

**Fernando Henrique Cardoso:
Science and politics from a perspective of utopian
realism**

A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies

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Carlos Michiles
Department of Government

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Abstract

This thesis approaches a number of issues in Brazilian history – slavery; capitalism and industrialisation; democracy and authoritarian regimes; development and dependency; class, imperialism and the international economy; and participation and civil society – through the work and ideas of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. It does so for two main reasons – because of the importance of his intellectual work as a sociologist, and because he entered politics and rose to the position of President of Brazil. This rare event in intellectual and political spheres, has made him virtually unique. After an introduction to his trajectory as an intellectual and a politician, I examine the scientific method of analysis he has pursued since the 1950s, then explore the development of his ideas in relation to the themes of dependency, globalisation, and democracy through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. I then give a brief account of the parallel development of the thought of Jurgen Habermas, and argue in the closing chapters that Cardoso has reached independently a perspective on democracy which is close to that espoused by Habermas himself. The final chapters consider how far Cardoso can be seen as applying Habermasian principles in his own discourse as an intellectual in power and, whether his procedure in the presidency is best understood not in terms of commitment to either social democracy or neoliberalism, but rather in terms of commitment to a ‘Habermasian’ ethic of argumentative discourse and rational communication intended to create a public sphere, and rather than to impose. The final chapters analyse his discourse on democracy and his attitude toward civil society, and consider how far he has sought to be a conductor of debate in the public sphere. Overall, the main argument is that the relationship between science (knowledge) and politics (action) in the specific case of Cardoso has been guided by a commitment to utopian realism – a scientific analysis of possible options, along with a continuing commitment to utopian ideals. The conclusion considers the capacity and the limits of such discourse in power.

Keywords: Democracy, Civil Society, Public sphere, State, Dependency, Capitalist development, Argumentative discourse, Radicalisation of democracy, Globalisation, Participation, Dialogue, Communicative action.

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Dedication

To Vivaldo and Francisca, my parents

To my daughter Hanna, love

To my friends, Mauricio Corrêa and Edvaldo Vasconcelos

To Paul Cammack, my thesis supervisor - for his example as a democratic intellectual and caring friend

INTRODUCTION

My interest in studying and understanding the thought of Fernando Henrique Cardoso dates back to 1973. At that time I was beginning to study Sociology as a final year undergraduate at the University of Brasília, and his works were stimulating the curiosity of young and restless non-conformists by revealing the contribution of the sociological imagination to understanding the tensions between dictatorship and democratization. Along with many other authors, such as Marx, C. Wright Mills, Poulantzas, Stavenhagen, Althusser and Florestan Fernandes, he awoke my fascination with sociology.

At that time, Cardoso had already published his most influential work, *Dependência e Desenvolvimento na América Latina (Dependency and Development in Latin America)*, written with Enzo Faletto between 1966 and 1967, but only published in Spanish in 1969 and in Portuguese in 1970. But I started to study sociology without having any idea of the significance of that work for Cardoso's intellectual trajectory and for the Latin-American sociology.

My first readings of Cardoso's works, still as student of social sciences, had a great impact on my fascination with sociology and the effort to understand social phenomena. During my Masters in the University of Brasília, I worked on the theme of democratization and popular participation in the National Constituent Assembly of 1988 under the supervision of Rui Mauro Marini, one of the most outstanding theorists of dependency and one of Cardoso's most intelligent critics. At that time I became aware of the theoretical polemics involving Cardoso and his critics to the left, like Ruy Mauro Marini himself, Theotônio dos Santos and Andre Gunder Frank. Initially, my intention was to proceed in that critical line, focusing on the 'revisionist

and liberal-bourgeois character' of Cardoso's thought, and bringing out the contradictions between his later work and his past as a theoretical socialist. In the course of my research, however, I had to revise my own original ideas in order to be faithful to the findings that my readings and studies were revealing.

As the project developed, I became determined to understand Cardoso's ideas, the political-historical circumstances in which they were developed, the intellectual polemics they stimulated, and their place in Brazilian and Latin-American intellectual history. Only time will produce the necessary maturity to achieve this task to the full, and I do not claim to have done entire justice to the intellectual creativity and complexity of his thought. But I believe that the thesis has some original content, and makes a contribution to illuminating Cardoso's ideas and political action. Nevertheless, I consider this the beginning of an effort to understand his work, and I hope that it will be seen as one to be continued by other researchers through critiques, refutations and new arguments. It seeks to contribute to a process of advancing our understanding of the tension and/or articulation between theory and practice in action and intellectual work.

That understanding has become complex in Cardoso's particular case because his trajectory makes it impossible to understand him simply as an academic. He is, rather, an intellectual with a growing record of participation and political leadership that eventually made him President of the Republic – a rare situation for an intellectual, whether of the right or of the left, in the Latin-American political tradition. There was no alternative but to seek to understand the complex interaction or articulation of science (intellectual activity) with politics (action) in Cardoso's trajectory from its beginnings up to the close of his first presidency, 1995-1998. That is the objective of this thesis.

Because he has combined the roles of intellectual and politician, and proved capable of operating within a framework of pluralism and diversity, Cardoso occupies a unique place in the Brazilian political and cultural landscape. His intellectual contributions in books, articles and the press, and his political interventions in lectures and interviews, in a discourse that combines practical and normative concerns, are explored by students and intellectuals looking for clues to the evolution of the political life of the country. Cardoso has become a theoretical point of reference for those who sought a democratic path for the country. His influence over three decades is clear and decisive, in the context of the struggle of the society for the democracy in the seventies; in the transition period in the eighties; and as President of the Republic in the nineties.

Methodology

Although this is not principally a work of political or cultural theory, it is necessary to clarify at the outset the assumptions which underpin it. It approaches Cardoso's intellectual output from the perspective of critical theory, taking as a point of reference the suggestion that "if knowledge itself is understood to be a social product, the traditional oppositions between theory and practice, fact and value, and the like break down, for there are practical dimensions to any social activity, theorizing included" (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 17). It advances the argument that Cardoso should himself be seen as a critical theorist who has the particular distinction of having converted the 'critical project' with which he has been associated as an intellectual into a 'political project' which he has sought to develop from within the presidency. I interpret Cardoso's critical project in terms which parallel the account given by McCarthy of Horkheimer:

One of the broadest goals of a genuinely multidisciplinary research practice would be a “critical theory of the present,” that is, a general view of contemporary society, its problems, and its prospects. That is, what Horkheimer referred to as a “comprehensive existential judgement,” which he delivered in classical Marxist terms ([1937:] 227). Writing in the midst of profound socioeconomic changes, however, he added an important qualifier: owing to the continuous transformation of its object, this is a judgement with an ineliminable historical dimension (239). Thus critical theory had to be understood as an ongoing attempt to “reflect a living totality” (238), an ever-renewed effort to comprehend contemporary society from a practically interested point of view. “It is not a metaphysics of history but rather a changing picture of the world that develops in connection with practical efforts to improve it .. [and that] offers no clear prognosis for historical development” ([1933: 114]). To be sure, Horkheimer was himself convinced that this object would remain essentially the same so long as capitalism was the dominant social formation, and thus that the “essential content” of Marxist political economy would remain valid through all the necessary adaptations and adjustments ([1937:] 238-40) (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 18-19).

McCarthy adds at this point a general comment which sums up Cardoso’s critical project as I perceive it:

Critical theorists can develop and deploy practically interested, theoretically informed, general accounts in a fallibilistic and open

manner, that is, without claiming closure. The point is to view big pictures and grand narratives as *ongoing accomplishments*. They are never finished, but have to be constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed in ever-changing circumstances. If such global accounts are going to play a role in any case, it is better to put them up for discussion from the start (ibid: 19).

Linklater has recently defended the concept of a 'critical project' in the following terms, again directly applicable to Cardoso:

The point .. is not to abandon the critical project in the wake of realist or neo-realist objections, but to reconstruct it in the wake of contemporary social and political change. Reconstructing the critical project means preserving the strengths of the perspectives of Kant or Marx and cancelling their profound weaknesses. The most important developments as far as the project of reconstruction is concerned stress potentials for widening the boundaries of dialogic communities. Reworking the critical project requires normative and sociological accounts of more inclusive communities which introduce unprecedented forms of dialogue between the radically different. Critical theory is to be judged not only by its contribution to ethics and sociology, but by the extent to which it sheds light on existing political possibilities (Linklater, 1998: 5).

Linklater's broader characterisation of the 'critical project' as "drawing upon the moral reserves provided by modern ideas of freedom and equality in order to criticise systems of unjust exclusion" (ibid: 6) captures very well the spirit of Cardoso's

perspective on politics, and provides as basis for differentiating him from contemporary neoliberals (despite the 'neoliberal' content of some of the policies he has pursued), just as Linklater contrasts the critical approach with realism and neo-realism. In order to pursue this dimension of Cardoso's activity – an unusually direct and prominent intervention in politics for a 'critical theorist' – I adopt the concept of a 'political project' from Cammack, understood as a 'programme for the achievement of power and the orientation of government' (Cammack, 1997: 155), and involving an identification by political leaders of the set of interests to be advanced, and the obstacles to their advancement arising from 'the structural context in which they were operating – in terms of national and global structures of political and economic power' (ibid). I set out to show that Cardoso's 'political project' in power is of a piece with the 'critical project' represented by his intellectual output from the 1950s onwards.

In accordance with this objective, I have set out to identify the theoretical and philosophical roots of Cardoso's thought, to set it in historical context, to highlight the extent to which he has sought engagement in public debate throughout his career, and to assess the extent to which his overall body of work has the level of methodological and thematic consistency to be regarded as constituting a 'critical project'. In line with this set of objectives, after an overview of Cardoso's biography in Chapter One, Chapters Two and Three explore his method and his analysis of economic and political themes. After a presentation of Habermas's thought in Chapter Four, Chapters Five and Six then explore Cardoso's 'political project' as a 'Habermasian' intervention in politics.

To conduct this investigation of Cardoso's ideas and their connections with his political practice, I have made a thorough review of his output in books, essays,

speeches, interviews, newspaper articles and magazines – literally thousands of interventions in debates concerning forms of understanding of Brazilian society and politics. The starting point for this was the construction and analysis of a comprehensive bibliography, in which I was substantially aided by the support provided by Cardoso's official archivist Daniela Ardaillon, who has been organizing all his intellectual output, including books, essays, press articles, translations and prefaces, as well as papers and documents relating to his period in office. The bibliography prepared by Daniela Ardaillon served as reference for my work and it constitutes, in my view, the most complete study of Cardoso's intellectual production. In addition, I conducted a lengthy interview with President Cardoso, as part of the process of collection of materials. This interview was carried out with the aim of capturing his perspective on the themes identified as the research proceeded, addressing the theme of consistency or contradiction in his intellectual trajectory, and exploring his current ideas and understanding of his situation as an intellectual and a politician in office.

The method of presentation adopted seeks to recognise the internal logic of Cardoso's thought, allowing it to "speak" and reveal its meaning. I have tried to be sensitive to the richness and variety of the ideas that it contains, and to bring out the character of the reasoning found in his sociological and politico-sociological works. To that end, I have sought: a) to consult the largest possible number of primary sources and b) to provide as much contextual information as possible, as a background against which to assess the consistency, or lack of it, of his discursive action. I am mindful of issues relating to the 'interpretation' of such materials. I have used the extended interview with Cardoso to subject my own independent assessment of his intellectual and political trajectory to what Bryman describes as 'respondent

validation' – in which 'the ethnographer submits a version of his or her findings to the subjects themselves' (Bryman, 1988: 78). Rather than establishing the 'truth' of the analysis, I regard this as acknowledging and developing the 'reflexivity' which is central to critical theory as practice and method, which led Horkheimer to insist 'upon the fact that 'social researchers are themselves engaged in socially situated forms of social action, and upon the importance of their bringing this to conscious awareness and thinking through its implications' (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 14). I declare my sympathy with the Habermasian concern for 'the conditions and procedures of democratic pluralism' (ibid: 17). But I do not subscribe to the assumptions of 'discourse theory' – at least when it takes a post-structural or postmodern turn and insists that 'the traditional epistemologically centred demarcation of the subject's relation to the world, in which knowledge (especially perceptual) provides the guiding thread, is fatally undercut by the linguistic character of our being' (Wood, 1990: xviii). As my comments on critical theory above suggest, I affiliate myself with McCarthy and his endorsement of the project which runs through Horkheimer to Habermasian pragmatism, and seeks to avoid a level of scepticism which disempowers critical reason altogether (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 37).

An important theme in the research concerns Cardoso's continuing engagement in intellectual polemic. For the purposes of my argument, the fact that Cardoso has continually engaged in such polemic is as important as the particular ideas that he has developed and defended. During the course of the thesis, therefore, I draw attention to three such episodes of intellectual debate. The first polemic concerns dependency theory, in relation to which Cardoso defended a methodology of 'concrete analyses of concrete situations' (Cardoso and Faletto against the more systemic (and more 'revolutionary') approaches of Andre Gunder Frank (1967), Teotonio dos Santos

(1967) and Rui Mauro Marini (1969). A key exchange took place at FLACSO in Santiago, Chile, in November 1970 (subsequently published in Cardoso, 1973: 123-139, and Weffort, 1978: 165-181) in which Cardoso defended himself against the charge of petty bourgeois nationalism brought by Weffort, and the issues were revived, in relation to the prospects for 'associated-dependent development', in the pages of the *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia* in 1978 (Cardoso and Serra, 1978; Marini, 1978). The second polemic concerns democracy, where I focus at length in Chapter Three on the exchange on the prospects for democracy between Cardoso (1979) and the Argentine-born sociologist Guillermo O'Donnell (1979). Finally, I draw attention to an exchange over Cardoso as intellectual-in-power, in relation to critiques advanced by Singer (1996) and dos Santos (1998).

The purpose of the research, then, has been to accomplish a theoretical analysis of the relationship between scientific interpretation and practical politics, intending to understand what kind of relation there is between one and the other, what is the point at which they become incompatible and, last but not least, to find what it is that governs their particularities, differences and ambiguities. To delineate this subject, we took as the nucleus of this study, the evolution of Cardoso's thinking on dependency and democracy and its reorientation in the context of globalisation. This has involved an examination of how the epistemological production of these concepts was achieved and put to work in the exercise of power and reflection upon it.

The end point of this investigation comes with the period from 1995 to 1998 because it marks the high point of Cardoso's career as sociologist and politician. Nevertheless, to understand this period I had to put it into the context of his trajectory as a public intellectual and latterly a politician from the 1960s onwards. The relationship between the practice of science or the generation of scientific knowledge,

and politics as the domain where the power mechanisms of the polity and state are organised has been a major theme in classical sociology. Nowadays, this topic has a prominent place in the theoretical preoccupations of academic researchers. In the particular case of Brazil, this problem was obscured for those long years of political authoritarianism (1964-1985) when the conditions for open enquiry in these fields did not exist. With the transition to democracy in 1985, it became possible for a new phase of debate to resume. The Brazilian case has been unique precisely because the serving President of the Republic is an individual who is the same time the most distinguished sociologist in the country, with a record of sustained reflection not only on such issues as dependency and globalisation, but also on politics and power and, in particular, the role of the intellectual in politics.

What gives a singular meaning to Cardoso's performance is exactly his commitment to explore the appropriate interaction between practice and theory. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to explore the development of Cardoso's thinking on these issues and relate it to his engagement with party politics from the 1970s onwards and to his exercise of power once elected to the presidency in 1994. The principal hypothesis is that there is a close and continuing relationship between his production of scientific knowledge— the "critical" project — on the one hand and his adoption of a public role as intellectual and politician — the "political" project — on the other; and that his practice as president can be interpreted primarily in terms of his "utopian realism" and his commitment to Habermasian proceduralism.

The Structure of the Thesis

Chapter One, on Cardoso's family background and political trajectory, tries to relate the family atmosphere in which he was educated, his personality and intellectual

formation. It then sketches out his intellectual and political trajectory, with emphasis upon some ideas that I judged important for each one of its phases, giving an introductory overview of his national and international trajectory, first as an intellectual, then as a politician and intellectual, up to 1998.

Chapter Two offers an analysis of his intellectual trajectory, showing how his theoretical interpretations arise from a solid rational methodological formation inspired by Marxist dialectics. I try to demonstrate that this rational method is responsible for the precision of his thought and its capacity to recognise and explain phenomena still in the making. In order to do so, I explore the continuities in his analysis of three issues as they have related to Brazil: slavery, which was the subject of his first major work; dependency, which is the concept with which his name is associated in Brazilian, Latin American, and world sociology; and globalisation, which has been his preoccupation in recent years.

In Chapter Three I explore Cardoso's approach to democracy, and try to show how it develops from his analysis of dependency and his interpretation of it in the context of globalisation, highlighting the fact that in both concepts the normative basis of the analysis is always the democratic alternative as a viable utopia. I argue that the method employed in his theoretical analyses served equally as a compass to guide his political interventions. In the same way that, as an intellectual, he criticized and polemicized against general and simplistic theoretical analyses, as a political actor, he questioned and overturned easy and simplistic received interpretations of reality. In particular, as we shall see, he challenged the idea that liberal democracy was either impossible in the Brazilian context, or even if possible, no more than a bourgeois concept, only of interest to the bourgeoisie. I show that Cardoso's analyses of democracy remain true to the same principles and ends, but take different forms

according to the historical context. He develops a conception of substantive democracy and, later modernizes and expands it with the notion of democratic radicalization in the period after the failure of real socialism.

Against this background, the second part of the thesis explores the extent to which Cardoso's theory and practice can be understood in Habermasian terms. Chapter Four presents a summary account of the ideas of Jurgen Habermas, concentrating upon his analysis of the public sphere, and his advocacy of an ethic of communication and argumentative discourse.

It is common to recognize, as I do, that the intellectual influences in Cardoso are many and varied: his ability to draw ideas from Marx, Weber, Mannheim, Tocqueville, Bobbio, Fernandes, Hirschman, Giddens and others confirm the eclectic roots of his thought. But it was during the research that the parallel – “more coincidence than influence” according to Cardoso himself – with Habermas' ideas made itself evident and drove me to rethink the project as originally elaborated. One of the links that caused that reorientation in the analysis as originally formulated was the fact that Cardoso insists on the importance of rational debate and argument in frequent interviews, analyses and political interventions, in the national and international press, and in his insistence on the importance of public dialogue with society. The interview given in 1997 to the journalist Roberto Pompeu de Toledo (Cardoso, 1997e: 22-33) explaining the President's thinking, illustrates what I mean. It was when I read this interview that , the idea came to me to place the argumentative discourse of Cardoso in the analytical framework of Habermas's theory of communicative action. Habermas's analysis of democracy and the public sphere helps to throw light upon Cardoso's discourse on political action. I argue, therefore, that Cardoso's style as president fits in the conceptual framework developed by Habermas,

especially as regards the idea of the key role of institutions and of the radicalization of democracy.

Chapter Five, then, presents Cardoso's 'Habermasian' political project, which places emphasis upon the moral significance of democratic speech and non violence. Here, the theoretical ideas of Jürgen Habermas with regard to communicative action are used as a point of reference to interpret Cardoso's ethical discourse related to his political practice.

Chapter Six then assesses the extent to which Cardoso has acted as a 'Habermasian' in power, paying particular attention to the way in which he has devoted time to communication along Habermasian lines, and to the terms in which he has analysed and defended the priorities of his presidency. Our interpretation is that Cardoso acts as a 'Habermasian' politician and president, acting in the public sphere on the basis of a discourse based on the pedagogy of the communicative action. This uses rational argument, with its methodological and practical presuppositions, to orient debate in the public sphere.

In these chapters, I seek to show that Cardoso has been a Habermasian-reformist President, concerned to act more as a creator of the public sphere and a conductor of debate within it than as a charismatic politician who uses direct ideological appeal to influence the masses. He is, therefore, neither a neo-liberal nor a typical social-democrat. He acts as a political reformist who tries to stimulate debates in the public sphere through his very frequent interventions in interviews in books, magazines, newspapers, and speeches in Brazil and abroad. Like Habermas, Cardoso thinks that, after the bankruptcy of the socialism of State, the institutional radicalization of democracy in a context of critique and self-criticism, is "the eye of the needle through which everything should go" (Habermas, 1994:14). I have used his interventions on

such topics as health and education to illustrate his tendency to use the presidential role to stimulate debate, rather than “to decide and to command” as Latin American presidents have generally been inclined to do.

However, I could mention, in agreement with Cardoso's thought, an answer from Habermas about the extent of idealism in his theory. It is really quite simple, Habermas says. Whenever we mean what we say, we raise the claim that what is said is true, or right, or truthful. With this claim, a small bit of idealism breaks into our everyday lives, because such validity claims can in the end be resolved only with arguments. At the same time, we know that arguments that appear valid to us today can prove to be false tomorrow, in the light of new experiences and new information. (Habermas, 1994:102) That is why, I don't claim to have written a thesis on the basis of infallible arguments, but of an interpretation of the thought and political practice of Cardoso that it is limited by my experience, information and circumstances of the moment I wrote it.

CHAPTER 1

Cardoso's family background and political trajectory

Everything revolves around this, freedom, wages and autonomy (...) What I find interesting is the demand for autonomy. People, today, really want to organise themselves to fight for their own ideals. (...) For that, you need to be radically democratic. I think it is that I emit as a signal, even independently of my words, of their content. My attitude is radically democratic and by radically democratic I mean autonomy to demand better life conditions, which includes changing the structures (Cardoso, 1978c: 108).

What is important is not the formulation of goals; what is important is the path; what is important is the process; what is important is the capacity that we have to mobilise the people so that they say what they want so they can do more and more, say more and more. Democracy is based on the activation of society and on the participation of the base of society in the control of political decision-making. There is no possibility of thinking of freedom and democracy, if we don't face the fundamental problem, that is opinion, i.e., the formation of public opinion (Cardoso, 1978a: 12).

"They thought I should be a protest candidate. I was not entitled to run, because I had been punished by AI [Institutional Act] 5. It was a sort of movement to strengthen the oppositions and, at the same time, to create a more open movement of intellectuals, students, artists and such people. (...) Interview with the author, Brasilia, 27 July, 1998).

"Brazil didn't change because I am here. I am here because Brazil has changed." Revista *Exame*, July, 3, 1996, p.22.

Democracy with activation of the base of society, the formation of public opinion and popular control of political decision-making constitute the central themes of Cardoso's pronouncements since his first interventions in the sphere of party politics from 1977 onwards. His political positioning as an intellectual on the issue of democratisation in Brazil starts from 1974 with lectures and interviews in the press. But his ideas and practice as an intellectual and politician have their roots in his family background. This chapter outlines that background, and gives a summary of Cardoso's early career in politics.¹

Family and values

The Cardoso family, of Portuguese origin was very much a part of Brazil's political establishment. Cardoso's great-grandfather, Felicíssimo do Espírito Santo Cardoso, had been a federal senator, the governor of the state of Goiás and a leader of the Conservative Party during the Brazilian empire. His grandfather, General Manoel Joaquim Inácio Batista Cardoso (1860-1924), a historic republican, supported the legalist forces against the naval uprising in 1893, from which he developed close ties to President Floriano Peixoto. He also participated in a nationalist military uprising in 1922. He was arrested with Hermes de Fonseca (1855-1923), president of the Republic (1910-1914) on board ship in the Revolution of 1922. As general he refused to walk "except in the company of officers of the same or superior rank, and he refused to leave the ship to walk on the quays. So, did not walk much, and he contracted a problem in his legs that would later contribute to his death" (Cardoso, 1998i: 342).

Cardoso's uncle Felicíssimo became a leader of the nationalist current in the Brazilian Army, rising to the rank of general, and his father, Leônidas, born in the southern Brazilian state of Paraná, enlisted in the army at the age of fifteen. He later enrolled in the Military High School in Porto Alegre to begin a career as an officer, and attained the rank of second lieutenant in 1910 at age twenty-one. But Leônidas was not satisfied with a military career. He aspired to be a writer and began to write articles for small magazines and journals. Eventually, he was published in leading newspapers such as the *Correio da Manhã*, *O País*, *Gazeta de Notícias* and *O Globo*. Leônidas also sympathised with the left, and he wrote mostly about the role of revolutionary and popular movements in Brazilian history. Energetic and highly

intelligent with very wide interests, he began to study medicine while still a second lieutenant and a journalist. His career was interrupted but not permanently disrupted by political events. He put his medical studies aside to become involved in the popular agitation touched off by the Russian revolution in 1917. In 1919 he was promoted to first lieutenant and also entered law school. His studies were again interrupted by politics when he became involved in a military revolt in 1922 against the election of Arthur Bernardes as president of the republic and against punitive measures taken by the retiring president Epitácio Pessoa, against the military. Because of this episode Leônidas was transferred to a remote post on the Amazon River. Soon thereafter he was transferred to Manaus, the major city on the Amazonas, where he met his future wife Nayde.

Leônidas supported the democratic revolt in 1924 that held the city of São Paulo for twenty days. When this movement also failed, he chose not to join lieutenant Luiz Carlos Prestes in his march of the Prestes Column - a famous march that lasted three years, and took a 24,000 kilometre route across Brasil to exile in Bolivia. Because of his part in the 1924 revolt Leônidas was transferred to the interior. In 1928 he returned to Rio de Janeiro where he enrolled in the law and social sciences programme at the law school. He took part in the successful revolutionary movement in 1930 that put the nationalist regime of Getulio Vargas into power, and received his law degree in 1931, the year Fernando Henrique Cardoso was born.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, born on 18 June 1931 in his paternal grandparents' house in Rio de Janeiro, was brought up by his grandmother, who exercised a great influence on the formation of his values and personality. Gilda, his sister, born a year later, says of that period "my grandmother adored him, because he was a child with a

very pleasant disposition and he knew how to make himself loved. He was much admired, most of all by my father's family" (Goertzel, 1999: 2).

Several members of the Cardoso family accepted leading posts in the Vargas administration in the 1930s, including Fernando Henrique's uncle Augusto Inácio, who was Minister of War from 1931 to 1933. Despite these connections and his support for Vargas in 1930, Leônidas supported the 1932 Constitutionalist Revolution in São Paulo that sought to protect the government's independence against interference from Vargas. However, in 1933 he was promoted to major and in 1934 he took a staff position in the Ministry of War. He was promoted to colonel in 1945. In this year, when fourteen-year-old Cardoso was old enough to become interested in the adult world, his father retired from active military duty and joined the reserve with the rank of brigadier general.

Freed from his military career, Cardoso's father devoted his life to reformist politics. He was one of the founders of a progressive policy research institute, the Centre for the Study and Defence of Petroleum and the National Economy. Besides that he was active in the leading social movement of his time, the Petroleum is Ours campaign. In 1954, when Cardoso was twenty-three years old, his father was elected president of the São Paulo chapter of the League for National Emancipation and ran for elected office on a progressive ticket. In 1954 he was one of the candidates for the Chamber of Deputies on the ticket of Brazilian Labour Party and was elected federal deputy with 28,000 votes. He retired from active politics when his mandate ended in 1959. Opposed to the military coup d'état of 1964, he died in August of the following year.

There are strong parallels between Cardoso's career and that of his father – the combination of intellectual commitment and political activity, the interruptions in

their professional careers caused by the political instability, and the use of the press and research centres to develop and to debate ideas. The ability to listen also served in Cardoso's scientific research and, in future, in the political life, and he recognises this as a paternal inheritance. His father had the habit of "speaking, speaking, listening and leaving the other to speak. I was trained even on that, let me say, emotional side, to listen to the other. Then, my professional training also influenced me (...) To listen, to take note with patience, to ask, to ask again. That is to say, I never stopped, either in my education at home, or in my professional training, to try, with empathy and also with reason, to understand the other" (Cardoso, 1998i: 343). "Since I was a boy, eight or nine years old - my father was a very open, very democratic person - I participated in the conversations, or I was present at them. Already in my grandmother's house it was like this: after lunch or at dinner - more at dinner - the political discussion began. There was a lot of argument among them. My father was soldier and my grandfather too. They had taken part in many episodes of Brasil's history" (ibid: 340).

It is no exaggeration to say that although Cardoso only became involved in party politics in 1977, when he already enjoyed international prestige as an intellectual, his political personality was socialised in a family atmosphere in which characters of the Brazilian political history were part of his daily life. Politics, with its histories and characters, filled Cardoso's imaginary childhood. The Empire, the Republic, the revolutions of 1922, 1930 and 1932, Getulio Vargas, Floriano Peixoto, Prestes, Goes Monteiro, Dutra and so on, "these characters, for me, were not from fiction. They were people. I was, let me say, socialised, trained, in that atmosphere of permanent review of the political circumstances, and many times in opposition to the government" (ibid: 342).

Although the son and grandson of generals, Cardoso chose not to follow a military career. Besides generals, Cardoso was surrounded by adults who lived and breathed politics. However, if on the one hand, living among politicians and soldiers was not enough to persuade him to follow that family tradition, preferring to pursue an intellectual career, on the other, it was enough to give him a strong, self-confident and decisive personality from his childhood.

Despite being “born into a family of people tied to the state” his interests turned him towards an academic career. “For a long time my great-grandfather exercised public functions, my grandfather, my father, uncles, cousins, but not me. I never took part, not even when my father was very active in political life. I took part as a listener to conversations and things like that, since I was a boy. But I never participated directly in these things. My interest was academic, basically.” (interview with the author, Brasilia, 27 July 1998). As Goertzel has written, one might guess that he was rebelling against his family by turning against militarism, but that was not the case (Goertzel, 1999: 2).

In the family conviviality Cardoso witnessed other habits and values that were important to determine his personality. Even with a father with military formation, Cardoso reaffirms “my father was never an authoritarian. Strictly democratic and a very open man, he was liberal, tolerant, with an absolute sense of public morality. His tolerance has marked me in a deep way” (Cardoso: 1983c: 118). Elsewhere he recalls how his father, arrested in 1922 in Fortaleza de Lages, kept lines of communication open: “The one thing that my father said,” says Cardoso, “we should never stop speaking with the jailer. In the several times that was arrested, he never failed to do so. Thanks to that he could pass messages to other prisoners, or outside. Even under

arrest, you have to speak, you can not leave the opponent at a distance. We have to speak all the time. And with the jailer, not with the captain” (Cardoso,1998i: 342).

It is possible that this atmosphere of family conviviality, reinforced by an academic training to understand and to interpret reality in intellectual terms, developed a spontaneous ability to work with the difficulties of politics. Thus Cardoso, “born on a catapult to power”, “readily acknowledges that the fact that the men in his family have been national leaders since the days of the empire may have given him an advantage in developing his politics skills” (Goertzel, 1999: 2).

This is an ability that is derived more from family background than acquired from books or in the streets. Because from books one acquires a certain capacity to understand the processes, and from the streets one acquires the passion for politics, but to understand is given to very few people. As Cardoso put it, passion is more comfortable than understanding, because there is nothing crueller in politics than lucidity. When it is noticed what will happen, when it is known that we cannot avoid what will happen, we suffer. The number who are lucid in politics, luckily, is small. However, without the suffering of understanding and the passion of doing, concludes Cardoso, there is no transformation (Cardoso, 1983c: 58).

1964-1968

The military coup of *état* in 1964 found Cardoso in full university activity developing field research for a book on industrial entrepreneurs and economic development in Brazil (1964), which constituted a critique of the predominant positions of the left at the time. Although researching themes with political significance, Cardoso didn't have political ties with parties or social movements that justified his exile from the country. However, his activity as member of the University Council caused his removal from

the University: "I had been elected by the former students and, afterwards, by the junior academics and, finally, by the professors, on a platform of support for university reform" (interview with the author, Brasilia, 27 July 1998).

With the atmosphere in the country hostile to independent academic activity, he decided to go to Chile to work as a professor of Development Sociology in the *Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica y Social* (ILPES – Latin American Institute of Economic and Social Planning) from 1964 to 1967; as Professor of Development Sociology, in the *Facultad Latino-americana de Ciências Sociais* (FLACSO – Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) from 1965 to 1966; in the University of Chile from 1966 to 1967 and in the *Consejo Económico para América Latina* (CEPAL – Economic Council for Latin America) from 1964 to 1967, as coordinator of research in the Social Division (Interview with the author, Brasilia, 27 July 1998).

The research on the industrial entrepreneurs combined political interpretation with empirical analysis. That combination resulted in the questioning of the theoretical model that guided left thought at the time. The dominant theory of the Communist Party and the nationalists was that there was the need for a national bourgeoisie, capable of making the bourgeois revolution and, at the same time, for a revolutionary proletariat capable of opposing the bourgeoisie after its revolution. There was a need, therefore, for an alliance of the national bourgeoisie with the proletariat against imperialism and the landowners.

With his research on the profile of Brazilian industrial entrepreneurs, Cardoso shows the fragility of that thesis, revealing a close association between national entrepreneurs (the industrial bourgeoisie) and foreign capital (imperialism). This theoretical formulation was the seed of the debate that would intensify later around

imperialism and landowning in Latin America. These debates continued in Chile where Cardoso, in co-partnership with Enzo Faletto, wrote *Dependence and Development in America Latina* (Cardoso and Faletto, 1967) a volume that became a classic in Latin-American literature. After having been influenced by the ideas of European thought, Cardoso, starting from his own experience in Chile and in CEPAL started to understand the specificity of Latin-American situation, reversing the direction of influence: "CEPAL contributed to our thinking about our own situation, and not about the classical theory of development. Instead of saying that the international division of work solves everything - how does it solve everything, if we export agricultural products and import industrial products, and if there is a difference in the labour value embodied in each that is lost in exchange?" (Cardoso, 1983c: 41).

Ironically, the 1964 coup d'état gave Cardoso an opportunity to develop his intellectual activity on an international scale. Up to 1964, Cardoso had only published in Brazil. After 1964, he would publish more books outside than inside Brazil, especially once *Dependency and Development in Latin America* was translated into English, French, German and Japanese. With this work Cardoso helped to shape an entire generation of researchers in Latin America. (Cardoso, 1983c: 29).

About that time (1967-68), Cardoso received from his former teacher, Alain Touraine, an invitation to work in the Industrial Sociology Laboratory at Nanterre campus of the University of Paris. "For me, says Cardoso, Nanterre had a different flavour. I arrived Paris in October 1967, after having lived four years in Chile, at the time of President Frei, but also at that time in which Che Guevara was calling for the Latin-American revolution" (ibid).

Cardoso observed a curious paradox while in Nanterre. He says "I observed then that not only at the University of Nanterre, but also in the street, there was a very

substantial imbalance between the Latin American perception of the struggle for change and what was happening there. There was no reference to imperialism, for a start (...) Nothing related to what one would understand as class struggle” (Cardoso, 1998i: 47). From that observation, Cardoso says he drew a practical lesson in the sociology of social change that he called the “theory of the short circuit.” Complex societies such as contemporary ones, based on mass communication, with large-scale circulation of information, can move through a short circuit prompted by the feeling that “some thing is in the air.”

It is not a systematic general theory guided by a philosophy of the history based on a general model of historical change. Cardoso simply observes the way that change has occurred in societies in which information is mediated through television and radio – as happened in May 1968, in Nanterre (France); in Gdansk (Poland); in Moscow (Russia) and in São Bernardo, in Brazil, with the campaign for direct elections. Cardoso defines the theory of short circuits as follows: “apathetic” societies can become quickly mobilised and they can change; social change, even “revolutionary” change, is not predictable. It depends on the fusion of multiple contradictions and aspirations, located in different social planes and moved by previously unencountered values. But, at the final moment, if there is no political force with an organised will to guide the change, in keeping with the popular pressures, the impasse will reappear. (Cardoso, 1998i: 50 and Cardoso, 1983c: 100).

1968 - 1974

Cardoso returned to Brazil in 1968 in order to take part in the competition at the University of São Paulo for the Chair in Political Science left vacant with the death of Lourival Gomes Machado, whom Cardoso had considered as the supervisor of his

doctoral thesis on capitalism and slavery in Brazil in 1962, if Florestan Fernandes, “very irritated, because of the Preface ” had not continued in that role. In the event the change was not made, because it would have been “the greatest offence that I could do to my master and teacher Florestan Fernandes to whom I was very dedicated and who was a very close friend. Because we reached an understanding and the version finally published is much closer to his perspective, in the empirical foundations of sociological explanation, because I give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, I give some space for the functionalist method” (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

In the system in place at the time, vacancies were filled by a competition between candidates on the basis of their published research. In that competition, Cardoso had a great advantage because of his outstanding intellectual work, especially *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, which had changed the framework within which the relationship between the international capitalism and the countries of Latin America was understood. Cardoso won the chair of political science in October 1968, but in December of the same year Institutional Act 5 (AI-5) was decreed, introducing further restrictions on political rights, and in April Cardoso was compulsorily retired. The reason was unclear, because as Cardoso says, “I was appointed in October and I got to give one and a half month of classes and then I was removed. There was no time to do anything that could be contrary to anything at the University. It was a purely arbitrary act” (Cardoso, 1983c: 30). He had been out of the University of Sao Paulo since he had lectured there in 1963. He now assumed the position of “a teacher who was determined to stay in Brazil but didn't want to pay the price of keeping his mouth shut for being here” (Cardoso, 1978c: 84).

