

THE STRUCTURE OF SMALL STATE BEHAVIOUR
IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

A THESIS

Submitted to the University of
Manchester for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Vaughan Allen Lewis

June, 1970

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
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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

THE STRUCTURE OF SMALL STATE BEHAVIOUR
IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

This thesis attempts to analyse the international environmental context of the behaviour of small states in the contemporary period. The contemporary period is meant to refer to the period since the Second World War. The thesis therefore attempts to do two things: first, to discuss certain analytical problems arising in the study of international politics, and to relate these problems specifically to the analysis of small state behaviour; secondly, to analyse the sets of relationships in international politics in which small states find themselves engaged. More specifically, an attempt is, therefore, made to discuss the notion of international system as an analytical tool - to determine the extent of its relevance to an understanding of the 'reality' of small state behaviour in international politics.

Next, we attempt a stratification of the units involved in international interaction, with a view to isolating the 'small' state from other states, and categorising the different kinds of small states that may exist. This is essentially an exercise in taxonomy, though we attempt to move beyond this by distinguishing between size, defined according to a set of objective criteria, and systemic size. The purpose of this is to link the notions of size and status.

The remainder of the thesis is concerned with an examination, in a variety of ways, of the central problem of small state behaviour in the international society - the problem of self-maintenance and development or what we refer to as the search for viability. We perceive various modes of international viability and various strategies

for its maintenance, these depending, in part, on the particular characteristics of the small state. We therefore examine, first, the conditions under which particular kinds of small states attain international existence: the circumstances of the international environment which either assist or inhibit their development as sovereign states. Here we are concerned with what we have called short-term viability - the demonstration in the post-war period of a capacity for independent existence.

Subsequently, we attempt to analyse the context of longer-term viability: the strategies and mechanisms through which it may be possible for the small state to maintain a relatively autonomous international existence. We discuss the extent to which this is possible in the contemporary period, in terms of an examination, first of the perspectives that dominant units in the international society have of the 'proper' roles of small states; and secondly, in terms of the nature of the relationships between dominant units and small states in an era in which the search for economic viability on the part of small states, and therefore economic relationships become important aspects of external relations. We examine the concept and reality of penetration by dominant units and ask to what extent, in the context of this, small states have a capacity for meaningful political autonomy.

Finally, we attempt to deal with the relationships of small states in some geographical proximity to each other, in two senses. First in terms of the extent to which they are viewed and acted upon as regions by dominant units; we discuss the circumstances in which the sets of transactions in which small states in a region are involved with major extra-regional units, might lead to the analytical conclusion that these small states exist in systemic subordination to the extra-regional units. We proceed from there to discuss the question of the extent of

subordinate system autonomy that is possible for regional systems - distinguishing at the same time, between different kinds of regional subordinate systems.

The second sense in which we discuss subordinate system behaviour is by examining the mechanics of political integration as a strategy for sustaining viability. In so doing, we concern ourselves with certain analytical problems raised in recent literature in the theory of integration, thereby discussing its relevance for, in particular, small states that are economically weak.

Our conclusion raises the question of statehood itself as the optimum strategy for resolution of the demand for self-determination by relatively small populations considering themselves 'nations'.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the University of Manchester and the Social Science Research Council for the grant of a Research Fellowship for the academic years 1966-1968, during which most of the research for this thesis was undertaken; to Professor Brian Chapman of the Department of Government, University of Manchester, for assistance; to Dr. John Erickson for very useful suggestions during the initial period; and to Dr. A.W. Singham for constant advice and encouragement, and for reading parts of the drafts. I am also grateful to the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University and to its Director, Professor W.T.R. Fox, for granting me facilities in the Institute as a Visiting Scholar during the summer of 1967; to my friends and colleagues Eric St. Cyr and F.A. Baptiste for helpful discussion. Finally, I am grateful to Miss A. Wood for typing assistance with original drafts, and to Mrs. K. Miles and Mrs. E. Young, for typing the final product.

INTRODUCTION

The idea that it was useful to analyse the context of activity of small states in the contemporary international society came to the present writer as a consequence of two events: the first, the dissolution in 1961 of the West Indies Federation, an institution then still under colonial tutelage, and secondly, the secession from the British Empire in November 1965, of Rhodesia, soon after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

With the independence of a number of territories once deemed not to be capable of the "viability" that was the sustenance of full sovereignty, it seemed necessary to examine the extent to which systems of international relations in the contemporary era allowed the search for small-state independence to be a realistic strategy for the self-determination of peoples who, for a variety of reasons, wished to liberate themselves from colonial domination. Even before the dissolution of the West Indies Federation, the wave of decolonisation had begun to gather force; and in the decade of the 1960's there came into existence, as legally sovereign entities, a multiplicity of what we define in the body of this thesis as small states, particularly in Africa. In fact, the events in Indo-China in 1954-1955 constituted a foreshadowing of this, and the fate of the states that came into existence in that area, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, could only give additional force to an inclination to study the small state as a global phenomenon.

Much of the work on the strategy for survival of the small state had been done in the inter-war period, or in terms of analysing the behaviour of states during that period. The so-called "balkanisa-

tion" of Europe and the behaviour of the small neutral states during the second World War was the focus of this analysis. More recently, however, in fact in response to analyses of small-state behaviour in the contemporary period (particularly David Vital's The Inequality of States to which we make reference in this essay), doubts have begun to be expressed by political scientists, as to the wisdom of using the small state, however defined, as the focus of analysis of state behaviour, even though the state should happen to be small.¹

The argument here is, essentially, of two kinds. The first, whether it is not the case that small states and, for example, large, weak and "underdeveloped" states have so many characteristics in common, and give rise to such similar responses to their existence and activities by other types of states, that to make a distinction, analytically, between them is to add to the general problems of the analysis of state behaviour in international relations. The second aspect of the argument is that the qualitative distinction between the Superpowers and others is so marked, that this should be the basis of analysis.

We are not convinced by either of these arguments though the first has much more substance than the second. Small states are often defined in the literature (or counterposed against) great states. We prefer, as will be seen, to make the distinction between small and large states, using various determinants of physical size as the main criterion, then to distinguish between different kinds of large states and different kinds of small states. We use other kinds of criteria for the status ranking of states. Further, we see as important not

¹See for example Fox, A.B., "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969", International Journal, Vol. 14, 1969, pp. 751-764, at p. 751. Fox is herself the author of a work entitled, The Power of Small States; see also, Bull, Hedley, "Force in Contemporary International Relations" Survival, Vol. 10, 1968, pp. 300-2, at p.302.

only the relations between small states of various kinds and large powerful states (Superpowers, Major powers), but the relations among small states themselves. In this context, we hold that it is useful to distinguish, (and use as a viable focus of analysis) small states from even physically large, but weak and "underdeveloped" states.

Then we attempt in this essay, a general theoretical analysis meant to apply in some respects as much to the future as to the present. In this context large, presently weak, states have to be seen as having, at least in principle, a potential for the development of capabilities and modes of activity that small states cannot attain. It is true, as we suggest later, that small states can supersede large states in rank, but we also attempt to demonstrate conditions under which this becomes possible (hence the emphasis in this essay on the structure of small state behaviour), and the extent to which it can be a long-term characteristic of the small state. At the same time, we recognise the significance of the existence of major powers for the small state, hence our devotion of a chapter of this thesis to the perspectives of the major powers (Chapter 5).

The method of analysis is both deductive and inductive. We use empirical material as a means of demonstrating the relevance and meaningfulness of a number of general propositions that we advance. Hence, case studies appear here as supports for these propositions, rather than as the basis on which certain conclusions are drawn. Of course, the distinction in practice is never as clear-cut as this. Secondly, the work has a predominantly taxonomic character; it represents a first attempt to distinguish and analyse small states in terms of their various attributes, and it thus eschews the policy orientation, not as a matter of principle, but of necessity. Thirdly, since the focus of the thesis is on the structural context of activity

rather than on the activity itself of the small state, we have had to devote some considerable discussion to the 'international context' and to the analysis of the concept of 'international system'. Since 'systems theory' is a relatively new form of analysis within the discipline, we have had to attempt to justify our view of its partial relevance in the study which we have undertaken.

Finally, since our title indicates that we have restricted the analysis to contemporary international relations - seen, roughly, as encompassing the post-war period, we need to explain our use of, in parts of the essay, empirical references relating to a time period prior to this. Our justification relates to, as is explained in the essay, the view of the character of the international society that we hold, especially in the context of our questioning of the assertion sometimes advanced, that there exists an international political system. We will hold in this work, that certain aspects of contemporary international relations bear a sufficiently close similarity to those of earlier periods, to allow us to use forms and events from those periods as the basis for devising frameworks of analysis useful for the interpretation of the present.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONTEXT: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

"Dependence and independence, hierarchy and circularity (or multi-regional interdependence) are the four basic concepts of structural analysis".¹

An essay which sets out to develop a framework or set of frameworks for analysing the structure of small state behaviour in contemporary international politics must commence with an attempt to delineate the form and behaviour of the relationships which can be said to constitute 'international politics' itself. This involves, first of all, a choice of a relevant unit of analysis or universe that can be taken as either delimiting or suggesting the scope of the relationships with which we are concerned. Both in the recent analytical literature on international politics and in everyday parlance about international politics, the concept which frequently serves to denote these relationships is that of international system.² It is the intention, here, to discuss the relationships of international politics in terms of the notion of international system, and to do this in essentially two ways.

First, we will discuss the concepts of 'system' and 'international system' as they have been used in the recent theoretical

¹Leontief, W. "The Structure of Development", Scientific American, September 1963, pp. 148-167 at p. 151.

²For two theoretical works using the concept predominant in the literature, Knorr, K. and Verba, S. (eds.) The International System, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1961) and Kaplan, M. System and Process in International Politics (N.Y.: John Wiley, 1957). See also Goodman, Jay S. "The Concept of 'System' in International Relations Theory", Background, Vol. 8, 1965, pp. 257-269.

literature. The aim is to try and perceive the extent to which recent theories of 'systems' are of help in evolving an analytical approach to the study of small state behaviour; more generally, we will ask whether the term 'international system' itself is sufficiently descriptive of or explanatory of, the relationships of international politics. Secondly, we shall try to, as it were, "fill in" the analytical framework which we devise by attempting a description of the concrete actors - their relationships and interactions with each other - and the actual context in which such relationships take place. The first part of the discussion in this Chapter is, therefore, mainly of a theoretical (almost deductive) character; the second more analytical/descriptive.

A dual operation of this kind is necessary, for as one writer has remarked in discussing in analytical terms the notion of international system,

"It is tempting yet misleading to analyse international politics at a level so abstract that one forgets what stuff the units of international politics are made of, for their nature shapes their goals and the stakes of the contest Analysis of the international system has something skeletal about it; we learn nothing about the muscles and blood and nerves. It is therefore necessary to return, so to speak, to the flesh of contemporary world politics. The international system deals with abstractions.... we must introduce the real states their concrete goals and policies, the real networks of amity and hostility, the specific issues".³

This quotation, in fact, itself suggests a problem of approach that has been at the heart of much recent discussion in the literature, and which can be stated in two parts; first, if the notion of international system is used as the central analytical concept, does it

³Hoffmann, Stanley, Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (N.Y. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Paper Edition, 1968) pp. 22 and 73.

constitute a sufficiently inclusive one for explaining all of international politics; or, secondly, are there not a number of "levels of analysis" from which the relations of international politics can be viewed, the implication here being that the central analytical concept is likely to vary (to be one or another of a number of useful concepts) depending on the problem with which one is concerned, and the perspective from which one attempts to analyse the problem.⁴

Thus, in dealing with this "level of analysis" problem, some writers assume that the most useful analytical perspective is no longer that of the nation-state, but the "international system" constituted by the relations between states and their environments. Here, the international system, when referred to in this way, is seen as something more than the mere "state system" of traditional analysis. As Michael Brecher explains this perspective, it is assumed that just as "an international economic system exists apart from the national economic systems within it, there must also be an international political system related to, but distinct from, the political systems of nation-states".⁵

The utility of this as a perspective is questioned by other writers - even by those who admit the "systems" approach has some merit. Snyder et. al., after considering it, remain of the opinion that the investigator's perspective, and therefore central analytical concept, should still be that of the state since "the nation-state is

⁴See, on this, Singer, J.D., "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations, in Knorr, K. and Verba, S. op. cit., pp. 77-92.

⁵Brecher, M., "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia", World Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1963, pp. 213-235.

going to be the significant unit of political action for many years to come" and thus "strategies of action and commitment of resources will continue to be decided at the national level".⁶

In addition, from the methodological point of view, it has been suggested that "the systems-oriented model... tends to lead the observer into a position which exaggerates the impact of the system upon the national actors and, conversely, discounts the impact of the actors on the system", though "this is... by no means inevitable".⁷ At the concrete (as distinct from the methodological) level, the point of issue here is whether and in what circumstances either elements internal to the state itself or the system (however defined and discerned) exercises on contemporary international relations, the dominant influence on state activity. We shall attempt to resolve this point later in this Chapter.

Those who posit the existence of system, however, go on to deduce that it may be composed of subordinate systems. (We shall later distinguish this concept from that of sub-system). Brecher writes of the "state system of Southern Asia" as a "subordinate state system" to be distinguished from the "Dominant system" (that involving the relations between the Super-powers) or the "World or Global Political System". In somewhat similar terms Leonard Binder has attempted to describe and analyse "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System" and David Singer has recently written of "The Global System

⁶ Snyder, R. et. al., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (N.Y. 1962) p. 63.

⁷ Singer, D., op. cit., p. 80. We might note that the area of dispute here is different from that associated with the "traditionalists" which suggests that there is "a kind of recalcitrance of international politics being theorized about": Wight, M., "Why is there no International Theory?", in Butterfield, M. and Wight, M., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966) p. 33.

and Its Sub-Systems".⁸

Whatever the analogies that might be used, it seems necessary to ask, first, the more general question of what constitutes a system, then whether the properties of "system" apply with any degree of stringency to the social system⁹ and, finally, to what extent these concepts can be applied in international relations. For these three questions, stated as assertions, are central assumptions of the "systems" approach to the study of international relations.¹⁰

It is as well to start with the dictionary definition of "system": that of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary runs: "(i) Complex whole, set of connected things or parts, organized body of material or immaterial things; (ii) Method, organization, considered principles of procedure, (principle of) classification (- of government)". The significant words here, are obviously - connected, organized organization; that a system must have organization, that its parts must be 'connected' in some manner: these properties are necessary to any set of phenomena defined as a system.

⁸Brecher, M., op. cit.,; Binder, L., "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System", World Politics, Vol. IX, 1958, pp. 408-29; Singer, J.D., "The Global System and Its Sub-Systems: A Developmental View", p. 210, (University of Michigan: Mental Health Research Institute, June, 1967), mimeo.

⁹"By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end", Marx, K. and Engels, F., The German Ideology (N.Y. New World Paperback edition, International Publishers, 1960), p. 18.

¹⁰Thus Modelski, for example, counts among his "theoretical assumptions" that (i) the proper object of the study of international relations is the universe of international systems, past, present, future and hypothetical ... that (ii) international systems are social systems". Further "like other systems, international systems consist of a set of objects, plus the relationships between these objects and between their attributes". Modelski, G., "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of International Systems", in Knorr and Verba, op. cit., p. 121, my emphasis.

And these are the properties recognized by natural scientists when dealing with phenomena in their disciplines. One can take the field of biology where Bertalanffy, for example, writes, "Every organism represents a system by which term we mean a complex of elements in mutual interaction each individual part and each individual event depends not only on conditions within itself, but also to a greater or lesser extent on conditions within the whole the problem of life is organization".¹¹

Similarly, R.S. Lillie, "The system, complex as it is, holds together, maintains its identity, grows and reproduces The most striking feature (of living systems) is the predominance of synthetic activity Associated with synthesis is integration, the possession of a special character as a whole. The word, integration implies composite character, together with coherence and unity".¹² Here, both Bertalanffy and Lillie are emphasising the 'systemic' character of anything that can be called a system, that is, its "possession of a special character as a whole".¹³

The concept of "organization" as central to a valid definition of system is important here: organization not in the sense of an entity existing or constructed to the attainment of some purpose

¹¹Bertalanffy, L., Problems of Life (N.Y. Harper Torchbooks, 1960, first published, 1952), pp. 11-12. Italics in the original.

¹²Lillie, R.S. "Living and Non-Living Systems" Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, 1942, pp. 307-322 at p. 307.

¹³As a cybernetician, Stafford Beer, has remarked, "the adjective which means 'pertaining to system' is not 'systematic' (which means something quite different) but 'systemic'; and that is a word one seldom hears", Beer, S., "The World, The Flesh and the Metal: The Prerogative of Systems" Nature, Vol. 205, January 16, 1965, pp. 223-31.

(an organization), but in the sense of the linkage and mutual interaction between two or more elements:

"The hard core of the concept [of organization] is"

Ashby writes,

"that of 'conditionality'. As soon as the relation between two entities A and B becomes conditional on C's value or state then a necessary component of 'organization' is present The converse of 'conditional on' is 'not conditional on', so the converse of 'organization' must therefore be ... the concept of 'reducibility' (it is also called 'separability')".

Ashby takes the analysis further:

"This way of looking at 'conditionality' makes us realize that it is related to that of 'communication'; and it is ... quite plausible that we should define parts as being 'organized' when 'communication' (in some generalized sense) occurs between them. Again the natural converse is that of independence which represents non-communication).

Now 'communication' from A to B necessarily implies some constraint, some correlation between what happens at A and what at B. If, for given event at A, all possible events may occur at B, then there is no communication from A to B and no constraint over the possible (A + B) - couples that can occur. Thus the presence of 'organization' between variables is equivalent to the existence of constraint in the product-space of the possibilities".¹⁴

[Emphasis in original]

¹⁴Ashby, W. Ross, "Principles of the Self-Organizing System" in Von Foerster, H. and Zopf, G.W. (eds.), Principles of Self-Organization (Pergamon Press, 1962) pp. 256-7. Ashby's remarks are worth quoting at some length, for we shall recur to the distinctions which he makes.

THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEM AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

It is scarcely necessary to observe that it is from all these conceptions (some differing from each other) that social scientists have derived their own. And they have tended in large part to accept, as defining characteristics of social systems, those of living systems and certain types of semi-mechanical constructs: integration, regularity, wholeness, organization, coherence or connectedness. In addition, there are the assumptions that a system must "maintain its identity" over a period of time if it is to be characterized as such; that is to say it must demonstrate viability; it must, while maintaining that identity, "grow and reproduce", that is, it must develop.¹⁵

The problem that arises for the social scientist is how completely the concept, used in this way, should be taken over. One solution is to use 'system' as applied in the natural sciences as an ideal, as a point of reference, and to demand vis-a-vis the social system that particular properties exist only with varying degrees of stringency. H. and M. Blalock can thus, for example, say that "A system is anything one wishes to study as an entity; in the social sciences it may be a person or group such as a family or a large business organization". What is common to each of these examples is that they are all in some degree 'integrated' - they are characterized by connectedness, and more often than not, organised

¹⁵See also Stromberg, G., "Coherence in the Physical World", Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, 1942, pp. 323-34 at p. 330. "In living organisms a particular type of coherence in space as well as in time is clearly evident. The coherence in space is often called organization, and the coherence in time is often described as a development towards a well-defined pre-determined structure". (*Italics in the original*).

for some purpose or set of purposes, however, broad, within some, in principle, bounded framework.

Boulding is, similarly, prepared initially to allow a fairly broad definition of system: "A system is anything that is not chaos"; and 'non-chaos', particularly in the sphere of social relations, tends to be complex. The extent of complexity means that it is impossible to perceive completely how the system works. It therefore becomes necessary to "abstract ... those elements which exhibit enough regularity to be subject to analysis".¹⁶ Boulding seems to be allowing for the existence of varying 'degrees of system' in any entity or among any set of entities - the defining characteristic of a more or less coherent system being the extent of regularity in their relations which the elements of the system exhibit. To this we can add that the regularity of interaction - and thus the degree of system is partly dependent on the manner of 'connectedness' of the elements with each other. (The emphasis on connectedness gives a 'tightness' to the notion of system and can be related to what James Miller finds, following Bertalanffy, in a discussion of living systems, as the most useful general definition of system: "A system is a set of units with relationships among them The word 'set' implies that the units have common properties. The state of each unit is constrained by, conditioned

¹⁶Blalock, H. and A., "Towards a Clarification of Systems Analysis in the Social Sciences", Philosophy of Science, Vol. 26, 1959, pp. 84-92 at p. 85; Boulding, K.E., "The Relations of Economic, Political and Social Systems", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1962, pp. 351-62 at p. 351; see also Beer, S. Cybernetics and Management (English University Press, 1959) p. 9: "Anything that consists of parts connected together will be called a system The definition of any particular system is arbitrary".

by, or dependent on the state of other units").¹⁷

Now, if we accept, for the moment, two points - (a) the concept of system as derived from natural sciences as a reference point or ideal and (b) the emphasis in systemic analysis on 'abstracting regularities' as an analytical focus - we are in a position to turn to the problem of the relevance of systemic analysis for social and political systems analysis. And we attempt to determine the extent of relevance by trying to discern whether and in what degree the properties which are attributed to living systems can be found among the relationships which we refer to as social and to the entity which we call society.

One difficulty is immediately apparent and forms the basis of an assumption which the present writer uses as a starting point: the difficulty in analysing social life of identifying regularity or, to put this in another way, of identifying, over some period of time, those factors to which may be reputed the functions of giving some order and persistence to relationships between individuals and groups. For, in an important sense, the concept of 'society' is, much more than that of organism, for example, an abstraction; and though the basic unit of society may be a concrete unit (the individual), what constitutes the society and the social system and gives them the character of 'ordered' systems are not the individuals, nor even simply individual-in-relation, but the expectations of individuals-

¹⁷Miller, J.G., "Living Systems: Basic Concepts", Behavioural Science, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1965, pp. 193-237 at p. 200. (Second emphasis added.) Boulding's remarks about the need, in dealing with elements in interaction, to "abstract ... those elements which exhibit enough regularity" introduce the useful distinction between what Miller calls "abstracted systems" and "concrete systems". The latter notes that "abstracted systems are oriented towards relationships rather than towards the concrete systems which have those relationships", cf. Miller, ibid., pp. 204-206. We shall return to this distinction.

relation and the roles (or multiplicity of roles) which individuals assume in order to live up to and sustain these expectations.

Society and social system, unlike the organism or the mechanical ~~construct~~^{we} are not concrete entities. Societies are constituted of individuals (or groups of individuals)-in-relation (hence Karl Marx's insistence in the nineteenth century that "the individual is a social being").¹⁸ Social systems are constituted of the networks of expectations and roles which give these societal relations coherence and persistence, and which allow individuals-as-actors to assume, and the analyst to suggest, that there may be a degree of regularity in various aspects of societal relations. The boundaries of societies extend to wherever individuals (or sets of individuals)-in-relation are perceived to exist; the boundaries of social systems extend beyond the mere individuals themselves. The social system, then, is even more of an 'abstraction' than the society.

The problem of perceiving 'coherence' (a property of living systems) among expectations and roles - of perceiving where 'system' may be said to exist - becomes fundamental, therefore, in attempting to apply the 'systemic' notion to social life. The boundaries of the perceived system (and thus the system itself) are neither 'given' nor relatively stable - as with the living system or, for example, the planetary system where even if boundaries could not be perceived, they could be assumed to exist and be stable. An important analytical

¹⁸ And that society is "the product of men's reciprocal activities" the "sum of the relations in which ... individuals stand to one another." Marx also insists that "It is above all necessary to avoid postulating 'society' ... as an abstraction confronting the individual". (my emphasis). See Bottomore, T.B. and Rubel, M., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Philosophy. (London: Watts and Co., 1956), pp. 77 and 96.

problem becomes that of whether coherence or connectedness diminishes or increases as the social system is extended: it becomes in fact more and more difficult to see how the various elements or units of the system (or whether they necessarily) do cohere and to trace such aspects of regularity as may be present. This is not simply a question of increase in size in the orthodox sense of increase in number of units or elements or increase in the scope of elements (from, for example, small group to political party to nation and so on); rather it is one size in terms of increase in complexity of relations between elements - which may occur where number of units or scope of a unit remains the same - and of the networks of expectations and roles which denote these relationships.¹⁹ And increasing complexity may mean increasing or decreasing coherence and capacity for adaptation to or control of environment.

The problem is compounded by the fact that in social life it cannot be assumed that, for purposes of observation, all these relationships will occur in precisely the same way more than once; though the importance of this is diminished if the objects of analysis are taken to constitute not all elements and relationships but those perceived to be crucial to the persistence of the system. A system, D.M. Emmet holds, "may be any ordering of interdependent elements". The "ordering" and "interdependence" of, for example, the elements of organism exhibit specific and (in principle) verifiable regularities; the same cannot be said of the relations of social life. In fact, Emmet would conclude, "a society is a process with some systematic

¹⁹This conception of size is important for our discussion of the notion of viability of small states in international politics. See also Ashby's discussion of the concept of size in cybernetic analysis in, Ashby, W.R., An Introduction to Cybernetics, (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1957), pp. 61-3.

characteristics, rather than a closely integrated system, like an organism or a machine".²⁰ (We would, however, as indicated above, go further and distinguish social system from society.)

