harm not so much to his country but to himself: in a way, even though he was hungry amidst gold, his shedding off of gold does make people happy as they came 'to gather golden gravel' (l. 38). However, though Midas and Marlborough share the same vice of greed, Marlborough has another vice because his thirst of greed is quenched by his political corruption. It is through this difference that Swift's satirical accusation of Marlborough becomes poignant.

After he proves the analogy between Midas and Marlborough in having asses' ears through demonstrating Marlborough's poor quality as a patron in lines 51-60 and his failure to discern delusions in lines 61-66, Swift's attack on Marlborough becomes more acidic when he again tries to establish the analogy in their losing their golden touch. While there is no mention of the cause for Midas's loss of transforming power, Swift provides the readers with the cause for it in Marlborough's case: [105]

But gold defiles with frequent touch,
There's nothing fouls the hands so much:
And scholars give it for the cause,
Of British Midas' dirty paws;
Which while the senate strove to scour,
They washed away the chemic power. (ll. 67-72)

[105]Actually, as he got his golden touch by supplicating to Bacchus, Midas asked the favour to be reversed, and Bacchus ordered him to bathe in the Pactolus.

In view of Swift's accusation of his political corruption, it is appropriate to interpret the word 'dirty' metaphorically, thus as politically corrupt. However, there is another twist here, and through this twist Swift's condemnation of Marlborough is made more damning. As gold can be interpreted as insinuating excrement, the word 'dirty' can also be literal in its meaning, fouled by excrement.[106] Thus, when Marlborough is described as 'neglected stands/ With asses' ears, and dirty hands' (ll. 81-82), Swift is inducing in the readers satirical laughter as well as anger at the pathetic figure of him with asses' ears (metaphorical) and fouled hands (literal and metaphorical).

In these two poems, 'The Descriptions of Salamander' and *The Fable of Midas*, there exist two layers of argument: the first is the obvious, the immediate—the similarity between Midas and Marlborough—the other less obvious, but Swift's real argument, building on the delicate difference between the two. Swift's poetic skill is well shown in his manipulation of these two layers of argument as he utilises the first one to introduce and strengthen the second argument. In a way, these poems become successful in the satiric indictment of their victims as a result of Swift's skilful connection of two arguments, his using the first one as a check on the second one. For example, in 'The Description of a Salamander', the first argument is 'Cutts is like a salamander, because he can withstand fire', and the second one, 'Cutts is vicious as he has all the odious characteristics of a salamander'. Swift succeeds in connecting these two arguments by literalising and physicalising the first argument, as in the case of the term 'fire'. However, if this connection is faulty, the successful control of his satiric emotion seems to collapse, as the satiric emotion becomes free of control and takes over from his reason. We can find the first example of this faulty connection in *The Virtues of Sid Hamet the Magician's Rod.*

When Godolphin, then Lord Treasurer, had been requested by Queen Anne in 1710 after the Sacheverell affair to break his staff of office, in other words, to resign, the imagery of the staff provides Swift with the foundation on which he builds his accusation of Godolphin's vice.[107] In the poem, he utilises the staff as the symbol of Godolphin's

[106]In Harold Williams's edition which follows original typography as much as possible, the word 'gold' and 'fouls' are italicised, encouraging the readers' interpretation of this kind. Pat Rogers misses this point when he normalises this specific use of italics.

[107]'Godolphin, Sidney, first earl of Godolphin (1645-1712), statesman; . . . a lord of the Treasury, 1679; . . . secretary of state, 1684; . . . head of the Treasury, 1690-6; the only Tory lord justice, 1695; . . . lord high treasurer and Marlborough's confidential ally, 1702-10; induced by the duchess to force the queen to

vice, which he reveals through repetitive comparison of it to other staffs, historical, mythical, or ordinary.

First, he compares it to the rod of Moses, which was 'a harmless wand' (l. 1) when Moses held it but turned to a 'devouring serpent' (l. 4) when he laid it down. In comparison with Moses's rod, however, Godolphin's staff acted in the opposite way (ll. 7-12). Swift's satirical view of Godolphin can be easily grasped as Godolphin's touch on the rod is described as having evil influence. The use of comparison of this kind is again shown when Godolphin's rod is compared to 'a certain magic rod' (l. 22). While the divine rod is believed to point toward gold, Godolphin's staff of office is described as pointing toward the sources of profit unerringly:

> In Scottish hills found precious ore,
> Where none e'er looked for it before:
> And by a gentle bow divined
> How well a cully's purse was lined:
> To a forlorn and broken rake,
> Stood without motion, like a stake. (ll. 29-34)

The satiric implication arises from the fact that, even though both rods are pointed toward gold, one is supposed to, and the other, Godolphin's rod, is not. Swift's accusation of Godolphin's exploitation of his office is repeated as his rod is next compared with that of Hermes. As Hermes's rod could put mortals to sleep and send 'departed souls' (l. 38) to Styx, the underworld, Godolphin's rod can also put mortals to sleep: but in this case, it puts not the 'departed souls', but that of Parliament to sleep and sends it down to hell (l. 42).

Swift's criticism of Godolphin's vice goes on through the comparison of his rod to a fishing rod, a magician's rod, and Achilles's sceptre, demonstrating the superficial similarity and the fundamental difference between them, which emphasises Godolphin's vice. However, as these objects do not have any relation except the fact that they are all rods of various kinds, each accusation against Godolphin remains disconnected and

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replace Tory by Whig ministers; took part in promoting union with Scotland and in Portuguese and Spanish affairs; . . . attacked by Sacheverell as 'Volpone', vehemently urged his impeachment, 1709; dismissed by Anne with a pension, 1710;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*. For Swift's animosity against the earl of Godolphin, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, III, pp. 152-156.

rather too repetitive to develop a satiric theme. Even though Swift neatly accuses Godolphin of his vice, this poem does not possess the same satiric quality as the poems I discussed earlier: for, Swift does not offer a secure point of connection between the rod analogy and Godolphin's vice. This is to say that, although Swift uses the rod analogy to attack Godolphin, it is not clear how this rod analogy is now actually connected to Godolphin's vice. There do exist two arguments in this poem: the first one is that 'Godolphin used to have a rod as a symbol of his office' and the second one that 'Godolphin is a vicious man'. However, this poem does not show how these arguments are related, because, instead of explaining the reason why Godolphin deserved to be satirised through the development of the rod analogy, Swift uses this analogy simply to trigger his various attacks on Godolphin while the readers are required to take it for granted that Godolphin in office was a greedy, corrupt, and insensitive man. We can admit that each analogy is ingenious, but the ingenuity itself cannot guarantee the success of this poem: for, the rod analogy in this poem is not a sustained comparison between original story and the satirical application of it, as Swift simply takes a series of rods randomly and applies them to attack various aspects of Godolphin's behaviour. What Swift demonstrates in each analogy is 'the neatness of the parallelism rather than the nature of the charge which that parallelism is a witty way of making', when the series of analogies reflects a repetitive indulgence of Swift's own emotion, rather than a controlled development of the satirical theme.[108] The readers can take pleasure in observing Swift's ingenious way of exploiting Godolphin's vice through the rod analogy, but they cannot agree with his charge without reservation, for they are not offered the grounds for it. However, we also should understand that Swift's satiric emotion taking a free flight is not a one-off incident. It may be the revelation of a deeply rooted attitude of mind, as a similar thing happens in other poems such as *Upon the South Sea Project* and *A Serious Poem upon William Wood.*

5. *Upon the South Sea Project* (written in 1720) and *A Serious Poem upon William Wood* (written in 1724)

In *Upon the South Sea Project* and *A Serious Poem upon William Wood*, Swift's grip on his management of the imagery, that of water and wood, to develop a satirical

[108]A. B. England, 'The Subversion of Logic in Some Poems by Swift', *SEL*, 15 (1975), 409-418 (p. 415).

theme is far weaker than in the poems I have discussed above. In these two poems, his manipulation of imagery ceases to operate as a medium by which he can persuade us of the moral depravity of the South Sea Company directors and William Wood, and rather is degraded to a means by which he can express his anger repeatedly towards them.

*Upon the South Sea Project* is Swift's satire on those who are associated with the South Sea Project, who, Swift believed, deluded the naive investors into believing the South Sea Company to be a rich source of financial gain.[109] When Swift starts the poem as follows,

> Ye wise philosophers! explain,
> What magic makes our money rise,
> When dropped into the Southern Main;
> Or do these jugglers cheat our eyes? (ll. 1-4)

he makes it clear that the disaster of the South Sea Project was due to cheating by the directors, through a literalised explanation of the preposterous nature of the scheme: as the hard coin cannot rise from the bottom of the sea once thrown into it, the financial gain from the investment into the South Sea Company was the same as to defy the nature of gravity, which could be made possible only by some kind of magic, or more realistically by cheating. In so doing, Swift demonstrates his intention to use the water imagery to accuse the directors of the scheme of cheating.

When he presents the following passage,

> Thus in a basin drop a shilling,
> Then fill the vessel to the brim;
> You shall observe, as you are filling,
> The ponderous metal seems to swim.
>
> It rises both in bulk and height,
> Behold it swelling like a sop!
> The liquid medium cheats your sight,
> Behold it mounted to the top! (ll. 9-16)

[109]For the debacle of South Sea Bubble, which put so many people into ruin and gave a few cunning and fortunate ones a fortune, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, III, pp. 152-156.

Swift's poetic skill is well demonstrated: as it is due to delusion that the coin seems to float in the water contrary to reality, it is insinuated to be due to cheating that the investors came to believe the South Sea Project. The connection of water imagery and the theme of cheating is again well demonstrated when Swift compares the investors to an unfortunate mariner:

> So, by a calenture misled,
> The mariner with rapture sees
> On the smooth ocean's azure bed
> Enamelled fields, and verdant trees.
>
> With eager haste he longs to rove
> In that fantastic scene, and thinks
> It must be some enchanted grove;
> And *in* he leaps, and *down* he sinks. (ll. 25-32)

As calenture is 'a disease incident to sailors within the tropics, characterized by delirium, in which the patient, it is said, fancies the sea to be green fields, and desires to leap into it' (OED, sb. 1), the immediate comparison seems to be established between the sailor and the investors. Yet, comparison does not stop there. Swift also reminds the readers of the similarity between calenture and the South Sea project, which is their illusory nature leading their victims to destruction, and, in so doing, he accuses the South Sea directors of creating an illusion, thus cheating. Thus, Swift's accusation of the South Sea directors is well developed in this mariner's tale through his ingenious adoption of water imagery from the name of the project, and comparison of the directors to calenture, a disease.

However, the connection between the water imagery and the satiric theme begins to loosen when Swift introduces the tale of Icarus:

> Raised up on Hope's aspiring plumes,
> The young adventurer o'er the deep
> An eagle's flight and state assumes,
> And scorns the middle way to keep.
>
> On paper wings he takes his flight,
> With wax the father bound them fast;
> The wax is melted by the height,
> And down the towering boy is cast. (ll. 41-48)

This Icarus tale does not bear much relationship with the water imagery: if there is any, it can be forced from the fact that he drowned in the sea. However, when we apply this tale to the South Sea Project, the theme of the cheating disappears because, as the blame for Icarus's fate lies on himself whose refusal to keep 'the middle way' caused his fate, the investors come to be responsible for their financial ruin and thus the directors go free of any moral accusation. As the poem proceeds, Swift produces variations on the water imagery rather than a sustained development of the satirical theme. For example:

> Inform us, you that best can tell,
> Why in yon dangerous gulf profound,
> Where hundreds, and where thousands fell,
> Fools chiefly float, the wise are drowned?
>
> So have I seen from Severn's brink
> A flock of geese jump down together,
> Swim where the bird of Jove would sink,
> And swimming never wet a feather. (ll. 57-64)

When the fools who survived or indeed got rich in the South Sea scheme are compared to the geese on the river Severn, we observe that Swift is ridiculing or name-calling the directors by comparing them to geese. However, we should ask, where is the relevancy of these lines in relation to the demonstration of moral deficiency of the directors? How do the directors who indeed cunningly deceived the investors come to be described as fools, and how can Swift compare the naive investors to the wise? As these lines have no bearing on the satiric theme of cheating, they become nothing but Swift's diversion on creating ingenious ways to attack the people involved in the South Sea Project. Swift's original plan to subordinate the water imagery to the satiric theme begins to fade rapidly in these lines, and with the following lines, it seems to be completely lost:

> Undone at play, the female troops
> Come here their losses to retrieve;
> Ride o'er the waves in spacious hoops,
> Like Lapland witches in a sieve.
>
> Thus Venus to the sea descends
> As poets feign; but where's the moral?

It shows the Queen of Love intends
To search the deep for pearl and coral. (ll. 97-104)

The image of 'female troops' attempting to 'Ride o'er the waves' seems to have some bearing on the poem's basic imagery, and makes them accountable for their ruin as they are described as 'Undone at play', which is the motive for their investment in the scheme. However, even this vague accusation (vague because it deviates from the original theme of the cheating) is thrown into confusion when in the second stanza Swift introduces Venus. As is shown in the word 'Thus', the two stanzas are connected, but how are they related? The only point of connection seems to be Venus's being a female and having been born at sea: apart from that, the second stanza does nothing to develop or strengthen the argument of the first stanza. When he asks 'but where's the moral?', Swift himself seems to admit that there is no moral point in this stanza and its only value is his variation of the water imagery as he flaunts his own question by providing an irrelevant and gratuitous answer.

From this point on, what Swift is doing in this poem is demonstrating his ingenuity in connecting the South Sea Project to anything if it has even the slightest relation to water, ignoring his initial satiric theme. For example, in the following lines

The sea is richer than the land,
I heard it from my grannam's mouth,
Which now I clearly understand,
For by the sea she meant the South.

Upon the water cast thy bread
And after many days thou'lt find it;
But gold upon this ocean spread
Shall sink, and leave no mark behind it. (ll. 105-108, 141-144)

Swift's virtuosity is remarkable in relating traditional sayings or biblical passages to the condemnation of the South Sea Project. However, even though we can appreciate Swift's criticism of the project in these lines, these lines are reiterating the same argument Swift made long before: without developing the satiric theme, these lines are redundant. Swift is simply using the water imagery to repeat basically the same accusation again and again, with no proper justification for the attack.

When Swift applies the water imagery to the Antaeus myth, we find that the original purpose of the water imagery is completely disregarded:

> Antaeus could by magic charms
> Recover strength whene'er he fell,
> Alcides held him in his arms,
> And sent him up in air to hell.
>
> Directors thrown into the sea
> Recover strength and vigour there,
> But may be tamed another way,
> Suspended for a while in air. (ll. 189-196)

According to the myth, Antaeus was given new strength whenever he touched the ground, so Hercules had to kill him by crushing him while holding him up in the air.[110] However, the relevance of this myth as applied to the South Sea Project is not clear. The myth does provide Swift with a means of expressing his anger and desire to see the directors executed: as Antaeus was killed in the air, Swift implies, the directors should be 'suspended for a while in air', in other words, they should be hanged to be tamed. Even though we do appreciate Swift's ingenuity in utilising the myth and the water imagery, we notice that the water imagery actually degenerates into a means of expressing anger and hate, as it becomes utilised for surrogate physical punishment. As the connection between the satiric theme and the water imagery is lost, here we observe that Swift's control of his emotion disappears and his anger takes over.

In *Upon the South Sea Project*, however, we should notice that there is at least some attempt to connect the water imagery with Swift's theme in the early part of the poem, even though this attempt fades as his emotion takes over. However, in *A Serious Poem upon William Wood*, there cannot be found even the slightest hint of such an attempt, as what Swift is doing in this poem is to try get some satisfaction by symbolically torturing William Wood through the vehicle of analogy. Though Swift contrives the wood analogy from the surname of his victim and applies it with some virtuoso effect to inflict as much damage as possible, this satire does not become

[110]For more detail, see *Lucanus: Pharsalia*, trans. by J. D. Duff, *The Loeb Classical Library* (London: Heinemann, 1928), IV, ll. 589-655.

anything other than an invective against Wood, in other words, Swift's unchecked burst of anger against his victim, as there is no argument about Wood's moral deficiency.[111]

What Swift is doing in this poem is to exploit the word 'wood' by letting it denote the real person William Wood, and in so doing to become a 'hewer of wood', a tormentor of William Wood. One way of inflicting damage is to call names by deliberately ignoring the difference between two kinds of wood. When Swift says

> I hear among scholars there is a great doubt
> From what kind of tree this Wood was hewn out.
> Teague made a good pun by a brogue in his speech,
> And said: 'By my shoul he's the son of a beech':
> Some call him a thorn, the curse of a nation,
> As thorns were designed to be from the creation.
> Some think him cut out from the poisonous yew,
> Beneath whose ill shade no plant ever grew.
> Some say he's a birch, a thought very odd,
> For none but a dunce would come under his rod.
> But I'll tell you the secret, and pray do not blab,
> He is an old stump cut out of a crab, (ll. 25-36)

he is exploiting the difference between Wood the real person and wood the object to throw names at William Wood, as he deliberately confuses the two. Under the pretence of enquiring into the history of Wood the person, he is talking about wood the object, and in so doing, he is encouraging the readers to do the reverse reasoning, which is to find a clue to the real person from the words which denote the object. Thus, as the difference between Wood and wood becomes deliberately blurred, wood 'the son of a beech' and 'crab' becomes William Wood 'the son of a bitch' and 'crap'. In these lines, Swift's anger towards Wood is being expressed by the name-calling on top of other hard hitting phrases such as 'the curse of nation' and 'poisonous', while Wood's moral deficiency is taken for granted. If there is any form of emotional control here, it is for the purpose of inflicting more damage on Wood, rather than for persuading the readers to accept his accusation.

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[111]This poem is one offspring of Swift's anger caused by Wood's half-pence affair. Along with his celebrated *Drapier's Letter* series, in which he passionately urged Ireland to refuse the scheme, Swift wrote several poems, such as 'An Epigram on Wood's Brass Money', 'Wood and Insect', and 'Wood the Ironmonger', to attack William Wood, the infamous patent-holder. For more information about Swift's effort against the scheme, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, III, pp. 187-283.

Another way of inflicting damage is to symbolically inflict physical damage on Wood as is shown in the following lines:

> A joiner to fasten a saint in a niche,
> Bored a larger auger-hole in the image's breech;
> But finding the statue to make no complaint,
> He would ne'er be convinced it was a true saint:
> When the true Wood arrives, as he soon will no doubt,
> (For that's but a sham Wood they carry about)
> What stuff he is made on you quickly may find,
> If you make the same trial, and bore him behind;
> I'll hold you a groat, when you wimble his bum,
> He'll bellow as loud as a de'il in a drum: (ll. 71-80)

In these lines, Swift's deliberate confusion of the difference between the two woods is carried to an extreme until eventually the wooden saint becomes an animate being who bellows for the pain inflicted by Swift. However, reading these lines, some readers who might not yet be pre-disposed against William Wood, and thus whom Swift needs to persuade to rally Ireland against the half-pence scheme, may become uncomfortable, because, without any justification for it, the lines show nothing but his desire to torture William Wood and to hear him bellow.

When the poem draws to a close, Swift does not even try to exploit the difference between the two woods:

> Hear one story more, and then I will stop.
> I dreamt Wood was told he should die by a drop:
> So methought, he resolved no liquor to taste,
> For fear the first drop might as well be his last:
> But dreams are like oracles, hard to explain 'em,
> For it proved that he died of a drop at Kilmainham:
> I waked with delight, and not without hope,
> Very soon to see Wood drop down from a rope. (ll. 109-116)

In these lines, the pun on wood is no more, as instead Swift plays the pun on 'drop'. William Wood's death is taken for granted, as Swift ponders by what method Wood shall die, whether by poison or by hanging. The metaphorical nature of torture in lines 71-80 disappears and is replaced by blatant desire for the real execution of William Wood. In

this respect, this poem is a fine example of how far Swift can lose the control of his emotions. Enraged by the situation caused by Wood's half-pence, from the beginning of the poem Swift rushes into a hard-hitting attack on his satiric butt, which does not even consider explaining the cause of his moral anger. The only thing which prevents this poem from degenerating into total invective is Swift's witty manipulation of the wood imagery. However, against Swift's enormous anger, this wood imagery is indeed too fragile a means of achieving the ideal balance between the anger and the need to persuade the readers, which would enable the poetic sublimation of the anger, and in so doing, provide a clue to resolving crisis. The hard-hitting of this poem might be enough for the readers who already had sympathy with Swift's cause. And, given the situation, in which almost all of Ireland became enraged by the half-pence scheme, Swift might get away with this poem. However, it could still have impact only on pre-disposed readers. And, if the situation becomes more tricky—that is, if there were no pre-disposed readers—this kind of poem cannot demonstrate the persuading power which a reformative satire should have.

Before we proceed to the next chapter, which concerns both poets' reaction to their growing sense of scepticism about the reformative power of satire, we should keep in mind that both poets' practice in satire is nothing but precarious. That is, even in their early satires before their scepticism grew, they could not quite confidently put into practice the ideal of reformative satire which they advocated ardently.

# Chapter 4

## The Sincere Persona: The 'I' in the Satires of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift

### I

In chapter 2, I have discussed Pope's and Swift's defence of their satires, which proved to be apologias which betray a lack of confidence in their self-doubt about their satire's ability to occasion any reform. As I have discussed in chapter 1, despite their initial conviction about the reformative function of their satires, what was emerging towards the latter stages of their satiric careers is their changing attitude towards satire, their doubt about its reformative function.[1] Even though this change of attitude cannot be said to be a linear development, we come across a number of remarks by Pope and Swift which point to their altered view of satire. For example, when he remarked to his friend Charles Ford as follows, commenting on Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Lord Hervey's attack on Pope in the *Verses Address'd to the Imitator of the First Satire of the Second Book of Horace* that

> I envy Mr. Pope for his being railed at. I think all men of wit should employ it in Satyr, if it will onely serve to vex Rogues, though it will not amend them. If my Talent that way were equal to the sourness of my temper I would write nothing else.[2]

Swift is rather nonchalantly, as his ironic envy for Pope suggests, commenting on satire's inefficacy to reform the rogues. Even though he insists that every wit should write satire, his purpose is not to reform, but to vex, thus to destroy rather than to construct. If Swift's remarks on the inefficacy of satire in the paragraph above are relatively relaxed, he did show his agony and despair when this subject was picked up again in 'An Answer to a Paper, called a Memorial':

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[1]For the discussion about their changing attitudes towards satire through their remarks on it outside their satires, see chapter 1, pp. 48-61.
[2]*The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, p. 138, Swift to Charles Ford, 5 April 1733.

> I have now present before me the Idea of some Persons . . . who spend every Moment of their Lives, and every Turn of their Thoughts while they are awake, (and probably of their Dreams while they sleep) in the most detestable Actions and Designs; who delight in *Mischief*, *Scandal*, *Obloquy*, with the *Hatred* and *Contempt* of all Mankind against them; . . . Such Creatures are not to be reformed; neither is it Prudence, or Safety to attempt a Reformation. Yet, although their Memories will *rot*, there may be some Benefit for their Survivers, to smell it while it is *rotting*.[3]

In this paragraph, we can sense Swift's painful observation about satire's inability to cause reform: the only function satire can manage is to record the abominable memory of the wrong-doers. It is almost masochistic for Swift to admit that his satire is only capable of preserving the invidious smells which come from vice, thus its only function is to remind the survivors of his generation, if there are any, of the vice which it cannot reform. This kind of pessimism was shared by Pope as well. He was painfully aware of his limitation as a satirist in trying to correct vice when he said as follows in his letter to Ralph Allen:

> I can but Skirmish & maintain a flying fight with Vice; its forces augment, & will drive me off the Stage, before I shall see the Effects complete, either of divine Providence or vengeance: for sure we can be quite Saved only by the One or punished by the other: The Condition of Morality is so desperate, as to be above all Human Hands.[4]

In this letter, Pope is confessing that all he can do is to resist the final outcome. But even this is doubted as he also accepts the might of the corruption which would make his meagre effort futile.

It is easy for us to assume that this change of view was brought about as their immediate reaction to outside pressure, in other words, external hostility towards their efforts to correct the vice and folly they perceived. Actually, this assumption can be supported by the historical evidence which proves the existence (rather abundant) of such

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[3]'An Answer to a Paper, called A Memorial *of the poor* Inhabitants, Tradesmen and Labourers *of the Kingdom* of Ireland', in *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, XII, pp. 24-25.

[4]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, pp. 108-109, Pope to Ralph Allen, 6 July 1738.

hostility.[5] However, it is to see only a part of the whole picture if we assume that Pope and Swift wrote tragic satire only as an immediate reflexive reaction to outside hostility. As I have argued in chapter 3, they experienced certain difficulties in transforming their ideal into practice, and this inner frailty should be taken into account when considering their changing view of satire.[6]

It is in a way very helpful for us that Pope and Swift wrote satires over a long period of time, covering decades. What is more fortunate for us is that, before they wrote satire of a tragic outlook, they wrote some poems which reveal to us their exploration and reassessment of the relationship between them and the world. It is my contention

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[5]For example, for Pope's case, we can look into the dunces' attack after he published the first *Dunciad* (1728), which he enumerated in the Appendix II of the *Dunciad Variorum*. (Actually, Appendix II is divided into two parts, one allotted to the dunces' attack before the *Dunciad*, the other after its first publication, altogether 26 examples.) Also, we can add to the list Lady Mary and Lord Hervey's vicious attack on him after he published *Sat. II. i*, which I discussed in chapter 2. We can also add the Walpole administration's attack on him, carried out by the hack writers hired by Walpole, in the pro-administration newspapers such as the *Daily Gazetteer*, two examples of which I shall mention later in this chapter. In my opinion, the following epitaph, ascribed to Colley Cibber, his arch-enemy, which appeared in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for June 1744 after his death (30 May 1744),

> Our pious praise on tombstones runs so high,
> Readers might think, that none but good mends!
> If graves held only such: *Pope*, like his verse,
> Had still been breathing, and escap'd the hearse.
> Tho' fell to all men's failings, but his own,
> Yet to assert his vengeance, or renown,
> None ever reach'd such heights of *Helicon*!

sums up contemporary hostility towards Pope, from Leonard R. N. Ashley, *Colley Cibber* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), p. 115. For Swift's case, we can cite the administration's attempt to arrest him after he published the Drapier's letters against Wood's half-pence and after he published *An Epistle to a Lady* in 1733. For more information, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, III, 264-271, 717-718, John I. Fischer, 'The Government's Response to Swift's *An Epistle to a Lady*', *PQ*, 65 (1986), 39-59.

[6]Of course, we cannot exclude the relationship a satirist has with the outside world, his historical audience, which includes hostile readers as well as sympathetic ones, in discussing a satirist's inner doubt about his satire, when we consider that satire belongs to the public domain. Thus, when I distinguish inner doubt from outside pressure, I emphasise the satirist's own estimation of his relationship with the world, which is the most important factor in the effectiveness of his satire in occasioning the reform he desires. Thus, when I say inner doubt, I mean the satirist's assessment of his relationship with the world, which proves different from the ideal relationship with the world, that between a satirist and his sympathetic readers. A satirist might lash out his rage against the world, without reassessing the reality he is in, thus not understanding the real reason behind the failure of his satire. However, another satirist might reassess the situation after the initial reaction to his satires, trying to understand the cause behind his failure. This satirist can ask himself several questions such as whether it is meaningful for him to continue writing satire given the reality he is in, and if he does want to write satire, what role he can endow his satire with after its reformative function proves to be difficult or even impossible to achieve. My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how Pope and Swift reassessed the situation they were in, and thus how they changed their views of satire in modifying the roles their satires could play.

that, through the interpretation of these poems, we can arrive at an understanding of why their uncertainty about their satire came to grow into strong doubt about the reformative function of their satires and of how these growing doubts came to be manifested in these poems.

What is peculiar in these poems, Pope's imitations of Horace's satires and epistles, and Swift's poems to Stella and the Markethill poems, is that the subject of the poems is the poet himself or his relationship with other people, which allows our intimate insight into their views about themselves, and which in turn provides us with valuable information about the relationship they perceived themselves to have with the world.

However, before we proceed to discuss these poems, one matter should be resolved, which is the question of the relationship between the speaker of the poem and its author. In previous chapters, I assume that the relationship between the putative speaker and the author is almost identical. However, while there seems to be relatively little problem of identification between speaker and author when the speaker says what the author believes, there can arise reasonable doubt about this identification if the speaker advocates what the author actually wants to criticise. One might say that the identification is still possible because in this case we can assume that the author adopts an ironic posture. However, if the speaker sometimes says what the author believes but at other times says the contrary even in the same work, revealing considerable inconsistency, can we still deny this speaker some form of separate identity, ascribing all the signs of inconsistency to the historical author? It seems to me that the facile identification of the speaker with the author should be put under rigorous scrutiny until we arrive at some reasonable establishment of the relationship between the speaker and the historical author.

This need for rigorous examination becomes stronger when we consider that, in the poems above, the 'I' of the poem speaks about itself, and in so doing provides us with valuable information which can be put to use for understanding their attitudes towards satire.[7] We should ask whether this 'I' can indeed be regarded as Pope's or Swift's

[7]In the Markethill poems, Swift employs a different strategy, in that it is the third person speaker, not 'I', who talks about Swift according to his or her view. Yet, this group of poems shares the same characteristic with *Imitations of Horace* and the poems to Stella in that they try to establish a portrait of the author.

authorial voice and its subject as the historical, not fictional, Pope or Swift, which in expansion can be related to the fundamental question of the relationship between the speaker, the persona or the mask, and the author. In this respect, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first is to establish the relationship between persona and author; [8] the second is to explore how and what Pope and Swift say about themselves through the use of 'I'.

1. The validity of the persona

In discussing eighteenth-century literature, especially its satiric works, the critical debate about the concept of the persona can be really problematic for any reader seeking to understand the proper meaning of a work. It is a painful experience to witness how interpretations can be dramatically different from each other, depending on whether each interpretation acknowledges the existence of the persona or not. For example, Swift's *Letter of Thanks from My Lord Wharton*, in which Swift speaks in the person of the infamous Wharton, yields two different interpretations resulting from two different attitudes towards the persona. Irvin Ehrenpreis argues that, in this work, unlike most creators of satire or comedy such as Juvenal, Molière, and Brecht who 'avoided bringing themselves directly into their works' and 'so far from accepting a part of the responsibility for the triumph of evil covertly absolved themselves of blame', Swift 'plunges into the prospect of evil, establishing himself in the immediate foreground of the scene'.[9] For Ehrenpreis, Swift acknowledges his own complicity in the folly and vice he attacks, because he regards the voice of the speaker (the 'I') in this work as the historical Swift's without any doubt, and in so doing, he assumes that Swift blurs the distinction between himself and Wharton by adopting the latter's voice. However, Robert C. Elliott argues against Swift's recognition of his own involvement in the vice and folly, emphasising the distance between the 'I' in Swift's work and the historical Swift. Elliott counters Ehrenpreis's argument about this work as follows:

[8] I decide to call the putative speaker of a literary work the persona, because whether one likes it or loathes it, it is the most frequently used term to denote the speaker of a literary work, and carefully defined, it can include the concept of mask, as I shall argue later.

[9] Irvin Ehrenpreis, 'Swift and the Comedy of Evil', in *The World of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Brian Vickers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), pp. 213-219 (pp. 216-217).

> Swift takes on the guise of the enemy in order to do a wrecking job from the inside; he wants to articulate and lay bare the premises, to trace out the consequences, of enemy's position. . .[.].
>
> But to impersonate the enemy, and even at some level of one's being to have sympathy with him, is not, as critics are saying now, automatically to take on the enemy's guilt or to admit complicity in his acts.[10]

Both critics do not disagree on the fact that the main thrust of this work is Swift's attack on Wharton's vice, but the problem is to determine whether Swift acknowledges secretly his own complicity by assuming the identity of Wharton. We readers cannot know for sure because there is no reliable historical document about this matter. Ehrenpreis thinks Swift does because, even though he does recognise the possibility of the author's ironic posturing, he does not acknowledge the distance between speaker and author.[11] Elliott does not think Swift does, although he does not rule it out as a possibility, because he acknowledges the distance between speaker and author, thus the existence of the persona. In other words, for Ehrenpreis, there is no buffer zone between speaker and author, so the guilt of the speaker can spill over to the author, while for Elliott there is a gap between them.

We can see the complex problem of determining the identity of the first person singular pronoun 'I' in a literary work even when the author takes on the disguise of a different person such as his enemy. Thus the sheer difficulty can be imagined when the author uses 'I' with some self-referential remarks accompanied by some historical truths. Should we identify this 'I' directly with the historical author or should we recognise some distance between the 'I' and its creator?

The purpose of this chapter is to try to find some point of compromise between the two seemingly opposite stances. It is inappropriate to disregard one stance entirely, because, I believe, each has its own merit which guards against the fallacy of the other stance when applied radically or exclusively. The point of compromise is not at all impossible, because Ehrenpreis and Elliott share more than they disagree, in that they

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[10]Robert C. Elliott, *The Literary Persona* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 115.

[11]Irvin Ehrenpreis's argument against the persona and his theory of author assuming various postures including the ironic one will be discussed in the following pages.

both oppose the facile identification of the speaker with its author as well as the total autonomy of the speaker from its creator.[12]

Before entering into further discussion, we need to define the point they disagree upon. It would be very helpful in the first place if there existed a certain literary definition of the word persona. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case. Actually, one aspect of the debate about the persona is about its definition. Elliott is quite right to point out that the controversies over the concept of the persona are 'terminological' rather than 'substantive':

> Writers who attack the persona are likely to think the term entails a complete separation between the author and the pose he assumes: the mask having nothing to do with the wearer of the mask. Proponents have a much more flexible idea of the relation between persona and author, mask and wearer becoming almost indistinguishable at times.[13]

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[12]In his article, 'The Muse of Satire', Maynard Mack seems to adopt the stance which emphasises the complete impersonality of satire when he discusses the 'ethos' of the satirist, such as *vir bonus* and *ingénu*, which he defines as the 'rhetorical' occasion, thus lessening the importance of the historical actuality surrounding the satirist. For more detail, see Maynard Mack, 'The Muse of Satire', *The Yale Review*, 41 (1951), 80-92.

[13]Robert C. Elliott, p. 18. Elliott's view can be supported by looking at the arguments of the opposite camps concerning the persona. For example, Ehrenpreis, in his controversial essay 'Personae', assumes that there is a complete separation between author and persona when one uses the term: 'Although terminology may vary, the concept as normally invoked seems to imply certain common presuppositions. Fundamental is the principle that a literary work should be regarded not as an aspect of the author's personality but as a separate thing. As a consequence, the sentiments expressed in a literary work are not to be attributed to the author himself. In the room of the author, one is well advised to lodge an intermediate figure, the speaker or narrator created by him. It is to this persona that we may then assign the attitudes which seem implicit in a literary work. The persona again is not to be considered an aspect or revelation of the author but an independent creation, designed for its function as part of the self-contained work.', Irvin Ehrenpreis, 'Personae', in *Restoration and Eighteenth-Century Literature*, ed. by Carroll Camden (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 25-37, (pp. 26-27). Philip Pinkus expresses similar concern about the misuse of concept of the persona in his contribution to the symposium prompted by Ehrenpreis's article: 'The inference of the term [persona] is that there is a certain impersonality in satire, that the author assumes a pose—the persona—which is not to be identified with the actual position of the author himself.', 'The Concept of the Persona in Satire: A Symposium', *Satire Newsletter*, 3 (1966), 89-153, (p. 126). On the other hand, pro-persona critics such as William F. Cunningham, Jr. or Leonard Feinberg do acknowledge the unseverable relationship between persona and author: 'The satirist cannot be considered in exactly the same relationship to his work as, say, the lyricist. Some kind of distinction seems necessary. Yet even the satirist cannot be totally removed from his work, for the artist-art relationship does continue to exist, and in a very special way.', 'In spite of Mack's insistence on the detached nature of the persona, the result of the persona's actions and statements is always an attack on what the satirist himself wants attacked and a defense of what the satirist himself wants defended. After all, the personae of Swift and Horace and Juvenal and Voltaire and Thackeray do express, in various ways, the same criticism of society which each of these satirists wanted to express. The content of satire is historically identifiable material—specific individuals, institutions, issues—and it is remarkable how often

Thus, in my opinion, there arises a need to define the term persona carefully with regard to its distance from the author and to enquire into its necessity for the interpretation of literary works, especially eighteenth-century satire. This will prove whether it is better to accept the concept of the persona in interpreting eighteenth-century satires and whether a definition of the term can cope with the fallacies pointed out by both anti- and pro-persona stances.