Compulsorily retired from teaching, Cardoso rejoined his former research colleagues in the same situation, José Arthur Giannotti, Juarez Rubens Brandão

Lopes, Paul Singer and Octavio Ianni, who had participated in the Marx Seminar in the late 1950s. Now, at the end of the sixties, their common situation led to a joint venture that greatly enhanced their impact on Brazilian society: the foundation of the Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Research, CEBRAP (*Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planejamento*), the think-tank of Brazilian democracy. From this moment onward, Cardoso intensified his intellectual concern to bring together academic research on dependency and development, urban politics, and the theorisation of the process of transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy and a progressive social regime.

According to Goertzel, CEBRAP's elitism was not just a formal organisational matter; it represented deference to the outstanding abilities and accomplishments of the founding members. He cites Bernardo Sorj, who observes in his history of CEBRAP that the distinguished philosopher José Arthur Giannotti played an important role as a kind of "theoretical super-ego, guardian of orthodoxy for some, motivator and source of theoretical inspiration for others;" but by far the most important figure was Cardoso, since "the quality and diversity of his work, as well as his personal charisma and wide varied network of relationships in Brazil and abroad, made him the pivot of the organisation. Without a doubt the person with the greatest national and international renown, he maintained a clear leadership role among the younger staff members and the most complex relationships with the members of his own generation" (Goertzel, 1999: 55).

The 1970s, with the foundation of CEBRAP, became a decade of intense intellectual productivity and political activities for Cardoso. In this period, the "focus of his efforts gradually shifted from traditional academic scholarship to applied social science. He found little time to write detailed scholarly treatises that refined and developed his ideas. In addition to playing a key role in CEBRAP, he travelled all

over the world attending conferences, teaching courses, and giving invited lectures. He wrote many essays and articles, some of which were later collected and published in book form" (ibid).

1974 - 1982

Although Cardoso only began to participate in party politics proper from 1977, he was already developing party activities from 1974, whether as an intellectual with his lectures or by participating in the composition of the MDB programme for the electoral campaign of that year. But when he decided to enter party politics directly, he assumed a new commitment. He said at the time that it should be expected that those who had some understanding "should allow passion to touch us a little, to abandon the splendid isolation of the university. But if we come to contribute, we should not do it just as supporters, but as someone who adds something to the vision of the world. If not, we will suffer with our lucidity or we will be lost in the cowardice of letting ourselves be carried away by passion without adding the element of reason that change requires and that our training allows and obliges us to bring to the political struggle" (Cardoso, 1983a: 45).

If Cardoso's previous work as an intellectual had no element of party political involvement, it always had a social vision on political subjects and, in particular, on authoritarianism. He was a militant political-intellectual without practical political-institutional participation. For that reason he was oriented, as an intellectual, "against certain perspectives that seemed to me superficial, like the ideas diffused by ISEB (the Institute of Brazilian Social Studies in Rio de Janeiro), that had a very significant political influence. The São Paulo group was very suspicious of ISEB because it

thought its position was one of populist nationalism” (Interview with the author, Brasilia, 27 July 1998).

According to Cardoso, in the 1970s, because of his intellectual prestige and his identity as “an intellectual engaged in the fight against the military regime, a group of friends decided that I should be candidate to the Senate, to protest” (Interview with the author, 27 July 1998). Even before assuming a party political commitment, Cardoso, somehow, had never been politically inactive. But a moment came when it was necessary to organise, and come up with new ideas and new candidates. With the prospect of being candidate for the Senate on an MDB ticket, Cardoso declared: “I have an advantage, because the electorate is tired, tired of politicians in the traditional sense. I think, in the same way that there is a will everywhere for change, dissidence, and rebellions, that it is beginning happen in the MDB as well, and also that in sectors that are not in the MDB but are participating in the oppositions, they are trying to see if it is possible to give another direction to things. I think there is a kind of feeling – of things that are in the air – that things are not going to stay as they are. It is necessary to take a step forward. Well, my candidacy was born basically of that will to take a step forward. It wasn’t just my will, although it could have been (interview with the author, Brasilia, 27 July 1998).

To give expression to the perception that change was “in the air” it was necessary “to find somebody who was capable of gathering some support within the MDB, and of winning over first the MDB, then those outside it. We kicked the ball around to see who could do this, and apparently, by virtue of the evolution of my own trajectory in the life of Brazil, it seems that I had a better chance to play that part than others. So I became the candidate” (Cardoso, 1978c: 50).

Cardoso's political-intellectual involvement developed in parallel with his growing intellectual prestige in Brazil. An example of this was his participation as a member of the opposition in a symposium organised by MDB, in 1977, and transmitted on national television, which culminated in the banning from politics of the then Deputy Alencar Furtado, a leader of MDB. The symposium was organized by the Pedroso Horta Institute of Political Studies, a think-tank of the MDB. I was closely involved, as Youth President of the MDB in the Federal District, and a consultant sociologist to the Institute. The Institute's President, Deputy Alceu Colares, General secretary Deputy Sérgio Murilo and I conceived, organized and ran the symposium, for which we came up with the idea of the participation of some intellectuals who could give lectures on the political situation in Brazil. Cardoso's name was mentioned and supported unanimously in a meeting in the office of Deputy Ulisses Guimarães, the President of MDB. I recall that Deputy Ulisses Guimarães was entrusted with entering into contact with CEBRAP and São Paulo Deputy Airton Soares, to get Cardoso's telephone number abroad.

Cardoso remembers the meeting as a very important turning point in the history of Brazilian authoritarianism, for the courage and firmness with which opposition leaders dared to challenge the regime. His account is as follows: "in 1977 I was in the University of Cambridge, in England, and I received a phone call from Deputy Ulisses Guimarães wondering if I could come to Brazil. There would be a meeting here and he would like somebody without party affiliation - I was not in the MDB yet - but somebody with a commitment to the opposition, to discuss Congressional politics under the auspices of MDB. I came in April 1977 and I got a big surprise, because at that moment there was certain effervescence. Then I delivered a lecture, and the following day I was invited by Dr. Ulisses to take part in a television programme in

which he, Deputy Alencar Furtado, Senator Franco Montoro and Alceu Colares would speak to the Nation. And they spoke to the Nation. I took part in the round table and I was astonished because I was coming from another planet, which was Cambridge, to an authoritarian country, in a moment at which the toughest laws were still in full force, and I heard a powerful, uncompromising critique from them. More or less a week later, Alencar Furtado was sacked because of that meeting. At that time the freedom we seemed to sense was an illusion" (Cardoso, 1983a: 10-11). The "April package" of authoritarian measures, intended to prevent the loss of control of the political system by the military regime, confirmed that the path to democracy would not be short or straightforward. In the same year, however, Cardoso joined the MDB, one year before the election to the Senate that made him an alternate, with 1,240,000 votes.

First, though, Cardoso had to await the decision of the Supreme Federal Court regarding his entitlement to be a candidate in view of his legal situation as an individual banned from politics as a consequence of Institutional Act 5. The Court ruled in his favour, saying that 'nobody can be punished for ever. This was the only time that a decision under Institutional Act 5 which prevented someone punished under it from being a candidate was overturned" (Cardoso, 1983c: 57). With result of the 1978 elections Cardoso had the second largest vote for the Senate, and became an alternate. Four years later, in 1982, senator Franco Montoro ran for the governorship of the state of São Paulo, while Cardoso was teaching in the University of Berkeley, in the United States.

Habermas coincidentally appears in Cardoso's life at this moment. Cardoso was invited by the Director of the Department of Sociology at Berkeley "to a permanent position in the University in place of Habermas, who hadn't settled very well and

wanted to return to Germany. Because Habermas has a speech impediment and he doesn't much like to give lectures and the Americans like lectures a lot. I had a large number of postgraduate students there, a very popular course in Berkeley" (interview with the author, 27 July 1998). With a Senate seat in prospect as a consequence of Franco Montoro's impending resignation, Cardoso, in a humorous tone, saw only one way in which he could stay in the University of Berkeley: "I agree, I said, but I shall need a seat in the US Senate, because if I go back to Brazil I am going to the Senate. And so it was, I became a Senator that way; in a certain way, something very unexpected" (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

1982 - 1992

Cardoso took his Senate seat in February 1983, reiterating his previous intellectual ideas, and insisting that was necessary to make a "rational analysis of alternatives and of the sense of responsibility of one who knows that solutions are not easy, that the political project of making a break with immobilism requires, in the circumstances of Brazil, conviction, but also a capacity to persuade, and that any pretention to exclusivity in the passage towards a democratic and prosperous tomorrow is futile and rash" (Cardoso, 1983c: 10).

Thus Cardoso defined his plan of action as follows: "First, I am going to learn, because I have never been a member of Congress. Second, the general and institutional debate is important, and I can help to debate those topics. The Senate is in a position that gives its members chances of political alliance-building, at the party level and in society. Third, the time is right for social themes. From now either we redistribute income, we discuss power and participation, or we won't make progress. We have to change labour legislation, tax law, land ownership; the issue of the

constituent Assembly and the issue of the State, "because it is necessary to transform the State that today is a machine that oppresses, into something that is public, and that allows us to debate social issue. That is the core of modern democracy" (Cardoso, 1983c: 202). In pursuit of this agenda, Cardoso's first activity was as an effective member of the Committees on Infrastructure and Education.

In 1984, as Senator rather than a teacher, Cardoso experienced one of those moments when 'things are in the air', and a 'short-circuit' occurs: the campaign for direct presidential elections, *Diretas Já*. The opposition victories in the elections for the state governors in 1982 gave the democratic movement optimism with regard to direct elections for the Presidency of the Republic, unifying all elements of the opposition and mobilising Brazilian society in general around the slogan Direct Election Now (*Diretas Já*). Cardoso, not only as a senator but also as a well known intellectual, had an influential role in the movement, which resulted in a vote on a constitutional amendment in the National Congress.

The amendment was defeated in the Chamber of Deputies, and the prevailing system of indirect election through the Electoral College remained in place. With that defeat, Cardoso responded with pragmatism to the inevitable facts. As Goertzel says, "Cardoso favored putting maximum effort into fighting the election even under the old rules - much to the surprise of the left wing of the MDB, which wanted to continue to campaign for direct elections. Cardoso responded, 'If we want direct elections, we must prepare for the indirect ones. The Electoral College is now an inevitable stage'" (Goertzel, 1999: 88)

The political transition that would take the country to democracy started from this point, but it first had to go through a delicate phase precipitated by the eventually fatal illness which prevented Tancredo Neves, elected by the opposition through the

College, from taking office on March 15, 1985. Taking his place, vice-president-elect José Sarney, a traditional elite politician, had to face three great challenges: the calling of the Constituent Assembly, the fight against inflation, and the conducting of the first general elections for the President of the Republic since 1964.

In 1985, Cardoso was chosen as candidate for mayor of São Paulo, only to be defeated by less than one per cent of the vote by Jânio Quadros, a populist who had resigned the presidency in 1961. Despite this defeat, Cardoso went on to assume leadership of the government in Congress, and in 1986 he was re-elected to the Senate for the state of São Paulo by the PMDB with a massive 6,223,900 votes. Once returned to the Senate he resumed work in the Committees on Infrastructure and Education, adding to this a central role in the working of the Constituent Assembly.

1987 – The Constituent Assembly

Re-elected senator, Cardoso took part in the National Constituent Assembly entrusted with writing the new Brazilian Constitution after two decades of authoritarian-military regime. The task fell to the members of congress chosen in normal elections, rather than to a separately designated assembly, with deputies and senators meeting together to draft a new constitution. Cardoso was chosen as reporter on the Internal Rules of the Assembly and as joint reporter of the Systematisation Committee which would prepare final versions of the elements of the new constitution submitted by sub-committees to whom individual sections were initially assigned.

As an intellectual and democratic social movement leader

“Cardoso had been preaching for years about the importance of civic participation. He was eager to make the process work, and he took on the important role of managing the legal records for the

Constituent Assembly, which was chaired by Guimarães. Cardoso was in charge of the day-to-day work of organising committees - coordinating their activities, scheduling meetings, and editing reports into a consistent document. He was also in charge of processing the 1,947 amendments that had been submitted by groups from all around the country; many overlapped, and he was able to edit them down to a mere 697 amendments” (Goertzel, 1999: 92).

Cardoso was chosen for this delicate political task because, as Goertzel says, he was well liked and respected, and everyone knew he was interested more in facilitating the democratic process than in advancing the interests of a specific group. After a year of intensive work, the members of Congress concluded the Constitution of 1988, a process with significant participation from civil society, including the utilisation of popular initiatives for law-making with the direct participation of the population.² Although with many positive aspects in the areas of civil and social rights, the Constitution reflected a moment in the world political situation that would change completely in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and its well-known consequences.

Cardoso knew that politics had to move to adapt to new circumstances in the making, and became disappointed with the process and also with the direction taken by the Constituent Assembly. He thought the body was leading Brazil backwards rather than forwards, as he would say once he reached the presidency. In his view, at this point in history, “Choosing development implies a process which, for lack of a better name, I will call “modernisation”, but which in truth is the “globalisations” of the economy. In an era when Europe is integrating its market by means of a multiplicity of joint-ventures with the Soviet Union, in which China is “westernizing”, Japan is already a part of the “western” world, and the United States is forming a great

market in North America, together with Canada and Mexico, Brazil cannot isolate itself, anachronistically, with an outdated policy of autarchy which runs the risk of turning it into a huge Cambodia” (Cardoso, 1995f: 67). With this analysis in mind, Cardoso envisaged future adjustments to the new constitution from the outset: “What I think is that after the promulgation of the new constitution, we will have to make adjustments, because the Brazilian State entered its fiscal crisis, a state threatening to go into failure, before it began to promote well-being. I am certain that this will not be easy. I am certain that it must be done (Goertzel, 1999: 94).

1988 - Cardoso and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB)

Cardoso’s political-intellectual militance, with his publication of detailed analyses of Brazilian social and political issues in the press and his involvement in party politics, form a process of mutual influence that connects knowledge and politics. Because even as a senator, Cardoso said, “I still made a certain effort to keep up to date with intellectual developments” and he remained President of the International Association of Sociology up to 1986, when politics became more time-consuming (Interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Cardoso brought to his militance in press and party the same style and method of analysis that he adopted as an intellectual. In the press, his analyses of the political conjuncture in interviews and articles in *Movimento*, *Opinião* and *A Folha de São Paulo* reflected a sense of the specific, of the particularity of concrete situations, because his premise was “everything that generalizes loses its force” (Cardoso, 1983c: 96). In party politics, he continually emphasised argumentative discourse and the pragmatic recognition that utopias without politics and programmes of action were sterile (Cardoso, 1980a:116).

Thus, Cardoso became involved in party politics in the knowledge that the intellectual's relationship with politics is complex. Many people, Cardoso says, "prefer intellectuals not to enter politics, on the grounds that politics is a part of life that gets your hands dirty. He can talk about grand theories, even grand political theories, but it is better not to take sides, the party idea. But, from the intellectual point of view, participation in politics and specifically in party politics, enriches you, you learn a bunch of things you did not know, you really have to come out from the ivory tower, to come into contact with a range of real situations. It is true that there are in party limitations; the options are limited. But what can you do, we have to live in the real world, not an ideal one" (Cardoso, 1978b: 8).

So in 1988, three months before the adoption of the new Constitution, Cardoso left the PMDB and, along with other political leaders, founded the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, the PSDB. In his view the PMDB had achieved its task as an "omnibus" party during the whole period of democratic resistance but now, with the return to democracy, it had transformed itself into a party of *fisiologicos* (clientelistic dealers in political favours). Cardoso explained his departure from the PMDB in a speech in the Senate on 22 June 1988, stating that "Democracy is here, with imperfections, but it is here. The constitution was written by us." The PMDB had accomplished its founding goals but once it won power it became a careerist vehicle for politicians, the "great notary's office whose stamp is indispensable for the exercise of power." Some might say "well, that's politics", but that was so only for those whose only goal is to hold on to power. The main goal of the progressive forces always had to be different - it had to be for change (Goertzel, 1999: 96).

Despite calling himself a "social-democrat" Cardoso doesn't have illusions with regard to the limits of that perspective in Brazil. With regard to both the fragility of

parties and the character of trade unions, Brazil is very different from the European tradition within which the idea of social democracy. For this reason Cardoso was opposed to “the PSDB calling itself social-democratic. It called itself social-democratic because there was a vote on it. But I was against it. Why? I said that it would be forced to explain all the time how it was that a party with no trade unions called itself social-democratic. I didn't want it to be a party of trade unions. Social democracy has a respectable history. If I were in Europe I would be a social democrat. In Brazil it is much more a party of democratic radicalisation rather than social-democratic party” (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

The PSDB emerged in the context of political and ideological redefinition after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, committed to the continuation of the democratic process. Its manifesto pointed in the direction of politics of alliances, even with conservative sections relatively open to the social progress the country needed so much. Its founding manifesto presented it as “a party broad enough to encompass the confluence of different streams of contemporary political thought - e.g., progressive liberals, Christian democrats, social democrats, and democratic socialists - the PSDB is strongly united on the basis of democracy as an essential value and the mainspring for the changes demanded by the Brazilian people” (Goertzel, 1999:103).

1989-1990 – Presidential elections

At a distance of 25 years from the military coup d'état that illegally removed the last constitutional president, Brazil was once again able to experience the selection of a president by democratic means. However, it first had to live through the unexpected death of Tancredo Neves, and the fragile government of José Sarney.

With the direct election for president in 1989 Brazil saw one fragile and patronage-oriented government replaced by an equally patronage-oriented successor government under Fernando Collor which mounted a comprehensive system of corruption put together by Collor himself and the treasurer of his presidential campaign. What seemed to be an opportunity to demonstrate the success of the path to democracy became a national nightmare that came close to bringing democracy down. But Brazil's new democracy revealed a capacity to overcome and learn from political crisis. It became clear that direct election of the president was not enough. The President needed the political skill to deal with Congress and with the political parties if the system was to work. The President, in a democracy, is not omnipotent. There is a need to negotiate and to debate in order to carry out the role and to strengthen democratic institutions. This was the perspective that Cardoso, with his background in Congress, would bring to the presidency.

1990-1992 - Impeachment

The impeachment of Collor was a moment of reaffirmation of Brazil's commitment to democracy, both because the president was removed by legal institutional means, and because it made people aware that values such as honesty and public accountability can only be soundly established with the participation of civil society.

In addition, the lessons of the Collor presidency were that political leadership could not be created out of nothing by a media operation, and that the personal power of the president could not be placed above the integrity of political institutions.

However Cardoso's hesitation to integrate Collor's government as Foreign Minister, PSDB convinced by Mario Covas, refused to participate in the Collor government, which left Brazil with a legacy of uncontrolled inflation in urgent need of solution.

Speaking in 1991, in the context of the failure of Collor's anti-inflation programme and amidst spreading concern over corruption, Cardoso declared in the Senate that "My anguish is real, and it is not mine, it is of the Brazilian people...in the last few months, the Brazilian crisis has gotten worse. The national anguish has increased, a profound disbelief, which was already common among the masses, has been definitively installed in the elite of the country. There is a clear sense that government is not functioning and that chaos is imminent (Goertzel, 1999: 99).

That anguish and sense of imminent chaos were solved by a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI) in the Congress that investigated the misconduct of Collor's government and his direct involvement in corruption. With the same speed that he had appeared on the political scene and risen to power, Collor was removed from the Presidency of the Republic by a vote for impeachment in September 1992.

1992-1994

President Collor was succeeded by his Vice-President Itamar Franco, a politician with limited national recognition who had not expected to assume the position of President of the Republic. After the unsuccessful economic stabilisation programmes of Sarney and Collor, the new president had to face the most urgent economic issue: inflation. But he allowed the public deficit to grow while blaming individual manufacturers for the continuing rise in prices, concentrating meanwhile on the plebiscite to decide between a parliamentary or presidential system, the revision of the 1988 Constitution, and accusations of corruption against members of the Congressional Budget Committee.

His government was saved in the end by the eventual designation of Cardoso as Minister of Foreign Affairs, then of Finance. His appointment as Foreign Minister was

ideal, according to Skidmore, because of Cardoso's intelligence, linguistic ability, and international reputation (Skidmore, 1998:310). In May 1993, however, Franco invited Cardoso to assume the Ministry of Finance, a post in which he would remain until April 1994. In a context of imminent chaos that threatened democracy, Cardoso took charge of the ministry, and with a team of notable economists with experience in previous plans, put together a stabilisation programme that would enable the government to recover its reputation, and to lay the foundations for Cardoso's election to the presidency (*idem*).

1995-1998

Cardoso resigned as Minister of Finance in April 1994 in accordance with electoral law, announcing his candidacy for the presidency in the forthcoming elections (November 1994). Knowing that his party, the PSDB, lacked a national structure, he tried to make an electoral alliance with the centre-left parties - first with the PT, which proved unwilling to abandon its own candidate, Lula, then with Brizola's PDT, which equally insisted on persevering with its own eternal candidate.

Cardoso had always favoured alliances, and his search for common ground with other left parties reflected his conviction that it would be impossible to implement deep reforms in the structure of the state without such alliances as a basis for both election and successful government. He had long ago argued against the almost religious hostility to alliance politics in Brazil, on the grounds that it showed ignorance of history as no social transformation in the world had ever been achieved by a small group on behalf of the workers. He had also rejected the metaphysical vision of a society composed of two blocs, the dominant class and the dominated class, in global confrontation, arguing that it was the lack of homogeneity in such

supposedly monolithic blocs that made transformation possible (Cardoso, 1978c: 86). Having failed to secure the backing of the centre-left, however, he ran with the support of the centre-right PFL and PTB. He was elected President of the Republic in the first round of voting, with 34,377,198 votes, or 54.3 per cent of the total.

It is the argument of this thesis that once elected President, Cardoso adopted the same discourse and practice that characterised him as an intellectual, brought to the exercise of power the habit of rational analysis, considering the specific aspects of each situation. There is, therefore, a consistency in the interaction between his theoretical understanding and his political practice.

In his perspective, the role of the president is to work more as a facilitator of the expansion of democratic space than as a source of orders emanating from executive authority. His adoption of this role was facilitated by the characteristics of his personality developed in a political-family atmosphere of conversation and dialogue that was the basis for his career first as an intellectual then as a politician. In both cases, he has relied heavily on moving processes ahead by the use of argument to convince and persuade. In office, he would seek to innovate, to reconcile paths seen before as antagonistic, without losing sight of the values and the fundamental commitments of the centre-left. The following chapters explore his intellectual trajectory from the 1950s onwards, before turning to his career as politician and president.

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, the source for information on Cardoso's family background is Goertzel (1999).

² On this, see my MSc. Dissertation, 'Democracia e Participação Popular: as emendas populares na Constituinte de 1987/88' and also Michiles, C. Coelho, João Gilberto L., Whitaker, F et al. 1988. Both works make a systematic theoretical and empirical analysis of the significance of popular amendments, in terms of contents, statistics and consequences for direct democracy.

CHAPTER 2

Cardoso's Method: Slavery, Dependency, Globalization

In simple terms, starting from this perspective it is possible to use the dialectical method in a heuristic manner, because what is real is not given a priori but is a result of the analytical effort of investigation. This helps to avoid creating new Frankensteins that would otherwise be created, as many a time they have been in fact, in the name of a method that sought to bring them to an end (Cardoso, 1962: 41).

In other words, our approach should bring to the forefront both aspects of social structures: the mechanisms of self-perpetuation and the possibilities for change. Social structures impose limits on social processes and reiterate established forms of behavior. However, they also generate contradictions and social tensions, opening the possibilities for social movements and ideologies of change. The analyses have to make explicit not only structural constraints that reinforce the reiterative aspects of the reproduction of society, but have also to delineate chances for change, rooted in the very social interest and ideologies created by the development of a given structure (Cardoso and Faletto, 1971: xi).

What is [my method]? What do I do? Normally, in the first place it is indeed dialectical, it is clearly of dialectical inspiration, and I always spoke of it as historical-structural. You can see that whenever I want to explain something ... I resort to history, I show a process. I show a process, although I think that there do exist regularities, structures, I take much less interest in the structure and much more in the change of the structure, in what arises. ... I should say that I do it almost instinctively, I don't even have to think about it. But if you look at what I have written, *Capitalism and Slavery*, what I have written about the problem of Brazil's industrial development and about the formation of the bourgeoisie in Brazil, what I have written about dependency in Latin America and the way I analyse globalisation today, they are the same. The method, the perspective is the same (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Here, there's a whole political game around saying that I said "Forget what I wrote." I never said this because in truth, the opposite is the case" (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Introduction

Cardoso's first two statements recorded above, made at different moments of his intellectual trajectory, reflect his commitment to a mode of analysis of reality that tries to avoid general and mechanical reasoning about the social process; that is his most striking characteristic as an intellectual. My objective in this chapter is to show the consistency of Cardoso's method of analysis of different phenomena from the 1950s to the 1990s, with particular reference to his analyses of slavery in nineteenth century Brazil, dependency and globalisation. I shall also show that he is consistent in his conclusion that whether in the 1960s or the 1990s, Brazil had limited options as regards economic choices in the global economy. In this sense, his analysis of the constraints of globalization can be seen as consistent with his earlier analysis of dependency and 'associated-dependent development'. Consistently, though, Cardoso looks for the potential for change within each situation, and as we shall see in the following chapter, this leads him to assert the possibility of democracy within situations of dependency and globalization. Structure, history and political choice, therefore, comprise variables that define the limits of alternative political projects. Cardoso is much more interested in identifying the change-generating process than in seeing structure as a static variable. Historical-structural explanation has to do with the process of formation of structures and, simultaneously, with the discovery of the laws that transform these structures. It is a question of conceiving the structures as relations among individuals which are determined, Cardoso says, but are also liable to change, as social (political, economic, cultural) struggles, start to open new alternatives (Cardoso, 1972a: 60-70). The roots of this orientation lie in the formative intellectual experience of the Marx Seminar in which Cardoso participated from 1958 onwards, and which created the

framework for his first major work, *Capitalism and Slavery in Brazil*. From this point on Cardoso remains committed to a line of reasoning based upon the dialectical method, and concerned with establishing a Brazilian sociology based on scientific analysis.

The Marx Seminar

The Marx seminar was the initiative of a group of sociologists who were searching for an appropriate method for building a scientific methodology for Brazilian social science. Florestan Fernandes, professor of Sociology at the University of São Paulo, was an influential pioneer of the effort to “transform Brazilian sociology into science”, and he played a fundamental academic role for this group of young intellectuals. But as Cardoso has recalled, he was not favourable to the Marx Seminar itself: “the main inspiration and initiator was Giannotti, who was my colleague, in fact, a year behind me, in the Department of Philosophy. Florestan did not look on it favourably” (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

The participants in the seminar were inspired by the desire to find an alternative to US functionalism on the one hand and the orthodox method of vulgar marxism on the other. Cardoso confirms both the importance of the seminar, and its undogmatic orientation:

I believe I owe this to the Marx Seminar, because I have a good training. I mean, not just academic, from the University of Sao Paulo, from the time when I a student and assistant to Florestan [Fernandes], and Roger Bastide, and so many others who influenced me. In France too with Touraine, Raymond Aron’s courses, on Marx in fact. Anyway, my training was a solid training. Our training in the Marx seminar was never ideological, it was always about seeing – and this was Giannotti’s influence, I repeat – Marx’s

texts not as if they were biblical texts, analyzing, studying, not adopting (interview with the author, 28 July 1998).

Roberto Schwarz, another participant in the Seminar, remarks, recalling the intellectual atmosphere dominated by apparently dogmatic alternative methodologies:

This was a context in which intensive reflection on *Capital* and the *Eighteenth Brumaire* [of Louis Napoleon], along with the reading of the recently published *History and Class Consciousness* [George Lukacs] and Sartre's *Question of Method*, two classics of heterodox Marxism, would prove to be productive. The fact is that at a certain point there emerged in the seminar an idea which it is not an exaggeration to call a new intuition in Brazil, which shaped the principal worked of the group and had significant repercussions. In summary, the novelty consisted of connecting what had been separated, or better, linking the sociological and political specificity of the country to the contemporary history of capital, whose orbit was of a different order (Schwarz, 1995).

One consequence of the seminar was that Cardoso never came under the influence of the populist nationalism that was prevalent in some progressive circles in the period:

we were struggling a lot, at that time, against certain perspectives that seemed to us superficial, like the ideas diffused by ISEB – the Brazilian Institute of Social Studies of Rio de Janeiro – that was very influential in politics. The São Paulo group was very critical of ISEB because we thought it was populist nationalism, things like that. Then, we had an other perspective (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

The Seminar on Marx's *Capital* recognized the importance of Marxism for sociology, then, not as a simple tool to determine the course of class struggle according to an evolutionist model borrowed from Europe, but as a framework for the interpretation of the historical structuring of Brazilian society from an angle that recognizes in the particularity of each social reality a concrete situation to be unmasked by a heuristic method of interpretation. It attached particular value to the dialectical method, committed to identifying not only structural constraints, but also contradictions that might give rise to new possibilities. It gave Cardoso a constant resistance to vulgar Marxism, a critical posture, and a taste for questioning and challenging standard interpretations of reality. And it led him to focus consistently on exploring the relationship between the capitalist system and its impact upon the economies and societies of Third World and developing countries. As Cardoso recalls elsewhere, however, the group did not come to Marx without any prior intellectual training:

At the end of the fifties – much before the ‘reading of *Capital*’ became a global fashion in universities – a group of teaching assistants and more intellectually mature students at the University of São Paulo dedicated itself for years to reading that outstanding work. However, we did not read *Capital* with the naive eyes of those who had read nothing before, nor with the obedience of newcomers. We read it after much of Weber, Descartes, Durkheim, Dilthey, Mannheim, Husserl, some anthropology, history and economics. The preferred authors and the level of knowledge of each member of the Marx Seminar varied. But during the heated debates we learned with one another (Cardoso, 1977a: 12).

The Seminar is of enduring importance in the formation of Cardoso's thought, and the starting point for the academic work of a group of scholars principally committed to developing the dialectical sociological method in order to apply it creatively to the specific problems of Brazilian reality. The first evidence of its influence in Cardoso's work is revealed in *Capitalism and Slavery in Brazil* (1962).

Capitalism and Slavery in Brazil - the heuristic application of the dialectical method.

Cardoso's *Capitalismo e Escravidão no Brasil Meridional: o negro na sociedade escravocrata do Rio Grande do Sul* is the work in which he sets out the dialectical and heuristic method that will mark his future academic trajectory and, later, his political life, or in other words in which he formulates the approach that will guide both his intellectual projects and his political interventions in the public arena.

The introduction begins with Marx's epigraph "to be a radical is to take things by the root. Now, for man, the root is man himself." Marx's classic declaration is accompanied by a dedication to Florestan Fernandes, and to Joaquim Nabuco, for perceiving that the system of slavery did not just mean the degradation of the slave, but the constitution of a society totally organized and marked by slavery. The work then seeks to exercise the dialectical method from the global perspective of the functioning of the capitalist system, exploring the apparent contradiction of the articulation of opposites in the way in which Brazilian society was formed: capitalism based on slave labour.

This work was written as an exercise in dialectical interpretation in sociology, utilizing the basic concept of a "concrete totality". To justify this methodological procedure, Cardoso develops a long exposition on the concept of totality not as the expression of a set of factors summed up according to their identity, but as the unity of the diversity of

elements that form it. According to Cardoso, other modalities of sociological explication – such as the functionalist and structuralist approaches – use the notion of totality, but what differentiates these from the dialectic approach is its *heuristic* use in his approach. In the dialectical analysis, the concept of totality is used as an interpretative resource by which one aims to understand, as Marx explicitly wrote in the preface to the *Contribution of Political Economy*, not the identity or pattern of invariance, but the differences of a unity that are engendered in a specific totality.

The totality thus understood presupposes not only the existence of differences in a unity but also the existence of “organic connections” that explain, at the same time, the mode of inter-relationship existing between the determinations that constitute the totalities and the very process of constituting the totalities (Cardoso, 1962: 25).

The characteristic of this use of Marxist knowledge is that it doesn't reproduce knowledge given beforehand, but seeks to relate concrete realities with the history of their formation and, based on these, identify the potential for transformation. This perspective shapes Cardoso's approach to slavery based on large plantations, and integrated into the expansion of mercantile capitalism. It is dynamic (it obeys, in this case, the dynamic of capitalism) and contradictory (the transformations of capitalism make the servile relationship itself a hindrance to the advancement of the system of production). The contradictory and dynamic character upon which slave-holding capitalism rests has been given since its installation, but only presents itself as something historically determinant of options when the entire system begins to break down. It is at this moment that social movements to refuse servility become possible. Collective human action – and not any technical factor in itself – comes

to stand up against the reigning structure and the possibility of an alternative order arises: "I proclaim, therefore the relative autonomy of politics at the level of classes and of their struggle" (ibid: 14-15). At the same time, it is not possible to make an abstract and mechanical analysis of the classes and the struggle in which they are engaged: "The ideas of class struggle and of class consciousness must be redefined in relation to the global structural conditions that determined them and in function of the particular type of society (slave-holding and patrimonialist) that resulted in the reign of slave-holding capitalism" (ibid: 16). It is important to note here Cardoso's insight into the specificity of the relationship between capitalism and slavery, and his interest in identifying the circumstances in which human agency may give rise to its transformation, because it will be this same heuristic application of the dialectic that will mark his interpretation of dependency.

Dependency and Associated-Dependent Development

As Cardoso has recently recalled, his essay on dependency, written with the Chilean historian Enzo Faletto, was part of a lively intellectual debate on the left in Latin America in the 1960s:

my version, along with Faletto, of the theory of dependency, would hardly have been formulated had it not had, as a backdrop, the most orthodox marxist views of Latin America and the most nationalist perspectives, along ISEB lines, on our continent. In this regard, I insist, we were, in a situation of diversity, a school of thought where the rule is internal debate and critical respect for different interpretations. We did not lack versions of utopia. To some, revolution and socialism; to others, a strong State, able to change the very nature of social relations; to others, rational capitalism. But, always, the

idea that we could be better, more socially just, than we were (Cardoso, 1995b: 46).

The starting point for Cardoso and Faletto's notion of dependency is Lenin's view of it as "a form of articulation between two parts of a same mode of production and about the subordination of one mode of production to another" (Cardoso, 1976: 365). In the context of peripheral economies in the modern period, this means that "the control mechanisms of the national economy partially escape from the internal sphere as there are no alternatives to certain universal norms of operation of a modern productive system, imposed by the universal market: the unification of productive systems leads to market standardization and their supranational arrangement" (Cardoso and Faletto, 1973a: 130). But within this structural context

development is considered as a result of interaction between social groups and classes which have a mode of relation which is peculiar to them and, therefore, different material interests and values, whose opposition, conciliation or success in dealing with them, gives life to the socio-economic system. The social and political structure undergoes changes as different social classes and groups manage to impose their interests, their strength and their domination on society as a whole (Cardoso and Faletto, 1973a: 21-22).

Tracing the specific evolution of dependency in the Latin American case, with an eye to the case of Brazil in particular, Cardoso and Faletto rejected the extreme dependency view that industrialization was impossible, and the national-populist analysis that saw the

emergence of a developmental State as a progressive development. While the latter was at one point a possibility, the outcome was different:

in the industrialization of the Latin American periphery, the direct participation of foreign companies gives a particular meaning to the region's industrial development which, during its national-popular period, seemed to march toward the consolidation of national producing groups and, essentially, toward the consolidation of the State as a tool for the formation of regulatory and productive nucleus. But it occurred that, on the contrary ... a model of development based on ever increasing foreign investment in the industrial sector was chosen (Cardoso and Faletto, 1973a: 125-6).