The focus of the analysis of societal relations is, if the above discussion is a valid one, a two-fold one: there are what we might call the relationships stemming from the interaction or connectedness of elements (individuals or groups) and there is the level of social system relationships - the network of roles and expectations.

From this perspective we are able to evade as not entirely relevant (if not to solve) a problem of analysis which at least one author, J.D. Singer, has recently attempted to pinpoint. He has remarked that,

"Whereas most laymen and most foreign policy practitioners tend to organize their ideas on world politics around a variety of social entities, many social scientists increasingly tend to build their schemes around roles and relationships. [Singer in a footnote quotes Parsons: "the unit of a partial social system is a role, and not the individual".] In my judgment, this represents a regressive step, moving us away from conceptual clarity and operational measurement, with no trade-off in the form of enhanced explanatory power. To the contrary, by subdividing an entity's roles into those appropriate to the economy, the polity or the society, we reduce the probability of ever seeing the entity in anything approximating its entirety".²¹

²⁰ Emmet, D.M., Function, Purpose and Powers (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1958) p. 293. See also Emmet, Rules Roles and Relations (Macmillan, 1966), pp. 113-14. R.S. Lillie writes, with reference to the natural sciences: "Repetition implies the persistence or stability of the factors determining each single event of the class considered. Verifiability (which requires either repetition or continuance) is possible only for persistent facts of experience, or for repeated facts (determined by single factors). Single transient events (since they recede quickly into the past) are not directly verifiable". "The Problem of Synthesis in Biology", Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, 1942, pp. 59-71 at p. 61, note 2.

²¹ Singer, J. David, "Man and World Politics: The Psychological Interface", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1968, pp. 127-56, at pp. 130-1. Italics in the original.

For us, the dual level perspective would lead to posing the relevant analytical questions not in these dichotomous terms, but in the following way: (a) How many elements or units (or entities) are we concerned with - this depending in part on the kind of problem we have chosen for analysis? (b) What is the extent of connectedness between these elements, and how do the particular attributes of these elements determine the character of relationships of connectedness? (c) What kinds of networks of expectations and roles spring from these relationships of connectedness and what is the extent of coherence between them? In other words, what kinds of social systems (and/or political systems for example) flow from these attribute or structural relationships, giving a certain continuity to the behaviour of elements-in-relation? (d) How are new elements added to existing patterns of connectedness, and does this 'adding' take place exogenously or endogenously (from outside or within the existing societal pattern)?

The form of analysis need not commence with the first of these questions. In fact, it may be questions about expectations and performance of roles that may lead us to ask questions about the connectedness of elements and about the nature of their relationships stemming from the particular kinds of attributes that they possess. And though roles and expectations are always the roles and expectations of particular entities or units, they (roles etc.) have a certain autonomy, especially as they become more and more complex, in that the unit may not, for example, be able unilaterally to change the roles that it plays, or the sets of expectations about its activity that arise as a consequence of its interaction with other units.

Implicit in the idea that systems of roles and expectations develop is the further idea that systems are constituted of rules

with a certain permanency which themselves affect the terms of unit behaviour and of entry into any system. Where this analysis differs from that of systems analyses as applied in the natural sciences is in emphasising the dynamic nature of unit activity in social life that arises from the fact that units can develop and change roles and expectations (whether these units are individuals or groups of individuals like nations). The parts of organisms or mechanical constructs have functions within a relatively fixed and hierarchically ordered structure; individuals and groups that are parts of structures may have functions, but they also develop systems of roles and expectations that can change the 'ordering' of relationships which is implicit in the notion of function. Finally, the analysis we have here used in describing the development and character of social systems can also be used in relation to the analysis of economic or political systems.²²

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Where we can perceive those entities - groupings of individuals - which we call nation-states-in relation or in reciprocal activity with similar entities, there we are entitled to define relations as constituting international society. (We do not, of course, mean to imply as will be seen below, that nation-states are the only members of international society, nor do we necessarily equate international

²² Thus one economist's description of an economic system as a "mechanism or set of rules by which any national economy functions or is operated". Wyczalkowski, M.R. "Communist Economics and Currency Convertibility", I.M.F. Staff Papers, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1966, pp. 155-97, at p. 155.

society with global society.²³ Our task is, then, to try to delineate the interconnection of elements in that society and the networks of roles and expectations which we have called systems with particular reference to the extent to which these latter are themselves, give rise to, or impinge upon, a form of behaviour that we will call political. In addition, we have to examine the extent to which this political aspect of societal behaviour has itself a certain coherence and therefore autonomy, which would lead us to speak of a political system or systems.

How does one identify the political? If, for convenience, we accept Max Weber's definition of politics as "the striving to share power and striving to influence the distribution of power either among states or among groups within the state" and also Weber's definition of the state as "that human activity that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory (as Runciman has pointed out the definition can be faulted - "politics" can exist in "stateless" societies and non-territorial states or in entities in which territorial boundaries are ill-defined - but this is not, for our purposes immediately important)²⁴ we can agree with, among others, Bernard Crick, that politics within a state or territorially defined grouping is a somewhat different activity in

²³Otherwise this would tend to lead to the erroneous suggestion characteristic, one writer has suggested, of European international lawyers and historians of the past, that because European-type states could not be identified in other areas of the world, and because units in such areas had different kinds of rules and expectations about inter-unit intercourse, they were therefore outside the pale of international society (meaning Eurocentric norms of state intercourse). This relates to our point about the terms of entry by elements into different patterns of relationships. See Alexandrowicz, C.H., "Le droit des nations aux Indes orientales (xvi^e, xvii^e, xviii^e siècles)", Part 2, Annales, No. 6, 1964, pp. 1066-84.

²⁴Runciman, W.G., Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 87. The quotations from Weber are taken from Runciman.

kind from that among states. In fact, however, it would be more correct to say that it is the terms, and by implication, methods of political activity that are different in these respective spheres. Crick concludes (given his very specific views of what kind of activity merits the name 'political') from his discussion that "International 'society' is not a political system";²⁵ he is quite correct, especially if the argument that we have developed earlier is accepted. But he in fact misses the point, or rather confuses these distinct concepts. (The 'society' cannot be the 'social system' or the 'political system'. Nor should we confuse the political system with the ancient notion of the 'polity'. No polity can exist for any length of time without a government; but political systems can. In a similar manner a society can, in principle, continue to exist while the social system or aspects of it, has broken down.)

The conception which we wish to propose here is that where various elements in international society interact with each other, and on the basis of this social systems develop, and where activity within social systems is directed towards influencing some distri-

²⁵Crick, B., In Defence of Politics (2nd Penguin edition, 1964) p. 182. We quote Crick somewhat more fully: "Politics is one form of human activity; diplomacy or the conduct of international relations is another. The political system exists within a prior framework of order. International 'society' is not a political system. It is a proper subject for the study of government; but while it has no common government at all, it is not helpful to call it political". The methodological point which Crick seems to wish to make is put more clearly by Stanley Hoffmann, where he writes: "The starting point of any valid theory of international relations is the recognition of the radical difference between the domestic and the international milieu a discipline must be based on a kind of ideal-type, a representation of the essence of the phenomena that are studied and of the essential difference between these and other phenomena. This does not exclude a subsequent analysis of instances in which the difference is blurred, but we find such an ideal-type at the starting point of any theory." See Hoffmann, S., The State of War, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965) pp. 13-14.

bution of power (towards the possession or control of some 'stake' which leads to the establishment of predominance) - there political relations occur and systems of political activity develop. These systems of political activity are the networks of roles and expectations directed towards the establishment (however temporarily and even with respect only to certain aspects of, and issues in, the society) of unit or group predominance.

Political activity, in this sense, takes place when divers elements of a society - for example, though not only, nation-states - seek to influence or succeed in influencing the relations of super- and subordination that exist in the society. Such relations may be more 'fixed' in certain spheres (within states, for example) than in others where the bases for establishing predominance are more transient. (In other words, within states, these relations are presumed to exhibit, in prescribed circumstances, a degree of legitimacy, for example, in terms of law or constitution - governors and governed; among states the claim to legitimacy tends not to be recognized, though this is to some extent minimized by the acceptance of 'custom' which itself presumes some network of roles and expectations). With reference to international society, we must discern the ordering of the various politically interacting elements, the ordering and coherence of the various political systems that may develop, and the patterns that develop on the basis of these. For political systems exist in the context of a variety of other kinds of systems and it is their interaction that determines the ordering of element (in one case, state) relationships within the society.²⁶ No

²⁶Hoffmann remarks that "Order and system are not synonymous: the system is a situation, order is a normative state". But this is not the sense in which we here use the term 'ordering'. See Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 146.

element has 'legitimate' responsibility for this ordering, as is most often the case within the state.²⁷

A relevant digression: Given this situation, the international society may well be deemed to have the potential for anarchy (the struggle of "all against all" in Hobbes' phrase), but the relations between states can never, in fact, be 'anarchic' if this word is used in its specific sense. Anarchy can be taken to mean 'aimless conflict', but the conflict between states is, however, indirectly, always directed towards influencing some distribution of power - in state, other institutional or systemic relations in international society.

OTHER APPROACHES - CRITIQUE

A number of writers have attempted to devise new theoretical approaches to deal with the problem of the definition and analysis of the behaviour of international systems and we need to consider some of them briefly at this point. Our own analysis of the dynamics of international society will follow this.

Many of these writers have made attempts to search for a common core of concepts suitable for the analysis of relations both within the state and between states. The structural-functionalists, for example, have claimed that this theory can be used to explain the

²⁷This is surely the context in which Kaplan can observe vis-a-vis the "balance of power international system" that it is "an international social system that does not have as a component a political sub-system" (my emphasis). Surely, for "political sub-system" we can read "political directorate" or "stable controlling centre". But this cannot be to deny that within the balance of power system, 'political systems' (transitory, and not accepted as 'legitimate' over time) existed. See Kaplan, M.A. "Some Problems of International Systems Research", in International Political Communities (N.Y. Anchor Books, 1966) pp. 469-501, at pp. 471-2.

ordering of and relationships between the elements of international systems. Essential to their definition seems to be the assumption that the values pertaining to the social system are related to some system of authority so that the stability of the system is defined in terms of a dynamic or moving equilibrium occurring "within a defined range or variation".²⁸ From this they derive the concept of the 'deviant' to account for the behaviour of the element which does not 'fit in' with the system. The emphasis here is on the value system as a cultural system accepted by all the members of the social system (implying that they would not be members if they did not accept the value system) and giving legitimacy to super and subordinate relations within the system.

Even making allowance for the amendments to the notion of deviancy made by Merton²⁹ to explain the development and persistence of non-conforming elements (those not accepting the legitimacy of the system) the concept does not seem applicable to the whole field of international relations - though Parsons has attempted an explanatory schema in this direction,³⁰ where what we might refer to as the

²⁸Parsons, Talcott, The Social System: Glencoe: Free Press 1951) p. 495.

²⁹In his Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957).

³⁰See Parsons, "Order and Community in the International Social System", in Rosenau, J. (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), pp. 120-9. See also Liska, G., International Equilibrium (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); Kaplan, M., System and Power in International Politics. Criticisms of the approach as it relates to domestic social systems are made, *inter alia* by Lockwood, D., "Some Remarks on the 'Social Systems'", British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 7, 1956. pp. 134-46, and "Social Integration and System Integration" in Zollschan, G.R., and Hirsch, W. (eds.) Explorations in Social Change (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 244-57; Emmet, D.M., *op. cit.*, and Homans, G.C., "Bringing Men Back In", American Sociological Review, Vol. 29, 1964, pp. 809-18.

notion of the 'obligation of participation' tends to remain undefined. It may have some usefulness, as we shall see, to the analysis of International Organization.

A recent exposition of the structural-functional approach, though somewhat amended, is that made by Gabriel Almond who writes:

"When we speak of a stable political system, what we usually have in mind is a particular pattern of flow into and out of the political system, a particular kind of input and output flow. In the political system properly speaking, the inputs of demands and supports are converted into extractive, regulative, distributive and symbolic outputs. The demands can be handled by the political system; the strains which they impose are bearable without any basic change in structure or culture. The outputs are responsive to the demands in expected or legitimate ways. When these conditions obtain, the political system may be said to be in a state of political equilibrium both internally (in the performance of conversion functions by political structures) and in its relations with its environment".

This, in fact, constitutes an attempt to incorporate Easton's method of explanation of the behaviour of political systems into the structural-functional approach, but Almond concurs, broadly, with Parsons when he observes that:

"Parsons comes closer to meeting the needs of the contemporary political theorist when he speaks of the functions of the polity as that of the '... mobilization of societal resources and their commitment for the attainment of collective goals, for the formulation and implementation of public policy'".³¹

(It would seem to us that this definition of the function of the 'polity' itself involves a 'commitment' to one particular way of looking at politics. B. de Jouvenel has recently drawn attention to the significance for the kind of political system envisaged, of

³¹ Almond, G.A., "A Developmental Approach to the Study of Political Systems", World Politics, Vol. 17, 1965, pp. 183-214 at pp. 193 and 196; further quotations, pp. 201-2. See also Easton, D., A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (N.Y.: John Wiley, 1965).

the word 'mobilization' in definitions of this kind.³² Almond then goes on to suggest that

"we may use the same capabilities scheme for the international interaction of political systems. Just as a political system may have an extractive capability in regard to its own society, so also it may have an extractive capability in regard to the international environment".

One does not question the utility of capabilities and input-output-analysis, but it would seem that Almond's approach here is constructed on the basis of a larger assumption about the utility of structural-functional analysis, with its own emphasis on the importance of the coherence of the value system. As we have already observed, in the sphere of international relations, even though a 'society' may be said to exist (Parsons also assumes the existence of a 'social system'), legitimate authority does not, as such, exist. But it is surely because of the acceptance of the notion of the existence of legitimate authority that Almond can write, for example, of 'outputs' being responsive to demands, in expected or legitimate ways, and quote with approval Parsons on the 'mobilization' and 'commitment' of resources towards the implementation of 'public policy'.

Further, it would be necessary to assume the existence of a particular set of values (that politics involves mobilization of societal resources) that these values are related to a system of political authority, and that change in a stable political system should not create any 'basic change in structure or culture'. In international society, however, the change or maintenance of any particular state of relations is subject to no 'authoritative values'

³²de Jouvenel, B., "The Principate", Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, 1965, p. 25; also Runciman, op. cit., p. 41.

(which is not to say that a particular set of values may not, over any particular period of time, be predominant),³³ but much more to a random arrangement of physical attributes of elements; this gives rise to systems of roles and expectations which are not necessarily perceived by member-elements as having either permanency or legitimacy.

It is significant, then, that Liska (in his book International Equilibrium), for example, observes that "my central concept is that of institutional equilibrium, applied primarily to international organization with respect to its structure", for organizations tend to have definite, pre-ordained systems of relations and rules of authority specific to themselves - that is constitutions. Further, with reference to international society in general, Liska observes that, "the concept of power in international relations must be adapted to cover a control situation which is not a pure case of dominance" and "In a state system - without recognized ordering of powers and functions, social control inheres, among other things, in the inducement to community-oriented responses arising from relations of interdependence".³⁴

What is important here, if we emphasize the analysis of change is the relations between various elements in international society, in that the 'control situation' and 'social control' are not viewed as authoritative situations within any given time perspective - a point that is illustrated by Liska's use of the term 'dominance' which can exist without legitimate authority. In fact, Liska tries to suggest that 'dominance' can become acceptable (and thus be translated into legitimate authority) by a utilization

³³See in this connection, Wright, Q., "International Ideologies, Law and Politics", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 48, 1954, pp. 616-626.

³⁴Liska, G., op. cit., pp. 13, 19, (my italics).

formula - the notion of 'inducement'. This approach would lay the groundwork for the construction of a kind of political theory of preferences³⁵ based on an analogy from unit behaviour in an economic system: but any theory along these lines could, at best, only be partial, since the making of decisions (decisions, for example, to agree on some particular measure in international relations) presupposes the existence of certain 'ground rules'. A social system cannot exist over any length of time on the basis of forms of behaviour (and rules about them) based merely on utilitarian calculations.

In international relations, the ground rules or core of common values (which have the effect of introducing the notion of 'community' into that of social system) are never definitive (which is not to say that certain rules do not exist - though often of an operational nature, for example, the rules of diplomacy and war). What Liska, thus, calls the "inducement to community-oriented responses" comes in international relations often to be based on unit appreciations of the existing state of other units' physical attributes: hence the importance, for our analysis, of linking the system of expectations and roles with the attribute basis of element connectedness (with the factors determining the structure of initial transactions between elements). Finally, if definitive and authoritative ground rules do not exist, it becomes difficult to speak of 'deviants' in international relations.³⁶ Indeed, it might be

³⁵See Duncan Black's, "The Unity of Economic and Political Science", in Shubik, M. (ed.), Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behaviour, (N.Y. John Wiley, 1964) pp. 110-19.

³⁶For some criticisms of the application of 'preference theory' to international relations see Burns, A.L., "Prospects for a General Theory of International Relations", in Knorr and Verba, (eds.), The International System, p. 32.

doubted whether the notion of 'community' can be used as a basic concept for the analysis of international relations.

The point can be illustrated by two examples. First, if one considers the United Nations intervention in Korea, it can be seen that once, among the members of that organization, a system of values (in this case, those concerning the characterization of the North Korean intervention as "aggression") had become common, it could then become possible to cope with the situation by deciding upon the operational rules concerning allied intervention: in other words, for the 'mobilization' and 'commitment' of resources towards the 'implementation' of a particular 'public policy'. But only because the whole process had been preceded by, so to speak, an internationalization of a particular set of values within the United Nations organization whose internal relations, and the external activities, were characterized by 'legitimacy' and 'authority'. If, on the other hand, one looks at the inter-war period, one sees how difficult it would be to analyse this period in terms of the existence of a value system or of any of the concepts referred to above. The failure of the sanctions experiment with respect to the Italian-Ethiopian events is symbolic of this. To say that the elements involved could not be 'induced' to 'community-oriented responses' would not count as an explanation, but would simply shift the problem to another level.

The second example, with respect to the notion of deviancy, can be illustrated by reference to the working of the concert system. Though the small states who from time to time protested against the various actions of the Great Powers could be compelled to submit to agreements arrived at by the Concert, it is clear that they would see a difference between 'compulsion' and 'inducement'. In other words, to submit to a suggested procedure at the peril of one's

existence cannot really be assimilated to the notion of being 'induced' to agree. At least, from the perspective of the small power, this is never so. Inducement is a notion more applicable to a situation in which there is some degree of equality of attributes between the elements involved in conflict or negotiation. In addition, even among the relations of the Concert Powers, though there was some degree of organization, there remained a large element of 'randomness' and 'uncertainty'.³⁷

All these points can be summarised by saying that the relations between elements in international society, constantly evade conscious Organization and control. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish between the imposition of Organization (and thus, order in the normative sense) and the 'natural' organization arising from the fact of connectedness between elements. (We leave, for the moment, the question of the extent of this connectedness in international society.)³⁸

Questions concerning concepts like deviancy, authority, legitimacy in any system relate to another - that is, the question of the purpose for which a system exists (and the related term function). One can say more correctly of, for example, organisms, than of social systems in general, that it is possible to have a total view of their interaction. Thus it seems permissible to say that the purpose for which a particular element of an organism exists is to perform a particular function; if the element is not

³⁷On this, see Hoffmann, S., Organisations Internationales et Pouvoirs Politiques des Etats (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954), especially Part II.

³⁸Ashby remarks that "in the past, biologists have tended to think of organization as something extra, something added to the elementary variables ...", "Principles of the Self-Organizing System", op. cit., p. 257.

performing this function it is deviating and there is something wrong with it. If, on the other hand, it is working properly, it is contributing to the overall purpose of the organism ('Proper behaviour' can in fact only have meaning in terms of some perception of an overall purpose). When it is difficult, as in many social systems, to perceive pre-ordained functions for elements-in-relation, then the structural-functional approach loses some of its usefulness. An approach which tends to assume an equilibrium between variables as an indication of the proper working of the system of which they are apart cannot be applicable to situations in which it is difficult to discern that coherence between elements that gives the system the characteristic of being a 'whole', and to situations in which elements though connected are in 'unequal relation' and seek to change the terms of connectedness, thus sometimes implying a change of system itself.³⁹

We have said that an international society is constituted of elements-in-relation, though the extent of connectedness between interaction among these elements means that they are involved in 'political relations'; that on the basis of this interaction we are able to perceive the existence of system. When we ask how a system works, we are asking what accounts for the interaction among these elements over time - what initiates the interaction and then maintains it; and what determines the directions in which interaction

³⁹Gunnar Myrdal has argued that a similar emphasis on equilibrium has inhibited the development of theory in international trade analysis, with respect in particular to problems of underdevelopment and international economic inequality. See his Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London: Duckworth, 1957), p. 142. This view is, however, contested: see Haberler, G., A Survey of International Trade Theory (Princeton University: Special Papers in International Economics, No. 1, 1961), pp. 17-18.

takes place. The answers to these questions then determine the answers to others: (a) what it means to say that a system changes from one state to another, and therefore (in certain circumstances) ceases to be the same system, (b) what leads to the 'breakdown' or 'disintegration' of the system. One cannot, for example, simply say that a breakdown occurs when the "communications network" fails, without demonstrating beforehand the manner of development of that network, as well as the factors accounting for the extent of its integration or coherence. These problems are, finally, related to two others: is it meaningful to say that a social system can integrate itself? And is it therefore "self-regulating"?

It is useful to look at the attempt of one author, Karl Deutsch to answer questions of this nature, in terms of the communications approach.⁴⁰ After rejecting the mechanistic and equilibrium approaches, he concludes:

"In place of these obsolescent models, we now have an array of self-controlling machines that react to their environment, as well as to the results of their own behaviour; that store, process and apply information; and that have in some cases a limited ability to learn".

The construction of such models represents the communications approach:

"It is communication, that is, the ability to transmit messages and to react to them that makes organizations; and it seems that this is true of organizations living in the human body as well as of organizations of thinking human beings in social groups".

The communications or cybernetic approach "represents a shift in the centre of interest from drives to steering", since government is essentially a matter of steering, analogous in some respects to the

⁴⁰Deutsch, K., The Nerves of Government (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963).

steering of a ship. "Steering" in governmental systems is more important than "power" and "steering is decisively a matter of communication".⁴¹

Regardless of the kind of system involved, a certain emphasis, in analysis, on learning information and communication, is important. But one might question the acceptability of these concepts as central to an analytical approach in circumstances where the extent of coherence and wholeness of system is itself problematic; where the legitimacy of learning systems, for example, is in doubt. In other words one is objecting (as with the approaches discussed above) to some of the premises on which the approach is based. At times, Deutsch seems to subsume 'politics' under 'government'. He is thus then able to solve some of our most important difficulties - the problems of purpose, will, consciousness, autonomy, sovereignty - by viewing them as part of some relevant learning system. It might, he writes,

"be most realistic to think of political parties and interest groups as organizations with at least limited ability to steer themselves, with leaders and decision-making facilities that permit them to take warnings from their environment, to receive warnings concerning the limits of practicable or safe action, and to manoeuvre accordingly..."

Political conflicts could then be studied

"in terms of the efficiency or the failures of steering facilities, the limit signals, and the manoeuvreability of the organizations and groups involved".

This is partially acceptable, but applicable particularly to the type of nation state in which the direction of policy has been decided. It would seem to imply the acceptance, on the part of the elements involved, of an on-going system, but it is of less use if

⁴¹Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 80, 77, and 76, ix and 182; and for the following quotation, p. 208.

one is concerned with situations in which elements wish to undertake different directions of policy and relations, desires which cannot be attributed to inefficiencies of "steering facilities" or to the capacities of elements to appreciate the "limit signals" of the system. The main emphasis of the policy-maker is not on change per se, nor is his main concern the avoidance of change, but the avoidance of the "wrong" kind of change. Where, as in international society, the learning system and processes of communication may not be viewed as settled or acceptable, then the manner of interaction is likely to involve more than "steering".⁴²

The criticisms of the communications approach apply in some respects to the general systems approach, derived from the analysis of organisms, and applied to social relations. Thus McClelland writes, much in the manner of Deutsch, that "Open system thinking in international relations leads the inquiry away from a concern with the accumulation of power. Its emphasis is, instead, on adaptive action".⁴³ For us, on the contrary, it is the 'accumulation of power' and the differences in accumulation - leading to inequality in relations of connectedness, that constitute an important part of the analysis.

⁴²The question is, in part, whether a political system can be analysed in terms of the same general framework that may be used in the analysis of organizational (for example, a business organization) behaviour. See Deutsch, op. cit., p. 136. Also Beer, S., Cybernetics and Management; and Marschak, J., "Efficient and Viable Organizational Forms", in Haire, M., (ed.), Modern Organization Theory, (N.Y.: Wiley, 1959).