At least, we can agree that the persona is something which cannot be literally identified with the historical author: for, there is a fundamental distance between the persona on the printed page and the historical author outside his work. When George T. Wright offers the following argument concerning the distinction between persona and author,

> however accustomed we may be to the more direct lyric in which the thoughts or feelings of the poet, or of the characters he represents, are stated with unambiguous explicitness, art is formal, and there must always be a distance, minimized or emphasized, between the maker of the poem and the persons in the poem. Poetry, dramatic or lyric, does not present fragments of human experience, but formalized versions of it. The actions represented do not really take place; the persons, including the "I," do not exist outside the poem, or at least do not exist in the same way. Characters in literature have no extension in space or time beyond the limits of the work in which they appear;[14]

he is pointing out the inevitable difference between art and life. However identical the 'I' of the poem is to the historical author, it can only be a version of the historical author on the printed page, lacking the physicality of the historical author. The problem begins when we begin to ponder whether this difference between art and life, in which the *raison d'être* of the persona exists, can be ignored or should be emphasised in interpreting what the author means through this 'I' or the other speaker. There is a wide spectrum of attitudes ranging from that which views the persona as a totally autonomous entity to that which regards the difference as negligible. What I shall do in this chapter is

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the effect of the persona's behavior supports the satirist's own position.', 'The Concept of the Persona in Satire: A Symposium', pp. 93, 109.

[14]George T. Wright, *The Poet in the Poem: The Personae of Eliot, Yeats, and Pound* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 7-8.

to check the applicability of various stances about the persona to eighteenth-century literature, and in so doing, to find a viable definition of the persona, if it is proved that we cannot do without it.

The belief which advocates the thorough identification of the speaker in a work with its author, arguing that what the speaker says is literally what the author means, seems not viable in literary interpretation. If the author takes on the identity of his enemy, or he assumes a very ironic pose, the literal identification of the speaker with the author will arrive at a very false interpretation of that work. For example, in reading Swift's *Modest Proposal*, when the projector says 'THOSE who are more thrifty (*as I must confess the Times require*) may flay the Carcase; the Skin of which, artificially dressed, will make admirable *Gloves for Ladies*, and *Summer Boots for fine Gentlemen.*', it would be to miss the point of this paragraph if we interpret this as Swift's advocating barbarous acts.[15] It is to miss the irony insinuated here, the irony that even cannibalism and barbarism may be seen benign and beneficent compared to the dire situation of contemporary Ireland. A naive literal identification of the speaker with the author cannot cope with ironical works. Even when we identify the speaker with the author without any reservation, we should leave a room for the author's irony; that is, we should prepare for the fact that sometimes the author says (or lets the speaker say) the direct opposite of what he really means.

At the other end of the spectrum, there exists an attitude which advocates the impersonality of literary works. According to this idea, once a literary work leaves the hand of the author, it becomes impersonal, as it no longer has relationship with its author. In his *Fields of Light*, Reuben A. Brower argues for the idea of poetry as an impersonal art, an idea which plays an important part in the emergence of the New Criticism:

> Every Poem is 'dramatic' in Frost's sense. . . . Someone is speaking to someone else. For a poem is a dramatic fiction no less than a play, and its speaker, like a character in a play, is no less than a creation of the words on the printed page.[16]

Wimsatt and Beardsley express a similar idea, as we can see in the following paragraph, excluding the author from the meaning of a literary work:

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[15]*The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, XII, p. 112.
[16]Reuben A. Brower, *The Fields of Light* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 19.

> The meaning of a poem may certainly be a personal one in the sense that a poem expresses a personality or state of soul rather than a physical object like an apple. But even a short lyric poem is dramatic, the response of a speaker (no matter how abstractly conceived) to a situation (no matter how universalized). We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic *speaker*, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.[17]

By likening the speaker of a poem to a character in a drama, in which the meaning of the work should be gathered from all the characters' speeches and their actions, not from just one character, Wimsatt and Beardsley widen the distance between the author and his speaker in his poem. Thus, in the tradition of the New Criticism, the persona replaces the authorial voice, enjoying total independence from the author.

This argument for the independent persona seems to be dramatically strengthened in the recent emergence of structuralist and post-structuralist theories, because they even oppose the traditional notion of the self. Robert C. Elliott summarises the stance taken by them towards the 'self' as follows:

> For Roland Barthes the "I" is no more than the wake of all the codes which are its sole constituent elements: subjectivity, as Barthes says in *S/Z*, is "not the ship but its wake, not the plow but its furrow." The linguistic "I," he says elsewhere, must be thought of in a completely a-psychological way. "I" is nothing other than (he quotes the linguist Emile Benveniste) "the person who utters the present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance *I*." Similarly, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida contribute in their various ways to the "decentering" of the subject. The self, personal identity, is at least as much an illusion to them as it was to David Hume.[18]

However, this idea encounters a problem when it is applied to the interpretation of a highly self-referential work. There are some important eighteenth-century works which do not fit the New Critical or the structuralist dogma that after all a literary work is impersonal.[19] As Phillip Harth argues, there are some poems, such as Pope's *To*

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[17]W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy', in *The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry*, ed. by W. K. Wimsatt (New York: The Noonday Press, 1954), pp. 3-18 (p. 5).
[18]Robert C. Elliott, p. 95.
[19]For example, we can regards the apologias for satire, which I discussed in chapter 2, as highly self-referential works: for, apologias such as *Sat. II. i* or the *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift* are written for the defence of the historical author and are impossible to understand if we ignore the historical background of the authors.

*Arbuthnot*, in which 'although the situation itself is imagined and therefore fictitious, the poet explicitly identifies himself as the speaker, refers to his friends and often his enemies by name, alludes to his home, profession, and pursuits, and recounts some of the events of his past life and career'.[20] It seems that, in the interpretation of such poems, an emphasis on the impersonality of the poem can actually seriously limit our understanding: for, to emphasise impersonality and fictionality exclusively is to ignore the purpose of the poems like *To Arbuthnot*, whose purpose is unquestionably to defend the innocence of the historical Pope and his previous satires. Whether we take the speaker to be the historical Alexander Pope or a fictional character in the name of Alexander Pope, his purpose is highly personal in that what he tries to defend is the innocence of the historical Alexander Pope. In this sense, this poem cannot be autonomous from the historical situation, because its purpose is deeply related to the situation outside the poem. Once the relation between the speaker and the historical Alexander Pope collapses, there can be no *raison d'être* for this poem.

Also, we should notice how the 'I' in the poem defends the innocence of the historical Alexander Pope. It is important for us to notice that the defence is carried out by relying on the historical truths. In this poem, there are two kinds of truth which the 'I' believes. One is the historical truth which almost everyone knows and believes—that is, the historical Pope is loyal to his closest friends; he cares for his parents; Sporus, Lord Hervey, certainly has an effeminate appearance, and so on. The other is the contention of this poem—that is, the historical Alexander Pope is innocent because he writes satire only when he is intolerably provoked and for the sake of public weal. The logic of the defence of the speaker (the 'I') is to show the readers the undeniable truth of some of his claims to make them believe that he is overall speaking the truth. This, in turn, will ensure the purpose of the poem. The readers will believe the speaker's other claim—the innocence and integrity of the historical Alexander Pope—because they come to have trust in the speaker's claim. Irvin Ehrenpreis similarly argues for the personality and the historicity of this poem as follows:

> I have already suggested that if such an approach [from the extreme pro-persona view] is valid, Pope has been inept, because the speaker of the *Epistle*

[20]Phillip Harth, 'The New Criticism and Eighteenth-Century Poetry', *Critical Inquiry*, 7 (1981), 521-537 (p. 531).

> appeals continuously to history, resting his defence upon the verifiable truth of his data. Now this appeal seems to me anterior to the surface of rhetorical persuasion. If the author of this poem were not the great poet of his age, if his relations with his parents were not well known to have been as he testifies, if Atticus and Sporus did not belong to public life, the force of the poem would dwindle.[21]

Thus, the extreme pro-persona view is also untenable, because, in the case of some literary works, the link between the speaker, its author, and its historical background is essential for a proper understanding of the poem's meaning. It follows that the appropriate way to interpret the identity of the speaker should be found in the middle ground. Irvin Ehrenpreis's anti-persona theory, propounded in his article 'Personae', seems to result from his reaction to the impersonality and the fictionality which have been exclusively emphasised in the New Criticism. As we can see in the following paragraph, what Ehrenpreis opposes is mainly the insulation of the author from his own work:

> As audience, we try to discover what the real author means in the particular work. That he may possibly (without our knowing) deliver a different doctrine elsewhere, or that his life may exemplify the vices he begs us to avoid, is irrelevant. At the moment, in the poem, he says what we have to accept as his assertion if no evidence appears to the contrary. (p. 28)

However, we should notice that, in Ehrenpreis's theory, there is room for irony, although he advocates that what the speaker says is what the author means:

> So long as there is no hint of deceitfulness, what a man says must be precisely what he means. In suggesting that we are not to take Pope at his word when he makes a statement in a poem, an essay, or a private letter, the critic is turning a genius into a fool. It is inconceivable that a writer as sensitive to overtones as Pope should deliver a proposition from his own lips and expect the reader to doubt that he feels responsible for it. Where, on the other hand, we find suggestions that the speech is ironical, or that the reasoning is suspended, or that a remark was intended to trick a specific correspondent, an intelligent reader will, of course, take warning from the cues. (p. 28)
>
> He [the author] may talk ironically; he may imitate a man he despises; he may ask you to sneer at the fool he is copying; he may in mockery talk like his foolish

[21] Irvin Ehrenpreis, 'Personae', p. 32.

> audience. But unless we treat the material as indicating, however indirectly, what the author believes and is, we do not discover the meaning of the work; and if we miss its meaning, we cannot judge its form. (p. 37)

From these remarks, we can infer that Ehrenpreis opposes not only the insulation of the author from his work but also the literal identification of the speaker with its creator:

> True, it would be absurd to read the whole of this poem [*To Arbuthnot*], or the imitations of Horace, or the auto-analytical poems of Swift and Prior, as direct, literal statements of the author's principles. It is equally a mistake to read them as independent of those principles. Through his masterpieces a man defines—not hides—himself. By reading them, we are put in touch with him, not with a series of intermediaries. (p. 33)

What makes Ehrenpreis's theory a lot more viable than the previous two stances is the fact that it can deal with ironic works such as *A Modest Proposal*, using literary concepts such as parody, as we can see in the following paragraph:

> I believe, on the contrary, that *A Modest Proposal* makes sense only if we treat the voice as the author's throughout. Swift is so ambiguous that at first we think he is in earnest. At the moment of understanding, we realize that he has been speaking in parody. There is no intermediate person between the real author and us. Sur[e]ly the inference we draw when a decent, intelligent man produces an abominable scheme is that he doesn't mean it, that he is ironical, that he speaks in parody. Surely we read the *Modest Proposal* as a widely sarcastic fantasy delivered by the true author, whoever he may be. Surely the kind of literary disguise that is deliberately intended to be penetrated is a method of stating, not hiding, what one thinks. (pp. 35-36)

Understood as this, Ehrenpreis's idea of dispensing with the concept of the persona seems quite reasonable. Above all, the validity of the concept of the persona should be acknowledged only when to ignore it would result in a distortion of the meaning of a literary work.

However, it is because it is open to such distortion that Ehrenpreis's theory cannot be accepted without qualification. As we have seen earlier, Ehrenpreis argues that the reader can safely identify the speaker with the historical author because, in the case of the author's untruthful claim, we are offered signs of irony. As long as there is no sign

of irony or deceitfulness, Ehrenpreis argues, the speaker should be identified with the author and what he says is what the author means. However, there can be a case in which the speaker utters a historically untruthful claim without any sign of irony, as if he believes its truthfulness. In this case, the reader who applies Ehrenpreis's theory cannot but be baffled. Ehrenpreis's stance does contain a fallacy in that he simplifies the relationship between the claims of the speaker and the historical truth. He seems to acknowledge only two kinds of relationship—the straightforward and the ironic, whereas there is some twilight zone between these two. This becomes most apparent when a literary work is aimed at the apology for the defence of the satirist's innocence and integrity. For example, when the 'impartial speaker' in the *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift* claims that

> Yet, malice never was his aim;
> He lashed the vice but spared the name.
> No individual could resent,
> Where thousands equally were meant. (ll. 463-466)

we readers know that this claim is not historically true: the falsity of this claim can be detected even in the first part of the poem in which several persons are attacked by their names. If we apply Ehrenpreis's theory and identify this speaker with Swift, we cannot but be plunged into a dilemma. If we regard these lines as Swift's ironic posturing, then these lines actually damage the purpose of this poem, the defence of Swift's integrity. As I have argued earlier in chapter 2, there are too many positive claims made by the speaker for Swift's integrity which are supported by the historical truth to regard the part spoken by him as ironic and to interpret this passage as supporting La Rouchefoucauld's maxim that all men are selfish. On the other hand, if we literally accept these claims, we cannot answer the question of how we should deal with the apparent discrepancy between them and the historical truth, the only possible result being the recognition of Swift as a clumsy liar. Robert C. Elliott too discusses this problem in the example of Pope's *To Arbuthnot*:

> Say, for example, we identify the speaker of "The Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot" unequivocally with Alexander Pope and accept that he means precisely what he says, as Ehrenpreis wants us to do. Under those rules we are bound to test any

claim about himself made in the poem by our understanding of the life and character of the historical Alexander Pope. At several points in the poem the speaker expresses his abhorrence of falsehood:

> how wretched I!
> Who can't be silent, and who will not lie. (lines 33-34)

Or, again, the speaker claims that when his poems were unjustifiably criticized, he merely smiled; when the criticism was just, "I kissed the rod" (line 158). We know that Pope lied to friend and enemy alike in his complex literary dealings, and we know that with critics he was much more likely to wield the rod than to kiss it. Applying Ehrenpreis's criteria, we conclude that Pope lies about lying in the poem and that he lies about his relations with critics.[22]

We should admit, then, that there is a twilight zone between irony and sincerity with which Ehrenpreis's theory is unable to cope. However, if we accept the possibility of distance between speaker and author, and so accept the *raison d'être* of the persona, this problem of interpretation can be solved. In the above two poems, the historical Swift and Pope are speaking through the persona of the 'impartial speaker' and fictional 'Alexander Pope' who, free from historical actuality, do believe in the overall integrity of both authors. In this respect, the persona is not a disguise behind which the author hides his identity, but a literary device by which the author can deliver his argument more effectively, free from the burden of strict historical truth.

Having examined and discarded the two extreme attitudes towards the persona, and pointed out the problem within the anti-persona theory propounded by Irvin Ehrenpreis, I believe that the most viable attitude towards the persona can be achieved by recognising the inevitable distance, whether it is virtually ignorable sometimes or extremely large at other times, between speaker and author. Having acknowledged this distance, we can arrive at a workable definition of the persona: that of persona which does not emphasise the impersonality of a literary work, but recognises the close relationship between it and the historical author. This persona should be flexible enough to reflect the fluid and ever-changing relationship with its author: sometimes it can be virtually identical with its creator and at other times can assume a separate identity of its own, while manipulated by its creator to achieve his purpose.

[22]Robert C. Elliott, p. 68.

I believe that we should understand the term persona as indicating an author wearing a mask. Nowadays the term persona seems to be easily assumed to be an independent entity separated from the historical author, and thus tends to become divorced from its linguistic etymology.[23] We cannot deny the history that the persona's relationship with its creator became more obscure, while the word persona came to signify the Latin name for a theatrical mask for an actor, and then the actor's role itself, and eventually any personage or individual, as in *dramatis personae*.[24] I have no basic objection to the term persona, as long as it does not lose its close link with its creator. The claim for the persona as a masked author can be supported if we examine the concept of the persona in the eighteenth century. Up to now, I have been dealing only with modern critical attitudes, but as my purpose is to understand what the historical author wanted to mean in his work, a definition of the persona which is incompatible with contemporary views is not viable. Thus my next concern is to demonstrate the close relationship between the persona and its creator, indeed the call for semblance between the two, in the eighteenth-century understanding of the concept of the persona.

2. Eighteenth-century views of the persona

In examining the eighteenth-century concept of the persona, my aim will be to answer the following questions. The first is a simple one: that is, to ask whether a concept of the persona existed. The second may be more important for understanding the meaning of eighteenth-century literary works: that is, to question how much freedom contemporaries gave to the persona in its relationship with its creator. In other words, this is to ask how much distance they acknowledged between the speaker in a work and the author, whether the persona was seen as autonomous as some modern critical trends would have it or whether it was a mask which could barely hide the identity of the author.

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[23]Even though scholars cannot agree from what the term persona derives, whether it is from *prosôpon*, Greek for mask, or from *personando* (sounding through), or from *peri sona* (around the body), or from *personare* (to sound through), or from the masked Etruscan gladiator, *Phersu*, one thing is certain: that it originally assumes a close relationship, even physical contact with its creator. For the etymology of the term persona see Robert C. Elliott, pp. 19-20, and George T. Wright, pp. 8-9. *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, ed. by C. T. Onions and others (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966) also points to a similar origin for the word persona: 'L. *persona* mask used by a player, one who plays a part, character acted ('dramatis persona'), . . . f. Etruscan *Øersu* mask, and used to render Gr. *prosopon* face, mask, dramatic part, person (f. pros to, towards, ops face).'

[24]For the history of the word persona, see Robert C. Elliott, pp. 19-32, and George T. Wright, pp. 6-21.

In answering the first question, it seems that there did not exist a general agreement on the concept of the persona. We can find enough materials which did not acknowledge the existence of the persona or, on the contrary, did accept it. For an example of the argument against the persona, we can take the following paragraph from Richard Steele's *Tatler*, No. 242 (1710):

> When I had ran over several such in my Thoughts, I concluded, (however unaccountable the Assertion might appear at first Sight) that Good-Nature was an essential Quality in a Satyrist, and that all the Sentiments which are beautiful in this Way of Writing must proceed from that Quality in the Author. Good-Nature produces a Disdain of all Baseness, Vice, and Folly, which prompts them to express themselves with Smartness against the Errors of Men, without Bitterness towards their Persons. This Quality keeps the Mind in Equanimity, and never lets an Offence unseasonably throw a Man out of his Character. (No. 242)

For Steele, there exists an undeniable causal relationship between personal spirit and public art in writing satire. For, in discussing the essential quality of a satirist, his emphasis is put on the author's integrity, not on the literary rhetoric or technique in his satire. Thus, referring directly to the integrity of the satirist as the most important factor in satire, Steele ignores the possibility that a speaker created by an author might enhance a cause on behalf of the author, free from the author's burden of historical actuality. When the integrity of the satirist is strongly emphasised, there is no room for possible distance between speaker and author.

We can find another example of the same argument in the second of Edward Young's *Two Epistles to Pope* (1730):

> No Mortal can write well, but who's *sincere*:
> In all that charms or strongly moves, the Heart
> Must aid the Head, and bear the greater part.
> Can they, tho' tongu'd as Angels sweet, perswade
> The Soul to day, who Yesterday *betray'd*?
> Wit in a *Knave*, my Brethren! is no more
> Than Beauty, in a rank, abandon'd *Whore*.[25]

[25]Edward Young, *Two Epistles to Mr. Pope, Concerning the Authors of the Age* (London, 1730), p. 29.

In emphasising the importance of sincerity, Young presumes that an author should write from his heart rather than from his head. In so doing, he makes sincerity incompatible with the literary skill or wit of an author, which leaves no room for creating space between speaker and author.

However, we can also find examples which can prove that the concept of the persona was recognised in the eighteenth century. For one example, Richard Steele himself wrote as follows in the *Englishman*, No. 7 (1713), three years after he had strongly argued that the success of a satire depended on the author's integrity:

> An Heroick Poet assumes a Character manifestly distinct from a Writer of Pastoral; a Complainer in Elegy is under a different Inspiration from that which breaks out in an Ode. The same Man, under these various Denominations, is, in Effect, so many different Persons. If he speaks, if he thinks, in one Kind, as he doth in the others, he confounds two or three Characters: It is not the Muse, the Lover, the Swain, or the God, but *Bavius* at hard Labour in his Study.[26]

By mentioning that a man can be different persons under various denominations in literary works, Richard Steele here opens the door to the persona. What is quite different from what he said in *Tatler* No. 242 is that, in this paragraph, he distinguishes the speaker (the Lover or the Swain) from the author (Bavius).[27]

A similar argument can be found in the *London Journal* on 4 December 1725. The writer of this periodical essay acknowledges the existence of the persona and its temporal nature by saying that 'Are not poets allowed to personate all *Characters* fit to be presented; and ought they not always to write in that character which they personate for the Time being?' The recognition that a persona is adopted at a particular moment ('character which they personate for the Time being') is an important factor in acknowledging the difference between speaker and author. For, while the author's personality or character is permanent or does not change over a short period, the character he assumes in his work only lasts in that specific work: hence the distinction between the temporary speaker and the permanent author.

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[26]*The Englishman: A Political Journal by Richard Steele*, ed. by Rae Blanchard (Oxford: Clarendon, 1955), pp. 32-33.

[27]Bavius, type of the bad poet, as satirised by Virgil (*Eclogue* 3). Thus becomes a name for any poor poet (see Pope, *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot* line 250). William Gifford wrote a mock-heroic poem called *The Baviad*.

We can find enough eighteenth-century examples of the recognition of this distinction to confirm a general acknowledgement of persona. For one example, we can take the following recording of Samuel Johnson's conversation with the Bishop of St. Asaph by James Boswell, when he commented on the difference between the author on the printed page and the historical author:

> The Bishop said, it appeared from Horace's writings that he was a cheerful contented man. JOHNSON. 'We have no reason to believe that, my Lord. Are we to think Pope was happy, because he says so in his writings? We see in his writing what he wished the state of his mind to appear. Dr. Young, who pined for preferment, talks with contempt of it in his writings, and affects to despise every thing that he did not despise.'[28]

Boswell himself also recognised the possible difference between author and speaker, when he added the following note by Edmund Malone in explaining how 'surly . . . severe and arbitrary' Milton was able to evoke the 'sweetest sensations of which our nature is capable': 'Mr. Malone thinks it is rather a proof that he [Milton] felt nothing of those cheerful sensations which he has described: that on these topicks it is the *poet*, and not the *man*, that writes.'[29]

The fact that contemporaries did recognise the distance between speaker and author, as we have seen above, can be well supplemented if we examine the contemporary discussion of Roman satire. When Dryden made the following remark about Persius's technique in Satire III while discussing how he exhorts his contemporaries despite his young age,

> Our Author has made two Satyrs concerning Study; the First and the Third: The First related to Men; This to Young Students, whom he desir'd to be Educated in the Stoick Philosophy: He himself sustains the Person of the Master, or *Præeptor*, in this admirable Satyr, where he upbraids the Youth of Sloth, and Negligence in learning. Yet he begins with one Scholar reproaching his Fellow Students with late rising to their Books: After which he takes upon him the other part, of the Teacher, and addressing himself particularly to Young Noblemen, tells them, That, by reason of their High Birth, and the Great Possessions of their Fathers, they are careless of adorning the Minds with Precepts of Moral Philosophy:[30]

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[28] *Boswell's Life of Johnson*, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1934), III, p. 251.
[29] *Boswell's Life of Johnson*, IV, p. 42, n. 6.
[30] *The Works of John Dryden*, edited by H. T. Swedenberg, Jr. and others, IV, p. 293. Italics and Roman types are reversed in the text.

he was acknowledging the need for distance between speaker and author, thus the need for an author to utilise a character, a persona, who in some way is in a better position than he is himself to advocate his argument.[31] We can find similar arguments in the contemporary discussion of Horace's Satire II. ii, in which Horace decides to speak in the person of, thus to wear the mask of, Ofellus in recommending moderation. For example, David Watson remarks on his technique, when he renders Dacier in 1743: 'The Poet knew very well, that such Rules from his own Mouth, would appear ridiculous, who was known to be so much a Lover of good Company and good Chear.'[32] When Thomas Blackwell discussed Horace's practice a decade later, he too stressed the role of the persona: 'By introducing various Characters, and making them talk each in their own style, you put a PERSON *between* you and the PUBLIC, and out of *his* mouth can say many things which you could not have said so well, or possibly not said at all from your own.'[33]

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[31]Barten Holyday, in his translation of Juvenal, also acknowledged the similar use of the persona, when he remarked that in Satire III Juvenal speaks 'in the person of *Umbritius*' to attack the vice of the Romans, Barten Holyday, *Decimus Junius Juvenalis, and Aulus Persius Flaccus* (Oxford, 1673), p. 56, n. 30.

[32]David Watson, *The Satires, Epistles, and Art of Poetry of Horace* (1743), p. 124, from Howard Weinbrot, 'Masked Men and Satire and Pope: Toward a Historical Basis for the Eighteenth-Century Persona', *ECS,* 16 (1983), 265-289, (p. 274). I am gratefully indebted to this article for the information about contemporary materials concerning the persona. 'Watson, David (1710-1756), translator; native of Brechin; MA, St Andrews; published a text and prose version of Horace (1741) and a manual of classical mythology (1752).', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography.*

[33]Thomas Blackwell, *Memoirs of the Court of Augustus* (Edinburgh and London, 1753-63), III, p. 71. 'Blackwell, Thomas, the younger (1701-1757), classical scholar; son of Thomas Blackwell (1660-1728); studies at Marischal College, Aberdeen; MA, 1718; professor of Greek, 1723-57; . . . His works include *An Inquiry into Life and Writings of Homer* (1735) and *Memoirs of the Court of Augustus* ( 2 vols., 1753-5), a third and incomplete volume being published posthumously (1764).', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography.* Even though not written in the period which we are interested in, William Gifford's following argument shows the on-going understanding of the need for the persona. Discussing Persius's third satire, he argues that 'the real inconsistency rests with those who persist in bring the author on all occasions in *propria persona*. . . . It is one of years and gravity who opens the third Satire; it is a preceptor who alternately seeks to shame, to alarm, and to encourage his pupil, and who concludes his admonition in a strain of indignant reproof which a youth could not with decency assume towards his fellows.', William Gifford, *The Satires of Decimus Junius Juvenalis, and of Aulus Persius Flaccus* (London, 1817), II, p. xiii. 'Gifford, William (1756-1826), first editor of the *Quarterly Review* . . . ; became known by his satires, the *Baviad* (1794) and *Maeviad* (1795), against the Della Cruscans and small dramatists; editor of and writer in *Anti-Jacobin* (1797-8); . . . probably wrote the *Quarterly*'s attack on Keats's *Endymion,* 1818; inspected Byron's works before publication; . . . edited Juvenal, with autobiography (1802) and translated Persius (1821);', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography.* For a more detailed discussion of the contemporary understanding of the various roles the persona can play, see Howard Weinbrot, 'Masked Men and Satire and Pope', pp. 272-279.

Clearer reference to the concept of the persona can be noticed in discussions of the dramatic quality of satire. Before the eighteenth century, Isaac Casaubon remarked briefly on the dramatic quality of satire in his discussion of Persius's satires: 'propter affinitate quam habet cum dramaticorum fabulis, ipsa personarum mutatione perplexum. (And on account of its affinity with the plots of drama, it is complicated by the shifts of personae.)'[34] Also, as late as 1797, William Boscawen emphasised the dramatic quality of Horace's satire when he argued that Horace discusses topics

> sometimes in his own person (introducing occasional questions or arguments from a supposed objector), sometimes in the person of another, sometimes in a Dialogue between himself and some other speaker, and sometimes in a Dialogue, in which the speakers are two different persons.[35]

By emphasising the dramatic quality of satire, these critics are arguing that, in satire, the speaker has an independent identity one step, not many steps, removed from the author. In reading a drama, most readers would understand that the characters in it have their own identities and thus cannot be easily identified with the author. The meaning of a drama should be interpreted by understanding the collective meaning of each character's words and actions. Similarly, if we can acknowledge the dramatic quality of satire, we should also recognise that there is some distance between its speaker and the author. Thus the meaning of satire should be construed from a recognition that the speaker's words cannot be literally identified with its creator's.

We can find the clearest example of a contemporary conception of the persona in Aaron Hill's argument in the Advertisement to the Reader of his unsigned *Tears of the Muse* in 1738. For Hill, the persona is not a literary device which a satirist may or may not adopt to make his satire more effective: it is a device which a satirist must use to make his satire viable:

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[34]Peter E. Medine, '*Isaac Casaubon's* Prolegomena *to the* Satires *of Persius: An Introduction, Text, and Translation*', *English Literary Renaissance*, 6 (1976), 269-298 (pp. 286, 297).

[35]William Boscawen, *The Satires, Epistles and Art of Poetry of Horace* (London, 1797), p. ix, from Howard Weinbrot, 'Masked Men and Satire and Pope', p. 273. 'Boscawen, William (1752-1811), author; nephew of Edward Boscawen (1711-1761); educated at Eton and Exeter College, Oxford; commissioner of victualling office, 1785; published translations of Horace and other works.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

> I am afraid, there is another Particular, that calls aloud for the Regard of the *Satirist*: and That is, a Reflection, how far Decency may make it a *Duty* to abandon his personal Self, and insinuate Opinions, with *Modesty*. I mean from the Mouth of Some *figurative Speaker*, whom He ought to *suppose* of more Consequence; and whose Sentiments the Reader will *be sure* to receive with less Scruple.
>
> There is a Meaning, in the very *Name*, of a *Poet*, that shou'd seem to prescribe us this Duty: and the Use and Necessity of *Invention* can never be more manifest, than where the Subject is so invidious, as *Satire*.
>
> Who is there, to say truth, so unguilty of the Follies of Life, that he dares, in his own proper person, stand out and *justify* the Right he assumes, of reproaching the Conduct of Others?[36]

From the examples shown above, we can conclude that a concept of the persona was acknowledged, even though not everyone seemed to accept its importance. However, the basis of the arguments against the persona in the eighteenth century was not, oddly as it might sound, inconsistent with the concept itself. That is to say that an emphasis on the causal relationship between the private spirit of the author and his public act was not much different from a demand for resemblance between the persona and its creator. This is the reason why I want to emphasise the concept of the persona as an author wearing a mask, not to hide his identity but to advance his argument, assuming a proper role that the occasion requires. As we shall see from now on, the persona did not enjoy autonomy from the author in the eighteenth century, as strong links between persona and author were called for.

If an author employs a persona inferior to himself to expose the vice and folly of other people crystallised in that persona, there cannot be many problems for him in persuading the readers, because they can be made to accept that what the speaker says is not what the author really means, as he will utilise and exploit the discrepancy between himself and his persona. However, it is not so easy to persuade the readers when he assumes the identity of another man who seems to be superior to himself. In such cases, he does not undermine what his speaker says: what his speaker says is what he wants to propound. In this case, there is an inevitable likeness between himself and his persona. However, he cannot expect that all the readers easily overlook the possible discrepancy between himself and his persona. Unless it is published anonymously, a satire is

[36]Aaron Hill, *Tears of Muse* (1738), pp. vii-viii, from 'The Concept of the Persona in Satire: A Symposium', pp. 145-146.

presented to its readers with information about its author: thus, the readers actually assume two speaking voices—first, that of the persona, and second, that of the author behind the persona. If it is thought that the persona is a kind of reflection of its creator—another self, so to speak, not an autonomous being—we should understand that there may be a tendency to liken (even though not identify) the speaker to its creator, despite the recognition of the persona, especially when the first person singular pronoun 'I' is used in a work. In this case, it may be possible for the readers to discredit what the speaker says if the speaker's integrity is not supported by the author's quality. Even if a satirist employs a figurative speaker, the burden of reality can always overshadow him as long as people regard the persona as a reflection of the author. As we shall see later, it seems to me that this was exactly the case in eighteenth-century literature, especially the case for the opposition satirists, as they seem to have always been exposed to rigorous demands for such resemblance from their enemies.

The call for closeness between author and persona can be best understood when we look into the two different kinds of mask metaphor used in the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, the metaphor of mask was used not only for putting on but also for stripping off. Examples can be found which demonstrate that one function of the satirist is to strip the mask of hypocrisy and reveal the reality beneath. For one example, we can take the following lines from Thomas Gilbert's *A View of the Town: In an Epistle to a Friend in the Country* (1735):

> Satire, like a true mirrour to the fair
> Shews not what we affect, but what we are;
> Plucks from the splendid courtier all disguise,
> And sets the real man before our eyes.[37]

This metaphor of unmasking was frequently used by the opposition to attack the Walpole regime in its political journalism. For example, in the *Craftsman*, No. 441 (1734), one of Caleb D'Anvers's correspondents used this metaphor in attacking the corruption of the government, bemoaning the fate of Rome:

[37]From Howard Weinbrot, 'Masked Men and Satire and Pope', p. 280.

> Into such a State, (the Difference of Times, and of other Circumstances consider'd) at least into a State as miserable as This, will the People of *Britain* both fall, and deserve to fall, if They suffer, under any Pretence, or by any Hands, *That Constitution* to be destroy'd, which cannot be destroy'd, unless They suffer it; unless They co-operate with the *Enemies* of it, by renewing an exploded Distinction of *Parties*; by electing *Those* to represent Them, who are hired to betray Them; or by submitting tamely, when the *Mask* is taken off, or falls off, and the Attempt to bring *Beggary* and *Slavery* is avow'd, or can be no longer conceal'd.[38]

However, we should notice that this metaphor of unmasking was also used by the administration and the enemies of the opposition satirists, as many examples can be found in the *Daily Gazetteer*. On 2 December 1735, No. 137, it attacked the opposition claiming that

> Thus modern Traytors, under PATRIOT MASK,
> Rave at Corruption, and for vengeance ask
> To crush VINDICTIVE MINISTERS of state,
> Who shun Advice, and quit their Pow'r too late:

Also, on 21 April 1738, No. 883, there appeared a letter that attacked the opposition's hypocrisy (for the author's opinion) as follows:

> WHO are those who assume the Name of *Patriots*? A Name never abused, never brought into Contempt, but when apply'd to such as don't deserve it, —— to such as are a Shame to it, and ridiculous in wearing it.

Thus, unmasking was not a metaphor monopolised by satirists; any satirist himself could be an object of unmasking, being accused of hypocrisy. The popularity of this metaphor of unmasking shows that contemporaries tended to regard the persona as a reflection of the writer, because unmasking happens when the mask does not fit its wearer. So when they thought they detected some discrepancy between the mask and its wearer, they regarded it as hypocrisy, as we have seen above, and attacked the wearer as a liar on the basis of the demand for resemblance.

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[38] *The Craftsman by Caleb D'Anvers, of Gray's-INN, Esq;*, 14 vols. (London, 1731-1737), III, p. 126.