For Cardoso and Faletto, this made the idea of an anti-imperialist struggle based on the belief that imperialism would not industrialize the periphery problematic. Local economies attached themselves to international economies in such a way that whatever was external became internal, and the consumer market for production in peripheral countries was the local market (ibid: 125-126). That meant, in turn (in a way that echoed the contradictory combination of slavery and capitalism) that dependency and industrialization coexisted, at the same time. This was a paradox, and a real one that was literally unthinkable in terms of rival approaches which saw two alternatives: dependency or industrialization. In other words, Cardoso saw the dynamism of the industrialization of peripheral countries whereas many other authors, among them Andre Gunder Frank (1967) and Rui Mauro Marini (1969) saw only stagnation. While Frank (1967) asserted that the development of the underdevelopment of peripheral countries closed off any perspective of industrialization, and Marini (1969) developed a theory of 'superexploitation' which argued that workers in

the periphery were being paid wages below the subsistence level while the length and intensity of the work day was being increased, Cardoso and Faletto insisted on the possibility of genuinely capitalist development. Within this framework, it was possible to establish that the old left idea of a national-popular alliance was increasingly anachronistic. The initial formation of the internal market “relied on the impulse of an industrialization policy backed by stable relations between nationalism and populism,” whereas the period of differentiation of the capitalist economy is “based on the formation of the capital goods sector and on the strengthening of entrepreneurial groups, on account of the crisis in populism and of the representative political organization of the ruling groups” (Cardoso and Faletto, 1973a: 114). In a significant exchange which took place in Santiago, Chile, in 1970, the first year of Allende’s socialist government, Francisco Weffort (1978) accused Cardoso of switching the focus of his analysis away from class to the nation, and adopting as a consequence a form of petty bourgeois national developmentalism. In response, Cardoso insisted, in one of the clearest account of his methodological principles, that his method of analysis of ‘concrete situations of dependency’ allowed him to capture the relationship between internal social classes and external constraints (Cardoso, 1973d). And when Marini (1978) returned to the fray as the 1970s drew to a close, accusing Cardoso of promoting reformist national developmentalism, Cardoso and Serra (1973) returned once again with a defence of the possibility of associated-dependent development, crucial at the time to the political project of the MDB.

Continuity in these analyses is provided by the key analytical concepts of the internationalization of the domestic market, and associated-dependent development. In this modality of dependent development, the integration with the external is accomplished through transfer of external capitals and also modern productive organization techniques.

Latin American countries in general are affected by this process but in different degrees concerning the intensification of the industrialization process. As a consequence of that link, the degree of autonomy of the national economic system and of political decisions are limited in accordance with the nature of an associated-dependent development model. The new fact in this concept, Cardoso argues, "is not in the recognition of the existence of an external domination – an obvious process – but in the characterization of the form that it assumes and of the different effects, with reference to past situations, of that type of relation of dependency on classes and the State":

The present situation of dependent development not only surpasses the traditional opposition between the terms development and dependency, making it possible to increase development and keeping, redefining them, the bonds of dependency, but also relies politically on a system of alliances different from the one that in the past guaranteed external hegemony. Exporting interests are no longer the ones that subordinate interests solidary with the domestic market neither are rural interests which oppose to urban interests as a type of economic domination. On the contrary, the specificity of the present situation of dependency lies in the fact that 'external interests' take roots more and more in the sector that produces for the domestic market sector (without annulling, of course, the previous forms of domination) and, as a consequence, found themselves in alliances that are supported by urban populations. On the other hand, the formation of an industrial economy on the periphery of the international capitalist system minimizes the effects of typically colonialist exploitation and searches for sympathy not only among

the ruling classes but also in all social groups linked to modern capitalist production: salaried, technicians, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, etc. (Cardoso and Faletto, 1973a: 142).

In the case of Brazil, this gave rise to a dependent industrialization with internal dynamism, with dramatic effects on social and class structure, and as a consequence on political possibilities – to be explored in the following chapter.

At a later stage, this perspective would enable Cardoso to maintain an awareness of the unequal structure of the global economy, and the continuing reality of the idea of dependency, even in conditions of the globalization of industrial development:

In other words, the process of domination between States-nations – by means of renewed economic channels - continues to occur in the international capitalist system, in spite of the internationalization of the productive process, although the social structure of dependent countries has undergone significant transformation and in spite of the fact that the domestic output capacity of some of these countries has increased significantly (Cardoso, 1988: 444).

Cardoso can therefore argue, referring back to the analyses of dependency from the 1960s onwards that

at that time, the word globalisation did not exist, nor even multinational. Then I used the term ‘internationalization of the domestic market’. Actually, that was a forerunner of globalisation. Later, in the 1970s, I developed a new concept, ‘associated-dependent development’. Development and not stagnation (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

From dependency to globalisation

I shall demonstrate in this section how Cardoso analyzes the impact and the consequences of globalisation, without forgetting that the transformations resulting from it are a consequence of a situation of dependency, but adding new variables with different characteristics. Since the most visible phase of globalisation, around the late 1980s and 1990s, finds Cardoso more in the role of politician-sociologist than of academic, I shall use a variety of sources – essays, articles, interviews and lectures – as sources of his ideas about globalisation. In doing so, I shall demonstrate both the continuity of the intellectual matrix underpinning his thought, and the continuity between his intellectual and political interventions.

Cardoso has himself insisted on the continuity between his understanding of globalisation and his early training in a Marxist methodology: “The conceptual universe which gives us the key to understand globalisation, a phenomenon which, as a matter of fact, takes capitalism’s tendencies to its utmost extreme, is still composed of the classical authors [Marx and Weber]” At the same time he insists, as he did in relation to dependency, that “the classic thought, even though it gives us points of reference, is clearly insufficient. On the one hand, there are no more formulas that can easily explain the general movement of globalisation; there is no a general theory of globalisation, as there was for the early beginning of capitalism. ... The material modes of production, the dispersion of the company’s ownership systems, the expansion of the middle class, the importance of mass communication mechanisms in politics, the multiple forms of societies’ mobilization, are signs of difference that do not let reduce the analysis of capitalism to what is proposed by classic authors. On the other hand, if the best analytical understandings draw attention to

problems such as unemployment, marginalization and increase in inequality, they do not get to the point of clearly proposing global political solutions that lead to a higher level of equality, to more jobs. The classical problem of combination between market expansion and exclusion does not have global solutions as has been demonstrated, by the way, by the historical experience of liberal and social-democrat formulas” (Cardoso, 1997a: 82-83).

Globalisation, then, is such a comprehensive concept that it becomes abstract if its nature fails to be specified. This happens, Cardoso states, because the term is used by different people to explain facts of a completely different nature. Even when it refers to economic issues, it is associated with a variety of phenomena which, instead of clarifying, make its understanding more difficult. According to Cardoso (1997b:11-13) it is possible to specify some of its characteristics:

- a) increasing expansion of international financial flows and their impact on national economies’ monetary and foreign exchange policies, in which the virtually free movement of large volumes of capital creates, at the same time, opportunities and risks.
- b) expansion of international trade flows, with the result that “final products, especially those with a higher percentage of technology, can hardly be said to have been made in one country alone.”
- c) international trade in intermediate goods among industrial plants of the same company, in which “Countries are singled out to receive investments from these corporations based on the general table of comparative advantages they offer.”
- d) competition among countries for foreign investments, especially among developing countries creating a reality quite different from that of the 1960s and 1970s when

countries “found it necessary to impose controls and restrictions in order to discipline, in their markets, transnational companies’ activities.”

- e) increasing uniformity of the institutional and regulatory framework, such as international standards for intellectual ownership rights and for investment rules: “Issues that, in the past, were considered as internal matters of each country are now subject to multilateral rules”.
- f) evolution in the method of production, which has completely changed the notion of comparative advantages among countries, because “the competitive position of a country in relation to the others is, more and more, determined by the quality of its human resources, by knowledge, by science and technology applied to production. .. Due to this irreversible trend, the success of Southern countries is unlikely to derive, on an exclusive basis, from cheap labor and natural resources.”

Against this background Cardoso draws attention to the impact on the prevailing ideas that have given shape and content to explanations of the world:

The extraordinary changes that have occurred from 1989 on, among them the acceleration of the effects of globalisation, have revealed the limits of this century’s hegemonic theories and ideologies. And this does not apply to Marxism alone. Both classic liberalism (due to the transformations in the theory of comparative advantages) and social democracy (that is critiqued by the exhaustion of the welfare state) have required radical reformulations yet to be completed. Of course, the historical perspectives available to their founders were different, presuming certain forms of dialectic between the

internal and the external and even of relations between capital and labor, which do not exist anymore (Cardoso, 1997c: 27).

In these circumstances, Cardoso argues that traditional leftist concerns about social justice and equality remain unchanged, but should be considered while taking into account these transformations. As regards capital, these concern the strategic position of pension and investment funds (Cardoso, 1997c: 27), and the obsolescence of the visionary entrepreneur who controls the whole productive process. In the process of privatization of the Brazilian economy, pension funds turned out to be major investors, and their managers have gained considerable power in terms of options of where and how to invest. It must be said that most pension funds have originated in public companies. This, from Cardoso's viewpoint, raises a question: "how to speak, today, clearly, about the 'exploitation' of capitalism, the realization of the 'surplus-value' in the classic marxist sense, if a significant number of workers become partners of capitalism? Doubtless, there are specific groups of workers who have managed to gain better ways of access to capital precisely because they were able to organize themselves in a modern way" (ibid: 28).

Another change in the modern character of capital is the mobility of international financial flows and their impact on national economies' monetary and foreign exchange policies. In this respect, Cardoso ends by saying that "it's more and more difficult to find out where capital come from and, especially, what are the plans of the managers who manipulate them. The analysis of the final destination of profits and their beneficiaries also becomes a complex issue." But, he says, this does not mean that one should take a passive stance in view of that volatile flow of capitals. On the contrary, this "internationalization of flows deserves international arrangements to discipline them" (Cardoso, 1997c: 29). The

global regulation of capital flows replaces national developmentalism as a realistic objective intended to produce a level of social justice within a global capitalist economy.

Concerning changes in the realm of labor, Cardoso makes a comparison between the conception of the classic theory of economy that conceived labour – capital – land as the three factors of production and what these three factors mean to the modern productive process. In that theory, Cardoso says, the factor labour had a static characteristic and technology was directly associated with the factor capital and not with labour. However

currently, as production has become more 'knowledge intensive' he who holds that knowledge, much more than the company, is the worker himself. A significant example of this is Silicon Valley, in the USA, that has grown thanks to knowledge and not to capital, that arrived later. Although this is a rather schematic example, it is useful to illustrate the point that I wanted to highlight: in Marx's terminology, the variable capital grows in importance with relation to the constant capital, as the productive process becomes more knowledge intensive (Cardoso, 1997c: 29).

The process of modernization of the productive system through knowledge intensity generates two changes in the characteristics of labour. Firstly, knowledge has become a factor of qualification, when it comes to labour. There is a shortage of qualified and high quality labour on the market in comparison with the relative abundance of capital circulating around the globalised system. So, in relation to developing countries Cardoso adds that the

comparative advantage that peripheral countries would have due to cheap and abundant labour has practically disappeared. Or, more precisely, it is

concentrated on the most modern sectors of the economy. This strengthens the difficulty of dealing with internal differences in developing complex countries, like ours. It is necessary to combine public policies that preserve modern and competitive areas according to international standards with a permanent effort to incorporate the backward sectors, which are labour intensive (ibid: 29).

In these circumstances the classic proletariat is reshaped as the tertiary sector grows in significance, and the structure of opportunity which individuals experience changes, with significant social and political consequences. In addition, the role of the state has to change. Thus “globalisation means that the external variables have begun to have added influence on domestic agendas, reducing the space available for national choices. (...) the requirements for external competitiveness have caused the state’s institutional and regulating aspects to become more homogeneous and such requirements have left a narrower margin of manoeuvre for highly differentiated national strategies in regard to, among other things, labour and macroeconomic policy” (Cardoso, 1997b: 13). Secondly, State actions begin to depend on international public opinion as well as on market behaviour. We thought in the 1960s, Cardoso says, about the structural effects of insertion which, today, have become more complex and to which has been added the possibility of conjunctural effects of extraordinary impact. This phenomenon is captured in the idea of the “omnipresence of flows” studied by Manuel Castells, not only economic and financial, but rather comprehensive, encompassing modes of behaviour and cultural and information movements (Cardoso, 1995b: 53). An example of this situation is that “news begins to spread that a certain country is having trouble to control its budgetary deficit or that it is

going to raise interest rates in the near future and, based on this news, the international financial markets make decisions that may have a real impact on the country at issue” (Cardoso, 1997b: 14). It happened in January 1999 when Brazil was hit by an international crisis out of its control. Because of this, states cannot choose differentiated development strategies, cannot adopt heterodox macroeconomic policies or rigid formulas concerning capital and labour. Hence, it is important for governments to know how to “search in contradictions and inconsistencies as well as in opportunities of the system that is being developed, strategies able to strengthen the priority of national interest, to strengthen the vocation of countries like ours to self-determination and, above all, to consolidate our capacity to influence on the building of the future” (Cardoso, 1997c: 34).

Thirdly, globalisation has changed the role of the State concerning its governmental action. States now should focus on the task of making it possible for national economies to develop and maintain structural conditions of competitiveness on a global level. This implies, according to Cardoso, a kind of “State able to funnel its investments into areas vital for improving the country’s competitive position, such as infrastructure and essential public services, among them education and health; a State ready to transfer to the private sector companies which will be better run by it; finally, a State where public servants may meet people’s demands for better services” (Cardoso, 1997b: 14). The State’s mission in this context is to steer development, rather than to replace the private sector in the supply of goods and services. To that end, Cardoso states, in the Brazilian case, it is necessary to rebuild the State, taking it out from the autarchic model of the past to a model which takes the national economy to a full integration with the world trade and investments flows (Cardoso, 1997b: 15).

In Cardoso's view, this has nothing to do with neo-liberalism's idea of the minimal state: We are not abolishing the State in the name of what is often referred to as neoliberalism, a doctrine of laissez-faire whereby the market can do what it likes. Not at all, absolutely not. This is a quite different matter: How can the citizenry control the public sector? We need clear rules. That's what is happening now. We're privatizing the state-owned enterprises and at the same time creating a system of regulation to prevent what has happened in other countries where privatization without regulation has led to the emergence of monopolies and sky-high tariffs. Secondly, that change in the State's profile points to changes in the social issue also. The State is investing more in this area but must also invest in close cooperation with society in health, education, social security and the countryside. In education, we're decentralizing, transferring powers to states and municipalities. For this to be done, it is necessary to bring to an end the old structure of the state used by private interests, in other words, we have to destroy old clientelistic habits, the system of patronage controlled by parties and politicians. That can be done by defining priorities for budgetary appropriations.

The State, in this new context, should be the promoter of more equitable opportunities. Its size cannot be defined a priori, based on ideological options for being for or against the market. The size of the State will be the size necessary for a good performance of its social role. The State needs to be redefined, its priorities democratically redrawn to be able to keep up pace with the imperatives dictated by a knowledge intensive mode of production (Cardoso, 1997d: 79).

Finally, globalisation leads to a change in the State's orientation towards regional integration. The European Union is a classical example. But Southern hemisphere countries are also going through a process of integration, in the recognition that "the globalisation of

the productive system is an irrefutable reality, with repercussions at all levels of present life. Interdependency becomes deeper and regional integration speeds up. Globalisation and regionalism should not be, under any circumstance, contradictory impulses. They are sides of the same coin that point to market expansion and to the enlarged scale of productive structures. To harmonize these movements, however, multilateral organisms play a decisive role" (Cardoso, 1995c).

Thus Cardoso's perspective on globalization continues to reflect the orientation of his analysis of dependency. There are complex options which cannot longer be resolved, just like that, by an ideological formula. In the light of that complexity, the public administrator's capacity to make the right decision when it comes to the external conjuncture counts more than any other capacity. The state is still an obligatory reference as a tool to organize political transformations. It is precisely the recognition that there are 'limits' to the market that allows, Cardoso says, developing countries, to act politically in defence of their national interests. Nevertheless, the way of acting, of regulating the process of globalisation, varies from developing country to developing country. "Whether we want it or not, economic globalisation is a new international order. We need to accept that fact with sense of realism; otherwise, our actions will be deprived of any effective impact. This does not mean political inertia, but a completely new perspective about the ways of acting on the international scene" (Cardoso, 1997c: 36).

The objective remains, therefore, to assess the range of political alternatives against the background of a realistic assessment of the scope for choice:

When I wrote my books about the theory of dependency, the hypothesis was that development was negatively conditioned by the international capitalist

process. It did not prevent it, but it made it unjust and unequal. To many, autarchic economic models were a likely form of defence against an international integration considered risky and dangerous. That view has changed. We must admit that the participation in global economy may turn out to be positive, that the international system is not necessarily hostile. But, you have to be careful when it comes to make good use of opportunities (Cardoso, 1997b: 17).

This balanced attitude arises from the fact that globalisation has two faces: one of opportunities, one of risks. The world today, Cardoso says, may be divided into the regions or countries which participate in the process of globalisation and enjoy its fruits and those which do not take part in it. The former are usually associated with the idea of progress, wealth, better living standards; the latter, with exclusion, marginalization, misery:

It's true that globalisation has opened a window of opportunities to allow more countries to join the world economy. The Asian Tigers and even Japan are significant examples. These countries have known how to take advantages of opportunities given by world economy by enforcing a set of policies that include, among others, the development of a skilled and qualified labour force, a significant increase in the domestic savings rate and the implementation of models focused on exports and based on State's selective intervention in some sectors (ibid: 18).

It is necessary to think deeply, in this context, about the consequences of the "ethical vaccum that has been generated by market idolatry and stimulated by revolutionary utopias." It is necessary, Cardoso insists, to seriously reflect on how globalisation, that

signals an era of unheard-of prosperity in history – a new Renaissance - may be oriented to meet the demand for equity called for by four fifths of mankind who suffer from misery and sickness. How to reinvent the sense of community in the international sphere, to avoid social exclusion and marginalization? How to strengthen the social responsibility of cultural and economic elites? (ibid: 43). As we shall see in the following chapters, these questions, derived from a method of analysis pursued consistently over forty years, continue to orient Cardoso's political action.

A comparison between the analyses of dependency and globalisation

From the viewpoint of the approach we have adopted, a methodological convergence between Cardoso's interpretation of dependency in the 1960s and 1970s, and what is currently called globalisation has been verified. Two phenomena that occurred in different historical periods are interpreted intellectually from the same methodological premise (historic-structural and dialectical) that emphasizes a concern to search for the specificity of the phenomenon instead of generalizing a presumed explanation to it.

Starting from the identification of the specificity of dependency, Cardoso analyzes, based on his historical-cultural conception, the conditions of transformations of those specific social situations. He does so because the specification of a given situation of dependency is intended to make it possible to investigate the possibilities of transformation of that same situation. He rejects the belief in the mechanical conditioning of the internal (or national) political-social situation by external domination, and the contrary idea that everything is historical contingency.

As a matter of fact, neither the relation of dependency, in the case of dependent nations, nor 'national underdevelopment' implies that national history inevitably becomes a mere

reflection of changes in the external hegemonic pole, nor are these changes irrelevant to the possible autonomy of national history. There are structural bounds that limit the possibility of action, starting from the material base of production available in a country and from the degree of development of the productive forces, not to mention the way the latter combine themselves with the political and juridical relations internally and with the hegemonic nations. But, at the same time, it is through the action of groups, classes, organizations and social movements in dependent countries that these bonds are perpetuated, transformed or severed. There is, therefore, a peculiar internal dynamic which gives intelligibility to the 'course of events', without whose understanding there is not any possible political science" (Cardoso and Faletto, 1973a: 140-141).

This type of analysis reflects his understanding of relative autonomy, of the presence of contradictions and also of the possibilities of convergence between the economic system and the political process. That is how the so-called "internationalization of the internal market" has been conceived. If we return to Cardoso's assertion that the singularity of this concept mirrors the fact that the "specificity of the present situation of dependency resides in the fact that 'external interests' take roots more and more in the internal market-oriented-production sector (without annulling, for sure, previous forms of domination)", the parallels with his analysis of globalisation are clear. Globalisation, too, is a phenomenon which deepens the internalization of that external variable.

Making a comparison between the 1960s and 1970s and the 1990s, it is evident that over the past few decades, capitalism has become much more complex. But Cardoso has given priority throughout to the internationalization of the productive process, as a reality that has been taking shape over the past few decades.

More than twenty-five years ago, I used the expression “internationalization of markets” to characterize the action of multinational companies in countries such as Brazil, transferring to them, in response to high tariff protection, some of their operations to penetrate those new markets. But, in fact, the process that was going on was more complex: more than a simple internationalization of the market, it was the internationalization of the productive process or, as it is often said, the globalisation of the economy, of the expansion of international trade and capital flows, that has entailed a profound reorganization of the world economic system (Cardoso, 1995d: 86).

Cardoso’s introduction of the concepts of the internationalization of the market and of associated-dependent development involved him in a number of polemics, of the kind that have marked the whole of his intellectual trajectory. He was accused, in particular, of justifying the capitalist system, to which he responds as follows:

I was not justifying anything at all. I was describing an objective process of what is currently called ‘globalisation’. And I said that this situation provoked a change in social relations of production. It created a working class, a new middle class, it changed society. It was a different relationship from selling raw materials and importing industrialized goods. At that time I argued with the left – communist, guevarist, etc. – for whom there would only be changes with revolution. I used to say: ‘a change is underway and there is no revolution. And there is change with development’. In this

picture, which were the dependency ties? They were technological and financial. This was written in my book from 1966-67 (Cardoso, 1998i: 83).

Cardoso identifies a clear continuity, then, between his analyses of dependency and globalisation. And just as he drew from his analysis of dependency the conclusion that the first requirement for an effective political strategy in conditions of dependency is a realistic assessment of the structural limits imposed by global capitalism and an accurate analysis of its transformations, so he continues to take as a starting point the real constraints of integration in a subordinate role in the global capitalist economy. His work on dependency, appropriately for the time, drew attention to the obsolete character of much of the analysis – favoured by Debray (1967) and others – of the social and economic limits of primary production for export in the countryside. Countering this, Cardoso and Faletto drew attention to a complex and dynamic process based upon a form of industrialization, but one which had neither the character nor the effects of industrialisation in Europe in earlier periods. Against this background, his analysis of globalization has the character of an updating of dependency theory to take account of the evolution of the global economy in the last quarter of the twentieth century. If anything, the dependence of national economies on the logic and dynamics of the global system is accentuated. In each country, foreign exchange rules, interest rates and all other economic measures work with an eye on the speculative market. Before the risks of that financial market, Cardoso concludes:

If I were director of ECLA, I would stop everything else, and concentrate on a study of the likely ways of disciplining the new flows of international capital and their wild fluctuations. The Bretton Woods system does not work

any more. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are insufficient to solve the problems (Cardoso, 1998i: 76)

In this respect Cardoso acknowledges that, to paraphrase Marx, a new phantom haunts the world – the phantom of speculative capital. With the same approach he adopted to interpret the relation of dependency in the 1970s, characterizing dependency under a new paradigm that led to a redefinition of some interpretations of imperialism and underdevelopment, Cardoso now interprets the phenomenon of globalisation. From his viewpoint, globalisation is not a “phantom” which may be attacked with a national-level policy. Countries are now more “dependent” on what is going on in the world, not only concerning the definition of their projects of development but also the daily management of the national economy (Cardoso, 1995g: 136). The criticism of globalisation, in these circumstances, has to be global. It is necessary, to take account of the risks and opportunities that it presents, to build new institutions so that, putting things on a basis of utopia, globalisation might be controlled by a world government (Cardoso, 1998i: 87).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have sought to identify the continuity in Cardoso’s analytical method from the time of the Marx Seminar which started in 1958. From that time forward, he has developed and practiced a method of analysis which seeks to avoid the rigid formulations of alternative approaches, whether based or not on supposedly Marxist principles, and to identify both the character and the potential for transformation of social structures in the modern world. Central to this approach is a concern to identify contradictions and tensions in complex ensembles of structures (totalities), in order to identify the scope for human agency that can simultaneously be scientific in approach, and utopian in its commitment to

and quest for equality and social justice. This gives rise to a second feature, the effort to avoid a separation or cut between the world of “scientific praxis” and the world of politics and history. In this sense, we can identify some characteristics of Cardoso’s thinking which link scientific production and activity in the political sphere - even when at this level the characteristics are more problematic than those in the realm of academic reflection.

These characteristics can be found throughout his work, but especially in his first major work, on capitalism and slavery in southern Brazil. The fundamental principles of his method, as first outlined there, are:

- 1) a heuristic dialectical method where the notion of totality is used to interpret reality;
- 2) a continued focus on the singularity of the historical structural process - whenever possible, with the utilization of an empirical base;
- 3) a triple focus on the historical process, social structure and social change;
- 4) a constant effort to estimate the correlation of political forces among the actors who lead and develop the social transformation; and
- 5) an insistence on the relationship between critical (scientific) reflection and social and political praxis.

We may return at this point, then, to the third quotation highlighted at the beginning of this chapter:

What is [my method]? What do I do? Normally, in the first place it is indeed dialectical, it is clearly of dialectical inspiration, and I always spoke of it as historical-structural. You can see that whenever I want to explain something ... I resort to history, I show a process. I show a process, although I think that there do exist regularities, structures, I take much less interest in the

structure and much more in the change of the structure, in what arises. ... I should say that I do it almost instinctively, I don't even have to think about it. But if you look at what I have written, *Capitalism and Slavery*, what I have written about the problem of Brazil's industrial development and about the formation of the bourgeoisie in Brazil, what I have written about dependency in Latin America and the way I analyse globalisation today, they are the same. The method, the perspective is the same (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

On the basis of the analysis presented in this chapter, this is demonstrated to be an accurate representation of Cardoso's intellectual trajectory, and justifies, as regards his method of analysis, his claim to consistency:

in the 60s, I wrote that book about dependency which is the contrary of what they say today that I wrote. In other words, it was an attempt to say things similar to what I say today about globalisation. I used to say the following: there is not only one dependency; there are different forms of dependency, according to how the external component is bound up with the internal one. Here, there's a dynamics which is internal, which is liable to change the external. This is what I used to say, with Faletto, about dependency, against others who said the contrary, in a rather mechanical way. They said that the political superstructure was conditioned by the economic infrastructure, in a vulgar marxist manner and so that there was no autonomy without socialism. This is not what I used to say, I used to say that there may be several forms of development (Cardoso and Soares, 1998a: 51-52).

On the basis of this analysis, Cardoso may be seen as committed to the pursuit of a *realistic utopia* – an objective that may be said to have guided him throughout his academic and political life. As we shall see in the following chapters, this perspective first led him to advocate the possibility of liberal democracy in conditions of dependency, and has recently led him to advocate, and to seek to bring about, the radicalisation of democracy in conditions of globalization.

CHAPTER 3

Democracy

When I returned to Brazil in the 70s, I formulated another concept of associated-dependent development. I said that there was dependency but with development, I insisted on development. There is development and not stagnation. Because the analysis of others is: socialism is needed because there will always be a dictatorship here. Even O'Donnell in his books about the authoritarian regime, has an implicit mechanicism. He considered the authoritarian regimes as a necessary phase of capitalist accumulation in the periphery. Not me. We said, no, here there can be democracy, it's not necessary to have socialism, I mean, either socialism or fascism, the thesis of Teotônio dos Santos. I say: nothing like that. We can have democracy. Democracy was the theme we took up in the 1970s and the 1980s. In the 1970s there was a lot of struggle against the regime. In the 1980s there was the open defence of democracy, the institutionalisation of democracy.

I said, "There is a transformation of relations of production going on here. This transformation is being pushed forward by capitalist development. A capitalism that is not that of the countries of the centre, but, still, is sufficiently strong to bring about a massive transformation." Then the people who criticized me said, "Well, this is a rationalization for the military regime." I said, "No, I think there has to be a struggle for democracy. Because the military regime is not necessary for this transformation and democratization is possible." And the others thought that no, that we needed to overthrow the military regime and go directly to socialism. And that's what we went on to defend – many of us, Weffort too, many others, who had positions different to mine, as regarded many issues, on that we were the same. Democracy came to be seen as a value, it was instrumental: "democracy, then afterwards, who-knows-what." No, no. Democracy as a permanent value, and a thing that was desirable, not instrumental. So that was taken on during the 1970s, and more clearly, in the 1980s (interview with the author, 28 July 1998).

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Cardoso has consistently held the view over three decades that democracy is both possible and desirable in Brazil, and to establish what he understands by the term. I begin by discussing his critique of dependency theorists who argued in the 1960s and 1970s that Brazil faced a choice between socialism and fascism, because democracy was impossible. I then offer a detailed analysis of his debate with O'Donnell over the question of the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian state', showing that Cardoso insisted that democracy

was viable in the conditions of associated-dependent development discussed in the previous chapter. I then trace his commitment to democracy in the context of globalisation. Finally, I summarise what Cardoso understands by democracy, recognising his acceptance of the importance of representative liberal democracy, but identifying two related themes – of substantive democracy and the ‘radicalisation of democracy’ – which go beyond a commitment to representative liberal democracy. Cardoso’s treatment of democracy as a specific topic reflects the methodological approach sketched out in the previous chapter – in the context of dependency and of globalisation, he seeks to argue the case for advancing the idea of democratization within a context of economic constraints. In both cases, history and social structure do not place absolute limits on political choice. The purpose of historical-structural analysis is to identify the opportunities for change, and eliminate impossible options, and on that basis democracy is identified as a possible option. At the same time, it requires purposive action over a long period to bring it about. In the closing sections of the chapter, I shall identify throughout Cardoso’s work from the 1970s onwards themes and preoccupations that parallel concerns addressed by Habermas, as a prelude to their extended treatment in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

The Politics of Dependency

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Cardoso develops his concept of democracy by showing the economic basis of society as a dynamic factor, and trying to show the connections established between economy, society and politics in different historical moments and structural situations (Cardoso and Falleto, 1973a: 7). That is why he criticizes some interpretations that exclude democracy as an alternative, seeing only the polarization “socialism” or “fascism”. For him, on the contrary, the nature of associated and dependent development created conditions to make the issue of democracy a realistic utopia to be built from the standpoint of a dynamic political economy.

In a paper that is a classic today (Cardoso, 1973c), he listed some ill-conceived hypotheses among Latin American analyses of dependency theory: the notion of imperialism and the alternatives ranging between “socialism” or fascism”. According to Cardoso, this vision of the alternatives was due to the mistake of some analyses in failing to recognize empirical facts pointing towards an associated, albeit dependent development on the periphery of capitalism. On this analysis, in these countries there seemed to be a choice between either a revolutionary outbreak to allow for the development of productive forces and the egalitarian development of society or the implantation of fascist regimes as a in-built need of capitalism to continue its process of capital accumulation.

Cardoso invokes Marx to show that market dynamization is not the result of competition between workers leading to a growing reduction in the labour force (variable capital), but that the capitalist system is based on what Marx called the “tendency to raise the organic rate of capital composition” (constant capital), i.e., on the frequent introduction of new technologies to confront competition among the capitalists. It is true that “in certain periods (in the period of initial accumulation) the extension of the workday plays an important role in accumulation (...) After the implantation of an advanced capitalist sector, its dynamic (which in the initial phase might have benefited from labor reserves and poverty pockets) does not depend on the development of underdevelopment, but, on the contrary, depends of the real creation of a capitalist consumer market. This market is not comprised only of what workers spend but also of consumption by capitalists and, especially, business, the State and the classes connected to the tertiary sector (Cardoso, 1973c: 32).

The need to over-exploit workers and the loss of any historical role for the local bourgeoisie, a phenomenon commanded by the unilateral interests of foreign capital, would lead to this imaginary scenario in which the only choice was between socialism and fascism, which would certainly be so if reality responded to the convenience of concepts. Reality, however, is not so. What no longer played any important role, according to Cardoso, was the “ideology of national

bourgeois development”, used widely in populist appeals but not by the national bourgeoisie. This hypothesis harks back to Cardoso’s work (1964) on the national business class and economic development, wherein he criticised that the national bourgeoisie functioned as a propeller for economic progress.

We need to recall that Cardoso showed that the bourgeoisie’s real behaviour was never on the side of reformists’ proposals with respect to changes in the structure of landholding as a determining factor in the expansion of the internal market; neither did it favour the strengthening of local decision-making centres, nor did it oppose the penetration of foreign capital – because these were not its real interests. Rather, these did not correspond to the interests of the local bourgeoisie as it effectively functioned, but to the interests of a national-populist ideology. In fact, the bourgeoisie which corresponded to the ideas of national-populism was an ideological fiction as the military coup of 1964 would soon confirm. The supposed national character of the local bourgeoisie would transmute into a character subordinated to international interests in an associated and independent way. This association took on a multiplicity of forms inside the State, depending on the situation and the power relations, such as bureaucratic-authoritarian, the “circles of bureaucracy” of this local bourgeoisie with the bureaucracy, and technocracy.

His criticism, since the 1960s, of mechanical and deterministic thinking in general, and in particular of the idea of a growing polarization in Latin American society, in which dependency forced a choice between fascism or socialism, is illustrative of a general characteristic of his thinking. It is also particularly significant in the context of his analysis of the viability of democracy. His conclusions at the time with regard to political alternatives in Brazil and Latin America reflect what he would later describe as “faith in the conjuncture” (Cardoso, 1978c:58). At the basis of his disagreement with Regis Debrary and with ‘theorists of dependency’ such as Gunder Frank (1967) and Mauro Marini (1978) was a methodological difference, of the kind identified in the previous chapter:

I always refused to say “dependency theory.” Why? Because I was afraid of a mechanistic perspective. What happened? So to speak, dependency became a Frankenstein. I even used the term “Frankenstein”, on account of Gunder Frank, who is my friend, but who had a very mechanical view of things. And it became a Frankenstein, and they attribute to me what is not mine, what is his, Rui Mauro Marini’s, who saw dependency as a strait-jacket. I never saw it that way. We studied situations of dependency, and insisted that they changed (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Cardoso’s application of democratic theory to the particular circumstances of Latin America begins by criticizing the belief that since peripheral countries are structurally dependent, their future must be economic stagnation and authoritarianism, with no possibility for industrial development or representative democracy. Even if his ideas were born out of confrontation with analyses of Latin America, his concern was concentrated on the viability of democracy in Brazil. His theory seeks to take account of the economic transformations happening in Brazilian society, and observe their reflections in the relationship between the State and the society and its various ideological manifestations to interpret the framework of democratic possibilities through political parties, civil society and social movements.

His concern, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is to show the dynamism of peripheral industrialization, not the stagnation of the export model. He showed that, contrary to conventional thought, the attribution of anti-imperialist interests to the Brazilian bourgeoisie did not correspond to the facts. This bourgeoisie, rather than allying itself with workers in the struggle for industrialization, against foreign capital and land concentration, “was satisfied with its role as a minor partner of capitalism and the advance guard of agriculture” abnegating its role of hegemonic power in society. With the unfolding of the 1964 coup, with its economic expansion cycle in the context of authoritarianism, it seemed that unilateral facts would defeat dialectics. Debray (considered further in Chapter Five) was not alone in identifying socialist

revolution as the only alternative, not just for Brazil but for the continent as a whole. For him, and for others such as Gunder Frank and Mauro Marini, the alternatives were that either a socialist revolution would allow for the growth of productive forces, or a fascist state would be imposed to protect the process of capitalist accumulation. Utilizing the same analytical method that explained the contradictions of the paradox of capitalism and slavery, and the latter's end, making room for an industrialized economy that required a market of free workers for waged work, Cardoso uses the heuristic dialectical method of interpretation to argue for the possibility of democracy as a consequence of the nature of dependent capitalism.