⁴³McClelland, C., "Applications of General Systems Theory in International Relations" in Rosenau, J.S., International Politics and Foreign Policy (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), p. 417.

PART II

SYSTEMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS


What we might accept from the general systems approach is emphasis on social systems as being 'open'; that open systems are continually 'exchanging materials' with, and therefore being influenced by, the environment in which they exist, part of which may be other systems with which they come into contact.⁴⁴ Let us, however, initially, merely say that by 'system' we mean no more than a set of relations of roles and expectations, based on a pattern of transactions between connected elements, and giving rise to norms and rules of behaviour of some degree of permanency. It is not always possible to identify the totality of these relations, for they are themselves constantly changing, but we abstract behavioural rules which are, in effect, what we call 'system'. Transactions between elements we see as the concrete aspect or basis of system; roles, expectations and norms as the abstracted aspect.⁴⁵ Subordinate patterns of these we call sub-systems. As a general proposition then

⁴⁴Though I do not think that general systems theorists would claim that this is entirely new. One author remarks: "Systems, of course, have been studied for centuries, but something new has been added.... The tendency to study systems as an entity rather than as a conglomeration of parts is consistent with the tendency in contemporary science no longer to isolate phenomena in narrowly confined contexts ..." Ackoff, R.L., "Games, Decisions and Organizations", General Systems, Vol. 4, 1959, p. 145. (My emphasis).

⁴⁵See the distinction in Miller, J.G., op. cit., between conceptual, concrete and abstracted systems, pp. 201-209. An approach which tries to apply fairly directly, the general systems and cybernetic approach, to international relations, is that of Rosecrance, R., Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963); for a useful critique of this work, see Liska, G., "Continuity and Change in International Systems", World Politics, Vol. 16, 1963, pp. 118-36.

we say that system is an abstraction, based on the observation of concrete or actual element relationships, the stringency of whose meaning changes in accordance with the phenomena which come under examination.

Diagrammatically, our approach can be represented in the following way:



We now attempt to use this broad framework to give a sketch of the working of international society. We therefore proceed by means of the following propositions. An international society would be composed of various elements or parts connected in various ways, though not each directly to the other or all others. Further, the relation of elements to each other is not of a similar nature: connectedness of the elements varies and given an inevitable difference in attributes, all the elements have not got the same 'weight'. The interaction of elements gives rise to what we have called (see diagram) structures of transactions, based on the particular issues or activities to which interaction is directed. Given the differential weighting of elements in the structures of transactions, it is possible to suggest that some elements are likely to be more crucial than others to the working of these structures and of the systems which develop on the basis of their behaviour.⁴⁶

A crucial element is characterized as having within the structure of transactions a greater degree of capacity for autonomous activity than other elements; but the structure may possess more than one crucial element. A crucial element, in addition to being a 'functionally autonomous' part of the structure of transactions and derived systems may also be an initiator of change (of direction of activity) within them. (We take, here, a term from Marx/Engels, following Hegel, who write of the "moments" or "determining active

⁴⁶ Some of the terms used here are derived and developed from the work of Gouldner. See Gouldner "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory", in Gross, L., (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (Row, Peterson and Company, 1959) pp. 241-70. See also an earlier attempt at formulation by Lewis, V., and Singham, A.W., "Integration, Domination and Small-State System: The Caribbean", in Lewis, S., and Mathews, T. (eds.) Caribbean Integration, (University of Puerto Rico: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1965), pp. 119-40.

factors of any dynamic structure of relationships; or from Bertalanffy, who refers to the "controlling parts or centres" of a system.⁴⁷) Functional parts may, however, lose their characteristic of being crucial - an element that was once functionally autonomous becoming 'useless' or a 'survival' or diminishing in importance. This is likely to occur in the context of a change in the terms of connectedness of elements - based on a redistribution of attributes or capabilities of these elements.

It is usual to suggest that in contemporary international society, the fundamental elements-in-relation are nation-states; but given the different weightings of nation-states conducting transactions with each other, it is obvious that not every nation-state can be seen as crucial to the behaviour of a structure of transactions and a network of systemic relations. In fact, a structure of transactions, while based on certain attributes possessed by nation-states may give rise to systemic relations that transcend the physical boundaries of nation-states, so that the "controlling centres" of systems, with respect to the determination of nation-state attributes may be outside of the nation-state proper, though crucial to the existence of the state itself.⁴⁸

This leads us to the variety of other elements, in addition to nation-states, that may exist in international society - to take

⁴⁷Marx/Engels, The German Ideology, p. 18; Bertalanffy, L., Problems of Life, p. 117. See also Harry G. Johnson's characterization of the United States as "a centre country in the world economy", Johnson, H.G., Canada in a Changing Economy (University of Toronto Press, 1962) p. 16.

⁴⁸This I take to be an illustration of Gouldner's remark that "specific system parts may be both partly exogenous and partly endogenous", op. cit., p. 264. Our emphasis.

one example, international and regional institutions. Some of these may be predominantly 'political', like the U.N. or the OAS; some 'trading' like the E.E.C. or G.A.T.T.; some 'monetary', like the I.M.F. (each of the latter two groups are, of course, characterized by 'political' activity). Each of these institutions may be susceptible to direction by a particular nation-state or group of states (which is another way of saying that these systems are constituted of elements that are, again, partly exogenous and partly endogenous), but with respect to many nation-states existing within particular patterns of relationships they may be functionally autonomous. (We shall return to this point). An institution is itself representative of a set of structural and systemic relationships. And the coherence or disjunction of the institution comes to be essentially the consequence of the relationships between and the position of its own crucial elements.

There are a variety of types of transactions which the same elements may be engaged in. We can take trade as one example (that the two great nation-states in the contemporary period, the United States and the U.S.S.R., are not essentially trading nations is not here important, since they both, in any case, maintain currency systems which are important vehicles of world trade. The United Kingdom would be an example of a significant nation-state that does both of these). Nation-states can, with respect to the structure of trading transactions, be defined as merely the instruments or mechanisms used by governments, or, for example, trading companies, in their pursuit of international trade; so that the state itself may not necessarily be one of the crucial elements in a structure of trade transactions, but a subordinate element. A point somewhat similar to this has been made with respect to a particular case, the

so-called branch-plant or hinterland economies of which the economies of the West Indian States are taken to be an illustration.⁴⁹

Some nation-states may be crucial to particular trading relationships while others may not. On the other hand, an institution like GATT or IMF may be more crucial to the existence of a trading and monetary system than certain nation-states themselves (such institutions fall into the category C in our diagram); the institution may have a greater significance for the working of the system, and therefore a greater impact on the behaviour of other institutions and states than any one state.

Another generalization follows from this: that a crucial state or institution within the trading system can become the imitator of new 'non-economic' institutions and networks of roles and expectations (for example, political or ideological) hierarchically-ordered, of which it is the controlling centre. This form of development characterizes the phenomenon that came to be called colonialism, but the system of mercantilism can be analysed in this way. "Mercantilism", Andrews writes, "was essentially a nationalistic policy Historically considered, mercantilism was the nationalistic, self-protective philosophy of a growing state that was striving to win for itself a place of superiority among the nations. It was a doctrine of exclusiveness and self-sufficiency,

⁴⁹"... the units of production have, for the most part, been externally owned. What has also to be taken into account is that these units have usually been minor partners in wider international systems of resource mobilization and allocation. The lines of interdependence run, not laterally between these, but vertically within them. As a consequence, the regional economy (or the territorial economy) is really comprised of a number of unintegrated segments held together by the political system. Production and pricing and other decisions are made at least as much with reference to international as national considerations". Best, L., and Levitt, K., Externally Propelled Growth in the Caribbean: Selected Essays (mimeo., Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, Dec. 1967) p. 114.

opposed to cosmopolitan co-operation and to any form of international control".⁵⁰

All this is of particular importance if one is discussing the activities of 'small' states within the various systems of political and other international relationships that may be perceived to exist. It is therefore only partially correct to say with Snyder et. al., that "the nation-state is going to be the significant unit of political action for many years to come",⁵¹ and to imply from this that it can be taken as the basic unit of analysis. One must add that some nation-states may and some may not. What is analytically important is to place the activities of the state in the context of the variety of systemic relations - the state being a crucial element and significant unit of political action, or not being so, playing or not playing at a particular time a determining or controlling part within these systems. This, in our view, represents a viable approach to the "level-of-analysis" problem. Our perspective can then shift from the state to some other element as this is warranted. The structure of element transactions and the systems of roles and expectations (for convenience we will refer to this as 'system') is our primary focus.

The Nation State Defined

From here we digress momentarily to a definition of the concept of nation-state itself. In 'ideal' terms, the nation is a form of system, but one physically bounded in space. The basic elements-in-relation are individuals transacting a variety of

⁵⁰ Andrews, C.M., "The Mother Country and Its Colonial Policy, 1713-1763", in his The Colonial Background of the American Revolution (Yale U.P., 1924, 1957) pp. 93 and 94.

⁵¹ Snyder, R., et. al., Foreign-Policy Decision Making, p. 63.

capabilities and attributes - such as basic resources and manufactured goods, but not necessarily tangible ones - found in the first instance, within the specific bounded geographical area (Boulding has written of population and exchange sub-systems,⁵²) The basic elements of the system - the nation - with a persistent coherence, also possesses the characteristic of historicity - of relationships bounded in time and expectations of a future development of further coherence of relationships, giving them a distinctiveness from other systems of this kind. The nation then comes to be characterised by ties of culture (learning systems) and a variety of threat relationships which assist the maintenance of coherence. (More coherent sub-sets of learning or culture systems existing within the larger system we refer to as 'community'. The community need not be physically bounded in space.) The nation, then, is a culturally-determinate system of relations.

Two caveats do not affect this ideal definition. First, a nation may exist, for a time, without possessing a physically-bounded resource area, (the Jews as nation), though it would probably be the case that the learning system incorporates some memory of such an area once-possessed. Here, however, the memory of coherence in time becomes important. Secondly, a nation may exist on a resource-base not physically bounded (nomadic peoples), in areas where similar types of systems are not perceived to exist in geographic proximity. Here the idea of 'nation' tends to approximate to that of 'community'.

The system of relations that forms the nation-state has, of necessity, geographical boundaries. It is recognized by other such entities within the terms of the rules of international law. However, the significance of its own capabilities, for example, of the stability of its threat-co-operation relationships (that internal

⁵²Boulding, K., op. cit., Vol. 11, 1962, p. 351.

authority, even when exercised on the basis of negative sanctions can be seen to be legitimate) is important for the process of recognition. In this sense, the nation-state is a self-defining system. (We return to this in the chapter on 'Viability').

Structure and System

Structure, we have suggested, is the pattern of transactions formed over time by elements-in-relation. What seems to be a fixed structure is really only the appearance of 'fixedness'. Here we follow Bertalanffy, who writes of structure as a "slow flow of events". One cannot, in strict terms therefore, speak of the structure of a system. What one can do is to describe the terms of connectedness, which are themselves variable, between elements, and the forms of transactions of these elements over a period of time, so that a "steady state" may appear to exist. In the same sense, since systems are networks of roles and expectations, based on changing transaction structures, it would not be correct for the analyst to write about a total international system or the international political system. There exist a variety of systems which do not necessarily form at any time a perceptible and coherent 'whole'.⁵³

Terminological note: 'Structure' and 'system' are often used coterminously in the literature, or given a number of different meanings. See, for example Haas' comment on Emmet's use of the term 'social system' as distinct from his own; Emmet's distinction between what she calls 'social aggregate' (what we call 'society') and 'social structure'; Brecher's comment that he uses 'structure'

⁵³Phrases like 'the international system' are often seen in the literature however. Hence the importance, for the analyst, to try and distinguish the 'language of politics' (or political practice) from the concepts of the language of political science.

for the same phenomena to which Herz refers as 'system'; Haas' observation that Hoffmann uses 'structure' to refer to Haas' 'environment'; and Waltz's definition of structure in terms of state relations: "By 'structure' I mean the pattern according to which power is distributed; by 'stability' the perpetuation of that structure without the occurrence of grossly destructive violence".⁵⁴

We need now to make some distinctions in the usages which we will attach to the term system, particularly in view of the manner in which the terms have been used in both theoretical discussions and more empirical descriptions of international relations in the literature. We have so far used the concept in a sociological sense - to define a pattern or series of patterns of relationships between connected elements in society (of which institutions are only one). Sub-systems we refer to as those patterns which have a particular coherence or organization within a larger pattern or 'whole'. The sub-system, while possessing some degree of autonomy with respect to the larger pattern is itself seen as performing a function that is meaningful only in terms of the larger pattern itself, so that it can retain its own viability if that pattern disintegrates.

While, however, the sub-systemic relationships are subordinate in organization to the whole, and in terms of their relationships to other elements or patterns find themselves ranked or hierarchically ordered in terms of importance of functional activity, this ranking is not taken to be 'given' for all time. The functional importance

⁵⁴Haas, E.B., Beyond the Nation-State (California: Standord U.P., 1964) p. 529 note 59 (on Emmet) and p. 528 note 39 (on Hoffmann); Brecher, M., "International Relations and Asian Studies" op. cit., p. 218; Herz, J., International Relations in the Atomic Age, (N.Y.: Columbia U.P. 1962) p. 7; Emmet, Function, Purpose and Powers, pp. 22-26; Waltz, K., "International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of Power", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21., 1967, pp. 215-31 at p. 229 nt. 18.

of the sub-system is, in part, determined by the problem, or particular aspect of the system's behaviour with which one is concerned. Thus particular sub-systems may predominate over others and at other times become subordinate to these latter. It is important to note here that the focus of analysis is on relationships (interactions, processes, transactions) which we have defined as systems, and sub-systems within some larger, perceptible whole.⁵⁵ With respect to international society, these relationships may be economic, political, social or ideological.

We distinguish this usage from the concept of 'State system' when it is used in international relations analysis to refer solely to a particular form of state relationships, often of a military kind - for example, the 'North Atlantic System' or the 'Inter-American System'. Here the term comes close to meaning simply 'alliance': the institutional connection between a group of states for purposes of security organization. This is an essentially geopolitical usage of the term 'system' which we wish to keep distinct from the sociological concept.

With respect, similarly, to the concept 'sub-system', we wish to make the distinction between this and the concept of 'subordinate system', or 'subordinate state system' as currently used.⁵⁶ As with Bertalanffy in describing living systems, Modelski, in international relations analysis uses the concept of sub-system and subordinate

⁵⁵Bertalanffy, remarks with respect to living systems "... the developmental system, unitary at first, segregates into subordinate systems or 'fields'. In the course of development, these fields become increasingly autonomous, their boundaries, vague at first, becomes progressively definite". Op. cit., p. 67.

⁵⁶This distinction is made, though not in the writer's view fully explained, by Singham, A.W., in his The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 302-3. We attempt here and in the chapter on 'Small State Systems' merely to expand on the distinction. See, for one use of the term 'Subordinate State System'; Brecher, M., "International Relations and Asian Studies: the Subordinate State System of Southern Asia", op. cit.

system interchangeably. Modelski refers to a subordinate system as a "cluster of small powers" and suggests that the "international problems" of sub-systems stem from the fact that they are "peculiarly susceptible to the influence of ... great powers".⁵⁷ For our purpose, however, it seems necessary to make a distinction between sub-system and subordinate system to indicate first that groupings of small powers in a region, though because of their proximity they might be liable to be viewed as in some sense a unit by the analyst, may have few of the characteristics of system (in the sociological sense); and secondly, even where systemic processes may exist within the geopolitical region (which we call the subordinate system) giving it a certain coherence, more important systemic processes may in fact transcend the physical boundaries of that region, so that the locus of "controlled activity" may in fact exist outside of that region.

The point here, which we shall expand in a later chapter, devoted to small-state systems, is that the subordinate system as here defined has its basis in the geopolitical relation between a particular set of elements - states; further, it is characterized by a particular kind of coherence; and finally, unlike the sub-system (a set of processes continually redefining its boundaries)⁵⁸, while

⁵⁷Modelski, G. (ed.) SEATO - Six Studies (F.W. Cheshire for the Australian National University, 1962) p. 3.

⁵⁸Bertalanffy, in relation to living systems writes: "An organism displays not only a morphological hierarchy of parts but also a physiological hierarchy of processes. More accurately stated: an organism does not represent one hierarchy that can be described thoroughly in morphological terms. Rather it is a system of hierarchies that are interwoven and overlapping in many ways, and that may or may not correspond to the levels of the morphological hierarchy". Further, "the hierarchy of processes is much less rigid than morphological organization". Problems of Life, pp. 42 and 43. Italics in original. It is this distinction between systems and sub-systems defined processually and (state) systems and subordinate systems defined institutionally, that we wish to make.

the subordinate system within the larger hierarchical institutional system (Dominant State System/Subordinate State System) may exist as a crucial element and gain some degree of functional autonomy, it cannot, in principle, within the same system attain to a position of dominance. Among sets of processes - systems and sub-systems - controlling centres may change over time; in Dominant System - Subordinate System relations, the hierarchy tends to be stable and the controlling centre to remain in one location.

The term State System and Subordinate System are not, then inclusive enough of all the relationships which we wish to analyse, though they represent important parts of these.

The Coherence of System

We suggest that the coherence or disjunction (integration or disintegration) of system - defined as a pattern of institutional and structural relationships - is essentially the consequence of the kinds of relationships that exist between its crucial elements; and that crucial elements, as hinted earlier, may be both internal and external to a physically-bounded element like a state, which while part of a larger systemic whole, may be the focus of our analysis. Implied in this is a further distinction between types of crucial elements: functionally autonomous entities which constitute particular groups ('groups' may be taken to mean institutions as well as collections of individuals) within the system; while the interaction or processes of elements or parts (the 'forces() which condition the autonomy of groups constitute the crucial structural aspects of system.⁵⁹

⁵⁹I have adapted this and following distinctions from Lockwood, D., "Social Integration and System Integration", in Zollschan and Hirsch (eds.) op. cit., p. 249, and Gouldner, A., "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory", in Gross, L. (ed.) op. cit., pp. 263 ff.

Further we distinguish between kinds of coherence or integration. Within a system there may be (i) structural coherence and (ii) what we call social or institutional coherence. Structural coherence, as will now be clear, involves the interaction of crucial structural elements - for example the processes of economic development and trade and the development of forms of technological 'forces' which have significant influences on these processes. Major system change, we suggest, occurs when there are 'major' changes in structural patterns. Social or institutional coherence involves more narrowly 'political' (power) relationships. To take an analogy from internal nation-state activity, these are forms of 'class' relationships. The same distinctions apply to relations of conflict. Thus we can say that in international society, the organized form of power grouping that emerges in 'class' or social conflict is the nation-state or groupings of such states; but social conflict or integration may occur between other kinds of institutions (monetary, I.M.F., or political - U.N.) or between such institutions and nation-states (between international corporations and nation-states).

The structural and social coherence aspects of systems are obviously related, but are at least analytically separable. Social conflicts (becoming political conflicts between states and institutions) need not necessarily result in conflict at the structural level, or lead to changes in structural patterns. There may be modification though not disruption of structural patterns. This is, however, not to deny that an institutional system may be an important influence on the form of structural relationships.

The consequent problem for us is, then, to attempt to discern to what extent patterns of relationships exist within any area of international society so as to be deemed 'systemic' relationships: to what extent that society is 'organized'.

THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

We are now in a position to consider empirically the nature of contemporary international society and to proceed to a conceptualization of the behaviour of its components. The primary proposition which we wish to suggest here is that international society is best viewed as a fractioned society; that in spite of certain cohering structures and processes, the relationships between its elements viewed as a universe⁶⁰ do not take the form of a unified network, such that we can call them system; and that though there may be some coherent networks of relationships, these are not necessarily connected to all other networks, so that their elements or parts can be said to be organized or ordered in some specific and predictable manner over a period of time. The relationships between elements and systems are, then, organizationally discontinuous or fractioned.⁶¹ There are coherent sets of relationships between elements on specific aspects of societal behaviour and not on others; the same elements may therefore be 'organized' in terms of one issue and with reference to a specific set of attributes or capabilities, and be simultaneously

⁶⁰What some writers call the 'global' system: a perspective or frame of reference that includes all the 'actors' on the globe. It is, of course, not a 'system' in the sense that we have hitherto used the term; hence our reference to it as simply a 'universe'. See Singer, J.D., "The Global System and Its Sub-Systems: A Developmental View", op. cit.

⁶¹Oran Young sees "international politics in the present period" as "one that encompasses the concurrent influence of global and regional power processes in patterns that are strongly marked by elements of both congruence and discontinuity". He therefore sets out to devise what he calls a "discontinuities model". George Liska perceives international political relationships as a "segmented international system", suggesting that "the problem of long-term coexistence between industrially and politically developed segments has moved to the foreground". See Young, O.R. "Political Discontinuities in the International System", World Politics, Vol. 20, 1968, pp. 369-92 at pp. 370 ff; and Liska, George, Alliances and the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968) pp. 10 ff.

not organized in relation to some other issue.

We attempt to make these propositions more explicit as we proceed. The elementary components of contemporary international society are nation states. This is not to say, obviously, that all nation-states are equally important, nor that the nation-state is, in an examination of international society, always or necessarily the most meaningful unit of analysis. Rather it is that the behaviour of all other actors, however powerful, falls ultimately under the jurisdiction of some state; and changes in the structure of international society are, when purposively conducted, still undertaken under the protection or aegis of the nation-state.

The interactions and transactions between states give rise, in all historical periods to a variety of processes and structures within some relevant area. The nation-state, which is not created as either an optimum economic or resource unit⁶² can, given its 'power', change the direction or hinder the development of these processes. The rational development of resources in some geographical areas may not coincide with the requirements of the nation-state or states located in that area.⁶³

⁶²"The Nation" Harry Johnson remarks, "acquires economic relevance largely in its political capacity as a policy-making unit, endowed with fiscal and monetary powers." Johnson, H. G., "Economic Implications of the Size of Countries", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 10, 1961, p. 105.

⁶³Stafford Beer remarks on this problem and seems to suggest that it constitutes an obstacle to the application of general systems analysis as a problem-solving approach to international realtions: "...It is possible to argue that most of the troubles we encounter in deciding on policies at the national level derive from our habit of dividing the system, which is too big and too complicated to handle integrally by classical methods, and trying to compute with the pieces - or sub-systems.But the boundaries drawn around the sub-systems, around each country and around political blocs, are too rigid. In terms of the entropies which system-oriented scientists perforce discuss, these sub-systems operate within virtually adiabatic shells. Hence there is no chance of levelling out (for example) food supplies which constitute the energy of the total system Nor is there any obvious political techniques by which a Stephenson Lecturer can propose to start engineering with these conventional packages. In national affairs there is". "The World, The Flesh and the Metal" (1964 Stephenson Lecture) op. cit., p.227.

These processes and structures arise on the basis of a variety of specific types of transactions: (a) economic, (b) political and strategic. By economic we mean the exploitation of resources within a particular state or region and the distribution to or exchange of these resources with other elements in society - states or other; or, on the other hand, the subordination of exploited resources to the techniques of manufacture (production) and the distribution and exchange, again, of goods manufactured. The requirements of distribution and exchange themselves give rise to processes and structures of trade, currency formation and exchange (monetary systems) and of communication - forms of communication themselves being dependent on levels of technology. These 'informal' structures over time develop a coherence through the structuring or formalization of roles of elements-in-transaction, rules of behaviour (rules of commerce), and expectations about the stability of or changes in these roles and rules. Thus a coherent network of activity may be constructed - a system - which may even gain a certain autonomy for itself, and develop further component parts or institutions for 'servicing' itself or 'ordering' its relation with other systems. A system such as this is an utilitarian one and the adherence of elements to such norms or value systems that may develop is contingent on the consistent production of benefits to these participating elements or at least on a situation in which, over time, benefits outweigh losses (or at least non-production of benefits).

Similar networks of activity develop based on the need to regulate the transactions arising from interaction between elements-in-proximity⁶⁴ (for example, movement and protection of persons) -

⁶⁴The meaningfulness of the notion of 'proximity' like that of 'distance' is subject to changes in technology. See Wohlstetter, A., "Illusions of Distance", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, 1968, pp. 242-55.

diplomatic systems; these include both the rules of 'peaceful' behaviour and the rules of war. The 'value or norm structures' which are themselves part of the structures of roles and expectations and which give, as we have suggested earlier, a predictability (a coherence and degree of permanence) to relations between elements, when codified, come to be called law; when informally accepted, ethics.