We should notice that, in the eighteenth century, while a satirist tries to advance his arguments through the use of the persona, adoption of the persona also opened the door to his opponents, if they sensed, or believed they sensed, a discrepancy between speaker and author. Understandably, the call for likeness was at its height, when the author wrote in the first person singular pronoun. Except for cases in which the author tries to undermine 'I', 'I' seems to have been virtually identified with the historical author, leaving no room even for the possibility of assuming a posture superior to his own character.

This attitude is best demonstrated by the arguments of opponents of the satirist. For example, in the case of Pope, his enemies were quite ready to ignore the supposed distance, however small, between speaker and author. For them, Pope was an ill-natured satirist who wrongly assumed the mask of virtue. We can find typical examples of this in Lord Hervey's attack on Pope. As the title of his poem *The Difference between Verbal and Practical Virtue* shows, Lord Hervey's attack on Pope was based on the alleged disparity between Pope's speaker in his satire and the real Pope:

> If then we turn our Eyes from Words to Fact,
> Comparing how Men write, with how they act,
> How many Authors of the Contrast kind
> In ev'ry Age, and ev'ry Clime we find.
> Thus scribbling *P*— who *Peter* never spares,
> Feeds on extortious Interest from young Heirs: . . .
> If *Sallust*, *Horace*, *Seneca*, and *He*
> Thus in their Morals then so well agree;
> By what Ingredient is the Difference known?
> The Difference only in their Wit is shown,
> For all their Cant and Falsehood is his own.
> He rails at Lies, and yet for half a Crown,
> Coins and disperses Lies thro' all the Town:[39]

In these lines, Lord Hervey's basis for the attack on Pope is the alleged discrepancy between what Pope claimed to be in his poems and what he perceived Pope actually was. In the above lines, there is no reference to the concept of the persona. Pope's 'I' is directly identified with the historical Pope. Yet, another of Hervey's attacks on Pope in

[39]John, Lord Hervey, *The Difference between Verbal and Practical Virtue* (London, 1742), pp. 4-5, from *The Augustan Reprint Society*, 125 (1967).

his *Letter to Mr. C—b—r, on his Letter to Mr. Pope—* (1742) shows that he did acknowledge the concept of the persona, as his use of the word 'personate' demonstrates:

> whenever he [Pope] has endeavoured to personate. . . *Benevolence, Disinterestedness, Humanity,* or *Virtue*, he has play'd them so ill, they have sat so awkwardly upon him, and the Mimickry has been so coarse, that all his Attempts have been constantly exploded, the Cheat seen through, and the wretched Actor despised.[40]

However, the result is the same. If the mask was perceived to be not in accord with the wearer's real face, it became the object of unmasking, and for Hervey, this was so with Pope.

One might argue that this demand for resemblance came only from those seeking to defend themselves from satire. However, this was not the case, as is shown in Samuel Johnson's remarks on Pope. When Johnson made the following remark on Pope's letters in his 'Life of Pope',

> When Pope murmurs at the World, when he professes contempt of fame, when he speaks of riches and poverty, of success and disappointment, with negligent indifference, he certainly does not express his habitual and settled sentiments, but either wilfully disguises his own character, or what is more likely, invests himself with temporary qualities and sallies out in the colors of the present moment.[41]

he recognised the existence of the persona in Pope's letters, as the phrase 'fictitious part he began to play' shows. However, the basis of his criticism of Pope in his letters is the discrepancy exposed, he believes, by the ill-applied persona between Pope's professed claims in the letter and his real feelings. Similarly, his praise of Pope in *To Arbuthnot* is also based on the requirements of likeness:

> In this poem Pope seems to reckon with the publick. He vindicates himself from the censures; and with dignity, rather than arrogance, enforces his own claims to kindness and respect. (III, p. 177)

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[40]John, Lord Hervey, *Letter to Mr. C—b—r, On his Letter to Mr. P—* (1742), p. 19, from Howard Weinbrot, 'Masked Men and Satire and Pope', p. 284.

[41]*Lives of the English Poets by Samuel Johnson, LL.D.*, ed. by George Birkbeck Hill, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1905), III, pp. 211-212.

> As there is no stronger motive to exertion than self-defense, no part has more elegance, spirit, or dignity than the poet's vindication of his own character. (III, p. 246)

As the careful phrase 'Pope seems to reckon with the publick' shows, Johnson acknowledges that Pope the speaker is different from Pope the man. However, the basis for his judgement of this poem is again reality. For Johnson, Pope succeeds in this poem because Pope the speaker's claims for the integrity of Pope the man have the backing of actuality. As Howard D. Weinbrot puts it,

> in *Arbuthnot* Johnson just as clearly recognizes an idealized portrait: Pope has dignity, elegance, and spirit, and demands kindness and respect from his audience. The idealized mask is sufficiently appropriate for the real man, and the pose is, therefore, dramatically viable. Johnson—and most subsequent readers—is willing to grant that Pope the speaker may be better than Pope the man because he knows that Pope is in fact a good man to start with. Once partial goodness is granted, it is easy enough to grant the speaker's more demanding assumptions.[42]

Johnson believes the overall claim of Pope the speaker, because he accepts that enough evidence of Pope the speaker's truthfulness can be gathered from his knowledge of Pope the man.

I believe that Johnson's remark on the persona in the final *Rambler* essay in 1752 sums up the contemporary understanding of the persona:

> The seeming vanity with which I have sometimes spoken of myself, would perhaps require an apology, were it not extenuated by the example of those who have published essays before me, and by the privilege which every nameless writer has been hitherto allowed. "A mask," says Castiglione, "confers a right of acting and speaking with less straint, even when the wearer happens to be known." He that is discovered without his own consent, may claim some indulgence, and cannot be righteously called to justify those sallies or frolicks which his disguise must prove him desirous to conceal. . . .
>
> But I have been cautious lest this offence should be frequently or grossly committed; for, as one of the philosophers directs us to live with a friend, as with one that is some time become an enemy, I have always thought it the duty of an anonymous author to write, as if he expected to be hereafter known.[43]

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[42]'The Concept of the Persona in Satire: A Symposium', p. 144.

[43]*The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson*, ed. by W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, 16 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), V, pp. 317-318.

Even though the idea of persona was recognised, it was regarded as a mask an author wears which should not be inconsistent with his actual self, as he should try to live up to the words which his persona says. In this sense, the persona in the eighteenth century should be understood as an author wearing a mask, which does not give him complete freedom from historical actuality, assuming a posture which befits his argument. In this respect, his mask is simply to denote a role or posture he will be playing, like the masks which were worn by the actors in ancient drama: but, unlike those of ancient actors, his mask should bear a strong relationship with his historical actuality. Of course, his mask grants him some flexibility which is required by the difference between art and life and which enables him to present his arguments more efficiently. Yet, unless he wears a mask to ironic purpose, the role with which he endows his persona should be the one which he is prepared to play or at least aspires to play in real life.[44]

II

When Pope and Swift wrote about themselves in the middle of their satiric careers, in poems such as the *Imitations of Horace*, the Markethill poems, and the poems to Stella, our understanding of the concept of the persona can enable us to deal with the presence of 'I' in their poems. Having considered the strong demand for resemblance between the mask and its wearer, it seems to be reasonably safe to regard the speaker's

[44]Even though Pope and Swift did not leave us remarks which bear direct relation to our current discussion, at least Pope left us a valuable remark which reveals his awareness of the difference between art and life. When he said in his letter to Tonson as follows concerning his inquiry about John Kyrl, the Man of Ross in *To Arbuthnot*,

> A small exaggeration you must allow me as a poet; yet I was determined the ground work at least should be *Truth*, which made me so scrupulous in my enquiries; and sure, considering that the world is bad enough to be always extenuating and lessening what virtue is among us, it is but reasonable to pay it sometimes a little over measure, to balance that injustice, especially when it is done for example and encouragement of others. If any man shall ever happen to endeavour to emulate the Man of Ross, 'twill be no manner of harm if I make him think he was something more charitable and more beneficent than really he was, for so much more good it would put the imitator upon doing.

he is insisting that in art some historical inaccuracy can be permitted, or even recommended, as long as his argument bears overall truth to historical actuality, *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 290, Pope to Tonson, Sr., 7 June 1732.

voice as the author's voice unless there is any noticeable hint of irony to undermine 'I' as the authorial presence.

Of course, we should not confuse art with life. When Pope and Swift talk about themselves, they are providing the readers with their versions of themselves. That is to say, the self in their poems is what they believe they are or even what they want to be, presented sometimes with half-truth or manipulated truth.[45] Their version of themselves can be of great use, since they can provide us with a clue to how they view themselves in a hostile world around them, and how they view their relationship with the world. My concern in the interpretation of their poems is their side of story about themselves, not the third party's version, for in the end they came to change their attitude towards writing satire only through their own understanding of themselves and the world around them. My purpose in the remaining part of this chapter is to discover, in their version of themselves, their evaluation of the relationship between themselves and the outer world, which will lead us to the comprehension of their changing attitude towards satire. I shall begin with Pope to examine how his presentation of the self in the *Imitations of Horace* can actually lead us to an understanding of the basis of his pessimism about the power of satire which is supposed to enable him to escape from crisis.

In Pope's *Imitations of Horace*, we can find an important change in Pope's presentation of the self in the world of satire. Pope's self is supposed to be presented in contrast to the corrupt world around him as a defence of his integrity, which prompts him

[45]In a way, when we talk about ourselves, we all are concerned with our version of self, with what we believe we are, manipulating the truth for our self-esteem subconsciously. Actually, it is virtually impossible for us to understand the objective us, because who we are is not determined by ourselves alone but by the combination of the opinions of ourselves and other people. The difference, if there is any, between ordinary people and the satirists who use themselves as a kind of reference point is that the satirists might manipulate the truth more consciously. At this point, Patrick Cruttwell's explanation, in his essay 'Makers and Persons', of the strategy by which the author exhibits himself in a literary work would be of some help. Cruttwell explains the several ways by which the exhibition can be performed; the first is 'the Direct' which purports to be a simple transcript from the person to maker; a presentation of self untouched, undisguised, as in confessions, autobiography; the second is 'the Masked', 'the making of self which pretends not to be, but which encourages the reader to think it is, the person of the writer', as in Conrad's Marlow, Sterne's Tristram and Yorick; the third is 'the Mythologized', which is 'a presentation of self which transposes the person into a symbolic figure or reference'; the fourth is 'the Dramatized' in which the distance is greatest between person and maker, Patrick Cruttwell, 'Makers and Persons', *Hudson Review*, 12 (1959-60), 487-97. What makes Cruttwell's explanation viable is that he does recognise the distance between the author (the maker) and the persona (the person) and the flexibility of this distance which is controlled by the author's manipulation. Of the four categories, Pope's and Swift's presentations of themselves belong to the third category, 'the Mythologized', as they present themselves with certain purpose.

to write satire. However, it should be noted that the relationship between his personal integrity and his public engagement comes to be obscurer and eventually incompatible. In a way, though strong criticism of contemporary society emerges in the *Imitations of Horace*, Pope's presentation of the self in these poems can be interpreted as the revelation of his pessimism about satire while writing satire.

When we read Pope's *Epilogue to the Satires*, we can find a significant characteristic in Pope's defence of his satires—that is, emphasising his own personal integrity. To emphasise his personal integrity can certainly be a useful tactic for a satirist to vindicate his satire; for, in so doing, he can advocate his righteousness by insisting that his satire does not come from personal malice, but from the 'strong Antipathy of Good to Bad' (Dialogue II, l. 198). The emphasis put on his personal integrity is not used for the first time in the *Epilogue to the Satires*, as it was frequently used throughout his satires, for example *Sat. II. i* (1733) and *To Arbuthnot* (1735). When he says in *Sat. II. i*, 'TO VIRTUE ONLY and HER FRIENDS, A FRIEND' (l. 121), Pope is actually emphasising his strong commitment to virtue, that is, his own personal integrity, transforming public morality into a matter of friendship. In this poem, the public function of satire and the poet's concern for his personal integrity merge together. Pope defines the world around him by reference to himself, that is, as 'my Foes' or 'my Friends' (l. 58), as all is to be reflected in the 'impartial Glass' (l. 57) of the self. At first sight, Pope seems to emphasise the personal nature of his satiric battle; but, in fact, in so doing, he transforms his personal battle into a public one by calling all the public corruption his personal foe, as well as emphasising his personal integrity by calling virtue his personal friend.

However, in *To Arbuthnot*, a tendency toward separation between the public function of satire and the poet's personal integrity begins to emerge. As I discussed in chapter 2, when Pope mentions Midas's story in lines 69-72, his motive for writing satire is revealed not as public amendment, but as self-satisfaction.[46] When he claims that his satire is in fact not cruel, for 'No creature smarts so little as a Fool' (l. 84), Pope not only asserts the harmless nature of his satire, but also shows ironically that he recognises his satire to be ineffectual, that his motive is not to reform. Codrus is unconcerned as peals of laughter break over his head; no scribbler is shamed by Pope's words, no poet or peer hurt. Sporus himself is described, through Arbuthnot's words, as being unable to feel

[46]For the discussion of Midas's story in *To Arbuthnot*, see chapter 2, pp. 93-95.

either 'Satire or Sense' (l. 307). Amendment, the supposed aim of satire, seems not to be his interest; what matters then is his own integrity, his commitment to 'Fair Virtue' strong enough to 'welcome ev'n the *last*' (l. 359). He must as a matter of principle declare on which side he stands, without reference to the outcome of his protest. Then, in *To Arbuthnot*, Pope's emphasis is not on the public function of his protest, but on his personal integrity which enables him to protest regardless of its danger.

This weakening of the public function of satire is expressed more forcibly in the first dialogue of the *Epilogue to the Satires*. Despite the fact that vice triumphs over a willing world, that nothing is sacred but villainy, Pope declares that he never surrenders to vice: 'Yet may this Verse (if such a Verse remain)/ Show there was one who held it in disdain.' (ll. 171-172) However, though these lines may advocate his personal integrity, they at the same time seriously undermine his public position as an opposition satirist. In spite of the firm protest of these lines, the poet's public function is ambivalent: Pope only wants to register a protest against vice triumphant and to be remembered as one 'who held it in disdain'. At this point, Pope actually gives up the public function of his satire and transforms it into a mere record of his personal struggle, which in turn provides a reference to his own personal integrity. For Pope, now satire becomes nothing but a statement of his personal virtue: he advocates his personal integrity at the expense of the public function of satire.

In the second Dialogue, Pope develops this point more explicitly. As we can see in the following lines

> Ask you what Provocation I have had?
> The strong Antipathy of Good to Bad.
> When Truth or Virtue an Affront endures,
> Th' Affront is mine, my Friend, and should be yours.
> Mine, as a Foe profess'd to false Pretence,
> Who think a Coxcomb's Honour like his Sense;
> Mine, as a Friend to ev'ry worthy mind;
> And mine as Man, who feel for all mankind. (ll. 197-204)

Pope advocates his personal integrity by identifying himself with 'Good', 'Virtue', and 'Truth'. Though, in these lines, he emphasises again the personal nature of his battle, Pope's claim for his personal virtue seems to be well connected with the public function

of satire, as it was in *Sat. II. i*: because, even though he writes satire out of his personal 'antipathy', his 'antipathy' to evil is large enough to take every instance of evil as a personal 'affront' to him, thus making his personal battle actually public. And this conviction enables him, for a moment, to predict some public success for his satire: bad men will be 'afraid' of him, will be 'touch'd and sham'd' by his ridicule. (ll. 209-211) However, by the end of this poem, this degree of success is doubted, and his stance is once again measured only with reference to his own conscience:

> Yes, the Last Pen for Freedom let me draw,
> When Truth stands trembling on the edge of Law:
> Here, Last of *Britons*! let your Names be read;
> Are none, none living? let me praise the Dead, (ll. 248-251)

In these lines, Pope's own personal integrity cannot be more strengthened, as he himself will be the 'Last of *Britons*' alive in the contemporary world. Yet, as he becomes the sole righteous man alive in the world of evil, the failure of his satire to mend evil becomes apparent. In the *Epilogue to the Satires*, the separation of Pope's personal integrity and the public function of satire becomes complete.[47]

When Pope advocated his personal integrity in *Sat. II. i*, it was a means of defending his satire. But by the time he writes the *Epilogue to the Satires*, his personal integrity is no longer a mere means: it becomes Pope's end which should be defended even at the expense of the original function of satire. My contention is that, in some of the poems in the *Imitations of Horace* written between *Sat. II. i* and the *Epilogue to the Satires*, we can witness the process of the separation of personal integrity and the public function of satire, and the reason for this separation, which leads to Pope's reassessment of his satire, not as a means of public reformation, but as a record of his personal integrity.

1. Rare Confidence: *Sat. II. ii* (1734)

Pope's paraphrase of Horace's Satire II. ii in 1734 demonstrates his idea of how personal integrity can be related to public morality. Horace's simple advocating of

[47]I shall discuss the *Epilogue to the Satires* in more detail in chapter 5 as Pope's valediction to reformative satire.

moderation and temperance through the persona of Ofellus is transformed in Pope's rendering into a discussion of how private integrity should form the basis of public morality.

When Horace advocates moderation through the words of Ofellus, he is talking about morality on the level of the individual. His criticism of extravagance and its opposite in the following lines does not have much social implication, using a type-portrait of Avidienus to criticise avarice:

> *Sordidus a tenui victu distabit, Ofello*
> *Judice: nam frustra vitiam vitaveris istud,*
> *Si te alio pravum detorseris. Avidienus*
> *(Cui* Canis *ex vero ductum cognomen adhœret)*
> *Quinquennes oleas est, & sylvestria corna.*
> *Ac nisi* mutatum *parcit defundere* vinum, *&*
> *Cujus oderem olei nequeas perferre (licebit*
> *Ille* repotia, natales, *aliosque dierum*
> Festus *albatus celebret) cornu ipse bilibri*
> Caulibus *instillat;* veteris non parcus aceti. (ll. 35-44)
> (A mean style of living will differ, so Ofellus thinks, from a simple one; for it will be idle for you to shun one fault, if you turn aside into another crooked path. Avidienus, to whom the nickname "Dog" quite rightly clings, eats his olives five years old with cornels from the wood, and is chary of drawing his wine till it has soured; as to his oil, you couldn't bear its smell, yet even if in his whitened garb he keeps a wedding or birthday feast or some other holiday, he drops it on the salad from a two-pound horn with his own hands, though his old vinegar he does not stint.)

However, when Pope renders these lines as being spoken by his friend Hugh Bethel, he changes Horace's type-portrait into public figures of contemporary society:

> 'Tis yet in vain, I own, to keep a pother
> About one Vice, and fall into the other:
> Between Excess and Famine lies a mean,
> Plain, but not sordid, tho' not splendid, clean.
> *Avidien* or his Wife (no matter which,
> For him you'll call a dog, and her a bitch)
> Sell their presented Partridges, and Fruits,
> And humbly live on rabbits and on roots:
> One half-pint bottle serves them both to dine,
> And is at once their vinegar and wine.
> But on some lucky day (as when they found

A lost Bank-bill, or heard their Son was drown'd)
At such a feast old vinegar to spare,
Is what two souls so gen'rous cannot bear;
Oyl, tho' it stink, they drop by drop impart,
But sowse the Cabbidge with a bounteous heart. (ll. 45-60)

In these lines, Avidien and his wife are transformed into Lord and Lady Montagu by Pope's allusion to Lady Mary's strained relationship with her son in lines 55-56 as well as their well known stinginess.[48] In so doing, Pope's attacks are not limited to personal immorality: as he satirises publicly identifiable people, their personal degradation is dragged into the public domain and thus is given public meaning.

The same process happens when Pope renders Horace's warning on the despair that may follow from the disgrace caused by extravagance. Horace's lines deliver his warning in general terms, not using specific names, as he talks about the damage done in a small circle, such as 'uncle' and 'neighbours':

*Das aliquid* Famæ? (*quæ* carmine gratior *aurem*
*Occupat humanam.) Grandes rhombi, patinæque*
*Grande ferent una cum* damno, dedecus. *Adde*
*Iratum patruum, vicinos, te tibi iniquum,*
*Et frustra mortis cupidum, cum deerit egenti*
*As*, laquei *pretium.* — (ll. 76-81)
(You set some store by good repute, which, sweeter than song, charms the human ear. Big turbots and dishes bring a big scandal and loss. Add the angry uncle, the angry neighbours, your hatred of self, your vain longing for death, when in your need you lack a penny to buy a halter with.)

However, in Pope's imitation, the public figure of Lord Hervey ('Lord Fanny') is introduced to emphasise that private immorality should lead to public humiliation:

Unworthy He, the voice of Fame to hear,
(That sweetest Music to an honest ear;
For 'faith Lord Fanny! you are in the wrong,

[48]We can gather from Horace Walpole's letter to Bentley in August 1756 that the above passage was recognised as about Lord and Lady Montagu by contemporaries: 'Old Wortley Montagu lives [at Wharncliffe Lodge] on the very spot where the dragon of Wantley did, only I believe the latter was much better lodged: you never saw such a wretched hovel; lean, unpainted, and half its nakedness barely shaded with harateen stretched till it cracks. Here the miser hoards health and money, his only two objects . . . I wanted to ask if Pope had not visited Lady Mary Wortley here during their intimacy, but could one put that question to *Avidien* himself.', from *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 57.

That World's good word is better than a Song)
Who has not learn'd, fresh Sturgeon and Ham-pye
Are no rewards for Want, and Infamy!
When Luxury has lick'd up all thy pelf,
Curs'd by thy neighbours, thy Trustees, thy self,
To friends, to fortune, to mankind a shame,
Think how Posterity will treat thy name;
And buy a Rope, that future times may tell
Thou hast at least bestow'd one penny well. (ll. 99-110)

In Horace, the disgrace spreads only to 'uncle' and 'neighbours', but, in Pope, it does spread into the public realm, that is, to 'friends', and ultimately to 'mankind'.

The addition of public and political meaning to the original continues when Pope imitates Horace's lines on the moral duty the rich have towards society. Even Horace's lines have more than personal meaning, as he argues that the rich should be used in a publicly useful way, such as for religion or for the country:

— *Jure, inquis, Thrasius istis*
*Jurgatur verbis; ego vectigalia magna*
*Divitiasque habeo tribus amplas regibus. Ergo*
*Quod* superat, *non est* melius quo *insumere possis?*
*Cur eget indignus* quisquam *te divite? quare*
Templa *ruunt* antiqua *Deum? cur* improbe! *carœ*
*Non aliquid* patriæ *tanto emetiris acervo?*[49] (ll. 81-87)
("'tis all right," you answer, "for Trausius to be scolded in such language, but I have large revenues, and riches ample for three kings." Well, is there no better object on which you can spend your surplus? Why is any worthy man in want, while you are rich? Why are the ancient temples of the gods in ruin? Why, shameless man, do you not measure out something from that great heap for your dear country?)

Pope goes even further as he renders Horace's last two lines into political criticism of the Duke of Marlborough's greed: 'Or to thy country let that heap be lent,/ As M**o's was, but not at five *per Cent.*' (ll. 121-122)[50]

[49]There is a difference between Pope's version and the Loeb edition in line 81. Pope's version reads 'inquis' while the Loeb edition reads 'inquit'. Despite the variation, there seems not much difference in the meaning of overall passage. I quietly changed the Loeb translation from 'he answers' to 'you answer'.
[50]Obviously, the Duchess of Marlborough did not think it greedy to lend money to the country at profit, as her own account reads as follows: 'From the beginning of the reduction of the interest I lent such sums to the government as reduced the interest from 6 *per cent* to 4 *per cent*; thinking it would have a good effect for the security of the nation.', From *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 68.

What Pope is doing in these renderings is to connect private vice with public immorality, and in so doing to advocate the case for the opposite; that is, to advocate that public morality and private integrity should have a close relationship. This message Pope drives home in his rendering of the final lines. What should be noticed is that, unlike Horace who is still using Ofellus to advance his argument, Pope speaks the final section of his poem in *propria persona*, which demonstrates his confidence in his private integrity.

Horace emphasises in his final section of the poem, through the mouthpiece of Ofellus, the benefits of moderation, simplicity, and industry, which enable men to be secure of their fate, to resist the cruel turns of fortune:

> *Sæviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus!*
> *Quantum hinc imminuet? quanto aut* ego *parcius, aut* vos,
> *O pueri nituistis, ut huc* novus Incola *venit?*
> *Nam* propriæ telluris *herum natura neque illum*
> *Nec me, aut quemquam statuit; nos expulit ille,*
> *Illum aut* Nequities, *aut* vafri inscitia juris,
> *Postremo expellit certe* vivacior hæres,
> *Nunc ager* Umbreni sub nomine, *nuper* Ofelli
> *Dictus, erit nulli proprius, sed cedet in usum*
> *Nunc mihi, nunc alii. Quocirca vivite fortes!*
> *Fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus.* (ll. 106-116)
> (Let Fortune storm and stir fresh turmoils; how much will she take off from this? How much less sleek have I been, or you, my lads, since this new landlord came? Nature, in truth, makes neither him nor me nor anyone else lord of the soil as his own. He drove us out, and he will be driven out by villainy, or by ignorance of the quirks of the law, or in the last resort by an heir of longer life. To-day the land bears the name of Umbrenus; of late it had that of Ofellus; to no one will it belong for good, but for use it will pass, now to me and now to another. Live, then, as brave men, and with brave hearts confront the strokes of fate.")

There is not much sign of joy here, or celebration of his achievement of independence. What is being emphasised in these lines is the fortitude gained by moderation and industry which will enable us to soldier on through the unpredictable changes of fortune. However, in Pope's imitation, these lines become a celebration of his personal integrity which is in stark contrast to the immorality of public figures he satirised in previous lines. In this respect, Pope is presenting himself as a viable norm in the bi-partite

structure of formal verse satire. From Horace's abstract description of the hardship which befell Ofellus,

> *Quo magis hoc credas, puer hunc ego parvus* Ofellum
> Integris *opibus novi non latius usum,*
> *Quam nunc* accisis. (ll. 94-96)
> (That you may give more credit to such words, I will tell you how, when I was a little boy, this Ofellus, as I well know, used his full means on no larger scale than he does now, when they are cut down.)

Pope produces the following lines which concretely describe the hardship that he had to endure, as well as at the same time attacking corrupt contemporary society:

> In *South-sea* days not happier, when surmis'd
> The Lord of thousands, than if now *Excis'd*;
> In Forest planted by a Father's hand,
> Than in five acres now of rented land. (ll. 133-136)

Here, while he attacks contemporary political and economical scandals, such as the South-sea Bubble, and the controversy surrounding the introduction of excise duty, he emphasises his contentment achieved despite these turbulences as well as his predicament as a Roman Catholic.[51] When he provides the readers with the following lines,

> Content with little, I can piddle here
> On Broccoli and mutton, round the year;
> But ancient friends, (tho' poor, or out of play)
> That touch my Bell, I cannot turn away.
> 'Tis true, no Turbots dignify my boards,
> But gudgeons, flounders, what my Thames affords.
> To Hounslow-heath I point, and Bansted-down,
> Thence comes your mutton, and these chicks my own:
> From yon old walnut-tree a show'r shall fall;
> And grapes, long-lingering on my only wall,
> And figs, from standard and Espalier join:
> The dev'l is in you if you cannot dine.

[51]For the South-Sea Bubble (1720) and the turbulence surrounding the introduction of excise duty, see *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 64. See also Maynard Mack, *Alexander Pope: A Life*, pp. 392-393.

Then chearful healths (your Mistress shall have place)
And, what's more rare, a Poet shall say *Grace*.
Fortune not much of humbling me can boast;
Tho' double-tax'd, how little have I lost?
My Life's amusements have been just the same,
Before, and after Standing Armies came. (ll. 137-154)

Pope is not just talking about his moderation, which can be proved otherwise if we consult the historical truth.[52] What Pope wants to point out to the readers is his small achievement despite the hardships that he had to face, because of his religion and political allegiance, so presenting to his readers a 'portrait of deep inner contentment as he contemplates his personal experience of self-sufficiency and moderation'.[53] As he celebrates his friendship, describing himself entertaining old friends 'tho' poor, or out of play', in these lines he is portraying himself as a model of personal virtue which he goes on to relate to public morality, as he has related private vice to public immorality in previous sections of the poem. In other words, he is demonstrating in these lines 'the interdependence of public and private morality, the fall from a state of public virtue to a state of public vice, and the private virtue as the saving remnant in such a crisis'.[54]

Pope's attempt to demonstrate his personal integrity in relation to public morality is completed in his lines on the concept of 'property'. When he writes

My lands are sold, my Father's house is gone;
I'll hire another's, is not that my own,
And yours my friends? thro' whose free-opening gate
None comes too early, none departs too late;
(For I, who hold sage Homer's rule the best,
Welcome the coming, speed the going guest.) (ll. 155-160)

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[52]Bathurst described Pope's intemperance in his habit of eating as follows in his letter to Lady Suffolk: 'You do well to reprove him about his intemperance; for he makes himself sick every meal at your most moderate and plain table in England. Yesterday I had a little piece of salmon just caught out of the Severn, and a fresh pike that was brought me from the other side of your house out of the Thames. He ate as much as he could of both, and insisted upon his moderation, because he made his dinner upon one dish.', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, 414, n. 1. Lyttelton also recorded Dr. Cheyney's remarks on his eating habits as follows: 'the immortal Doctor Cheyney, who desires his compliments to you, and bids me tell you that he shall live at least two centuries by being a Real and practical Philosopher, while such Gluttonous Pretenders to Philosophy as You [Pope], Dr Swift and My Lord Bolingbroke die of Eating and Drinking at fourscore.', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 46, Lyttelton to Pope, 4 December 1736. William Kent once called Pope 'the greatest Glutton I know', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 150, William Kent to the Earl of Burlington, 28 November 1738.
[53]Frank Stack, p. 72.
[54]John M. Aden, p. 43.

Pope declares his personal integrity which uses another's land for his virtuous deeds. When he exploits Horace's use of 'usus' (l. 114) into the difference between 'ususfructus' (the right of using and enjoying property) and 'dominium' (the owning) in the following lines,[55]

> "Pray heav'n it last! (cries Swift) as you go on;
> "I wish to God this house had been your own:
> "Pity! to build, without a son or wife:
> "Why, you'll enjoy it only all your life."—
> Well, if the Use be mine, can it concern one
> Whether the Name belong to Pope or Vernon? (ll. 161-166)

Pope is building a portrait of himself as one who can endure the fate of not being able to own a property, but actually, by its right use, more than owns it. When these lines are supplemented by the following lines, which have no counterpart in the original, Pope demands that his personal integrity is viewed in terms of public morality:

> What's *Property*? dear Swift! you see it alter
> From you to me, from me to Peter Walter,
> Or, in a mortgage, prove a Lawyer's share,
> Or, in a jointure, vanish from the Heir,
> Or in pure Equity (the Case not clear)
> The Chanc'ry takes your rents for twenty year:
> At best, it falls to some ungracious Son
> Who cries, my father's damn'd, and all's my own.
> Shades, that to Bacon could retreat afford,
> Become the portion of a booby Lord;
> And Hemsley once proud Buckingham's delight,
> Slides to a Scriv'ner or a City Knight.
> Let Lands and Houses have what Lords they will,
> Let Us be fix'd, and our own Masters still. (ll. 167-180)

By portraying the wrong obsession with property, the obsession with 'dominium', not 'ususfructus', and by again invoking the name of the notorious public figure, Peter Walter, Pope is demonstrating the contrast between public immorality and his personal

[55]I am indebted to Frank Stack for this information about the difference between 'ususfructus' and 'dominium', Frank Stack, p. 70.

integrity.[56] We may not be quite sure whether Pope is indeed as happy as he claims about the situation he is forced into. However, we can be sure of the fact that, by sublimating the difficult situation into his personal achievement, Pope succeeds in presenting us with a portrait of the self which can be a model for the achievement of public morality.

2. Scepticism about the Art of Life: *Ep. II. ii* (1737)

In *Satire II. ii*, Pope's vision of the self is unified, as his private integrity is well connected to the pursuit of a public ideal. However, we should notice that this kind of confidence rarely appears in the *Imitations of Horace*, as many poems of this group demonstrate the separation of the self from the public world. On the one hand, there is a private man who is devoted to the pleasures of friendship and gardening, who is concerned with his life's own business, far from the clamour of the world. On the other hand, there is a man who is conscious of public responsibilities, who delights in lashing out at villainy, who is concerned above all else with the defence of the public weal, a man aggressive, fierce, and appreciative of the satiric battle. What should be noticed is that, as time went by, Pope became more and more conscious of the gap between these two selves and the impossibility of caring for the needs of both selves at the same time. In *Satire II. ii*, Pope is content with what he has achieved despite the hardship, and is prepared to demonstrate the utility of his private integrity as a starting point for the achievement of a public ideal. However, as we shall see later, Pope comes to see his private self as separated from the public self, and becomes more and more conscious of the urgent need to fulfil his inner potential which is viewed as incompatible with active involvement in the world.

For Pope, the 1730s can be characterised by an intensified experience of illness or loss. As early as at the age of thirty-nine, Pope wrote to Caryll in reference to his own illness and the condition of his friends: 'I see and hear nothing but sickness and death'.[57]

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[56]'Peter, Walter (1664-1746), A "money Scribner," that is, "one who received money to place out at interest, and who supplied those who wanted to raise money on security" (OED). Clerk of the Peace for the county of Middlesex; Land Steward to the Duke of Newcastle. Walter lived at Stalbridge in Dorset, and acquired considerable property in the country. He represented Bridport in parliament from 1715 till 1727.', *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 390.

[57]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, II, p. 435, Pope to Caryll, 10 May 1727.

Six years later the death of his mother initiated what he called a 'new Æra' in his life, as we can see in his letter to Caryll in 25 June 1733:

> But in a word not seem a better man than I am, my attendance upon her living was not virtue, but only duty, and my Melancholy for her dead, is not virtue but weakness. I thank God her life was innocent her death easy, and her state, I doubt not, happy. May yours and mine be just the same!
>
> To see you at Ladyholt was the first thought I had upon this event, but as it is a great and new Æra of my life, and upon which the whole course of it will in a manner change, I must pause awhile to look about me.[58]

The sentence that invites our interest in this passage is the final one: when Pope says that 'I must pause awhile to look about me', he is expressing the need to reassess the situation he is in, thus is emphasising the concern for his private self. Also the steady loss of his friends forced him to experience a feeling of loss.[59] Concerning the loss of his friends Pope wrote to Swift in 1736 as follows:

> The climate (under our Heaven of a Court) is but cold and uncertain: the winds rise, and the winter comes on. I find myself but little disposed to build a new house; I have nothing left but to gather up the reliques of a wreck, and look about me to see what friends I have. Pray whose esteem or admiration should I desire now to procure by my writings? Whose friendship or conversation to obtain by 'em? I am a man of desperate fortunes, that is a man whose friends are dead: for I never aimed at any other fortune than in friends.[60]

We can suspect that these changes around him, and his ensuing realisation of the need to 'pause awhile to look about' himself, lead to his inner doubt about his past works—that is, his satires. Pope seems to have begun to view writing satire as an activity whose validity must be re-accounted for, when he grew more conscious of the toll time exacted from his own self. In his imitation of Horace's Epistle II. ii, Pope regards the loss time inflicts on him as a self-diminishment, against which the validity of writing satire should

[58]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 375, Pope to Caryll, 25 June 1733.
[59]Beginning when Pope was thirty-five, they include the death of John Gay in 1723, the same year in which Pope lost Bishop Atterbury to exile; the death of Robert Harley in 1724; in 1728 the death of Congreve and Swift's permanent return to Ireland. Soon after Pope's mother died in 1733, Bolingbroke left for voluntary exile in France, while in 1735 death claimed both Lord Peterborough and Dr. Arbuthnot.
[60]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, pp. 5-6, Pope to Swift, 25 March 1736.

be judged: 'Years foll'wing Years, steal something ev'ry day,/ At last they steal us from our selves away;' (ll. 72-73).