The general argument behind this perspective was that rigid and mechanistic thinking was to be avoided, but at the same time that not all options are socially feasible, since options are socially constituted and in the process of their constitution the social struggle singles out among defined alternatives those that impose themselves through the social process. At the time of writing *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Cardoso and Faletto had rejected the socialist option as unrealistic, and Cardoso had long before argued (in *Industrial Entrepreneurs and Economic Development in Brazil*) that the orthodox left idea of a progressive alliance between the working class and a developmentally-minded national bourgeoisie was no longer viable, precisely because the growing presence of international capital and the incipient process of internationalization of the market was pushing domestic capital into a reactionary alliance with foreign capital, against the working class. Their conclusions at this point regarding the range of political options were guarded, reflecting their focus on creativity within carefully analyzed structural constraints, but not stating an unequivocal confidence in the prospects for democracy. The final chapter of the book, written at the end of the 1960s, concluded as follows:

The basic economic conditions of development are an open market, the exclusion of the dependent economies from the markets of the most developed countries, and the continuous transfer of new units of external capital in the form of advanced technology, which are more appropriate to the needs of the mature

economies than to those of the relatively backward economies. The combination of these conditions with the ideologies and legal relations among social groups makes possible "industrial economies in dependent societies." Whether the structural barriers to development remain or are overcome will be determined by how these economic conditions are used in the power game rather than by the particular economic conditions themselves. In this sense we suggest that present or potential opposition may vitalize the industrialized and dependent countries of Latin America. There are structural possibilities for various types of social and political movements. The course of history depends largely on the daring of those who propose to act in terms of historically viable goals. We do not try to place theoretical limits on the probable course of future events. These will depend, not on academic predictions, but on collective action guided by political wills that make work what is structurally barely possible (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 175-176).

The politics of associated-dependent development

It is possible to detect in the conclusion to *Dependency and Development*, in embryonic form, a commitment to the possibility of liberal democracy in conditions of dependency. But it was only in the early 1970s that Cardoso moved towards a clear conclusion that democracy and dependency were compatible. The key development which permitted this, in conceptual terms, was the working out of the idea of associated-dependent development. The idea that the price paid by the capitalist system for development in a context of unequal income distribution is an increase in civil liberties and the need for legitimization through participation comes from the fact that the system needs technical progress, which in turn requires the expansion of the education and communications systems. This leads Cardoso to the conviction that authoritarianism cannot serve as a stable basis for capitalist expansion and reproduction.

Education and a growing level of information circulating freely in different sections of society hamper the consolidation of a closed, politically exclusive system. The primary context in which his position emerged was in his protracted debate with the Argentine social scientist Guillermo O'Donnell, who had advanced the concept of the 'bureaucratic-authoritarian state'. It is therefore essential to dwell at some length on the debate between the two. Thus, first, we will expound O'Donnell's hypothesis and then present Cardoso's anti-thesis about the viability of democracy in dependent countries.

O'Donnell shared Cardoso's view that dependency in Latin America was compatible with economic and industrial development, but took the view that it gave rise to a permanent new alliance between domestic and foreign capital and the State which excluded the popular masses (Evans, 1979). This, he argued, led to a new form of state – the bureaucratic-authoritarian state – which should be understood as a consequence of dependent development, and as an enduring feature of the politics of the most advanced states of the region. Having developed this idea in relation to the military takeovers in Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s, he was confirmed in this view when military dictatorships were established in 1973 in Chile and Uruguay (the two most urbanised and socially developed states in the region, with the longest experience of democracy).

For O'Donnell (1979: 292-293), the main features of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state were

- 1) its main social base was the upper oligopolists and the transnational bourgeoisie;
- 2) institutionally, it was formed by organizations made up of "specialists" in coercive policies and in the "normalization" of the economy;
- 3) it promoted a pattern of capitalist accumulation in the interests of the oligopolist capital and some sectors of the state;
- 4) it promoted the transnationalization of the productive structure, resulting in a stronger de-nationalization of the society;

- 5) it was based on the political exclusion of a popular sector, that had formerly mobilized and was very active on the political scene, with the aim of constructing an “order” of normalization and of “transnationalizing” the economy;
- 6) it excluded the political mediation of citizenship and any trace of democratic institutions in order to eliminate any appeal to “the people” or to class;
- 7) it sought a complete de-politicization of social issues, which complemented the prohibition of an appeal to class or the people; and
- 8) political access was restricted to military groups and to the representatives of oligopolists.

O'Donnell's analysis, as the above summary suggests, derived a definition of a form of state somewhat mechanically from a global characterisation of economic and social relationships which are themselves understood as fixed. To understand Cardoso's counter-position and the reasons that made him the leading theoretician of the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in Brazil, using it as linchpin for an alternative project for the country, it is necessary to consider the fundamentals of the theoretical discussion that he used as background. Besides this background, it is important to stress Cardoso's insistence on taking into consideration the dynamic interplay between politics and economics in his analysis. The key text in this connection is Cardoso's contribution to the collection on *Authoritarian Brazil* edited by Alfred Stepan at Yale in 1973 on the basis of papers first presented in 1971 – at the height of the dictatorship in Brazil. Without a nuanced analysis of the relationship between economics and politics, Cardoso argues, the analysis would either slide into economic determinism or into political voluntarism, as he notes with the analyses of Celso Furtado, Helio Jaguaribe and Cândido Mendes:

I argue that these interpretations give overly static, mechanistic views of the relationship between the economy and the polity. They err either on the side of excessive economic determinism, which does not take into consideration the full

implication of "associate-dependent development," or on the side of excessive political voluntarism, which does not take into consideration any economic constraints on political elites or sufficiently consider internal contradictions within the political elite (Cardoso, 1973b: 143).

For Cardoso, then, the process of democratization does not occur in abstract, but is closely related to the character of the industrialization process in the Brazilian case, recognizing a kind of dependent economic development associated to international capital and the creation of a society which showed increasing signs of modernization of its productive base. Rather than debating whether the military movement of 1964 was a "coup" or a "revolution", Cardoso seeks to analyze the dynamic process by which a new form of national political power and new international economic forces have interacted and resulted in the emergence of what he called "associated-dependent development" in Brazil. He then examines the dynamic interrelationship between politics and the economy as a fundamental basis for a perspective on democracy. Therefore, it is relevant to set out some crucial characteristics of the associated-dependent development model, since this will lead to the roots of Cardoso's concept of democracy. Cardoso says that the phrase was chosen deliberately to combine two notions which have traditionally appeared as separate and contradictory: development and dependence. In his view, changes in the organization of international capital have produced a new international division of labour. The moving forces behind these changes are multinational corporations. Assuming, as it does, the immersion of industrial capital in peripheral economies, the new international division of labor sets in motion a dynamic element in the internal market.

Thus, to some extent, the interest of foreign corporations becomes compatible with the internal prosperity of dependent countries. In this sense, they help promote development. Because of this factor, the growth of multinational corporations requires a reformulation of the traditional view of economic imperialism, which holds that the basic relationship between a developed capitalist country and an underdeveloped country is one of extractive exploitation that perpetuates

stagnation. Today, massive investment of foreign capital aimed at manufacturing and selling consumer goods to the growing middle and upper classes is consistent with, and indeed dependent upon, fairly rapid economic growth in at least some crucial sectors of the dependent country. Development, in this situation depends on technological, financial, organizational and market connections, that only multinational corporations can assure (ibid: 143-150). After a detailed critique of the contemporary analyses of Furtado and Jaguaribe, Cardoso offers the following diagnosis, which is representative of the method sketched out in the previous chapter:

The model of associated-dependent development does have a dynamic character. It does allow for economic growth and social mobility, at least for the urban-industrial sector. Undoubtedly it does not prevent class attrition, it does most certainly have a "marginalizing" effect, and it does not reduce inequality; on the contrary, it is based on concentration of income and increasing relative misery. The task of the informed critic is not to deny or obscure these characteristics of the associated-dependent model of development. Instead, he must take them both fully into consideration to make realistic assessments and identify the social groups that might be able to carry through an alternative model (ibid: 157).

In the "realistic assessments" that followed, Cardoso first rejected the anachronistic politics of the left, then sketched out the potential for democracy. Recognizing the existence of some "pre-revolutionary" elements of the situation in Brazil in 1964, he nevertheless concluded that the strategy of populist alliance had failed:

The state seemed to be in partial decomposition, and the level of mobilization might have reached a point where the existing capabilities of the political system would have been unable to control it. Yet, it is quite unlikely that the final outcome would have been a fundamental social revolution, given the lack of adequate means to achieve it: clearly defined goals, a nonopportunistic strategy

on the part of left-wing groups prevailing at the moment – in short, organization to capitalize for its own benefit on the decomposition of the state apparatus. The populist alliance through which some sort of attempt was made to bring together the masses, middle-class groups, and the national entrepreneurs was itself dependent on the state. It was caught up in a web of interests and relationships ultimately based on an economic foundation that was not only intrinsically nonrevolutionary, but also backward. Furthermore, one of the structural anchorages of that alliance was the nonincorporation of the rural population, leaving it politically unorganized and economically overexploited. This made it possible to count on the support of the conservative clientelistic parties, particularly the Social Democratic party (PSD) (ibid: 160-161).

He then addresses the military regime, describing it as “relatively stable,” but stating at the same time that

It is true that the regime has been able to generate effective policies and to keep order. It has not, however, solved its fundamental problems, particularly those of a political nature. It has not devised a means to broaden and firmly establish its legitimacy in the society at large (ibid: 171).

Sticking to the line of “realistic assessment” Cardoso rejects the possibility of a move towards democracy from within the regime, and the efficacy of “outside opposition,” to conclude as follows:

A long march awaits the Brazilians, a slow, patient march, before the nation will be able to be rebuilt politically for a people whose symbols, organizations and hopes were crushed by the same power elite which, from the heights of its vision of the state and the nation, thought that, launching an autocratic process of development, it would bring the country one step closer to a regime of

reconciliation. We have all paid the price of this elitist vision. It is to be hoped, at least, that the intellectuals will not invent other myths, whether Nasserist or not, which are as incapable as the present ones of producing viable policies for the participation of the popular classes in politics. Without this participation, any "technical" formula for mass mobilization will lead to mass manipulation, and perhaps to an increase in the accumulation of wealth, but will not bring about political development favoring the majority and increasing the quality of life (ibid: 175-176).

From this point on, then, Cardoso was himself to embark upon the "slow, patient march" that would lead him into the MDB and eventually to the presidency. He had reached the firm conclusion that the authoritarian regimes of the period were in principle vulnerable to democratic opposition from below, and that successful opposition would come over a long period of self-organisation of civil society:

In the abstract, the task of repression and assuring apathy is feasible. But it has a high cost and this task cannot always be accomplished in keeping with the other aims of western industrialized societies, for instance, creating a technocratic and cultured elite, and expanding the educational system for this purpose. To do all this simultaneously it is necessary to have a mystique, new values, a new party, etc., which, at least on the formal plane, would deny the separation of order for the majority and abundance for a minority. The price that an unequal distribution of income, the fruits of labor and technological progress pays in the western world is more freedom and a legitimized ideal of participation which, in turn, try to correct the exaggerated concentrations. Without the real and total closure of a country to the ideological currents of the outside world (including capitalist world), over-exploitation and political apathy are as inconsistent as internal war without cold war. Criticism sprouts everywhere, not because there

are groups disseminating insidious subversion in the universities and at work places, but because the contradictions between proclaimed ideals and actual practice end up being disseminated by life itself, naturally with the aid of the media, technical personnel, students, priests, workers, intellectuals, etc, even housewives (Cardoso, 1974: 10).

By the late 1970s, O'Donnell too came to believe that there was a fundamental problem with the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, in that it lacked any basis for legitimation and therefore needed to rely upon coercion. This circumstance derived from the form of domination that the authoritarian-bureaucratic state set in motion, utilizing the most severe forms of political exclusion. By the very nature of its origin, by the manner in which it was constituted, this form of state brought with it a prior rejection of the social base, its own legitimation. Its weaknesses are therefore weaknesses of origin, as a result of which

BA cannot but appear as the transparent conjunction of coercion and economic domination (O'Donnell, 1979: 299).

As we have seen, this merely echoed a position Cardoso had adopted earlier in the decade. But O'Donnell took too rigid a view of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state to proceed much further with the argument. In the BA (bureaucratic-authoritarian) model, O'Donnell argues, the state is fundamentally a social relationship of domination aimed at maintaining a class structure that has the objective of assuring and reproducing the capitalist relations of production. Given this character it cannot easily offer either political democracy, which would be based upon a sense of belonging as citizens to a shared political community, or substantive (socio-economic) democracy, which which be based upon an integration of "the people" into its programme and policy concerns. As a result, it cannot become a mechanism for protection of the general interests of the population. The BA state imposes an order that severely punishes political and class organizations which serve as channels for the political activation of the popular sector. The

economic exclusion of this sector and the prohibition against raising issues of substantive justice around the symbols of the people and the class makes it clear that the BA state cannot proclaim the nation as universal because it does not include the popular sector. O'Donnell therefore considers the BA state as a "suboptimal form of bourgeois domination" (O'Donnell, 1979: 309).

The conclusion to which O'Donnell comes on this basis is that in theory the introduction of democracy would resolve the problems of legitimation and presidential succession, but that it would have to be a form of democracy

that achieves the miracle of being all of this and at the same time maintains the exclusion of the popular sector. In particular, it would have to be one that sustains the suppression of invocations in terms of *pueblo* and class. Such suppression presupposes that strict controls of the organizations and political movements of the popular sector are maintained, as well as controls over the forms of permissible discourse and rhetoric on the part of those who occupy the institutional positions which democracy would reopen. The search for this philosopher's stone is expressed in the various qualifying adjectives that customarily accompany the term "democracy" (O'Donnell, 1979: 314).

O'Donnell is therefore able to diagnose the problem, but unable to find a solution. The political cost of maintaining civil society obediently in silence is high, but states that recognize the need for recovering their mediation of legitimacy by the democratic route, utilizing values such as nation, citizenship and "the people" find themselves in an impasse. Hence his conclusion that

the philosopher's stone would be a form of democracy which is carefully limited, in the sense that invocations in terms of *pueblo* or class are prohibited, but which at the same time is not such as farce that it cannot provide the mediations and, ultimately, a legitimacy that could transform itself into hegemony. The question of how this form of democracy will be achieved poses an enigma that severely

tests the ingenuity of the “social engineers” who offer their expertise to accomplish a task which amounts to squaring the circle (O’Donnell, 1979: 315).

In formulating the process of democratization in these terms, O’Donnell places too heavy a stress on the logic of elite domination, letting it appear that democracy is a unilateral initiative, to be managed from above. This contrasts sharply with the position adopted earlier by Cardoso, which rejects the possibility of transformation from above, and at the same time makes a commitment to slow and patient reform from below. O’Donnell’s analysis shares characteristics of that which Gunder Frank and Mauro Marini applied to politics in the earlier period, in which a rigid and mechanistic framework of analysis generated what appeared to a forced choice between socialism on the one hand and fascism on the other. In his case, it leads to an apparent impasse.

In a contribution to the same volume in which O’Donnell discussed the problem of democratization from above, Cardoso offered an essay which differentiated between the state on the one hand and the regime on the other, and addressed by this means the potential for variation in the relationship between the economy on the one hand and politics on the other. For Cardoso, political regime refers to the formal rules that link the main political institutions – the legislature to the executive, executive to the judiciary and the party system to all of them – as well as the issue of the political nature of the ties among the citizens and the government, that could be of a democratic, oligopolistic, totalitarian or any other nature. On the other hand, the concept of state refers to the alliance or pact of basic domination that exists among the social classes or fractions of the dominant classes and the norms that guarantee their dominion over the subordinate layers (Cardoso, 1979: 38). This distinction is important because

An identical form of state – capitalist and dependent, in the case of Latin America – can coexist with a variety of political regimes: authoritarian, fascist, corporatist, and even democratic (ibid: 39).

This can be explained by the fact that the capitalist state, that is, the basic "pact of domination" existing among the dominant classes, uses different political regimes for each phase of the process of capitalist accumulation. His consistency in the heterodox use of the dialectic to understand specific situations of political reality without being deceived by appearances, is a constant in Cardoso's thinking and analysis. Thus, Cardoso shows the capital sin of the theory of the authoritarian bureaucratic state lies in drawing conclusions regarding the impossibility of the rise of democratic regimes from such capitalist formations, and ending with the impossible task of "squaring the circle."

In Brazil, for example, despite the authoritarian-bureaucratic regime having dismantled the political party structure and having substituted fake parties that carried out the role of political support for the system and of opposition, one party, the MDB, effectively became a part of the opposition:

We have recently seen in Brazil how the one of the two parties created by the military regime to fill a purely formal role of opposition has actually become an effective opposition party. .. It is true that the dominant political system soon reacted, using whatever tools were available to deny the opposition any possibility of gaining power through the electoral system. In any case, the significant point is that the goals of the military have by no means been fully accomplished. In civil society there is an awareness of the illegitimacy of the regime and a conviction that sooner or later the political organization of society will have to be reconstituted (ibid: 46-47).

For this reason, "it is simplistic to imagine that a dependent capitalist process of industrialization can take place only through authoritarianism" (ibid: 55). Once again, then, Cardoso concludes with an appeal to creativity within constraints:

The ambiguities of politics give ground for hope. Sometimes they open roads favorable to change by generating forces within an established order that eventually undermine authoritarian rule. The very functioning of authoritarian regimes and the achievement of proposed economic goals create new challenges to the military and new forms of opposition. The military will not necessarily be able to overcome these difficulties. To a large extent, the likelihood of change may depend on the political capacity of opposition groups to propose creative alternatives of power that address these same challenges by offering different and better solutions (Cardoso, 1979: 57).

These essays from the 1970s confirm some significant points in our argument. First, they demonstrate that Cardoso consistently applied his dialectical methodology in his analysis of Brazilian and Latin American politics. Second, they show that he came in that decade to believe that only democracy offered a way forward for Brazil. And thirdly, as will be recalled from the first chapter, he acted upon the conclusions to which he came, associating himself with the opposition MDB and towards the end of the decade standing as a substitute for the Senate for Sao Paulo. Hence we can accept as an accurate reflection on this period the comment made by Cardoso when interviewed in 1998:

When I returned to Brazil in the 70s, I formulated another concept of associated-dependent development. I said that there was dependency but with development, I insisted on development. There is development and not stagnation. Because the analysis of others is: socialism is needed because there will always be a dictatorship here. Even O'Donnell in his books about the authoritarian regime, has an implicit mechanicism. He considered the authoritarian regimes as a necessary phase of capitalist accumulation in the periphery. Not me. We said, no, here there can be democracy, it's not necessary to have socialism, I mean, either socialism or fascism, the thesis of Teotônio dos Santos. I say: nothing like that. We can have

democracy. Democracy was the theme we took up in the 1970s and the 1980s. In the 1970s there was a lot of struggle against the regime. In the 1980s there was the open defence of democracy, the institutionalisation of democracy (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Globalisation and Democracy

To understand Cardoso's attitude towards democratic procedure, it is necessary to address his concept of democracy, and the way it should be understood in conditions of globalisation. First, it is impossible to separate his general analysis of society from the issue of democracy. The idea of democracy is related to that of society. It is necessary to see democracy not only from the institutional standpoint, but from that of democratizing society itself in its daily relations: a process, not a situation. Cardoso uses the same principle used by Joaquim Nabuco, when he referred to the concept of "authentic abolitionism". That is, seeing in slavery not only a relation between slave and master but the relationship of all of society to its daily life, constructed on the basis of the strong presence of this relationship.

The definition of democracy today cannot be confused with that of the nineteenth century. For Cardoso, democracy in that century

really meant a transformation of institutional structures, so that a stratum of society that was not part of the relationships, such as the bourgeois producers, could enter and take a share of what had been reserved to the nobility and the church. The bourgeois revolution was an attempt to open up the institutional system to allow industrialists and merchants to share in institutional power. There was no notion of mass party. In nineteenth century Europe, in England, for instance, there was no mass party. The parties were parliamentary parties, factions of the bourgeoisie, the nobility and the church. Today however, when one thinks of democracy, one thinks about how to increase the participation of different

strata of society in the decision-making process. Contemporary democracy is not just about having a parliament. The functioning of parliament is important because it informs. But democratization implies controlling decisions made on other levels. Those taken at the executive level in one case, and those at the business level, in another. Democracy, today, implies broadening the channels of participation, control and supervision at the various plural levels of society (Cardoso, 1978b: 12).

Democracy, according to Cardoso, is the opposite of homogenization, and the opposite, in a certain sense, of consensus

Consensus may be achieved, but when it is reached, it is by means of discussion and at a given moment expresses a correlation of forces. This cannot be a mythical consensus, which is totalitarian. In name of the nation, in name of a class, or whatever, it is authoritarian. In a democratic process, one must recognize that there is always diversity and conflict. And that conflict is legitimate (Cardoso, 1993b: 196-197).

Cardoso continually stresses the importance of diversity and conflict instead of consensus. The latter always expresses a germ of totalitarian will because

democracy is not consensus, there must be divergence, diversity and the tolerance to accept it and, at a given moment, convergence. If there is no convergence it is because there is no respect for a diversity of viewpoints (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

In the shift from dependency to globalisation examined in the last chapter, the world has changed and countries have renewed themselves. They no longer are simple societies where it is possible to establish a simple class division between bourgeoisie and proletariat. In this sense, Cardoso states that "globalisation, in the way that has already been shown by dependency in a simpler

capitalist system, embodies dialectic implications, it turns things similar and different at the same time (Cardoso, 1995b, 54). As the process of associated-dependent development has led to changes in social structure and political options, Cardoso has continued to argue that the capacity of formal democracy to improve peasants' and workers' living standards was underestimated by the traditional left. More than that, Cardoso reasons, "in sticking to closed and authoritarian political structures, it also underestimated the importance of the free circulation of ideas and information, at a moment when the new technological paradigm was beginning to command a more and more internationalized productive process delimited by the logic of market economy (Cardoso, 1995f: 71).

Cardoso's conception of democracy, however, does not limit itself to formal representative democracy, but draws heavily on ideas and values of substantive democracy which he derives from Marx and Mannheim. This perception of democracy runs through representative statements over three decades, and goes back to the book *Capitalismo e Escravidão* (1962), when Cardoso criticizes the generic and formal form (as if a consensus were possible) of liberal ideas which issued from Europe and were set down on a land marked by the the treatment of human beings as objects. Therefore Cardoso always refers the need to imagine the utopia of substantive democracy – as the daily search in society and all its segments, to build levels of tolerance for the diversity of social identities and cultures. Although he gave depth to this concept, Cardoso says he found it in the classics: "Marx thought about substantive democracy; I copied him, drawing from Marx and Mannheim. They spoke about substantive democracy, i.e., it is not the form, it is not the relationship between the constitutional powers, it is this: it is the practice of society." (Cardoso, 1978b: 13). This distortion of the notion of democracy as being bourgeois, as not serving the grand objectives of transformations in the society, comes from an instrumentalist idea, as if democracy served only as a means, a tool to reach certain ends. This was true both in the tradition of exporting oligopolies and their patrimonial, conservative privatism, and for the vulgar left which saw democracy as an automatic consequence of revolutionary changes in the

mode of production. For this reason, Cardoso has continued to stress both the formal representative content and the substantive content of democracy. As he said in his interview with the author,

The question of substantive democracy was, actually, at that time, the way of showing the left that democracy was not being discussed just from the formal point of view. You have two possible readings: one is a criticism of representative democracy. And the other one is its acceptance and a step forward. I would rather take the second one. To me, substantive democracy was not 'instead of' elections, parties, etc, social welfare. No, it was 'in addition to that'. I think that this is fundamental. I keep on thinking like that (...) Because we cannot underestimate the question of the representative and formal aspects of democracy. Democracy requires law, rules, of a formal and universal nature. And besides, you have to see that this is intended to permit higher standards of well-being (interview with the author, 28 July 1998).

In this context, Cardoso notes the growing numbers living under democratic rule in this era of globalisation, and accepts that the state will not be the leading agent in delivering social benefits:

Currently, it is possible to correlate the expansion of democratic institutions with social progress, in the different national areas and even in the international area, as forms of freedom-favouring systemic pressures get articulated. The possibility of shaping social structures to favour the excluded, begins the moment that they are given voice, which is the primordial task of any democratic society. Strictly speaking, the state is not the promoter of social benefits: it will simply be the agent of forces which are prior to it, which shape it (Cardoso, 1997d: 75).

Nevertheless, while shifting the state from the centre of the process, he insists on the need to radicalize democracy. In this connection, the importance of information to galvanize society into

action in order to organize and oppose itself to the international forces of globalisation is perceived by Cardoso as a necessity for more and deeper democracy. Democracy is perceived as a tool to fight against domination in the global context. This way, he argues,

to amplify democracy, this is the challenge in view of the new forms of economy.

The big question over there is to build a more radical democracy. If you ask what it is to be progressive today, the answer is: to be progressive is to be searching for the radicalization of democracy (Cardoso, 1997e: 28).

Although this idea of the radicalization of democracy appears today in his rhetoric in the context of globalisation, it is a notion that has been appearing since the middle of the 70s when Cardoso first became directly involved in political life. Thus he argued in 1978 that in the opposition campaign within the military regime

one must be radically democratic. We should go deep down to the roots of the problems, to the social issue, to the extent of showing that the question of democracy is tied to the problem of equality, which is tied to the question of ownership (...) not to be taken in its abstract sense, but in its concrete sense (Cardoso, 1978c: 59-60).

The “radicalization of democracy” emerges as a key theme, then, for Cardoso, as a response to the conditions of globalisation, and it picks up on the content of the term “substantive democracy” that he used in earlier interventions. The impacts of globalisation have to be politically delimited. For this to happen, it is not necessary to give the state a leading role, but rather to guarantee access to decision-making by making the state more permeable. In order to perform its role appropriately, the state must promote more equitable opportunities, it has to be redefined, its priorities democratically redrawn in order to be able to keep up pace with the imperatives dictated by a knowledge intensive mode of production (Cardoso, 1997d:78). As a consequence, genuine participation is a fundamental requirement. The political debate must be

widened and deepened. To that end, Cardoso says, it is necessary to “open public space to people’s participation. Political reason will only be well founded when the free access of all social groups to debate has been guaranteed. The expansion of the public sphere is, therefore, essential to the development of efficient mechanisms of social inclusion. It is necessary to give voice to those who are not in a position to defend their own rights (Cardoso,1997d: 77).

In Cardoso, therefore, democracy goes through a process of expansion to a point at which a contradiction between formal and substantive democracy disappears. As he stated when interviewed:

I don’t think this contradiction exists any more. I mean, not to my mind it doesn’t.

That is to say, you have to make a fusion of the classical idea of democracy with the socialist idea of democracy, which is substantive democracy (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

The State therefore, beyond being an expression of a given power relation is also a mixture of bureaucracy, ideology and a bit of illusion. The State is a

need to express the whole, or rather, to express a part as if it were the whole. In expressing a part, as if it were a whole, in having to represent sometimes mystifyingly the interest of the whole, in fact the state requires formulations that are value filled, ideological formulations. However, these value-charged and ideological formulations could not subsist, could not have an effective presence if they were mere mystifications. They are not mere mystifications, they involve beliefs in the values and rules that engender them. Public servants working in judicial bureaucracy must believe, for instance, that every citizen is equal before the law. We all know that, in fact, they are not, but the judge must accept the idea that the citizen is equal before the law. Thus, we are not dealing with conscious mystification, but with a much more complex process that involves a necessary

deformation for the constitution of the form of the state itself (Cardoso, 1977b: 78).

It is in this sense that one must search for “forces of counterweight” to find solutions for adverse situations. Although democracy, in itself, does not solve the issue, without it less would be resolved. Thus

it is necessary to have this conjunction, that is, you cannot say: well, since we have elections, everything is fine. No. People’s lives must be improved, one must have concrete things. The solution for the problems and difficulties of democracy, is more democracy. Not less democracy. It is more democracy, more democracy and more democracy. That is what allows for really transforming substantive issues accessible to the public: health, education, jobs, etc. (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Underlying this is a particular analysis of the specific nature of the Brazilian state. Cardoso stresses that this specificity lies in the fact that the dominant private classes have fused with the state apparatus, appropriating its official posts (which were “public” only in name) and utilizing the State organization as a direct political arena. They minimized, therefore, the potential for political party organizations independent of the State and limited, as far as possible, the political mobilization of the subordinate classes (Cardoso, 1988: 452).

Conclusion

Cardoso has developed an analytical style whose key methodological feature, as shown in the previous chapter, is finding specific aspects of a given reality, trying to underline paradoxes and contradictions and then explaining them. So, he began gradually to define his concept of democracy by way of critiques of other authors. This was the case with his critique of Guillermo O’Donnell’s concept of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. He also did this with the critique of the proposed transformation of authoritarianism, the beginning of democracy and civil society,

without a break with the state and its military support. His analysis of Brazilian democratization makes a new blend of these ideas, adding his appreciation of the role of political parties. In addition, Cardoso emphasizes his concept of substantive democracy, according to which it is not enough to cry out against the authoritarian and patrimonialism, and to propose the best of worlds, and extends it to the broader conception of the "radicalisation of democracy" in the contemporary period. In politics, as Weber said, it is necessary to search out the reality principle. This, "cannot be other than the existing social forces. If among them are included the pale face of established interests and the ugly face of state repression, do not be stopped there: maybe a new Narcissus may be found, behind the masks that obscure the face of popular interests. The day when the radical student or progressive intellectual meets with the roots of society, with the workers, the people on the land, the office workers, slum and housing projects dwellers, then we may have a less generous and vague rhetoric, but we will certainly have a more coherent and consistent practice (Cardoso, 1977c). Behind this idea is the concept of a civil society that can, little by little, organize and weave the threads of its interests to counterbalance the state, becoming part of the political reality of the nation. But this process requires a wide review of values from all sides, so that the reality of daily life is fully accepted. The combination of political realism with values of possible utopia drive Cardoso to say that

To the facile verbal overcoming of real problems in the name of a mythical future ... it is necessary to oppose the challenge of specific needs, which are multiple and different for each group or social class. Not as a means of escapism, or passive acceptance of present conditions of living, which are unacceptable, but as an apprenticeship for political existence, as a discipline for those who direct and for the people, who will teach us how to believe in the need, the possibility and the legitimacy of a reactivation of society. In these terms, it makes sense to think about re-democratization and to prepare for it. As a daily practice, and not as a benevolent gesture on the part of the enlightened elite, which can hardly move

beyond intention to action if there are no real structures of political support and organized forms of pressure coming from segments of society not entrenched within the state (Cardoso, 1975: 239).

The aim of this chapter has been to present the concept of democracy that Cardoso has developed as an intellectual. We adopted this procedure in an attempt to grasp the principal intellectual ideas that resulted from his scientific research, using a method that led him to challenge different theoretical paradigms at different moments of his intellectual history. Using the heterodox approach of the dialectic method, he produced interpretations that left their mark on contemporary Latin American political theory, from the singularity of his interpretations of the dependent relationship of the peripheral countries to international capitalism, of the role of the national bourgeoisies, the internationalization of markets and associated-dependent development, to the concept of "the conjunction of the classical idea of democracy with the socialist idea of democracy, which is substantive democracy". These are complex themes that Cardoso faced with intellectual creativity. He knew how, when faced with the paradoxes that reality produces, to decipher them always with the impetus of a commitment to making theory into a strategic orientation for practice. Thus, the transition from theoretical to practical intervention, particularly marked from the mid-1970s onwards, is not a moment of tension and incompatibility, but the unfolding of a concept of political process that could articulate political theory and action. In the second part of this thesis (Chapters Four to Six) we shall explore the parallels between this orientation and that of Habermas, and assess the extent to which Cardoso may be understood as seeking to carry out a 'Habermasian' project from the presidency.

CHAPTER 4

Habermas

I never say that people want to act communicatively, but that they have to (...) when they work to get along with one another without the costly recourse to violence, they all have to act communicatively (...). Communicative action normally takes place in a common language and in a linguistically developed, preinterpreted world, in shared cultural forms of life, normative contexts, handed-down traditions, customs, routines and so forth - in lifeworlds that are porous to one another, that permeate and intertwine with one another.(...) democracy - and the public struggle for its best form - is capable of hacking through the Gordian knots of otherwise insoluble problems. I'm not saying that we're going to succeed in this; we don't even know whether success is possible. But because we don't know, we at least have to try. Apocalyptic moods sap the energies that nourish these initiatives. Optimism and pessimism aren't really relevant categories here (Habermas, 1994: 97-111).

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of Habermas's ideas, as a prelude to Chapters Five and Six, which argue that over the last thirty years Cardoso's thought has followed a similar trajectory to that of Habermas, with the consequence that Cardoso, in power as President, may be seen as attempting to implement a 'Habermasian' project. The chapter makes no pretence to originality in its discussion of the work of Habermas itself. Rather, it offers a synthesis drawn from Habermas's own work and from that of a number of leading commentators, emphasizing key themes from the wide range of Habermas's work. The focus is on the issues of the public sphere and civil society, argumentative discourse, and democracy, communicative power and deliberative politics, as it is in relation to these that the convergence between the thinking of Habermas and Cardoso respectively is most clearly seen.

The Habermasian intellectual project of emancipation has emerged and developed in the context of democratic expansion, as a global phenomenon at the end of the

century. It advocates a continuous process of political communication in constitutional democracies, using the public sphere as a sphere for debates with the exclusion of violence. As a project of democratic emancipation, it is only valid and effective in the context of a democratic society. Therefore, it is possible to say that in the same way that the Frankfurt School had a significant influence on the formation of New Left students and intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s, Habermas has had a marked influence in the 1980s and 1990s with his work.

At the same time, a consequence of Habermas's democratic theory of communicative action is scepticism regarding the possibility of the revolutionary transformation of a complex society. This is because, as discussed below, at the centre of his social theory is the self-emancipation of people through the self-understanding of social groups capable of promoting the transformation of society. Habermas considers that revolution, in this context, is an out-dated nineteenth century notion.

On the basis of the overview presented in this chapter I shall go on to argue that there are strong parallels, and significant convergence, between Habermas's analysis and Cardoso's approach to democracy in both his academic and political discourse. This is not to say that Habermas has always been a direct intellectual influence on Cardoso. As we shall see, Cardoso has not always had a close familiarity with the evolution of Habermas's work. Rather, the argument is that Habermas and Cardoso reach, from similar backgrounds of Marxist inspiration, and through similar critiques of the orthodox left in the 1960s and 1970s, similar views on the need for a 'radicalisation' of democracy, and similar views on the priorities if it is to be brought about. In my view, it is this which characterizes Cardoso as a 'Habermasian' president, committed to the expansion of the public sphere as a space for reasoned debate. Without doubt, others authors have influenced Cardoso's thought, such as

Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Mannheim, Florestan Fernandes, Alain Touraine, Norberto Bobbio, Albert Hirschman, Anthony Giddens and even Foucault - all of whom have played an important role in his eclectic intellectual development. However, Habermas is of crucial importance in that Cardoso shares Habermas's view that the radical potential of democracy lies in its commitment to reason and dialogue.

Habermas aims to rethink contemporary philosophy; the philosophy of objects, of norms and the lifeworld, building a philosophical interpretation based on a new paradigm: instead of a philosophy of the mind, a philosophy of the theory of interaction, from reflexive reason to communicative reason. This proposal of interaction based on dialogue replaces Kant's monologic concept of pure reason with its categorical imperative of the subject. It is, therefore, this dialogical dimension of communicative reason that leads me to link Cardoso with Habermas: more than an influence, as a historical convergence of ideas. As Cardoso himself has commented, "coincidence means that, when I read Habermas's things today, I agree with him" (interview with the author).

Jurgen Habermas - trajectory and key concepts.

Jurgen Habermas is the most renowned member of the second generation of the Frankfurt School of Social Research. He was born in 1929 in Dusseldorf, and wrote his PhD dissertation (published in 1954) on the conflict between the absolute and history in Schelling's thought. Like other members of the Frankfurt School, Habermas was strongly influenced by the writing of Hegel and Marx. Unlike Adorno and Horkheimer, however, Habermas rejected Marx's labour theory of value, along with the cultural pessimism of the first generation of the School.

Identifying with Weber, Habermas believes that the first generation of the Frankfurt School erred in confusing "system rationality" and "action rationality", a confusion which parallels another - the uncoupling of the system (e.g. the economy) on the one hand and what Habermas, following Husserl and Schutz calls the "lifeworld" on the other: the immediate milieu of the individual social actor. The result, says Habermas, is that the system is erroneously seen to dominate the whole of society at the expense of lifeworld.

Again following Weber, Habermas sees science and rationality in the capitalist era as being turned against human beings instead of being used on their behalf, impoverishing their cultural lives and exacerbating pathological social forms. Critical theory needs to combat this negative form of positivistic science and turn it into an emancipatory activity concerned with political and social reform (Lechte, 1998).

This said, the task of pinning down Habermas's theoretical formulation is not easy. His works involve a wide range of knowledge (across philosophy, sociology, psychoanalysis, history, and politics) and debates with the ideas of Marx, Weber, Parsons, Gadamer, Rawls, Wittgenstein, Luhman, Popper, and Dilthey, among others. Any attempt to simplify is therefore difficult. As noted above, I concentrate in what follows on the main elements of his contribution to thinking about democracy, as it is here that the convergence of Cardoso's thought and his own is most noticeable.