Political activity and thus rules of political behaviour develop, among these varieties of systems in international society when component parts direct their activity to changing the form or direction of transactions, so that different norms, roles and expectations come, however temporarily, to be accepted by other elements. Since the utility of norms and rules is dependent on utilitarian calculations, and the capacity to change these on the relating strength of element capabilities, such political rules (and therefore systems) that develop - giving particular elements or groups of elements 'domination' over existing systems - are not viewed as 'permanently' legitimate or authoritative. There is never that coherence of systems which might allow us to speak not simply of international society but of international community with a social system. There is no legitimate controlling centre. We can, in fact, as a generalization, suggest that among the networks of relations that develop in international society, given the tendency of component parts to try to exact domination over these networks, there is a tendency for the coherence of relationships to vary between society (in the sense that Emmet refers to society as 'social aggregate') and community. The intervening variables are domination, a constraint orientation, on the one hand, and authority accepted at various times

as a norm, but not constraint orientation.⁶⁵

Where, however, there develops a coherence among networks of relations that is derived from the persistence over time of a single controlling centre - where some element has been able to dominate, and organize to its own requirements, the systemic relations among other elements - we refer to these as administrative international systems. Here there exist not systems and sub-systems in competition, but a single, coherent system with subordinate systems and elements. Thus the systems of mercantilism, imperialism or colonialism and what we call satellitism, can all be described as administrative international systems. In this system a particular element gains control over the terms of connectedness of elements, and is able to determine the types of transactions and thus the types of processes and structures that develop, and proceeds to give a bureaucratic form to these processes and interconnections.⁶⁶

It is important then to distinguish between these kinds of arrangements to which the international society becomes subject:

(a) where a number of systems and sub-systems exist, connected in varying degrees of coherence, and in which there is, in principle,

⁶⁵We have, therefore, attempted to differentiate our conceptualization from that of Parsons as expressed in his "Order and Community in the International System" in Rosenau, J., op. cit. We tend to agree with Hoffmann's remark that, at least from the point of view of the analyst, "within the realm of international relations the word community does more harm than good as a tool of analysis". Hoffmann, S., "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International System", International Organization, Vol. 17, 1963, pp. 521-49 at p.525.

⁶⁶There is much literature on mercantilism, imperialism and satellitism, but see Andrews, C.M., reference cited in his The Colonial Background of the American Revolution; Barratt Brown, M., After Imperialism (London: Heinemann, 1963); Modelski, G., The Communist International System (Princeton University: Research Monograph No. 9, Centre for International Studies, 1960).

no single, legitimate controlling centre; (b) where some concept of 'community' is perceived (the Parsonian view) so that domination and authority become a single phenomenon (orders are obeyed and commands given because of a recognition of and adherence to a 'legitimate' value system); (c) the somewhat historical notion of the administrative international system, where domination has no 'long-term legitimacy'.⁶⁷ The analytical orientation accepted in this essay as most relevant to an understanding of contemporary institutional relations is the first; though the sharp distinctions which we make between the three types cannot always be sustained in empirical description.

Other writers, for example Liska in a recent essay⁶⁸ which follows, in terms of conceptual orientation, his earlier work referred to, accepts predominantly the second orientation. Viewing the present international society as an "empire-centred (or imperial, or unifocal) order" which "rests in the last resort on the widely shared presumption of the ultimately controlling power of the imperial state", he is able to introduce the notion of the deviant in such a system thus: "In the imperial system, the critical deviant actions are those which, apart from aiming at substantial changes, are also calculated to abridge access by the responsible power to any

⁶⁷"Somewhat historical", because as we shall see, some writers suggest that imperialism and colonialism have given way to a new form of administrative system, less highly or visibly structured, but very similar in effects: neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism.

⁶⁸Liska, G., Imperial America: The International Politics of Primacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). While accepting that international society is 'segmented', Liska sees the United States as having to impose some degree of domination (likely to be acceptable because of the legitimacy of the value system which the U.S. proposes) upon that society: "... in an unorganized world of conflicting and successive local and regional imperialisms the United States faces the imperial tasks of maintaining order". (Preface).

particular area for purposes of police and protection against unilateral forcible changes, in such a way as to compel resort to a major display of force and authority if access is to be reopened".⁶⁹ The critical terms in Liska's definition are exactly the ones which we would hold to be problematic. It is necessary to demonstrate in terms of particular events and issues rather than assert, the circumstances in which there might exist or the fact that there always exists a "widely shared presumption of ultimately controlling power" or a view of the so-called imperial state as "responsible" (the latter a normative term having meaning only in the context of an accepted cultural system).

In our view, it is precisely the problem of the enforcement of judgments which they make about order, by elements (states or other institutions) which is significant, if international society is seen as not deriving authority permanently from any one element, but being subject, depending on the issue, to the existence at different times of 'power' or a combination of power and authority in some element or system.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 36 and 37.

⁷⁰See in this connection a recent essay dealing with the capacity of institutions like the U.N., I.M.F. or I.C.J., to enforce judgments: Reisman, M.W., "The Enforcement of International Judgments", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63, 1969, pp. 1-27. See also Gold, J., "The Next Stage in the Development of International Monetary Law: The Deliberate Control of Liquidity" Ibid., Vol. 62, 1968, pp. 365-402, for a discussion of proposals to remove the creation of international liquidity from its dependence "on more or less fortuitous factors" and to make it "the subject of rational and deliberate international control" in the form of the "collective judgment" of the "international community" (pp. 376-77). Reisman suggests a "functional system ... based on the political-legal elements at play in an enforcement process: community authority and effective power", (p. 8). See also Johnson, Harry G., "The Decline of the International Monetary System", The World Today, Vol. 25, 1969 (March), pp. 103-9.

It is this problem of the enforcement of judgments, legal or political, that can be used as an entrée into the central analytical problem: that of the terms of connectedness between elements in contemporary international society, for this can give us an insight into what we can call the structure of dependence⁷¹ between elements and systems. It is, in this connection, possible to accept the view (as we do) that the relationship between elements in terms of the attributes (and therefore of the 'basic component of power') that they possess is heavily lop-sided or unequal, and that in contemporary society, the United States possesses a predominance of the attributes necessary in the determination of economic connectedness between elements; and that it is able to determine in large measure the direction of economic transactions and processes.

Certain writers proceed from this assumption to suggest the United States is able to order all (or the predominance) of relationships with international society, in particular the political relationships between elements. Thus one author has written in a Marxist analysis:

"Here then is the synthesis of today's imperialist network of international relations. The United States as leader has the economic power to invade the industry and markets of its chief trading partners and politico-military allies. It has the resources to maintain a dominant world military position. It can carry on foreign aid, invest in and lend to the underdeveloped countries, thus tying them closer to the United States through the resulting financial dependency of these countries. All of this, plus the maintenance of prosperity and fending off depressions, is made feasible because of the position of the United States as the world banker and off the dollar as the world reserve currency. And it can be the world banker and supply the reserve currency, because of the co-operation its military and economic strength commands among the other industrialized nations".

⁷¹This is an important aspect of our discussion below of the concept of 'penetration'.

The U.S. is therefore characterized as, "the organizer and leader of the world imperialist system".⁷²

In a similar vein, another author has suggested that

"Instead of thinking of a non-aligned Third World, it would be more realistic to think in terms of a world-wide capitalist economy of which the supposedly non-aligned countries form an integral part, and, considered as a whole, a profitable part. Objectively, their non-alignment represents an enlightened tolerance, by the controllers of the capitalist economy, of unlimited verbal flights in independence and socialism".⁷³

While accepting the validity of the argument about the pervasiveness of the United States in the world economy, we would, however, go on to argue that the degree of political control which that country is able to exert over particular elements, areas or events, is not as given; that certain elements may be more susceptible to control than others (either directly or through international organizations which may at some period come under the domination of the U.S.); but that the capacity of a country to evade a network of trade and monetary relations dominated by the U.S. is not simply inversely related to the extent of its interconnections within that network. The relationships between finance and world political power is a variable one.⁷⁴

⁷²Magdoff, Harry, The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1969) pp. 106 and 40. A useful work based on a series of essays formerly appearing in the journal, Monthly Review.

⁷³O'Brien, Conor Cruise, "Epilogue: Illusions and Realities of Non-Alignment", in Burton, J.W. (ed.), Nonalignment (London: Andre Deutsch, 1966) pp. 131-2.

⁷⁴For some useful discussions on this topic, reference to the implications of which will be made again in Chapter 2, see inter alia, Aubrey, H.G., Behind the Veil of International Money (Princeton University, Essays in International Finance, No. 71, 1969); Kindleberger, C.P., The Politics of International Money and World Language (Princeton University, Essays in International Finance, No. 61, 1967); Aubrey, H.G., The Dollar in World Affairs (N.Y.: Harper

The main question here is the extent to which, within the structure of dependence, there is reciprocity of relations between elements, the kind of reciprocity and thus interdependence between elements. There may thus be some respects in which even the dominant element is characterized by a degree of dependence on "the system". Finally, it becomes important to determine (especially as we shall be dealing with small states) the extent to which an element may be functionally autonomous within a system, and thus the relationship for the element between functional autonomy on the one hand, and its interdependence or dependence and thus status, on the other.

Within the notion of structure of dependence we accept that the character of economic transactions is an important aspect and determinant of the other forms of structure that exist. The distinction between developed and underdeveloped countries as well as the emphasis attached by economists to the terms and content of the trade which these different kinds of countries choose or find themselves constrained to engage in, is therefore, an important one.⁷⁵

Another important notion accepted as descriptive of the contemporary international society is that which emphasises the distinction between dependent and independent economies, the essence of an independent economy being that "it has a momentum of its own,

and Row, 1964); Nichols, J.P., "Dollar Strength as a Liability in United States Diplomacy", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. III, 1967, pp. 46-56.

⁷⁵See UNCTAD, Commodity Survey, 1967, TD/B/C.1/46./ Rev. 1, (NY 1968) for a discussion of "the principal factors influencing the longer-term trends in world trade in food and raw materials", principal exports of 'underdeveloped' countries; also Tilton, J.E., "The Choice of Trading Partners: An Analysis of International Trade in Aluminium, Bauxite, Coffee, Lead, Manganese, Tin and Zinc", Yale Economic Essays, Vol. 6, 1966, pp. 419-474, esp. pp. 419-20, 443-45, 461-2, 471. The economic layman is much helped by Luard, E., Nationality and Wealth, (London: Oxford U.P. 1964) especially Chapter 5 ("Exchange") and 6 ("Investment").

in the sense that the annual rate of investment, and the flow of innovation, are not mainly determined by external causes. These are relative terms. All developed economies have some degree of dependence because they trade But it is quite valid to speak of more dependent and less dependent economies with say the U.S.A. towards one end of the scale, and Jamaica towards the end".⁷⁶


Much of our discussions will be concerned then, in subsequent chapters, to discuss the behaviour of the small state within an environment of the kind described above, and the systems which develop as part of that environment; to discern the extent to which the state is or is not able (a) to extend its control over as much of the environment as is possible, that is to control the "organization" of the environment so that it acquires a prior capacity to adapt to changes in that environment, or so that its capacity to change the environment does not require extensive re-arrangement of itself as a system; and (b) so to determine and narrow the relevant range of its environment that it is able and finds it necessary over a period of time to adapt to a selected part or parts. It then may develop the capacity so to insulate itself that disturbances in particular parts of the environment become irrelevant to its survival.

The state's ability to do either of these in a particular context will be a major determinant of the status ranking which is attributed to it.

⁷⁶Lewis, W. Arthur, "Economic Development in World Trade" in Robinson, E.A.G. Problems in Economic Development (London, Macmillan, 1965) p. 484. See also Thomas, C.Y., "The Transfer Process: Theory and Experience in a Developing Economy", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 15, 1966 at pp. 135-6, for his discussion of the economy of Guyana as "small, open, underdeveloped" and "virtually a price-taker" in international trade.

DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

LAW AND ETHICS



CHAPTER TWO

INTERNATIONAL STRATIFICATION AND THE SMALL STATE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

"The Prince [Norodom Sihanouk] told Mr. Attwood that American Press references to Cambodia as a 'tiny' country had contributed to his anti-American feeling. 'They always talk about 'tiny' Cambodia - the 'pocket Kingdom'. They never say 'tiny' Belgium which is smaller, and what about that so-called country of Grace Kelly's? It's racism', he added".¹

"I shall relate", Macaulay wrote in his History of England, "how our country, from a state of ignominious vassalage, rapidly rose to the place of umpire among the European powers Nothing in the early existence of Britain indicated the greatness which she was to attain".² In this quotation, as well as in that quoted at the head of this Chapter, we come up against, at least implicitly, the problem of the relationship between a number of concepts - size, role, status, and location - which would seem to be of some use in any attempt to place the varieties of states, and of small states in particular, in some relationship of 'power' to each other: in other words, within some system of stratification. All these concepts have a 'dynamic' element built into them; at least two of them, role and status, are concerned with element behaviour, and both size and location are, like the concept of distance, variables whose meaning can be changed in relation to the same element, in circumstances where other variables themselves dynamic (for example, technology) 'act' upon

¹Financial Times (London), 19 March 1968.

²Macaulay, Thomas Babington, The History of England from the Accession of James the Second, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1849, 4th ed.) pp. 1 and 4.

them. Thus, for example, as one author has written,

"any assessment based upon a strict definition of great, small and middle powers ... of nuclear, conventional, and potentially nuclear, not to speak of status quo and revisionist, or growing and declining powers, will be sometimes contradictory, often ambiguous and always provisional".³

We attempt in this Chapter, then, to discuss the main concepts which we will use in the analysis of small-state behaviour and in our development of a typology of small states, taking into account the fact that typology-making tends to impose a static character on what are a set of essentially dynamic phenomena. But this is simply another way of saying that no single typology is likely to be of use in explaining every aspect of a state's behaviour or position in international society.

We proceed in our analysis, first by discussing the general problem of the ranking of states in international society with reference to their importance in 'political relations'. Secondly, we attempt to differentiate what we call the "small state" from other kinds of states and to discuss the problem of ranking among small states themselves. In dealing with these problems we will, finally, hope to have succeeded in evolving a general framework for analysing the conditions of behaviour of the small state in international society.

TYPES OF STRATIFICATION ANALYSIS: REVIEW OF APPROACHES

We can perceive the difficulties involved in stratification analysis when we consider the uncertainty among political analysts about what kind of state should be referred to as "small". One

³Hassner, Pierre, "The Nation-State in the Nuclear Age", Survey, No. 67, 1968, pp. 3-27 at p. 3.

author, while recognizing that "some clarification of the term 'small state' is clearly necessary", goes on to remark that "there is the difficulty that if an objective definition is attempted it will be circular"; he therefore settles for 'a frankly subjective, if not arbitrary definition ... one which is supported by common usage'.⁴ This definition has as its criteria level of economic advancement and population.

Another writer defines the small state with which she is concerned, as "a state lacking the military power to carry out a policy by force against a large state for any protracted period". This definition would seem to be too inclusive, and, in fact, while excluding certain states which might well be thought to fall within its terms (such as Canada or Australia) on the grounds that they have "for one reason or another ... escaped most of the consequences of smallness", she suggests that a state like Indonesia can be referred to as small. She does, however, immediately highlight the difficulties involved in this kind of categorization by noting that "there are small states and small states".⁵ A third author refers to "small countries like the Congo or Cuba"⁶ an example of the tendency to identify smallness with weakness, and both of these, often, with economic backwardness.

But for students of international relations the physical size of a state is only important insofar as it can be shown to be related in some way to the 'power' of the state vis-a-vis the other

⁴Vital, D., The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 7-8.

⁵Fox, Annette Baker, "Small State Diplomacy", Chapter 17 in Kertesz, S.D. and Fitzimmons, M.A., Diplomacy in a Changing World (University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 339-40.

⁶Brams, Steven J., "Transaction Flows in the International System", American Political Science Review, Vol. LX, 1966, pp. 880-98 at p.884.

units involved in international politics; that is to say, to the extent that it is assumed to be an indicator (or contribute toward the indication) of the status of the state relative to others. Thus, in the literature, the problem has tended to be attacked in terms of the more general one of trying to define the various levels of power of states in international society - attempting to describe some kind of hierarchy of states in terms of their capacity to utilize effectively their 'power', this latter concept itself being defined in a variety of ways. It is therefore, first to a discussion of some of this literature that we now turn.

The emphasis here is on the strengths and weaknesses of states relative to each other and relative to the situations in which their 'power' has to be utilized. The categorization of states tends then to be in terms of greater and lesser or minor powers (states), the category of states in between these two being usually referred to as secondary, or simply middle, powers. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, would distinguish between states in terms of their ability to utilize their "power" for the purpose of protecting or furthering their "national interests".⁷ George Schwarzenberger refers to all states as forming an international aristocracy with international institutions, for example, as subsidiary to this aristocracy; then among states themselves, he refers to the major states at any period of time as the international oligarchy, his criterion being, again, the concept of 'power'. He thus observes that "in international society the hierarchic element is pronounced" and "the overriding role of power in international relations dominates thought and action", so that "as in all fields of social relations there is continuous

⁷Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations (N.Y. A.A. Knopf, 3rd ed. 1965).

interaction between primary and subsidiary agents". Given, then, the basically competitive and antagonistic character of international society, it is "ultimately, the oligarchy of World Powers which decides on the character of international affairs".⁸

Schwarzenberger's use of the concepts oligarchy and aristocracy (while noting the limited cohesion of "international society") illuminates the fact that his model is derived from an analogy with the domestic societies of states. This model has been used, though in slightly different ways, by others. Johan Galtung, for example, in a recent formulation⁹ in which his main interest is to discern the conditions under which societal disequilibrium is likely to occur, delineates different kinds of international systems in terms of the following concepts: feudal system, class system, mixed system and egalitarian system (this latter being a limiting and extremely unstable case). Within each system - with the exception of the last - there are to be found "top dogs" and "underdogs", the criteria for ranking being size (geographical), wealth, military power, degree of development. As with domestic societies, then, these systems can polarize in various ways.

To distinguish further between states, Galtung enumerates yet another set of, more overtly 'political' criteria. Thus the "big powers are the Security Council veto members"; and within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union is the only big power because it "is the only nation with nuclear arms, veto power, a world language and a sphere of interests". Galtung is, in fact, using a mixture of structural and

⁸Schwarzenberger, G., Power Politics, (London: Stevens, 3rd ed. 1964).

⁹Galtung, J., "East-West Interaction Patterns", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 2, 1966, pp. 146-76.

institutional criteria (level of technological development and veto power in the Security Council for example), and notes that there will obviously be cases of states which do not 'fit' into his schema - thus the ranking among NATO states is not always clear. Using, however, the elements of distinction big-small, he concludes that within NATO, for example, "Germany and Canada and Italy are ... the nations that rank highest among the small powers as to nuclear potential, with Belgium ... as a poor no. 4".¹⁰ In reading this we are reminded of Fox's dictum that "there are small states and small states".

Galtung's dichotomy between "top-dogs" and "under-dogs" is much the same as Schwarzenberger's - that "the international oligarchy is limited to the inner ring of the Great Powers inside the international aristocracy, and the rest of the players are viewed as minor members of the international cast"; these Great Powers "jealously guard their privileged position" for any addition to their number serves to weaken the relative influence of each one.¹¹ The criteria used to define the Great Power are essentially the same used in that analysis of international society which perceives it, in its political aspect, as a "bi-polar" world, insofar as the possession of advanced nuclear weaponry is seen as dividing the Super-powers from the rest. And Schwarzenberger observations just quoted

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 114, 150-51. What I have referred to here is only a small part of Galtung's formulation. He goes on to test his concepts in some detail and to develop, for example, the notion of 'rank-dependence'. See also his, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Journal of Peace Research, No. 2, 1964, pp. 95-119 and Galtung, Moray Arango, M., and Schwartzman, S., "El Sistema Latino-Americano de Naciones: Un Analisis Estructural", America Latina, Vol. 9, 1966, pp. 59-94. A 'structural' approach somewhat similar to that of Galtung, and directed towards analysing the rank relationships of "Third World" countries to each other and the extent of homogeneity within the Third World, is that by Robertson, R. and Tudor, A., "The Third World and International Stratification: Theoretical Considerations and Research Findings", Sociology, Vol. 2, 1968, pp. 47-64.

¹¹ Schwarzenberger, op. cit., pp. 15, 110.

approximate in Toynbee's view, for example, the pre-1914 European balance of power situation: "the deterioration in the position of the Great Powers as a whole", he remarks, "could best be measured by the extent to which the states of lower rank had improved their position as a class"¹²

These conceptualizations, however, tell us little about rank and relations among the Small or Lesser Powers themselves. Also, as with models of social class in domestic societies, though the distinction between the Great Powers (or, as at present, the Super Powers) - the 'upper class' and the very Small Powers - the 'lower class', is made clear, there remains largely undifferentiated, the great number of "in-between" states: the not-so-small, the middle or secondary, and the not-so-great states.

Where, as in contemporary international politics the possession of a military weapon in scarce supply constitutes the major criterion of the Great (or to go beyond this, the Super) Power, the problem of differentiating among this group of states (between super and small) is exacerbated. The emphasis is then often placed on degrees of "weakness" of states relative to each other, and though this would seem a viable method of analysis, it tends to obscure our own equally important problem - that of the behaviour of "small" (to be defined below) states which may in certain circumstances (with respect to certain issues) be weak, but not necessarily so. We will attempt to focus our analysis not simply on the definition of weakness (or minor status) in terms of a state's relation to ownership of the most technologically advanced military weapon, but on the development of criteria which help to determine the capacity of the state (and in

¹²Toynbee, A.J., The World After the Peace Conference (London: O.U.P., 1925) p. 30.

particular the small state) to protect its "interests" - usually unilaterally defined - against all other kinds of states, with respect to issues other than those involving military conflict and thus in circumstances where the possession of superior weaponry is not one of the indicators of probable "success". This relates to our intention to concern our analysis of the conditions of small-state behaviour as much with activity in "peacetime" crises as with behaviour during wartime,¹³ the assumption being that war performance and performance in crises leading to war is determined by considerations and decisions (and constraints on decisions) made during 'normal' periods.

We shall examine three other conceptualizations of the stratification problem. The first is the attempt by Bruce Russett to describe and explain the working of international society in terms of the so-called "North-South" and "East-West" problems. Russett has shown, for example, that states in the United Nations have tended to align themselves with and against each other on the basis of their stages of economic development and underdevelopment, (the North-South problem), and in terms of their attitudes towards the Cold War and questions of colonialism (the East-West problem). He remarks that the "most disquieting" of his findings is the "pervasiveness of the East-West conflict, so that it accounts for well over half the voting and speech-making" and that there is "a clear and growing bipolarity on East-West and North-South issues". He also attempts to classify states and partially relate their voting behaviour in the United

¹³The subject of the book by Fox, A.B., The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II (Chicago University Press, 1959). For a recent study attempting to differentiate between and estimate the behaviour of great and small states in terms of their possession of nuclear weapons, see Rothstein, Robert L., On Nuclear Proliferation (Columbia University: School of International Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1966).

Nations, in terms of the degree of competitiveness of their party systems; and he uses, as well, a model of party politics to explain state activity in that organization and to make projections about probable future activity.

This is, again, a form of "class" analysis founded on an analogy from domestic socio-political systems, and Russett's model seems to have been validated in some respects by the persistent coalescing of underdeveloped states on many issues at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of 1964. We would suggest, however, that the model is not a sufficiently complete one. We need, here, to bear in mind Weber's qualification to Marx's theory of class, in which Weber described classes as no more than "bases for communal action". In other words, the class alignment of states at conferences of organizations concerned predominantly with economic issues, does not in itself demonstrate a capacity to influence in a significant manner the international systems of which they are a part. If the North-South alignment, for example, is to be taken as important as a political factor, the dissatisfied sector of this equation must be shown to be capable of affecting (influencing and controlling in some degree) important political decisions and the consequence of these (as distinct from merely affecting roll-calls).

Approaches like that of Galtung and, to some extent, Russett, deal with stratification predominantly as a sociological problem and do not, in our view, tell us sufficient about the political implications for particular states of different kinds of structural arrangements of society. As two authors have recently remarked, while "structural and relational variables" are of importance in the attribution of status to member states in international society (or what they call the global system), "they tend to reflect more why N [state]

should be important to A [state] than whether or not A does in fact so consider N".¹⁴ An important structural approach which in part avoids these strictures is that developed by Gustavo Lagos,¹⁵ who attempts to link a concept and definition of 'power' to the other, usually referred to, objective variables. But Lagos, in adopting as his basic framework, the Parsonian structural functional approach tends to view the present underdeveloped countries as accepting an existing international social system, and desiring simply to develop such attributes as will enable them to move nearer in rank to, in particular, the category of states that he defines as "middle powers". The political behaviour of small, underdeveloped states is then defined in terms of norms characteristic of, and acceptable to the great powers in contemporary international society.

In order to avoid these deficiencies, while using some variable that can indicate the subjective assessments of states of each other, Singer and Small suggest rank and extent of diplomatic representation as a useful index. They are concerned with the period 1815 to 1940 and posit that a population of about 500,000 should be the base figure for consideration of an entity as an actor in the

¹⁴Singer, J. David and Small, M., "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940", World Politics, Vol. 18, 1966, pp. 236-82, at p. 240. Italics in original.