When Pope imitates Horace's Epistle II. ii, he transforms Horace's excuse to Julius Florus for not writing any more into the more compelling inevitability of not being able to write any more. When Horace offers five reasons for not writing poetry any more, that he is lazy and runs away from work (lines 20ff.), that he has become too old to write (lines 55ff.), that he cannot please at the same time the tastes of different readers (lines 58ff.), that it is impossible to write amid the noise of Rome (lines 65ff.), that writing lyric poetry leads to vanity or painful self-criticism (lines 87ff.), all these reasons are only superficial in comparison with his real excuse; that is, that he has now come to the phase of life in which he should turn from the art of poetry to the art of life itself. Yet, when Pope renders this poem, he gives his lines a tinge of scepticism and doubt, thus making his poem 'an elegy on time, defeat, and limited achievement'.[61]

When Horace ponders on the effect of time on his ability to write,

> *Singula de nobis anni* prædantur *euntes;*
> *Eripuere* jocos, venerem, convivia, ludum;
> *Tendunt extorquere poemata. quid faciam vis?* (ll. 55-57)
> (The years, as they pass, plunder us of all joys, one by one. They have stripped me of mirth, love, feasting, play; they are striving to wrest from me my poems. What would you have me do?)

there is relative calmness in accepting the inevitable. As the phrase 'quid faciam vis' suggests, these lines are offered as a reason for not writing poetry any more; now time has come to snatch poetry away from me as it did other things, Horace says, so what am I to do except to accept my fate and turn to the art of life? Horace does not dwell on the experience of the past, as he accepts that writing poetry is going to be a thing of the past. However, when Pope renders these lines, he transforms Horace's lines on past experience and future preparation into a powerful elegy on the diminishing joy of the past, of which the most important is, of course, writing poetry:

> Years foll'wing Years, steal something ev'ry day,
> At last they steal us from our selves away;

[61]Frank Stack, p. 121.

In one our Frolicks, one Amusements end,
In one a Mistress drops, in one a Friend:
This subtle Thief of Life, this paltry Time,
What will it leave me, if it snatch my Rhime?
If ev'ry Wheel of that unweary'd Mill
That turn'd ten thousand Verses, now stands still. (ll. 72-79)

Extended to eight lines from the three lines of the original, the emphasis is put on Pope's feeling of loss which time has inflicted inevitably on him; in particular, while Horace regards poetry as the same as other things, Pope views poetry as his source of life, which time is now threatening to snatch away from him. Horace is looking backward and forward; Pope is looking only backward.

Pope's pessimistic rendering occurs again when he imitates Horace's Man of Argos story. When Horace tells Julius Florus, thus the readers, the following story,

*Prætulerim scriptor delirus inersque videri,*
*Dum mea* delectent *mala me, vel denique* fallant,
*Quàm sapere, & ringi. Fuit* haud ignobilis *Argis,*
*Qui se credebat miros audire tragœdos,*
*In* vacuo *lætus sessor plausorque* theatro:
*Cætera qui vitæ servaret munia recto*
*More; bonus sanè vicinus,* amabilis *hospes,*
Comes *in uxorem;* posset *qui ignoscere servis,*
*Et signo læso* non insanire *lagenæ:*
Posset *qui rupem, & puteum vitare patentem.*
*Hic ubi cognatorum opibus curisque refectus*
*Expulit elleboro morbum bilemque meraco,*
*Et redit ad sese: "Pol me occidistis, amici,*
*Non servastis, ait; cui sic extorta voluptas,*
*Et demtus per vim mentis gratissimus error.* (ll. 126-140)
(I should prefer to be thought a foolish and clumsy scribbler, if only my failings please, or at least escape me, rather than be wise and unhappy. Once at Argos there was a man of some rank, who used to fancy that he was listening to wonderful tragic actors, while he sat happy and applauded in the empty theatre—a man who would correctly perform all other duties of life, a most worthy neighbour, an amiable host, kind to his wife, one that could excuse his slaves, and not get frantic if the seal of a flask were broken, one that could avoid a precipice or an open well. This man was cured by his kinsmen's help and care, but when with strong hellebore he had driven out the malady and its bile, and had come to himself again, he cried: "Egad! you have killed me, my friends, not saved me; for thus you have robbed me of a pleasure and taken away perforce the dearest illusion of my heart.")

he is depicting how difficult and even meaningless it would be for him to abandon his folly, that is, writing poetry, which has been giving him such enormous pleasure. However, Horace is able to counter these lines with the following, which demonstrate the fact that, despite its charm, he is able to renounce it and turn his concern to the search for the art of life:

> *Nimirum sapere est abjectis utile nugis,*
> *Et tempestivum* pueris *concedere ludum;*
> *Ac non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Latinis,*
> *Sed* veræ numerosque modosque *ediscere* vitæ. (ll. 141-144)
> (In truth it is profitable to cast aside toys and to learn wisdom; to leave to lads the sport that fits their age, and not to search out words that will fit the music of the Latin lyre, but to master the rhythms and measures of a genuine life.)

Despite his affection for writing poetry, Horace recognises that the time has come when writing poetry should be regarded as one of his toys ('nugis'). Now is the time, Horace is telling us, not for writing poetry, but for the search for life itself ('veræ . . . vitæ') through calm reflection on the need to care for his inner self.

Pope follows the main thrust of Horace's lines about the need for searching for the art of life. However, we should recognise that, in writing these lines, Pope emphasises not success but the possibility of failure. As Frank Stack points out, in his rendering of the Man of Argos story, Pope stresses 'not the need for illusion but the failure of a "cure"':[62]

> There liv'd, *in primo Georgii* (they record)
> A worthy Member, no small Fool, a Lord;
> Who, tho' the House was up, delighted sate,
> Heard, noted, answer'd, as in full Debate:
> In all but this, a man of sober Life,
> Fond of his Friend, and civil to his Wife,
> Not quite a Mad-man, tho' a Pasty fell,
> And much too wise to walk into a Well:
> Him, the damn'd Doctors and his Friends immur'd,
> They bled, they cupp'd, they purg'd; in short, they cur'd:
> Whereat the Gentleman began to stare—

[62]Frank Stack, p. 137.

My Friends? he cry'd, p—x take you for your care!
That from a Patriot of distinguish'd note,
Have bled and purg'd me to a simple *Vote*. (ll. 184-197)

Here, Pope is emphasising his affection for illusion by stressing the painful process of cure ('They bled, they cupp'd, they purg'd') while Horace describes the process simply as 'this man was cured with strong hellebore'. In the original, the Man of Argos is returned to a state of normality, despite the charm of his illusion and his yearning for his former state. But, in Pope's lines, the Lord does not become a normal man by disposing of his illusion; this 'patriot' Lord is simply reduced to a mere statistical vote, which implies his being manipulated and even bribed by the administration: by being a vote, he is not regarded as a person who should be argued against and persuaded, but as a thing which can be 'purchased'. Thus, the cure succeeds in only half of its function; even though it may cure this Lord of his illusion, it fails to return him to a real 'patriot', only reminding him of his dire state. Thus, while, in the original, the Man of Argos story can be a basis for showing Horace's calm acceptance of fate in getting rid of his folly and then moving on, Pope's lines on this Lord become a basis for Pope to express his doubt about achieving the calm acceptance of fate which would enable him to progress to the next stage of life:

Well, on the whole, *plain* Prose must be my fate:
Wisdom (curse on it) will come soon or late.
There is a time when Poets will grow dull:
I'll e'en leave Verses to the Boys at school:
To Rules of Poetry no more confin'd,
I learn to smooth and harmonize my Mind,
Teach ev'ry Thought within its bounds to roll,
And keep the equal Measure of the Soul. (ll. 198-205)

Despite the recognition of the need to move on, Pope is indeed reluctant to accept this need to cater for his inner self, as the phrases '*plain* Prose', emphasising the word 'plain' by italics, and 'Wisdom (curse on it)' reveal. He recognises the need; but, as his sardonic and self-deprecating reflection shows, he is not quite sure whether he is going to achieve that completion of inner integrity.

The closing section of this poem reveals more clearly Pope's doubt about achieving the art of life. Pope starts this section by strongly echoing his confidence in *Satire II. ii* about what he has achieved through hardship:

> Yes, Sir, how small soever be my heap,
> A part I will enjoy, as well as keep.
> My Heir may sigh, and think it want of Grace
> A man so poor wou'd live without a *Place:*
> But sure no Statute in his favour says,
> How free, or frugal, I shall pass my days:
> I, who at some times spend, at others spare,
> Divided between Carelesness and Care.
> 'Tis one thing madly to disperse my store,
> Another, not to heed to treasure more;
> Glad, like a Boy, to snatch the first good day,
> And pleas'd, if sordid Want be far away. (ll. 284-295)

By emphasising his independence, achieved despite the hardship which befell him, this passage seems to refute any uncertainty about the possibility of inner fulfilment. However, this is not to be, as Pope suddenly deflates this confident mood in the final lines of the poem:

> "But why all this of Av'rice? I have none."
> I wish you joy, Sir, of a Tyrant gone;
> But does no other lord it at this hour,
> As wild and mad? the Avarice of Pow'r?
> Does neither Rage inflame, nor Fear appall?
> Not the black Fear of Death, that saddens all?
> With Terrors round can Reason hold her throne,
> Despise the known, nor tremble at th' unknown?
> Survey both Worlds, intrepid and entire,
> In spite of Witches, Devils, Dreams, and Fire?
> Pleas'd to look forward, pleas'd to look behind,
> And count each Birth-day with a grateful mind?
> Has Life no sourness, drawn so near its end?
> Can'st thou endure a Foe, forgive a Friend?
> Has Age but melted the rough parts away,
> As Winter-fruits grow mild e'er they decay?
> Or will you think, my Friend, your business done,
> When, of a hundred thorns, you pull out one?
> Learn to live well, or fairly make your Will;
> You've play'd, and lov'd, and eat, and drank your fill:

Walk sober off; before a sprightlier Age
Comes titt'ring on, and shoves you from the stage:
Leave such to trifle with more grace and ease,
Whom Folly pleases, and whose Follies please. (ll. 304-327)

At first sight, these lines might seem a faithful rendering of Horace's final lines, in which he cautions against complacency about the possibility of inner-fulfilment:

*Non es avarus: abi. quid? cætera jam simul isto*
*Cum vitio fugere? caret tibi pectus inani*
*Ambitione? caret mortis formidine & irâ?*
*Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,*
*Nocturnos lemures, portentaque Thessala rides?*
*Natales gratè numeras? ignoscis amicis?*
*Lenior & melior fis accedente senectâ?*
*Quid te exemta juvat spinis de pluribus una?*
*Vivere si rectè nescis, decede peritis.*
*Lusisti satìs, edisti satìs, atque bibisti:*
*Tempus abire tibi est: ne potum largiùs æque*
*Rideat, & pulset lasciva decentiùs ætas.* (ll. 205-216)
(You are no miser. Good? What then? Have all the other vices taken to flight with that? Is your heart free from vain ambition? Is it free from alarm and anger at death? Dreams, terrors of magic, marvels, witches, ghosts of night, Thessalian portents—do you laugh at these? Do you count your birthdays thankfully? Do you forgive your friends? Do you grow gentler and better, as old age draws near? What good does it do you to pluck out a single one of many thorns? If you know not how to live aright, make way for those who do. You have played enough, have eaten and drunk enough. 'Tis time to quit the feast, lest, when you have drunk too freely, youth mock and jostle you, playing the wanton with better grace.)

However, with close examination, the crucial difference emerges. Even though Horace ends this poem by forcing the readers to recognise the uncertainty of achieving the art of life by asking some questions to which Julius Florus and the readers cannot answer confidently, he also hints that we have in fact received sufficiently from life, thus implying that, even though we might not achieve life's full potential, we may deserve to leave without regret. What makes Pope's rendering different is his lack of warmth towards the life he and others had. While Horace views young people with affection and hope, as can be shown from the words 'decede peritis' ('make way for those who do [know how to live aright]' [l. 213]), Pope's attitude towards the people who will replace

his generation is frigid, if not hostile. For Pope, young people are another generation who will simply 'shove' the old one off the stage: as his use of a rough, violent word 'shove' in place of a gentler one such as 'move' reveals, there is no warm feeling in Pope's part towards the future generation. Even though Horace does not say that the younger generation will achieve the art of life better than his, he also does not say that they will not. Yet, Pope shows his pessimism about the prospect of young people as he stresses their folly in the last line of the poem. Pope does recognise that, whether he achieves the ideal of living or not, he has to leave the stage at some time. However, without Horace's contentment about life's fullness, Pope does reveal his discontentment about his present state, which makes the uncertainty about achieving the ideal sound bitter.

3. Scepticism about Active Involvement: *To Murray* (1738)

While *Epistle II. ii* reveals Pope's uncertainty about the prospect of achieving the ideal of the inner self, his imitation of Horace's Epistle I. vi demonstrates his doubt about active involvement in the affairs of the world. Written in 1738 when the Opposition was active in its attack on the Walpole regime,[63] and addressed to William Murray, one of Pope's new young friends and a rising member of the Opposition,[64] we can find through careful examination that this poem's insinuation to Murray to participate actively in the affairs of the world using his private virtue is seriously undermined by Pope's doubt about the effectiveness of that active engagement in the world. The essence of understanding this poem, I believe, is to recognise its double relationship with the original. That is, we should recognise the fact that Pope not only changes Horace's expression of spiritual or sceptical detachment into a suggestion of political commitment,

[63]Frank Stack summarises the situation of England in 1737-8 as follows: 'With the death of Queen Caroline in the autumn of 1737, and growing dissatisfaction with the government's peace policies, Walpole's position was weaker than it had been. The Opposition saw its chance and rallied itself for a concerted attack on him in Parliament, led by Carteret, Pulteney, Wyndham and Barnard. The drive gained momentum throughout the winter and then failed disastrously in May', Frank Stack, p. 201. *To Murray* was published in January 1738 in the midst of the events.

[64]'William Murray, first Earl of Mansfield (1705-93). Murray was called to Bar in 1730. He gained fame and popularity by his eloquent speech before the House of Commons in support of the merchants' petition concerning the Spanish depredations, 1738. Campbell (*Lives of the Lord Chief Justices*, ii, 330) records that Pope undertook to teach him oratory—"not the composition of orations, but the varying attitudes and intonation with which they should be delivered." As an orator, he was rivalled only by Pitt.', *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 374.

but also retains the original's sentiment to undermine the value of that commitment, thus revealing the tension between the desire for involvement and the suspicion of its futility.

One of the characteristics in Pope's rendering of Horace's Epistle I. vi is his putting political import into the original. When Horace opens the poem as follows,

> Nil Admirari, *prope res est una, Numici!*
> *Solaque, quæ possit facere & servare beatum.*
> *Hunc Solem, & Stellas, & decedentia certis*
> *Tempora momentis, sunt qui formidine nulla*
> *Imbuti, spectent. Quid censes munera Terræ?*
> *Quid Maris, extremos Arabas ditantis, & Indos?*
> *Ludicra quid, plausus, & amici dona Quiritis,*
> *Quo spectanda modo, quo* sensu *credis, &* ore? (ll. 1-8)
> ("Marvel at nothing"—that is perhaps the one and only thing, Numicius, that can make a man happy and keep him so. Yon sun, the stars and seasons that pass in fixed courses—some can gaze upon these with no strain of fear: what think you of the gifts of earth, or what of the sea's, which makes rich far distant Arabs and Indians—what of the shows, the plaudits and the favours of the friendly Roman—in what wise, with what feelings and eyes think you they should be viewed?)

he is advocating scepticism of and detachment from general worldly affairs. However, when Pope renders these lines, he instils some political implications:

> "Not to Admire, is all the Art I know,
> "To make men happy and to keep them so."
> [Plain Truth, dear MURRAY, needs no flow'rs of speech,
> So take it in the very words of *Creech.*]
> This Vault of Air, this congregated Ball,
> Self-centred Sun, and Stars that rise and fall,
> There are, my Friend! whose philosophic eyes
> Look thro', and trust the Ruler with his Skies,
> To him commit the hour, the day, the year,
> And view this dreadful All without a fear.
> Admire we then what Earth's low entrails hold,
> Arabian shores, or Indian seas infold?
> All the mad trade of Fools and Slaves for Gold?
> Or Popularity, or Stars and Strings?
> The Mob's applauses, or the gifts of Kings?
> Say with what eyes we ought at Courts to gaze,
> And pay the Great our homage of Amaze? (ll. 1-17)

At first, these lines seem to be a faithful imitation; yet, if we examine them closely, from phrases such as 'Stars that rise and fall', 'All the mad trade of Fools and Slaves for Gold', 'Stars and Strings' and 'the Gift of Kings', Pope's political attack on the government emerges, as these phrases imply that bribery is rife in the Walpole administration.[65] In so doing, the general 'Courts' becomes specifically George II's, and Pope's abstract advice to Murray 'not to admire' becomes a specific appeal 'not to admire the rewards of the Walpole regime'.

Given this kind of political implication, we are tempted to interpret this poem, as John M. Aden does, as Pope's 'carefully couched appeal to Murray's well-known virtue to extend itself to considerations public as well as private, to enlist itself on the side of political morality; to resist the blandishments of Court and Ministry and to cast its lot with the patriotic Opposition'.[66] However, to interpret the poem this way is to miss the tension between Pope's desire for political involvement and his suspicion of its futility.

When Pope imitates Horace's ironic recommendation of the pursuit of wealth, pride, and business (ll. 17-27), he transforms the original into lines where desire for political involvement and acknowledgement of its futility co-exist. When Pope gives Murray the following advice,

> If not so pleas'd, at Council-board rejoyce,
> To see their Judgments hang upon thy Voice;
> From morn to night, at Senate, Rolls, and Hall,
> Plead much, read more, dine late, or not at all. (ll. 34-37)

we cannot be quite sure how far these lines are ironic. The overall import of these lines may be ironic, but under the surface, they can also be read as Pope's compliment for Murray's talent and energy as an opposition orator. Is Pope advising Murray about the futility of public involvement, or covertly urging him to engage in the world? The next six lines again reveal this kind of tension:

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[65]As the phrase 'stars and strings' refers to the order of knighthood, it not only denotes a warning to Murray not to be tempted by the promise of knighthood, but also an attack on Sir Robert Walpole who is a holder of that knighthood. OED defines 'star' as 'sb. 8. An ornament, usually of precious metal, representing a star, worn as part of the insignia of an order of knighthood, or as a military decoration' and 'string' as 'sb. 7. A cord or ribbon worn as a decoration; the ribbon of a knightly order.'
[66]John M. Aden, p. 75.

But wherefore all this labour, all this strife?
For Fame, for Riches, for a noble Wife?
Shall One whom Nature, Learning, Birth, conspir'd
To form, not to admire, but be admir'd,
Sigh, while his Chloë, blind to Wit and Worth,
Weds the rich Dulness of some Son of earth? (ll. 38-43)

These lines can be given three different emphases; first, they can be read as Pope's advice to Murray about the emptiness of love in this world. However, as he compliments and emphasises Murray's personal qualities in lines 41-42, they can also be construed as Pope's consolation for Murray's unhappy love affairs, stressing the undeservedness of the object of his love in comparison with his qualities. Also, these lines can be interpreted as a political satire, as Aden argues, since the phrase 'some Son of earth' can be a 'covert allusion to the Norfolk squire, Sir Robert', thus insinuating 'don't be entangled with the likes of Walpole'.[67]

However, I believe, it is going too far to interpret these lines simply as Pope's covert urging to Murray to exert his talents by becoming involved with the Opposition cause, and to ignore their ironic import. If we look at the lines which conclude Pope's rendering of Horace's section on wealth, pride, and business, we can see that his covert desire for active involvement is overwhelmed by the scepticism which results from a recognition of its futility:

Yet Time ennobles, or degrades each Line;
It brighten'd CRAGS's, and may darken thine:
And what is Fame? the Meanest have their day,
The Greatest can but blaze, and pass away.
Grac'd as thou art, with all the Pow'r of Words,
So known, so honour'd, at the House of Lords;
Conspicuous Scene! another yet is nigh,
(More silent far) where Kings and Poets lye;
Where MURRAY (long enough his Country's pride)
Shall be no more than TULLY, or than HYDE! (ll. 44-53)

What we should notice here is the effect of the personal reference to Murray. While Horace's warning on the futility of everything in the face of time—'*Quicquid sub terra*

[67]John M. Aden, p. 78, n. 22.

*est, in apricum proferet Ætas,/ Defodiet, condetque nitentia*' ('Time will bring into the light whatever is under the earth; it will bury deep and hide what now shines bright' [ll. 24-25])—is general in its import, Pope's warning is very direct, as the phrase 'and may darken thine' indicates what is going to happen to Murray, and as well as to himself, and the readers. The final two lines of this paragraph emphatically summarise Pope's scepticism about active involvement in the world. The reference to Tully and Hyde may be a positive tribute to Murray, as Tully can be regarded as an example of the orator and a symbol of political patriotism, and Hyde as another symbol of patriotism:[68] that is, the comparison of Murray with Tully and Hyde constitutes Pope's compliment to him.[69] However, to regard the reference to Cicero and Hyde as not only *momento mori* but also a call to duty, as Aden interprets, is over-stretching the comparison, as the emphasis is put on the eventual fate of these two, their unsuccessful political attempts being put to an end by political betrayal. However big a compliment these lines might be to Murray, it is overshadowed by the scepticism caused by a recognition of the futility of political involvement and its meaninglessness before the power of all-levelling time.

Pope's advice to Murray to follow the example of Cornbury, great grandson of Hyde,[70] 'Disdain whatever CORNBURY disdains;/ Be Virtuous, and be happy for your

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[68]'Edward Hyde, first earl of Clarendon (1609-1674); joined Charles I at York, 1642, and for three years drew up all his declarations; advised adherence to law and constitutional methods, with refusal of further concessions; privy councillor and chancellor of the Exchequer, 1643; captured by corsair on way to Paris; ultimately joined the Prince at The Hague; advised him against accepting Scottish proposals; After Worcester (1651) Charles II's chief advisor, as secretary of state, and (from 1658) lord chancellor; as chancellor and member of secret committee of six became virtual head of the government, 1660; created Baron Hyde, 1660, and Viscount Cornbury and earl of Clarendon, 1661; overthrown by court intrigues and hostility of Parliament, whose authority he had endeavoured to restrict; dismissed, 1667; subsequently impeached; though the Lords declined to commit him, fled to France, 1667. A consistent upholder of constitutional monarchy, he refused to recognize the altered conditions introduced by the Civil War.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

[69]For the eighteenth-century appreciation of Cicero, we can look into Conyers Middleton's remark on him in 1741: 'As to his political conduct, no man was ever a more determined patriot, or a warmer lover of his country. . . . His general view . . . was always . . . to support the peace and liberty of the Republic, in that form and constitution of it which their ancestors had delivered down to them. . . . it was his constant aim to unite the different orders of the state into one common interest, and to inspire them with a mutual confidence in each other. . . .', *Life of Marcus Tullius Cicero*, (London, 1810), III, pp. 392-393, from John M. Aden, p. 80, n. 26.

[70]'Henry Hyde, Viscount Cornbury and Baron Hyde (1710-53). Great-grandson of Charles II's minister. M. P. for Oxford, 1732. In spite of his sympathies with the Opposition, he refused to take part in the attempt to depose Walpole in 1741. His honesty and wit received general applause; Bolingbroke addressed his *Letters on the Study of History* to him, and Thomson commended his poetry and his polished manners in *Summer*, l. 1424. Pope may have met Cornbury as early as 1717, but they do not seem to have become familiar until 1735. After that date, Pope often stayed at Cornbury's London house, and there are numerous references to him in Pope's correspondence, showing high opinion in which Pope held him. He wrote to Swift to May 17, 1739, "There is a Lord Cornbury, a Lord Polwarth, a Mr. Murray, and one or

pains' (ll. 61-62), does have a political import, since Cornbury was one of the boy patriots. Yet this advice falls short of advocating active involvement: Cornbury is praised in this poem not for participating in the Opposition, but for his refusal to be sold to the government, as Pope's own note to these lines implies.[71] At the start of this poem, Pope's advice 'not to admire' has a specific object, unlike Horace's; yet, as the poem progresses, his 'not to admire' becomes more and more general in its import. As the following lines show,

> But if to Pow'r and Place your Passion lye,
> If in the Pomp of Life consist the Joy;
> Then hire a Slave, (or if you will, a Lord)
> To do the Honours, and to give the Word;
> Tell at your Levee, as the Crouds approach,
> To whom to nod, whom take into your Coach,
> Whom honour with your hand: to make remarks,
> Who rules in Cornwall, or who rules in Berks;
> "This may be troublesome, is near the Chair;
> "That makes three Members, this can chuse a May'r."
> Instructed thus, you bow, embrace, protest,
> Adopt him Son, or Cozen at the least,
> Then turn about, and laugh at your own Jest. (ll. 97-109)

Pope's scepticism is not limited to one spectrum of politics—that of the government: as this farce of a political scene refers to the general contemporary practice of electoral and parliamentary procedure, Pope doubts here the wisdom of participating in the farcical world. More importantly, unlike the original, this advice is directly referred to 'you' (Murray), thus the readers, so that Pope's scepticism about active involvement in the world has a more powerful message: 'Don't you be involved with this farce.'

This attitude of Pope—scepticism towards active involvement—is quite strikingly opposite to his attitude in the *Epistle to Augustus*, his imitation of Horace's Epistle II. I, written earlier than this poem, in 1736.[72] There, in his attack on the Walpole

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two more, with whom I would never fear to hold out against all the corruption in the world."', from *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, p. 366.

[71] *Imitations of Horace*, ed. by John Butt, pp. 240-241, l. 61n.

[72] That *To Augustus* was written in 1736 can be inferred from his letter to Fortescue in 21 September 1736: 'I am as you guess'd, returned from one Journey, & now I must add am going another: But to the quietest place I can go to, where I never yet pass'd a fortnight, but by a fatality, I think, I fall to writing verses. I wrote there my last Epistle; & began an Imitation of the finest in Horace this spring; which I propose to finish there this autumn. I mean Lord Peterborow's at Southampton, where I am to put the last hand too to

regime and George Augustus through ironic praise, writing poetry is regarded as an asset to the public. Working on Horace's phrase 'utilis urbi' ('an asset to his country' [l. 125]), Pope demonstrates his conviction about the public function of poetry:

> Of little use the Man you may suppose,
> Who says in verse what others say in prose;
> Yet let me show, a Poet's of some weight,
> And (tho' no Soldier) useful to the State.
> What will a Child learn sooner than a song?
> What better teach a Foreigner the tongue?
> What's long or short, each accent where to place,
> And speak in publick with some sort of grace.
> I scarce can think him such a worthless thing,
> Unless he praise some monster of a King,
> Or Virtue, or Religion turn to sport,
> To please a lewd, or un-believing Court. (ll. 201-212)

For Pope, the poet's function is not limited to teaching a song to children or English to foreigners. The poet can have an active public role, as his function can be inferred from the conversion of negative to positive in lines 209-212; he can protect virtue and religion; can chastise a lewd and irreligious court. Even though Pope feigns to praise George II, what he actually is doing in this poem is to criticise, not to praise 'some monster of a King', through transforming praise into criticism by insinuating the unworthiness of George II and thus making him a 'monster'. In so doing, through the delivery of his irony, Pope justifies his own public worth as a poet, that of a scourge of an unrighteous king. In these lines, Pope is advocating that, to borrow Frank Stack's words, 'the Augustan poet of his time must be at every level concerned with the moral and political life of the country', whether he is physically in retreat ('Enjoys his Garden and his Book in quiet;/And then — a perfect Hermit in his Diet' [ll. 199-200]), or actively in the front of the political struggle.[73]

However, this conviction in *To Augustus* all but disappears later in *To Murray*. Politics and indeed overall active involvement in the world become the object of 'not to

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the Garden he begun & lived not to finish. It is a place that always made me Contemplative, & now Melancholy; but tis a Melancholy of that sort which becomes a Rational creature, & an Immortal Soul.', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, pp. 32-33, Pope to Fortescue, 21 September 1736.

[73]Frank Stack, p. 175.

admire', its futility recognised and demonstrated. In the concluding lines of this poem, Pope provides Murray, and the readers, with two alternatives to follow:

> If, after all, we must with Wilmot own,
> The Cordial Drop of Life is Love alone,
> And Swift cry wisely, "Vive la Bagatelle!"
> The Man that loves and laughs, must sure do well.
> Adieu—if this advice appear the worst,
> E'en take the Counsel which I gave you first:
> Or better Precepts if you can impart,
> Why do, I'll follow them with all my heart. (ll. 126-133)

However, for Murray and the readers, Pope makes it very difficult to follow the first advice. In Horace's original, Mimnermus's love is what makes life sweet: '*Si (Mimnermus uti censet) sine* amore, jocisque/ *Nil est jucundum; vivas in amore, jocisque*' ('If, as Mimnermus holds, without love and jests there is no joy, live amid love and jests.' [ll. 65-66]). Quite different from this, Rochester's love is hallucinogen which at best makes man forget the hardship and bitterness of life, a 'cordial drop heaven in our cup has thrown,/ To make the nauseous draught of life go down'.[74] While Horace does not force the readers to choose his option, '*Vive, vale! si quid novisti rectius istis,/ Candidus imperti: si non, his utere mecum*' ('Live long, farewell. If you know something better than these precepts, pass it on, my good fellow. If not, join in following these.' [ll. 67-68]), in Pope's rendering, the readers are indeed provided with an alternative that 'appear[s] the worst'. However, even though Pope forces the readers to choose the latter option—'not to admire' any worldly things including active involvement for the sake of the public weal—Pope does imply that he himself is hard pressed to accept the latter alternative, as the word 'E'en' in line 131 demonstrates his uncertainty and reluctance about his choice. Even in the last lines, his desire for active involvement remains, though strongly overshadowed by the need 'not to admire' all the worldly affairs and to look after his own inner self.

In this respect, *To Murray* and *Epistle II. ii* can be seen as a pair of poems which demonstrate Pope's inner conflict between his two selves— that is, between his public

[74]The lines are from Rochester's 'Letter from Artemisia in the Town to Cloe in the Country', ll. 44-45, quoted from *The Complete Poems of John Wilmot Earl of Rochester*, ed. by David M. Vieth (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 105.

self and private self. In these poems, while he recognises the need to look after his private integrity, Pope is yet very reluctant to acknowledge the need to sever the link between his private and public self. This reluctance, Pope reveals in *Epistle II. ii* through his doubt about what he can achieve in the pursuit of inner perfection; in *To Murray*, this unwillingness is insinuated in the form of persistent political attack on the government even when the eventual futility of such attack is suspected. It is my contention that it is in *To Bolingbroke*, the last Horatian imitation, that Pope finally accepts the need for separation, resulting from the overriding importance of the private self.

4. The Separation Between Private and Public Self: *To Bolingbroke* (1738)

*To Bolingbroke*, Pope's imitation of Horace's Epistle I. i, can be regarded as a very personal work, a poem about retirement in which he speaks to Bolingbroke as his close friend and mentor about his own spiritual yearnings, weaknesses, and doubts, even though there appear vigorous and daring attacks on the City and the Court. In this poem, Pope puts emphasis on the urgent business to make himself into the ever-consistent 'Man divine whom Wisdom calls her own' (l. 180), who should not be disturbed by other worldly involvement. Various obstacles to this goal are considered: Bolingbroke's advice that he should continue writing, his own lingering fondness for 'Verse, and Love, and ev'ry Toy' (l. 17), London's voice that he should seek instead 'Wealth and Place' (l. 104), all of which he manages to dismiss, and finally and most importantly his own temperamental inconsistency and incoherent mind.

When Pope talks about himself as follows,

> Long, as to him who works for debt, the Day;
> Long as the Night to her whose love's away;
> Long as the Year's dull circle seems to run,
> When the brisk Minor pants for twenty-one;
> So slow th' unprofitable Moments roll,
> That lock up all the Functions of my soul;
> That keep me from Myself; and still delay
> Life's instant business to a future day:
> That task, which as we follow, or despise,
> The eldest is a fool, the youngest wise;
> Which done, the poorest can no wants endure,
> And which not done, the richest must be poor. (ll. 35-46)

the claims of the private self can hardly be put more strongly. In the original, Horace is relatively calm and settled in describing the feeling of tedium arising from the hours passed in doing other than looking after his private self:

> *Sic mihi tarda fluunt* ingrataque *tempora, quæ spem*
> *Consiliumque* morantur *agendi gnaviter* id, *quod*
> *Æque* pauperibus *prodest,* locupletibus *æque,*
> *Æque neglectum* pueris, senibusque *nocebit.* (ll. 23-26)
> (so slow and thankless flow for me the hours which defer my hope and purpose of setting myself vigorously to that task which profits alike the poor, alike the rich, but if neglected, will be harmful alike to young and to old.)

However, in Pope's rendering, the time spent in other obligations becomes hostile to his most urgent need; while, for Horace, time simply defers his hope and intent, for Pope it 'lock[s] up all the Functions of [his] soul'. This is the Pope who yearns so deeply to know his true self, that private self as yet not tended and undiscovered. This self is entirely different from his public self that is involved in the world, which, at the moment, denies him his most urgent desire. For him, the task is so urgent that no man should leave the task undone, whatever his duty to public morality:

> Farewell then Verse, and Love, and ev'ry Toy,
> The rhymes and rattles of the Man or Boy:
> What right, what true, what fit, we justly call,
> Let this be all my care—for this is All:
> To lay this harvest up, and hoard with haste
> What ev'ry day will want, and most, the last. (ll. 17-22)

In this context, as Dustin H. Griffin argues, to write satire ('Verse'), is no longer related to the private self, let alone a means of serving the needs of his private self as it once was in *Sat. II. i* in 1733—'Not write? but then I *think,*/ And for my Soul I cannot sleep a wink./ I nod in Company, I wake at Night,/ Fools rush into my Head, and so I write' (ll. 11-14); rather, it comes to be regarded as 'a trifle to be outgrown'.[75]

[75]Dustin H. Griffin, *Alexander Pope: The Poet in the Poems* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 203.

However, as can be found in the following lines, Pope, for all his idealism, is also aware of the limitations to achieving this wisdom:

> Late as it is, I put my self to school,
> And feel some comfort, not to be a fool.
> Weak tho' I am of limb, and short of sight,
> Far from a Lynx, and not a Giant quite,
> I'll do what MEAD and CHESELDEN advise,
> To keep these limbs, and to preserve these eyes.
> Not to go back, is somewhat to advance,
> And men must walk at least before they dance. (ll. 47-54)

Through the self-deprecating portrait of poor eyesight and weak limbs, physicalising mental weakness, Pope shows his awareness of human limitations. What should be noticed is that Pope views these more seriously, and is thus more sceptical about reaching the ideal state of the inner self. In the original, even though Horace recognises his handicaps, he still thinks it is not impossible to make some progress: '*Est quâdam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra*' ('It is worth while to take some steps forward, though we may not go still further' [l. 32]). Yet, for Pope, this progress is regarded as so difficult to achieve, and human limitations so deplorable that he can even 'feel some comfort, not to be a fool' and 'not to go back' can indeed be recognised as 'to advance'.