Habermas's principal objective is to reconstruct some important Greek and German theses, such as the unity of truth and virtue, facts and values, and theory and practice. Such a reconstruction arises from the necessity to reinterpret the Critical Theory originally formulated by the Frankfurt School that is the main source and stimulus of his critique of the theory of modernity. This reconstruction has a practical intention: the self-emancipation of people from domination, where emancipation

means autonomy and democratic freedom from arbitrary power and from the humiliation of material poverty.

To achieve this intellectual task, Habermas establishes as a principle the “struggle for the critical soul of science” and “the scientific soul of criticism” in a clear expression of the importance of science and criticism to his communication theory (Held, 1995:250; Passerin and Benhabib, 1997). To appreciate the manner in which this is addressed, it is first necessary to understand the tripartite model which is the basis of Habermas’s explanation of the communication structure of society. This model starts, as noted above, from the notion that modern society is system and lifeworld, and from a perspective that relates them simultaneously (Habermas, 1987:137-138).

This tripartite model is formed by two subsystems: 1. *Politics* (power) and 2. *Economy* (money), and the dimension of the *Lifeworld* - in which the social interaction based on instrumental reason targeting mutual understanding and consensual agreement takes place. Such agreements come about through the mutual confrontation between social actors and their claims of normative validity by way of dialogue. This is the realm of the social sphere that is, according to Habermas, coordinated by communicative action in the lifeworld, and oriented in three directions: towards mutual understanding, the co-ordination of action and socialisation. It is mutually oriented and mutually negotiated. He explains it as follows:

Under the functional aspect of *mutual understanding*, communicative action serves to transmit and renew cultural knowledge; under the aspect of *co-ordinating action*, it serves social integration and the establishment of solidarity; under the aspect of *socialisation*, communicative action serves the formation of personal identities. The

symbolic structures of the lifeworld are reproduced by way of the continuation of valid knowledge, stabilisation of group solidarity, and socialisation of responsible actors. The process of reproduction connects up new situations with the existing conditions of the lifeworld; it does this in the *semantic* dimension of social space (of socially integrated groups), and historical time (of successive generations). Corresponding to these processes of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialisation are the structural components of the lifeworld: culture, society, person (Habermas, 1987:137-138).

Each one of these functions refers to distinct structures of lifeworld. *Culture* is the stock of knowledge that a society possesses and transmits. *Society* is the legitimate order through which participants regulate their membership in social groups and thereby secure social solidarity. The *person or personality* is the competence that makes a subject capable of speaking and acting, that put him or her in a position to take part in processes of reaching understanding and thereby to assert his or her own identity. So, the lifeworld is said to be (symbolically) reproduced through mutually oriented, mutually negotiated communicative action, and it is identified as having this tripartite structure.

So, we will see in the course of this exposition that the tripartite model provides the backdrop of Habermas's analysis of society and the means to its emancipation. I now address three aspects of Habermas's thought that are linked with my interest in theory and political action in Cardoso: (a) the relationship between the public sphere and civil society; (b) the principle of argumentative discourse aimed towards mutual understanding, and (c) democracy, communicative power and deliberative politics.

The public sphere and civil society

Basic constitutional guarantees alone, of course, cannot preserve the public sphere and civil society from deformations. The communicative structures of the public sphere must rather be kept intact by an energetic civil society (Habermas, 1996: 369).

The first of Habermas's works, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1961), tackled the question of the formation and transformation of the public sphere. In this work, the notion of public sphere is derived from the formation of bourgeois society, and especially the relationship between capitalism and the state in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century in Britain, France and Germany (Habermas, 1984:1; Calhoun, 1992:4). The public sphere is defined as "a realm in which, in principle, political life can be discoursed openly; debates proceed in accordance with standards of critical reason and not by simple appeal to traditional dogmas and authorities – the divine right of Kings, for instance. The procedures and presuppositions of free argument are the basis for the justification of opinion" (Held, 1995: 260).

Starting from what Habermas calls a historical-sociological analysis of the meaning of "public" and the "public sphere," he attempts to explain the categories of public sphere in a bourgeois society, its meaning and the transformation that it has undergone through the centuries since its founding. The line of analysis begins from the incipient formation of the public sphere through the rational-critical discussions that had begun to take place in society as the public sphere separated from the state. That rational-critical discussion happened in the form of letters, reading, publications and books that developed in a wider arena, rather than in the confines of exchanges

between specialist scholars. Habermas himself set out this process, which he would later call the theory of communicative action, as follows:

With the growth of a reading public that transcended the republic of scholars and the urban bourgeoisie and who no longer limited themselves to a careful reading and rereading of a few standard works but oriented their reading habits to an ongoing stream of new publications, there sprang from the midst of the private sphere a relatively dense network of public communication. The growing number of readers, increasing by leaps and bounds, was complemented by a considerable expansion in the production of books, journals, and papers, an increasing number of authors, publishers, and book sellers, the establishment of lending libraries, reading rooms, and especially reading societies as the social nodes of a literary culture revolving around novels (Habermas, 1992:423).

This description refers to the context of Germany at the end of the eighteenth century in which that net of public communications would play an important role in the formation and development of other forms of organisation in civil society. So, Habermas says that this sort of association would work as a base for what will later be the principle of equal civil rights. The relevance, says Habermas, of the associational life that began to take off late in the German Enlightenment has by now been acknowledged, although its significance for future developments lay more with its organisational forms than with its manifests functions (Habermas, 1992: 423). So, he continues:

The societies for enlightenment, cultural associations, secret freemasonry lodges, and orders of illuminati were associations

constituted by the free, that is, private ns of their founding members, based on voluntary membership, and characterised internally by egalitarian practices of sociability, free discussion, decision by majority, etc. While these societies certainly remained an exclusively bourgeois affair, they did provide the training ground for what were to become a future society's norms of political equality (Habermas, 1992:423-424).

In the same way as for the German case, Habermas refers to the French Revolution that “eventually triggered a movement toward the politisation of public sphere that at first revolved around literature and art criticism. (...). A ‘politization of associational life’, the rise of a partisan press, the fight against censorship and for freedom of opinion characterise the change in function of the expanding network of public communication up to the middle of the nineteenth century.” (Habermas, 1994:424) Public sphere “characterised initially by an educated bourgeoisie interested in literature and the critical discussion of cultural issues in a sphere dominated by mass media and mass culture” (idem).

Thus, the phenomenon of the public sphere arose, originally, in bourgeois society:

With the growth of a general reading public that transcended the republic of scholars and the urban bourgeoisie and who no longer limited themselves to a careful reading and rereading of a few standard works but oriented their reading habits to an ongoing stream of new publications, there sprang from the midst of the private sphere a relatively dense network of public communication (Habermas, 1992:423).

The importance of the public sphere is in the role that it plays in the process of social integration. The public discourse or the communicative action that occur in the public sphere is a model of co-ordination of human life, state power and the market economy. The public sphere arises as a characteristic of the formation of the bourgeois society and the necessity to establish nets of communication according to mercantilist interest. In this sense power and money are also, according to Habermas, forms of co-ordinated human action but not forms of communications as formulated above.

In the modern state the public sphere is constituted as a specific sphere, as a necessity of demarcating the border of the public and the "private joined in the public". Its specificity lies in the fact that bourgeois society constitutes the public sphere as its space for communicative action. For instance, as Calhoun explains:

In a world of kings who could say 'L'etat, c'est moi', the public of a country did not exist apart from a king and his court. This was the heyday of 'representative publicity', and lordship was represented 'not for but before the people (...) [until] bourgeois society produced a certain form of public sphere. This process led to an idea of society separate from the ruler (or the state) and of private realm separate from the public (...). Civil society, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, developed as 'the genuine domain of private autonomy [that] stood opposed to the state (Calhoun, 1992:7).

The public sphere constituted, like the civil society in general, an impersonal space of authority. Contrary to the traditional notion of public, the modern notion characterises itself by the possibility of counter-position between state and society. Civil society thus appears as a consequence of the impersonal nature of the state's authority and as a counterbalance to that authority. In principle, it is a sphere in which

political life could be discussed openly, without embarrassment. Debate could be conducted according to a standard of critical reason and not appealing to dogma, the mystification of traditional values, and authority.

In order to produce a counterbalance to the power of the state, the main institution of civil society appears: the press. It derives from private correspondence for information, which evolves into a kind of opinion press. Habermas provides detailed descriptions and interpretations of changes in the nature of the press, the distortion of its original role and its transformation into a capitalist undertaking. The redefinition of the function of the press shows the public sphere as treating political parties and fractional interests as merely appendices. In other words, his is not an idealistic account which ignores the operation of power and money within civil society, but one which is aware of the interaction between these and the sphere of communicative action.

The public sphere in a capitalist society no longer allows the purely free exchange of ideas. Its aim is to "work public opinion" through a process of "engineering of consent". As Habermas accepts:

Engineering of consent is the central task, for only in the climate of such a consensus does promotion to the public, suggesting or urging acceptance or rejection of a person, product, organisation or idea, succeed. The awakened readiness of the consumers involves the false consciousness that as critically reflecting private people they contribute responsibly to public opinion (Habermas, 1961: 194).

The transformation undergone by the public sphere now subjected to the manipulation of instrumental reason interest drives it to distinguish between public opinion (rational critic) and opinion (prejudice, costumes and stereotypes). Having

said that, public opinion is now marked by the depoliticisation and the impoverishment of critical discourse. Therefore, the public sphere has become an arena to be worked more by publicity rather than rational-critical debate. This phenomenon reaches all the institutions of the public sphere: the legislature (actors exposed as propagandists to their constituents), the media (used to shape consumer standards) and political parties (no longer constituents' groups but bureaucratic organisations that target the psychological profile of the constituent).

Thus, the public sphere became a space to be disputed and manipulated by the state apparatus and by the economic corporations to develop its technique of legitimisation, rather different than it was in its bourgeois origins. In other words, "The public sphere becomes a setting for states and corporate actors to develop legitimacy not by responding appropriately to an independent and critical public but by seeking to instil in social actors motivations that conform to the needs of the overall system dominated by those states and corporate actors" (Calhoun, 1992:26, Habermas, 1975).

As Leys observed with regards to the public sphere,

It had been seriously eroded in the course of the nineteenth century; with the widening of the franchise, popular education and the spread of mass culture it had become the target of heavy manipulation and commercial advertising and had ceased to be a forum for objective and critical debate. And in the present century, Habermas thought, matters had become steadily worse: the 're-feudalisation of society, the creeping re-absorption of civil society by the state through bureaucratisation, commodification and the 'colonisation of the life world' had all but destroyed the public sphere (Leys, 1999: 314).

Once the party systems transform themselves, the state mixes with society, the corporation's particular interests increase and the original shape of the public sphere dissolves. That is the reality of modern society, and any attempt to revert to the traditional model may lose the few vestiges that remain. In this context, the challenge seems to be to find ways of salvaging democratic public discourse in order to save critical reason in the age of big corporations, in which the border between state and society is confused. Habermas suggests that the solution is in "*the long march through the institutions.*" This means that

parties, parastatal agencies and bureaucracies of all sorts must themselves be internally democratised and subjected to critical publicity. In the case of the media, for example, some mechanism for insuring more democratic access and selection are needed as a response to the concentration of ownership and increasing scale of media organisations. There may be no alternative to a politics based on negotiation of interest among organised groups. But the trend for these organisations to become less open to rational-critical discourse can be reversed. To be able to satisfy these functions in the sense of democratic opinion and consensus formation their inner structure must first be organised in accord with the principle of publicity and must institutionally permit an intraparty or intra-association democracy - to allow for unhampered communication and public rational-critical debate (Calhoun, 1992:28).

Habermas recognises the process of distortion of the public sphere with the advent the big economic and commercial corporations, increased interdependence between science, technology and industry, the state and society, the commercialisation of the

media, and the extension of instrumental reason through social life. He suggests that the public sphere and society must turn back to social integration based on critical-rational discourse, so that integration can be based on communication and not on domination.

The institutionalisation of democracy in a social-democratic society and the idea of publicity could be achieved only through the process of rationalisation of social and political power under the mutual control of organisations committed to the idea of public sphere publicity as the space for democratic practical discourse. In particular, publicity must be the commitment of politics with morality (Kant, 1991:116) and for those who are still committed to the project of radical democracy (Habermas, 1992:463).

Argumentative discourse

From the perspective of democratic theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and dramatise them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes. Besides the "signal" function, there must be an effective problematization. The capacity of the public sphere to solve problems on its own is limited. But this capacity must be utilized to oversee the further treatment of problems that takes place inside the political system (Habermas, 1996 :340).

In the previous sector, I presented Habermas's conception of the public sphere before discussing the notion of discourse, because it is at the level of the public sphere, that debate committed to reasoned argumentation, seeking democratic legitimacy and political stability, takes place. So, the public sphere, democratic

legitimacy and political stability constitute a sort of tripod, and one which will prove very useful to the interpretation of Cardoso's approach to government.

So how has the concept of discourse based on argumentation that is at the core of Habermas's thinking arisen and been formulated? Why is the focus on argumentation and not on coercion? Why on dialogue and not on violence? To attempt to formulate answers to these questions, I rely on Chambers' work on 'reasonable democracy' (Chambers, 1996), one of the aims of which is to "show that beneath the unfamiliar vocabulary stand rather familiar ideas" in Habermas.

Above all, to understand Habermas's formulation it is necessary to invoke Kant's ideas. Kant was the first to suggest why argumentation is better than violence and coercion and its moral fundamentals (Chambers, 1996).

Persuasion is related to the legitimacy of those who govern, since as Chambers says, echoing the thought of Habermas, "The legitimacy of laws rests on the persuasiveness of the reasons that can be garnered to those laws. Domination is transformed into self-rule when citizens are convinced in a free and equal conversation that the limits placed upon them are not chains but self-imposed limits for good reasons. The introduction of rational persuasion to consent theory adds an important dimension to our understanding of democracy" (Chambers, 1996: 8). Besides its ability to persuade, the word has the strength to provoke transformation. As Chambers explains:

We do things with words in a way that a nominalist such as Hobbes could never grasp. Speech is more than a verbal naming of things; speech is action. Through talk we persuade, order, promise, reassure, deceive, teach, discipline, praise, heal and dispute (...) And of course, we fight with words too. We arm ourselves with words because they are effective weapons when used in a certain way. We can even destroy

lives with words. And we can certainly bash each other over the head with words as, for example, when we use 'fighting' words - those which by their very utterance inflict injury (Chambers, 1996: 6).

According to Chambers, saying that argument is a better solution than violence seems obvious, even common sense. The difficulty lies in responding to people's doubts when they say: "Well, in principle, yes, dialogue and persuasion are definitely better than force and coercion, but the sad fact of the matter is that we often need to use force." Which means, in principle yes, but in fact, no. Which circumstances may change the principle that dialogue is better than violence? Kant, for instance, answers this question by asking what sort of principle people have which leads them to defend either dialogue or violence. He identifies four principles: a) the principle of rational self-interest; b) the principle of legitimacy; c) the principle of respect and d) the principle of equal worth (Chambers, 1996:8 and Kant, 1991: 61-92).

The *principle of rational self-interest* is based on dialogue and persuasion that in turn depends on a pacifist co-operation that assures an environment in which everybody is allowed to live in peace to follow their plans for life. The price of violence is too high because it sows violence, disagreement, ruptures and conflicts. Furthermore, it creates a non-feasible atmosphere for everyone wishing to achieve their life plans. However, in certain situations the principle of self-interest may not be in the interest of one side. In this case, Kant says, the *principle of legitimacy* is the only one that may appeal to the use of power and coercion. It is not correct to say that every kind of power and coercion is unjust. Another justification to support the idea of superiority of persuasion is based on the *principle of respect*. In this particular case, the classical explanation of mutual respect is in Kant's analysis of human dignity:

“Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, *exists* as an end in himself, *not merely as a means* for arbitrary use by this or that will” (Kant, 1991:78).

Dealing with people through discourse instead of coercion is the recognition that each one of us deserves to be distinguished as having worth, to be consulted and allowed to participate in whatever matters interest us. That is the *principle of equal worth*. It is obvious that this principle and the principle of respect are subjective and so more difficult to defend than the principle of self-interest.

Therefore from these four Kantian principles it is possible to deduce the philosophical foundations for the superiority of argumentation in relation to coercion.

According to Chambers:

Kant maintained that each of us must acknowledge that in some fundamental sense we are free, self-directing agents. An honest (and rational) self-examination confirms that we are put on this earth not merely to serve other people’s purposes but to pursue our own freely chosen purposes even if those freely chosen purposes involve serving others. Thus, even the very religious must acknowledge that the dignity of their service to God resides in their having freely chosen it. If rational, we will see ourselves as ends (i.e., as free) and not as means (i.e., instruments) (Chambers, 1996: 3-4).

From this principle that the human being is free to make choices and not be a mere instrument of other people’s interest, it is possible to draw conclusions. If I am an end by virtue of my rational capacity to direct my life, then all other rational agents are ends by virtue of their rational capacity to direct their lives. Thus, we are all not only free but also equal in this freedom. The conclusion, therefore, of this line of thought, according to Kant, is the recognition that you must treat humanity, whether in your

own person or that of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end (Kant, 1991: 75).

It is, briefly, on Kant's ideas that Habermas bases his commitment to public debate as a resource for argument and dialogue rather than violence and coercion - the theory of communicative action. This implies that individuals must be seen as an end in themselves, therefore, dealing with people discursively instead of coercively, with respect and dignity. From his first work, *The Structural Transformation of Public Sphere*, Habermas uses Kantian notions of argument as key elements of his theoretical project.

Foucault objects to the separation made here between discourse and violence, arguing that violence is embedded and reproduced within discourse itself (Chambers, 1996: 6). He sees discourse as a new form of power and, consequently, of domination. However, Chambers defends Habermas's position by discriminating between different ways in which speech may be employed, and arguing that some uses of speeches are clearly different to others (Chambers, 1996: 7).

What follows for Habermas's position is that to avoid debate/dialogue in the public sphere becoming another form of domination it is necessary to look in more detail at the aspects mentioned above,

identifying the present social relations, power structures, and sociocultural grids of communication and interpretation that limit the identity of the parties to the public dialogue, that set the agenda for what is considered appropriate or inappropriate matters of public debate, and that sanctify the speech of some over the speech of others as being the language of the public (Benhabib, 1989: 155-56).

This idea of Benhabib's follows from Habermas's reasoning that it is necessary, to retain the efficacy of discourse, to reconstruct the presuppositions of the communicative act in public sphere as an act different to coercion. The socio-political context in which this communication occurs needs to be considered. In this sense, we turn back to Rousseau's classical idea, rationalised by Kant. In the political world of power, how is it possible to be at the same time, dominated and free? When Rousseau says that "man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains" he recognises that man lives, politically, chained up. Everyone who lives in society is under domination. How can we transform the subjection of a person in a relationship, but retain her place in the community and allow her to be true to herself? Kant responds that this is only possible through the rational capacity of persuasion: "Each individual requires to be convinced by reason that the coercion which prevails is lawful, otherwise he would be in contradiction with himself" (Kant, 1991: 85).

Under the influence of Habermas, then, the idea that democracy revolves around transformation rather than simply an aggregation of preferences has become one of the major positions in democracy theory (Elter, 1999: 1).

This is the starting point for Habermas's concept of democracy. Domination is transformed into laws which are made by citizens. It is not chains that imprison them but the laws they make that define the limits of behaviour acceptable to living together as a society. This process takes place in communication in the setting of the public sphere, with due account taken of the socio-cultural structure of power within which the democratic process of communication takes place.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Habermas's communicative reason based on dialogue replaces Kant's monologic concept of pure reason. That is to say, discursive ethics replaces the categorical imperative of Kant. It is no longer simply a

person's conscience which monologically defines the general principle of behaviour in society. On the contrary, practical group discourse through dialogue, based on rational argument operates as the universal principle.

In the process of argumentative dialogue, all the members of the group participate. All subjective wills are expressed, all critiques and opinions are considered, all consequences are advanced and all the collateral effects of a possible action balanced out. The change of focus from the "categorical imperative" of the individual to a process of reasoned argument constitutes the essence of the Habermasian discursive ethics (Freitag, 1989:7-14).

Civil society, democracy and deliberative politics

The notion of civil society in Habermas is characterised as a sphere that is delimited from the state and the economy, with insertion in the private sphere and lifeworld. It is composed of organisations, associations and movements that emerge, more and less spontaneously, from which social problems arise, have repercussions and are amplified in the public sphere.

In this perspective, civil society is a kind of web of associations that institutionalises its problems and solutions through communicative action and the discourse of general interest. Thus, Habermas says that

Such associations certainly do not represent the most conspicuous element of the public sphere dominated by mass media and large agencies, observed by market and opinion research, and inundated by the public relations work, propaganda, and advertising of political parties and groups. All the same, they do form the organisational abstratum of the general public of citizens. More or less emerging from

the private sphere, this public is made of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations for their social interest and experiences and who want to have an influence on institutionalised opinion- and will-formation (Habermas, 1996: 367).

Civil society, therefore, according to Habermas, reflects the network of communications taking place in the public sphere. However it is “swamped by the propaganda and advertising” of associations and citizens striving to retain their influence on the rationalisation of their interests in the public sphere. The concept of civil society, according Habermas’s ideas, has been well explained by Cohen and Arato who identify its characteristics as “demarcated from the state, the economy and other functional systems but coupled with the core private sphere of the lifeworld” (Habermas, 1996: 368). These characteristics are:

1. Plurality - families, informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and autonomy allow for a variety of forms of life;
2. Publicity - institutions of culture and communications;
3. Privacy - a domain of individual self-development and moral choice;
4. Legality - structures of general laws and basic right needed to demarcate plurality, privacy, and publicity from at least the state and, tendentially, the economy. Together, these structures secure the institutional existence of a modern differentiated civil society” (Idem).

In these terms, civil society is, at the same time, the lifeworld in which communicative discourse of the public sphere develops. We will now see how the concepts of the public sphere and dialogue are committed to the notion of communicative action through which the deliberative political procedure of radical democracy occur.

In Habermas, from the viewpoint of legal theory, the main element of the democratic process is in a deliberative proceduralism in politics that differs from the idea of a society centred in the state, according to the traditional democratic model. Habermas argues that the idea of deliberative politics goes beyond the liberal ideas or republican models:

According to the liberal view, the democratic process is effected exclusively in the form of compromise among interest. Rules of compromise formation are supposed to secure the fairness of results through universal and equal suffrage, the representative composition of parliamentary bodies, the mode of decision making, rules of order, and so on. Such rules are ultimately justified in terms of liberal basic right. According to the republican view, on the other hand, democratic will-formation takes the form of ethico political self-understanding; here deliberation can rely on the substantive support of a culturally established background consensus shared by the citizenry (Habermas, 1996: 296).

Habermas concludes his discussion of this concept with the following significant statement:

Discourse theory takes elements from both sides and integrates these in the concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision making. Democratic procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises, and discourses of self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption that reasonable or fair results are obtained insofar as the flow of relevant information and its proper handling have not been obstructed. According to this view, practical

reason no longer reside in universal human right, or in the ethical substance of a specific community, but in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action oriented to reaching understanding. In the final analysis, this normative content arises from the structure of linguistic communication and the communicative mode of sociation (Habermas, 1996: 296-97).

This democratic procedure is institutionalised through discourse and “bargaining processes” or by the process of mutual commitment to communication which strives to reach conclusions acceptable to all. Thus, such discourse taking place in the public space is an important variable in deliberative politics. Habermas quotes Cohen, to affirm that the concept of deliberative politics is conceived as a “procedural ideal” of deliberation and “decision making” which must reflect the social institutions:

The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens. Citizens in such an order share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free public deliberation (Habermas, 1996: 305).

Explained in these terms, the deliberative political procedure is a model aimed at constructing legitimacy that has to spread through the social structure in order to create a legal system to support a society seeking self-organisation. Therefore, Habermas and Cohen characterise the idea of deliberative politics as follows:

- a. A deliberative process happens in an argumentative way;
- b. A deliberative process is public and inclusive because it may not exclude any social sector; iterations must be free of any form of coercion and sovereign, following communication and argumentative rules;
- c. deliberations must be free of any form of internal coercion to guarantee the equal condition of participants;
- d. deliberation aims to reach agreement rationally;
- e. deliberative politics apply to any matters that regulate general interests;
- f. deliberative politics also include interpretations of necessities, and changes of pre-political attitudes, preferences, traditions and different way of life (Habermas, 1996: 305-6).

The deliberative political process or deliberative democracy therefore contrasts with and goes beyond the idea of liberal democracy, which entails simply the normative representation of interests. Weber and Bobbio, for instance, present this concept, as a democracy based on a system of representation, that is, a form of government characterised by regular elections, universal votes, freedom of conscience, the universal right of association and aspiration to power - democracy as a plural relation and expression of different interests toward dialogic democracy (Giddens, 1994: 112).

The importance of these liberal democracy values is undeniable, especially in countries facing problems in the transition or consolidation process as the result of the continuing coercion of an outgoing authoritarian regime. While liberal democracy is a whole or a web of representative institutions oriented to certain values, deliberative democracy is a distinctive practice within this web of institutions, a way of attempting to reach agreement and political commitments in the public sphere, that is not an

extension of liberal democracy or even a complement to it. Dialogic democracy through deliberative proceduralism aims at reconstructing social solidarity.

Analysing the same concept of deliberative proceduralism, Giddens recognises its worth in resolving conflicts:

The deliberative ideal, for example, starts from the premise that political preferences will conflict and that the purpose of democratic institutions must be to resolve this conflict. For such conflict resolution to be democratic, echoing Jurgen Habermas, it must occur 'through an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake with the aim of arriving at an agreed judgement.' It does not have to be the case that agreement is reached directly through such discussion. A vote might be taken; the important thing is that the participants reach a judgement on the basis of what they heard and said (Giddens, 1994:113).

Liberal institutions assure the normatisation of the democratic rules, through which the citizens exercise their right of vote. But they do not assure the continuity of the legitimacy of the laws produced by one of the democratic spheres that is the legislature. On the other hand, the emphasis placed on deliberative politics is one of exhaustive discussion, where every point of view is considered in order to reach legitimate solutions that must reflect all these previous discussions. In this kind of representative system all decisions must be made in the public sphere and be visible to all citizens.

As we shall see in the following chapter, what Giddens here calls the democratisation of democracy is precisely what Cardoso has in mind when he talks about the radical democratisation of society and institutions.

Conclusion

As the concluding section above makes clear, Habermas is more than simply an advocate of representative liberal democracy. He is aware that there are limits to the extent to which discussion in a capitalist society can be entirely freed from the inequalities arising from unequal distributions of power and money. But at the same time he insists that the best chance for democracy to succeed will be provided only if political authorities and citizens alike exert themselves to ensure to the fullest extent possible that a public sphere is preserved, free of undue state influence, within which civil society flourishes, and institutions are fostered which will allow the voices of all citizens to be heard. Second, he argues, within the framework created by the maintainance of this public sphere, for an ethics of discourse which is committed to reasoned argument and debate, rather than coercion and disguised violence through language. Third, as we have seen, he derives from this a model of deliberative politics in which the outcome of such institutions of liberal democracy as elections and votes in legislative chambers are justified not by the fact that they are the formal products of democratic institutions, but because they have emerged from a process of deliberative discourse.

I shall argue in the following chapter that this set of themes from Habermas – focused principally on the public sphere, argumentative discourse, and deliberative politics – are precisely those which have come to the centre of Cardoso's discourse as he has moved to the centre of practical politics in Brazil. Carrying into the public political sphere his identity as an intellectual with strong commitments to liberal democracy and social justice, he has increasingly emphasised the significance not only of the formal institutions of liberal democracy, but also of the deeper need to secure

the fundamental guarantees and procedures through which it can operate in practice. These are, in the Brazilian context, the rejection of revolutionary violence, the patient construction of civil society, and the creation of a communicative space in which all entrants commit themselves to reasoned dialogue as a means to eventual agreement.

CHAPTER 5

Cardoso's 'Habermasian' Project

So there has to be, in reality, the possibility of creating a sphere of debate, let us say, to promote convergence without hiding differences and arguments. So I am positively Habermasian. Neither Habermas nor I are liberals. I mean, we don't have the conservative view, liberal-conservative. We are something else, we are for the radicalisation of democracy, which is a different point of view (Interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Being the conductor of the public debate is the fundamental role in a general sense, in a democracy, for whoever exercises the role of President of the Republic, in the conditions of Brazil, or Prime Minister, or whatever (Interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

That is to say, "there are no unquestioned proposals, ... only dialogue" (Cardoso, 1997e: 29).

Introduction

We saw in Chapter Two that Cardoso has had a long and consistent commitment to liberal democracy, combined with a critical analysis of the structural inequalities present in Brazil and their social consequences. Chapter Three added to this picture by showing that his analysis of issues in international political economy over four decades led him to the conclusion that there was no immediate prospect of social or economic development in Brazil outside the increasingly rigid framework provided by a competitive capitalist global economy. And as we have seen, these related analyses have been connected, throughout, by constant attention to the particular social and cultural circumstances arising in Brazil from a century of republican development arising out of slavery and marked through the twentieth century by political practices of exclusion, and private and state clientelism of a pervasive kind. Chapter Four then stepped briefly aside from the development of Cardoso's thinking to review briefly the contribution made by Habermas to democratic theory, focusing on the issues of civil

society and the public sphere, the centrality to the democratic ideal of argumentative discourse, and the notion of deliberative democracy.

Against that background, the argument of this chapter is that during the 1980s and 1990s Cardoso moved towards a similar position to that developed by Habermas, not as a consequence of direct influence, but as a result of the confrontation between liberal democratic ideals and the social and political realities of Brazil, in the context of the universal dynamics of globalisation sketched out in Chapter Three. These circumstances led Cardoso to adopt a 'Habermasian' project, aiming not only at the consolidation of liberal democracy in Brazil, but at the radicalisation of democracy through the creation of a public sphere for reasoned political debate, the strengthening of civil society, the expansion of political participation to include those sectors previously excluded from political deliberations in Brazil, and the reform of the state.

As we shall see in this and the following chapter, this project has particular significance for Cardoso's conception of the nature of the role to be played by the President. I shall argue on this basis that to confine debate over Cardoso's intervention in Brazilian politics to the narrower issue of whether he should be seen as a social democrat struggling against a hostile environment or a convert to neoliberalism is to miss what is perhaps the most important dimension of his political project – the reform of the relationship between state and society, and the character of political culture in Brazil.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate continuity in Cardoso's thinking, from the starting point established in Chapter Two, where it was demonstrated that he came in the early 1970s to the heterodox conclusion that liberal democracy was not only desirable, but also possible in an associated-dependent state. This went along with a philosophical and practical rejection of the alternative of revolution and armed

struggle, the implications of which are explored in the first section of the chapter. The second section then examines Cardoso's commitment to the creation of what I call a new left of "Habermasian character." The third section then addresses his explicit commitment to developing a public sphere, and the crucial significance he attaches within that context to the way in which the president acts in terms of political leadership and debate. Finally, I explore the theme of reform of the state, showing that this too is motivated by the pursuit of Habermasian principles in the particular context of a Brazil still dominated by the legacy of unaccountable authority, populism and clientelism. The suggestion here is that when Cardoso refers to Habermas, as a theorist who recognises the public sphere as the locus of rational communication of democratic discourse, he is expressing in a new form the same ideas regarding democracy that he has been defending since the 1970s -- democracy as an end, not simply as a means.

Cardoso's critique of armed struggle

The aim of this section is to focus on Cardoso's critique of all forms of violent struggle. This later gives rise to a philosophy of political action characterised by ethical discursive and democratic argumentation -- the critique of violent action links directly to the advocacy of commitment to communicative action of a Habermasian character. This shift of focus is characterised by a commitment to rational and convincing argumentation aimed at political understanding through violence-free communication. This transition, in fact, takes place in the context of a general critique of orthodox thinking (in the case, on the left in the 1960s and 1970s) that, as I have argued earlier, marks Cardoso's intellectually heterodox career. Cardoso's critiques of populism, of the distorted vision of the nationalist bourgeoisie, of the orthodox

version of Marxism, and of the forced alternatives of socialism and barbarism all reflect this heterodox thinking that characterises his theoretical project and, consequently, his political action. As a consequence, he has been continually engaged in polemics in political and intellectual circles in Brazil. In his own words,

I was involved in polemics with all my generation, and with the ones who came before and after. I was involved in polemics all the time. But I never got involved in personal terms.... I think that at that time, if I can put it this way, with some vanity, I saw more of what was happening, with greater, let us say, capacity to explain because I took a less ideological approach than most of my contemporaries and predecessors. Even the most important, like Celso Furtado and Helio Jaguaribe. They were wrong in their analysis of what was happening in Brazil in the sixties (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Cardoso's project has always accepted that the democratic ideal is to be built in the adverse circumstances of a concrete world subject to an instrumental reason of capitalist dominion and of bureaucratic power. At the same time, it has placed constant emphasis upon the need for a clear analysis, conducted without prejudice, of the specific circumstances generated by the interaction between dynamic global and national processes of change. His critique of a strategy of armed struggle is of particular interest in this context not only because it led him to make an early commitment to liberal democracy, but also because the terms of his critique reveal the values of non-violent communicative action and the radicalisation of democracy in a modern society.

This is significant because Cardoso's critique of armed struggle began in the 1970s, when it was still defended by many on the left in the context of military coups and

authoritarian regimes. However, Cardoso maintained his critique of the “dissimulated cartesianism” which proposed armed struggle as the only alternative to Cold War authoritarian military rule justified in terms of the need for opposition to the global communism. His critique of armed struggle is facilitated by his analytical methodology, which resists generalisations in favour of close analysis of the dynamics and potential of specific situations.

Cardoso’s critique of the armed struggle that was endorsed by a considerable segment of the left-wing intelligentsia must be understood in the light of his commitment to scientific analysis rather than ideological dogmatism, and to a methodological option that reflects simultaneously on theory and practice. In terms of scientific knowledge, as Cardoso has understood it from his earliest work, interpretations cannot be limited to the level of manifest facts. A hermeneutic analysis and imaginative capacity are necessary to develop models of interpretations of reality in order to be able to explain present day social problems. For that, it is necessary to provide a method of applying concrete analysis to particular situations. Yet, here is one of the major challenges of the social sciences: to identify the particular transformations that are taking place in each concrete situation studied, and to take into account the historical evolution of these situations and their political structure. As the approach set out in *Capitalismo e Escravidão no Brasil Meridional* (1962) made clear, this is the main task of the social sciences – to identify the particular transformations of each concrete situation that has been studied.

Cardoso states, referring to some analyses of dependency relations and armed struggle, that although they had the right level of commitment to the denunciation of exploitation, they conceived imperialism and the processes of capitalist accumulation in the peripheral economies as the only problem, and in the terms of the English

proverb "threw the baby out with the bath water". In this case, the necessity to investigate and explain novel social processes was replaced by easy schemes or images that were theoretically attractive but mistaken, such as "the development of underdevelopment", "sub-imperialism", "lumpen-bourgeoisie", "the revolution of the marginalisers", and so on. These are important concepts because they grasp some of the more specific aspects of the problem, but they lead to distorted analyses which have dramatic consequences on political practice (Cardoso, 1973c: 47).

Within this general methodological context, Cardoso's criticism of the guerrilla strategy is based on a dialectical methodology which refuses to engage in static analysis of a reality that is in fact dynamic. As it happened, it did not find immediate favour with the Latin American and international left at the time:

The book that I wrote with Enzo Faletto on dependency and development was at the time overshadowed by Regis Debray's book, *Revolution in the Revolution*. This was an ideological book that had an opposite viewpoint to ours. Its theses, as a matter of fact, were the ones that prevailed, not ours. Ours were marginal to the political process. Nobody took an analysis of the kind that we produced seriously, one that was a structural analysis, an historical-structural analysis (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

The perspective adopted by Cardoso and Faletto was that to work in social science in terms of concepts such as social class, bourgeoisie and proletariat, class conflict and class interest, means to seek the specificity of each concrete situation through the use of these concepts as simple instruments of analysis. To conceive of them as abstract and ungrounded notions leads to subjective analysis, stereotypes and generalisations. In fact these concepts transform and interact, especially in a modern

global society where information drives and continually changes the cultural level of the population. Such dynamics, of course, give rise to novel kinds of problems that need to be revealed and analysed. The analysis has to consider the particularity of capitalism in each social formation with a different historical background. In other words, it has to consider that Latin American societies do not reproduce the same historical processes as European countries. An attempt to apply the same analytical model to historically different realities is the origin of errors of interpretation.