¹⁵Lagos, Gustavo, International Stratification and Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963). See pp. 97-98 for his definitions of small, middle-range and great powers. See also Lagos, "L'integration de l'Amerique latine et son influence sur le systeme international", Tiers-Monde, Tome VI, no. 23, 1965, pp. 743-756. Carlston, K., in his Law and Organization in the World Community, (Univ. of Illinois Press, 1962) again using the Parsonian framework, seems to wish to place the activities of underdeveloped countries within a system of norms and behaviour determined by the great powers. He is concerned particularly with attitudes of underdeveloped states towards nationalization of foreign-owned property.

state system of that period - recognizing that this would not do justice to all the states actually involved. Finally, they suggest, as an elementary means for identifying the importance of members in the system - much in Schwarzenberger's terms - that states can be classified in terms of whether they belong to the central or peripheral areas of the total global system. The authors do note that "after World War II a strong 'inflationary' trend set in, with the result that the previously clear and meaningful distinctions between the classes of diplomatic representation accredited to members of the international community became obscured by major-power attempts to win favour with minor and non-aligned, but strategically important nations",¹⁶ the implication being that their schema might not be entirely suitable for the post-1945 period. They propose, however, that types of representation in, and support (both financial and servicing) for various international organizations might serve as indicators for this period.¹⁷ This seems to us especially useful for differentiating between "middle" states and certain kinds of small states. But the standardized system of present-day diplomatic accreditation means that this latter indicator will have lost its usefulness for distinguishing in the contemporary period between, in particular, small states. The same criticism would apply to the levels of financial contributions - extremely standardized for under-developed states - to international organizations (see Table I).

Finally, we can look at some recent suggestions of Raymond Aron. Noting that "atomic weapons discredit the traditional concepts", he observes that "no nation, small or great, considers itself obliged

¹⁶Op. cit., p. 241, note 5.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 282.

to yield to a nation stronger than itself once the stronger nation is not in a position to use its strength effectively.¹⁸ This suggests that the small state need not necessarily submit to the great nuclear power if the latter is unable, for one reason or another, to bring other means of pressure on it, whereas in earlier periods where the types of weapons the two might have were more comparable in kind, and the consequences of the use of these weapons were less immediately overwhelming, the small state was likely to be more inclined to submit to even the threat of military force.¹⁹

Aron suggests, in somewhat traditional terms, that the status of a political unit in contemporary international politics "is fixed by the size of material or human resources that it can devote to diplomatic-strategic actions." The great powers are those who are "capable of devoting considerable resources to external action and, in particular, of mobilizing numerous cohorts. International society involves a hierarchy of prestige which approximately reflects the hierarchy established by preceding combats".²⁰ With respect to disputes and conflict relations between small and some secondary states, whose weapons capabilities are of the traditional (non-atomic) kind, these observations seem to us still to hold. Aron reminds us that location is an important aspect of state capacity and behaviour: thus, "according to the space they occupy, the political units have different resources, different objectives, different dreams", but in relation to the more general configuration of forces, "space" assumes

¹⁸ Aron, R., Peace and War (N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 58.

¹⁹ But for what might be considered a qualification even of this, see Fox, A.B., The Power of Small States.

²⁰ Aron, op. cit., p. 69.

"a diplomatic significance only as a function of the localization of great and small powers, of stable and unstable states, of sensitive points (in military and political terms) and pacified zones."²¹

These generalizations can easily be empirically related to relations between the European states (great and small) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And we wish to suggest that this kind of 'traditionalist' analysis - rather than more recently devised ones is of major relevance in understanding unit behaviour in particular areas constituted of small states today (for example, the Middle East). We shall show, in a later Chapter, the extent to which it needs to be amended for the purpose of analyzing contemporary small-state relations. Obviously, it is more relevant to the analysis of war and tension relations, than relations of 'normalcy', but it can possibly be argued that in such circumstances all other kinds of state and systemic relationships are likely to be subordinated to those of tension.

TABLE I

Membership and Scale of Contributions to United Nations Budget, 1965

Afghanistan	0.05	Bulgaria	0.17
Albania	0.04	Burma	0.06
Algeria	0.10	Burundi	0.04
Argentina	0.92	Byelorussia	0.52
Australia	1.58	Cambodia	0.04
Austria	0.53	Cameroon	0.04
Belgium	1.15	Canada	3.17
Bolivia	0.04	Central African Republic	0.04
Brazil	0.95	Ceylon	0.08

²¹Ibid., p. 97

Chad	0.04	Iran	0.20
Chile	0.27	Iraq	0.08
China	4.26	Irish Republic	0.16
Colombia	0.23	Israel	0.17
Congo (Brazza- ville)	0.04	Italy	2.54
Congo (Kinshasa)	0.05	Ivory Coast	0.04
Costa Rica	0.04	Jamaica	0.05
Cuba	0.02	Japan	2.77
Cyprus	0.04	Jordan	0.04
Czechoslovakia	1.11	Kenya	0.04
Dahomey	0.4	Kuwait	0.56
Denmark	0.62	Laos	0.04
Dominican Republic	0.04	Lebanon	0.55
Ecuador	0.05	Liberia	0.04
El Salvador	0.04	Libya	0.54
Ethiopia	0.04	Luxembourg	0.05
Finland	0.43	Madagascar	0.04
France	6.09	Malawi	0.04
Gabon	0.04	Malaysia	0.15
Gambia	...	Maldives Is.	...
Ghana	0.08	Mali	0.04
Greece	0.25	Malta	0.04
Guatemala	0.04	Mauritania	0.04
Guinea	0.04	Mexico	0.81
Haiti	0.04	Mongolia	0.04
Hungary	0.56	Morocco	0.11
Iceland	0.04	Nepal	0.04
India	1.85	Netherlands	1.11
		New Zealand	0.38

Nicaragua	0.04	Syria	0.05
Niger	0.04	Tanzania	0.04
Nigeria	0.17	Thailand	0.14
Norway	0.44	Togo	0.04
Pakistan	0.37	Trinidad	0.04
Panama	0.04	Tunisia	0.05
Paraguay	0.04	Turkey	0.35
Peru	0.09	Uganda	0.04
Phillipines	0.35	Ukraine	1.97
Poland	1.45	USSR	14.92
Portugal	0.15	United Arab Republic	0.23
Rumania	0.35	United Kingdom	7.21
Rwunda	0.04	United States	31.91
Saudi Arabia	0.07	Upper Volta	0.04
Senegal	0.04	Uruguay	0.10
Sierra Leone	0.04	Venezuela	0.50
Singapore	...	Yemen	0.04
Somalia	0.04	Yugoslavia	0.36
South Africa	0.52	Zambia	0.54
Spain	0.73		
Sudan	0.56		
Sweden	1.26		

Total U.N. Budget 1965 - US \$108,472,800

Eight non-member States participate in certain activities of the UN, such as regional economic commissions, the International Court of Justice or the international control of narcotic drugs. They con-

tribute to the expenses of such activities on the basis of the following percentages:

Federal Republic of Germany	(7.41)
Holy See	(0.04)
Liechtenstein	(0.04)
Monaco	(0.04)
Korea	(0.13)
Vietnam	(0.08)
San Marino	(0.04)
Switzerland	(0.88)

Source: [Statesman's Year Book, 1966-1967]

SIZE AND STATUS: Some Elementary Terms

The approach which we adopt here to the analysis of stratification involves, initially making a distinction between size concepts and status concepts. Thus where we use the term "small" to refer to the characteristic of a state, we intend that it should refer to criteria relating only to physical size; though this term is often used in the literature to refer to both size and status of entities in international society. A fundamental problem for us then becomes that of showing the relationship between size and status as well as showing the significance of that relationship.²² For physical size, however measured, cannot give any indication, or explain the behaviour of an entity, though we may be able to derive

²²Just as Lagos attempts to show the relationship between another class of State - the underdeveloped - and its possible status. He tends, however, to equate underdevelopment with 'smallness', using this latter as a status concept. See Lagos, G., op. cit., pp. 97-8.

from a concept of size some estimate about potential for developing the kinds of capabilities on which behaviour may be based.

But to attempt to establish the link between physical size and status we introduce here another conception of size - what we call systemic size. This is a conception that we borrow from cybernetics. Ashby observes²³ that when the cybernetician refers to the size of a system (that is, to its smallness or largeness), he is, in effect, referring to the system's complexity - to the number of "degrees of freedom" that the system possesses or to the number of 'states' (in the general systems sense of 'state of a system') that can be distinguished, or conversely, to the number of constraints on the system at any particular time and in relation to some specific objective. These two concepts - degrees of freedom and constraints - indicate the extent of variety which the analyst or observer can perceive in the system; and it is this variety in states of a system which can allow it to match the variety of an equally complex environment, and thus to adapt to successfully, or control, that environment.

Now the same system can be viewed in these terms as either 'small' or 'large', that is simple or complex, depending on the extent to which it is perceived as easily or with difficulty (or not at all) susceptible to control. If the mechanisms used to exert control can easily match the variety of that system, then the system can be referred to as small - not complex. (In other words, the controlling system must itself be able to demonstrate the variety required to fulfill that particular objective.) A physically large nation-state then (whichever of its resources are used as the criteria of size in

²³Ashby, W.R., Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1957), pp. 61-63. We have hinted at the concept in Chapter 1.

this sense - area, population or gross national product, for example) may, given some objective set by itself or set in relation to it by some other state, be systematically large; so may a physically small state; or they may both not have sufficient variety to control an entity in their environments which is, in physical size terms, small. This is the way in which we can, to take an example, view the problem of decolonisation. It is on these terms that we can say that the physically small country, Cyprus, by 1959 (the Cypriot problem viewed as a set of systemic relations) had become systemically too large to be controlled by the United Kingdom. And it is the context in which a South Korean editorialist could remark recently, with respect to a particular event,²⁴ "Is the U.S. a great power - or merely a large country?"

The significant points are then, in practical terms, three. First, that a physically small state, for example, may 'possess' a set of systemic relations with respect to some issue or objective, much more extensive than its physical boundaries or resources and so have the capacity to introduce in its relations with some entity a degree of complexity and variety with which the latter entity is unable to cope. Secondly, a physically large state, one with extensive resources (what tends to be called a 'great state') may, again in respect to some particular issue, be unable to match the variety of some systemically large system; this is the characteristic situation of what we will call the declining imperial state. Thirdly, the capacity of a state-as-system to introduce variety into its relations is not simply a question of whether the state is independent

²⁴The seizure of the United States intelligence vessel, Pueblo. Quoted from the South Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo, in Newsweek, 19th Feb. 1968.

of or dependent on its environment - that is the extent of its conditionality - though this is of some importance. The variety of a state-as-system may well be matched to that of another state on which it is dependent (in fact, a certain matching is one of the criteria of dependence). It may in those circumstances be able to adapt to, but certainly not to control, its environment.²⁵

Physical size, we suggest then, assumes significance in unit relations in international society only insofar as on the one hand it imposes a constraint on the variety which a state-as-system is allowed to develop or, on the other hand, if it contributes to the use of such variety as a state may possess.

This generalization allows us to introduce our notion of the relationship between physical size and status. The intervening (and dynamic) variable is systemic size, but systemic size seen as allowing for variety in relationships. We now introduce another concept, that of risk, and posit that the attribution of high status to some state or other international entity is determined by the extent to which its resources (physical size or, for example, location) allow, at a particular time and in relation to some objective, for the introduction of such variety as will enable the entity to undertake the objective without risk of undermining its own survival in international society. The complexity of systemic processes in relation to the resources at a state's disposal determine the character of risk (and the sustenance of risk) that it is able to take over time. And it is the character of risk, and capacity to sustain it, that distinguishes states in terms of status. Further, the difficulty for states of

²⁵ Thus the importance of Sommerhoff's distinction (introduced in another context) between the 'activity of adapting' and the 'relationship of adaptedness' in what we have called the structure of connectedness. See Sommerhoff, G., Analytical Biology, (London:OUP, 1950) p. 46.

whatever physical size, lies in the fact that while some are able to exercise control over the resources at their disposal during some period of activity, none can inhibit absolutely the introduction into the systemic processes relevant to some given objective, of added variety. High status is attributed where it is perceived that the state-as-system can match the variety fortuitously introduced into its environment with an increased variety in its own resources and mechanisms and thus successfully control that environment, without risking its own viability as a unit of some autonomy in international society.

Stanley Hoffmann has made a somewhat similar assessment in distinguishing between what he calls "larger and smaller powers".

He writes:

"At all times, the line separating smaller from larger powers has corresponded to the different attitudes towards risks. Small powers are forced by their resources, their location, and the system, to be satisfied with establishing a hierarchy of risks and with attempting to minimise the risks they consider to be most serious... Larger powers which, while trying to minimise the unbearable risks the system or other states create, nevertheless do not engender new risks The main object of a larger power is to maximise gains (defined in a variety of ways) rather than to minimise risks".²⁶

What Hoffmann calls larger and smaller powers, we prefer to refer to as Greater and Lesser powers, and to emphasize that a Great Power which is also large may come to be viewed as a Lesser Power or, at least, a 'not-Great' one, for status is attributed not simply in terms of the capacity to develop resources or capabilities, but in terms of the capacity to use these effectively with respect to a particular objective or set of objectives. A physically large

²⁶Hoffmann, S., "Roulette in the Cellar: Notes on Risk in International Relations" in his The State of War, p. 138.

state like the Congo (Kinshasa) may be of low status, and a large state like pre-World War I Austria-Hungary, may gradually 'descend' into low status position. A state of low status, then, is one which, over time, lacks the capacity for intentionally determining significantly the direction or share of the environment or systems of which it is a part. It is a state of minimal significance in any particular system of international relations. And its ability to use its resources as a basis for risk-taking or for setting for itself a hierarchy of risks is limited.

Resources may be related to risk-taking in a variety of ways. To take two examples: first, for a physically small state any risk-taking that involves the loss of space (land area) must be fairly low down in its risk-hierarchy. Secondly, for both physically large and small states an important, though partly intangible, resource is what we can call the state's Domestic Political Efficiency: this relates to the nature of its administrative organisation, the extent to which it possesses an adequate 'mix' of political and other elites, and an efficient system of communication. Domestic political efficiency is a significant determinant of the degree to which the state can introduce needed variety in its internal political and social order. Thus, whatever the resources of a state like Brazil, it cannot, given the arrangement of its political efficiency resource, be attributed high status, (though its size can be referred to as having a potential for increasing its status).

Status or prestige, then, is a transient commodity and a physically small state with few viable resources at one particular time and thus viewed as low in status, may in some other period attain to relatively high status, given some change in environmental processes. Thus, to take an example from the classical Greek period,

Rhodes, "a small island in the Eastern Mediterranean ... exposed to aggression on all sides", but at the same time "at the crossroads of commercial, strategic and political interests, equally accessible to the great and secondary powers", came to hold a "key position in the Hellenistic system of diplomacy. Bozeman,²⁷ from whom these quotations are taken, goes on to observe that the Rhodians "by mobilizing their skills" (having recognized that their independence would depend on international trade and thus on freedom of the seas) provided themselves with a small, efficient navy "to police the adjacent waters and to maintain a balance of power among their powerful neighbours"; they were thus able to pursue "bold policies"²⁸ as a consequence of which "they gained great influence and prestige" and Rhodes was "ultimately recognized by her contemporaries as the most important secondary state of the Hellenistic system". When circumstances changed (in particular with the rise of Rome) Rhodes declined in prestige, reverted to the position of a small, minor state, and was subsequently annexed.

Rhodes can here be described as a small state which, through the exploitation of its resources or attributes, for the creation of new attributes, became a crucial element within a set of systems of international and political relations. Its experience as here related can be used to illustrate our distinction between size and status. While a small state or a larger state may both gain in status or prestige by being crucial to the development and maintenance of a set of systemic relations that may even become partly

²⁷Bozeman, A.S., Politics and Culture in International History, Princeton, N.J., (Princeton U.P., 1960) pp. 107-108. The quotations are re-arranged by this writer from two paragraphs.

²⁸In our terms they were able to re-arrange their hierarchy of risks.

institutionalised, the state of major status - traditionally called the 'great' state - is likely to be the one which, in relation to being crucial, is also functionally autonomous within this set of relations; it has an 'unconditional' existence within the systems, and is likely to be a controller of the systems (though not necessarily in a formal and institutionalised sense).

The small crucial state, however, is likely to be part of a series of reciprocal relationships, and its viability, power and status cannot be described in any way other than in terms of the viability of these relationships. Here, the terms of reciprocity are important; the great state can through a number of systems determine the terms of its reciprocal relationships: while the small state, even where it attains to an appreciably higher status than other small states, is unable to do this. It is likely to constitute a subordinate system within the system of reciprocal relationships, though the terms of its dependency or subordination may give it a degree of autonomy within this system. The supreme importance, at the end of the eighteenth century of an entity like Haiti, then its rapid insignificance, is an historical illustration of this.²⁹ The simultaneous dependence and autonomy of a small state of this kind leads to fluctuations in its prestige and an ambiguity in analysts' estimations of its viability. In the contemporary period, South Africa is an example of this. Its existence within a monetary system based on gold of which it is a major producer (see Table 2) gives it a status of subordination to and dependence on, the viability of that system, while it can at the same time exploit the position of

²⁹See James, C.L.R., The Black Jacobins: Toussaint l'Overture and the San Domingo Revolution (N.Y. Vintage Books, 2nd edition revised, 1963) esp. Ch. 2.

its 'product' as crucial to the system, for the purpose of gaining a certain degree of autonomy in this and other relevant systems.³⁰ Here is an example of status as a transient and 'non-stable' commodity.

TABLE 2: Gold Value of World Production, 1940, 1945, and 1963-67*
(In millions of U.S. Dollars at U.S. \$35 a fine ounce)

	<u>1940</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
South Africa	492	428	961	1,019	1,069	1,081	1,068
Canada	186	95	139	133	126	115	104
U.S.A.	170	32	51	51	59	63	52
Australia	57	23	36	34	31	32	29
Ghana	31	19	32	30	27	24	27

* Excluding the output of CMEA countries, mainland China, etc.

Source: I.M.F. Annual Report, 1968, p. 88.

The state of high status in a ranking order-- one which is able to exploit its resources and use them as capabilities, simultaneously within a variety of systems in international society - is always a state of great economic significance; and the state of predominant economic significance is likely to be the initiator of a structure of ideological relationships. It not only acquires status and prestige over a large area (through a large number of systems) in international society, but it attempts to create and universalise a system of societal norms. This is the sense, it seems, that Marx and Engels wrote of the "civil society" (of an industrial nation) which "transcends the State and the nation, though on the other hand ... it must assert itself as nationality". The inventions of

³⁰ See Hirsch, F., "Influences on Gold Production", I.M.F. Staff Papers, Vol. 15, 1968, pp. 405-90. South Africa's importance as a crucial element within a system of strategic relationships relevant to the North Atlantic powers is another example.

such states, they remark, become "world-historical fact(s) ..." ³¹

The Size of States: Size and Systemic Autonomy

Having attempted to establish the kind of relationship that we perceive, between size and status, we now proceed to suggest the criteria we will use in the determination of size of states, as a means, more particularly, of focussing on the "small" state in international society. Having done this we will attempt to categorise small states, and then return to the problems of status and international behaviour.

Size, one economist writes,

"is not an unambiguous concept. It can be defined in terms of area, population, income, or even natural resources. To some extent area and resources are inter-related, since a country with a large land area is more likely to have a diversified base of natural resources than one with a limited territory. Even so, there may be exceptions as, for example, when a large country consists mainly of desert and a small one has coal and iron-ore deposits. The size of the population is a more meaningful index of economic size than is area, relative population size of different countries being a guide to the relative size of their internal markets. Since, however,

³¹Marx, K. and Engels, F., The German Ideology, pp. 26, 38. More than a century later, the (London) Economist characterised as "the new nationalism", the statement of a trio of American international economists that suggested the predominance of the dollar as "the world's standard of value" and the United States as a "bank ... with a fast growing world as its body of customers", and implied that the stabilization of the world monetary system must depend predominantly on the United States. "It is the view" the Economist replied "that America can, even at this late stage of the day, perform all its old international functions without ... /a particular kind of/ international support that we have termed 'the new nationalism'". The group of economists remark, on the other hand, that their view "can reasonably be interpreted ... as internationalism". See Despres, E., Kindleberger, C.P. and Salant, W., "The Dollar and World Liquidity: A Minority View", The Economist, 5 Feb., 1966, pp. 529-29. For a further discussion of the arguments, see Kindleberger, C.P., The Politics of International Money and World Language (Princeton University, Essays in International Finance, No. 61, August 1967).

income per head varies enormously, if we compare developed with under-developed countries, size of population may be a misleading measure of market size in terms of effective demand.

Some countries are, of course, small in terms of all four criteria; others, again, are large whichever basis is used. But in general it seems most sensible to distinguish large, medium and small countries, in terms of population size, in the economically advanced areas from the corresponding size categories in the underdeveloped world".³²

The student of economics is concerned with differentiating between countries in terms of the sizes of their economies; in fact the economist introduces the criterion of land area only in so far as he is able to demonstrate that land area has particular relevance or consequences for the economic growth of countries. He is therefore not generally concerned with land or geographic area, but with something less inclusive - size of economy defined in terms of some particular concept or group of concepts: G.N.P., G.D.P., size of foreign trade, level of income per capita, population. Thus, where geographic area is seen as important, it is seen as such not as a meaningful criteria of size, but more often as constituting the base of something which can be used as a criterion, for example, extent of resources, or population.³³

A tradition of international politics analysis, however, has seen geographic area as an important size criterion. This tradition has been the source of a structural or geopolitical

³²Maizels, A., Industrial Growth and World Trade (Cambridge University Press, 1963) pp. 137-38. Our emphasis.

³³See, for example, Michaely, M., "'Developed country' is defined arbitrarily as a country whose per capita annual income exceeds U.S.\$300 'Small country' is defined, following Kuznets, as one whose population numbers less than 10 million. This means, of course, that the country's area is not a part of the definition, although there is certainly a close correlation between area and size of population". "Concentration of Exports and Imports: An International Comparison", Economic Journal, Vol. LXVIII, 1958, pp. 722-36 at p. 729, note 2.

determinism in international politics.³⁴ That is, it has often been assumed that mere land area (an immense amount of it) is an important political resource for the state which possesses it, and that it gives to the state a particular status - a degree of importance or an attribution of potential importance that is the consequence of this land area alone. But geographic size (if we are making the distinction between size and status) must, as we have suggested, be seen as no more than a resource that can be used in a variety of ways; it is taken by itself, not a meaningful indicator of status: it is too static a criterion.

Our approach is to use, first, that is as a base criterion, population, to illustrate the kind of human resources of which a state can dispose. Land area is then taken as relevant only in relation to population. Secondly, to illustrate the state's capacity for development of its resources (introducing thereby a dynamic element into the analysis) we use, as a criterion of economic development, gross national product. Finally, as a means of discerning something about the state's position in the structure of connectedness (of economic transactions), we use a measure of external trade dependence: the geographic and commodity concentration of trade. Population is, essentially, a static criterion; G.N.P. and concentration of trade, behavioural criteria. Population and G.N.P. are our main criteria for determining size; concentration of trade³⁵ allows us to bring into

³⁴Associated in the literature with the name of Halford Mackinder. For a recent discussion of the "geopolitical hypothesis" in international politics, see, Sprout, H. & M., The Ecological Perspective in Human Affairs (N.J., Princeton U.P., 1965), especially Ch. 3, "Environmental Determinism".

³⁵On this concept, see M. Michaely, ibid., and on its political importance, see Galtung, J., "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia", World Politics, Vol. 19, 1967, pp. 378-416.

the analysis one indication of systemic size, and is one criterion for suggesting the extent to which the state determines, or is a subordinate element in, its set economic relationships. The first two criteria indicate the resource factors and the latter the dependency factor in the analysis.

There are, of course, other criteria that might well be taken into account, especially when states are looked at, not simply in terms of classes or categories, but individually, that is, relative to each other. Thus, the extent of land area of a country is taken, by economists, as indicative of a probable diversity of natural resources.³⁶ But we use G.N.P. as an indicator of the extent to which a state, regardless of extent of land area, has been able to develop whatever resources it may possess. Similarly, G.N.P. per capita may give an indication of the degree to which a population is, on the whole, developed in terms of 'skill' - high G.N.P. per capita suggesting a strong industrial base. But here again, GNP per capita cannot be taken as a central variable; it may, in fact, also only suggest that a country of any size or any level of 'population skill' has one important resource in great demand. Hence the importance then, of examining geographic and commodity concentration of trade.

The relationships between all the criteria are suggested in a proposition by Kindleberger:

"The smaller the economy in geographic area, the more skewed it is likely to be and the more it must trade outside its borders. Conversely, the larger the economy in geographic area, the less skewed and the smaller its trade as a proportion of its income.

³⁶ See among others, Kuznets: "The availability of a variety of mineral and other natural resources, useful at a given level of technology, is largely a function of area", in his "Economic Growth of Small Nations", The Challenge of Development (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1958), pp. 9-25 at p. 11. Also on this point, see the essays in Robinson, E.A.G., Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (London, 1960); and Demas, W.G., The Economics of Development in Small Countries (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965), especially Ch. 2.