We readers should recognise that, in this poem, even though there are some daring political attacks on the City and the Court, the political satire is leading to quite a different direction. Pope indeed transforms Horace's lines on people's variance amongst themselves, exemplified by their various pursuits for money, to an audacious attack on contemporary society for its lust for money:

> Well, if a King's a Lion, at the least
> The People are a many-headed Beast:
> Can they direct what measures to pursue,
> Who know themselves so little what to do?
> Alike in nothing but one Lust of Gold,
> Just half the land would buy, and half be sold:
> Their Country's wealth our mightier Misers drain,
> Or cross, to plunder Provinces, the Main:
> The rest, some farm the Poor-box, some the Pews;
> Some keep Assemblies, and wou'd keep the Stews;
> Some with fat Bucks on childless Dotards fawn;

Some win rich Widows by their Chine and Brawn;
While with the silent growth of ten per Cent,
In Dirt and darkness hundreds stink content. (ll. 120-133)

However, what is so different in this poem is that this stinging attack directed at other people prompts Pope to examine himself as well. That is to say, the daring attack on the corrupt world does not make him feel righteous, but forces him to consider his own inconsistency, which emerges as the major obstacle to the fulfilment of the perfection of the inner self, as he reveals in the lines that follow the attack on other people:

Of all these ways, if each pursues his own,
Satire be kind, and let the wretch alone.
But show me one, who has it in his pow'r
To act consistent with himself an hour. (ll. 134-137)

The important phrase for our purpose is 'Satire be kind', which reveals Pope's scepticism about it when he faces a more important and urgent task in the perfection of the inner self. In these lines, he comes to feel a kind of kinship with the people he attacked, as he implicates himself in the self-cancelling inconsistency.

While other obstacles are relatively easily brushed aside, human inconsistency is, for Pope, a real obstacle to the personal perfection for which he yearns. After surveying, as Griffin calls it, the 'pageant of human inconsistency' in lines 138-160, Pope comes to view his inconsistency with frustration.[76] As Griffin rightly observes, when Pope touches the subject of inconsistency earlier in the poem, he 'had presented an engaging portrait of his own inconsistency, there viewed as eclecticism and flexibility', which sanctions him to be free from the trap of dogmatism:[77]

But ask not, to what Doctors I apply?
Sworn to no Master, of no Sect am I:
As drives the storm, at any door I knock,
And house with Montagne now, or now with Lock.
Sometimes a Patriot, active in debate,
Mix with the World, and battle for the State,
Free as young Lyttelton, her cause pursue,

[76]Dustin H. Griffin, p. 204.
[77]Dustin H. Griffin, p. 204.

Still true to Virtue, and as warm as true:
Sometimes, with Aristippus, or St. Paul,
Indulge my Candor, and grow all to all;
Back to my native Moderation slide,
And win my way by yielding to the tyde. (ll. 23-34)

However, after viewing the people's failure resulting from their inconsistency, his own inconsistency is no longer recognised as eclectic but as self-cancelling:

You laugh, half Beau half Sloven if I stand,
My Wig all powder, and all snuff my Band;
You laugh, if Coat and Breeches strangely vary,
White Gloves, and Linnen worthy Lady Mary!
But when no Prelate's Lawn with Hair-shirt lin'd,
Is half so incoherent as my Mind,
When (each Opinion with the next at strife,
One ebb and flow of follies all my Life)
I plant, root up, I build, and then confound,
Turn round to square, and square again to round;
You never change one muscle of your face,
You think this Madness but a common case,
Nor once to Chanc'ry, nor to Hales apply;
Yet hang your lip, to see a Seam awry!
Careless how ill I with myself agree;
Kind to my dress, my figure, not to Me. (ll. 161-176)

Here, his inconsistency becomes the obstacle Pope urgently needs to overcome, as it is regarded not as 'well accorded strife'—that is, *concordia discors*—'that expresses an underlying harmony', but incongruity that undermines the possibility of personal perfection.[78] These lines are rather a faithful rendering of Horace's acknowledgement of his inconsistency and his plea to Maecenas to correct it:

*Si curtatus* inæquali *tonsore capillos*
*Occurro, rides; si forte subucula pexæ*
*Trita subest tunicæ, vel si toga* dissidet impar,
*Rides: quid? mea cum pugnat* Sententia *secum,*
*Quod petiit, spernit; repetit quod nuper omisit;*
*Æstuat, & Vitæ disconvenit ordine toto;*
*Diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis?*
*Insanire putas solennia me; neque rides,*

[78]Dustin H. Griffin, p. 204.

*Nec* Medici *credis, nec* Curatoris *egere*
*A* Prætore *dati? rerum Tutela mearum*
*Cum sis, & pravè sectum stomacheris ob unguem,*
*De* te pendentis, te suspicientis, *Amici.*[79] (91-102)
(If, when some uneven barber has cropped my hair, I come your way, you laugh; if haply I have a tattered shirt beneath a new tunic, or if my gown sits badly and askew, you laugh. What, when my judgement is at strife with itself, scorns what it craved, asks again for what it lately cast aside; when it shifts like a tide, and in the whole system of life is out of joint, pulling down, building up, and changing square to round? You think my madness is the usual thing, and neither laugh at me nor deem that I need a physician or a guardian assigned by the court, though you are keeper of my fortunes, and flare up at an ill-paired nail of the friend who hangs upon you and looks to you in all.)

Yet, Pope is not just borrowing Horace's sentiment here. As the following lines, which are not in the original, reveal,

Is this my Guide, Philosopher, and Friend?
This, He who loves me, and who ought to mend?
Who ought to make me (what he can, or none,)
That Man divine whom Wisdom calls her own,
Great without Title, without Fortune bless'd,
Rich ev'n when plunder'd, honour'd while oppress'd,
Lov'd without youth, and follow'd without power,
At home tho' exil'd, free, tho' in the Tower. (ll. 177-184)

Pope is emphasising the need for consistency of the self more urgently than Horace, to which his friend Bolingbroke must guide him, as he expresses his expectation of him in the beginning of the poem: 'St. JOHN, whose love indulg'd my labours past/ Matures my present, and shall bound my last!' (ll. 1-2). Even though these closing lines grammatically refer to Pope,[80] I believe that Howard Weinbrot is quite right in observing their intentional ambiguity: 'The ambiguity must be intentional, however, for the portrait includes much of what Bolingbroke already is or has overcome'.[81] Thus, what Pope is

[79]In the Loeb edition, line 102 reads 'respicientis' instead of 'suspicientis' in Pope's version. However, there seems to be not much difference in meaning 'to respect', thus there seems to be no need to change the Loeb translation.
[80]Grammatically, the lines refer to Pope, the 'me' in line 179.
[81]Howard D. Weinbrot, *Alexander Pope and the Tradition of Formal Verse Satire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 297. Brean S. Hammond also notices the ambiguity of these lines: 'Pope ends the poem with a portrait of the truly wise man that is a composite of various of his friends—John Gay "without Fortune bless'd," Jonathan Swift "Great without Title," Bishop Atterbury "free, tho' in the

doing in these lines is to urge Bolingbroke to guide him to the state he is in. While Horace shows no sign of resentment towards Maecenas, Bolingbroke's counterpart in the original, in his imploring, Pope's sentiment towards Bolingbroke does border on resentment, as the rhetorical questions pile up to express an urgent need for his friend's help as well as his ardent desire for the perfection of his inner self.

When Horace concludes the original as follows,

> *Ad summam,* Sapiens *uno minor est* Jove! *Dives!*
> *Liber! honoratus! pulcher! Rex denique regum!*
> *Præcipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.* (ll. 103-105)
> (To sum up: the wise man is less than Jove alone. He is rich, free, honoured, beautiful, nay a king of kings; above all, sound — save when troubled by the "flu"!)

these lines become his praise for the perfect state of self for which he yearns. Even though there is a wry irony in the phrase '*nisi cum pituita molesta est*', it is not directly referred to himself; rather it can be regarded as directed at the rigidity of Stoics, as Frank Stack interprets.[82] However, by making Horace's original irony refer to himself as well as to Bolingbroke, Pope ends his imitation on a note of doubt and agony, suspecting failure:[83]

> In short, that reas'ning, high, immortal Thing,
> Just less than Jove, and much above a King,
> Nay half in Heav'n—except (what's mighty odd)
> A Fit of Vapours clouds this Demi-god. (ll. 185-188)

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tower"—and though the lines are in apposition to "me" (line 179), most of the references are also applicable to Bolingbroke. "Rich e'en when plunder'd" may refer to the attempt to withhold an inheritance from Lady Bolingbroke because her husband was attained; "Great without Title" to his gaining vicountcy rather than the earldom he expected; "follow'd without power" to his being the leader of the opposition despite not being permitted to take his seat in the Lords.', Brean S. Hammond, *Pope and Bolingbroke: A Study of Friendship and Influence*, p. 122.

[82]Frank Stack, p. 273.

[83]Brean S. Hammond explains well how the final lines of the poem fit the description of Bolingbroke: '"Just less than Jove" is very typical of the hyperbolical way Pope was wont to refer to him: to Warburton on 12 January 1744, he calls him "a Being paullo minus ab angelis." And Bolingbroke's fits of depression and giddiness are frequently mentioned in his letters.', Brean S. Hammond, *Pope and Bolingbroke: A Study of Friendship and Influence,* p. 122. In this respect, if we interpret the final lines as referring to Bolingbroke, they signify Pope's ironic deflation of his mentor, refusing his advice in the poem to continue writing, pointing out his own defect. However, though we should notice this meaning, we also must not forget that the main and grammatical thrust of the final lines is directed to Pope himself, emphasising his, rather than Bolingbroke's, problem.

In these lines, Pope acknowledges that, even if Bolingbroke could manage to make him a consistent and wise man ('Demi-god'), innate human inconsistency would easily undermine that achievement. Of course, we cannot ignore that there is a wry joke operating here, following the import of the original. Yet, in my opinion, the joking nature is imported from the original and the underlying seriousness is Pope's own, which should be given at least equal, if not more, weight. Thus, 'A fit of Vapours' symbolises the inevitable human limitation in achieving and maintaining integrity, thus the inevitability of his failure. In this poem, Pope's image of himself is disturbed and unsettled, as his powerful yearning for improvement struggles hard against inner doubt and the fear of failure.

In so doing, the room for satire all but disappears, as it is put aside for the more urgent need. In this final imitation of Horace, Pope as a confident satirist disappears, as he recognises himself as laden with doubt about his own condition. In the poems I discussed in this chapter, satire's public function becomes obscurer, as Pope regards as incompatible the need to tend to his inner self, which he realises should be given more weight, and his duty as an opposition satirist, which is understood as precarious and becoming more futile due to his doubt about the wisdom of it. What is left of satire is then its private function, that is as a testimony to his private integrity, which will be revealed in his final formal verse satire, the *Epilogue to the Satires*.

III

Unlike Pope, who does provide us with the clues to his attitude towards the relationship between his private self and writing as public involvement, Swift does not write explicitly in his poems about his changing attitude towards satire. However, whether it was due to coincidence or not, he did also write some poems in which the subject becomes his own self. In the 1720s and early 1730s before he wrote *An Epistle to a Lady* and *On Poetry: A Rapsody*, he wrote some poems in which he considered the relationship between his own self and the outer world.[84] In his poems to Stella,

[84]Pat Rogers uses the title *To a Lady* instead of *An Epistle to a Lady*, following the title in *The Works of Jonathan Swift, D. D* (1735). Yet, I decide to call the poem *An Epistle to a Lady*, because the poem was first published with this title as well as being more commonly known by it.

especially his birthday poems, we can find a Swift who does not seek to confound readers, but to speak directly to the recipient of his poems, Esther Johnson. By doing so, he acknowledges the earnest relationship he had with Stella, and, in so doing, reveals his inner thoughts. In these poems, the 'I' can be regarded as Swift who talks to one of his closest friends, free from the need to conceal his true feelings. Also in the Markethill poems which were written between 1728 and 1732, such as 'My Lady's Lamentation and Complaint against the Dean', *The Grand Question Debated*, *Lady Acheson Weary of the Dean*, and 'A Panegyric on the Dean', Swift provides us the readers with his portrait of himself as a guest of the Achesons. It is my contention that, if examined carefully, these poems do present us with useful clues which help us to understand the reason why Swift came to take such a pessimistic stance towards the public function of satire from the mid 1730s.[85]

The key to that knowledge is, I believe, to comprehend the relationship between Swift's self and the outer world, which is revealed in the poems I shall discuss. As I have argued earlier in Chapter 3, one important aspect of the public function of satire is to enable the satirist to resolve the crisis he perceives, that is, to escape from an impasse. In a way, the relationship between a satirist and the outer world can be understood as strained, if not hostile, and the public value of satire can be regarded as residing in its ability to resolve that strain. What is valuable for us is that, in the poems above, Swift does explore the relationship between his self and the outer world, even though not in satiric terms, and in so doing, he questions his ability to deal with the strained

[85]As my purpose in this part of the chapter is to explain how Swift views his relationship with the world, which I believe is the vital clue to his changing attitude towards satire, I exclude the so-called scatological poems from my discussion. Even though arguably the most famous poems of Swift, these poems do not provide us with knowledge about Swift's appraisal of his relationship with his contemporary readership and the 'I' in these poems cannot be comfortably identified with a Swift who provides information about Swift outside the poems, that is, the historical Swift. I have no artistic value in mind when I decide which poems to include and to exclude, as my criteria are solely based on their usefulness for my current purpose.

Also, one might find that my interpretation of Swift's poems in this chapter is too serious, ignoring the basic light-heartedness found in most of them, which comes mainly from Swift's prosody (his use of racy octosyllabic metre) and everyday conversational style. It is not that I regard these poems as gloomy and seriously natured: I do acknowledge that these poems have a light-hearted joking nature. However, what I am concerned with in the interpretation of these poems is the deep undercurrent, sometimes almost too deeply buried to notice, which does reveal Swift's reassessment of his relationship with the outer world and thus is well related with his scepticism about the public function of satire repeatedly expressed in the 1720s and 1730s. Thus, what I shall be discussing is not the whole import of the poem, but part of it which, I believe, testifies to Swift's inner doubt of his ability as a reformative satirist.

relationship. What should be noticed, as I shall argue later, is the fact that, regardless of whether intentionally or not, the relationship between self and the outer world he presents in the small world of friends comes to be representative of that relationship in the broader world. Thus, we can take these poems as a yardstick to the development of Swift's attitude towards the public function of satire.

1. Limitation of Art: Swift's Birthday Poems to Stella

The importance of Swift's birthday poems to Stella, written almost annually between 1719 and 1727 until Stella's death in 1728, for the purpose of this chapter, comes from the fact that these poems bear a record of Swift's struggle against time. Of course, these poems do not deal only with the effect of time, that is, the inevitable decline of the body: they are basically poems of celebration which are chiefly concerned with Stella's virtue and their ongoing exemplary relationship. However, what is fascinating in these poems is that Swift recognises from the start that Stella is no longer a beautiful and young woman and that he is unfit for the role of admirer in those love poems where a young male lover addresses his ardent love to a beautiful female. In his first birthday poem to Stella, he does acknowledge the effect of time on Stella, as he admits that she is no longer physically beautiful or attractive:

> Stella this day is thirty-four,
> (We shan't dispute a year or more:)
> However Stella, be not troubled,
> Although thy size and years are doubled,
> Since first I saw thee at sixteen,
> The brightest virgin on the green.
> So little is thy form declined;
> Made up so largely in thy mind. (ll. 1-8)

However, as lines 7-8 suggest, what Swift is doing in this poem and in later birthday poems is to make Stella's physicality a non-issue, as in her case, what has been beautiful, he argues, is not her appearance but her mind, virtue, which is far more resistant to the effects of time. Yet, we should notice that Swift does not simply ignore the issue of the effect of time. He does not run away from the subject, but faces up to the challenge, transforming disadvantage to advantage: in other words, as Louise K. Barnett rightly

observes, Swift is faithfully 'chronicling [of] her increasingly less attractive physical appearance in order to expatiate upon its lack of importance', as is demonstrated in the following lines:[86]

> Oh, would it please the gods to *split*
> Thy beauty, size, and years, and wit,
> No age could furnish out a pair
> Of nymphs so graceful, wise and fair:
> With half the lustre of your eyes,
> With half your wit, your years, and size: (9-14)

In these lines, Swift does recognise the physical decline of Stella, and reveals his secret yearning for youthful physicality, that is, his 'nostalgia for the vanished form of the sixteen-year-old Stella', as he contrives a conceit to restore Stella to her former state by dividing her into two.[87] However, if that conceit reveals his nostalgia, it also enables him to face up to the challenge of the effects of time. The logic of the conceit comes from the idea that her virtue, which is far greater than that of ordinary women, is also divisible as well as her age and size to make two virtuous, beautiful, and young ladies.

When he concludes the poem as follows,

> And then before it grew too late,
> How should I beg of gentle fate,
> (That either nymph might have her swain,)
> To split my worship too in twain. (ll. 15-18)

Swift not only argues for his admiration for Stella, but also reveals his ongoing task in the birthday poems: he is going to celebrate Stella's birthday as 'the triumph of mind over body, permanent over transient charms', withstanding or even triumphing over the onslaught of time.[88]

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[86]Louise K. Barnett, p. 98.
[87]Louise K. Barnett, p. 98. We can find here Swift's joke on Stella, because these is no historical evidence that Stella became fat enough to deserve this conceit. She may have gained some weight, as some of us do as we become older, but we should recognise Swift's joke here behind this exaggeration, which leads to the main conceit of the poem.
[88]Louise K. Barnett, p. 99.

What should be noticed in Swift's birthday poems to Stella is his sincerity, his truthfulness, by which he does not turn away from physical actuality to false imagination. When we examine his 'Stella, Visiting Me in My Sickness' and 'To Stella, Who Collected and Transcribed His Poems', both of which were written in 1720, we can find these qualities.[89]

In 'Stella, Visiting Me in My Sickness', in which Swift praises Stella for her honour, his praise does not become vapid, since he bases it on his understanding of solid truth. In this poem, he redefines honour as he intends to demonstrate Stella as its example:

> But, lest we should for honour take
> The drunken quarrels of a rake;
> Or think it seated in a scar,
> Or on a proud triumphal car,
> Or in the payment of a debt
> We lose with sharpers at piquet;
> Or, when a whore in her vocation,
> Keeps punctual to an assignation;
> Or that on which his lordship swears,
> When vulgar knaves would lose their ears:
> Let Stella's fair example preach
> A lesson she alone can teach. (ll. 23-34)

In these lines, Swift differentiates honour as applied to Stella from that tired term when used in questionable circumstances: as Nora C. Jaffe points out, in so doing, he is 'trying to disengage himself from the false assumptions of the past, trying to discover new values that will last because they are more honest and more valuable than the old'.[90] In so doing, Swift is telling Stella that his celebration of her honour will be solidly based on reputable proof, which is different from the vapid term used by others that has no basis in actuality.[91]

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[89]As there is no birthday poem in 1720, we may regard these poems as a substitute for the annual birthday poem. Pat Rogers argues that one of the reasons for deciding the composition date of 'To Stella, Visiting Me in My Sickness' to be 1720 is the lack of a birthday poem in that year, *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 693.

[90]Nora C. Jaffe, p. 89.

[91]It is doubtful that Swift had general readers other than Stella in mind when he wrote the birthday poems. However, as these poems were published relatively quickly in *Miscellanies* (1728), in his life time with his approval, except his 1724 poem, in the end the general readers can be regarded as an allowed audience of

Thus, when Swift praises her virtues such as courage, he dissociates Stella from other women in having real courage and despising the affectations of the female sex:

> She thinks that nature ne'er designed
> Courage to man alone confined:
> Can cowardice her sex adorn,
> Which most exposes ours to scorn?
> She wonders where the charm appears
> In Florimel's affected fears:
> For Stella never learned the art,
> At proper times to scream and start;
> Nor calls up all the house at night,
> And swears she saw a thing in white: (ll. 65-74)

If Swift had not provided Stella and eventually other readers with solid proof for his argument, his praise of Stella might have ended up empty as well. Yet, this is not the case: when Swift describes how Stella looked after him in his illness, how she endured hardship with dignity, which can only come from true friendship, he is supporting his argument with particulars which substantiate the abstract praise of Stella's honour:

> When on my sickly couch I lay,
> Impatient both of night and day,
> Lamenting in unmanly strains,
> Called every power to ease my pains:
> Then Stella ran to my relief
> With cheerful face, and inward grief;
> And, though by heaven's severe decree
> She suffers hourly more than me,
> No cruel master could require
> From slaves employed for daily hire,
> What Stella, by her friendship warmed,
> With vigour and delight performed:
> My sinking spirits now supplies
> With cordials in her hands, and eyes:
> Now, with a soft and silent tread,
> Unheard she moves about my bed.
> I see her taste each nauseous draught,
> And so obligingly am caught:
> I bless the hand from whence they came,
> Nor dare distort my face for shame. (ll. 97-116)

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his poem. For more detail on the publication history of these poems, see *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, pp. 686, 692-693, 694, 706, 718, 729, 736, 748, 762.

What should be noticed is that there is, to borrow A. B. England's expression, 'a vivid immediacy in this passage which creates the impression that Swift is directly rendering a personal experience', which in turn supports the truthfulness of his claim.[92] The last four lines of this passage, describing Stella testing the medicine before giving it to him, make her an individual human being, not just an idealised portrait. Of course, we cannot possibly know that Stella was indeed honourable and virtuous as Swift claimed. Yet this is what Swift thought of Stella as we can see in his praise of her courage and other virtues in his prose work, *On the Death of Mrs Johnson*:

> With all the softness of temper that became a lady, she had the personal courage of a hero. She and her friend having removed their lodgings to a new house, which stood solitary, a parcel of rogues, armed, attempted the house, where there was one boy: She was then about four and twenty: and, having been warned to apprehend some such attempt, she learned the management of a pistol; and the other women and servants being half-dead with fear, she stole softly to her dining-room window, put on a black hood, to prevent being seen, primed the pistol fresh, gently lifted up the sash; and taking aim with the utmost presence of mind, discharged the pistol laden with the bullets, into the body of one villain, who stood the fairest mark. . . .
> Honour, truth, liberality, good-nature, and modesty, were the virtues she chiefly possessed, and most valued in her acquaintance; and where she found them, would be ready to allow for some defects, nor value them less, although they did not shine in learning or in wit; but would never give the least allowance for any failures in the former, even to those who made the greatest figure in either of the two latter.[93]

As far as he is concerned, Swift is praising Stella as he perceives she is: he praises Stella, since he discovers in her a virtue which excels temporary physical beauty, which enables her even to be a self-sacrificing fool because of her virtue who 'pull[ed] a palace [Stella] to the ground,/ Only to have the ruins made/ Materials for an house decayed [Swift]' (ll. 122-124).

That Swift does not ignore truthfulness and indeed takes a serious view of it is confirmed if we examine 'To Stella, Who Collected and Transcribed His Poems', written in the same year as 'To Stella, Visiting Me in My Sickness'. As in the previous poem,

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[92]A. B. England, *Energy and Order in the Poetry of Swift*, p. 153.
[93]*The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, V, pp. 229-230, 234.

Swift compliments Stella by dissociating his poem from those that concentrate on women's physicality. Even from the beginning of the poem, Swift makes it clear that his admiration comes not from her physicality, but from her mental qualities, which arouse in him 'friendship' and 'esteem', not 'love', which sanctions him to be free from physical desire:

> Thou, Stella, wert no longer young,
> When first for thee my harp I strung:
> Without one word of Cupid's darts,
> Of killing eyes, or bleeding hearts:
> With friendship and esteem possessed,
> I ne'er admitted love a guest. (ll. 9-14)

In so doing, Swift emphasises the purity of his intent, which is free from any physical desire or financial interest while satirising the impure purpose of other poems of admiration:

> A poet, starving in a garret,
> Conning old topics like a parrot,
> Invokes his mistress and his muse,
> And stays at home for want of shoes:
> Should but his muse descending drop
> A slice of bread, and mutton-chop,
> Or kindly when his credit's out,
> Surprise him with a pint of stout,
> Or patch his broken stocking soles,
> Or send him in a peck of coals;
> Exalted in his mighty mind
> He flies, and leaves the stars behind;
> Counts all his labours amply paid,
> Adores her for her timely aid. (ll. 25-38)

By arguing for the purity of his purpose, Swift is advocating the truthfulness of his poem: that is, because he is free from any financial or physical purpose, he can see her as she is and thus describes her free from any obligation which follows any impure purpose, such as having to make undeserving women 'goddesses' 'whose scoundrel fathers would not know 'em/ If they should meet 'em in a poem.' (ll. 49-52) In this respect, Swift not only praises Stella for what she is worth, but also advocates himself as an earnest poet, who

'are not scurrilous in satire,/ Nor will in panegyric flatter' (ll. 55-56), thus who is thoroughly truthful to actuality.

As in the previous two poems, Swift compliments Stella for her virtue, which 'on no accidents depend[s]' (l. 80), not for her physical beauty, which 'could not be insured an hour' (l. 64). However, what is peculiar in this poem is that Swift points out Stella's weakness as well as her virtue:

> Stella, when you these lines transcribe,
> Lest you should take them for a bribe;
> Resolved to mortify your pride,
> I'll here expose your weaker side. (ll. 83-86)

Of course, when Swift criticises Stella's occasional outburst of passion in lines 87-136, he does not do so cynically. By persuading her that passion can have contrary effects, Swift points out a defect of Stella which can be corrected to her benefit:

> So the sun's heat, by different powers,
> Ripens the grape, the liquor sours.
> Thus Ajax, when with rage possessed,
> By Pallas breathed into his breast,
> His valour would no more employ;
> Which might alone have conquered Troy;
> But blinded by resentment, seeks
> For vengeance on his friends the Greeks. (ll. 119-126)

The criticism of Stella for her weakness seems to serve two purposes. First, it can serve as genuine advice from him as a concerned friend and mentor. But it also demonstrates his sincerity, which enables him to view Stella with objective eyes, thus enabling him to be a trustworthy observer and reporter of life.

We should also notice that Swift too comes to deserve some credit as a genuine friend. When the poem ends as follows,

> Say Stella, when you copy next,
> Will you keep strictly to the text?
> Dare you let these reproaches stand,
> And to your failing set your hand?
> Or if these lines your anger fire,

Shall they in baser flames expire?
Whene'er they burn, if burn they must,
They'll prove my accusation just. (ll. 137-144)

Swift himself as well as Stella emerges triumphant in this poem. As he establishes himself as a genuine friend of Stella who really tries to improve his already virtuous friend through the half-jokes of these lines (Swift cannot be serious when he puts these questions to Stella, as he cannot really expect Stella to omit some lines or even to burn this poem), Swift is demonstrating his truthfulness as a poet and a friend, who does not turn away from the unpleasant side of life, but challenges it in his effort to improve it.[94]

In this respect, Swift seems to have set his own criteria in writing birthday poems to Stella: above all, they should be truthful, as they should be based upon the actuality of life. Yet, he does not aim to be a simple reporter or transcriber of events; he should also be a transformer, who not only acknowledges the inevitable actuality of life, in this case the effects of time, but also challenges it to transform it to Stella's advantage, thus sublimating life's harsh reality in the world of his poetic creation.

In his birthday poem to Stella of 1721, Swift confronts the effects of time and exorcises it by introducing the metaphor of an inn which might be a little old but is welcoming to its guests:

All travellers at first incline
Where'er they see the fairest sign;
And if they find the chamber neat,
And like the liquor, and the meat,
Will call again, and recommend
The Angel Inn to every friend:
What though the painting grows decayed,
The house will never lose its trade;
Nay, though the treacherous tapster Thomas
Hangs a new angel two doors from us,
As fine as dauber's hands can make it,
In hopes that strangers may mistake it;

[94]That Swift based his argument on actuality can be supported by the fact that Stella did transcribe Swift's poems, as is shown in Swift's letter to Thomas Sheridan: 'Pray copy out the verses I writ on her collecting my verses, and send them to me, for we [Pope and Swift] want some to make our poetical miscellany [1728 *Miscellanies*] long enough, and I am not there to pick what should be added. . . I do not want that poem to Stella to print it entire, but some passages out of it, if they deserve it, to lengthen the volume.', *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, IV, pp. 221-222, Swift to Sheridan, 1 July 1727. Thus his argument can have more force, since it bears reference to an actual event, not some imaginary situation.

We think it both a shame and sin
To quit the true old Angel Inn. (ll. 1-14)

Here, Swift utilises the name of the inn, Angel Inn, to insinuate Stella's virtue. As Nora C. Jaffe observes, Swift's name for the inn is consciously chosen, as he tries to imply that Stella in her nature 'is an angel too—alternately the sign and hostess of the Angel-Inn. But she is not so ethereal as her counterparts in the Renaissance and Restoration. The Poet endows her with all the humanity of a good-natured barmaid'.[95] Swift again frankly admits that Stella is not physically attractive—'An angel's face, a little cracked' (l. 16)—but emphasises its insignificance by stressing her inner virtue:

And every virtue now supplies
The fainting rays of Stella's eyes.
See, at her levee crowding swains,
Whom Stella freely entertains
With breeding, humour, wit, and sense;
And puts them to so small expense:
Their mind so plentifully fills,
And makes such reasonable bills;
So little gets for what she gives,
We really wonder how she lives! (ll. 21-30)

What is interesting in this poem is that Swift not only transforms Stella's current physical decline to her advantage, but also tries to exorcise the future effect of time on her:

That, should you live to see the day
When Stella's locks must all be grey;
When age must print a furrowed trace
On every feature of her face;
Though you and all your senseless tribe,
Could art, or time, or nature bribe,
To make you look like beauty's queen,
And hold forever at fifteen:
No bloom of youth can ever blind
The cracks and wrinkles of your mind,
All men of sense will pass your door,
And crowd to Stella's at fourscore. (ll. 45-56)

[95]Nora C. Jaffe, p. 88.

By envisaging Stella at the age of eighty, what Swift is doing here is to try to persuade and compliment Stella on her never declining virtue. Yet, it is equally important to notice that, as he tries 'to disarm time by anticipating the ravages of old age before they arrive and deprecating their importance', Swift also reveals his apprehension about the effects of time which lurks deep down in his sub-consciousness.[96] Even though he sanctions Stella 'to rejoice in the idea that her virtues will continue to make her attractive in old age' as well as to 'take pleasure in her present age through the poet's use of it as a physical ideal', it should not be overlooked that Swift keeps coming back to the issue of physical decline.[97] That is to say that, by continually referring to old age, Swift seems to be unable to make the subject of physical appearance a non-issue by exorcising it once and for all. If physical appearance is indeed insignificant, he does not need to mention it over and over again and even to envisage it in the far future: yet, as he cannot keep away from this issue, Swift reveals the burden of his task in imposing control in his poetic world over the inevitable onslaught of time, however gallantly and imaginatively he is managing to dispel it at the moment.

This burden of challenge begins to appear more clearly from his birthday poem in 1722. What he is now worried about is his capability to take up the challenge:

> If I perform this task with pain
> Let me of partial fate complain;
> You, every year the debt enlarge,
> I grow less equal to the charge:
> In you, each virtue brighter shines,
> But my poetic vein declines. (ll. 5-10)

In these lines, the effect of time is not limited to the appearance of Stella, as it also affects the poet's ability to celebrate her birthday. In this respect, Swift seems to face a double challenge: as time goes by, the increasing physical decline of Stella will impose more demands on his decreasing poetic powers. While the burden of his task is expressed rather abstractly in his 1722 birthday poem, it becomes more menacing, as it is revealed in more detail in next year's birthday poem, 'Stella's Birthday: A Great Bottle

[96]Louise K. Barnett, p. 99.
[97]Louise K. Barnett, p. 99.

of Wine, Long Buried, Being that Day Dug Up'. As can be inferred from the opening lines of the poem,

> Resolved my annual verse to pay,
> By duty bound, on Stella's day;
> Furnished with papers, pen, and ink,
> I gravely sat me down to think:
> I bit my nails, and scratched my head,
> But found my wit and fancy fled:
> Or, if with more than usual pain,
> A thought came slowly from my brain,
> It cost me Lord knows how much time
> To shape it into sense and rhyme:
> And, what was yet a greater curse,
> Long-thinking made my fancy worse. (ll. 1-12)

this poem is about his ability to face up to the challenge of writing a celebratory poem which overcomes the effect of time, rather than being concerned just to praise Stella. What is interesting in this poem is the way Swift expresses the inevitable decline of his poetic ability by dramatising his conversation with the traditional source of poetic power, Apollo:

> Forsaken by the inspiring nine,
> I waited at Apollo's shrine;
> I told him what the world would say
> If Stella were unsung today;
> How I should hide my head for shame,
> When both the Jacks and Robin came;
> How Ford would frown, how Jim would leer;
> How Sheridan the rogue would sneer:
> And swear it does not always follow,
> That '*Semel'n anno ridet Apollo.*'
> I have assured them twenty times,
> That Phoebus helped me in my rhymes;
> Phoebus inspired me from above,
> And he and I were hand in glove.
> But finding me so dull and dry since,
> They'll call it all poetic licence:
> And when I brag of aid divine,
> Think Eusden's right as good as mine. (ll. 13-30)

In these lines, Swift seems to resort to help from Apollo for his poetic inspiration, as he used to do in the past. However, as he admits, in lines 27-30, that his friends would ridicule this attempt of his, his reference to Apollo is used only to reveal the departure of poetic power from him. The decay of his poetic ability becomes more apparent, as Apollo gives him rather unconventional advice: instead of endowing him with a poetic inspiration for the praise of Stella, though he himself acknowledges the importance of the task—'You yearly sing as she grows old,/ You'd leave her virtues half untold' (ll. 39-40)—Apollo gives the advice that Swift should resort to the power of wine, which should be dug up on Stella's birthday:

> 'Behold the bottle, where it lies
> With neck elated towards the skies!
> The god of winds and god of fire
> Did to its wondrous birth conspire;
> And Bacchus, for the poet's use,
> Poured in a strong inspiring juice:
> See! as you raise it from its tomb,
> It drags behind a spacious womb,
> And in the spacious womb contains
> A sovereign medicine for the brains. (ll. 61-70)

Of course, this advice is presented half-jokingly, as the epic dimension of the poetic terms is in conflict with the trivial task of digging up a bottle of wine. However, what is important for our purpose is the fact that Apollo, who is supposed to be a source of poetic inspiration, does not even guarantee the success of his advice, as he declares that whether Swift can find the bottle of wine or not is up to fate:

> 'You'll find it soon if fate consents;
> If not, a thousand Mrs Brents,
> Ten thousand Archies armed with spades,
> May dig in vain to Pluto's shades. (ll. 71-74)

Apollo finishes his advice as follows:

> 'From thence a plenteous draught infuse,
> And boldly then invoke the muse:
> (But first let Robert, on his knees,

With caution drain it from the lees)
The muse will at your call appear,
With Stella's praise to crown the year.' (ll. 75-80)

On the surface, Swift seems at last to find poetic imagination through the power of wine: yet, his serious doubt for the future emerges as Apollo's advice is marked by the bathetic deflation in lines 77-78, in which a moment of inspiration is interrupted by tedious attention to detail. Of course, we cannot dismiss the claim that, above all else, this poem is a witty joke, exaggerating the difficulty in creating suitable praise of Stella. Yet, we should also notice that this poem does not serve its original purpose—that is, to praise Stella: this poem is only occasioned by Stella's birthday, but falls short of its supposed purpose. This year, Swift may have succeeded in writing a poem on Stella's birthday, but he only succeeded in part. Moreover, as the device of wine separates Swift from the traditional source of poetic inspiration, this metaphor also dents his self-esteem as a poet, who after all is reduced to a state in which he has to resort to the power of alcohol to face up to the task.[98]

When Swift writes the birthday poem in 1724, 'To Stella: Written on the Day of Her Birth, But Not on the Subject, When I Was Sick in Bed', as the subtitle reveals, his subject is no longer the praise of Stella, but himself, the despair about his decaying poetic ability. When he begins the poem as follows,

Tormented with incessant pains,
Can I devise poetic strains?
Time was, when I could yearly pay
My verse on Stella's native day:
But now, unable grown to write,
I grieve she ever saw the light. (ll. 1-6)

his emotion verges on despair, as he even laments the birth of Stella which occasions his current pain. His pain deepens as he acknowledges his debt to her, which should be repaid by writing a proper tribute:

[98]Of course, we can interpret Swift's rather unconventional use of Apollo as his criticism of the now over-used and tired convention which is still being used by many third-rate poets. However, though this aspect of the poem should be appreciated, it should also be noticed that Swift not only debunks the device but also, in so doing, expresses concern over his decaying poetic ability. In other words, Swift does not emerge triumphant through his undermining of the convention: rather he goes down along with it.