The belief that it is possible to “break the bourgeois state” through armed struggle is a typical example of this mistaken analysis. This strategy, Cardoso says, is a mistaken response to the crisis of Latin American populism and the simultaneous weakness of the liberal party system. In the face of the impossibility of reproducing the classical relationship of power that existed with the founding of the cities - civitas and polis, as space to live and interact - in European societies, populism and the patrimonialism appear as phenomena in which citizenship of liberal inspiration cannot prosper in an economic reality originating on the basis of slave exploitation. Support for the guerrilla arises in this context as a new form of opposition politics that applies a method of analysis which continues to view different realities as homogeneous. Régis Debray, for instance, according to Cardoso, “accepted the idea that imperialism was homogeneous in all Latin American countries (with one or two exceptions) and adopted a frame of reference that emphasised a sort of outmoded imperialist domination, based on the oligarchy and large estates” (Cardoso, 1972b: 202).

Cardoso, therefore, maintains that:

Debray, in what is virtually the official synthesis of the style of left politics in a recent period, in *Revolution in the Revolution*, is inspired by a sort of Rousseauianism to demonstrate the virtues of the struggle

in the jungle and in the mountains against the evils of the city. Guided by a poorly concealed Cartesianism, Debray starts from a *cogito*: the guerrilla exists therefore... His main argument is not directed towards characterising the social forces in struggle, the relationship between mass and party, etc., but defending, militarily, the tactical-strategic superiority of the rural guerrilla. At the same time, too, he gives a moral characterisation of the advantages of the guerrilla in the political struggle: "the city, says Fidel, is the cemetery of revolutionaries and of resources" (Cardoso, 1972c: 158-159; see also Castañeda, 1997).

The characteristic of this type of reasoning, for Cardoso, lies in the ideological conviction of the moral superiority of the armed struggle and not in the rational analysis of class composition, and the relationship of strength between the masses and the parties that represent them. In Weberian terms, this means that the principle of conviction prevails over the principle of responsibility. No matter how important the passion of conviction is, it is not sufficient to mobilise political actions, since, instead of being of benefit, it can increase opposition and delay social emancipation.

For instance, refuting criticism of his formulation of dependency theory, Cardoso says: "it would not be correct to replace what we did, that is to say, the dialectical analysis of concrete situations of dependency, with a formal theory of classes that does not situate them in a context in which the imperialism and the dependency that correspond to them are obligatory references for class analysis (...). This is an error that originates in a formalist interpretation of the Marxist dialectic" (Cardoso, 1970: 139). In order to take concrete steps forward, having principles and convictions is not enough. It is necessary to understand the realities and social forces that might negate or reproduce the conditions of dependence.

Cardoso asserts on this basis that analysis should be directed toward the following: "not making a 'socialist theory' of the revolution, but working out a theory which allows us to guide the practice of a socialist revolution, should it occur, or that allows us to demonstrate the circumstances in which such a type of revolution becomes more a desire rooted in ideologies than a viable path to socialism" (Cardoso, 1970: 139).

An analysis made on the basis of an ideology rather than in terms of a viable path to socialism is reduced to a conviction of principle, in which one simply proclaims that the struggle will begin with an armed struggle in the countryside, spreading across the cities, surrounding and strangling the bourgeois terrain, leading to the collapse of the state of oppression imposed by the capitalists. Behind that march towards the overthrow of the bourgeois state lay a handful of individuals, armed with revolutionary principles. Cardoso, in order to sustain his criticism, quotes Debray to illustrate the idea that for the guerrilla combatant the "first challenge is a combat against himself, aiming at overcoming his old bourgeois habits, being the birthmark left by the incubator on his body, where his weaknesses is found" (Cardoso, 1972c: 158) For Cardoso, the guerrilla experience is in the first place a romantic rejection of the city built by the orthodox non-revolutionary left wing and a statement of opposition to the lack of principles in the bourgeois political terrain.

Emphasis upon the romantic orientation of guerrilla politics leads Cardoso to diagnose the experience of the armed struggle in a critical manner. Reviewing its record after ten years of almost continuous failure, he argues that the end result of the guerrilla experience was an anachronistic dislocation of a rural focus to the city. The urban guerrilla, as conducted by the Uruguayan Tupamaros or by its adherents in Brazil, polarised politics and opened more major perspectives than the primitive form of rousseauian jansenism preached by Debray in the name of Marxism, but it still

failed to make an appropriate analysis of political forces, and it ended in disaster (Cardoso, 1975: 159).

Taking into account the trajectory of Cardoso's work, his criticism of armed struggle is a natural progression from his work on slavery in nineteenth century Brazil, and on dependency and development. It reflects the application of the same methodological principles, and shows a recurring theme: a refusal to address issues in contemporary Brazilian politics in terms of abstractions, and a constant willingness to challenge received ideas. As we shall see, the same spirit lies behind his rethinking of what the meaning of 'left-wing' politics could be in the Brazil of the 1960s and 1970s.

Cardoso and the formation of a 'Habermasian' left wing

Cardoso's critique of the strategy of armed struggle was based upon the claim that it reflected a romantic rejection of the city, and failed to make a realistic assessment of the balance of forces at the time. But he took an equally critical view of some on the left who took for granted the more classical Leninist position that the urban proletariat was by definition a united and progressive entity, destined to be the social vanguard of the revolution. He dismissed the perspective in which history appeared to be a succession of facts and characters whose performances and roles were defined beforehand, where the proletariat was poised as the bearer of humanity: "History ... defined as in a chess game where only the black pieces may win. Isn't there more theology in that than Marxism? (Cardoso, 1995:101). Thus Cardoso rejects some of the principal assumptions of orthodox Marxism-Leninism: "The theory that the proletariat is the universal class, how are we going to accept that today? This nineteenth century point of view isn't acceptable any more. The inevitability of the revolution isn't acceptable any more.. What was accepted with blind confidence in the

nineteenth century is doubted today” (Cardoso, 1991:8-12)). It follows that the left can no longer justify its programme simply by claiming that it is in some sense in the interest of the proletariat: “If the left wants to be in the vanguard, it cannot think about these conflicts and justify them in the name of the interest of just one segment of society, because these social concepts are historical, structural, they relate to a structure, and that structure changes’ (Cardoso, 1996a).

As we shall see later, Cardoso’s thinking coincides with that of Habermas on this point. He sees a need to rethink the Marxist approach to ideology and class struggle as a consequence of the changes that have taken place with the advent of large-scale investment in research, science, technology and industrial production. As a consequence of this, Cardoso says, society today is highly diversified. There are many points of view which need to be debated, hence the necessity to organise the public sphere within which such debate can take place: “We cannot have the illusion of a subject that is ‘the subject of history’...That is why we have to have, in reality, the possibility of creating spheres for debate, let us say, to seek convergence without hiding differences and arguments (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

From our viewpoint, there is a parallel process of intellectual development in Habermas’s and Cardoso’s analyses of democracy since the 1960s when their first works were written – Habermas’s classic *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1961) and Cardoso’s *Capitalismo e Escravidao no Brasil Meridional* (1962).

Habermas, as the heir to the Frankfurt School’s theoretical criticism, seeks to establish an explanatory framework for human capacity for mutual understanding through a focus on the origins of the public sphere in capitalism and the rise of formal democracy. Cardoso, from another direction, seeking to apply a scientific analysis in the context of an incipient Brazilian sociology, analyses the exhaustion of the slave-

based economy, the dissolution of its social order (masters and slaves) and the formation of another class structure that replaces it – but one in which the conditions for the emergence of a ‘public sphere’ of the European kind are absent. There are strong similarities in methodology between them, arising from a common Marxist background.

However, despite the clear presence of common inspiration, and a shared approach, the two analyses appear to have proceeded in parallel, but without mutual influence. In fact, the first reference to Habermas in Cardoso’s work appears only in the 1980s, when Cardoso undertook a conjunctural analysis of the authoritarian political regime, the transition to democracy, and the social transformation that was taking place as part of the process. In that period Cardoso refers to Habermas’s *Legitimation Crisis* (1973) to describe, from a liberal-democratic point of view, the problems the Brazilian political regime was going through – the lack of legitimacy, as a result of the economic growth model put into practice after 1967, which produced what Hirschman called the “tunnel effect”: while there was growing prosperity, there was a growth of inequality as well, causing a loss of legitimacy for the regime. Since no regime could be sustained without legitimacy, ways to re-establish legitimacy were sought, through the liberalisation of the political regime without democratising it (Cardoso, 1981). A decade later, Cardoso cites Habermas again as a thinker who has formulated an intellectual project in reaction to the obfuscation of reason reflected in the “anguished pessimism” of libertarian thinking triggered by the instability of the post-industrial world shaped by nuclear terror and the cold war. Cardoso here values Habermas for his rejection of the fragmentary thought which promotes scepticism toward the tradition of rationalism:

Indeed, the attempt to reevaluate the Frankfurt School (somewhat skeptical altogether and, in the version of the *Kultur Kritic*, full of anti-modernism) undertaken by Jurgen Habermas, as well as the revisions of Talcott Parsons undertaken by Niklas Luhmann, were attempts to anchor critical thought onto the old pillars of reason (Cardoso, 1993c: 150).

As a sociologist and politician, Cardoso has invoked Habermas to guide his heterodox analysis of reality. For instance, following his analysis of the prospects for contemporary left wing challenges, after the fall of authoritarian socialist regimes, he rejects the liberal alternative because it promotes a simplistic solution to different national situations. Distancing himself from a liberal perspective, Cardoso believes that there are

values of a critical left wing, of Habermasian inspiration, that will be able to understand the diversities and contradictions of contemporary world and, at the same time, identify a politics that will mean the improvement of living conditions for the majority and the improvement of the democratic game (...). The traditional left wing underestimated the capacity of formal democracy to promote improvement in proletarian and peasant welfare. More than that, attached to closed and authoritarian political structures, it also underestimated the importance of the free circulation of ideas and information at a time when a new technological paradigm was arising to command an internationalised process of production oriented by market logic (Cardoso, 1995f: 70-71)

But which Habermasian values are these? Which guiding politics are these? At root, Cardoso and Habermas share a similar conception of civil society. For both, the social space is where issues of public interest are debated with the aim of revitalising democracy. Cardoso has pointed out the necessity for democratic revitalisation since the 1970s, when he analysed the process of change from authoritarian regimes to liberal democracies and criticised the use of coercion and violence from either left or right. The starting point here is representative liberal democracy – both analyses descend from this tradition. But, it is evident that both go beyond the normative limits of this model, and that what Cardoso refers to as ‘substantive democracy’ has close parallels with Habermas’s model of democracy based on communicative action. They are able to converge, as a result, on what both call the radical institutionalisation of democratic society.

To summarise, Cardoso rejects the idea of a left that has privileged access to the truth, in favour of a left committed to democratic dialogue as a means to promoting a reform-oriented agenda.

Cardoso’s Commitment to Argumentative Discourse

According to Habermas, the fundamental commitment to debate and not to coercion in the public sphere finds justification in the idea that diversity within society is to be valued and that the main instrument for communication in the society is discourse. Through his interventions in the public sphere Cardoso reveals the centrality of this idea in his government’s intellectual project. Due to his own intellectual trajectory, he has made an effort to be perceived as an invigorator, capable of inciting debate in the Brazilian public domain rather than violence, using the word and not the stick. Praising the commitment but not the tactics of reformers who use violent means, he

states: “We should react with energy, with the same force of protest and the same indignation. Only we should not obscure our vision or imagine that solutions can be found without rational efforts” (Cardoso, 1998c).

Patience and tolerance know no limit in democracy. “Without legitimate order there is no democracy since it is based on argument and not violence” (Cardoso, 1998d). In this process “The State engages in dialogue, talks, discusses, assumes its responsibilities, but accepts the free flow of information, and even accepts discussion of the decision-making process itself, of what is legitimate on the part of society, on the part of those channels [of communication] that are being created” (Cardoso, 1997f). The channels of communication to which Cardoso refers give shape to a public sphere in which citizens, that is to say each participant, each member of a national community, have a notion of their own importance as an integral part of that society and seek to participate actively in the decision-making process. This Cardoso, like Habermas, calls deliberative democracy. This demand in society for transparency and access to the State’s political decision-making process is what Cardoso refers to when saying that “We need to radicalise democratic concepts of the State which are capable of reaching all members of the electorate. In turn the electorate’s various manifestations need to be perceptible to the State” (Cardoso and Soares, 1998a: 211).

Thus, when Cardoso refers during his presidency to a certain conservative mentality that fails to understand what contemporary democracy should be, he is able to relate his position directly to that espoused by Habermas:

The mental attitude of the opposition, be it of left-wing, right or centre, does not understand that the basis of radicalisation of democracy - à la Habermas, if you want - is to raise questions in the public arena and to argue, go to the roots, to attempt to convince... Whoever does not

understand that, does not understand either how to do modern left politics, politics that push forward (...) Everything is a question of domination. I have no doubt about it. The question is how to live with it, what to counter-balance to it. The answer is democracy. To enlarge democracy, that's the challenge that imposes itself in the face of new forms of economy. The big issue is to build a more radical democracy. If we ask what it means to be progressive today, the answer is: to be progressive is to seek for the radicalisation of democracy (Cardoso, 1997e: 21).

In sum, Cardoso recognises the manner in which Habermas extends democratic theory to explore its social and institutional requisites, and uses the concepts addressed by Habermas to explore the need for a focus beyond state and party (the traditional points of reference of the left), towards an autonomous public sphere:

For hope to survive it is necessary to associate social justice and freedom with the political instrument. The latter will no longer be the union of state and party, even if both are reformed, for postindustrial societies (i.e. information economies) are 'decentralized': politics is not the center of all change; nor do the state and the parties constitute the sole instruments for reforms. The 'polyarchization' of contemporary societies, as Robert Dahl has pointed out, is a fact. But, either we can build *mechanisms* and *institutions* with which the citizen can relate, at various levels of society, to the *res publica* (the 'public thing'), or the paths leading to the new society will not be established. We can and we must discuss the place of the 'public,' the limits that mass society and organizational society impose on the making of

'public opinion.' We can even dream of a rational public discourse *à la Habermas* or destroy the myth of the public man. But we cannot escape redefining the scope of politics and extending it far beyond state and party' (Cardoso, 1993c: 151).

This is a passage that shows clearly how Cardoso reaches through his own critique of the traditional focus of the political left a position which can be expressed directly in Habermasian terms. The critique of reliance on state and party leads to a critical focus on the public sphere, and to the presentation of the concept of 'rational public discourse' as an ideal end-point, even if it is one that can only be a dream in the context of contemporary Brazil. This statement, dating from the early 1990s, captures with remarkable precision the project that Cardoso would undertake as President – a commitment to the radicalisation of democracy which goes beyond the context of state and party, focuses on the development of a public sphere as a priority, and holds out as an ideal to orient political behaviour in the public sphere the conception of rational political discourse advocated by Habermas.

Cardoso exercises and conceives of power from the perspective of an intellectual of the modern Left who is equally critical of the populist style, the traditional left and neo-liberalism. He reiterates his perspective that the modern left cannot oppose reform of the State or fail to espouse an ideology of transformation. "That is not left wing. I am left wing", he concludes (Cardoso, 1997e: 32). In his view, the left today has two roles: "expanding democracy before new forms of economy take hold", and "being progressive in the search for radical democracy with greater access to the decision making process and a more responsive state" (Cardoso, *ibid*: 28). These have been Cardoso's constant themes in Government and in opposition.

The aspiration expressed here is that Brazilian society today should function as a polyarchy. That is to say, "There are many centres for decision-making. Decisions here are not decisions that can be taken in a closed and authoritarian way and have an effect. It is always necessary to have a lot of negotiation. It is necessary to be aware of and to regain the capacity to tolerate diversity, and to see that sometimes you get it right and sometimes you don't" (Cardoso 1997g: 311) In a complex and dynamic society like Brazil's it is not conceivable to impose outcomes because "we cannot restrain ourselves from speaking, from indicating ways forward, and, when it is appropriate, using power to teach, because power in the form of violence is no longer able to obtain concrete results. Power which does not explain itself is unacceptable and so there has to be a continual dialogue" (Cardoso, 1997g: 311).

The effect of this, according to Cardoso, is

the creation of an effective public space, inspired by an ethic of argument and negotiation, in circumstances in which we cannot count on the institutional instruments found in the Western countries in which these spaces were maintained by political parties. Here our specific experience is that parties exist, that representative democracy has taken root among our elites, but that demands are diverse and fragmentary. The presence of the mass media as a means of communication is strong. Aspirations appear but we don't yet have very clear ways of articulating that public sphere based on normative values that take into account an ethic of argument and negotiation" (Cardoso, 1997h: 324).

The role of the president

Cardoso repeatedly returns, therefore, to a strong contrast between the President as a source of ultimate and sometimes unaccountable authority on the one hand, and as a facilitator of reasoned debate and leader of a process of consensus-building on the other. Instead of participation in and contribution to debate in the public arena, he notes, demands are made of the “President’s dictatorial manner” to resolve issues alone and act the illustrious tyrant. To Cardoso unrestrained political will of this kind can lead to authoritarianism. Giving his own view on the presidency, Cardoso says,

There is an expectation, in Brazilian society, that the President – this expectation goes back a long way – that the President resolves things. I say it’s not like that. The President has to lead toward a solution. That’s it. And he has a symbolic role in this. Today, in the world of today, presidents have functions they did not have previously. They are not autocrats – they should not be – but they cannot opt out of leading the process. And while leading the process he cannot lose sight of his symbolic role of bringing people together – bringing the nation together (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Referring to Habermas he explains that “the creation of a public space for debate and dialogue is fundamental. This is what we do on economic issues. Here there is not a decision that is not explained, and explained again. There is a permanent effort to give reasons, and when appropriate, to introduce modifications. But to give reasons, convince, get people to believe, more all the time, in the objectives that are proposed” (Cardoso, 1997a: 311).

On the same theme he says "I always try to convince, to give arguments – it is a bit pretentious to say so – to teach, but it's the response of the professor in me. I try to establish a pedagogical relationship with whoever I'm speaking to and the country as a whole. I could win a debate or a vote because I have the power to impose it, but that is not what I want, I want more, I want to persuade." Due to the desire to persuade, says Cardoso,

I have, for example, more interest and desire for discussion with the opposition than with the government, with those who are on my side. It is very difficult for me to be debating things with those who are on my side. I am always, almost always, debating things with those who oppose. As president, with the power you have, your ability to persuade is greater. That fascinates me. They say I'm vain, that I'm an intellectual. It isn't that. It may in part be that of course, but it's more than that. It's essentially a pedagogical position in a socio-cultural system that is fundamentally democratic (Cardoso and Soares, 1998a: 81).

Cardoso views this process as essential to the revitalization of the art of politics. To revitalize the art of politics it is necessary to end the vices which have traditionally permeated the structures of power "putting together traditional representative democracy, the demand for wider participation, the non-governmental organizations, which will have to have an ever-growing presence in the life of society, demonstrations, sometimes even by individuals, which have greater impact all the time as a result of the presence of the means of mass communication. In one way or another we have to recreate the ability to negotiate and to conduct an argument – I don't want to mention authors – but à la Habermas, to guarantee that it really is a

democracy we are living in” (Cardoso, 1997h: 324). Here debate and non-violent means are used to convince and be convinced. Cardoso in fact acts “basically as an intellectual and a teacher, although I am in the Presidency and have power at my disposal” (Cardoso and Soares, 1998a: 80).

Democracy is not a final destination but a persistent evolution, never satisfied with itself. Always looking for improvements in areas where new tests are permitted, different proposals are discussed and, eventually incorporated or rejected. The biggest advantage to the democratic system is this, says Cardoso, being imperfect it finds its own imperfection and opportunities for improvements. “This demands our greatest efforts to present arguments, discuss, engage in dialogue, finally to try to convince and form stable political majorities capable of supporting the transformation process. It is not easy but it is gratifying” (Cardoso, 1998f).

A fellow party member, Senator Sergio Machado, testifies to Cardoso’s capacity to persuade, saying, “Fernando is a good listener and has strong debating abilities. This is what makes him a seductive speaker. For he has exceptional charisma which lends to his position of high standing in the country.” Though this is an added attribute “His ability to persuade evidently lies in his fundamental grasp of the facts. He is an enlightened and well-informed man. To this is added tactics and techniques which the speaker is initially unaware of, or on many occasions is completely unaware of” (Cardoso, 1997j: 8).

It is not merely the combination of persuasive ability and knowledge of the issues, which are indispensable weapons in the political world, but also a technique that is born of reason rather than academic style or intellectualism. “If somebody comes to speak with me I pay attention to what he is saying. I am interested. Not that what is said may be of particular interest to me, but at that moment I am interested. The

speaker realises this. He realises that I am genuinely listening. All manner of people visit me. I frequently receive Members of Congress. A person with more refined sensibilities than myself, like Vargas Llosa, or with purely academic sensibilities, or a great intellectual would become impatient. But if you perceive visitors to be representative of Brazilian society and that views should be formed consensually then the process is not uninteresting" (Cardoso, 1998i: 344).

At different points in his political trajectory the ability to listen and persuade is linked to the nature of the role of the intellectual who, like the President, he speaks on behalf of civil society and sectors of the State. Just as, as an intellectual, he is concerned with "what changes, how it changes, and in what conditions the new emerges", this is how he views the political process as well. In this sense, he says, "there isn't any split in me between the academic and politician in me, I mean in the way that I look at things" (interview with the author, 27 July 1998). Thus "the politician with a true vocation for power, the statesman, will help the people to organise, to think and to vote with a knowledge of what they are doing; he will prepare the debate. For example, what should we do about oil? And sugar cane? Democracy is more about deliberation than about voting, and debate has to be organised" (Cardoso, 1983c: 44-47).

As an intellectual Cardoso recognises the value of words and instruments of discourse which as a politician he uses as a resource to persuade. Speaking as President-elect in a closing speech to the Federal Senate, he took up this line of thought which links the idea of the intellectual to that of the politician, placing emphasis in Gramscian terms on the function of argument and persuasion rather than imposition. Cardoso set out his understanding that

Democratic politics should be a form of civilized living together: the art of transforming society with a belief in your own convictions, but also listening to the reasoning of others and measuring the consequences of your own acts. Because the democratic method of change also involves changing people's minds through persuasion. And this, when it is not the disguised imposition [of your own point of view], is a process of reciprocal enlightenment that equally presupposes the potential to persuade and to be persuaded (Cardoso, 1994a: 3).

In the same way, it is possible to lose a vote or an argument, because to persuade and be persuaded are not isolated acts. Their mutual relationship can be negatively highlighted by defeat during elections or debates. As Cardoso says, "I have already lost so many times. When we lose we have to know how to recognise defeat. If I lost a debate, an argument, an election I have had to trace a new path (Cardoso, 1998a: 345). Cardoso recognizes, as a consequence, that the concentration of power may at times need to be reduced in order to make the decision making process more flexible and permit greater societal involvement. By implication this means a reduction of the powers of the federal bureaucracy and of those at the head of the federal bureaucracy. As he says, it may frequently require a reduction in his own power: "As over the communications issue, where I suspended by decree the right which the President of the Republic enjoyed to give away, as if they were hereditary grants in the time of the Empire, to give away television, radio and bandwidth rights, as a personal prerogative of the President. This prerogative does not work in a democracy" (Cardoso, 1997k).

However this does not imply a lack of commitment to the responsibility of deciding "with serenity and firmness." As Cardoso himself puts it, the government should

always look for “avenues of dialogue and persuasion but without shirking the responsibility of making a decision” (Cardoso, 1995i: 15-23). In all this it is possible to understand Cardoso’s unease at imposing his views. As he himself recognises: “I have a preference for persuasion” (Cardoso, 1998a: 345).

In a democracy, then, to govern is not to impose: “it requires leadership. It is leadership in the modern world, not imposition by the executioner. It is not histrionics, it is understanding, motivation, coordination, persistence and the ability to stick to a resolute course” (Cardoso, 1999b). In addition to these qualities, what is important is the ability to explain, “and it is to this that I have dedicated myself. Instead of symbols which throw out into the air something that is not well understood, I focus on understanding. I always think: I have to make myself understood” (Cardoso, 1998a: 170). Cardoso as president, in other words, has sought to act in a manner consistent with that he outlined in a meeting with intellectuals as President-elect, in which he argued that governing was about persuading rather than imposing, bringing people together not subordinating some to others, joining forces (Cardoso, 1994b: 81).

The Reform of the State

The notion of a State which engages in open dialogue with civil society is fundamental to the rational discourse Cardoso has employed in power. During Brazil’s authoritarian regime Cardoso expressed the opinion he had already formulated on the public sphere as a space in which debate is organised.

What is the role of parties? What is the role of the press? What is the role of intellectuals? Their role is to articulate ideas in such a way that the people can recognise their interests and locate them. I think if there continues to be an expansion of space their ideas, political movements,

and debates can be organised and then the people will participate again (...) to articulate debate in relative harmony, to make that which is opaque in society transparent, then people will start to participate at all levels. I think all issues no matter how difficult are possible to discuss with the public (Cardoso, 1978d).

His insistence on debate and the opening of society to public scrutiny stems from his criticism of populism and political clientelism. Consequently democratic control of the State would allow public debate, since "it is at the core of modern democracy" (Cardoso, 1983c: 202). The themes of statements made by Cardoso in the 1970s and 1980s on society recur today since whilst society has opened up, the state has not. As contemporary commentators have noted, the state maintains its original characteristics formed prior to change in society (Skidmore, 1998: 44). The Brazilian political system, says Cardoso today, remains quite closed when compared to the openness that already exists in society at large. Society today is dynamic. Non-governmental groups have formed on all issues. This is a demand-driven society. It has trade unions, churches (not only Catholic, but also Protestant), and several cults that have formed which are quite political in their demands. Unlike the political system and the State, Brazilian society has undergone a huge transformation. Due to immigration, migration, urban development and a large increase in the number of schools, society has exploded. But the public sphere has not yet developed to the same extent. Nor has the State or the political system. The political system still doesn't have the same propensity for dynamic change as society. It is a system that reproduces itself under the auspices of the Party structure and Congress, both of which are steeped in the values of "the traditional State" and "traditional patrimonialism." As he approached

political office, Cardoso continued to insist on the need to go beyond the limits of representative democracy, especially as it functioned in Brazil:

Social democracy will not find the path to modernity through the defense of parliamentary government alone. The participatory dimension should be added to representative democracy. .. The enormous strength of the so-called popular movements – of undeniable democratic character and consequences – frequently is not being used to support those who try to define the institutional mechanisms that permit a regular pressure for social demands. It is in this politico-institutional engineering that social democracy, accepting the premises and objectives of expanding the participatory forms of democracy, should concentrate and differentiate itself from the merely basist action that characterizes a good part of Latin American popular progressivism (Cardoso, 1993d: 293-294).

Cardoso similarly commented in his interview with the author of this thesis that the state

is still not greatly permeated by democratisation. What am I doing in government? I am trying to open more and more of the State to the participation of non-state groups. The public sphere cannot be composed of the State alone. There has to be a third sector in which society is mobilized and you have to break the chains of clientelism in the health care and education systems. This is a process. We are making progress in this process. It will take time but it is progress made to transform the State. We are trying to facilitate this with large financial institutions assisting the small ones. In this area we already

have what is called the PRONAF programme to finance the network of small, family producers. The Brazilian state was not designed to serve the small but benefit the large (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Drawing on the analytical methodology that has marked his approach throughout his career, Cardoso looks at Brazil's evolution through "different historical phases and structural situations". Within this framework, he focuses on the way in which the processes of economic stabilization and development engage with the realm of politics and generate a challenge to carry out a whole range of reforms:

From this point on the challenge is no longer simply to intervene in the exchange rate, the rate of interest or the degree of openness of the economy, and in all these technical issues that I have never really learned to understand perfectly. But there is a challenge that is just as persistent as this, and that is for us to change certain relationships that have been ossified for a long time, and which we are now taking decisive action to change. To reform the structure of the state, to change the form of the relationship between the state and society, to reform the pattern of income distribution and above all to keep clearly in sight that the fundamental challenge is to improve social justice in the country (Cardoso, 1994b: 4).

To enable change to take place in the long-ossified relationship between the state and society, Cardoso aims to democratise the relationship. He seeks to open the previously aloof state to society. Thus, it is necessary "to put an end to the Vargas era. This state was basically shaped by two authoritarian influences: the *getulismo* of the *Estado*

Novo [the authoritarian regime in power between 1937 and 1945]; and military authoritarianism” (ibid).

The crisis of the Brazilian state, therefore, finds its roots not only in fiscal failure and a tendency to channel resources to the private groups acting in alliance with the State bureaucracy, but also in authoritarianism. As Cardoso says,

this State that today the Left defends is the product of two authoritarian movements in Brazil. It is an omniscient, omnipresent and all-controlling state, in which the good of the nation is confused with the good of the State. It didn't have faith in the people and it didn't believe in civil society. This is over. The state was set up for this purpose. It is a State that since it was founded has been encrusted with private interests and the clientelistic interests of the public sector. The two have fused (Cardoso, 1997i: 298).

In these circumstances, he argues, discussions should take place on common well-being, the level of satisfaction of the people, and social welfare. Social welfare, conceived of in Europe as the welfare state, in Brazil is known as the ill-fare state. The privatisation of welfare resources has not benefited society, that is to say “the private sector has infiltrated the State and allied itself with bureaucracy. It has made alliances with elements of the bureaucracy and controlled all decisions, suffocating society. We are putting an end to that” (Cardoso, 1997i: 298).

Cardoso utilizes debate to discuss the politics of his own government, defending the radicalization of democracy by means of developing a public sphere in which there is a commitment to moral values, legitimacy and political stability. In his view of the crisis of socialism, for example, he states that “the values and ethical objectives failed because the ideals ossified and lost vitality. This contributed to the weakness of

regime legitimacy; new modes of inequality arose (within socialist states and among them). Individual freedom was underestimated as a value in itself – necessary and indispensable in the affirmation of the citizen” (Cardoso, 1995h: 97-98).

Linking this statement with the Habermasian view of the public sphere, debate is important since, “not only is it the fair thing to do from the point of view of morality, not only is it the rational thing to do from the point of view of democratic legitimacy but it is also the prudent thing to do from the point of view of political stability” (Chambers,1996:10). Morality, legitimacy and political stability are the elements which Cardoso combines in his call for the renewal of a political space. Therefore, he insists that his government is a government “that has its basis in morality” (Cardoso, 1999a).

According to Habermas, the task of renewing a political space is to give voice to all in conditions of effective freedom. In the circumstances of contemporary social life it is important that the public arena is truly public. Conditions of contemporary democracy presuppose that there is an arena of debate and dialogue where mutual tolerance and respect are shown. In a radical democracy everybody is given effective conditions of freedom so that even those who are not organized may “speak out” (Cardoso, 1998e: 94). This progressive process of reform of the State is designed to answer the concerns of those who “speak out”.

This entails ensuring that the structures for decision-making are more accessible to the interests and demands of society as a whole and less easily manipulated by minority groups. On this issue we see Cardoso’s view of the State today as standing between traditional dichotomies which counterposed state and civil society, or central direction and market economics. The challenge identified by Cardoso in office is to bring the state and the people into close proximity, favouring participation of the

individual and social movements to construct a public space, to diffuse and universalise services and public policies, assuring all citizens equal access and genuine influence over government actions. In short, for Cardoso, radicalised democracy is the sense of contemporary political action where there is an effort to link utopian ideals (the desire for transformation) and ethical responsibility (Cardoso, 1998f).

In the case of Brazil this form of debate is hindered not only by the traditional private actions of the State and an overwhelming of society by the state bureaucracy, but also by the political system and party system as a whole. This is what Castels has to say with reference to the relationship of Cardoso's communicative action and Brazil's political reality.

If the nature of Brazilian political class does not change to support the modernization process Cardoso will fail. This will not be his own fault but a fault in the Brazilian class structure (...) The contradictions which Cardoso faces are the same as those which Mikhail Gorbachev faced in the former Soviet Union – how to reform the Communist Party without at the same time destroying its power. How can Cardoso reform the State with the support of the State, when many interests created by the State will be over thrown? Cardoso is not only a democrat but a man of consensus. He cannot modernize the State and the relationship between the State and society by himself. He is not a messiah. He has to negotiate with the Congress and with society. It is a task which requires political craftsmanship (Castels, 1999).

Reform of the state therefore occupies a pre-eminent position in the political agenda Cardoso wishes to debate in the public arena. Cardoso's main tenet of thought is that

the State should serve, indeed it should serve all its citizens. How is this possible? In an address on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from the London School of Economic and Political Science, he offered the following six-point account of the appropriate relationship between the citizen and the state:

a) First of all it is necessary to use a broad concept of citizenship, which, whilst retaining traditionally fundamental notions (essentially the notion of participation in politics), goes further to incorporate group and individual demands. The citizen is no longer a simple voter. He or she acts also as a member of a class; ethnic group; sexual minority; and according to employment status, as unemployed worker or a landless peasant and so on. This multiplicity of views must be reflected in the functions of the political system. The State must be prepared to enter into a dialogue *à géométrie variable* with the diverse groups that reflect the plurality of identities of the individual in contemporary society.

b) How can the citizen have any control in an economy in which the market is central and privatisation a necessary course? One must overcome the simplistic notion that what is in the best interest of the citizenry has to originate necessarily in the State. The mechanism for regulating "privatised public" activities (communications, electricity, transport, etc.) must be guided by the needs of the people and, to that end, the direct participation by representatives of civil society in the bodies concerned is fundamental. The State must be porous and permeable to the needs of its citizens. The identification of the State with national interest cannot be assumed, but it is a political construction work that requires major efforts to reach consensus.

c) Democracy entails the need to ensure universal access to essential public services, as one of the main conditions for bringing about an effectively

participating citizenship. And naturally, the first such services are education and health. More than ever, education is a decisive factor in the building of citizenship, particularly in a country like Brazil where so much remains to be done in this respect. Health is an equally indispensable element in the dignity of the citizen. Under present conditions, the solution to social problems calls for a creative partnership between state and society. There is an arena for new forms of dialogue and combined action that could make a fundamental contribution to bringing about what has already been termed "substantive democracy".

d) We face the task of renewing the political dimension, the task of giving a voice to all, under conditions of effective liberty. The public sphere should be really public and, under the conditions of contemporary democracy, this requires a sphere of debate and dialogue, a sphere of tolerance and respect for others.

e) Radicalising democracy means ensuring the right conditions for effective liberty, so that all citizens even those who are not formally organised, are able to have a say in the process. There is an important role and in seeking to contribute to the building of the public arena.

f) It will be necessary to find answers to the challenges posed by the globalisation process to democracy. This issue must be examined outside the traditional framework of autarkic scheme. We shall not return to an international system of the Westphalian mould. Interdependence between States, today, is a fact of life and ignorance of this fact would condemn our efforts to the realm of fantasy. However, we can examine the question of what can and what must be regulated in the international field in order that the will of citizens may be exercised democratically. It is necessary, for example, to consider the role of the Bretton Woods institutions and the composition and procedures of the United Nations Security Council.

In this summary overview, quoted at length, it is possible to see the manner in which Cardoso works Habermasian themes into an integrated conception of the role of the state and its relationship to its citizens in the contemporary world. The state is no longer assigned a leading role in the transformation of society. Instead it guarantees the existence of a public sphere in which deliberation can take place, recognises its duty to respect the plurality of interests in society, and exerts itself actively to ensure that the voices of the weak are heard.

Conclusion

The objective of this chapter and the last has been to show, as clearly as possible, the parallels in the theoretical analysis of Habermas and Cardoso in their scientific works, within the specificities of the cases they have studied. Both started from a Marxist methodological position but at the same time, took an independent and critical attitude to that tradition, and combined it with insights from other schools of thought. In terms of sociological theory, both Habermas and Cardoso employ an eclectic approach, with insights from such thinkers as Weber, Durkheim, and Mannheim enriching their theoretical interpretations.