This is partly due to natural resources. If resources are randomly distributed in space, the larger the geographic area covered by a given political unit, the less specialized will that unit's resources be ... It follows from what has been said about long-run decreasing costs that the larger the country, the more opportunities it will have to achieve an optimum size domestically, without need for foreign trade, if industries are based not on natural resources but on capital investment and labour skills. But here size is a function of population, rather than geographic area, and further the theorem applies only above a certain level of skill and income per capita".³⁷

A framework for size categorization which places an emphasis on GNP suggests that, for the contemporary period, after classifying states in terms of population, it is useful to classify them in terms of whether they are more or less industrially developed. Then, the further subdivision can be made between small and large developed, and small developed and small less-developed states.³⁸ Level of development, taken in conjunction with population, will give us an idea of a state's capacity to innovate technologically, and these, together with the size of GNP, will indicate the extent to which it can sustain technological innovation on a large scale: the extent to which its inventions can become "world-historical facts", bearing their label of origin, and these in turn become agents or mechanisms for universalising the 'presence' of that state and, possibly, its norms. This will, again, demonstrate the means by which states can establish the foundations for high status.

³⁷Kindleberger, C.P., Foreign Trade and the National Economy (New Haven and London: Yale U.P., 1962), pp. 32-33. Our emphasis.

³⁸Maizels, op. cit., Ch. 15 and Appendix A., groups the countries which he considers into (i) Large industrial (ii) Small industrial (iii) Semi-industrial and (iv) non-industrial. Chenery and Taylor make the division between (i) large countries and (iia) small industry-oriented and (iib) small primary-oriented countries. See Chenery, H.B. and Taylor, L., "Development Patterns: Among Countries Over Time", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 50, 1968, pp. 391-416.

We can compare, first, three lists of states; one showing the twenty-five states with the greatest populations; a second showing the twenty-five with the highest GNP and a third showing the twenty-five with the highest GNP per capita. (See Table 3).

Fourteen of the twenty-five countries in List I are to be found also in List 2: that is, they rank high in both population and GNP. The remainder of the countries in List I vary in population size. Only seven of the countries in List I are to be found in List 3; in the latter list it will be noted that the majority of countries with high GNP per capita are, compared to the industrially developed giants (U.S.A., USSR etc.), of relatively small population size - varying between two and just above ten million. These relationships are shown more clearly if we attempt to 'position' these countries in terms of GNP and population on a number of scatter diagrams. In Figure I, as would be expected, the U.S. and the Soviet Union find themselves some 'distance' from other states with respect to both their populations and gross national products; in addition, they are both low density population countries with large 'usable' land areas.

China and Japan are, in a sense, in contemporary society, anomalies having, relative to the United States and the Soviet Union, high populations and GNP's that rank with the 'major' states of Europe - West Germany, France and the United Kingdom. But like the European states they both have high population densities while China at present has, compared with these states a very low GNP per capita, indicating (in spite of its possession of a 'crude' nuclear capability) a low level of economic and technological development. (see Table 3). These seven countries can be divided into two groups - U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. which we refer to as the larger countries and the remainder which can simply be referred to as large. Finally, their trade

TABLE 3

POPULATION, GNP, AND GNP PER CAPITA

(25 countries)

List 1		List 2		List 3	
	Pop. (Mill.)	(\$US) GNP per cap.	GNP (\$US mill.)	Pop.	(\$US) GNP per cap.
China	710,000	101	683,900	196,920	U.S.A.
India	498,680	90	313,000	235,105	Kuwait
USSR	235,105	890	112,200	59,676	Sweden
USA	196,920	3,520	99,180	54,744	Switzerland
Pakistan	117,000	90	93,460	49,400	Canada
Indonesia	107,000	100	84,560	98,865	New Zealand
Japan	98,865	860	76,000	710,000	Australia
Brazil	83,175	240	56,740	51,962	Denmark
Nigeria	59,700	80	49,200	498,680	France
Germany (W)	59,676	1,700	48,050	20,050	Norway
U.K.	54,744	1,620	30,800	31,698	Germany (W)
Italy	51,962	1,030	26,600	17,067	Belgium
France	49,400	1,730	22,680	11,541	U.K.
Mexico	44,145	470	22,100	14,240	Finland
Philippines	33,477	160	21,970	83,175	Netherlands
Turkey	31,910	280	21,750	31,871	Germany (E)
Spain	31,871	640	19,415	44,145	Israel
Poland	31,698	730	19,320	7,808	Austria
Thailand	30,698	130	18,960	12,455	Italy
U.A.R. (Egypt)	30,147	160	16,740	9,528	Czechoslovakia
Korea, South	29,086	150	16,050	22,691	USSR
Iran	25,550	250	14,800	19,143	Japan
Burma	25,246	60	13,930	5,999	Ireland
Ethiopia	23,000	60	11,100	10,179	Venezuela
Argentina	22,691	780	11,040	117,000	Hungary

Sources: For 1966 Population and GNP per cap.: IBRD, World Bank Atlas, 1968:
 For GNP, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: World Wide Military
 Expenditures and Related Data, Calendar Year, 1965.

dependence, in terms of both commodity and geographic concentration, is low.³⁹

TABLE 4
POPULATION DENSITY (SELECTED COUNTRIES) (1963)

<u>Country</u>	<u>(Area (Sq. Kms.))</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Population Density (1962)</u>
U.S.A.	9,363,389	179,323,175	20
U.S.S.R.	22,402,200	208,826,650	10
China	9,561,000	582,603,417	
West Germany	248,454	53,917,418	220
France	547,026	46,520,271	86
United Kingdom	244,030	52,676,410	219
Japan	369,661	93,418,501	257

Source: United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1963. Population figures approximate broadly to those from sources used in other tables.

The scatter diagram (Figure 1) also shows, using List 2 (the 25 states with highest GNP's), a cluster of states each with a GNP relatively similar to the other, but characterized by a fairly wide population spread. Their level of GNP, however, (irrespective of the fact that some of them - India, Pakistan have fairly large populations) does not merit putting them in the same category as the seven large states. Within this group a further cluster can be discerned, constituted of states with relatively low populations, but falling into, in this respect, the grouping which Maizels refers to

³⁹See Michaely, M., op. cit., and IMF, IBRD, Directions of Trade, Annual 1963-67.

as small industrial, or semi-industrial countries.⁴⁰ The list of all these states, given, with populations, in the following table allows us to categorize this second set of states in terms of size, and to distinguish them from all other states in the international society.

TABLE 5
MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

	<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>
Medium-sized States	(India	498,680,000
	(Pakistan	117,000,000
	(Brazil	83,175,000
	(Mexico	44,145,000
	(Spain	31,871,000
	(Poland	31,698,000
	(Argentine	22,691,000
	(Canada	20,000,000
	(Rumania	19,143,000
	(Germany (F)	17,067,000
Small-sized States	(Czechoslovakia	14,240,000
	(Netherlands	12,145,000
	(Australia	11,541,000
	(Hungary	10,179,000
	(Belgium	9,528,000
	(Sweden	7,808,000
	(Switzerland	5,999,000

⁴⁰ Maizels, op. cit. His classification is broadly similar to that used by the I.M.F. Following the I.M.F. classification, the states referred to here would fall into two groups: small industrial countries and more developed countries within the larger group of primary producing countries. See I.M.F. - Annual Report, 1968, p. 27, note 1.

On the basis of Figure I and the above list, we suggest the following: states with either populations of twenty millions and above or with a GNP between U.S. \$30 bill., and U.S. \$50 bill., or fulfilling both of these criteria, we refer to as medium-sized. All states below these limits we refer to as small-sized states; and the lower limit of medium-sized states will, obviously, not be a precise one. Certain small states will have the capacity (in terms of our criteria) for "growing" into medium-sized ones; and certain of what we call small states may have more of certain attributes of the medium-sized category than some states which actually fall into that group (South Africa or Australia having a higher GNP than, for example, Nigeria which we would put in the medium-sized category because of its level of population).

It becomes possible to distinguish between types of small states themselves. We can get a first indication of this if we examine list 3 (Table 3) of the twenty-five states with highest GNP per capita. We observe that a majority of these states (sixteen) fall into the small-sized category that we have suggested. Most of these sixteen are of an industrially developed character or fall into the I.M.F.'s category of the more developed of the primary-producing countries (New Zealand, Australia and, in some degree, Israel). They possess, or are developing, patterns of trade that, in terms of commodity and geographical distribution are fairly diversified. In this group, there are what might be called two anomalies: Kuwait with the highest GNP per capita, an extremely small population (approximately 475,000) and with an economy almost totally dependent on petroleum exports - earnings from oil exports constituting 99 percent of total export earnings. Similarly, Venezuela, another major oil-exporting country, has a heavy commodity

concentration of trade - earnings from oil exports constituting over 90 percent of total export earnings.⁴¹

In the scatter diagram (Fig. 2, using GNP and Population), we attempt, by showing relative clusters, to compare the position of these countries with a number of African countries chosen at random, but with a similar spread of population, all being underdeveloped and having in general, a high concentration of trade (geographic and commodity). We include, for further comparison, two other countries - one large underdeveloped, Nigeria and one small and semi-industrialised, South Africa. The groups of countries plotted are the following:

⁴¹See United Nations, Commodity Survey, 1967 (N.Y., 1968), p. 36. Within this group, Ireland shows a heavy geographical trade dependence, the United Kingdom taking 70 percent of its exports and providing about 50 percent of its imports. New Zealand, although somewhat diversified in terms of its primary product exports (wool, butter, meat) is, in terms of geographical direction of trade, heavily dependent on the United Kingdom. The dominance of the U.K. is, however, declining, in favour of the United States and Japan. See I.M.F., Direction of Trade, Annual 1963-67, and G.A.T.T., International Trade, 1966, (Geneva, G.A.T.T. Report, 1967), pp. 214-15 and 277.

TABLE 6

<u>Small (High GNP)</u>			<u>Small (Low GNP)</u>		
<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>GNP (m\$)</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>GNP (\$m)</u>
Czechoslovakia	14,240,000	22,100	Algeria	12,147,000	,2,630
Netherlands	12,455,000	18,960	Kenya	9,643,000	846
Australia	11,541,000	22,680	Uganda	7,740,000	658
Hungary	10,179,000	11,100	Malagasy	6,200,000	578
Belgium	9,528,000	16,740	Upper Volta	4,955,000	257
Venezuela	8,921,000	7,691	Tunisia	4,460,000	936
Sweden	7,808,000	19,320	Ivory Coast	3,920,000	963
Austria	7,290,000	9,360	Malawi	4,035,000	163
Switzerland	5,999,000	13,930	Zambia	3,827,000	842
Denmark	4,797,000	9,990			
Finland	4,637,000	8,070			
Norway	3,753,000	7,050			
Ireland	2,884,000	2,800			
New Zealand	2,676,000	5,242			
Israel	2,629,000	3,397			
				<u>Others</u>	
			Nigeria	59,700,000	4,852
			S. Africa	18,882,000	10,720

Sources: Pop: IBRD, World Bank Atlas

GNP: ACDA: World-Wide Military Expenditures.

These are representative lists meant to indicate that all states of similar characteristics fall under this category, the lower population limit of which we put at one million. Here, again, the boundaries between the two categories of states will not be a precise one, for given resources, available skill and other attributes, some states will develop a capacity to move from the small to the medium-sized category. The population spread in the small-sized category is, then, a fairly wide one (from, for example, Rumania with its 19 million to, for example, Israel, with about 2 million); so is the spread of GNP. Here, the relationship of size to power and status cannot be determined a priori or simply on the basis of resource attributes, but will depend, as we have suggested, on the kinds of issues that a state faces in relation to its relevant 'diplomatic field', the extent to which its trade pattern, for example, allow it to insulate itself from 'damage' from that particular environment and other factors. (We return to this in the chapter on "Small State Systems").

Our main size categories of states are therefore:

- (1) Large (including the 'larger' states of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.);
- (2) Medium Size;
- (3) Small, which we divide into (a) Small developed
(b) Small Underdeveloped
with a subsidiary category, within 3b of Small
Petroleum-exporting countries;
- (4) Micro-States - states with populations of below
1 million.

Finally, a cursory examination of any list of states which have acceded to independence, indicates that most of them fall into

the category of small-size and below. Most of these do not differ from each other substantially in terms of GNP and GNP per capita. In terms, however, of capacity for growth of GNP, we can note Pincus's observation that of the fifteen less developed countries which have had the fastest GNP and trade growth rates over the period 1950/52 to 1961/64, nine of these had populations of less than 10 million.⁴² Most of the countries, on the other hand, tended to have a high geographic and commodity concentration of trade, while others (Israel, Jordan) have exhibited a high dependence on receipt of foreign financial assistance, in the form either of private transfers or of official government aid. The relationship between GNP or trade growth and the 'power' of such states remains, therefore, to be demonstrated.

Some Illustrations

Given the three main criteria of small size that we have suggested, it is useful here to attempt to illustrate more clearly, through examples, the meaning we attach to this notion.⁴³ In the contemporary period many of the states which we refer to as small,

⁴²The countries are: Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Trinidad, Jamaica, Venezuela, Puerto Rico (not independent), Nicaragua, Ghana. See Pincus, J., Trade Aid and Development (London: McGraw Hill, 1967) p. 74. Pincus notes that of the 90 less developed countries which he discusses, "72 have less than 15 million population; and 51 have less than 5 million". Ibid., p. 66. See also the same author's, "How much Aid for the Have-not Nations", Columbia Journal of World Business Sept.-Oct. 1967, pp. 10-12, and Dell, S., Trade Blocs and Common Markets (London: Constable, 1963) p. 166.

⁴³Economists are at pains to point out that, for them, the choice of criteria is somewhat arbitrary. W. Demas, emphasising that his concern is with "very small countries", refers to "a small country as one with a usable land area of 10 to 20 thousand square miles or less", Demas, W., The Economics of Development in Small Countries, (Montreal, McGill U.P., 1965); P. 40. For a critique of Demas's approach to the problem of size and development, see Best, L., "Size and Survival", New World Quarterly, Guyana Independence Issue, pp. 58-63.

do not have the capacity or potential, at present, for growth into the medium-size category; but some do. The criteria that we use then, do not suggest a wholly static definition of small size, but are valid for the foreseeable future: a recent U.N. comment argues the pessimistic view that various factors do not permit the rapid attainment of "industrial achievement", by both large and small less developed countries, and compares their prospects with what it considers the much better ones, of even the present small, developed and semi-industrial countries - mainly of Europe.⁴⁴

The exploitation of some resource can provide the basis for supporting a large population, increasing GNP and GNP per capita as well as attempting the diversification of commodities exported. But the capacity for application of a necessary technology, is, however, clearly dependent on other variables of a social and political nature. Hence the notion of 'resources' must apply to both material or tangible ones and intangible ones like political efficiency or governmental capability. A comment on Zambia, a small less-developed country, heavily dependent on earnings from copper exports, but relative to other small, less-developed countries with a fairly high GNP per capita (approximately U.S. \$180) is symbolic of the general problem facing states in this category:

"... Economic and social power has been abruptly divorced from political power It is a peculiar economy, the economy of Zambia. Half a dozen great copper mines turn over a hundred million pounds worth of copper a year, but, apart from a few hundred commercially run tobacco and maize farms there is really hardly anything else that could be called a basic source of income or

⁴⁴"A note on the New Delhi Session of UNCTAD and Implications for International Trade of Changes in Technology and Industrial Structure", U.N. Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1968, pp. 55-72 at p. 67.

employment. (The government sector, commerce and the professions are really dependent ultimately on mining and agriculture)".⁴⁵

A further problem is that relating to small states at the upper limit of our criteria; these may, as we have suggested, be able to 'grow' beyond small size, and may, in fact, be comparable to many states at the lower limits of the medium-size category. The relative positions of Australia and Canada in our groupings is illustrative of this, and the ambiguity about the position and prospects of Czechoslovakia during the inter-war period indicates a problem of a similar character.⁴⁶ We discuss briefly the first two of these countries.

Australia is an island state whose boundaries (therefore land area) being fixed cannot be increased other than by imperial expansion. It has a population of about 10,547,000 in an area of 7,704,159 square kilometres, giving a population per square kilometre of 1 person. The country has 21 persons for every 1000 hectares of agricultural land.⁴⁷ In terms of absolute population and ratio of population to land area (taking into consideration presently "unusable" land), it is small, but if one assumes (a) that it has natural resources which are for a foreseeable future exploitable, and (b) that its highly skilled human resources have the capacity further to exploit these natural resources, then clearly it has scope for sizeable

⁴⁵Report of the UN/ECA/FAO Economic Survey Mission on the Economic Development of Zambia (Ndola: Falcon Press Ltd., 1964) p. 7.

⁴⁶See the discussion in Ripka, H., Small and Great Nations, (Czechoslovak Documents and Sources, No. 9, London 1944). Dr. Ripka was then Czechoslovak Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in exile.

⁴⁷Figures taken from Alker, H., Russett, B., et. al. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (London: Yale U.P., 1964). Figures are circa 1961. The IBRD, World Bank Atlas population estimate for 1966 is 11,541,000.

increases in GNP and GNP per capita. It might then, over a period of time, become a medium-sized state. A limiting factor on its growth is not so much the present size of its population, but the fact that at the level of governmental policy (that is, apart from natural increase in population), the desired ethnic character of its population may be, in future, in short supply.⁴⁸

Canada, on the other hand, with a population of 20,050,000 and a GNP that places it in our medium-size category, is an example of a state which has grown through exploitation of its resources and its position in international trade. Its proximity to the United States, however, and the method of exploitation and development of these resources has placed it in a position of structural dependence on that country. The economic growth of the state may not necessarily, therefore, give it a capacity for developing or maintaining a large degree of political autonomy.⁴⁹

At the lower end of our category of small-sized states, for example states of below 5 million population, growth becomes dependent on the relationship of population to usable land area. It is unlikely, as we have seen, that states with a very small land area will have a

⁴⁸ An illustration of the importance of H.G. Johnson's assertion that "the nation acquires economic relevance largely in its political capacity as a policy making unit endowed with fiscal and monetary powers", see his, "Economic Implications of the Size of Countries", Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 10, 1961, pp. 105-9 at p. 105 (my italics). An historical view of Australia's economic growth is given in Smithies, A., "Economic Growth: International Comparisons - Argentine and Australia", Papers and Proceedings American Economic Review, Vol. 55, 1965, pp. 17-30.

⁴⁹ See Dickey, J.G. (ed.) The United States and Canada (N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964). The "political" meaning of Canadian dependence is subject to a variety of interpretations. See Levitt, K. "Dependence and Disintegration in Canada", New World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1968, pp. 57-139, and Johnson, H.G., Canada in a Changing World Economy, (U. of Toronto Press, 1962).

FIGURE 11 - corresponding to LIST 12)

↑ US\$ 1.239,000 m.

-98-

↑ China 710 m.
↑ India 498 m.

USA.

GNP = Pop (25 States with Highest GNP)




FIGURE 12

-99- $GNP \propto \text{POPULATION}$


↑ Nigeria (59,700,000)

- (1) SMALL - HIGH GNP
- (2) SMALL - LOW GNP
- (3) SOUTH AFRICA
- (4) NIGERIA

• S. Africa

POP (mln)

GNP



diversity of natural resources, though they may have one resource of major proportions; and even though, by the exploitation of both natural and human resources (the case of Switzerland, for example), it may increase the size of its economy and population, from our point of view, where size of economy is important for its political consequences, such states are unlikely to grow substantially - relative to small states at the upper end of the category. But their growth may be significant relative to states of a similar size in the regional environment.⁵⁰ And here the most important consideration with respect to growth of economy may be the need to reduce structural trade dependence through diversification of export products or in the geographical direction of export and import trade. (We might note here the case of Finland with a fairly large land area, some of which is not presently usable, a small population - approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ million - and a major resource, timber, from which, however, given the characteristic of this resource, it is able to develop a variety of end products for export.)⁵¹

Similar considerations apply to the states of population size below 1 million which we have called micro-states. Here the West Indian states might serve as a useful example. They may be compared with some of the states of West Africa which, while of

⁵⁰On the relationship of land as a resource, to other resources, see Chenery, H.B., "Land: The Effects of Resources on Economic Growth", in Berrill, K., (ed.) Economic Development with Special Reference to East Asia, (London: Macmillan, 1965) pp. 19-52. Chenery remarks that "a... major difficulty is the variation in technological possibilities over time, which limits the applicability of historical generalizations to present conditions", p. 20.

⁵¹Mead, W.R., An Economic Geography of the Scandinavian States and Finland (Univ. of London Press, 1958), pp. 233-4. Also Highsmith, J.G., and Jensen, J.G., Geography of Commodity Production (J.B. Lippincott Co., 1963, 2nd ed.)

comparable populations and lower GNP's, are not similar in terms of land area; this, however, given incapacity, at present, to determine and exploit resources, loses its importance. They, too, remain micro-states.

If one compares three states like Guyana, The United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Sweden in terms of land area, we are able to perceive the relationship of population/land ratio to capacity for exploitation of resources. Guyana, U.A.R. and Sweden are all states of relatively large land areas, and over their total land areas, of low population density. (Guyana has an area of 214,970 km² with a population density of 3; Sweden, 449,793 km², population density 17; and UAR, 1,000,000 km², population density 27). But large parts of their land area are at present uninhabitable, so that Guyana and UAR in particular, can, in fact, be called densely populated states, with populations (about 26 million in the case of the UAR, and 560,000 in the case of Guyana - circa 1963) restricted to relatively small areas of these countries. In the case of the UAR, inhabited and cultivated territory accounts for 34,815 km², making for a corresponding population density of 784.⁵²

In the case of Guyana, even with development of known resources, there may be limits to growth of population⁵³; in the case of the UAR while population may, at present, increase (rate of increase for the period 1958-62 being 2.6% per annum), there may be limits to the

⁵²U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1963.

⁵³A discussion by three economists of the meaning of the size of Guyana (then British Guiana) is instructive here. See the remarks of Berrill, Boulding and Newman, in "Comments on 'The Economic Future of British Guiana' by Peter Newman", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 10, 1961, pp. 1-5 (Berrill), 25-34 (Boulding), 35-41 (Newman).

capacity for exploitation of resources; in the case of Sweden whereas the resources of the land area and its human resources may continue to be exploitable, so that GNP continued increasing, the seeming limits on substantial population increase lead to the conclusion that, as a small, developed state, it cannot grow so significantly as to move into the medium-size category. The UAR is a medium-sized state with many small-state characteristics; Guyana is a micro-state.

PART II

A: SMALL STATE BEHAVIOUR - ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS:
THE SEARCH FOR STATUS (OR PRESTIGE) INFLUENCE AND POWER

We start from the assumption that the small state, as one cognisant of the limits to its growth (as we have defined this) is interested, first, in securing proper conditions for its survival - that is, in arriving at a condition of viability based on its internal resources (of which size is one) and external environment. Secondly, a central argument of this section is that having secured some viable arrangement of its internal resources - to the extent that this is possible given various constraints from its external environment - the small state, as a means of maintaining itself as an entity in international relations, seeks to increase its influence vis-a-vis other states, especially states higher in status than itself, and in relation to relevant systems in the international society as a whole.

We accept here the distinction recently suggested by Etzioni, between power and influence, and the three-fold distinction between types of assets and power, namely utilitarian, coercive and persuasive. For Etzioni,

"An application of power changes the actor's situation and/or his conception of his situation - but not his preferences. Resistance is overcome not because the actor subjected to the use of power changes his 'will' but because resistance has been made more expensive, prohibitive or impossible. The exercise of influence entails an authentic change in the actor's preferences; given the same situation, he would not choose the same course of action he favoured before influence was exercised. While from the power holder's viewpoint, the difference between the two might be relatively small (the exercise of influence also consumes assets though it produces fewer or no counter-currents), from the subjects' viewpoint it is more significant in that influence involves

not suspension or suppression of their preferences but a respecification of their commitments".⁵⁴

The argument we advance here is that while the small state may possess utilitarian or coercive assets, it can use them, with respect in particular to larger states or states of higher status, for conversion into influence rather than power. And influence itself is then indicative of, and, at the same time a medium for increase in, status. Further, where the small state does seem to possess power in relation to 'higher-status' states, this form of power, regardless of the assets or attributes upon which it is based, is likely to be of the persuasive kind. These propositions will be slightly qualified for the case of the small states' relationship with states of a size approximately similar to itself (in the chapter on small-state systems), but even in that case, the propositions as here advanced will form the basis of the analysis. The assumption underlying these propositions is that the small state does not possess the attributes that would allow it to pose as a first objective, as would be the case, at least potentially, for a large state, the exploitation of its environment so as to establish dominance (and thus control) over the systems relevant to its existence.

The optimum condition for the small state would be one in which it made itself indispensable to a variety of systems upon which its viability depended.⁵⁵ Here the small state would have to arrive, simultaneously at some point of balance between conditionality and functional autonomy in relation to these systems. Its interaction

⁵⁴Etzioni, A., The Active Society (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1968), p. 359, author's italics. The distinction between types of power and assets is on pp. 357 ff.

⁵⁵In making reference to the notion of viability, we are anticipating the discussion in the following two chapters.

with these systems, and thus with other states, could then be conducted on the basis of some notion of reciprocity. The state, in other words, would seek to provide itself with a crucial or strategic position with regard to the systems. The opposite case, and the one which the state would seek to avoid, would be that in which the systems constituting its environment would change in such a manner that it would be unable to adapt to such changes, and loses its position of cruciality: it then loses its particular status within its relevant systems and becomes 'useless'. A simple case is that of an island which has a military strategic position, and therefore, a 'value', and which, as a result of technological and other changes, loses this value; it ceases to perform that 'international function' which gave it value for some system or set of states and thus loses its status within that system.