Ungrateful; since to her I owe
That I these pains can undergo.
She tends me, like a humble slave;
And, when indecently I rave,
When out my brutish passions break,
With gall in every word I speak,
She, with soft speech, my anguish cheers,
Or melts my passion down with tears: (ll. 7-14)

Of course, in so despairing of his ability to pay a proper tribute, Swift manages, as ever, to pay some tribute to her intrinsic virtue in lines such as 'All accidents of life conspire/ To raise up Stella's virtue higher;' (ll. 21-22). However, the distinctive lack of imagination, which up to now has made it possible for him to challenge the effects of time, should not go unnoticed, as his praise of Stella degenerates into very abstract assertion. As the final lines of this poem reveal,

But when I once am out of pain,
I promise to be good again:
Meantime your other juster friends
Shall for my follies make amends:
So may we long continue thus,
Admiring you, you pitying us. (ll. 33-38)

even though he is attributing the present difficulty to illness, it is important to notice the fact that now he projects himself no longer as a confident poet, but as an object of pity. Time is conceived here as beginning to exact a heavy toll from himself as well as from Stella, putting his ability to challenge it into serious doubt. What is distinctive in this poem is the lack of light-heartedness, which up to now has disguised his deeper consciousness about the onslaught of time. Rather than joking about the effect of time and transforming it, Swift is, for once, in earnest and reveals his deeper concern, as the praise of Stella gives place to despondency about his decaying poetic ability.

The next year's birthday poem to Stella is at once a recognition of defeat by time and triumph over it, as, while the poem succeeds in softening the blow of time, it nevertheless fails to overcome it. In this poem, Swift concedes the inevitability of succumbing to the power of time, as he admits the near-impossibility of fulfilling the

task of writing a proper celebratory poem, revealed in the light-hearted banter of the following lines:

> As, when a beauteous nymph decays,
> We say, she's past her dancing days;
> So, poets lose their feet by time,
> And can no longer dance in rhyme.
> Your annual bard had rather chose
> To celebrate your birth in prose;
> Yet, merry folks, who want by chance
> A pair to make a country dance,
> Call the old housekeeper, and get her
> To fill a place, for want of better;
> While Sheridan is off the hooks,
> And friend Delany at his books,
> That Stella may avoid disgrace,
> Once more the Dean supplies their place. (ll. 1-14)

Of course, Swift is half-joking in this self-deprecation when he compares himself to an old housekeeper recruited only to fill a place in a country-dance. However, Swift's sense of his inadequacy as a proper poet lurks behind this joke, as becomes clearer as the lines progress. What should be noticed in understanding the following questions put to Stella is that this theme of physical decay has been used from the first birthday poem in 1719 and repeatedly claimed to be a non-issue:

> No poet ever sweetly sung,
> Unless he were like Phoebus, young;
> Nor ever nymph inspired to rhyme,
> Unless, like Venus, in her prime.
> At fifty-six, if this be true,
> Am I a poet fit for you?
> Or at the age of forty-three,
> Are you a subject fit for me? (ll. 19-26)

We should ask why Swift keeps returning to this theme of the physical inappropriateness of both Stella and himself as fit subjects for a love poem. Of course, Swift's question can be interpreted as rhetorical, as Louise K. Barnett does when she sees these lines as 'an intimate joke, dependent upon the private knowledge poet and subject share that both

are fit for their respective roles [poet and his lady] and that the poet will produce the expected poem'.[99] Yet, what is different is that, if the lines are Swift's mock-lamentation, no confident response, which can confirm his lamentation as exaggerated and thus make it mock-lamentation, follows in the ensuing lines. In the following lines,

> Adieu bright wit, and radiant eyes;
> You must be grave, and I be wise.
> Our fate in vain we would oppose,
> But I'll be still your friend in prose:
> Esteem and friendship to express,
> Will not require poetic dress;
> And if the muse deny her aid
> To have them *sung*, they may be *said*. (ll. 27-34)

Swift not only tries to face up to the challenge, but also accepts covertly the impossibility of that task. Just as Stella has no longer the 'radiant eyes' of youth, so he has to face the disappearance of his wit. Of course, the task will continue to be fulfilled, if not wholly in the form of poetry, then in the form of prose. We could interpret these lines as banter, because Swift is writing his praise in the form of verse while complaining about its difficulty. However, we cannot simply put aside these lines as a joke, because, in this poem, the subject becomes once again the difficulty of writing which has been repeated for the past three birthday tributes, those of 1722, 1723, and 1724. We may regard Swift's complaining about the difficulty of writing as a light-hearted joke, if it appeared once or twice. Yet, when it comes to be repeated four years running, we have every reason to suspect that a degree of seriousness lies beneath the surface. Thus, if Swift's avowal that the celebration of Stella's birthday will be continued in some form can be interpreted as the demonstration of his determination to resist time, his acknowledgement of failing poetic powers constitutes a sombre recognition of the reality that he can no longer challenge time successfully and thus should accept the inevitable and live with it. If time can indeed be challenged, it can only be challenged partially.

Some might argue that Swift's brilliant pairing of his dim sight and Stella's physical decay in lines 35-48 is the confident rebuttal of such acceptance of the inevitable:

[99]Louise K. Barnett, pp. 102-103.

'Tis true, but let it not be known,
My eyes are somewhat dimmish grown;
For nature, always in the right,
To your decays adapts my sight,
And wrinkles undistinguished pass,
For I'm ashamed to use a glass;
And till I see them with these eyes,
Whoever says you have them, lies. (ll. 41-48)

But these lines, however wittily conceived, in fact acknowledge that Stella has aged. By drawing attention to her physical decline, which should have been made a non-issue a long time ago, he actually undermines the final section of the poem, which contains his customary assurance of Stella's virtue:

No length of time can make you quit
Honour and virtue, sense and wit,
Thus you may still be young to me,
While I can better *hear* than *see*;
Oh, ne'er may fortune show her spite,
To make me *deaf*, and mend my *sight*. (ll. 49-54)

Of course, we cannot deny the brilliance of Swift's imaginative conceit that he '*hear*[s]' Stella's beauty rather than '*see*[s]' it, yet there is a hitch in this reasoning. In lines 41-48, Swift's rebuttal of Stella's decline is curiously based on his own physical decline, which enables him not to see her physical decay. As his physical decline is confirmed, even though at the moment he may be able to hear Stella's virtue and is fortunate in not seeing her not-so-beautiful appearance, the current equilibrium is all but temporary as his physical decline will continue ruthlessly.[100] The reason for my interpretation of this poem as Swift's admission of defeat by time as well as triumph over it is that the very

[100]It is indeed the irony of fate that Swift had been suffering from dizziness and deafness throughout his life, of which suffering he once described in 'On His Own Deafness', written in 1734:

Deaf, giddy, odious to my friends,
Now all my consolation ends;
No more I hear my church's Bell,
Then if it rang out for my Knell. (ll. 1-4)

In these lines, Swift describes deafness indeed as the cause of his loss of 'consolation'.

source of his triumph over time entails the admission that time has led to decay. In this poem, his praise of Stella is made possible, not in spite of physical decay, but by it, which has produced temporary and indeed illusory equilibrium. When Swift has to face the eventual effect of time, not just physical decline, but death, this fragile equilibrium finally breaks down in his last birthday poem to Stella in 1727.

In this poem, Swift is really trying hard to find joy in Stella's birthday:

> This day, whate'er the fates decree,
> Shall still be kept with joy by me:
> This day then, let us not be told,
> That you are sick, and I grown old,
> Nor think on our approaching ills,
> And talk of spectacles and pills.
> Tomorrow will be time enough
> To hear such mortifying stuff.
> Yet, since from reason may be brought
> A better and more pleasing thought,
> Which can in spite of all decays,
> Support a few remaining days: (ll. 1-12)

What should be noticed is that, in these lines, Swift refuses to talk about the future, which only reminds him of the impending death of Stella, as he tries to find joy in 'a few remaining days' rather than to find a way to face up to time and overcome its debilitating effects. This refusal to take on the challenge of the future inevitably leads to thoughts about the past, in which he and Stella could find joy, rather than the future, where they have to face the all-levelling death which Swift is not sure how to deal with:

> Shall these, like empty shadows pass,
> Or forms reflected from a glass?
> Or mere chimeras in the mind,
> That fly and leave no marks behind?
> Does not the body thrive and grow
> By food of twenty years ago?
> And, had it not been still supplied,
> It must a thousand times have died.
> Then, who with reason can maintain,
> That no effects of food remain?
> And, is not virtue in mankind
> The nutriment that feeds the mind?
> Upheld by each good action past,

And still continued by the last:
Then, who with reason can pretend,
That all effects of virtue end? (ll. 51-66)

These lines, which argue for the ever-lasting effects of past virtue, are a superb compliment to Stella, as well as a consolation to her whose past virtue might enable her to enjoy the last days of her life. However, here, Swift deals only with the past and only hopes that the memory of the past will soften the blow of time: yet, as he can only resort to the past for consolation and cannot address the future on its own terms, however moving this appeal to Stella may be, this persuasion cannot be convincing to her who actually has to face death. In this respect, the questions in the above paragraph cannot be regarded as rhetorical questions to which the answers are definitely yes: rather, they represent an ideal state instead of the actual state of things. What is important is that this kind of reasoning is not convincing to Swift himself either, as the following lines reveal:

Believe me Stella, when you show
That true contempt of things below,
Nor prize your life for other ends
Than merely to oblige your friends;
Your former actions claim their part,
And join to fortify your heart.
For virtue in her daily race,
Like Janus, bears a double face;
Looks back with joy where she has gone,
And therefore goes with courage on. (ll. 67-76)

The crucial phrase is right at the beginning: 'Believe me Stella'. Even though it can be regarded as a conversational convention which means 'This is, I assure you, the truth . . .', the important thing is that Swift's assuring Stella of the truth of the claim in these lines is not convincing to Swift himself, as the lines that follow this passage reflect his despair about the situation. Of course, it is going a bit too far to interpret it as implying Swift's desperate attempt to persuade Stella, interpreting it as 'you must believe me'. Yet, if we consider the fact that Swift does become desperate and overcome with emotion in the ensuing lines, this phrase seems to have a meaning which goes beyond a conversational convention. Thus, it seems to me that, however hard Swift tries to

persuade Stella of virtue's lasting effect, Swift himself knows that, in the end, his reasoning can only be 'believed' by the heart, rather than understood by reason.

When Swift ends the poem with the following lines,

> O then, whatever heaven intends,
> Take pity on your pitying friends;
> Nor let your ills affect your mind,
> To fancy they can be unkind.
> Me, surely me, you ought to spare,
> Who gladly would your sufferings share;
> Or give my scrap of life to you,
> And think it far beneath your due;
> You, to whose care so oft I owe,
> That I'm alive to tell you so. (ll. 79-88)

the fragile equilibrium he has managed to maintain throughout the past birthday poems breaks down, when he is overcome with emotion as he desperately implores—as shown in the repetition of 'me' in 'Me, surely me'—Stella to spare him from her despair. As the reversal of roles happens here—Swift instead of Stella becoming the object of consolation—these lines become Swift's confession of his inability to exorcise the effect of time through the art of his poetry. As he faces the death of Stella, his gallant effort to face up to the challenge of time, which he managed in the past birthday poems, collapses: as Louise K. Barnett points out, these lines come to demonstrate that in this critical crisis he 'is imprisoned within his own suffering and dependence'.[101]

This sudden outburst of emotion which at once destroys all the careful reasoning can also be observed in his 'Holyhead. September 25, 1727', a poem written during his prolonged stay at Holyhead on his return to Ireland from England at a time when he believed Stella to be dying. We can witness in this poem Swift's despair which was caused by a dire dilemma. His despair comes from the paradox that he both does not want to and does really want to return to Ireland. He does not want to, because he hates the land:

> I never was in haste before
> To reach that slavish hateful shore:
> Before, I always found the wind

[101]Louise K. Barnett, p. 105.

To me was most malicious kind, (ll. 19-22)

Yet, the paradox is that he also longs for a quick return to Ireland, because he believes his dearest friend Stella to be dying:

> But now the danger of a friend
> On whom my hopes and fears depend,
> Absent from whom all climes are cursed,
> With whom I'm happy in the worst,
> With rage impatient makes me wait
> A passage to the land I hate. (ll. 23-28)

The result of this dilemma is that he rages at everything in Holyhead:

> Lo here I sit at Holyhead
> With muddy ale and mouldy bread:
> All Christian victuals stink of fish,
> I'm where my enemies would wish.
> Convict of lies is every sign,
> The inn has not one drop of wine. (ll. 1-6)

Swift's uncontrolled outburst verges on hyperbole, as can be seen in phrases such as '**All** Christian victuals. . .', and '**not one** drop of wine' (my emphasis). What we should understand is the situation Swift is forced into. As he desperately yearns to go to the land he hates, the situation has the nature of a crisis, as 'there can be no completely positive outcome'.[102] However, though the situation seems really desperate, at least to try to find a way out is one thing but to vent his anger on other innocent objects is another. Swift shows some form of calmness in the prose journal that he kept in Holyhead:

> I shall say nothing upon the suspense I am in about my dearest friend; because that is a case extraordinary, and therefore by way of amusement, I will speak as if it were not in my thought, and only as a passenger who is in a scurvy unprovided comfortless place without one companion. . . .[103]

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[102]Louise K. Barnett, p. 97.
[103]*Holyhead Journal*, September 26, 1727, *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, V, p. 204.

Swift maintains his equanimity here by distancing himself from the situation he is put in, that is, by refusing to think about the impending death of Stella. However, this kind of distancing does not exist or indeed proves to be impossible in the poem, once he ponders on the death of his friend. Trapped in a crisis, provoked by his utter impotence in the face of the loss of Stella, the triviality of the insults he directs towards food, drink, and accommodation points to his deeper frustration against the world, which is represented by the wind and the discomfort of Holyhead.[104]

2. The Strained Relationship Between Self and the Outer World: Swift's Markethill Poems and 'A Dialogue Between an Eminent Lawyer and Dr. Swift Dean of St. Patrick's'

As I have demonstrated, in the poems to Stella, Swift regards time as hostile to his self, as Pope does in his *Imitations of Horace*. Time is conceived as an extreme force which threatens his inner equanimity. Of course, we cannot aver that time is a representative of the hostile outer world, because, whether one faces up to time or not, it will eventually become a negating force to us all. However, it is important for us to notice that Swift, from the first of the birthday poems to Stella, conceived it to be hostile to the self and tried to overcome it, an attempt whose failure he painfully recognises in the end. In a way, Swift's birthday poems to Stella are his exploration of the relationship between the self and the outer world, here represented by time, which is conceived as hostile.

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[104]Faced by Stella's impending death, Swift acknowledges his powerlessness before time. In another poem written during his prolonged stay at Holyhead, 'The Power of Time', Swift acknowledges that it is futile to challenge time, thus has to accept it without much fuss:

> If neither brass, nor marble can withstand
> The mortal force of Time's destructive hand:
> If mountains sink to vales, if cities die,
> And lessening rivers mourn their fountains dry:
> When my old cassock, says a Welsh divine,
> Is out at elbows, why should I repine?

We can notice here Swift's calmness in this acceptance of the eventual power of time, as in his prose *Holyhead Journal* I discussed. Yet, we also should notice that here as well as in *Holyhead Journal* there is no mention of Stella, unlike in 'Holyhead. September 25, 1727'.

In this respect, another group of poems, the Markethill poems, are of interest in exploring Swift's idea of the relationship between the self and the outer world. What is interesting in this group of poems is that Swift imagines a situation in which he and the outer world are at loggerheads. Of course, the situation he creates for the Markethill poems is imaginary and cannot be regarded as historically true.[105] However, Swift reveals to us his conception of the relationship between self and the world by creating a hostile environment for himself in the Acheson household. He reveals his uneasiness about the relationship by creating a situation which is presented through a third person speaker, normally Lady Acheson, and thus with an air of objectivity.

In 'My Lady's Lamentation and Complaint against the Dean', Swift portrays himself as a loathed guest. This impression is delivered by Lady Acheson's lamentation about the peace broken by the intrusion of Swift:

> Before he came here
> To sponge for good cheer,
> I sat with delight,
> From morning till night,
> With two bony thumbs
> Could rub my own gums,
> Or scratching my nose,
> And joggling my toes; . . .
> If he had his will,
> I should never sit still:
> He comes with his whims,
> I must move my limbs;
> I cannot be sweet
> Without using my feet;
> To lengthen my breath
> He tires me to death.
> By the worst of all squires,
> Through bog and through briars,
> Where a cow would be startled,
> I'm in spite of my heart led: (ll. 15-22, 37-48)

[105]Actually, we have no evidence which points to Swift's strained relationship with the Achesons in his stay at Markethill. In general, he seems to have been a welcome guest of the Achesons, especially Lady Acheson. For information about Swift's stay at Markethill, see Irvin Ehrenpreis, *Swift: The Man, His Works, and the Age*, III, pp. 600-603, 623-627, 666-677.

According to her account, Swift indeed seems to be an improper guest whose manner at the Acheson household does break the rules of decorum required for a sensible guest. However, if we examine the following lines,

> 'What, madam? No walking,
> No reading, nor talking?
> You're now in your prime,
> Make use of your time.
> Consider, before
> You come to threescore,
> How the hussies will fleer
> Where'er you appear: . . .
> And then he grows mild;
> 'Come, be a good child:
> If you are inclined
> To polish your mind,
> Be adored by the men
> Till threescore and ten,
> And kill with the spleen
> The jades of sixteen,
> I'll show you the way:
> Read six hours a day.
> The wits will frequent ye,
> And think you but twenty.' (ll. 111-118, 123-134)

there emerges another side of story. Even though Lady Acheson dislikes Swift's advice to her and even resents it, actually the advice itself seems to be wholesome, as it is the result of his good will to improve her. That is, if Swift does violate the decorum of a guest, it is for her benefit. In this respect, Swift is undermining Lady Acheson's credibility as a story-teller, and in so doing, covertly presenting a portrait of himself as a proper guest. However, what is also important is the fact that Swift's self is not understood by the outer world, here represented by Lady Acheson. As the following lines reveal,

> But, oh, how we laugh,
> To see a wild calf
> Come, driven by heat,
> And foul the green seat;
> Or run helterskelter,
> To his arbour for shelter,

Where all goes to ruin
The Dean has been doing.
The girls of the village
Come flocking for pillage,
Pull down the fine briars,
And thorns, to make fires;
But yet are so kind
To leave something behind:
No more need said on't,
I smell when I tread on't. (ll. 187-202)

Swift is viewed with cynicism, as his work is not appreciated by other people and the ruin of his work is greeted not with grief but with derisory laughter. Even though we should not forget that this story told by Lady Acheson is imaginary and is in fact told by Swift, and that the close circle of friends might have laughed at the discrepancy between the situation imagined and the actual situation, we also should not forget that Swift is presenting a portrait of himself as one who is not understood by other people, here represented by the Acheson household.[106] Thus, under the surface of jovial banter, Swift is expressing his fear that he might not be understood by the world, that his good will is rejected and laughed at by the world.

This fear of rejection by the world, though well covered by the light-hearted surface, is again well expressed in another Markethill poem, *The Grand Question Debated: Whether Hamilton's Bawn Should Be Turned Into a Barracks or a Malthouse.* Concerning the issue of the conversion of Hamilton's bawn in the Acheson estate, Swift again portrays himself as an unwelcome guest of the Achesons.[107] This is first revealed by Lady Acheson's comment on the matter, favouring a military barrack:

With parsons, what lady can keep herself clean?
I'm all over daubed when I sit by the Dean.

[106]This poem does not seem to have been written for the general public, like 'A Panegyric on the Dean', which was published later in *The Works of Jonathan Swift, D. D* (1735). The other two poems which I shall discuss in this chapter, *Lady Acheson Weary of the Dean* and *The Grand Question Debated* were published immediately after the composition as broadsides not without Swift's approval. We cannot be sure whether these poems were written from the first with a general readership in mind. Yet, what is important for our purpose in this chapter is that Swift revealed his inner apprehension to other people, however large or small the audience. In a way, Swift explored his relationship with the outer world in the safest environment in which his apprehension could not be jeered at, if he had only small group of friends in mind when he wrote the Markethill poems.

[107]'bawn sb. 1. A fortified enclosure, enceinte, or circumvallation; the fortified court or outwork of a castle.' (OED)

But, if you will give us a barrack, my dear,
The Captain, I'm sure, will always come here;
I then shall not value his Deanship a straw,
For the Captain, I warrant, will keep him in awe;
Or should he pretend to be brisk and alert,
Will tell him that chaplains should not be so pert;
That men of his coat should be minding their prayers,
And not among ladies to give themselves airs.' (ll. 29-38)

In these lines, Swift's status as an unwelcome guest emerges as his presence in the Acheson household gives weight to Lady Acheson's favouring a military barrack.

It is through Hannah the maid's fantasy that a more degrading portrait of himself is presented; in her fantasy, in comparison with the captain's glossy appearance, Swift becomes all but clumsy and humbled:

'Next day, to be sure, the Captain will come,
At the head of his troop, with trumpet and drum: . . .
See, now comes the Captain all daubed in gold lace:
O lor'! the sweet gentleman! look in his face;
And see how he rides like a lord of the land,
With the fine flaming sword that he holds in his hand;
And his horse, the dear *creter*, it prances and rears,
With ribbons in knots, at its tail and its ears: (ll. 87-88, 93-98)

The crucial lines come when Hannah imagines a dinner scene attended by Swift and the captain. It is through self-incriminating remarks attributed to the captain, despite his fine appearance, that Swift undermines the views shared by Lady Acheson and Hannah:

"Whenever you see a cassock and gown,
A hundred to one, but it covers a clown;
Observe how a parson comes into a room,
God damn me, he hobbles as bad as my groom;
A *scholard*, when just from his college broke loose,
Can hardly tell how to cry boo to a goose;
Your Noveds, and Blutraks, and Omurs and stuff.
By God they don't signify this pinch of snuff,
To give a young gentleman right education,
The army's the only good school in this nation;
My school master called me a dunce and a fool,
But at cuffs I was always the cock of the school;
I never could take to my book for the blood o' me,

And the puppy confessed, he expected no good o' me.
He caught me one morning coquetting his wife,
But he mauled me, I ne'er was so mauled in my life;
So I took to the road, and what's very odd,
The first man I robbed was a parson, by God.
Now madam, you'll think it a strange thing to say,
But, the sight of a book makes me sick to this day." (ll. 153-172)

Despite his scorn for Dean Swift, in these lines, it is the captain who emerges as the inferior, as he even does not deserve comparison, when he unwittingly admits, through the use of vulgar language such as 'scholard' and exposure of his ignorance shown in words such as 'Noveds' (Ovid), 'Blutracks' (Plutarch), and 'Omurs' (Homer), that he was a dunce and even once a highwayman.

However, what should be noticed is that the captain's inferiority or even vulgarity is not acknowledged, and that the captain is still admired and Swift still abhorred by Hannah and Lady Acheson, as we can see in the following lines uttered by Hannah and then by Lady Acheson:

'Never since I was born did I hear so much wit,
And, madam, I laughed till I thought I should split.
So, then you looked scornful, and sniffed at the Dean,
As, who should say, "Now, am I skinny and lean?"
But he durst not so much as once open his lips,
And, the Doctor was plaguily down in the hyps.' (ll. 173-178)

Then, turning to Hannah, and forcing a frown,
Although it was plain, in her heart she was glad,
Cried, 'Huzzy, why sure the wench is gone mad:
How could these chimeras get into your brains? —
Come hither, and take this old gown for your pains.
But the Dean, if this secret should come to his ears,
Will never have done with his gibes and his jeers:
For your life, not a word of the matter, I charge ye:
Give me but a barrack, a fig for the clergy.' (ll. 182-190)

Of course, Swift is imagining a situation and then turning that situation to his advantage, by undermining Hannah and Lady Acheson's view. Yet the existence of the fear that, despite his good intentions, he might be misunderstood or even rejected should be acknowledged, since if this uncertainty did not exist, there would have been no need to

reassure himself by creating an imaginary situation. In these two poems, Swift's fear is well covered by his undermining of the putative speakers of the poems, as in the end the Swift which he wants to portray emerges. However, in another Markethill poem, the presentation of the relationship between self and the outer world is a lot more disturbing.

The difference between *Lady Acheson Weary of the Dean* and the above two poems is that there is no discernible undermining of the speaker in this poem, which in a way acts like a safety net for Swift's fears. While he is described by Lady Acheson as an unwelcome guest as follows,

> After a week, a month, a quarter,
> And day succeeding after day,
> Says not a word of his departure,
> Though not a soul would have him stay. (ll. 9-12)

these lines are not answered by some positive portrait of Swift. Of course, there is a hint of hyperbole in the following complaint against him:

> The house accounts are daily rising,
> So much his stay does swell the bills;
> My dearest life, it is surprising
> How much he eats, how much he swills. (ll. 29-32)

Yet, the hint of hyperbole is too weak to balance the whole indictment directed at Swift. What is disturbing is that, when Lady Acheson bursts into rage in the following lines,

> Oh! if I could, how I would maul
> His tallow face and wainscot paws,
> His beetle brows and eyes of wall,
> And make him soon give up the cause. (ll. 37-40)

her rage is not undermined anywhere in the poem, despite its excessiveness. Thus, as far as this poem is concerned, her rage is not proved unfounded. Maybe Swift is presenting this poem as a pre-emptive strike to exorcise the fear of being a unwelcome guest. Maybe this poem caused genial laughter amongst the small group of his friends who knew the real circumstances. Yet, despite its light-heartedness, what is important for us

is that Swift here might be imagining the worst situation in which his side of story cannot be delivered to counter the misunderstanding or even rejection forced onto him by the world. We should start asking questions when Swift again and again tries to arouse laughter by creating a situation which is hostile to himself. Can we regard these as solely Swift's light-hearted banter? Can we not sense some deep uneasiness about the relationship between self and the outer world disguised by the humorous surface? That we cannot regard these poems as merely Swift's simple joke is, I think, supported by other evidence which points to the existence of Swift's apprehension, as I shall demonstrate later.

While his fear of misunderstanding or rejection is carried out in the form of complaint in the above three poems, in 'A Panegyric on the Dean: In the Person of a Lady in the North', it is carried out in the form of vapid praise of him. In a way, it is more disturbing for Swift to be misunderstood by his admirer, because this demonstrates the fact that he is ineffective in getting his message across even to his allies who are in a better position to understand his good intentions. When Lady Acheson 'salutes' Swift as 'Dean, butler, usher, jester, tutor' (ll. 38-39), she praises him for all the wrong reasons. For example, when she compliments Swift as a dean in the following lines,

> In you such dignity appears;
> So suited to your state, and years!
> With ladies what a strick decorum!
> With what devotion you adore 'em!
> Treat me with so much complaisance,
> As fits a princess in romance. (ll. 49-54)

her praise hardly befits him as a dean; as he is a dean, a proper compliment should be his power to encourage people to devotion or his religious faith. However, this is not the case, as he is admired for his gallant manner to the ladies, befitting a 'prince in romance' which he does not aspire to be. For another example, Lady Acheson's praise of Swift as a tutor actually becomes a demonstration of his failure. As the following lines show,

> Poor I, a savage bred and born,
> By you instructed every morn,
> Already have improved so well,
> That I have almost learnt to spell:

The neighbours who come here to dine,
Admire to hear me to speak so *fine*. (ll. 131-136)

Lady Acheson's praise of him as a tutor is tinged with cynicism, as the phrase 'I have almost learnt to spell' reveals the meanness of his achievement as a tutor. His feat as a tutor becomes even despicable, as the emphasis put on the word '*fine*' demonstrates that he only succeeds in making her seem to have acquired some knowledge rather than in helping her to obtain real and valuable knowledge. More disturbing and damning is her praise of him as a writer:

Your reverence thus, with like success,
Nor is your skill, or labour less,
When bent upon some smart lampoon,
You toss and turn your brain till noon;
Which, in its jumblings round the skull,
Dilates, and makes the vessel full:
While nothing comes but froth at first,
You think your giddy head will burst:
But, squeezing out four lines in rhyme,
Are largely paid for all your time. (ll. 187-196)

Her compliment is solely based on the process of writing, that is, his ability to write something regardless of its content. In this way, the spiritual part of writing disappears, as writing poems is conceived as the same as producing butter, as her praise of him as a writer is ominously similar to the praise of him as a dairy handmaid:

Behold; a frothy substance rise;
Be cautious, or your bottle flies.
The butter comes; our fears are ceased;
And, out you squeeze an ounce at least. (ll. 183-186)

Some might interpret these lines as Swift's light-hearted self-deprecation which can be heartily enjoyed among the circle of closest friends. However, there are too many recurrences of the theme of misunderstanding to regard the Markethill poems as simply self-deprecating jokes. We should recognise, under the surface of banter, Swift's uneasy concern at being misunderstood or rejected by the world, which leads him to try to

establish a true portrait of his self through undermining the wrong portrait of him delivered by the speaker. By creating an imaginary situation, Swift is exorcising his fear which stems from the strained relationship between the self and the world.

We should note that this fear of his as expressed through imagined situations has a solid basis in his understanding of reality. Swift's perception of himself as misunderstood or rejected by the world is well revealed in letters which were written at about the time of the composition of the Markethill poems. When he wrote to Bolingbroke in 21 March 1729/30 as follows,

> I have likewise seen a Monkey overthrow all the dishes and plates in a kitchen, merely for the pleasure of seeing them tumble and hearing the clatter they made in their fall. I wish you would invite me to such another entertainment; but you think as I ought to think, that it is time for me to have done with the world, and so I would if I could get into a better before I was called into the best, and not die here in a rage, like a poison'd rat in a hole. I wonder you are not ashamed to let me pine away in this kingdom while you are out of power.[108]

what he reveals is his growing realisation that the world does not change because of his anger, as he is not understood by the world, so that he had better live with it. We are not quite sure how much distance Swift put between himself and the monkey that throws the dishes just to see them tumble and to hear the clatter, watched by people for entertainment. The phrase 'that it is time for me to have done with the world' seems to imply ominously Swift's suspicion that, for the outer world, he might seem like this monkey. The phrase 'poison'd rat in a hole' reveals his conception of the state he is in: he is in a major crisis, but like this rat his fate is doomed as there is no way out. The realisation that he and the world are at loggerheads and that his writings are not understood by the world is again well revealed in his letter to Pope of 15 January 1730/1:

> I dine tête à tête five times a week with my old Presbyterian Housekeeper, whom I call Sir Robert, and so all my friends & Neighbours. I am in my Chamber at five, there sit alone till eleven, and then to bed. I write Pamphlets and follys merely for amusement, and when they are finished, as I grow weary in the middle, I cast them into the fire, partly out of dislike, and chiefly because I know they will signify nothing.[109]

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[108] *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 383, Swift to Bolingbroke, 21 March 1729/30.
[109] *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 434, Swift to Pope, 15 January 1730/1.

In this letter, Swift is painfully aware of the reality in which he and the world are irreconcilable, and his writing is unable to bridge the gap, as he admits that it comes to 'signify nothing'. Thus, it is not surprising for us to find him deploring the hopelessness of the situation, which he describes in another letter to Pope: 'without a Miracle we are just at our last gasp, beyond the imagination of any one who does not live in this Kingdom.'[110] The impossibility of reform is clearly stated in his letter to the Countess of Suffolk:

> If any State-scribble writ here should happen to reach London, I entreat your Ladyship would continue to do me the justice of believing my innocence. Because I lately assured D. of Dorset, that I would not have a hand in any such thing: and I gave him my reason before his Secretary; that, looking upon this Kingdom's condition as absolutely desperate, I would not prescribe a dose to the dead.[111]

While Swift deals with the imaginary conflict between self and the world in the Markethill poems, in 'A Dialogue Between an Eminent Lawyer and Dr. Swift Dean of St. Patrick's', his loose imitation of Horace's satire II. i written in 1729 or 1730, thus at the same period as the Markethill poems, the conflict is not imaginary, as he ponders on the conflict between himself and a lawyer who is a representative of the world hostile to him.

We should recognise Swift's conception of an irreconcilable gap between himself and the corrupt world. On the one hand, there is a lawyer who advises Swift to turn false into true and praise the irreligious:

> Commend the times, your thoughts correct
> And follow the prevailing sect,
> Assert that Hyde in writing story
> Shows all the malice of a Tory,
> While Burnet in his deathless page
> Discovers freedom without rage;
> To Woolston recommend our youth

[110] *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, p. 458, Swift to Pope, 20 April 1731.
[111] *The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift*, III, pp. 500-501, Swift to the Countess of Suffolk, 26 October 1731.

For learning, probity, and truth,
That noble genius, who unbinds
The chains which fetter free-born minds,
Redeems us from the slavish fears
Which lasted near two thousand years,
He can alone the priesthood humble,
Make gilded spires and altars tumble. (ll. 23-36)

On the other hand, there is Swift who admits no compromise in his position toward the corrupt world:

Must I commend against my conscience
Such stupid blasphemy and nonsense? (ll. 37-38)

Or, shall the charms of wealth and power
Make me pollute the muses' bower? (ll. 45-46)

In Pope's rendering, written relatively early in his satiric career, there exists a mock-compromise between Pope and Fortescue, as he imagines a situation in which his stance can be approved by 'deflect[ing] the issue metalinguistically by eschewing the offending labels "Libels and Satires"':[112]

See *Libels, Satires*—here you have it—read.
*P. Libels and Satires!* lawless Things indeed!
But grave *Epistles*, bringing Vice to light,
Such as a *King* might read, a *Bishop* write,
Such as Sir *Robert* would approve—
*F.* Indeed?
The Case is alter'd—you may then proceed.
In such a Cause the Plaintiff will be hiss'd,
My Lords the judges laugh, and you're dismiss'd.[113] (ll. 149-156)

[112]Louise K. Barnett, p. 32.
[113]The fact that Swift's poem precedes Pope's poem is significant for our understanding that, even though both satirists developed similar scepticism about the reformative function of satire, they developed it in their own ways, not being influenced by the other. By the time Swift wrote this poem (1729 or 1730), he had already begun to harbour serious doubts and was towards the end of satiric career, while, when Pope wrote his poem (1733), he was still in the early stage of his career and was exploring the relationship between himself and the outer world. For the discussion of Pope's *Sat. II. i*, see chapter 2, pp. 65-82.