The intention of this chapter has been to identify the elements in Cardoso's analysis that he shares with Habermas – elements that revolve around a shared view of science and of the world, and a conviction that reason is superior to coercion and violence as a means of transforming the world. Despite the impressive similarity of their interpretations of the world – it is enough in this respect to observe the parallels in their first works, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* and *Capitalism and Slavery in Southern Brazil* – it turns out that it is only in the 1980s that Cardoso begins to quote Habermas's ideas to reinforce his own with regard to the nature of

democracy, and the need for a process of institutional radicalisation. Until that point, the intellectual production of each develops in parallel in different political and social settings, with a significant convergence of ideas as a consequence of common responses to new realities in transformation.

Invited to comment on this parallel trajectory, marked by coincidence rather than direct influence, Cardoso suggested, when interviewed by the author,

Because Habermas, like me, comes from a dialectical Marxist background. The Frankfurt School, for all that it was critical, was in that tradition. The same as for us, however critical we have been, in the Marx group, we were too. And he [Habermas] remained open to the changes taking place in the world, he saw what was happening. And democracy as a value, isn't that it? Well then, how do you get to democracy today from a vision that is of an inspiration that doesn't necessarily lead to it? That was the path that Habermas took: how to organise public discourse, argument, the logic of argument, of persuasion, wasn't it? (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

It is possible to say that in each case there is a response within a similar theoretical background to the logic of global change since the 1960s. They have recognised, from common roots in Marxism, that the "bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization." In Cardoso's case, as we saw in Chapter Three, there is a clear recognition that in the current circumstances the best that can be achieved is reform within the the framework of capitalism. The distinctiveness of his position is that he has taken seriously the possibility of achieving and deepening reform through liberal democratic means. But his critique of

the limitations of state and society in Brazil has led him at the same time to recognise the need for a process of institutional reform. It is this perspective, present in his work from the 1970s on, that has brought him into proximity with Habermas.

So, we can identify in each a heterodox academic posture that has led them to a critical and reformist political point of view. However, in that reformist view, each retains the values of democratic socialism, translated into a continuing commitment to social justice, and a belief, against the pessimism of the Frankfurt School, that a degree of reform is possible (Cardoso, 1996b:27).

In his political career and in particular in office as president, then, Cardoso has come to express his project in explicitly Habermasian terms, and to place particular emphasis on the responsibility of the president to act in accordance with a classically Habermasian precept: "Only through public communication can the institutions of freedom be filled with the substance of a rational process of the formation of political views and political will" (Habermas, 1961: 92).

CHAPTER 6

The 'Habermasian Project' in Power

The President has, more than would reasonably be expected, to achieve and portray the symbolic cohesion, to present and to represent the values of society. (...) To portray this role well, a cohesive role, you must be convincing and have powers of persuasion. In order to convince society it is following a goal. Why am I giving this interview? Because I think this is part of my role. The most tangible power, the power to impose, would not be so effective were it not coupled with powers of persuasion (...). I have a deep seated fear of it (wholesale power, the traditional power to order, appoint and dismiss). This power without persuasion, which lacks cultural hegemony, as Gramsci said, is archaic. It is the power of the conservatives. The power of the conservatives is clientism, by appointment (Cardoso, 1997e:13).

The ideas we have in Brazil, that the state is everything, and that in our society patrimonialism is the rule, are the two enemies of democracy (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Introduction

This chapter examines Cardoso's practice in power, arguing that he has consistently pursued in office the 'Habermasian' project spelled out in the previous chapter. The argument is that the strategy was first developed around the Plano Real while he was serving as Minister of Finance in Itamar Franco's administration, and that since his election Cardoso has understood and practiced his office in Habermasian terms. He has set out to awaken the collective consciousness of the country from the presidency, using the role to convince and persuade rather than to dictate. Secondly, he has done so in a specifically Habermasian manner, demonstrating a commitment to the use of rational discourse in pursuit of the creation of a public sphere characterised by communicative action and debate. Thirdly, he has used the role of president to lead and guide debate, and to encourage other actors in the public sphere to commit themselves to the same practices. Fourthly, in substantive terms, he has sought to promote reforms that will enable Brazil to overcome the legacy of an authoritarian, elite-controlled and unaccountable state, and to challenge the equally corrosive legacy

of corruption and clientelism. Fifthly, the substantive project which he has sought to take forward by Habermasian means is one that seeks to modernise Brazilian capitalism, and to create space within it for social justice and reform. On the one hand, this means acceptance of the need for reforms which might enable Brazil to compete in the context of globalisation. On the other, it means seeking to increase the extent to which the poor and hitherto excluded majority can participate socially and economically, as well as in political terms. On balance, therefore, it seems better to understand Cardoso as a Habermasian reformist than as either a neo-liberal or as a social democrat. This is not to say, of course, that Cardoso has been without his critics. Paulo Singer recognises Cardoso's theoretical contribution and the clarity of his analysis, but finds that the analysis reveals the limitations of the response: "Fernando Henrique demonstrated the social and political effects of liberal globalisation, and his testimony in this regard is valuable. But when it comes to an alternative project, he has been conspicuous for his conformity" (Singer, 1996). Theotonio dos Santos similarly argues that for all the intellectual brilliance with which it is defended, Cardoso's government represents a new stage of dependency (Santos 1998). These critiques may be compared with Cammack (1997a), which recognises the coherence of Cardoso's trajectory and his commitment to democracy, but notes nevertheless the manner in which the progressive project Cardoso espouses involves both elements of neoliberal policy, and alliances with forces hostile to progressive reform. The material advanced in this chapter suggests that there is another, procedural, dimension that must be taken into account of Cardoso's project is to be understood. In the conclusion, however, I return to the question of the limits of the project, which Singer, Santos and Cammack raise in different ways.

The presidential role is important in both institutional and symbolic terms, and according to Cardoso its most tangible power, the power to impose, would not be so effective were it not coupled with powers of persuasion. He argues that the properties and magnitude of the president's power are variable, and that if someone lacks powers of persuasion his power will be diminished. That persuasion should be brought about by argumentative discourse (Cardoso, 1997).

Starting from this premise, I will demonstrate in this chapter how Cardoso's ideas are applied in practice. This will be done by focusing briefly on the selling of the Plano Real, then giving expression to Cardoso's own official actions and statements as president. As the focus is now on the president in action, the focus will be a dual one: on the one hand on the view which Cardoso himself has expressed, the commitment to use rational discourse in the exercise of power, and on the other hand, on the limitations that argumentative discourse turns out to face in the light of real facts and values, or in the practical circumstances of the exercise of power. The limitations that might be identified at a theoretical level are compounded in Brazil by the patrimonialism and clientelism of the State, a feature repeatedly noted and attacked by Cardoso himself. One consequence of this is that private interests have frequently been promoted to the detriment of society as a whole.

As we saw in the previous chapter, Cardoso approached the presidency with a fully worked out 'Habermasian' diagnosis of the deficiencies and possibilities of democracy in Brazil, and equally a fully worked out 'Habermasian' programme for the radicalisation of democracy. Because Cardoso has recognised this so clearly, and so clearly committed himself to a 'Habermasian' strategy in response, Brazil under his presidency may be seen as a test case for the efficacy of such a strategy. It may therefore have considerable implications beyond the specific case of Brazil itself.

Much of this chapter is presented in the words Cardoso himself has used in speeches and official statements as president. Attention to such official discourse is of crucial importance, as in power Cardoso has been concerned more about promoting and conducting debate in the public arena than being a charismatic populist, a pure social democrat, a neo-liberal prophet of the state's declining influence or a provider of ready-made solutions (Cardoso, 1977: 28-29). Aware of the traditional Brazilian presidential tendency "to govern, to appoint, to dismiss, to order, to arrest and release", he has opted rather to act as a Habermasian in power. That is to say, he has used his status as President to create, strengthen and expand deliberation in the public arena via discussion and argument. Despite the advice of those who have urged him to behave more in the manner of traditional presidents – such as the popular television entertainer who remarked: "you seem erudite. You are well educated but I think the people would prefer it if you struck out at those who attack" (Kramer, 1999) – Cardoso has chosen to emphasise the responsibility of the president to uphold and develop a commitment to democracy: "We fought hard for a democratic regime. I do not want to see Brazil under a regime where the President orders arrest and uses the Army again. I will not do that. I do not want it to happen. We have a collective responsibility to ensure that it does not happen" (Cardoso, 1998b). These and many other such examples display a consistent commitment to changing the political culture in Brazil, in an effort to move public opinion away from a taste for the exercise of authority towards participation in a collective process of deliberation.

To demonstrate the deliberative style of Cardoso's political actions I will analyse speeches addressed to institutions of the State such as the National Congress, and official pronouncements to a variety of audiences on formal occasions. For such views expressed in public I will look to interviews, statements and reports in the

national and international press. These official pronouncements do not resemble the those of previous Presidents. In these speeches one can see the sociologist and the intellectual who analyses more than the immediately obvious, who interprets rather than describes, who particularizes rather than generalizes, always employing the theoretical tools which he views as most appropriate to understand and explain actual events.

I will pay particular attention to the effort Cardoso has devoted, from within the presidency, to 'sociological' interventions in academic and public debate, both in Brazil and in the international sphere. This effort should be regarded as a significant aspect of Cardoso's action as president, and one which most clearly captures the 'Habermasian' view which he takes of the presidential role. It has been a consistent feature of his presidency that he has devoted time not to brief and superficial encounters with the press, but to extended attempts to put debate and argument out into the public domain through lengthy interviews and interventions. In what follows, I draw particularly on three such sources, selected for their content, and because together they reflect the extent to which Cardoso has engaged in this intellectual and communicative action in the presidency. The first is the extended interview, spread over nearly a week, which gave rise to the book-length text *O presidente segundo o sociólogo* (1998). This initiative developed in the wake of a shorter interview conceded to Roberto Pompeu de Toledo for the magazine *Veja* in September 1997, and presented an extensive analysis and justification of Cardoso's own presidential programme. The second is the dialogue conducted with the former Prime Minister of Portugal, Mario Soares, and published as *O mundo em português: um diálogo* (1998). The third is the interview granted to the author of this thesis in July of the same year – taking place over six hours, and running to sixty-eight pages of transcript, it ranged

across the whole of Cardoso's career as sociologist and intellectual, and addressed in particular his perception of the role of the presidency, and the extent to which he might be said to approach it in Habermasian terms.

This chapter will not, therefore, make reference to Cardoso's views prior to becoming first Minister of Finance then President, except in isolated cases where it is indispensable to strengthen an argument developed during his period in government. As we shall see, though, this will not mean that Cardoso the sociologist disappears from view, to be replaced by Cardoso the President and practical politician. As suggested at the outset, Cardoso has carried his intellectual and sociological concerns into government, and acts more as an intellectual in power than as a former intellectual turned politician.

Prelude: Communicative Action in Support of the Plano Real

As Minister of Finance (1993-1994) in Itamar Franco's transitional government, Cardoso was responsible for implementing the Plano Real, after the failure of successive stabilization plans from Sarney's Cruzado Plan through to Bresser Pereira's Plano (June, 1987) Verão (January, 1989), and two failed programmes during the presidency of Collor - Collor I and Collor II. Cardoso had accepted the need to control inflation, and took the position of Minister of Finance on that basis (Cardoso, 1998i: 64). What was distinctive about his action as Minister of Finance, however, was his commitment to a public campaign to argue for the policy in a range of different official and public arenas. In this respect, his strategy as Minister of Finance may be seen as a prelude to his development of a Habermasian strategy of communicative action in the presidency itself. His promotion and defence of the Plano Real exhibited all the features that would subsequently mark his presidency: the application to the issues of an analytical methodology present in his academic work

from the beginning, the carrying of academic argument into politics and the public sphere, the adoption of a 'pedagogical' style, the commitment to dialogue, and the prioritisation of communication of key messages across a wide range of media. After countless failed attempts by previous governments to control inflation, the biggest problem facing a new plan was the need to establish the credibility of its authors. Brazilian society was exasperated by inflation and government's failure to control it. The challenge was one of winning support for the strategy itself, and confidence in the capacity of the government to carry it out. For that reason, the capacity of Cardoso to engage in communicative action around the programme is of some significance.

The choice of Cardoso for Minister of Finance reflected his initial credibility in the context of a weak government, under Itamar Franco, which lacked the legitimacy of a popular mandate, and had replaced a President implicated in the spiral of systemic state corruption. A concurrent budgetary scandal (October, 1993) in the Chamber of Deputies had brought public confidence in political institutions to an all time low. Thus the government faced the challenge of regaining credibility in the eyes of the public, and gaining the support of Congress for legislation to implement the Plan. As Goertzel wrote:

Cardoso's greatest asset was his personal credibility. He knew everybody in the Brazilian political elite, and everyone knew he was honest and serious, as well as highly intelligent and well educated. (...) Even those who disagreed with him on policy issues never questioned his integrity (Goertzel, 1999: 109).

Cardoso's first initiative was to argue the case through Congress, taking advantage of the disarray of the institution, his international connections that he got as Foreign

Minister (October, 1992 to May, 1993) and of the contacts he had established as a result of his presence and recent role in the Senate:

the political situation was in our favour (...). The only way to put the Budget in order is to take advantage of the fact that Congress is in disarray. The Budgetary Committee would never have agreed to lose power if it had not lost it already (...). I went to the Congress and the Budgetary Committee on innumerable occasions. I argued vehemently with many deputies. But I managed, through discussion alone, to get Congress to cut the Budget by fifty percent. I was a Senator, I had that advantage. I could speak to the members of Congress on equal terms (Cardoso, 1998: 71).

Paradoxically, the context of high inflation (running at 5,200 percent in the final year before the plan), dire public finances and scandals benefited the implementation of Plano Real. In this context, Cardoso identified the strategy of 'exhaustive explanation' as the key to the success of the Plan:

Without the scandal the plan would not have been approved because no authority backs a plan like this. The Plan is against authority. It undermines the authority of those in power. Therefore, it could only have been passed in a state of chaos in which there was no organised political force. If we have a direction we have to advance because the time is ripe. So we opted for a direction which was ... to explain. Explain everything exhaustively (Cardoso, 1998i: 72).

The need to “explain everything exhaustively” stemmed from the loss of faith among the public with previous plans that had ended in wholesale disillusionment. Brazilian society had become exhausted by the State and politicians. As Cardoso testifies:

The country did not believe in economists in principle since many plans had failed. The country doesn't believe in government since it thinks government lies. So there's only one thing to do: to speak, to explain. I spoke everyday. I spoke on the radio and on television. Explaining and telling people everything we were going to do. I spoke to union members. Nothing in the Plano Real was done without being announced. And I was always asked, “Minister, where will inflation be at the end of the year?” I said, “I don't know.” That's all they wanted to know, to pin me down, so I it wouldn't work out. There is among the technocrats a fear of explaining things too much – a fear of sabotage and stock market manipulation. On the contrary, my theory, and that of Andre and Persio, was that, on the contrary, we should explain (*idem*).

The approach adopted to the Plano Real, then, was to devote considerable time and energy to a campaign of explanation and persuasion, aimed at convincing the poor that it was in their interests to put a stop to it:

The people understood that inflation harmed their interests, and that the peculiar thing about the Brazilian situation was that inflation did not harm the interests of companies since everything was index-linked. Now, a predictable inflation is the same as no inflation for those who can manage it, but it is not the same as no inflation for those who

receive their wages and, at the end of the month, don't have any money because the money disappeared, disappeared in the whirlwind of inflation which rises and rises and never stops (Cardoso, 1995j: 46).

As a consequence of this strategy the population was persuaded to support the plan, which achieved results in large part due to the efforts expended on communicating its logic and arguing it through. With a combination of political credibility, persuasion by dialogue and technical competence, inflation was brought under control within twelve months, standing at just over three percent in May 1998, the lowest rate recorded since November 1949. When Cardoso moved into the presidency he would adopt the same strategy of communicative action as a basic principle.

State reform in Cardoso's first presidential period: reconstructing the state

Partly because of the success of the Plano Real, the presidential elections of 1994 ended in victory for Cardoso and marked the beginning of his first presidency (1995-1998). In office, he has argued exhaustively for the 'reconstruction of the state' to meet the challenges of globalisation and democratisation. In his first Message to the National Congress, in which he gave an account of his first year of government, Cardoso reiterated the principal elements of this programme for state reform. He focused on the deficiencies of the state, and the extent to which persistent obstacles to its modernization jeopardised economic and political stability: a) the culture of the public deficit, b) backwardness, and c) corporatism.

In relation to the culture of the public deficit he stated that the problem lay in

treating public budgets as receptacles of expectations, and not as instruments for realistic choices between equally legitimate alternatives that are not always all possible at the same time. In addition, there is a tendency, still present in today's political environment, to simultaneously demand increases in expenditure and reductions in income. Another consists of transferring to the State costs and responsibilities which should clearly be assumed by specific groups and not the whole of society (Cardoso, 1996c: xv).

The Message linked this theme to the need to reform a state which

has become onerous, expensive and inefficient in many sectors. In the face of the new challenges of an internationalised economy, the State still faces difficulties in diagnosing the needs of the country, in executing the projects it adopts, and in monitoring performance in an efficient manner in what it does itself and in what it transfers to private initiative (...). We are just as backward in social provision. With low levels of education, deficient technical training, even that part of the population which is above the poverty line is ill-prepared for a labour market which must become more and more demanding in order to compete on equal terms in a global economy (ibid).

The Message also pointed to corporatism as a hindrance to sustainable growth. At issue was not the satisfaction of private interests that are "legitimate in a society such as ours", but the tendency "to look for solutions which subordinate public and general interests to private interests and those of private groups. This corporatist mentality

still persists to a high degree in companies, the organisations of civil society, and the state apparatus" (Cardoso, 1995c: xvi).

Cardoso has committed himself, then, in office, to a position which rejected both the minimalist 'neo-liberal' state and the maximalist 'socialist' state. The issue, he says, is not to choose between a minimalist or maximalist State but to construct the 'necessary' state, the state capable of playing the role vis-à-vis society and the economy that will deliver prosperity, equity and democracy in the conditions of contemporary globalisation. The state may regulate private activities well or badly, just as private managers may be good or bad; state companies may be highly competent, just as private companies may be extremely incompetent. Equally there is corruption in both sectors. "In principle, therefore, I don't say that the state is worse or better than the private sector, or that the state should disappear" (Cardoso, 1998i: 287-8). Faithful to his tendency to look for the logic of the specific situation rather than be guided by abstract principles, Cardoso suggests that it is a practical matter to determine the ideas that should guide State action.

As we have seen, he rejects the suggestion that the issue of social welfare in Brazil can be addressed by drawing a parallel with the 'crisis of the welfare state' in Western Europe:

The crisis of the Brazilian State is different. It has always been incapable of providing well being. Here it is irrelevant to cling to formulas that do not solve the problems for the majority. The second practical issue is that there was in Brazil a privatisation of the State. I have written about this since Geisel's times. Our problem is that the private sector has beset the State. The 'bureaucratic rings' and other phenomena I have written of were formed by associations between the

State and the private sector, which went unchecked by society. What comes of this is a State deformed by clientelism, which benefits private interests and is unable to assist the population properly (Cardoso, 1998i: 288).

According to Cardoso, then, the ability of the state to play a universal role has been undermined by the fact that it has been penetrated and invaded by private interests:

What were the agents of privatisation in the state? Let us take a look at the electricity companies. We had state-run companies and above them the National Department of Water and Electrical Energy (DNAEE), an organisation created by Juarez Távora in the 1930s. The DNAEE progressively lost its own administrative organisation. Officials were seconded from the private sector. A battle ensued for control of the organisation whose functions included setting tariffs, investments, interest rates and making concessionary regulations. All of this happened without any supervision by Congress, society or the government itself (Cardoso, 1998i: 292-3).

During the military regime the privatisation of the state increased, raising public expenditure without benefiting the poor. At most, concludes Cardoso, the state was capable of assisting sectors of the middle classes. In its later years it could no longer even assist the middle classes, since consumption demands increased, in areas such as education, and resources declined. So such assistance came to an end. The same situation arose in the health service and in other social services, the principal cause being inflation and the growing fiscal crisis of the state.

Thus, Cardoso concludes,

the first task which lies ahead of us is the reconstruction of the State. What I am doing is to reconstruct the State. Due to the fiscal crisis the state ceased to serve even the dominant classes. It became a sick organ. Herein lies the source of my irritation, compounded by the nonsensical approach the neo-liberals gave to government. The Liberals say that the state has to be rolled back and closed down: health, social security and prisons should be privatised. This is not my view. And to this I add: on the Left there are those who defend the contemporary state. Whose state are they defending? The state of the dominant classes that was previously attacked by the same leftists as oligarchic and incompetent? The fundamental task is to reconstruct the state (Cardoso, 1998i: 289).

At this point Cardoso repeats exactly the analysis made prior to his election to the presidency, regarding the need to supplement state activity through the development of civil society and the public sphere. The project of reconstructing the State has to start from the premise that

In the world that is being created, public action cannot be limited to the acts of the state. Public spheres exist which do not belong to the state, and these spheres have grown in influence. The third sector, non-governmental organisations – the debate that is organised around them, the influence that organised groups in society and even those who are not organised have over Government decisions. There is the press, the media in general, the seminars that are organised, the intermediary

bodies, not just the trade unions... they are fundamental for change and for the actions of the state (Cardoso, 1998a: 174).

Cardoso speaks of reconstruction of the state

in the sense of preparing the state, the government and administration to grasp all of this. It's the opposite to Oliveira Vianna [an influential theorist of corporatism in the 1920s and 1930s], it's the opposite to the point of view of a state that shapes society, it's a state that has to be sensitive to vibrations in the society and whose sensitivity cannot merely be based on the will of the President or of political leaders. There have to be channels to allow interaction between the government, the state, the administration and society (Cardoso, 1998a: 175).

Therefore, when Cardoso speaks of a reformed state he conceives of a state which is in tune with the movements taking place in society, and giving them expression and rationality. This model of the state that is Cardoso's dream for the next century is not a dream of economic growth, as such factors as efficiency, competitiveness and rationalization are already in place. As he argued in a speech at the opening ceremony of the International Seminar on Models and Policies of Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1998, the challenge of the "realistic utopia" is not the challenge of economics any longer but the challenge of reinventing society, of what to do on the issue of social integration by means of work, employment and access to technology (Cardoso, 1998h).

Thus Cardoso announced that

my dream for the next century is not only to reform the administration, but also to establish a capillary relationship between society and the state. It is necessary for society to be encouraged and self-motivated at the grass roots. The mass media, which turns its attention towards Brasilia, should accustom itself to highlighting and giving importance to the municipal districts. To see what is happening. It will take time, it's a long process, but we are beginning to change the social arena (Cardoso, 1998h).

The state has an important role to play here, but as "an articulating state, one which articulates. It regulates, it promotes and it articulates. It is not neo-liberal. Nor is it national-developmental, nor is it a welfare state, in the classic sense. It is an articulating state because it always brings the private into touch with the public" (Cardoso, 1998i: 325). Cardoso accepts that a state of this kind cannot do everything alone, since it does not have the power to act alone, and it does not control everything. Nor can it simply surrender everything to the control of the market. This is why the presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) "to monitor the State's actions" is important. NGO's form a kind of link between State and society "but not only that: they are catalytic agents of change." That is to say

It is society that has to monitor the action of the state. This element – the notion of the public– has to be developed. This is not a private or state question. If you go back you will find the notion in Gramsci, amongst recent authors. The 'public' contained in this notion has to respect what pertains to the state, to respect what is private, and not to confuse them, nor to make an enemy of either. It will take some time

for this idea to take root, but I think that this is what is new in contemporary society. Here just as in Europe or the United States. It is the emergence of the public in this sense that is new. Even the issue of citizenship has a lot to do with this (Cardoso, 1998i: 326).

Arguing for reform: communicative action within the presidency

As he had in his first major book, *Capitalism and Slavery in Southern Brazil* (1962), Cardoso took presidential office on 1 January, 1995 with a reference to Joaquim Nabuco, the great propagandist of abolitionism:

Just as was the case with abolitionism, the movement for reforms which I represent is not aimed against anyone. I do not wish to divide the Nation. I wish to unite it around the prospect of a better tomorrow for everyone. (...) Always looking for avenues of dialogue and persuasion, but without evading responsibility for making decisions. Knowing that most Brazilians do not expect miracles, but that there must be results from each day in office (Cardoso, 1995: 14-15).

During the elections all Parties had identified one major priority – the worsening condition of the Brazilian State (*Folha de Sao Paulo*, 1994). There was a general recognition that for a lasting solution to be reached it was necessary to reform the state in order to overcome obstacles to the modernisation and democratisation of the political system.

It might have been expected, then, that Cardoso would have enjoyed considerable cross-party support. In fact, though, the difficulties which Cardoso has faced in taking his reform project forward through the political system are well known and

documented. In accordance with the agenda set out above, however, I wish to focus attention on the extent to which he has continued to engage in intellectual debate in order to justify and promote his project of reform, and the extent to which he draws in doing so on the positions developed in the past, and addressed in Chapters Two and Three in particular.

The reform of the state, as noted, seemed to be a priority for all parties. Committed to finding a path towards necessary reform through engagement with other political actors, Cardoso sought to form alliances with the PSDB, PFL and PTB in order to advance his programme through collaborative action: "It is not just proposals which are necessary but a means of implementing them and the formation of alliances capable of realizing them" (Cardoso, 1994c). This strategy immediately brought to the fore the issue of governability, in view of the historically troubled relationship between the Executive and the Legislature. Past alliances had been based more upon the exchange of clientelistic favours than on common programmatic objectives across parties, and there was little precedent for principled cooperation across party lines. In response to criticisms that he has chosen corrupt and conservative political allies, for example, he insists that his policy of alliance-making is programmatic in character: "I didn't make alliances to win the election, I won the election alone. I made alliances to govern. This is different. Nobody wins elections with support of parties." This is linked to the argument that parties capable of linking private and public do not exist in Brazil:

there are no parties in Brazil, not even of the right. The nearest thing to a party is the PT with its traditional view of the old Left, which has now made an alliance with populism, with the PDT. This alliance has more contradictions in it than my own. The PT was born out of

renovation but has become a closed, conservative party. In Brazil backwardness prevails. What is backwardness? It is the inefficient state, it is using the Treasury for personal ends. This backwardness is present in almost all parties to varying degrees. That is why I didn't make an alliance with the right. I am using the votes of backwardness to bring about reform" (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

As we saw in Chapter Four, the concept of the public sphere is not simple, and it is no simple matter to ensure that it operates in a democratic fashion. Cardoso recognises these difficulties when he says that in Brazil "we have to work hard to raise new issues. In order to move forward in that direction and free ourselves from regressive action it will be necessary to expand open dialogue." He continues, "I find it pathetic that the leader of the Opposition has never talked with me. It is pathetic. Not to have talked privately with me and discussed issues without flights of rhetoric" (Cardoso, 1997e). Such considerations prompt Cardoso to depict the 'left' as conservative, and tied to outmoded ways of doing politics: "I raise new issues, they attack. They are conservative and tied into the patrimonialist State. That is today's corporatism. They do not adapt to new situations and they associate globalisation with Armageddon" (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

This has been a consistent pattern. In 1999, for instance, the governors met with Cardoso in an effort to reach a consensus on the elimination of the Social Security deficit at a federal and State levels, and to mobilize support in Congress for a new constitutional amendment permitting reduced benefits for retired public employees and pensioners. Cardoso met with fifteen Governors, including members of the Opposition but excluding the PT. The National Directorate of the PT "recommended" the PT governors not to attend the meeting with Cardoso, and hinted that other

Opposition Governors should likewise boycott it. The PT then decided to suspend Deputy Eduardo Jorge (PT-SP) from Party activities for thirty days as a punishment for his “treachery” in attending the meeting (“subir a rampa”). Jorge had a proposal for solving Brazil’s Social Security problems that he had first put forward in 1993, and found himself at odds with his party because of his willingness to contribute to constructive debate on the subject (Fleischer, 1999b).

Communicative action and social reform

According to one author

Brazil is changing rapidly under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. ... To call this a ‘paradigm shift’ or the ‘adoption of a new development model’ may not be hyperbole: after fits and starts in the early 1990s, Brazil under Cardoso appears to be definitely abandoning the dirigiste, import-substituting model of the past 60 years in favour of a model based on market reforms and a drastic reduction in the role of the state (Power, 1998a: 51).

This statement is correct, as far as it goes. But it overlooks the manner in which Cardoso’s programme of reform is intended as much to democratise the state and society as it is to reduce the role of the state along neoliberal lines. The principal issue here, as we have seen earlier, is the predominance of patrimonialism and clientelism in state and society alike. Since the time of Getulio Vargas, Cardoso believes, the structure and role of the state has changed dramatically. At that time the State was organized via a public body, the Department of Public Service Administration (DASP). Under the military regime an increase in state bureaucracy took place and during the process of democratisation the party system was increasingly infiltrated by

clientelism. Local, municipal and state bureaucracies grew, particularly those at a municipal level. Political clientelism grew immeasurably, doing considerable damage to efficiency (Cardoso, 1997p: 184). As a result, the main obstacles to the democratisation of the new state still come from patrimonialism and clientelism. Political negotiations between the administration and the legislature are viewed with suspicion by the public due to these two traditions within Brazilian politics, and these factors affect reforms guided by the Cardoso government. According to Cardoso,

The political system is still a system that lacks the dynamism of society. So it reproduces itself, in the form of parties and Congress, which are still very much imbued with this idea of the 'old state' and the 'old patrimonialism' (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

In these circumstances

It is difficult even to see legitimate political negotiation as a legitimate thing, because it appears as if it is always being broken down into individual interests (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

As a result, Cardoso has found political reform difficult to implement

if it were only dependent upon my will it would be easy to bring about change. The political structures themselves resist it. As a Senator, I and several other Senators, proposed changes to the electoral system that were never achieved. As president I can't achieve them either. We are going to try, as many times as are necessary. But the political system is still a system that does not correspond to the dynamism of Brazilian

society. The political system is overtaken, frequently, by the demands of society (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

In a country where the importance of the social (society) has always been minimised in relation to the economy or even manipulated to assist the clientelist demands of politicians, Cardoso has proposed a new start: "What is new in Brazil is not that we are solving all the social problems which have been in existence for centuries but the way in which the problems are being tackled, with a new spirit" (Cardoso, 1998d: 46). An example of this is the creation of the Community Solidarity Programme as a means to mobilize civil society. Cardoso has argued that a well-maintained country does not use social resources for electoral ends, and this programme tried to avoid the clientelistic practices which have usually surrounded the use of government resources for social ends. Cardoso demonstrates this clearly when he says

this Government's social programmes were not made for electoral ends. In the particular case of Community Solidarity, it simply doesn't have a budget. There is no budget. The Council has no budget. The programme's results are brought about through the interaction of civil society and Government. It is about looking for sources of funding, creating innovative processes with, of course, the Government's support. The Government support, however, comes in the form of the programme (ibid).

Brazil really entered an imaginative phase in relation to social problems. The orientation of social politics, that is to say in education, health, housing, sanitation, minimum income, and social services, has been universal provision. Universal provision, however, has "not always succeeded in reaching the whole population due

to shortage of resources, administrative shortages, administrative incompetence or other administrative problems” (ibid). The aim now is not to spend unlimited amounts in order to satisfy social expectations, but to adopt notions of managing expenses that entail greater control and efficiency. Analyses which say the Government is spending less in certain areas of social provision do not say why. Actually there has been no reduction in expenditure, says Cardoso. The Government hopes to improve the management of recourses to achieve additional benefits, utilizing the same resources to achieve more. This is a responsible attitude, defended by Cardoso as follows in an interview given to the *Gazeta Mercantil*:

To do what is necessary to increase the efficiency of expenditure and not say, great, allow spending, let’s spend more because in doing so I will win elections. Allow spending to earn applause. Allow spending because I will be seen to be spending on social issues. This is not my way (Cardoso, 1997i).

Cardoso presents himself as a politician who has rejected easy popularity and the politics of populism and clientelism, and as an individual who gives and keeps his word.

Cardoso accepts that urgent reform of the social security system is necessary to obtain a lasting solution to the imbalance in the social security budget. This imbalance, structural in origin, stems from demographic changes in the population of Brazil, and a multitude of systems that granted privileges to several professional categories. The main objective of administrative reform is to attain more control over public expenses, to allow attention to basic responsibilities and to reduce social and regional disparities (Cardoso, 1996c: 16-18).

These are important reforms involving the complex interest of key sectors of society, and requiring difficult and prolonged negotiations with Congress. When achieved these reforms will allow increased public savings, improve incentives in the private sector and eliminate the over-regulation of the labour market. The problem, as identified by Cardoso, is as follows:

In theory, everybody favours reform of the regional tax system. Yet some do not want to pay at all, everybody would like less tax imposed. Others would like to receive more. It is difficult, then, to reach an understanding (...). The problem we are faced with is to introduce reforms which increase production in Brazil whilst at the same time reducing taxes. Which increase the amount of resources and, thereby, the number of people who pay tax; and reduce fraud and bring about a fair distribution at the various levels of administration. This is not an easy task (Cardoso, 1997n: 387).

As in other examples seen in this chapter, Cardoso has set about addressing this issue by seeking cooperation through communicative action. In order to bring reform about, he argues, it is necessary for

government and society to act in partnership and, together, in a permanent democratic dialogue, to be committed to promoting the structural reforms which will, in the long term, ensure the consolidation of stability with economic growth, the generation of employment and social justice (Cardoso, 1997n: xvi; 1995j: 117).

The reforms are part of a process in which

We will bring about change through discussion and dialogue. Nobody will impose anything on anyone else. In a democratic society neither the government, nor entrepreneurs, nor workers must impose. We have to talk to each other, see the ways forward, and learn to respect the interests of others whilst always bearing in mind the collective interest (Cardoso, 1995:118).

In his quest for discussion and dialogue Cardoso has become the target for critics who allege that crucial reforms such as those of the federal tax system, social security and administration have been delayed. As the population at large watch the slow progress made in achieving solutions to serious problems the critics seem justified in their view. Contrary to criticism Cardoso states that

The irrefutable argument is that as the process of reforms unfolds, all the reforms have been made according to democratic principles. For changes which will have a huge impact on society we always want to ensure the highest possible degree of support. Debate and the search for consensus are intrinsic characteristics of democracy. By acting in this way the reforms gain legitimacy and this reduces the risk of their being reversed (Cardoso, 1997o: 362-3).

The same commitment to dialogue between state and society was seen in Cardoso's remarks to workers in Sao Bernardo dos Campos in March 1997 on the occasion of the launch of the new popular Ford model. Referring to the government's proposed reforms on the social security system, Cardoso defended his government's commitment to reform and reaffirmed the need for dialogue and for reasoned argument:

My government is, yes, pledged to reform. And poor is the country or political leader who is reactionary and conservative, and who does not want reform. Yes, we are going to carry out reforms. Not against the workers' interests. As I have already explained there is no proposal for workers to retire at the age of 65. There is no such reform. This is misinformation. This is disinformation. And as a consequence, this is the answer to what I said at the outset: we must have a democratic dialogue. And democratic dialogue is conducted with argument, and if the argument is right, mistakes get corrected; if the argument is wrong, mistakes get repeated (Cardoso, 1997n: 363).

On more formal occasions, Cardoso engages in a more academic discourse, supporting his arguments with classical references, and drawing on the repertoire of political theory to explain his position. Speaking in September 1999 at the swearing in of Alcides Tapia as Minister of Development, he offered the following commentary on reform:

Machiavelli said that it is very dangerous for the reformer not to be aware that his reforms will harm existing interests. The very idea of reform irritates those who do not want to change because they are all right. And those who are going to benefit from the reform do not yet feel the benefit. At certain moments the reformer is an isolated individual. That is why the reformer must have courage, resolution, perseverance and conviction. In time, if all goes well with the reform, recognition will come. Beneficiaries of the reform will come who will now understand its logic. And as for those who bemoan in the street

the loss of their privileges, history will take care of them, and will give them, for sure, the treatment they deserve for their past (Cardoso, 1999c).

The State cannot be a burden to society and the private sector. It cannot be dominated by privilege and corporatism, so reforms should help change mentality with relation to clientelism and corporatism. It is necessary, therefore, to break

the clientelist and corporative associations in health, education and social provision. These are the reforms of the State that the Government is implementing. The reform is not just one law. There are many measures being implemented simultaneously in Brazil. Reforms which take place within a democratic framework, with debate in Congress, with the comings and goings that are the norm in a democracy. A firm stance is taken when necessary without arrogance on the part of the President (Cardoso, 1997o: 362).

The democratic regime, however,

is not a regime within which the Executive can or should impose. Rather it should make proposals and be prepared to defend them. Hence the regime should be prepared to persuade. The best way to persuade is not to limit the action of the state to persuading one particular section, but to speak as widely as possible to the nation and at the same time to the particular section – in this case, the National Congress (Cardoso, 1997p: 379).