Further, the statuses of two small states both crucial to particular systems, may not be the same. Status would depend on the terms on which each state was, in some degree, functionally autonomous: and these would itself give an indication of the terms of reciprocity and of the kind of relationship of adaptedness to which each state might be subject. Here, the number and diversity of systems within which the state attains functional autonomy, is the significant factor.

Now while 'value' may be a function of, among other things, a fortuitous location,⁵⁶ influence is, in part, a function of acquired or accumulated prestige. "Having value for" a state or system is not necessarily coterminous with 'having influence with or over' these, though the possession of value may, over time, give or

⁵⁶For one approach to the problem of value see Wolf Jnr., C., "The Value of the Third World" in his United States Policy and the Third World (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), pp. 3-22.

lead to the acquisition of prestige.⁵⁷ Since, for the small state, status or prestige cannot come directly from its physical attributes (in the sense that a large state may be attributed some status as a result of an estimation of the potential effects of mere size), the state has actively to acquire or create likely sources and bases of prestige. A value stemming from location or the possession of some other scarce resource may, for example, illustrate a condition on the part of the small state of complete dependency, or it can be used as a basis for turning value into status and influence, and thus for increasing viability.

Given variable environmental conditions, we hypothesize that the degree of efficiency of internal arrangements of the small state is the main factor in the development of a capacity for the acquisition and maintenance of prestige. And it is the small, developed, politically efficient state that is likely to be able to exert greater control over the sources of prestige and influence. We therefore make a distinction - in terms of capacity to acquire and maintain prestige and influence - between, as limiting cases, the small, developed, politically efficient state on the one hand, and the small economically backward, politically inefficient state, on the other. Obviously, there are cases between these two (for example, the small developed state that is politically inefficient; further, a state can demonstrate political efficiency with respect to one area of issues and inefficiency with respect to another. Finally,

⁵⁷It is this latter circumstance in which the small state may find itself able to exact from a larger, higher status one, a particular line of activity, to which Aron refers as the case where "the small power sometimes takes the great where the latter would not have chosen to go", Aron, R., Peace and War (N.Y., Doubleday, 1966), p. 69.

let us note that for the small state one of the main purposes of the acquisition of prestige and influence is that these can be used as a form of investment, first for assuring its security and survival and, secondly, for reinvestment for the acquisition of further sources of prestige and influence.

It is impossible to decide a priori whether investment of tangible assets is undertaken, or prestige is acquired, first: this is a matter for empirical investigation. For example, it can be argued that the success of the Cuban Revolution of 1960 gave the state⁵⁸ a degree of prestige which was not the result of any prior investment of the capabilities of the state itself. This prestige was, however, then used as a form of investment (a) to seek sources and areas of influence, (b) to seek new resources for assuring the security of the state as a revolutionary state, (c) to seek sources of tangible assistance towards the re-arrangement of the internal resources of the state.⁵⁹ On the other hand the cases of Rhodes already referred to, and that of Switzerland in recent centuries, are those in which the small state decides to invest certain assets or capabilities stemming from its location and internal political efficiency for the purpose of acquiring prestige and influence in various systems and in other states, which become new assets; such assets can be, as it were, 'cashed' from time to time, in the interests of the maintenance of the state as a viable international entity.

In addition, the small state may not only be an investor in various systems, but may itself come to constitute an investment. It

⁵⁸ 'State' is here, and elsewhere, used to mean also 'state actors'.

⁵⁹ See, generally, Suarez, A., Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge, Mass: The M.I.T. Press, 1967).

may be viewed as, or be made, a 'stake' in the systems of international society by other (generally larger or higher status) states, or they may have in the small state investments of a political, economic, strategic or purely symbolic nature. Thus at the same time as the small state is attempting to manipulate its environment in search of new forms of investment, it is itself likely to be the object of manipulation as one of the states or investments of other powers in that environment. It is true that the same may apply to large, especially politically inefficient states, but we would suggest that the very physical size of the small state inclines larger states to see it (whether this perception proves to be correct or not is another consideration) as more amenable to control. As Hoffmann reminds us, "Politics remain(s) the art of manipulation, and the context of manipulation is always important".⁶⁰ Hence the importance of the notion of "risk" in the international behaviour of the small state.

Small-State Strategies of Behaviour⁶¹

Having decided on a particular goal or series of goals, whose purpose is the increase of influence or prestige, or having decided to react to certain challenges of the environment to its

⁶⁰Hoffmann, S., The State of War, p. 157.

⁶¹The analysis developed here, and in the above, is based inter alia on the following: Blau, P.M., Exchange and Power in Social Life (N.Y.: Wiley, 1964); Parsons, T., "On the Concept of Influence", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 27, 1963, pp. 37-62; Coleman, James G., "Comment on 'On the Concept of Influence'" ibid., pp. 63-82; Etzioni, A., op. cit.; In his discussion of 'exchange' and 'threat' relationships, as elements of 'actual political life', an essay by Boulding is also useful; see Boulding, "The Relationship of Economic, Political and Social Systems", Social and Economic Studies, op. cit.; see also Emerson, R., "Power-Dependence Relations", American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, 1962, pp. 32-41 and Wrong, Dennis H., "Some Problems in Defining Social Power", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73, 1968, pp. 673-681.

survival, the small state, then has to decide on the following:

1. What aspects of its assets or capabilities should it invest? That is, which of its capabilities should it put at risk and what extent of risk shall be taken?
2. Where (in what other states, in what systems and sub-systems of the international environment), when (at what time and in what circumstances) and how (by the use of what mechanisms or media) must it carry out this investment?
3. What is the stake involved in deciding to act? These can be, at one extreme, the existence of the state itself, and at the other, the loss of part of its reputation - its prestige (and probably influence in some part of the environment).
4. What are the costs and probable benefits of its decision to invest likely to be, over particular periods of time, given the total capabilities of the state?

In some respects these are considerations relating to any (in particular small and medium sized) state. What makes them particularly relevant for the small state is its cognisance of the fact that the final consequence (the stake involved) is its own existence. In addition, the resource or capabilities base of the small state is likely to be a narrow one. The immediate problem for this state, then, is the establishment of a 'hierarchy of risks' and a level on this hierarchy beyond which it is not safe (for its survival) to proceed. For the small state, unlike the large, the taking of risk in international relations is endemic to its participation in international relations.

The state is concerned, as we have earlier remarked, in its international relations, in a series of transactions - economic, social and political which involve the production and exchange of tangible resources (raw materials, manufactures) of influence, of threats (the ability to exact a change of behaviour on the basis of some threat or sanction is power), and of information. The main characteristic of these exchanges is that they are, in part (not completely) formally unstructured. Though there may be complementarity and reciprocity in their exchanges, the fact that they are not always institutionalized, and even when institutionalized are based more on utilitarian than normative considerations, means that such reciprocity as may exist is not likely, over time, to be viewed as stable or its terms predictable. For these terms depend on the relationships of dominance and dependence between participating entities - on a non-permanent hierarchical arrangement of these participants.⁶²

This, for the small state, is the context of operation. While certain elements of the environment may be able at different times to control (to decide on the direction and intensity of the processes of) this environment, it is unlikely that the small state will be unable to do so. Such influence and prestige as the small state is able to accumulate and invest, are, therefore, in addition to being narrowly defined and diversified, always subject to conditions of uncertainty.

⁶²We have in fact referred in Chapter 1 to a 'structure of transactions' implying a certain stability and therefore predictability of roles, expectations and exchanges. What is said here is not meant to contradict this. We mean here, to stress that where a state is in a position of subordination or dependence within some structure of transactions, a position that is indicative of the narrowness of its resource base, it is ipso facto unable to determine or direct the terms of the transactions and must therefore view any structure of transactions as non-dependable and, in its implications, unstable.

There are varying degrees of uncertainty. At one extreme, the small state is fairly certain of being able to 'cash' the credit (assets) which it has accumulated. (A material example of this would be its ability to withdraw its financial resources held in other countries; but the very fact that its resources can, at times, be "frozen" is an indication of the fact that the context - the international "climate" - is important. The proposition, however, can also be related to intangible assets.) Here the relationship between two countries is, in part, one of what is often called confidence. And if A has confidence in B, it is possible for B to use this confidence (which itself becomes an asset capable of investment) as a basis for acquiring and exercising influence over A. Further, a demonstration of influence raises the status of B relative to states of its own size, characteristics and objectives; the aim of all this being to lessen the degree of uncertainty and thus increase the degree of stability in the sets of transactions relevant to B.

The other limiting case is that of complete uncertainty in which suspicion between units in society have developed to such a degree, that transactions have no continuity, each being conducted on a separate basis and bearing no relation to the one preceding it and no expectation of one to follow. In such conditions, influence would be completely absent as would be prestige. This might be called the Hobbesian case. It is conceivable that a large state could operate satisfactorily in such a situation, but a small state could not. In fact, such a limiting case demands a perfect equality (or perception of such equality) of capabilities between actors, for where capabilities were unequal, 'investment' could be in one direction - that is accrue to the stronger.

Complete certainty for any state would be the case in which it were able to control completely the flow of resources (money, goods, influence, threats, information) into and out of itself. In such a situation the state could insulate (though not necessarily isolate) itself at times and in circumstances chosen by itself. Such insulation - or at least partial insulation - though at times felt to be a requirement for all states is possible for the small state only in conditions of great risk - either to its external assets or to its internal arrangements.⁶³

In conditions of uncertainty, then, the small state can seek to maintain the external requirements of its survival in the following ways:

1. By considering concluding written guarantees of assistance. Though this may constitute a claim, and may lead the small states to believe that the claim gives it influence in conditions of uncertainty (technological, or because of the 'unpredictability' of the state on which there is a claim), this may be incapable of being cashed.
2. By joining a military organization, such that its protection becomes automatic upon certain conditions, known in advance, being fulfilled. This may give the state neither "value" nor "prestige" in a system;

⁶³This seems to be the case for which David Vital attempts to devise a model of behaviour - "the isolated, maverick, unaligned power, the small state alone", in his The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (London, O.U.P., 1967). The quotation is on p. 6.

nor will it necessarily provide the state with "influence"; but it may ensure survival.⁶⁴

3. By attempting to attach itself (and being accepted) unconditionally to another state of much higher status and prestige, either (a) so that it becomes an appendage warranting protection almost as part of the territory within the latter state's borders: it may have no prestige, but it may gain influence; or (b) simply because, being similarly ideologically inclined, and having certain similar interests to those of the greater state, the effects of the greater state's influence may be beneficial in a psychological and material sense, to the small state.⁶⁵
4. By attempting to maximise vis-a-vis some other state, its location or the presence of some resource which it possesses and which is in scarce supply and great demand by a state more important than itself. It thus may increase its value for the state which chooses to utilize its resources. But it may gain neither influence nor higher status. The small state runs the risk of loss of value - of redundancy - if either its location or its resources become useless or are no longer in demand. Further, it may actually lose status, in the view of other states, if it allows

⁶⁴On these two cases see Liska, G., International Equilibrium, *passim*. The second strategy can apply to forms of organization other than military. For example, membership in a financial or monetary organization may simply provide the small state with a similar prospect of securing the external conditions of its financial survival.

⁶⁵We consider this further in Ch. 6.

the exploitation of its resources by some one state with the objective of using its value to provide 'protection' for itself by that state. But the small state may prefer to increase protection through exchange of value, at the loss of status in the perspective of its peers.

For the small state, then, increase in status and influence is to be derived not from increase in physical size per se (increase in population, GNP), but through increase in systemic size. That is through the exploitation of the variety of the environment, so that its position in existing structures of transactions is such that the terms of dependence (the relationship of adaptedness) allow some satisfactory degree of autonomy, while providing it with value in its relevant systems. Mere increase in physical size, for example increase in GNP, may actually increase dependence and decrease autonomy. And control of systemic size is, at least partly, dependent on the efficiency of internal arrangements.

B: SITUATIONAL FACTORS: LOCATION AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION

In our discussion of the notion of status of small states we have put some emphasis on the importance of at least two factors: location and internal political efficiency. The significance of location (closely related to the notion of 'distance') is dependent upon the state of communications technology. And internal political efficiency is dependent, in part, upon what we can call the character of the social composition of the state. We can categorise states using these indices in terms of a geo-political-cum ideological application.

First, the small state's geographical position influences the amount of attention which other states, in particular large ones, are likely to devote to it; which is to say that location influences their political/ideological view of the state. Location can make the state militarily strategic or (if, for example, it has some valuable resource) economically strategic. Its political arrangements may make it symbolically strategic. But all these estimations are dependent on the changing variable of the state of technology.

Secondly, with respect to internal political efficiency, the social composition of a small state's population becomes an important variable. The small state may be characterised by a population of a particular cultural or ethnic identity, or may, on the other hand, maintain a state of precarious viability because of the unsettled or diverse character of its cultural or ethnic population composition.

Thirdly, a small state may through the exploitation of both location and internal resources (material or population skill), create its own regional system - that is, become the controller of an institutionalized structure of transactions involving other states. This is the case of the small state which becomes an imperial power in some geographical zone. Here the small state has exploited a location or some other 'event'⁶⁶ - factors which are in most cases transient. The high status of this state is then also likely to be transient. The behaviour of the imperial small state which through time, is unable to maintain its colonies is a useful illustration of the necessity of state, in order to ensure its survival at some particular level of status, to have a capacity for adaptiveness.

⁶⁶For example, the circumstances in which Belgium became an 'African' imperial power.

Finally, the same state may come under more than one typological appellation, since it may be dominated by different characteristics at different times, or by a series of different characteristics at the same time. Also, since the small state is, at least in law, a sovereign entity, it has in principle the freedom (qualified in fact by various circumstances), to alter the direction of its external behaviour or ideological stance, at will; the descriptive appellation which is attached to it must therefore make allowance for this. We suggest then the following 'situational' (as distinct from size) typology: some of the appellations are already well known in the literature.

(1) The Reacting Small State

One example of this is the small state which finds itself at the centre of an ideologically hostile state system: Israel may be taken as a case in point. Alternatively, the small state may feel that it is dominated by a number of contrary ideological and historical "pulls" or forces. Thus the international behaviour of Yugoslavia in a post-1945 period has been conditioned by a series of ideological, cultural and economic tendencies working in different directions, so that the state itself has been forced to devise a variety of policies for simultaneously adapting to these differing tendencies of its environment. In recent years, Outer Mongolia has also been subject to similar conditions, in relation to the policies of the Soviet Union and Communist China. This leads to the suggestion that what has been called a buffer state, for example Nepal, can be taken as falling under this more general appellation. In all these cases, the foreign policy (and even its internal policy) of the small state is essentially reactive, in response to a series of challenges and demands made by its environment, as a consequence, mainly, of its location.

(2) The Treaty Small State

Here, larger and more powerful states may decide to set up or guarantee, by treaty, the existence of a small state in some system of international relations, in particular, one dominated by tension or the prospect of conflict. The state may be given the status, for example, of permanent neutrality. The idea, in these cases, is that the small state, by being given a settled status within the system performs the function of helping to stabilize that system - often because it was itself the focus of dispute by a number of powers. The continued existence of the state then comes to be dependent on the extent to which it is able to perform its international function; though it is likely to disintegrate if the system (or systems) of relations of which it is a part itself disintegrates. Examples of such states might be Switzerland (1815), Belgium (1830), Austria (1955), Laos (1962). The same considerations may apply to states that come into existence as a consequence of the partitioning of a region. Further, a state may be granted recognition in the international society only if it accepts certain conditions, by treaty, on its behaviour, with respect both to internal and external policy. This was the case of Cyprus (1959/60), and states which, as a condition of acceding to independence allowed for intervention for the purpose of the protection of minorities.⁶⁷

(3) The Appendage Small State

These are small states for which larger, more powerful states tend to assume an unofficial protective function. The latter states find that it is in their "interest" to ensure that such states do

⁶⁷The case of Cyprus (as also that of many other states referred to in this section), will be discussed in greater detail in Chs. 3 & 4.

not adopt a 'hostile' political or ideological stance. The situational context here is locational, in the sense that the small state may be an island located near to the large state or have a contiguous border with the large state. Such small states are, in other words, generally 'geographical' appendages before becoming 'political' ones. (Ceylon, Finland, Zanzibar, the Baltic state of the inter-war period.) The small state may end up by being "officially protected", often by being incorporated into the larger state. Cuba can be taken as an historical example of geographical appendage which became a political one, through legislative penetration (the Platt Amendment). The movement from incorporation to evasion of the appendage status is a precarious one.

Vassals, client states and so-called protected states (Sikkim, the Arabian Gulf States) can all be put into this category.

Here, too, can be put the so-called puppet or satellite state. These states tend to come under de facto rather than de jure control of their internal and external policies, though de facto control may be used as a means of legally tying the state to its controller or protector. The post-war Eastern European states are examples of this condition. Important here is the fact that appendage status, where it is "unofficial" must be seen as a dynamic rather than static condition. For a situation of subjection to de facto control means that it is possible for states to evolve from this status without having to meet a legislative requirement.

(4) The Island Small State

This category can be divided into (a) those islands which, though small, have some scope for growth and thus autonomy and (b) predominantly what we have called "micro-states" with limited scope for growth. The merger of micro-states can lead only to micro-

systems. Where the small island state is in an area of a much larger state it may become an appendage or be subjected to absorption. These states may also be called Federative Small States, since they are characterised by a tendency to integration. Their ideological stance is often predetermined by their geographical position. Where the island state is surrounded by a number of larger island states, its policy may tend to be of the reactive kind as a means of avoiding absorption - Singapore.

(5) The Imperial Small State

Where the small state, for various reasons, develops an empire system. Examples in Europe are many: Sweden, Holland, Spain, Portugal. This status may lead to:

(6) The Diminished or Truncated Imperial Small State

Here, the small state loses its empire, or its imperial system diminishes in area. The prestige of this state is dependent on the extent to which, after the loss of empire, it is able to maintain economic efficiency, having succeeded in, or having been forced to, separate its imperial relations from its other external relations; or it may depend on the extent to which the state is able to maintain a "cultural sphere of influence". On the other hand, the diminished state may have failed to make itself internally efficient, so that the loss of empire has further negative consequences - Portugal. In any case, the diminished state has to go through a period in which it seeks a new size equilibrium. This is most obvious in the case of a truncated empire state, where one 'region' - for example, Austria - has developed a large administrative apparatus to serve the needs of government of the whole area, but which becomes inappropriate to its

new size, and a burden on its resources.⁶⁸

(7) The Multinational Small State

Here, the diversity of the ethnic or cultural character of the small state, especially where there are populations of a similar ethnic character outside the state, but in close proximity, means that government is concerned with attempting to insulate its own population from external interference or attraction. The concern with domestic arrangements limits foreign policy behaviour and the main concern of foreign policy is the protection of domestic arrangements (especially where populations of a similar ethnic or cultural character spill over the state's borders). Examples of this are the inter-war Eastern and Central European States whose relations were characterized by frequent exchanges of populations, Cyprus, Lebanon. Here, again, the allowance for intervention by other states to protect minorities may be a condition of independence. Some states, while not acknowledging themselves as multinational, may have the character of potential multinationality, for example, Guyana, but this development is likely to be conditioned by the proximity and concern of the main national centres (the 'homeland') of the ethnic groups to the small state.

(8) The Internationalist Small State

Here, the small state demonstrates its capacity to exploit the variety of the international society. The state with a surplus of some "skill" that is needed by other states, may offer this "skill" and may in the process increase its status and influence. Sweden, for example, with a surplus of technically efficient nationals in the

⁶⁸ See Rothschild, K.W., "Size and Viability: The Case of Austria", in Robinson, E.A.G., (ed.) Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations, (London, 1960) pp. 168-181.

field of economics and diplomacy, offers these for the purpose of servicing international organizations. Switzerland offers to the international society her financial expertise and "dependability"; Israel and Taiwan offer technical aid in selected, narrow areas.

(9) The Racist Small State

States whose governments are dominated by a small population whose ethnic character is alien to the main much larger indigenous population. The maintenance of "internal security" is the main concern of the state, with economic viability, for example, seen as a mechanism for maintaining internal security: South Africa.

(10) The Homogeneous Culture, Ethnic or Religious Small State

Here, the state may be set up for the purpose of providing a homeland for a group of a distinct ethnic, cultural or religious character (Israel); or political participation in the state may require adherence to or membership of a particular religious, cultural, or ethnic system.

(11) The Fictional Small State

The state 'set up' as a diplomatic fiction by another state, for the purpose, for example, of gaining additional influence in international organizations or gatherings;⁶⁹ or for the purpose of giving support to a group in another state which has gained control of some part of the territory of that state. The Union Republics of the USSR are an example of the former and the setting up of the Azerbaijan Republic in Persia by the Soviet Union, of the latter.

Finally, we may note the case of the problem of what we can

⁶⁹See Aspaturian, V.V., The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1960), esp. pp. 25-29.

call the sub-state. This is a cultural or geopolitical unit which may have the potential for 'growth' into a small sovereign state, but which (a) may, through some inadequacy (for example, an assumed lack of economic capacity) be unable to grow, or be unwilling to accede to the status of full legal sovereignty; or it may grow into a larger unit ("integration"), or be absorbed by a larger state within its vicinity. These sub-states, while not sovereign members of the international society, are 'objects of international law'. (In a strict sense, vassals and protected states fall into this category.)

The problems surrounding the status of, for example, reactive states and sub-states lead us into a consideration of the general problem of the "viability" of the small state, which is the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

THE VIABILITY OF THE SMALL STATE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

"Fancy autonomy for Bosnia, with a mixed population: autonomy for Ireland would be less absurd"¹

Quincy Wright remarks, in his Study of War that "Among the inherent tendencies of a balance-of-power system, sapping its own vitality, has been the cumulative elimination of small states. After the practical disintegration of the Chou empire in the seventh century B.C., there were over a hundred virtually independent states in North China, but three centuries of balance-of-power politics reduced their number to seven". Wright notes that a similar tendency can be observed in Europe after the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, and in the relations among the Greek states and the medieval Italian city-states. He notes also that "this tendency has been accompanied by an increasing disparity of size of the states which remain".²

Toynbee, in his discussion of the Italian city-state system has made similar observations.³ It is this kind of consideration with which we are concerned, in discussing small-state viability in international relations, though we will not be discussing Wright's suggestion that the demise of small states is one of the "inherent tendencies" of a

¹Disraeli, 1875, quoted in Dedijer, B., The Road to Sarajevo (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1967) p. 45.

²Wright, Q., A Study of War (University of Chicago Press, 1942) Vol.II (Second edition, revised 1965) pp. 762-63.

³Toynbee, A.J., A Study of History, (London, 1945) Vol.III, pp. 301-41, 345-48, 355-56. See also G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, (London: Stevens, 3rd ed. 1964, p.101.

balance-of-power system. What is clear and makes their general observations relevant for us, is that the contemporary state system is also one stemming from the disintegration of empires, that this has led to the establishment of a myriad of small states and that, partly as a consequence of this, there is some degree of instability in the international society as a whole.

By "viability" we mean the capacity of the state to survive as an autonomous and distinguishable member of the global system. We are here, initially, simply following the dictionary definition (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) of the term "viable" - "capable of living; able to maintain a separate existence", with "viability" then understood as "the quality or state of being viable". "Survival", or "capacity to exist" are, then, the key notions. But these are concepts taken over from biology and they tend to be associated with entities whose final condition is already known to the observer. The concept of, for example, a "capacity to survive" implies that the analyst has some notion of a "time perspective" in which this capacity can be said to have established itself. But unless the analysis is either teleological or tautological this time perspective can only be determined post hoc (that is, historically). In order to avoid then, on the one hand, a purely historical analysis and, on the other the pit-falls of teleological analysis⁴ it is necessary to work in terms of an analysis of "conditions" making for or hindering the adaptation of states to their environments and, similarly, those allowing states to change, re-order or manipulate their environments, or inhibiting them from so doing.

⁴For an interesting discussion of the dangers involved in the use of biological analogies, though in a different context, see Penrose, E.T., "Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm", American Economic Review, Vol. 42, 1952, pp. 804-19. Penrose considers concepts such as life cycle, viability and homeostasis.