Yet, Swift's rendering permits no room for even this mock-compromise. As the lawyer's concluding speech demonstrates, there is a sharp difference between the two worlds which cannot be overcome:

> Some by philosophers misled,
> Must honour you alive and dead,
> And such as know what Greece has writ
> Must taste your irony and wit,
> While most that are or would be great,
> Must dread your pen, your person hate,
> And you on Drapier's Hill must lie,
> And there without a mitre die. (ll. 49-56)

As the clear compartmentalisation of 'some' and 'most' and the reiteration of the verb 'must' in each couplet demonstrate, this lawyer is confirming that there is no possibility of reconciling the two worlds. As the two worlds are perceived as irreconcilable, the price paid for Swift's pursuit of truth becomes apparent, as Louise K. Barnett points out, 'the mitre is itself a potent symbol of value, and for a devout believer and career churchman to die without it is a measure of loss and failure'.[114] Swift may take some pride in having the great men dread his pen and in lying on the Drapier's hill, which can be seen as a tribute to his patriotism. Yet, though Swift emerges as an advocate of truth who even sacrifices his own ambition, this poem is Swift's admission of the existence of an irreconcilable gulf between himself and the outer world, the expression of his fear that he will not be able to get his message across, in other words, the expression of his fear that he can only be an articulator of crisis, not its transformer.

Thus, Swift's self as examined in his poems to Stella, the Markethill poems, and the imitation of Horace's Sat. II. i reveals his inner doubt about his ability to control crisis through the art of his poetry. Through the examination of 'I' in Swift's poems, we can recognise that Swift himself comes to acknowledge his inability to transform crisis as a satirist. This understanding, I believe, will enable us to comprehend the reason behind the pessimism of *An Epistle to a Lady* and *On Poetry: A Rapsody* and the change of purpose in writing satire for Swift, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

[114]Louise K. Barnett, p. 33.

# Chapter 5

## The End of Resistance: The Late Satires of Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope

When we read Swift's *Epistle to a Lady* (1733) and *On Poetry: A Rapsody* (1733) and Pope's *Epilogue to the Satires* (1738), which were written towards the end of their literary careers, we notice the distinctive character of these poems if they are interpreted in relation to their earlier satires. It is my contention that these poems can be interpreted as both writers' evaluation of their past satiric efforts and in a way as a kind of valediction to one kind of satire resulting from that evaluation.

In previous chapters, I argued that both satirists came to recognise the difficulty of transforming crisis through satire, and thus to suspect their roles as being mere articulators of crisis rather than resolvers of it. What makes these poems different from other poems written earlier is that what was hinted at earlier is now expressed boldly and what was suspected is now confirmed. This is to say that Swift's and Pope's lingering or rather growing doubt about the efficacy of satire to effect any change is at last substantiated in these poems, and they admit that satire can no longer serve a public purpose. It is because of this aspect that these poems can be regarded as a valediction to that satire which has the public function of reforming the world, and thus which is positive in its outlook. As satire is conceived as an ineffective means of reforming the corrupt age, the emphasis in these poems comes to be shifted from the public function of satire to its private function—satire as a means of private satisfaction—whether this is the defence of the satirist's private integrity or the expression of his rage whatever the outcome.

### 1. *Epistle to a Lady*: Justification of the Outburst of Rage

Swift's *Epistle to a Lady* is not straightforward in its import. It is neither an apologia for the Horatian type of satire nor a downright abandonment of the corrective power of satire. There does exist considerable inconsistency in this poem, as there are some lines which advocate Horatian banter while others are more the expression of

personal rage. However, it seems to me that this inconsistency need not be regarded as a hindrance to our understanding of the poem: rather, it is a clue to a proper understanding of it, as it embodies the expression of Swift's painful realisation that there is an insurmountable gap between what satire is supposed to be and what it is forced to be under the pressure of reality.

As written in the form of a response to the lady's (Lady Acheson's) request that he should stop ridiculing her and his friends in low style and instead praise her in 'strain sublime' (l. 58), the ostensible aim of this poem is to defend his preference for satire written in low style. In defending his preference for satire of this kind, Swift needs to justify its *raison d'être* in the face of the lady's following appeal:

> But, I beg, suspend a while
> That same paltry, burlesque style;
> Drop for once your constant rule,
> Turning all to ridicule:
> Teaching others how to ape ye;
> Court nor parliament can 'scape ye;
> Treat the public and your friends
> Both alike, while neither mends. (ll. 49-56)

Beneath the lady's appeal, there emerges her serious accusation: for her, Swift is simply wasting his time, since she regards satire as ineffective in its function of reform, for it cannot reach even the ears of his friends, let alone those of the public.

Against this imagined charge of the lady, Swift provides the readers with the following answer, which vindicates his use of satire through advocating its effectiveness in inducing improvement or reform:

> From the planet of my birth,
> I encounter vice with mirth.
> Wicked ministers of state
> I can easier scorn than hate:
> And, I find it answers right;
> Scorn torments them more than spite.
> All the vices of a court
> Do but serve to make me sport.
> Were I in some foreign realm,
> Which all vices overwhelm;
> Should a monkey wear a crown,

Must I tremble at his frown?
Could I not, through all his ermine,
Spy the strutting, chattering vermin?
Safely write a smart lampoon,
To expose the brisk baboon? (ll. 149-164)

In these lines, Swift shows his confidence in the effectiveness of laughing satire to cause reform, and asserts his integrity which enables him to attack the vice of the age by ridicule. However, when he turns his eyes to reality, the theory of laughing satire does not hold up. When he offers the following lines,

When my muse officious ventures
On the nation's representers:
Teaching by what golden rules,
Into knaves they turn their fools:
How the helm is ruled by Walpole,
At whose oars, like slaves, they all pull:
Let the vessel split on shelves;
With the freight enrich themselves: (ll. 165-172)

the purpose is to prove the validity of the theory by demonstrating its applicability to the contemporary political world, here symbolised by Walpole. However, the lines that follow expose the inconsistency which stems from a different reaction to the state of affairs:

Safe within my little wherry,
All their madness makes me merry:
Like the watermen of Thames,
I row by, and call them names.
Like the ever-laughing sage,
In a jest I spend my rage. (ll. 173-178)

Swift starts these lines by confirming his theory of laughing satire as he argues for his calmness in the face of reality. However, from line 175, his theory begins to collapse, as it turns out that such a satirical attitude cannot effect reform or correction. However merry or facetious the obscene remarks of the Thames watermen might be, their random ribaldry is not an appropriate model for the serious satirist who should select his objects

carefully. Even Swift's calmness begins to disappear when he compares himself to the 'ever-laughing sage' who 'spend [his] rage in a jest'. The key here is the juxtaposition of the words 'jest' and 'rage'. As Louise K. Barnett argues, 'rage' symbolises the satirist's realisation of his impotence in inducing any change:

> *Jest* is the satirist's art, purposeful and controlled, not necessarily funny but jesting in the sense that it is not part of the world's serious business. Rage is provoked first by the existence of evils and second by the satirist's lack of power to affect them. He knows that he cannot act literally against the world's malefactors but can only act symbolically by writing satire. "Drown the world," Swift confessed to Pope, "I am not content with despising it, but I would anger it if I could with safety." Satire is therefore a substitute for action, which for various reasons, such as the danger Swift's letter suggests, cannot be carried out.[1]

We cannot regard all the satires as a substitute for action, since some satires can be regarded as the satirist's method of involving himself actively in the world. This is to say that a satirist can participate in the world by writing satire in the hope that it brings about the desired effect. What is valid, though, in Louise K. Barnett's observation is that, by pointing out the satirist's realisation of the impotence of his rage, she notices the emptiness which surrounds the word 'jest' in line 178. When originated by 'rage', this 'jest' cannot be purposeful and controlled: rather, it is a empty gesture of resignation. However, Swift cannot maintain even this empty gesture as he reveals his seemingly sadistic desire to torture the object of satire in the lines that follow: '(Though it must be understood,/ I would hang them if I could:)' (ll. 179-180). There is an element of self-mockery in his desire to torture his victims, acknowledging his impotence in attacking his victims in any real way. Yet, we should recognise that, despite the element of self-mockery, the main thrust of Swift's emotion is towards the satiric butt and his emotion is not sublimated to a reformative function. We can say that, in these lines, Swift loses

[1]Louise K. Barnett, p. 34. I discussed the importance of controlled passion in reformative satire, quoting from Edward Bloom's article 'Apotropaic Visions: Tone and meaning in Neoclassical Satire', in chapter 3. There appears to be a difference between Louise K Barnett's and Edward Bloom's views on the satirist's rage. While Bloom regards rage as an intensified passion which can be controlled for a reformative function, Barnett seems to regard rage as resulting from a satirist's loss of control. However, it seems to me that this difference does not affect our understanding of the importance of the satirist's control of his emotion, since Barnett's rage can be regarded as the equivalent of Bloom's uncontrolled rage. For me, the difference between them is terminological rather than fundamental. For more detail on Edward Bloom's view on passion and rage, see chapter 3, pp. 166-169.

control over his emotion while he expresses the desire to punish rather than reform, whatever the consequences. As Nora C. Jaffe observes, in lines 165-180 and the following ten lines, in the face of reality, Swift gradually abandons his theory of laughing satire:

> Swift rises to a crescendo of rage that his friend (rightly enough) finds incomprehensible. He has set up a series of expectations, only to violate them in the most obvious way. He has pretended to a detachment he cannot maintain. He tried to imply the triviality of his butts in words and rhythms that prove them not trivial. The comparison of Walpole to a schoolboy ready for whipping extends like a favorite fantasy and explodes in an ectasy of revenge.[2]

Seen in this way, the motive for satire becomes private relief rather than public reform. Our suspicion about this motive becomes stronger when we interpret the lines that follow:

> If I can but fill my niche,
> I attempt no higher pitch.
> Leave to D'Anvers and his mate,
> Maxims wise to rule the state.
> Pulteney deep, accomplished St Johns,
> Scourge the villains with a vengeance:
> Let me, though the smell be noisome,
> Strip their bums; let Caleb hoise 'em;
> Then apply Alecto's whip,
> Till they wriggle, howl, and skip. (ll. 181-190)

Readers may laugh at the scene where the members of the administration come to be stripped and whipped. Yet, these readers are the ones who already have sympathy with Swift. Thus, if this scene is comic, it is so only for opposition sympathisers. In these lines, the responsibility of reform is left to the authors of *The Craftsman*, such as Pulteney and Bolingbroke, while Swift enjoys the imagination of the sadistic (at least for neutral readers) torture of his victims in lines 187-190. At this point, the theory of laughing satire totally collapses as Swift indulges in impotent rage, not even in the form of 'jest'.

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[2]Nora C. Jaffe, pp. 23-24.

What makes this poem strangely disorientating is that Swift curiously returns to advocating the theory of laughing satire after the lady interrupts his burst of rage:

> 'Deuce is in you, Mr Dean:
> What can all this passion mean?
> Mention courts, you'll ne'er be quiet;
> On corruptions running riot.
> End, as it befits your station:
> Come to use, and application:
> Nor, with senates keep a fuss.' (ll. 191-197)

Nora C. Jaffe is quite right to point out that the lady's opinion is much closer to Swift's official position and thus her words express, as her poetic voice is a creation of his, his criticism of himself for 'keep[ing] a fuss' with senates which should not make him lose his temper.[3] Indeed, after the intervention of the lady, Swift seems to return to calmness while defending the theory of ridicule:

> It is well observed by Horace,
> Ridicule has greater power
> To reform the world, than sour.
> Horses thus, let jockeys judge else,
> Switches better guide than cudgels. . . .
> Thus, I find it by experiment,
> Scolding moves you less than merriment.
> I may storm and rage in vain;
> It but stupefies your brain.
> But with raillery to nettle,
> Sets your thoughts upon their mettle: . . .
> I, who love to have a fling,
> Both at senate house and king;
> That they might some better way tread,
> To avoid the public hatred;
> Thought no method more commodious,
> Than to show their vices odious:
> Which I chose to make appear,
> Not by anger, but a sneer:
> As my method of reforming
> Is by laughing, not by storming, (ll. 210-214, 219-224, 233-242)

[3]Nora C. Jaffe, p. 24.

These lines are a perfect vindication of laughing satire in its corrective power by demonstrating that it is more effective than mere rage. However, again, the calmness shown in these lines begins to be disturbed when Swift ponders on the state of public reality:

> If I treat you like a crowned head,
> You have cheap enough compounded;
> Can you put in higher claims,
> Than the owners of St James'?
> You are not so great a grievance,
> As the hirelings of St Stephen's.
> You are of a lower class
> Than my friend Sir Robert Brass.
> None of these have mercy found,
> I have laughed and lashed them round. (ll. 251-260)

Even though he does not lapse into such an outburst of rage as in lines 165-190, Swift again shows his predilection for sadistic punishment whenever the public reality and its culprit (such as Robert Walpole) are mentioned, as the phrase 'lashed them round', which returns to the manner of lines 188-190 before the lady's interruption, sits uncomfortably with his argument that his 'method of reforming/ Is by laughing, not by storming' (ll. 241-2). As Peter J. Schakel rightly observes, though he does not acknowledge Swift's minor outburst in line 260, Swift's theory of ridicule is 'each time undercut by the practice within the poem itself'.[4] Then, what seems to be a case of a *non sequitur* between the part before the lady's intervention and that after it proves to be otherwise. The lines that follow Swift's outburst of rage in lines 165-190 demonstrate the same case for Swift, even though in a lesser degree: that is, Swift cannot maintain his calmness in the face of public corruption, his anger resulting from the realisation of his impotence as a satirist who ought ideally to aspire to be a reformer of the state, in other words, a transformer of crisis.

In this respect, the *Epistle to a Lady* is a poem which demonstrates the insurmountable gap between precept and practice. Swift recognises himself that, to borrow Louise K. Barnett's words, in theory 'to effect changes in people's behavior or attitudes, he must not express anger baldly in the alienating form of Juvenalian raging'

[4]Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift*, p. 150.

because 'as the image of scourging proves, to do so is satisfying to the writer, but contrary to his purpose of gaining his victim's or his audiences' cooperation'.[5] However, Swift is also painfully aware that the idea that laughing satire can itself effect reform is false and fanciful. Thus, this poem is not a vindication of the Horatian type of satire, as it feigns to be, but a justification of the man Swift who is forced to attack the public corruption which he acknowledges cannot be corrected, so demonstrating the real state of affairs in which, to borrow Peter J. Schakel's words, 'the evil evident in the ministry and court, the "Machinations brewing,/ To Complete the Public Ruin" [199-200], drive a good man past ridicule to rage'.[6] By declaring this, Swift bids farewell to the type of satire that he has tried to adhere to throughout his past satires despite his growing doubts. However, once he justifies his outburst of emotion, the fetters of the Horatian type of satire begin to be broken, and he enters into a very different realm of satire—a satire which is not concerned about its corrective power, its public function, but rather its function as the direct expression of private feeling, as shown in poems such as *The Legion Club*.

2. *On Poetry: A Rapsody*: The Outcome of Pessimism

While Swift's pessimism about the corrective power of satire is expressed in the form of occasional outbursts of rage in the *Epistle to a Lady*, in *On Poetry: A Rapsody*, written in the same year of 1733, it is revealed in the form of a justification of vile encomium by the 'old experienced sinner'. The power of this poem derives from the confusing nature of this narrator, the 'old experienced sinner', whose views the readers can neither agree with nor reject comfortably. In a way, Swift forces his own dilemma upon the readers by setting up a trap, through this narrator, from which there is no escape.

Donald C. Mell, Jr. is quite right when he describes Swift's manipulation of his narrator as a mode of literary entrapment:

[5]Louise K. Barnett, p. 34. James Sutherland also emphasises the importance of control in satire when he mentions about Juvenalian tradition: 'The more *saeva* the *indignatio*, the more a satirist must bring to his work a fine control.', James Sutherland, *English Satire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 47.
[6]Peter J. Schakel, *The Poetry of Jonathan Swift*, p. 150.

> Swift's satiric irony in the poetry constitutes an important mode of literary entrapment. The "open-ended" feature of this irony in "On Poetry: A Rapsody" has the effect of entrapping the reader, as Vieth notes for Rochester's best lyrics and satires, "between two opposite extremes with no compromise or reconciliation between them." That is, Swift is compelling his reader to be an active participant in a drama of unresolved conflicts between two norms: the traditional ideal of good poetry to communicate moral truths and aesthetic values and what the world will actually reward the poet for writing.[7]

In other words, Swift is demonstrating to the readers that neither option is viable: as I shall argue later, the ideal of poetry proves to be impossible to achieve in a corrupt age, while sensible readers cannot be persuaded by the poem's justification of vile encomium. I believe that it is through this dilemma that Swift communicates his rage towards the world.

Swift entraps us, the readers, by thwarting our expectations. As the title *On Poetry: A Rapsody* reveals, this poem is designed to debunk the reader's facile expectations.[8] A reader might expect this poem to be a glorification of poetry in general, as it is about poetry written by a poet. However, if there had been readers who expected this poem to be in praise of poetry, they should have taken a hint from the spelling of the word 'rapsody', a 'rapp' being a counterfeit coin as well as a blow to the head. Thus, the meaning of rapsody is quite different from the modern understanding of the word as 'rhapsody', as John I. Fischer explains:

> Though the pun on "rap" is obvious, the significance of the word "rapsody" may be somewhat obscured for the modern reader since both the connotation and denotation of that word have changed considerably since Swift used it. For us, the word "rhapsody" commonly denotes a type of music which exhibits agreeable lyrical freedom. In the eighteenth century, however, the word was often used to refer to any work distinguished by an unhappy disorder. Thus, Pope, writing to Swift in 1729, defined the word "rhapsody" the opposite of true wit's creative and orderly process. "This letter . . . will be a rhapsody; it is many years ago since I wrote as a wit" (*Swift's Correspondence*, 3: 362). As Swift, then, would

[7]Donald C. Mell, Jr., 'Irony, Poetry, and Swift: Entrapment in "On Poetry: A Rapsody"', *PLL*, 18 (1982), 310-324 (p. 312).

[8]I prefer the spelling 'rapsody' to 'rhapsody' adopted by Pat Rogers's edition, because it appeared in early editions and opens up the connotation of the word 'rap'. There seems to be a pun involved in this word, as G. P. Mayhew observes its connection with a 'slangy double-pun upon "a rapp" or counterfeit coin and a "rap" or knock on the head', G. P. Mayhew, *Rage or Raillery* (San Marino, California: Huntington Library Press, 1967) p. 112. This pun is obscured if we follow Pat Rogers's modernisation of the word to 'rhapsody'.

> have understood the words of his title, *On Poetry: A Rapsody*, that title delineates the process his poem describes; a debasing and disordering of the very art that traditionally taught the proper end of things and men.[9]

The inflation of the readers' expectation and its debunking can be found from the early part of the poem in the two paragraphs which describe poetry-writing as a demanding job and the lines that follow. The first paragraph describes the writing of poetry in exalted terms and expresses sympathy for the real difficulties faced by the poets:

> Not empire to the rising sun,
> By valour, conduct, fortune won;
> Nor highest wisdom in debates
> For framing laws to govern states;
> Nor skill in sciences profound,
> So large to grasp the circle round;
> Such heavenly influence require,
> As how to strike the muses' lyre. (ll. 25-32)

In these lines, poetry-writing is raised to the highest level possible, as it is related to divine influence. However, while this passage puts poetry in the highest order, it backfires somewhat on the poet: the more he elevates poetry in status, the harder he makes it as an ideal to be achieved. In this sense, Swift is demonstrating what poetry should be and how difficult it is to achieve, expressing 'a mixture of sympathy for the real difficulties faced by the would-be poet and a certain skepticism toward the possibility of achieving high art'.[10] This scepticism hinted at in the first paragraph is fully expressed in the paragraph that follows. Through somewhat similar rhetorical and syntactical strategies, the second paragraph also describes the demanding challenge to poets:

> Not beggar's brat, on bulk begot;
> Not bastard of a pedlar Scot;
> Not boy brought up to cleaning shoes,
> The spawn of Bridewell, or the stews;

[9]John I. Fischer, *On Swift's Poetry* (Tallahassee, Florida: The University Presses of Florida, 1978), pp. 183-184, n. 8.
[10]Donald C. Mell, Jr., 'Irony, Poetry, and Swift: Entrapment in "On Poetry: A Rapsody"', p. 317.

Not infants dropped, the spurious pledges
Of gypsies littering under hedges,
Are so disqualified by fate
To rise in church, or law, or state,
As he, whom Phebus in his ire
Hath *blasted* with poetic fire. (ll. 33-42)

Our expectation that this paragraph will continue the image of lines 25-32 is disappointed, for the emphasis shifts abruptly. In the previous passage, Swift's emphasis is on the high art of poetry accompanied by sympathy for a poet who seeks to accomplish such a demanding task. However, though this paragraph also describes the idea of poetry-writing as a demanding task, Swift now implies that he knows what kinds of people do aspire to be a poet in his age and how they are disqualified from being a proper poet, through the use of different language and vulgar imagery. His posture in these two paragraphs seems to be, to borrow Claude J. Rawson's words, 'that of an enraged righteousness, the champion of poetry denouncing a vicious and philistine age, the true poet towering above Grub street', as he shows the difference between ideal and reality as well as contempt for contemporary poetasters.[11] However, it shoud be noticed that Swift does not let the readers remain in the domain of facile differentiation between good and bad poets. He puzzles and entraps the readers, as this lofty posture is not to be sustained. As we can see in the lines that follow the previous two paragraphs, this indignation gives way to 'a more low-pitched note of irritated commiseration, with Swift hovering between the roles of embattled scourge and crushed victim, both poised against a poetry-scorning age':[12]

What hope of custom in the fair,
While not a soul demands your ware?
Where you have nothing to produce
For private life, or public use?
Court, city, country want you not;
You cannot bribe, betray, or plot.
For poets, law makes no provision:
The wealthy have you in derision.
Of state affairs you cannot smatter,

[11]Claude J. Rawson, '"I the Lofty Stile Decline": Self-apology and the "Heroick Strain" in Some of Swift's Poems', in *The English Hero, 1660-1800*, ed. by Robert Folkenflik (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1982), pp. 79-115 (p. 89).
[12]Claude J. Rawson, p. 89.

Are awkward when you try to flatter.
Your portion, taking Britain round,
Was just one annual hundred pound.
Now not so much as in remainder
Since Cibber brought in an attainder;
For ever fixed by right divine,
(A monarch's right) on Grub Street line.

Poor starveling bard, how small thy gains!
How unproportioned to thy pains! (ll. 43-60)

What is important to notice in these lines, which deplore the reality in which poets are despised and thus do not get proper rewards, is that Swift does not differentiate between good poets and bad ones in describing their plights. In an ideal world, good poets should be rewarded while mere poetasters might be despised and unrewarded. Yet, in reality, there exists no difference between them, as both of them are not wanted by 'Court, city, country', which demonstrates that poets have little to offer apart from being impotent observers.[13] In this paragraph, as the lines proceed, his indignation towards Grubstreet shown in the previous paragraph passes, and there remain only Swift's realisation of the difference between ideal and reality and his sense of inescapability from that reality.

The introduction of the fictive narrator, the 'old experienced sinner', actually deepens the sense of puzzlement on the part of the readers rather than resolving it:

How shall a new attempter learn
*Of different spirits to discern,*
And how distinguish, which is which,
The poets' vein, or scribbling itch?
Then hear an old experienced sinner
Instructing thus a young beginner. (ll. 71-76)

There is some uncertainty about the relationship between Swift's previous narrator 'I' and this one: does there occur a change of narrator or does the previous narrator simply call now himself an 'old experienced sinner'? Considering that he uses the indefinite pronoun 'an' instead of 'this', which would have clarified the identification of him with

[13]That poets are not wanted by court or city might not be so important as these have been objects of satire for their lack of understanding of literature, as Pope's *To Augustus* demonstrates. The real damage to the status of poets is done by the fact that they are not wanted by country as well, which denotes that they are irrelevant to all sections of the nation.

the earlier narrator, Swift seems to imply that this character is a different personality. However, Swift again confuses the reader's response by making it difficult to dissociate this narrator totally from himself. If Swift had utilised this sinner as a sort of satiric butt whose views he undermines while making him a representative of the corrupt age, as he did in the case of John Toland and the Earl of Nottingham in *Toland's Invitation to Dismal*, the puzzlement he caused in the previous part might be dispelled: the poem would have become a criticism of the follower of the corrupt age. However, this is not to be.

Of course, this narrator in part represents the corrupt age, as he advises a young beginner how to transform literary failure into commercial success by writing a panegyric of people who are in power and by attacking the Opposition:

> But though you miss your third essay,
> You need not throw your pen away.
> Lay now aside all thoughts of fame,
> To spring more profitable game.
> From party merit seek support;
> The vilest verse thrives best at court.
> And may you ever have the luck
> To rhyme almost as well as Duck;
> And, though you never learned to scan verse,
> Come out with some lampoon on D'Anvers.
> A pamphlet in Sir Bob's defence
> Will never fail to bring in pence;
> Nor be concerned about the sale,
> He pays his workmen on the nail.[14] (ll. 183-196)

However, this narrator is not to be easily brushed aside as Swift's satiric butt: for, he also demonstrates that he is not a mindless dunce, but has been forced to recommend this kind of advice because of the inescapable reality imposed upon him. For example, when he advises a young beginner how to write a literary work, he reveals that he actually possesses a proper understanding of literature:

> Consult yourself, and if you find

[14]Lines 189-192 are one of six passages added in Pat Rogers's edition. Pat Rogers attributed the deletion of these passages to self-censoring because of their inflammatory content. For more detail, see *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, pp. 869-871.

A powerful impulse urge your mind,
Impartial judge within your breast
What subject you can manage best;
Whether your genius most inclines
To satire, praise, or humorous lines;
To elegies in mournful tone,
Or prologue 'sent from hand unknown.'
Then rising with Aurora's light,
The muse invoked, sit down to write;
Blot out, correct, insert, refine,
Enlarge, diminish, interline.
Be mindful, when invention fails,
To scratch your head, and bite your nails. (ll. 77-90)

What he actually does here is to communicate poetic inspiration and the importance of decorum and genre, apart from his wry criticism of prologue writers in line 83. Some might argue that the old sinner's sudden reversion to head-scratching and nail-biting 'when invention fails' reveals the true nature of him as a satiric butt.[15] However,

[15]John I. Fischer argues that the final couplet reveals the 'sly' nature of this sinner: 'For while the sinner's sudden collapse into trivia does not really detract from the validity of the Horatian advice he mouthed, it does muddy that advice. Horace's counsel [in *Ars Poetica*], after all, is founded on his belief that to be excellent, both poets and poems must reflect the nature of things as things really are: thus the poet must follow his proper calling, the poem must truly illustrate its subject. But the sinner's counsel covertly suggests that there really is no "nature of things" at all. For by mindlessly appropriating Horace's advice and then mixing in his own nonsense to make the whole serve him as an impressive opening, the sinner insidiously undermines the moral view of poetry's nature and function that Horace's advice both inculcates and assumes.', John I. Fischer, *On Swift's Poetry*, p. 189. However, I do not accept this argument, because this interpretation does not take into consideration the fact that, even though in the end the sinner recommends the vile panegyric to a young beginner, there are too many positive aspects about him to dissociate him totally from Swift. It seems to me that Fischer's interpretation is based on the assumption that clear dissociation is possible, which, I contend, is not so. For example, we cannot say that the following lines instructing a young beginner how to revise his once-failed work are ironically intended:

But first with care employ your thoughts,
Where critics marked your former faults.
The trivial turns, the borrowed wit,
The similes that nothing fit;
The cant which every fool repeats,
Town-jests, and coffee-house conceits;
Descriptions tedious, flat and dry,
And introduced the Lord knows why;
Or where we find your fury set
Against the harmless alphabet;
On A's and B's your malice vent,
While readers wonder whom you meant. (ll. 149-160)

What this old sinner does in these lines is to promote intellectual principles and aesthetic values which can be recommended to any seriously minded aspiring poet.

considering other passages which demonstrate his proper understanding of literature without any hint of irony, this passage should be interpreted as acknowledging the old sinner's awareness of the real conditions of composition. Hence he both recognises the ideal and accepts the limitations of the real world.

What makes this sinner distinctive is that he is always conscious that, when he advocates some nonsense, 'he is himself being sarcastic, as distinct from being the innocent carrier of Swift's sarcasms'.[16] In other words, he is aware that he is in the wrong when he offers some vile advice to a young beginner. For example, when he proposes

> Your poem finished; next your care
> Is needful, to transcribe it fair.
> In modern wit all printed trash, is
> Set off with numerous breaks — and dashes —
> To statesmen would you give a wipe,
> You print it in *italic type*. (ll. 91-96)

he is aware that this kind of work is nothing but 'trash'. Even when he advises a beginner to write some panegyric, saying 'The vilest verse thrives best at court' (l. 188), he is perfectly aware that this kind of panegyric is worthless. In this respect, this sinner is not an enthusiastic follower of the corrupt age: rather, he gives the impression that he is being forced to adopt its procedures. This impression is strengthened when we encounter the following passage:

> A prince the moment he is crowned,
> Inherits every virtue round . . .
> As soon as you can hear his knell,
> This god on earth turns devil in hell.
> And lo, his ministers of state,
> Transformed to imps, his levees wait: (ll. 205-206, 221-224)

Even though this passage is provided in the context of apparently recommending political panegyric, it actually verges on political satire, as he demonstrates his awareness

[16]Claude J. Rawson, p. 90.

that political panegyric does not need an objective basis for its praise, and that its object is usually undeserving of such praise.

This sinner gives corrupt advice not fully out of enthusiasm, but out of his realisation that this is the only way for a poet to survive in a poet-scorning and corrupt age. And, importantly, he actually does deplore this corrupt reality from which neither he nor any other poet can be free:

> O, what indignity and shame
> To prostitute the muse's name,
> By flattering kings whom heaven designed
> The plagues and scourges of mankind.
> Bred up in ignorance and sloth,
> And every vice that nurses both. (ll. 421-426)

What makes the poem ambiguous is that this sinner, who offers seemingly vile advice to a young beginner, actually 'bemoans the state of affairs in the cadence and style of the elegiac ideal itself'.[17] What is still more disconcerting is that his correct insight into the state of affairs—that is, his perception that the object of panegyric does not deserve it—does not necessarily make him different from the mindless dunces.

Yet, we notice that Swift does try to dissociate himself from his old sinner as the poem draws to an end. Up to now, this old sinner has shown his sharp understanding of reality, and his yearning for an ideal state of affairs. When he compares praise of Augustus Caesar with that of modern kings, that comparison leads to an invective against modern kings—that is, a vicious attack on George II, as he demonstrates their shortcomings by comparing them to beasts:

> Perhaps you say Augustus shines
> Immortal made in Virgil's lines,
> And Horace brought the tuneful choir
> To sing his virtues on the lyre,
> Without reproach of flattery; true,
> Because their praises were his due.
> For in those ages kings we find,
> Were animals of humankind,
> But now go search all Europe round,
> Among the savage monsters crowned,

[17]Donald C. Mell, Jr., 'Irony, Poetry, and Swift: Entrapment in "On Poetry: A Rapsody"', p. 319.

With vice polluting every throne
(I mean all kings except our own) . . .
Thus think on kings, the name denotes
Hogs, asses, wolves, baboons, and goats,
To represent in figure just
Sloth, folly, rapine, mischief, lust.
O! were they all but Nebuchadnezzars,
What herds of kings would turn to grazers.[18] (ll. 427-438, 457-462)

Even though he feigns to exclude George II from his incrimination, the readers cannot fail to detect the irony of this exclusion from the knowledge that this sinner has been attacking contemporary society without exception in previous lines. The feigned exclusion of George II is, thus, a thinly disguised tongue-in-cheek criticism of him. In these lines, we come to almost forget that the narrator is the old experienced sinner, not Swift, since they express Swift's attitude towards modern kings, including George II. However, after this passage, we no longer find any overt hint of sarcasm, as the old sinner's lines become a blatant encomium of the king and Robert Walpole:

Fair Britain, in thy monarch blessed,
Whose virtues bear the strictest test;
Whom never faction can bespatter,
Nor minister nor poet flatter.
What justice in rewarding merit!
What magnanimity of spirit!
How well his public thrift is shown!
All coffers full except his own.
What lineaments divine we trace
Through all his figure, mien, and face; (ll. 463-472)

At first, we are not quite sure whether the old experienced sinner is being ironic. However, as his blatant encomium carries on for another 76 lines to the end of the poem without any hint of irony to undermine the surface import, we come to suspect that he really means this vile advice. It is as though he finally gives up the resistance of conscience and joins the corps of mindless dunces out of despair. Even though he still believes in the wrongness of the praise, it is as if he is no longer hovering between ideal

[18]These lines were one of six passages omitted in the contemporary publications, because of their violent attack on George II.

and reality: from this point, he renounces completely any lingering yearning for the ideal state of things and settles for the actual world. As he continues his blatant praise of King George and Robert Walpole in the remaining part of the poem, the irony is now delivered not directly from the sinner but from Swift behind this narrator at his expense.

The corruption of this sinner is completed when he renounces the need for divine help in writing in the final lines of the poem, which border on blasphemy:

> Translate me now some lines, if you can,
> From Virgil, Martial, Ovid, Lucan;
> They could all power in heaven divide,
> And do no wrong to either side:
> They teach you how to split a hair,
> Give George and Jove an equal share.
> Yet, why should we be laced so straight;
> I'll give my monarch butter-weight.
> And reason good; for many a year
> Jove never intermeddled here:
> Nor, though his priests be duly paid,
> Did ever we desire his aid:
> We now can better do without him,
> Since Woolston gave us arms to rout him.
> * * * * * * * * *Caetera desiderantur* * * * * * * * * (ll. 535-549)

As Jove can be replaced by Christ,[19] line 540, which gives King George and Christ equal station, implies blasphemy. In addition, the elevation of the free-thinking Woolston over the aid of Jove/Christ proposes a blasphemous re-ordering of human priorities.[20] By renouncing Christ, the corruption of this sinner reaches its nadir, and the final words 'Caetera desiderantur' ('the rest is missing') cannot be more appropriate for the ending: as the old sinner hits rock bottom in his corruption, there is no more to be said; or, if there is more, it had better not be heard.

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[19]'Orrery filled the blank in the original edition with "Christ"', *Jonathan Swift: The Complete Poems*, ed. by Pat Rogers, p. 878, 544 n.

[20]'Woolston, Thomas (1670-1733), enthusiast and free-thinker; MA, Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, 1692; fellow, 1691; took orders; praelector, 1694; classical lecturer, 1697; BD, 1699; adopted from Origen idea of interpreting the scriptures as allegory; published religious controversial tracts and was deprived of fellowship; issued further writings, declaring his intention of founding a new sect; fined and imprisoned (1729) for published *Discourses* on Christ's miracles; remained in King's Bench till his death.', *The Concise Dictionary of National Bibliography*.

However, to assume, as does John I. Fischer, that the complete degradation of this sinner makes the poem more positive in its outlook than it seemed at the start, because we live in God's world while this sinner lives in his own hell, is to miss the point of the poem.[21] Although Swift dissociates himself from the old sinner at the end of the poem by making him beyond redemption, this dissociation does not produce a resolution of the tension between ideal and reality. The gap between ideal and reality still remains insurmountable, indeed is even widened now that another writer has surrendered his conscience to the power of corrupt reality. Thus, the complete degradation of this sinner makes deeper the dilemma we are forced into, as one, who used to have a correct understanding of the ideal and an accurate insight into reality, surrenders to the pressures of reality, in which the poetry is denied the power to communicate the ideal and correct the wrong. Thus, this old sinner is the outcome of Swift's pessimism towards the world, as he represents the possibility of reform as frustrated by the world of reality.

There is no way out for Swift or us the readers in the world of *On Poetry: a Rapsody*. To pretend that satire has a corrective power is to ignore the power of reality; nor can one turn to the advice of the sinner, as it is to renounce one's conscience and even providence. If there is one option left by which one can continue to write and keep one's conscience, it is to lash out at the corrupt reality out of rage, desperation, and impotence, for the sake of one's private satisfaction as a person of integrity. This is what Swift justifies in the *Epistle to a Lady*, and as I shall now argue, Pope vindicates in his *Epilogue to the Satires*, though in a different manner.