As this comment suggests, Cardoso has deliberately engaged in 'communicative action in the public sphere' as a means of mobilising civil society to pressure Congress to process and approve reforms. At the same time, he has sought to build support and understanding in society itself for social reforms, as the issues of education and health illustrate.

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistic (IBGE), Brazil's school population has increased significantly, to the extent that the President can say he hopes that by the end of his term in office no child of school age will be absent from school. But he says that such promises should be made with "a true social conscience", and relates the point back to the credibility of the government in the economic sphere. Promises should be made without populist demagoguery:

Not with words, not with rhetoric. They are made with the understanding that the basis for this prosperity is the stability of the currency. It is Brazilians being able to know that they can make decisions on personal and collective projects without being surprised by a sudden devaluation, or a sudden loss of purchasing power due to decisions taken in an office hidden in Brasilia without anyone knowing, when the public pays a high price (Cardoso, 1997).

At the same time, the issue in education, according to Cardoso, is not simply one of identifying the problem – that many children are without places at school, and it will cost so much to educate them – but one of changing the climate of opinion, or the political culture:

This means that there is a need for a great effort on the part of society as a whole so that we can create programmes which work, and which

work not because the government desires or commands it, but because the children want it, because their families realise that it is important, and employers know that we have to do it and society supports it (Cardoso, 1997q).

Prioritizing elementary education meant building schools, re-training teachers, modifying the curriculum, giving new content in education, motivating children, providing the child with a supportive home environment, feeding the child and improving teachers' wages. However, the issues here go beyond the question of shifting resources from higher education to primary education, and are connected directly, in Cardoso's thinking, to the longer term process of democratisation, and the building of civil society. Speaking on 8 March 1997 at the opening of the new headquarters of DATASUL, he explained the logic of educational reform as follows:

We made a choice. The choice was that first we had to set basic education, primary education in motion as without it, without a mass of people which will allow social mobility, we will simply have the elites reproducing themselves. And for the reproduction of elites not to strangle Brazil in the future, with those elites closed in on themselves, we have to open the education system up to those who don't belong to the elites so that in the future they will be able to belong, not because of wealth, but because of knowledge. So that they can acquire wealth through knowledge. Inheritance of material wealth is seen as less egalitarian. That's justifiable. So that it's not purely and simply the result of inheritance, because the perpetuation of elites can't be justified on that basis (Cardoso, 1997r).

With this vision of creating space for the socially excluded Cardoso presents the 'peaceful revolution' occurring in education as a revolution carried out through democratic persuasion, based on the assumption that social inclusion without education is impossible. In this perspective, education starts to take on wider implications. As Cardoso argued in front of an international audience in São Paulo, at the opening ceremony of the First Meeting of the High-Level ECLA Social Development Monitoring Group on 6 April 1997, it is not limited to

literacy, or even to passing through a formal system of training, but it is going to mean, in reality, the assimilation, in the daily life of the citizens, of techniques that will allow those same citizens to inform themselves, and thereby to make decisions, because without information you can't decide but you are a victim of manipulation; to have a capacity to adapt, even in the search for employment or for an occupation – the definition of a horizon which will allow each one to organise in order to survive amidst the challenges that are posed in the contemporary world (Cardoso, 1997s).

Hence the importance attached to primary education, which illustrates perfectly the 'utopian realism' of Cardoso's plans:

Today 96 per cent of school age children are in the class rooms. We have to be ambitious. In the year 2003 when I leave office I would like all Brazilian children of school age to have a place at school. All of them. It is a tough task. Few countries in the world achieve 99 per cent school attendance. If we don't dream the desirable as opposed to adjusting ourselves to the possible, if we don't think that, all of a

sudden, we can make the impossible possible, if we don't create paths by which the impossible can be made possible, when it's good, then we will not move forward. We will make the effort to have all our children in school. There will be resources for that in the Budget (Cardoso, 1999b).

The theme of reorganizing the State to make its activities more open to public scrutiny also applies to the health service, especially with regards to greater societal control over the public finances allocated to the health care system. The area has been a priority for Cardoso's administration, and figures released by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), based on a survey of more than five thousand of Brazil's municipal districts and focusing on census data from the 1970s to the 1990s, show an augmented improvement in the infant mortality rate, life expectancy and literacy rates. But this is not the only issue for Cardoso. This "is a task for everyone, and in saying that I don't want to conceal the responsibility of the government, nor to avoid criticism of the government, but this is not the only thing that matters" (Cardoso, 1997u). There has to be a positive commitment in civil society to a process of reform: "During the process of decentralization, belief in the programmes at a local community level will be a contributory factor to success on these fronts" (Cardoso, 1998k). In other words, the problem is not simply one of the need for more and more budget allocations. The key issue again, he argues, is the need for a change of mentality. It is not a question of an improved bureaucratic decision-making process, but a question of making the state a more permeable so that society can be present within it, participating in and monitoring the provision of services. During his time as Minister of Finance, state spending on the hospital system rose from 350 million to 650 million dollars:

Once again, money is necessary but it is not enough. I don't know if the public noticed the difference, that is to say, resources are not enough and it is not enough to double resources as we did. (...) It is necessary to direct the flow of resources better, and it's not for me to judge, or for us in Brasilia to judge. We have to have a system that feeds resources to the grassroots [*um sistema com capilaridade*] or we will get bogged down debates that will always be the same, more appropriations in the budget. And the money won't get down to the people who need it, and God knows what channels the money will be diverted into, not that I wish to level accusations against anyone in particular, because the truth is that it is a system that has to change. It isn't just a personal issue, it is a question of a mentality that has to change (Cardoso, 1997k).

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter I have tried to highlight the manner in which Cardoso the sociologist has approached the presidency. First comes the commitment to detached academic analysis of the issues:

Maybe even today I have never stopped concerning myself with analysing what is being done, even by myself. You can see in that book – *O Presidente segundo o sociólogo* – that whenever I can, I take the necessary distance , to try to understand processes, and give a testimony that might be useful in the future (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Second is the effort to convince and persuade, to provoke thought and to encourage the expression of the views of civil society in the public sphere. Third is the commitment to clear, rational thought in debate in the public sphere. These are characteristics that mark the nature of decision-making in a 'Habermasian' democratic regime.

I have used illustrated Cardoso's commitment to these Habermasian virtues with reference to his promotion of the Plano Real while minister of Finance in the administration of Itamar Franco, giving evidence of his identification of the need for a strategy of 'exhaustive explanation' if the policy was to succeed. I have shown also that from that point onwards he has given priority to extending rational analysis in a range of arenas – in direct contact with Brazilian citizens on innumerable occasions, in more formal official acts as head of state, and, most significantly in this context, in extended exchanges with journalists, international political leaders, and academics. At the centre of all this activity is the conviction that state and society in Brazil both need to be reformed, and that an indispensable element of the process of reform has to be a change of mentality that itself can only be brought about through democratic debate, and continual engagement in dialogue and communicative action. And as we have seen in the closing sections of the chapter, this perception lies behind Cardoso's approach to social reform. Its focus goes beyond addressing the notorious deficiencies in Brazil's education and health systems, and involves a deeper commitment to the involvement and empowerment of citizens through lasting changes in mentalities and political culture. We have seen in earlier chapters that these are themes with which Cardoso has long been preoccupied. This chapter demonstrates that he now addresses them in terms that can be best understood with reference to Habermas's approach to

the creation of a public sphere characterised by rational discourse and inclusive debate.

A radical version of deliberative democracy underpins Cardoso's thought. In my own understanding this matrix of thought has developed and matured from Cardoso's earlier intellectual activity through its application to the political arena, in the context of a habit of reflection upon action. Thus, in the Presidency of the Republic, he has not seen himself purely in a role of a powerful executive, but as a President who should act based on principles of a) persuading and convincing, b) discussion and rational argument, and c) the inculcation of debate in the public sphere.

Cardoso understands that the power to decide is not so great if it lacks the legitimacy brought about by persuasion and rational argument, and I have tried to illustrate by means of his own discursive action what difference this had made to his action in the role in reality. He had concluded prior to his choice of active political involvement that the path towards a modern democracy was made difficult by the anachronistic character of the thinking of the left, and the right's adherence to a political system where patrimonialism, corruption and political clientelism prevailed, and his experience in politics before and after assuming the presidency has confirmed this analysis. He is aware, therefore, of the need for social and institutional reform. What is distinctive about his position, and close to that of Habermas, is the conviction that such reform cannot be imposed, but must emerge as a result of changes in the structure and mentality of civil society itself. Hence the significance of communicative action. Only democratic means can promote democratic ends, and it is therefore necessary to tolerate diversity and to realize that sometimes this will lead to achievement and sometimes to error.

CONCLUSION

The limits of discourse in power

In other words, our approach should be to bring to the forefront both aspects of social structures: the mechanisms of self-perpetuation and the possibilities for change. ... It is not irrelevant in these attempts to pay attention to ideologies and intellectual capacity to assess possibilities for changes. In decisive historical moments, political capacity (which includes organization, will and ideologies) is necessary to enforce or to change a structural situation. Intellectual evaluation of a given situation and ideas about what is to be done are crucial in politics. The latter is immersed in the shady area between social interests and human creativity. At that level, gambles more than certainty line the paths through which social forces try to maintain or to change structures. Briefly, in spite of structural "determination," there is room for alternatives in history. Their actualization will depend not just on basic contradictions between interests, but also on the perception of new ways of turning a historical corner through "a passion for the possible" (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xi).

All through this thesis, we have tried to demonstrate the sense of "realistic utopia" that is present in Cardoso's thought and political action. This trace appears in his earliest work, and appears again in relation to his views about the political consequences of globalisation. Once we focus on this simultaneous element of utopia (change) and realism (bearing in mind the circumstances and the specificity of the problem), it is difficult, as we have demonstrated in this work, to define his thought as being inspired by neo-liberal, socialist or even social-democratic ideas. Actually, from the intellectual and political point of view, Cardoso is a fundamentalist only in his anti-pessimism. He is always in a position of seeking change for the better or, as he always says, he is always "progressive and not pessimistic" (Cardoso and Soares, 1998: 256). This is because his concern is always to identify objective tendencies, to combat negative aspects and to struggle for the possibility of taking advantage of positive aspects. Behind this is always a determination to avoid too simplistic an understanding of reality – or the necessity, in a given situation, to avoid two wrong conclusions. For example, it would be just as wrong to consider globalisation as the

unavoidable result of market forces as it would be to transform it into an ideology under which whatever is in favour of the market is positive, and it is a mistake to try to shape the forces of competition. Stating that the “intellectual evaluation” of what should be done in politics is crucial, Cardoso recognises that political activity is constituted as a result of the game of interests and of human creativity. On the one hand, the interests are determined by the structure (reality), on the other, human creativity in politics is determined by the capacity of perception of the political leadership in finding new answers (alternatives), taking right decisions to make history change – adopting the philosophy of the passion for the possible. This passion should be added to the method of intellectual evaluation to support the alternatives sought by human creativity. A rational method (pragmatism) and the passion for the possible (utopia) come together to define the profile of the intellectual and of the politician in the exercise of power.

Starting from this point, it is possible to say that the central idea that has guided the content and the argument of this thesis is the notion of power as a political exercise legitimated by dialogue through argumentative discourse in the public sphere, aimed at realising the progressive potential of each situation (the passion for the possible). Power is seen not simply as the capacity to exercise power in itself, but is also a means of gaining legitimacy through communicative action by using interpretative and explanatory capacity, to submit ideas and proposals to the debate in the public sphere.

This capacity to gain legitimacy is a characteristic of the sociologist who has made himself unique as a political leader and as President of the Republic. He is a unique political leader, both in terms of his intellectual discourse and in comparison with the previous presidents. This uniqueness comes from his intellectual standing and his

being a political leader who believes, as stated above, that the “intellectual evaluation of a given situation and ideas about what is to be done are crucial in politics.”

On the basis of the 1958 Seminar on Marx, and his important works such as *Capitalismo e Escravidão* (1962), *Empresário industrial e desenvolvimento econômico* (1964) and *Dependência e desenvolvimento na América Latina* (1969), the following conceptual notions can be seen as forming the basis of his thought:

- a) a dialectic method that uses the notion of totality (unity, contradiction and negation);
- b) a heuristic approach employed in order to retain the particularities of structural historic processes;
- c) the utilisation of an empirical reference to avoid generic conclusions not based on real processes;
- d) the attempt to grasp the movement “in the making” and to embrace paradox in such a way that classification and the creation of rigid concepts are not permitted;
- e) an heterodox concept of pragmatic politics (realism) that take account of the relation of forces and the capacity of the political groups to propose creative political alternatives to deal with the challenges and offer different and better solutions (a possible utopia).

There are two strong themes, then, in Cardoso’s thinking: a) the permanent use of a dialectical, structural-historical method to understand phenomena and b) a union of pragmatism and the notion of utopian realism in his theoretical conception of reality. We can notice these in his analysis of dependency, democracy, and globalisation and in his action throughout his intellectual and political trajectory based on a commitment to democracy and communicative action. At the root of his approach is

an orientation towards understanding change and discerning the potential for it, rather than carrying out a static investigation of prevailing circumstances:

I'm not interested in things that are fixed. I have a horror of thinking of a classificatory kind, Thomist-Aristotelian, classificatory. I'm very resistant to classifications. I think that that's alright for botany, but it doesn't help much in the social sciences. I want to see what changes and how it changes, and from what conditions the new emerges (interview with the author, 27 July 1998).

Dialogue, tolerance, persuasion, conciliation, political negotiation and a capacity to convince form the basis of his realistic discourse in favour of different forms of political action. These are concepts that form the basis of his political action and define his role as a conductor of debates in the public sphere. This is the reason for which I have identified him as a Habermasian president and as a conductor of debates in the public sphere who condemns outdated neoliberalism and preaches dialogue as a way to overcome crises. A recent article (*Jornal do Brasil*, 23 April 2000) offered support for this argument, commenting when Cardoso referred in a speech to the violence and inequality that had marred Brazil's 500 years of existence that instead of ignoring demonstrators, he used the speech to turn himself into a conductor of their ideas.

We found in Habermas the most developed account of a commitment to argumentative dialogue based on the group, or argumentation in the public sphere. Cardoso has adopted, as an intellectual in power, language as an instrument of communicative discourse in the public sphere in order to raise debates and convince by argumentation. As we have seen, he has been the object of criticism because of his

conciliatory temper, which prefers to convince rather than impose. According to critics, this makes it difficult to put political decisions into action and renders his authority fragile. However, Cardoso views this criticism as anti-democratic and as belonging to an authoritarian culture. The fact is that Cardoso, as an intellectual and politician is embedded in democratic values. "I am democratic. I was re-elected and I have been at the head of this government for many years. I have a agenda that is changing many things in Brazil and I have never encountered disrespect for my authority. Each of us has a style. I think mine is to convince" (Cardoso, 1999d: 21). Recently, along the same lines, he stated in an interview given to the *Folha de São Paulo* that these critics "are waiting for an undemocratic action from the president but I am a democrat" (Cardoso, 2000b).

Cardoso believes that in his position as president he cannot do everything.. This is because in complex, segmented and differentiated societies like Brazil, power is not concentrated in one institution or in one person. Such power is diffuse: "What the President can do is to signal a direction." Although the President has legitimated power, he doesn't need to be authoritarian. Cardoso sees the presidential system in Brazil as a very centralised one, which in his own words, "has been changing in its habits. More and more, we shall have to share responsibilities, to impose less, to convince more" (Cardoso, 1999d: 21). That is why persistence and a considerable capacity to convince is necessary in the institutional relationship, taking into account, in particular, the fact that in Brazil, there is a presidential system that also has characteristics of a parliamentary one in that presidents, Cardoso included, have always needed to build alliances in Congress in the absence of dominant parties.

In fact, this style adopted in power by Cardoso, as I have previously demonstrated, is related to his political, family and intellectual background. It is a conscious

characteristic of his role as president. One of his functions as president is to signal, with his ideas, analyses and interpretations of the Brazilian reality, the direction that debates in the public sphere should take. Besides that, he signals as his purpose to “oppose the anti-democratic culture that is present in the routine of social behaviour and the national-populist politics that takes a patrimonialist view of the Brazilian state seeing it as a means of clientelism and demagoguery” (Cardoso, 2000c).

Within the notion of utopian realism, then, there is a perspective that, in spite of structural “determination”, there is room for alternatives in history. These alternatives will depend not just on basic contradictions between interests, but also on the perception of new ways of turning a historical corner through “a passion for the possible.” What is perceived as necessary is a passion for the possible combined with a scientific method of analysis to arrive at understanding of what “the possible” might be. In other words, utopia is to be sought by following a realistic analytical path. Therefore, the method of analysing and understanding reality is a very important element in the intellectual and political context, since it provides consistency and an appropriate perspective. It is this which guides Cardoso to the path “of doing that which is necessary in order to transform reality.” What is possible is always determined by the method of analysis which takes account of the relationship between political options (alternatives, direction), the social structure (given conditions) and history (movement).

In Cardoso’s argumentative discourse, this relationship is explored with the objective of responding to the question: how is possible to change the social structures that determine reality, but which at the same time are determined structures. And how far is it possible to change them? In other words, the approach should bring to the forefront both aspects of social structures: the mechanism of self-perpetuation and the

possibilities for change: "Social structures impose limits on social processes and reiterate established forms of behaviour. However, they also generate contradictions and social tensions, opening the possibilities for social movements and ideologies of change" (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: xi).

This passion for making possible that which is necessary, has made Cardoso a reformist politician with a heterodox view in face of the challenges of a contemporary democratic society. Nowadays, societies change more by a process that does not represent a breakdown of structures, but rather a movement to reform in a democratic way. Within this reformist framework, however, Cardoso has moved beyond the notion of formal democracy to that of substantive democracy and to a commitment to the institutional radicalisation of democracy. This evolution has taken place, not simply as the result of adherence to a statement of principle, but as consequence of the empirical analysis of sociological data. As he did in relation to the 1970s debate, when he engaged in polemic with different interpreters of dependency studies, about the changes that were taking place in non-industrial underdeveloped countries, and about the emerging possibility for democracies to be established in these countries, Cardoso, as President, has analysed the problems of state structures and income distribution from a sociological as much as from a political point of view.

Cardoso proposes to answer the questions: Can a social-democratic course be taken to solve Brazil's current economic or social problems? Would this path lead to development that would actually bring about an improvement in people's lives? Should the path lean towards the self-regulating market economy or to state interventionism? This polarity is reminiscent of that in the 1970s, when the only apparent options seemed to be socialist revolution or fascism, a polarisation which Cardoso rejected by identifying a third route, associated-dependent development. This

form of development was far from perfect, but Cardoso's method of analysis dictated that he should first understand its character and potential for change, with all its limitations, before identifying a realistic course of action which might bring about progressive change. As we saw in Chapter Three, this led him to the intellectual conclusion that the only realistic way forward was the "slow, patient march" through the institutions, in accordance with a project committed to the building of democracy from below on the basis of the self-organisation of civil society. In the 1990s he faces a new polarisation which proposes traditional state-centred policies in opposition to neo-liberalism. In his opinion the main opposition to his own PSDB, that is to say the PMDB, the PT and the PDT, adopts a regressive position. It is not a question of going back to state-led development, or abandoning the state. According to Cardoso it is a question of facing up to the "democratic deficit" in the character of the state itself. It is essential to accept the realities of globalisation, in terms of global competition, but at the same time it is possible to deepen democracy through reform of the state: "to ensure Brazil's entry into international production, to serve the national and popular interests, required reform of the state – reform that will effectively open the state to the pressure and interests of the population and in particular to those with the lowest standards of living, the underclass (interview with the author, 27 July 1998). For this it is necessary to face up to corporate interests and create new instruments for articulation between the nation and the world order, since the traditional state supported national authoritarianism, national populism and national developmentalism, and was held together by populist clientelism. Cardoso's eclectic intellectual approach, still reflecting his Marxist training, has provided him with a methodological capacity of analysis that makes him a conductor of ideas in the debates in the public sphere.

Thus, he makes politics within the perspective of utopian realism – with a target to be reached, but also with a path to be constructed. Not only of principles but also realism – the two are combined in his conception of utopian realism. Therefore, method, concept and argumentative debate form three important notions in his thought and his action in the sphere of the politics.

As a whole, then, Cardoso's thought as an intellectual and politician, is guided philosophically by the notion of utopian realism. With those views and values Cardoso took office as the President of the Republic, interpreting Brazilian reality with the same method of analysis that he had earlier used as an intellectual working on the reform of Brazilian state in order to make the state an institution open to society. As we showed in the course of this thesis, that reform of the state aims for a kind of politics that has nothing in common with the clientelist and patrimonialist popular politics of the traditional Brazilian state.

Cardoso's thoughts are characterised by pragmatic realism but at the same time it is the razor's edge because realism alone may lead to opportunism if it is not oriented by some moral principle. Principles and realism are the criteria against which issues are debated and judged. According to Cardoso, aspects of domination in society can best be counteracted by increasing levels of democratisation. Enlarging democracy therefore is the challenge that imposes itself in the face of new forms of economy. Currently, to be progressive, he says, is to seek the radicalisation of democracy.


His commitment to democracy (representation) and the radicalisation of democracy (participation) has been inspired by the idea that politics is basically creating the conditions to reach certain objectives through changes in the correlation of forces. In other words, political action involves two main elements: one strictly of political philosophy – the need to know what is wanted, and the other, involving a certain

adaptation among available means, the point which needs to be reached, that is, utopian realism.

The concepts of representative formal democracy, substantive democracy and the institutional radicalization of democracy, are mutually complementary. They are combined due to complexity of the social demands, because the state has to be opened up and there is a need for greater institutional participation. The model I present in the following figure is an indication of how to depict the basic structure of Cardoso's idea of the institutional radicalization of democracy in a perspective of utopian realism.

Cardoso's model of institutional democracy radicalisation

pragmatism as utopian realism



This model of democracy illustrates that improvements in representative institutions are not merely a means but also ends in themselves. Like Habermas, Cardoso conceives of democracy as the “march through the institutions.” The key concepts in Cardoso’s model of democracy, then, are civil society, autonomy, the public sector (state and non-state), and institutions that emphasize decentralisation through participation, deliberation, and persuasion. Dialogue in the public sphere gives dynamism to this model in order to ensure democratic stability.

Liberal democracy, democratic society, liberty and social justice constitute the four classical dimensions that form the framework of this model. At the level of the institutions the enlargement of representation needs to be combined with the accountability and different form of direct participation. Therefore,

1. the key institutions are the executive, legislature, judiciary, parties, media, and civil organisations such as NGOs, and
2. the participation process involves the decentralisation, deliberation, persuasion and dialogue in the public sphere. These constitute the real mechanism through which the radicalisation of democracy occurs in a modern society.

In that sense, democracy is a process rather than a finished system.

From the mid-1990s, Brazilian democracy has been evolving in a manner that has sought to reaffirm the principles of dialogue and persuasion. Currently, Brazilian democracy enables different contrasting groups and social classes to coexist. All groups must be committed to the peaceful transformation of society. However, this does not imply an absence of problems and risks, at the level of the state and society

which challenge the democratic institutions. Dialogue in the public sphere is significant in order to stimulate the capacity of the democratic institutions to produce answers to the problems facing the society. Cardoso's political style is anti-populist and anti-demagogic. He emphasises the role of institutions and debate in the political game. The idea coheres with his discourse about the radicalization of democracy – within and through institutions. Radical action with democratic institutions occurs through the intense participation of society and via debate in the public sphere.

This is an important perspective within which Cardoso's political discourse should be understood. Cases which are illustrative of that orientation, are the events unchained by the MST – the landless workers' social movement and the peasant union, CONTAG. These are two movements engaged in the same struggle for land. The MST does not operate politically through institutions (rejecting institutional dialogue), while CONTAG does engage in institutional dialogue. "I don't hold negotiations with the MST," Cardoso says, "because they don't want to discuss. They resort to violence. But I do negotiate with Contag" (Cardoso, 2000d). Cardoso says that he is not averse to dialogue with whomever is interested in dialogue. He believes in having public dialogue via institutions which include the participation of society. In contrast, the MST does not accept that it is possible to resolve the issues concerning land through dialogue within the existing institutions. They maintain that the problem transcends the level of institutions (Stédile, 2000: 46-62).

This example begins to address the question of the limits of Cardoso's discourse. This is not an easy question. A commitment to rational dialogue which genuinely involves all sectors of society is a complicated undertaking. The diversity of interests around the land reform and, for example, tax reform highlight the difficulty of reaching agreement between the government and the opposition through dialogue. But

if such dialogue is perceived as an essential feature of democratisation in a political context which is characterised by distrust and political manoeuvring, there is no avoiding the issue. Cardoso's own analysis of the situation of Brazil reveals that many obstacles need to be overcome to realise the ideal of genuine democratic dialogue. For this to succeed there should be an absence of coercion, yet the circumstances of unequal distribution of land and wealth, and huge disparities in social power, identified by Cardoso himself in numerous speeches, demonstrate that this is not the case. Dialogue, thus, constitutes an instrument of negotiation and political progress, but it requires (and is intended to help to bring about) conditions which do not yet exist.

Brazilian democracy has experienced moments of political turbulence, since its transition from a military power to a civilian president in 1985. The emergence of a politics based upon democratic dialogue has been hindered owing to problems of bad administration, corruption and a lack of understanding in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Therefore, society has learned the lesson that the process of decision-making in a democracy is slow. In principle, it results in the policies which are the eventual outcome gaining in legitimacy. The paradox, however, is that commitment to dialogue and persuasion as a necessary part of bringing about a genuine process of democratisation runs the risk of delaying reform so much that legitimacy is lost.

In contrast to previous governments, Cardoso's term has enjoyed a phase of stability and democratic consolidation that has been conducive to promoting a tendency to improve the social welfare in areas such as education and health. Such tendencies of improvement are associated with the increasing enrollments of children in school and a decline in infantile mortality:

Until recently, Brazil's most glaring educational problem was to supply primary-school places to match the rapidly growing numbers of children aged 7 to 14 (the period of compulsory primary education). In 1985 only 82% were in school. But by last year enrollment had climbed to over 96%, thanks to government efforts to create new places (and to encourage poorer parents to use them) and a falling birthrate (*The Economist*, 2000).

Nevertheless, the persistent unequal distribution of income between the richest and the poorest continues. However, Cardoso presents his interpretation of this paradox. He says, the obsessive themes of Brazil today are poverty and the concentration of income.

Why? I shall repeat Marx: people are becoming conscious of these problems because society is putting together the conditions to solve them. However, these social problems are not solved in a month or a year. Unless you defend the theory of social rupture and redistributing income by force, which, however, doesn't work anywhere. No country changes its income distribution in ten years (Cardoso, 2000b).

However, politically, democracy has started to root, not only in the institutions but also in the practices and values prevalent in Brazilian society. To quote a recent optimistic evaluation of the extent of democratisation,

Free elections are regularly held at all levels of government, with remarkably high voter turn out. The party system is highly competitive – if indeed fragmented. Organisations of civil society, which played a

significant though incipient role in opposing authoritarian rule, have blossomed under democracy and today actively compete for space alongside political parties and organisations of the state itself in defining the public interest and setting the course of public policies. The independence of the judiciary is unchallenged. The press is diversified, free and aggressive, and often far in advance of the opposition parties in its scrutiny, holding the government accountable for its failings. Peaceful demonstrations of dissent and the expression of popular demands are commonplace (Faria and Graeff, 1999: 35).

Even so, there is still a long road to be travelled before the politics of argumentative discourse has the understanding and effectiveness to transform the deep problems that deform the human face of Brazilian society. A democratic system faces more problems and obstacles than a dictatorship. Democratic consolidation is a process of solving the difficult equation between problems of a national and international order; between the profound political and social problems to maintain a balance between the control of inflation and economic growth.

The complexity of these problems, in the context of the political history of the Brazilian state, imposes limits on the effectiveness of discursive action in the public sphere. Sectors of the opposition have denounced those limits. On the other hand, Cardoso recognises that, although there is an improving trend in Brazil's social indicators, many problems of poverty and exclusion still exist.

The continuity of economic growth will depend on many factors. We still have external vulnerabilities. We still have them. We can not put an end to them with a magic wand... There is no magic formula to

improve the condition of life of the population and to give the country a destiny that creates universal happiness. The leadership has to have honesty, competence, direction, determination and faith (Cardoso, 2000e).

Given the recognition by Cardoso himself that the project of radicalisation of democracy is a protected and precarious one, it is appropriate to look for evidence regarding the extent to which it enjoys popular acceptance. Opinion poll data from Brazil provides a means of assessing the extent to which support for democracy in Brazil has grown. Also, because the standing of the president in the eyes of the public is also regularly assessed, it also provides a means of assessing the extent to which Cardoso himself is positively regarded. Analysis of these two issues makes it possible to estimate the success with which Cardoso has put across his commitment to democracy and argumentative discourse in Brazil. As we shall see, the figures reported reflect limits to the level of support for democracy, and, by and large, increasingly negative personal ratings for Cardoso himself. These negative ratings are more a response to the limited success in pushing forward reform and dealing with issues such as corruption than directly to impatience with democracy or distrust of Cardoso's own democratic commitment, but they nevertheless underline the difficulty of making a decisive intervention in reforming the political culture of Brazil in the absence of other reforms desired by the people.

It is reasonable to suggest that faith in democracy was tested to the limits between 1985 and 1994 in Brazil. The death of Tancredo Neves, the slow and partial transition under Sarney, the disastrous episode represented by the Collor presidency and the relative weakness of national leadership under Itamar Franco compounded general

dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform. At the time of the first direct elections for the presidency in 1990, 55 per cent of Brazilians expressed the belief that democracy was the best political system. After the experience of corruption and rising inflation under Collor, this figure dropped to 42 per cent, with more than half as many (23 per cent) declaring their approval of dictatorship. With the election of Cardoso in 1994, the apparent curtailment of corruption and the successful campaign against inflation, the numbers supporting democracy rose again to a clear majority, with 54 per cent in favour. Five years later, however, in June 2000, with Cardoso well into his second term as President, this figure had fallen back to 47 per cent, with 18 per cent declaring a positive preference for dictatorship (Fleischer, 2000a: 4). Three immediate conclusions may be drawn from these figures, each with clear implications for the 'Habermasian' project described in this thesis. On the one hand, it cannot be said that Cardoso has succeeded in transforming commitments to democracy in the country, and to that extent the success of the project is clearly in the balance. On the other hand, the very fact that the level of support for democracy has proved to be so fragile suggests the need to continue to argue from the presidency for the virtue of democracy as a value in itself. Thirdly, though, it seems legitimate to assume that democracy is unlikely to be valued for itself until the reforms do make further progress and the level of corruption is seen to decline. The fact that reforms have proved difficult to achieve in a democratic context does not imply that they could have been better achieved by more authoritarian means, but it does mean that doubts about the capacity of democracy to deliver results in these areas impede acceptance of its procedural and developmental virtues.

Some of these conclusions are reinforced by the evidence regarding the ratings of the President himself. These remained stable throughout the first presidential period,

largely because of the success of the Real Plan and the consequent falls in inflation. In the second presidential period, however, his standing has fluctuated, largely as a consequence of setbacks in the area of economic policy, along with concerns over corruption, and failure to complete key reforms.

The economic crisis of early 1999, reflecting the fact that Brazil was caught up in the tide of global instability sparked off by the 'Asian Crisis', brought Cardoso's personal rating to a low point, with the proportion of Brazilians rating his performance as excellent or good reaching 19 per cent in February, and slipping to a low of 8 per cent by September, to recover only to 12 per cent by the end of the year (Fleischer, 2000b). Although the figures fluctuated in 2000, with some improvement in comparison with the last quarter of 1999, an average of 15 per cent rated Cardoso as excellent or good in the first half of the year, while over 50 per cent regarded him as either bad or 'terrible' (Fleischer, *ibid*). By July this rating had recovered to 19 per cent, and by October it recovered to 23 per cent, but it remained the case that fewer than one Brazilian in four regarded the overall performance of their president in positive terms (Fleischer, 2000c).

Two conclusions can be drawn from these figures. The first is that when citizens of Brazil make judgements about the success of their leaders, economic well-being is a primary concern. The second is that public discontent with growing evidence of corruption among Cardoso's ministers and supporters is not necessarily blamed upon or associated with Cardoso himself. Thus despite a series of corruption scandals in the middle of 2000 (June-August), Cardoso's negative ratings (bad or terrible) improved steadily from 59 to 44 and then to 39 per cent (*ibid*).

The much lower ratings for Cardoso himself than for democracy suggest that the Brazilian people continue to show greater support for the democratic system than for

their particular leader, or its current results. They might even reinforce the suggestion that Cardoso's consistent positive discourse regarding the value of democracy has kept support for it higher than it might otherwise have been. But the overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from his strongly negative ratings is that Brazilians do not find him persuasive as a communicator. To that extent, there is reason to be sceptical about the popular impact of his public espousal of democratic values, and his efforts to build support for a Habermasian public sphere. This conclusion does not necessarily go against the 'realistic utopianism' to which Cardoso is committed. As we have seen, some social indicators have shown improvement in Brazil, but a great deal remains to be done. At the same time, the persistence of corruption shows that whatever the aspirations of his government, there is as yet little evidence of moral reform among the country's political elites. If Cardoso's project for the radicalisation of democracy is to succeed, it may require the support of a new generation of leaders committed to a broader vision of democracy than has prevailed so far. While it is clear that Cardoso has devoted considerable energy to encouraging democratic debate and building a Habermasian public sphere, it is too soon to judge the likely success of the project. It is not surprising in these circumstances that Cardoso is only willing to claim that Brazil has progressed from "a bad to a less bad" situation (Abranches, 2000: 131).

The data reviewed above do not however invalidate the project espoused by Cardoso. To travel along the tortuous path to transform the institutionalised system of power is the only way to progress toward human emancipation in a complex society or, if one prefers, a modern and globalised society. It is more effective though not so easy as a simple dismissing of opposition. This is especially the case in an emancipation process free from coercion and of the constraints of violence. Dialogue is used as the antithesis of coercion and persuasion as the opposite of imposition. The

democratic society is guided by cosmopolitan values and is the antithesis of a society guided by fundamentalist values.

The fundamentalist view of all authoritarian regimes or dictatorships is developed in the soil of one sole line of thought, without diversity, without tolerance for paradox, doubt or multiple interpretations and identities. It means refusing to enter into dialogue, in a world whose peace and continuity depend on that dialogue and tolerance. This commitment to dialogue and tolerance is, historically, the most probable tendency for the world to follow in order to resolve its conflicts.

The general-secretary of the United Nations, for example, has made an analysis that converges with the perspective on democratic discourse argued by Cardoso and sustained in this thesis. Based on data, he says, that

Since 1990 there has been a remarkable and little-noticed reduction in global warfare. More old wars have ended than new ones have begun. Between 1989 and 1992 on average eight new ethnic wars began each year; today the average is two a year. Between 1992 and 1998 the scope and intensity of armed conflict around the world declined by about a third. The number of democratically elected governments increased by about the same proportion. We cannot leap to the conclusion that the increase in the number of democracies has caused the decrease in warfare. Other factors, such as the end of the cold war, surely also played a role (although the two are obviously related). However, the evidence is in line with the well-established, if publicised, finding that democracies have far lower levels of internal violence than non-democracies. This not really surprising. The non-

violent management of conflict is the very essence of democracy

(Annan, 2000: 91).

As we have seen, Cardoso's rejection of such violence dates back to the 1960s, when he refused to support guerrilla warfare as a solution to the inequalities prevalent in Brazil. As pointed out by Giddens, cosmopolitans have to make it plain that tolerance and dialogue can themselves be guided by values of a universal kind. All of us need moral commitments that stand above the petty concerns and squabbles of everyday life. We should be prepared to mount an active defence of these values wherever they are poorly developed, or threatened. Cosmopolitan morality itself needs to be driven by passion. None of us would have anything to live for if we didn't have something worth dying for (Giddens, 1999:50). Cardoso has a greater claim than most to be taken seriously when he refuses to be categorised as a neo-liberal. As this thesis has argued, he is a utopian realist, who has consistently applied a realistic method of analysis in search of utopian goals. And in his political practice, he is best seen as a 'Habermasian', committed to creating the circumstances for democracy to exist in Brazil, and conducting himself in the presidency in accordance with democratic values of a Habermasian kind.

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