3. *Epilogue to the Satires*: No More Resistance to the Apocalyptic Vision

Even though there are a lot of similarities between *Sat. II. i* and the *Epilogue to the Satires*—both are written in the form of dialogue between P. and Fr. or P. and F. and both seem to be aimed at the defence of Pope's satires—there is also a striking difference between the final outcomes of both poems. *Sat. II. i* reveals Pope's effort to win his

[21]John I. Fischer, *On Swift's Poetry*, pp. 194-197. Donald C. Mell, Jr. provides a similar interpretation of the poem to Fischer's: 'through the poem's ultimate self-destruction, having it fall under the weight of false praise in a flourish of dashes, lines, asterisks, and omissions, Swift demonstrates the power of genuine art to move and persuade, while underscoring the imaginative ideal totally lacking in the flatteries of court poetry.', Donald C. Mell, Jr., 'Imagination and Satiric Mimesis in Swift's Poetry: an Exploratory Discussion', in *Contemporary Studies of Swift's Poetry*, ed. by John I. Fischer and Donald C. Mell, Jr. (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981), pp. 123-135 (p. 133).

friend Fortescue over to his argument for the righteousness of his satire. Even though Pope hints his doubt about the success of this attempt in the form of Fortescue's dubious approval in the final lines, at least he does try to persuade the critic of the value of his satire. However, Pope's aim is quite different in the *Epilogue to the Satires*. Even though its framework is similar to *Sat. II. i*, in this poem Pope defends himself as a man rather than as a satirist. He does not even try to win the adversarius over: for, as I shall argue later, he regards the age and its representative, Fr., as being beyond persuasion and thus beyond reformation or redemption.

As we can witness in his letters, by the time he writes the two Dialogues of this poem, Pope has come to regard the contemporary age as indifferent to his satiric effort, as beyond the reach of his power, thus beyond correction. As he writes to Swift in 1736,

> I see things more in the whole, more consistent, and more clearly deduced from, and related to, each other. But what I gain on the side of philosophy, I lose on the side of poetry: the flowers are gone, when the fruits begin to ripen, and the fruits perhaps will never ripen perfectly. The climate (under our Heaven of a Court) is but cold and uncertain: the winds rise, and the winter comes on.[22]

Pope is now seeing the world through pessimistic eyes. When flowers are gone, it is quite natural for fruits to ripen for the next regeneration. Yet, Pope is not sure whether the fruits will ripen properly for life to continue under the current climate (natural and by implication political), thus expressing his pessimism about the future in the terms of a garden metaphor. Of course, it would be quite wrong for us to assume that Pope's growing pessimism about the future took the form of a simple linear development, as the following letters to Lyttelton and Swift demonstrate. The letters, written in 1738, the year of the *Epilogue to the Satires*, reveal that Pope still sometimes thinks about trying to resist the onslaught of the corruption of the world. In his letter to Lyttelton,

> I have had but very bad health since you left me, but tis no matter, tis all in the Way to Immortality. However I advise you to live, for the sake of this pretty World, and the Prettiest things in it.[23]

[22]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 5, Pope to Swift, 25 March 1736.
[23]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 117, Pope to Lyttelton, 15 August 1738.

Pope advises his young friend, a member of the Opposition, that the world still has a lot to offer and thus is worth fighting for.[24] Pope's determination of the value of resistance can be found even more clearly in his letter to Swift:

> Perhaps, to have a memory that retains the past scenes of our country and forgets the present, is the means to be happier and better to be contented. But, if the *evil of the day* be not intolerable (though sufficient, god knows, at any period of life) we *may*, at least we *should*, nay we *must* (whether patiently or impatiently) bear it, and make the best of what we cannot make better, but may make it worse.[25]

Yet, even though the intensification of the will to resist is well expressed in the 'postponing structure of the second sentence', that is 'the movement from "*may*" to "*should*" to "*must*", and the series of delays interposed by these', Pope is also painfully aware that his effort is to delay rather than to transform the final outcome.[26] Thus, even though there do appear some hints at resistance in this period, Pope's dominant attitude towards the world seems to be that of pessimism, not only anticipating but also fearing the final outcome, the apocalypse. He is perfectly aware of the limitation imposed upon his efforts to resist the final outcome in this letter to Ralph Allen:

> I can but Skirmish & maintain a flying fight with Vice; its forces augment, & will drive me off the Stage, before I shall see the Effects complete, either of divine Providence or vengeance: for sure we can be quite Saved only by the One or punished by the other: The Condition of Morality is so desperate, as to be above all Human Hands.[27]

In this letter, Pope is confessing that there is a limit to what he can do in his warfare against the vice of the world. As he acknowledges the might of the corruption, he knows that all he can do is to register a protest whose effectiveness he doubts. Thus, it is not surprising to find that Pope becomes weary of his fight, as he confesses to Fortescue in

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[24]'Lyttelton, George, first Baron Lyttelton (1709-1773), descended from William, son of Sir Thomas Lyttelton (1422-1481); educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford; MP, Okehampton, 1733-1756; opposed Walpole; a lord of the Treasury, 1744-54;', *The Concise Dictionary of National Biography*.

[25]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 135, Pope to Swift, 12 October 1738.

[26]Frederic V. Bogel, p. 189.

[27]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, pp. 108-109, Pope to Ralph Allen, 6 July 1738. This passage was quoted to prove Pope's growing scepticism about satire in chapter 4. Yet, I quote it again because it demonstrates well Pope's conflicting attitude around the time of composing the *Epilogue to the Satires*.

1739: 'The events of a world, I am daily weaning myself away from, as I think it less and less lovely, and less worthy either of remembrance or concern.'[28]

The *Epilogue to the Satires* reflects these complex feelings towards the world. On the one hand, there is Pope's desire to fight or at least resist the onslaught of contemporary corruption. However, on the other hand, there emerges his recognition that this kind of effort is futile, which becomes dominant towards the end of each Dialogue.

Pope brilliantly communicates his complex attitude towards the world through the manipulation of the dialogue between himself, P., and the representative of the world, Fr., the adversarius. The nature of the dialogue, I believe, represents the relationship he conceives he has with the world, as towards the end of each Dialogue it becomes more and more tenuous, which reflects his valedictory mood towards the world. Thus, what should be monitored closely in the two Dialogues is Pope's portrayal and manipulation of his adversarii. It is important to notice that Pope has not much intention of winning the adversarii over to his argument: what he wants to establish in the dialogue with the adversarius is the exposure of his corruption by confuting and discrediting him, along with the implication of the impossibility of persuasion.

In Dialogue I, unlike in Dialogue II, Pope hardly interrupts the adversarius's argument except on a few occasions: he lets the adversarius 'extend himself and feel that he is triumphing, while all along the ground is shifting under him and depriving him of footing'.[29] In other words, Pope make his adversarius reveal his corruption and stupidity through his own argument.

The self-indictment of the adversarius begins right from the start of Dialogue I. When the adversarius says that 'the Court see nothing in't' (l. 2), he intends no more than that the court is unimpressed with what Pope has published. Yet, in fact, what he says is extremely degrading to himself and to the court: for, we can interpret this line (Pope surely hopes us to do so) as meaning that he and the court are not intelligent enough to understand what the poet has been saying. In a similar way, when he commends Horace as follows,

[28]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 190, Pope to Fortescue, 26 July 1739.
[29]John M. Aden, p. 20.

But *Horace*, Sir, was delicate, was nice; (l. 11)

His sly, polite, insinuating stile
Could please at Court, and make AUGUSTUS smile:
An artful Manager, that crept between
His Friend and Shame, and was a kind of *Screen*. (ll. 19-22)

he commends Horace as a satirist for all the wrong reasons. The reasons for his praise—that is, Horace's being innocuous in face of vice by not attacking powerful people—are actually the reasons why sometimes Horace was criticised in Restoration and eighteenth-century England, as we can see in Dryden's *Discourse Concerning the Original and Progress of Satire*: 'a Temporizing Poet, a well Manner'd Court Slave, and a Man who is often afraid of Laughing in the right place: Who is ever decent, because he is naturally servile.' (p. 65)[30]

Pope emphasises his integrity by stressing his difference from this adversarius. When he refutes the adversarius's advice that he should go and see Walpole,

*P*. See Sir ROBERT!—hum—
And never laugh—for all my life to come?
Seen him I have, but in his happier hour
Of Social Pleasure, ill-exchang'd for Pow'r;
Seen him, uncumber'd with the Venal tribe,
Smile without Art, and win without a Bribe. (ll. 27-32)

Pope seems to measure his moral stance by the distance maintained between himself and the man whose well-known credo is that 'All men have their price'. In this passage, Pope also demonstrates his intellectual superiority which can discriminate Walpole's past virtue from his present vice. For Pope, to see the present Walpole means to surrender to or to compromise with contemporary corruption. As Hans Ostrom argues, for Pope, '"laugh" in line 28 seems to signify artistic freedom, or at least an unchecked satiric voice', so 'the consequences of "seeing" Walpole are that the poet will "never laugh"' properly.[31]

[30]For more information on contemporary criticism of Horace, see Harold Guite, 'An 18th-Century View of Roman Satire', in *The Varied Pattern: Studies in the 18th Century*, ed. by Peter Hughes and David Willaims (Toronto: A. M. Hakkert, 1971), pp. 113-120.
[31]Hans Ostrom, 'Pope's EPILOGUE TO THE SATIRES, "Dialogue I"', *Expl*, 36 (1974), 11-14 (p. 13).

The satiric adversarius in this poem is presented as stupid as well as vicious. He is a stupid man who, in his reply to Pope's remarks on Walpole, inadvertently slanders the first minister saying 'why yes' (l. 37); who puts himself in the awkward position of acknowledging the virtue of Lyttelton and of condemning Hervey by saying 'Why answer LYTTELTON, and I'll engage/ The worthy Youth shall ne'er be in a rage:/ But were his Verses vile, his Whisper base,/ You'd quickly find him in Lord *Fanny*'s case.' (ll. 47-50); who unintentionally damns the very court he is defending by arguing 'There [the court], where no Passion, Pride, or Shame transport,/ Lull'd with the sweet *Nepenthe* of a Court;/ There, where no Father's, Brother's, Friend's Disgrace/ Once break their Rest, or stir them from their Place;' (ll. 97-100). The adversarius in this poem is, to borrow John M. Aden's words, 'so convinced of his own and his country's normality and of the rightness of their vision that he is incapable of recognising such self-incriminations'.[32] However, Pope's manipulation has two sides: for, while Pope succeeds in exposing the viciousness and stupidity of this adversarius and the world he represents, he also reveals the impossibility faced by any satirist to get his message across because of the adversarius's unyielding belief in his rightness. Of course, against this corrupt symbol, Pope stands as a positive foil, who can draw the line between Walpole's good and evil; who is witty enough to let his adversarius reveal his own corruptness and stupidity; who can recognise bitterly vice conquering all the nation (ll. 145-170); and finally who, despite the fact that 'In golden Chains the willing World she [Vice] draws/ And hers the Gospel is, and hers the Laws' (ll. 147-148), can protest against vice: 'Yet may this Verse (if such a Verse remain)/ Show there was one who held it in disdain' (ll. 171-172). However, it is important for us to note that, having revealed his doubt over the possibility of persuading the world, as Dustin H. Griffin argues, 'Pope's action here is, from the worldly point of view, nobly irrelevant, perhaps even foolishly pompous ("held it in *disdain*"), a measure of his alienation and failure':[33] for, though writing satire may give him the private satisfaction of registering a protest against vice which he cannot let go unnoticed, it does not make any difference to the course the world is taking. What Pope can salvage is not the world, but his own private integrity, in other words, not himself as a successful satirist, but himself as a virtuous but alienated

[32]John M. Aden, p. 23.
[33]Dustin H. Griffin, p. 209.

man. The importance of the *Epilogue to the Satires* emerges from the fact that Pope himself recognises this bitter reality and confirms it while feigning to defend his satire, leaving strong hints in his final words.

Despite the firm protest of Pope's final words, Pope's role in the conclusion of this poem is ambivalent, even paradoxical. Even though his description of vice triumphant is very powerful in its denunciations of contemporary society, as seen in the following lines,

> Lo! at the Wheels of her [Vice's] Triumphal Car,
> Old *England*'s Genius, rough with many a Scar,
> Dragg'd in the Dust! his Arms hang idly round,
> His Flag inverted trails along the ground!
> Our Youth, all liv'ry'd o'er with foreign Gold,
> Before her dance; behind her crawl the Old!
> See thronging Millions to the Pagod run,
> And offer Country, Parent, Wife, or Son! (ll. 151-158)

yet Pope represents himself finally as a mere witness, who can only say 'Lo!' in front of the spectacle of the onslaught of corruption: as a virtuous man, Pope only wants to protest against vice and to be remembered as one 'who held it in disdain' (l. 172), not as one 'who managed to change it'. In this respect, Pope's description of vice triumphant in lines 145-170 serves two purposes at the same time: on the one hand, Pope is criticising the vice which prevails so shamelessly in the contemporary age; on the other hand, he is revealing to the readers the awareness that vice is too dominant and powerful to be touched and won over. In this sense, Pope's attack brings about quite an unusual result, because, as David B. Morris notices, 'Pope's attack, at its moment of intensest rhetorical power, betrays his weakness, his inefficacy, and his isolated absurdity'.[34] At this point, Pope actually gives up the public function of satire and wants to use it only on the personal level—that is, as a record of his personal virtue. This is a great retreat for him who, as a fervent moralist, said five years ago

> arm'd for *Virtue* when I point the Pen,
> Brand the bold Front of shameless, guilty Men,
> Dash the proud Gamester in his gilded Car,

[34]David. B. Morris, p. 257.

Bare the mean Heart that lurks beneath a Star; (*Sat. II. i*, ll. 105-8)

Yet, even this hope—that is, to be remembered as a man of integrity—is regarded as of uncertain outcome: when he says 'if such a Verse remain', Pope is revealing his doubt about whether it is even possible for him to be remembered when the dreaded future comes.

As Pope bitterly recognises his failure in his final speech, even the form of dialogue with the adversarius becomes lost. As there appear nine exclamation marks in lines 145-170, Pope's speech changes from dialogue to exclamation. The existence of the adversarius is lost: Pope seems so disgusted by the present state of his nation that he completely forgets that he has been talking with a man, and accordingly his tenuous link with the world is broken. At the end of Dialogue I, Pope emerges as an isolated, though virtuous, man.

One might wonder whether more remains to be said, after Pope's admission of his impotence in Dialogue I. However, it seems to me that the writing of Dialogue II represents Pope's complex feeling towards the world: that is, even though he acknowledges the hopelessness of the effort, he still desires to resist one more time the corruption of the world. This desire to engage one more time is well demonstrated by Pope's different manipulation of the dialogue with the adversarius.

The adversarius in Dialogue II, like his counterpart in Dialogue I, is also a self-deceived, morally corrupt representative of the world. However, as John M. Aden notices, while 'in Dialogue I the adversary exposes himself through his stupidity and moral confusion, that in Dialogue II is tripped up by the poet, who opposes him at almost every turn'.[35] It seems to me that Pope's frequent intervention in the adversarius's argument to expose his vice through his 'heedlessness and argumentative incaution' reveals his desire to engage the world with his appraisal of the urgency of the situation.[36] It is as if Pope conceives that now there is not much time left to wait for his adversarius to reveal his corruption by himself: he must do it now, not waiting for the adversarius to develop his argument fully.

[35]John M. Aden, p. 24.
[36]John M. Aden, p. 24.

The adversarius's defect of incaution, through Pope's interruption, is well demonstrated from the start of Dialogue II. As we can see in the following lines,

> *P*. How Sir! not damn the Sharper, but the Dice?
> Come on then Satire! gen'ral, unconfin'd,
> Spread thy broad wing, and sowze on all the Kind.
> Ye Statesmen, Priests, of one Religion all!
> Ye Tradesmen vile, in Army, Court, or Hall!
> Ye Rev'rend Atheists!—F. Scandal! name them, Who?
> *P*. Why that's the thing you bid me not to do.
> Who starv'd a Sister, who forswore a Debt,
> I never nam'd—the Town's enquiring yet.
> The pois'ning Dame—*Fr*. You mean—*P*. I don't. *Fr*. You do.
> *P*. See! now I keep the Secret, and not you. (ll. 13-23)

Pope interrupts his adversarius to make him contribute to the justification of his own satire through his incaution and confusion, as, in these lines, Pope actually makes his adversarius strengthen the cause for personal satire.

The corruption of this adversarius is fully exposed when he responds to Pope's Westphaly hog simile. When Pope attacks the perjury of the dunces as follows, using excremental imagery,

> Let Courtly Wits to Wits afford supply,
> As Hog to Hog in Huts of *Westphaly*;
> If one, thro' Nature's Bounty or his Lord's,
> Has what the frugal, dirty soil affords,
> From him the next receives it, thick or thin,
> As pure a Mess almost as it came in;
> The blessed Benefit, not there confin'd,
> Drops to the third who nuzzles close behind;
> From tail to mouth, they feed, and they carouse;
> The last, full fairly gives it to the *House*. (ll. 171-180)

his degree of attack might seem a bit excessive. However, his attack is justified in the end, because the adversarius who responds to this imagery with a hysterical reaction—'This filthy Simile, this beastly Line,/ Quite turns my Stomach—*P*. So does Flatt'ry mine;' (ll. 181-182)—actually exposes his vice through Pope's timely intervention when

he shows that he has the stomach for vile flattery, which should be more stomach-turning because of its moral import, but not for the description of the Westphaly hog.

What is also important in the role of the adversarius in this poem is that he functions as the agent of Pope's argumentative needs, raising the questions to occasion Pope's justification of his satire. Even though he raises them for the wrong reasons—that is, to deter Pope from writing satire—the questions are necessary for Pope to justify his satire. The adversarius asks Pope, if you must satirise why must you use names? (ll. 10-12); why do you attack some persons over and over again? (ll. 58-60); why did you commend so few? (l. 103). Pope wants these questions to justify the corrective power of personal satire. The adversarius tries to regard personal satire as lampoon which springs from personal spite, as seen in the following lines:

> *Fr.* Hold Sir! for God's-sake, where's th'Affront to you?
> Against your worship when had *S—k* writ?
> Or *P—ge* pour'd forth the Torrent of his Wit?
> Or grant, the Bard whose Distich all commend,
> [*In Pow'r a Servant, out of Pow'r a Friend.*]
> To *W—le* guilty of some venial Sin,
> What's that to you, who ne'er was out nor in? (ll. 157-163)

However, Pope confutes the adversarius's argument because he sees the question of personal and general satire quite differently, which he hopes will be understood by the readers. As he expressed in letters to Arbuthnot in 1734,

> To attack vices in the abstract, without touching Persons, may be safe fighting indeed, but it is fighting with Shadows. General propositions are obscure, misty, and uncertain, compar'd with plain, full, and home examples: Precepts only apply to our Reason, which in most men is but weak: Examples are pictures, and strike the Senses, nay raise the Passions, and call in those (the strongest and most general of all motives) to the aid of reformation. Every vicious man makes the case his own; and that is the only way by which such men can be affected, much less deterr'd. So that to chastise is to reform. The only sign by which I found my writings ever did any good, or had any weight, has been that they rais'd the anger of bad men.[37]
>
> But General Satire in Times of General vice has no force, & is not Punishment: People have ceas'd to be ashamed of it when so many are joind with them; and tis

[37] *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 419, Pope to Dr. Arbuthnot, 26 July 1734.

> only by hunting One or two from the Herd that any Examples can be made. If a man writ all his Life against the Collective Body of the Banditti, or against Lawyers, would it do the least Good, or less on the Body? But if some are hung up, or pilloryed, it may prevent others. And in my low Station, with no other Power than this, I hope to deter, if not to reform.[38]

to write personal satire is to retain the corrective power of satire. In other words, the writing of personal satire is seen by Pope, as Frederic V. Bogel argues, 'in terms of the apocalyptic stance and the poet's resistance to that stance'.[39] It is only by viewing it from a distance that one can avoid seeing the faces of individual offenders; but, by so detaching oneself, one renders it impossible to get to grips with corruption.

However, we should notice that, even though he justifies his personal satire by answering the adversarius's question with strength and wit, in Dialogue II as well as in Dialogue I, Pope finds himself drifting into the description of vice in general and abstract terms, as can be clearly demonstrated by comparing earlier passages with later ones of each dialogue:

> Ye Gods! shall *Cibber*'s Son, without rebuke
> Swear like a Lord? or a *Rich* out-whore a Duke?
> A Fav'rite's *Porter* with his Master vie,
> Be brib'd as often, and as often lie?
> Shall *Ward* draw Contracts with a Statesman's skill?
> Or *Japhet* pocket, like his Grace, a Will?
> Is it for *Bond* or *Peter* (paltry Things!)
> To pay their Debts or keep their Faith like Kings? (Dialogue I, ll. 115-122)

> *Vice* is undone, if she forgets her Birth,
> And stoops from Angels to the Dregs of Earth:
> But 'tis the *Fall* degrades her to a Whore;
> Let *Greatness* own her, and she's mean no more:
> Her Birth, her Beauty, Crowds and Courts confess,
> Chaste Matrons praise her, and grave Bishops bless:
> In golden Chains the willing World she draws
> And hers the Gospel is, and hers the Laws:
> Mounts the Tribunal, lifts her scarlet head,
> And sees pale Virtue carted in her stead! (Dialogue I, ll. 141-150)

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[38]*The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, III, p. 423, Pope to Dr. Arbuthnot, 2 August 1734. The letter dated 26th July is, as I have pointed out in chapter 1, the surreptitious reply to Arbuthnot which Pope printed in his collection of letters in 1737.
[39]Frederic V. Bogel, p. 192.

But hear me further.—*Japhet*, 'tis agreed,
Writ not, and *Chartres* scarce could write or read,
In all the Courts of *Pindus* guiltless quite;
But Pens can forge, my Friend, that cannot write.
And must no Egg in *Japhet*'s Face be thrown,
Because the Deed he forg'd was not my own? (Dialogue II, ll. 185-190)

When black Ambition stains a Publick Cause,
A Monarch's sword when mad Vain-glory draws,
Not *Waller*'s Wreath can hide the Nation's Scar,
Nor *Boileau* turn the Feather to a Star. (Dialogue II, ll. 228-231)

As numerous particulars amass to form a general pattern, Pope demonstrates in this poem the painful reality in which numerous name-callings of particular vices have to be transformed into general satire because of their sheer numbers. It is as if Pope is admitting that vice is the norm, and he the odd one out. It is as if Pope views general corruption in the far distance from a mountain top. But unlike Moses, who viewed the promised land Canaan from Mount Pisgah (Deuteronomy, 34: 1-4), Pope beholds only the bleak future from the mountain of his high moral ground.

Yet, it should be noted that, in the conclusion of Dialogue II, Pope turns from being a passive witness of virtue in Dialogue I to being its active guardian. As can be seen in the following lines,

Ask you what Provocation I have had?
The strong Antipathy of Good to Bad.
When Truth or Virtue an Affront endures,
Th'Affront is mine, my Friend, and should be yours.
Mine, as a Foe profess'd to false Pretence,
Who think a Coxcomb's Honour like his Sense;
Mine, as a Friend to ev'ry worthy mind;
And mine as Man, who feel for all mankind. . . .
O sacred Weapon! left for Truth's defence,
Sole Dread of Folly, Vice, and Insolence!
To all but Heav'n-directed hands deny'd,
The Muse may give thee, but the Gods must guide.
Rev'rent I touch thee! but with honest zeal;
To rowze the Watchmen of the Publick Weal,
To Virtue's Work provoke the tardy Hall,
And goad the Prelate slumb'ring in his Stall. (ll. 197-204, 212-219)

Pope rises from an impotent witness in Dialogue I to a fervent guardian of virtue, raising the status of satire to a divine level. Bad men will be 'afraid' of him (l. 209), will be 'touch'd and sham'd' by his ridicule (l. 211). This enthusiasm leads him to a vision of the Temple of Eternity where he envisages himself as being remembered as a virtuous man who fought against vice despite the danger:

> Not so, when diadem'd with Rays divine,
> Touch'd with the Flame that breaks from Virtue's Shrine,
> Her Priestless Muse forbids the Good to dye,
> And ope's the Temple of Eternity; (ll. 232-235)

Yet, it should be noted that, however strong Pope's vindication of himself as a virtuous man may be in these lines, his eyes are turning from reality to a realm of vision, as he seeks the reward of virtue not in reality but in the visionary world of whose existence we cannot be sure. It should be also noticed that, as can be found in the following lines, Pope himself is well aware of the fact that his revitalised moral enthusiasm cannot transform the current world:

> Yes, the last Pen for Freedom let me draw,
> When Truth stands trembling on the edge of Law:
> Here, Last of *Britons*! let your Names be read;
> Are none, none living? let me praise the Dead,
> And for that Cause which made your Fathers shine,
> Fall, by the Votes of their degen'rate Line! (ll. 248-253)

Even though these lines are full of his resolution for virtue, Pope reveals his appraisal of the situation that his pen is the 'last' pen for freedom and that there is none living he can praise for their virtue. Vice still rules; the poet is still embattled and isolated. Regardless of whether he is a passive witness of virtue or its active guardian, or whether he engages vice more aggressively or not, the corrective function of satire is recognised as unaccomplishable. If his satire can serve any purpose, it does so only as personal satisfaction, since it may serve as a demonstration of his personal virtue—that is, as a record of a man who risked his life for virtue.

That the adversarius has the last words in Dialogue II may be Pope's way of acknowledging that his own voice is indeed unheard in the contemporary world. When the adversarius responds to Pope indifferently and peevishly in the last couplet of the poem—'Alas! alas! pray end what you began,/ And write next winter more *Essays on Man*.' (ll. 254-255)—he is actually saying to Pope—that is, Pope is confessing—that his world will carry the day, while Pope cries in the wilderness, becoming a different kind of licensed fool, who can hurt nobody and who, like the 'old Whigs', is permitted to 'wear their strange old Virtue as they will' (Dialogue I, l. 44). Ironically, the adversarius's last words are in effect taken up by Pope, who reveals his resolution, in a final footnote appended to the end of the poem in the 1751 edition, 'to publish no more'.

The footnote appended to the end of Dialogue II can be regarded as Pope's own conclusion about his satires. In this footnote, Pope's mood is not triumphant, but valedictory. He looks upon the fallen world as finally shameless and unshakeable, and in this recognition he confesses that he wrote not to terrify, far less to redeem, but to simply register a protest:

> This was the last poem of the kind printed by our author, with a resolution to publish no more; but to enter thus, in the most plain and solemn manner he could, a sort of PROTEST against that insuperable corruption and depravity of manners, which he had been so unhappy as to live to see. Could he have hoped to have amended any, he had continued those attacks; but bad men were grown so shameless and so powerful, that Ridicule was become as unsafe as it was ineffectual. The Poem raised him, as he knew he would, some enemies; but he had reason to be satisfied with the approbation of good men, and the testimony of his own conscience.[40]

As he finally renounces resistance to the corruption of the world, Pope also gives up resistance to the apocalyptic vision. When a satirist loses the faith in the corrective power of satire, it seems that there is one possible option left to him, if he is not to

[40]The sentiment in this note is the same as one Pope expressed to Earl of Orrery in 1743, recognising the futility of reformative effort: 'As to any thing else I shall write, it will be very little, and very faint. I have lost all Ardor and Appetite, even to Satyr, for no body has Shame enough left to be afraid of Reproach, or punish'd by it.', *The Correspondence of Alexander Pope*, IV, p. 437, Pope to the Earl of Orrery, 13 January 1742/3.

compromise his conscience. This Pope is to carry out with the apocalyptic vision in the tragi-comic finale of Book IV of the *Dunciad* four years later.

# Conclusion

Having discussed Pope's and Swift's recognition of the futility of satire as a means of public reform, it is time for us to look at the differences between them. We might conclude that their change of attitude towards satire may be regarded as a localised matter, which happened to their unique situation as opposition satirists in eighteenth-century England and Ireland. Yet, even though we cannot ignore that outside factors played a great part in bringing about their change of view, we also cannot overlook that they had a fundamentally different understanding of satire. And it is my contention that this difference might be responsible for the different manifestations of their changing views of satire.

Unlike Pope, who never expressed his doubts about the public function of satire until well into the 1730s, Swift did express such doubts even before he began to write opposition satires. In the Preface to his *Tale of a Tub*, Swift ridiculed the claim that the chief aim of satire is reform:

> I have observ'd some Satyrists to use the Publick much at the Rate that Pedants do a naughty Boy ready Hors'd for Discipline: First expostulate the Case, then plead the Necessity of the Rod, from great Provocations, and conclude every Period with a Lash. Now, if I know any thing of Mankind, these Gentlemen might very well spare their Reproof and Correction: For there is not, through all Nature, another so callous and insensible a Member as the *World's Posteriors*, whether you apply to it the *Toe* or the *Birch*.[1]

Here, Swift expresses his doubt because he regards the victim of satire as insensitive to the criticism. In the same preface, Swift even doubts whether the objects of satire can notice that they are the intended target of satire:

> But Satyr being levelled at all, is never resented for an offence by any, since every individual Person make bold to understand it of others, and very wisely

[1] *The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, I. p. 29. Herbert Davis's edition of *A Tale of a Tub* and *The Battle of the Books* is based on their fifth edition, published in 1710. They were first published in 1704.

> removes his particular Part of the Burthen upon the shoulders of the World, which are broad enough, and able to bear it. (p. 31)

What is significant is that, when he repeats the same doubts in the Preface to *The Battle of the Books*, Swift uses the mirror metaphor not to enhance but to debunk the claims of satire:

> SATYR is a sort of Glass, wherein Beholders do generally discover every body's Face but their Own; which is the chief Reason for that kind of Reception it meets in the World, and that so very few are offended with it. But if it should happen otherwise, the Danger is not great; and, I have learned from long Experience, never to apprehend Mischief from those Understandings, I have been able to provoke; For, Anger and Fury, though they add Strength to the *Sinews* of the *Body*, yet are found to relax those of the *Mind*, and to render all its Efforts feeble and impotent.[2]

Here, for Swift, satire is ineffective in two ways: first, its objects cannot conceive themselves as being criticised; secondly, even if they do notice, their emotions aroused by it do not actually lead to the desired reform.[3]

These are indeed the expressions of serious doubts about satire. Thus, even though we observe his strong justification of satire in the 1710s and 1720s in journals such as the *Examiner*, No. 38 and the *Intelligencer*, No. 3, we cannot ignore that Swift harboured a serious doubt about satire's utility in occasioning reform. In this respect, Swift's career of satire-writing can be regarded as his struggle with this fundamental inner doubt as well as with the hostility of the outside world. In my opinion, Swift was further advanced right from the start than Pope along the road towards pessimistic, tragic satire.

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[2]*The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift*, ed. by Herbert Davis and others, I. p. 140. Italics and normal type are reversed. For defence of satire as a mirror, see chapter 2, pp. 71-72, n. 15.

[3]Of course, we should not forget that these remarks from *A Tale of a Tub* and *The Battle of the Books* are spoken by a persona, not by Swift himself. As I have discussed in part I of chapter 4, a distance (however small) between the speaker and its creator should be recognised. In the case of these two works, the distance between them is far greater than in Swift's self-referential works, because they were published anonymously at first. We should be very careful in interpreting these remarks as Swift's unreserved expression of his doubts about satire, as there does exist uncertainty resulting from the distance between persona and author. Thus, we should understand these remarks of Swift's as his cautious and oblique expression of doubts about satire. In this respect, we can conclude that Swift's satiric career proved to be a clarifying process of these nebulous doubts.

I would argue that this explains why the two poets differed in the extent to which, and the means by which, they put their ideal into practice. Unlike Pope, who did utilise the bi-partite structure in his epistles to several persons, Swift never used this device, which can be regarded as an active means of enhancing the reformative function of satire because of its direct and straightforward message.[4] We also should notice that there emerged a difference when they expressed their doubts about satire in their late satires. In my opinion, Pope did try to utilise satire for some positive purpose right towards the very end. As we can witness in the *Epilogue to the Satires*, when the public function of satire was conceived to be impossible, Pope did transform satire into a testimony to his personal integrity. Even though its function was far from public, in one respect it was positive because at least it was used to build something up—that is, his personal morality. However, this was not the case for Swift. What is different in his late satires is the prominence of his desire to lash out at his victims, his urge to gratify his anger by carrying out imaginative torture of his victims, as can be witnessed in *The Legion Club*.[5] In this respect, Swift's satire is more pessimistic and gloomy in its outlook than Pope's: in the final *Dunciad*, even though he cannot resist the apocalyptic finale of Book IV, at least Pope emerges as a critical intelligence who understands the current dire state of affairs; yet in *The Legion Club*, Swift's anger towards the Irish MP takes precedence over everything else, making it impossible for the readers to evaluate him as one who articulates (even though not transforms) a crisis through the control of his emotion.

Finally, we should understand that the change of attitude of each satirist did not happen at the same time. When Swift wrote the *Epistle to a Lady* and *On Poetry: A Rapsody* in 1733, his view of satire as futile effort was pretty much finalised. But, for Pope, 1733 was the year of *To Bathurst* and *Sat. II. i*, and he was yet to write *To*

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[4]One might argue that we can find the bi-partite structure in Swift's *Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift*, regarding the impartial speaker's speech as the part B of virtue in which Swift tries to advocate his integrity as a satirist. Yet, though this point is valid, we cannot say that Swift is comfortable in using this device: for, he defends his integrity not in his own person, but behind the persona of the 'impartial speaker'.

[5]Of course, we cannot aver that there is nothing of this kind in Pope's satires. Yet the tone in his satires is generally less violent, and such violence as does appear—as in his attack on Lord Hervey in the Sporus portrait in *To Arbuthnot*—is contained within the controlling structure of the opposition between vice and integrity. At least, we cannot find in Pope's satires the imaginative torture or execution of his victims, which are abundant in Swift's satires. If Pope hurts his victims, the attack is carried out by his clever wit, not by his coarse, untamed desire. But, in Swift's late satires, the violence is sometimes rather too blatant and dominating to persuade the readers of his good intention.

*Cobham*, *To a Lady*, and *To Arbuthnot*, in all of which he still tried to reconcile himself with the outer world by using the bi-partite structure or writing apologias for his satire.

Then, we should realise that, even though their overall view of satire developed similarly towards the same conclusion—satire's futility as a means of public reform—its manifestation was different enough for us not to regard the case of both satirists as the same localised event. Rather, we should recognise in the experience of Pope and Swift a model with potentially broad implications about the nature of satire. Despite their initial differences, they both arrived at a point at which satire became 'tragic'. Of course, we cannot say that satire is destructive of every satirist. Yet, if we ponder about what Pope and Swift had in common, we can get an idea of what makes satire destructive of its creator: it is the strained relationship with the world they wanted to improve and change; in other words, it was their isolation which made it impossible for them to take their messages across to the various spectrum of their readership.

In this respect, we should ask why they kept on writing satires. One answer could be that they could not get the desired result form their satires, which prompted them to another effort: thus their satiric careers which spanned decades can be a testimony to their grim situation in which they could not achieve an improvement to their standards. From the discussion of the satiric careers of Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift, we can gain an understanding about the relationship between a satirist's isolation and his satire. For them as the opposition satirists, isolation from society was indeed what made them write stinging attacks on society, but it was also the most important reason behind their sombre ending as satirists who had to admit their impotence.

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