Viability analysis, then, must be contextual - being a description of the relations between a state seen as a system (in the sense given to this term by general systems analysts) and the systems of its environment; it is an analysis of the kind of coherence or organisation between the systemic relations of the state and those of the environment. Thus the criteria for assessing viability are not necessarily the same in all cases. Further, one can talk immediately of military, economic and political viability none of which, in itself, given the multiple (and often empirically indefinable) purposes of the state, is sufficient in itself to be taken as a sole indicator of viability in international relations. To take an example, though the condition of economic viability may sometimes be necessary to a state's survival as a politically relevant unit, a state may also be fairly viable as an economic unit and yet given other circumstances of the international environment, be unable to survive as an autonomous entity.⁵

The point can be illustrated in terms of the complaint of the Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Government in exile during World War Two. Ripka was at pains to point out that Czechoslovakia could not be called a weak state and compares the latter favourably, in economic terms, with Italy; but he pays little attention to the problem of the minorities whose presence meant the weakening of the state as a coherent, and thus politically efficient, organisational unit.⁶ Yet in making these

⁵In much the same sense, for example, that a successful small firm may be absorbed by a larger and wealthier one; though it is not too useful to carry the analogy between the survival of the firm and that of the state too far. See Penrose, E.T., The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959). Boulding goes only as far as saying that "the situation of the nation..... is more complex than that of the firm....." Boulding, K.E., Conflict and Defence (Harper Torchbooks, 1963) p. 233. Our italics.

⁶Ripka, Hubert, Small and Great Nations (Czechoslovak Documents and Sources, No. 9, London, 1944) pp. 8-12. For an analysis which recognizes the ethnic problem, but still refers to Czechoslovakia as the "natural centre" of Europe, see CISAR, J. and Pokorný, F., The Czechoslovak Republic (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1922). The phrase quoted is on p. 8.

observations we do not intend to minimise the importance of economic viability in contemporary international politics, especially, as one writer has recently remarked, "in a world in which no country can really use force as an instrument of national policy, commercial policy is a far larger part of foreign policy than is often recognized."⁷

If we assume, then, that different kinds of systemic relationships constitute and condition state viability, then we can analyse viability in terms of the sources of stress from the environment - both internal (those diminishing the internal coherence of the state as a 'self-defining' entity) and external which (a) tend to threaten its existence as a formal (recognized) member of the international system and (b) inhibit its behaviour in a desired direction at some particular time. In terms of actual behaviour in 'real' international politics we are concerned with two problems: (i) the conditions of entry into the global system of entities then recognized as small states, (ii) the conditions in which they can remain members of the system; a third problem, that of the tendency in the global system to disappearance - disintegration and absorption - of small states is in fact an aspect of both of these problems.

If we start with Hoffmann's observation that the great state is one which, inter alia, does not have to concern itself as a first priority with its survival, we are left, initially, with three categories of state with which we are required to deal: (a) the small weak state (b) the small developed state and (c) the large weak state. Now, it is our contention that the problem for the large weak state (apart from that of maintaining an on-going system of government) is essentially one of

⁷Camps, Miriam, What Kind of Europe? (London, O.U.P., 1965) p. 62.

the maintenance of its boundaries where the boundaries of the state are populated by groups feeling themselves in some way (as a rule, generally ethnically) different from the ruling group in the state. Here, the large state, by its mere existence may be seen as performing, in Schwarzenberger's phrase an 'international function' - that of securing within one reasonably stable entity a number of ethnic groups (considering themselves as possessing separate nationalities) which are likely to compete with each other - probably leading to conflict within the international system - if given any substantial degree of autonomy, or statehood.

This was to some extent the case of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires in the period before the First World War. Let us take the case of Austria-Hungary - a large state considered a great state in the pre-1914 configuration, though with weaknesses of internal coherence stemming from nationality differences. Though one of the consequences of the War was the dismemberment of that state, as a great state, it engaged itself in the war without taking the maintenance of its own existence as a first priority of the war; similarly, none of Austria-Hungary's enemies, until very late in the war, considered Austria-Hungary itself to be one of the 'stakes' of the war.⁸ This was a recognition, on all sides, of the fact that a large state, even when weak - that is, unable to exert some desired degree of control over its environment - depends, in ensuring its existence as a unit of international politics, in major part, on the requisite of the maintenance of internal coherence;

⁸ See Mayer, Arno. J., Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-1918 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959). Even as late as Wilson's Fourteen Points, the allies looked forward to the existence of Austria-Hungary after the war. Wilson, in the Tenth of his Points only went as far as to say that "the peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." See Mayer, pp. 363-4.

the stresses of the international environment are likely to be effective in leading to the disintegration of the state only where this internal coherence is weak. In other words, the defeat of a great state (or an empire) in war (which is a form of stress from the international environment) is unlikely to lead to the disintegration of the state into a number of autonomous units unless the ruling group has lost administrative control of the state or its cultural cohesion has been weakened, that is, the domestic political efficiency of the state has diminished.

On the other hand, we would assert, the maintenance of the existence of a small state - whether a weak or an influential one - is generally a function of the behaviour of the international environment than of its own internal coherence. This is not to deny that in making its claim to be a member of the global system (in asking for recognition) the extent of internal coherence of the state is an important, or perhaps the predominant requirement. Indeed, the rulers of a new state are always required to show that they are capable of exercising effective control over the territory which they claim to control. Yet, we suggest, though this may be a necessary condition of an entity's establishment of itself as a state, it is not a factor which necessarily precludes the disappearance of the state as an international person. The small state may be administratively and culturally cohesive, and economically viable, yet international circumstances may force its disappearance. The large state which fulfills these first two conditions is unlikely to become subject to this experience.

We are, then, asserting the importance, and very often, the predominance, of extra-state systemic relations in the determination of the viability of the small state as an international actor. The danger

in this approach is an over-emphasis on environmental systemic relations and a tendency to determinism in the analysis of the behaviour of the state.⁹ However, if we keep in mind that the direction of state behaviour is (as we have suggested earlier) the result of the tension between the capacity to control and the necessity to adapt to the environment, we can avoid this determinism by attempting to trace the strength of the coherence at any one time, between the systemic relations of the state on the one hand, and those of the international environment which bind and penetrate the former.

The question we are thus concerned with is not so much whether the small state can be viable in the sense of the viable firm, since there are no definitive criteria within the contemporary international society for entry into it as a member other than a claim to control over territory and then eventual acceptance of this claim by other (major) members of the system, but the kind of viability (or existence) which is possible for the small state; and this latter is dependent on (a) the kind of small state being considered - with particular reference, for example, to its location and (b) the extent to which the types of activity the state perceives it possible to engage in, given the kind of state it is, are determined by the immediacy of the problem of the necessity to maintain its existence as a state. In other words, though the small state may be said to have one over-ruling purpose - the engagement in behaviour which will ensure (or not inhibit) its survival - it can develop subsidiary purposes depending on whether it feels itself likely to disappear as a consequence of some activity not determined or imitated by itself - i.e. as a consequence of stress from the environment. Thus, while it may be possible to say that the over-ruling purpose

⁹ See the article previously cited by J.D. Singer, in Knorr, K. and Verba, S., The International System (Princeton, University Press, 1961).

of Trinidadian foreign policy like that of the foreign policy of Cambodia is the maintenance of its existence, the kinds of external stresses to which the latter is subjected - given its location - make the question of its viability much less dependent on its own activity (or decisions) than would be the case with the former.

STATEHOOD IN THE POST-WORLD WAR ERA

We can discern, with respect to the formation of new states in the post-war period, two main characteristics. First, even as a consequence of the First World War, and moreover, as a consequence of their own requirements during World War Two, imperial governments were forced to react in a partially positive fashion to demands for the expression of the right of self-determination, of entities considering themselves to be nationalities. Self-determination was, in general, here used as a synonym for statehood. In the period 1914 to 1919, the demand by Czechoslovak leaders for a separate state, is a useful example of the process which this involves.¹⁰

In the post-1945 period, imperial governments reacted initially to demands for self-determination by attempting to devise, in particular for territories deemed 'small-sized', forms of government which, while giving increased internal authority (and even authority to negotiate with respect to external economic relations) could not be equated with prevailing conceptions of full sovereignty and independence.¹¹

¹⁰ See, on this, the study by Perman, D., The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962).

¹¹ See, in general, Emerson, R., From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard U.P. 1960) and on French attempts of this kind during the Second World War, Whiteman, M.M., Digest of International Law, Vol. 1 (Washington: G.P.O., 1963) pp. 308-11, on Syria and Lebanon.

In contrast to this, however, has been the second characteristic of the period: the almost inevitable demise of such schemes for 'semi-sovereign' government, and the eventual granting by the imperial governments, of full sovereignty. Responsible for this has been, partly, the inability of the internal structures and processes of the imperial states to sustain the financial and political "burdens" required to maintain the colonial entities at their sub-sovereignty statuses, and secondly their incapacity to withstand pressures from the external environment. In other words, the "burden of external relations" gradually became too great for the imperial governments.¹²

Independence for colonial territories in the post war period has, then, come in three ways. First, where some initial pressure has been exerted by the indigenous peoples, and the imperial government, after some hesitation and attempts to restrain this pressure, has, after a "constitutional conference" granted full sovereignty. This has been the case, for example, with countries like India and Ghana.¹³ Where the imperial government has not had a major strategic interest in territories, or has not longer felt bound by some special necessity for the maintenance of "trusteeship", this approach has had a demonstration effect - with whole groups of territories being granted statehood after expressing initial demands for 'self-government'. As one analyst, writing with respect to United States recognition policy has put it,

¹²The phrase is taken from the title of an article by Hammond, Paul Y., "The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations", World Politics, Vol. 19, 1967, pp. 443-464. See also Sprout, Harold and Margaret, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources", World Politics, Vol. 20, 1968, pp. 660-93.

¹³Kwame Nkrumah, for example, has described this process with some flourish, in his autobiography, Ghana, (London, Edinburgh: Nelson, 1957).

"In an international atmosphere conducive to independence, granting independence became almost an industry of the metropolises, and recognition of the result politically automatic... Since the metropolises or the General Assembly had decreed their independence and sponsored their membership in the United Nations, where a Member is a "state" by definition, the legal judgement of the United States was not called for and its political action could not deny this underwritten self-determination."¹⁴

The process, here telescoped in description, has not always been as direct as this. Imperial governments, have in fact, approached the status of full independence through a number of stages of increasing autonomy which were deemed necessary for demonstrating "fitness" for self-rule. An alternative, as we have suggested, has been the attempt to grant a large degree of autonomy within the framework of a Commonwealth or Community directed by the imperial power.¹⁵

Secondly, where the imperial power has perceived in some entity a major strategic, political or economic interest, it has resisted the demand for self-determination; the retort to this, by the indigenous peoples has been the launching of some form of internal warfare for the purpose of making the exercise of power and authority by the imperial government no longer possible, either on moral or material (financial) grounds. The independence of Algeria, the states of Indo-China, and Cyprus, can be taken as examples of this process, the formal granting of full sovereignty through negotiation at a constitutional or more general conference, being simply a mechanism for recognition by the imperial power of its inability to sustain government in the territories.

Thirdly, but again in response to prolonged resistance to the

¹⁴Myers, Denis, P., "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 1961 pp. 697-733, the quotation being drawn from pp. 706/7 and 717.

¹⁵See Emerson, op. cit. passim.

demand for self-determination, the indigenous peoples, through their 'leaders' may simply declare independence and the formation of a government for the new state, and request members of the international society for recognition. That is, in fact, a form of secession, and may be faced with two kinds of responses from the imperial power: there may, first, be an attempt to exert economic reprisals (sanctions) against the new 'state' coupled with an attempt to inhibit recognition of the entity's statehood by other (major) states in the international society. Economic reprisals have been thought a viable method for inhibiting the establishment of a new state because the structures and processes of imperial economic relations have bound the colonial entities' internal economic structures and processes closely to those emanating from the imperial powers.

The second response to secession may take the form of the imperial power, after the declaration of independence, attempting military reprisals against the new 'state', in which the context of activity becomes that of our second example of gaining independence: the development of internal warfare by the indigenous peoples. Secession is important, also, for our purposes, because it may be the consequence not only of imperial relationships but of the demand of a group, considering itself a nationality, for independence; that is, it may be the consequence of large-state fragmentation. And the institutional consequences of large-state fragmentation are usually small-sized states. Finally, in terms of consequences, another result of the existence of disintegrative strains in a large state may be 'separation-by-consent' or separation through the intervention of some external power, that is partition.

We shall not deal here with the first case of 'independence-through-constitutional conference', for here the imperial power agrees (even if tardily) that the new small entity fulfills the orthodox requirements of

sovereignty; that it possesses a people, a territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states of the world.

Imperial governments have, from time to time (in particular up to the end of the last decade) insisted on other requirements: for example, that the entity should show some capacity for economic viability, and that, in the words of a British Colonial Secretary,

"there must be in the territory as a whole a sufficient understanding of parliamentary institutions, and sufficient sense of responsibility in public affairs to hold out a reasonable prospect that parliamentary institutions, representative of the people, will produce responsible government ... is but a mockery if it is purchased at the expense of personal freedom."¹⁶

Whatever the requirements, however, the important point here is that the imperial government itself establishes the state and assures recognition by other states and international institutions by virtually sponsoring its entry into the international society. We shall therefore, be concerned with the other less normal cases, in this and the following chapter: the establishment of independence through internal war, the problem of the viability of small multinational states, and the establishment of independence through secession.

The establishment of independence through internal war and secession implies, in the first instance, some belief on the part of the rulers of the new entity that they are capable of defining and maintaining the physical (geographical) limits of the entity, especially in some,

¹⁶ Alan Lennox-Boyd, the British Colonial Secretary, speaking with reference to Kenya; quoted in Mazrui, A.A. Towards the Pax Africana (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967) p. 8, from House of Commons Debs., Vol. 604, 1959 at cols. 563-4. This emphasis on the necessity for a "sufficient sense of responsibility in public affairs" also had its counterpart at the level of external affairs, this time as one of the criteria for recognition of statehood. Thus the Office of the Legal Advisor in the U.S. State Department, in response, in 1947, to a question on Indonesia gave as one of the criteria for becoming "a recognized member of the family of nations, the following: "...the inhabitants must have attained a degree of civilization, such as to enable them to observe...those principles of law which are deemed to govern the members of the international society in their relations with each other". Quoted in Whiteman, M.M., op.cit., Vol.I, p. 223.

subjectively defined, short-run period; there is, therefore, a fundamental concern with what we call the boundary problem. This is not a problem peculiar to small states alone. But here the problem faced by small population/small GNP states, in either a small or a large land area, is not the same as that faced by large population/large land area states with either small or large GNP. The latter, in attempting to cope with a tendency towards disintegration have at least the option of resorting to some kind of federalist structure, or some kind of decentralised system akin, in practice, to federalism.¹⁷ Further, an encroachment on the boundaries of a large state need not pose the same threat to state existence that it would for the small state: the large state can, for some period of time, 'absorb' a fairly substantial encroachment on its territory, without having to admit that it has been 'occupied' by the encroacher, and has lost its claim to existence as an independent entity. Its resources, one of which is mere land area, provide it with a capacity after encroachment, for retrenchment.

This can be illustrated by reference to the separate cases of the World War Two invasion of the Soviet Union, and the Italian occupation of Albania. For the small state the distinction between encroachment and occupation is a much narrower one. Thus the rapid occupation of Albania effectively extinguished the independence of that state.¹⁸

¹⁷The attempts to do this by the Austro-Hungarian Empire are a good illustration. The first demands of the Czechoslovaks were, for example, for greater autonomy within the structure, rather than for independence. See, Perman, op.cit., p. 1: "In 1914, the concept of an independent Czechoslovak state was unknown to the world. It was new even to the Czechs. Before the outbreak of the war their aspirations for national autonomy never reached beyond a reform of Austria-Hungary on a federal basis."

¹⁸Serèni, A.P., "The Legal Status of Albania", American Political Science Review, Vol 35, 1941, pp. 311-316.

A discussion of the boundary problem, which is in fact another way of discussing the problem of viable size, involves a variety of considerations. It can, for example, be said that the boundaries of a state (in particular of a 'land' state) are always historically arbitrary. That is to say, it cannot ever really be claimed that a state has any 'natural' boundaries - either national (cultural-ideological relations of the population) or physical (geographical).¹⁹ However, (and thus as a generalisation) their historically arbitrary character has always been limited by three factors which must be taken into account in any analysis of viability. Boundary-setting involves a people or a government in the following:

- (i) Seeking to define the limits of 'national' that is, cultural-ideological affinity in an area;
- (ii) Seeking to define the limits of a viable economic structure in an area; these two factors being "conditioned" by the fact (and awareness) of
- (iii) The limits imposed by historical "administrative" power in the area - that is the divisions and communications structures created by former rulers, on an empire or other basis.

The problem of the growth of the small state is clearly related to these boundary-setting principles, in the sense that they are limiting factors. For the small state which attempts, for example, to grow in a substantial manner, through expansion of its territory by annexation, especially though not only in an area populated by a group not of an

¹⁹The case of Somalia is an interesting example here: see an article written before Somali independence on the idea of a "Greater Somalia": "Alarums from the Horn", The Economist, August 9th, 1958, pp. 435-6.

ethnic character similar to that of its own population, will probably soon find that the limits on its growth (lack of population, of financial resources and other capabilities to support the new structure) are so constraining, that it is unable to assimilate the new areas; it will therefore have to resort to creating, not a substantially enlarged state, but a series of buffer zones or a confederated area. And this may not necessarily increase either its power, prestige or viability vis-a-vis other states in its relevant sphere of diplomatic interests. In this situation, the new links that are created are not likely to be linkages of community (cultural-ideological), but to be in the nature of administrative ones.²⁰ In addition, the small state which 'successfully' enlarges its land area substantially, is likely to become a different entity and to be recognised by the international society as such.

Now, the factors enunciated here in defining the boundary-setting problem, relate not only to state-creation in the post-war period; in fact, one of the assumptions underlying this essay is that, given what we have called the 'fractioned' nature of the international society, certain modes of analysis useful for understanding earlier periods of international relations are, when suitably amended, useful for the analysis of the contemporary society.

Our boundary-setting factors can, however, be illustrated by using, in the first instance, a contemporary example. General de Gaulle, in attempting to rebut the arguments advanced for independence of French Somaliland, has, largely in a negative sense, given a description of the criteria, traditionally looked upon as requiring to be fulfilled, for state viability. Suggesting that an independent Somaliland could only be "theoriquement un Etat souverain", he went on to remark that,

²⁰It constitutes a case of limited integration. The problems of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union illustrate some of the difficulties that may be involved.

"la France n'engagerait certainement pas ses moyens et ses soldats pour soutenir inutilement une apparence d'Etat que le faible nombre et la division de sa population, la médiocrité de ses ressources, l'infirmité de ses frontières, les vises de ses voisins, l'Ethiopie et la Somalie qui, par rapport a ce futur Etat, sont des colosses, et aussi étant donné tous les appels qui de l'interieur seraient adressés continuellement a l'un ou a l'autre, étant donné enfin la situation de la region du monde où le territoire se trouve, qui est très agitée..... rendraient pratiquement inviable."21

de Gaulle was aware that there are many entities of a similar kind whose capacity for viability is, however, sustained by extensive external assistance. Thus he insisted that it would be wrong in this case to suppose that,

"la France..... continuerait cependant de pouvoir aux dépenses et, au besoin, ferait combattre ses troupes pour empêcher les voisins d'entrer. Il convient de dissiper cette dérisoire illusion"22

de Gaulle was here dealing with the kind of entity which could become what we have called a multinational small state. Thus even if the entity could provide itself with the conventional legal attributes of statehood (territory, population, government), it would still not have demonstrated that it had the attributes that would make it a viable state. Both its location and social composition, and its incapacity to defend itself or enter into such relationships as would ensure the protection of its boundaries, would militate against this.23

Another conclusion can be drawn from this example. That the requirements of small state viability cannot be determined a priori; for they are not always and for every state the same. For French Somaliland, for instance, de Gaulle's refusal to extend any form of assistance would

21 Le Monde, 19-20 March, 1967.

22 Ibid.

23 For an analysis of the problems faced by French Somaliland, see Sampaio, M., "Au-déla du referendum", Jeune Afrique, 26 March, 1967, pp. 18-19. The French have now given the territory a name which emphasizes its multi-national character: The French Territory of the Afars and Issas.

be a crucial factor inhibiting even short-term viability; yet, France has extended assurances to other small states, in case of external attack or of internal military action that might lead to the overthrow of government.²⁴

This conclusion can be illustrated by other examples, for it helps to show that the terms of viability may change over time. In 1947, on the eve of Indian independence the Nizam of Hyderabad proposed, basing his case on an interpretation of relevant historical documents, that that entity should then not be ceded to India, but should itself become an independent state. The Indian Government, in a White Paper, opposed this, in terms, among other arguments, of a likely threat to its own security, and by implication argued that an independent Hyderabad could not for long sustain itself:

"An independent state completely landlocked within the heart of another is an unheard of proposition. To compare Hyderabad to Switzerland or Austria, on the ground that they are landlocked and have no access to the sea, is to turn one's back on elementary history and geography. Switzerland and Austria have common frontiers with more than one State and their politics and economy have accordingly developed on a different basis. If all the Provinces of India were independent States and one of the three Provinces bordering Hyderabad questioned the right of this State to independence on the ground that it was landlocked, the analogy of Switzerland and Austria would hold good. As it is, however, the distinctive and decisive feature of Hyderabad's geographical set-up is that if it makes with a foreign State any defence, economic, or other arrangements which are prejudicial to India's interests, it cannot implement such arrangements without violating India's sovereignty over her own territories....."²⁵

²⁴The systemic size of the state therefore comes to be larger than its physical size, and its prospects of survival enhanced. One of the reasons for this is that the small state may have some functional significance for its protector, as is the case, for example, of Gabon, with its uranium deposits.

²⁵Whiteman, M.M., op. cit., pp. 503-4. My italics.

The Hyderabad leaders had been aware of the precariousness of the situation in which they would exist as an independent state, and thus of the weakness of the case that they were presenting. Thus as a counter to the Indian demand that they sign an Instrument of Accession, they "proposed that..... an Instrument of Association be concluded providing for the application of the legislation of the Government of India to Hyderabad in respect of the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs, and communications".²⁶ After a number of border raids, and the placing of the matter, at the instigation of the Nizam, before the United Nations Security Council, the Indian Government forcibly occupied Hyderabad, and the territory was subsequently integrated into the Republic of India.²⁷

This attempt at full sovereignty for Hyderabad, coming before the 'inflation' of states in the international society, and the enlargement of the United Nations General Assembly in the 1950's (and in particular after the famous "package deal" and the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories), could not attract much sympathy. But by the decade of the 1960's, when the imperial powers had become less inclined to propose rigorous conditions for independence, and requirements for entry into the United Nations had become less stringent, a country such as Lesotho, like Hyderabad an enclave, being surrounded on all sides by three provinces of South Africa, acceded to independence relatively easily in October 1966 and with the explicit sponsorship of the United Kingdom.

²⁶ Ibid p. 503.

²⁷ See also, Eagleton, C., "The Case of Hyderabad before the Security Council", American J. of Int. Law, Vol. 44, 1950: Eagleton is somewhat sympathetic to Hyderabad's case.

Lesotho, 30,344 sq. kilometres, is approximately the size of Belgium, with a population of under 900,000, with an economy which "to all intents ... is fragmented into a series of rural hinterlands, each serving as an adjunct to the economy of one of the prosperous and growing South African border towns" and possessing "a tenuous communications network". At the same time it possesses a population with "an exceptionally high level of literacy" and an "ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, as well as a sense of common national identity and purpose rare in Africa."²⁸ While aware of Lesotho's "external communications" problem, South Africa did not object to the coming into existence of Lesotho as a sovereign and independent state.

In fact, an evolution had taken place in the view of various South African governments with respect to whether Lesotho (and other High Commission Territories) could ever attain the status of sovereign states. The original stance taken by South Africa, following the provision made for incorporation of the territories - if the inhabitants gave their consent - in the South Africa Act of 1909, was that this (incorporation) was the best solution. Thus, according to one observer, up to 1949, the Prime Minister of South Africa, Dr. Malan was arguing, at the Commonwealth Conference, in terms fairly similar to those of the Indian Government concerning Hyderabad, "that the delay in effecting

²⁸Weisfelder, R., "Power Struggle in Lesotho", Africa Report, Vol. 12, 1967, pp. 5-13 at pp. 7 and 6. The practical implications of the coherence might be open to discussion. For, as one analyst has written: "According to the 1966 census, 117,000, or more than 40 per cent of the adult male population, were temporarily absent in the Union [of South Africa] or elsewhere". See Robson, P., "Economic Integration in Southern Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 469-490, at p. 472.

transfer [of the territories to South African jurisdiction] implied 'a position of inferiority' for the Union as a Commonwealth state, on the grounds that no other member of that association would tolerate being 'compelled to harbour territories, entirely dependent upon her economically and largely also for their defence, but belonging to and governed by another country'.²⁹

By 1961, however, this view had been reversed, the then Prime Minister, Dr. Vervoerd arguing that incorporation of the territories was not a possibility because it went directly against British policy of independence for African territories.³⁰ Yet doubts about the capacity of the High Commission territories for sustaining independence remained; so that reference could still be made in 1964 to "the British Government's current hesitation in making an unequivocal statement about the long term future of the territories".³¹

Even without the changes in the international climate (the reluctance of imperial governments to pursue with much zeal the maintenance of certain territories, the rise to independence and representation in the United Nations of African and Asian states, and the importance attached by these states to General Assembly Resolution on independence for non-self-governing territories), both the location and social composition of Hyderabad would have made its claim to independence a tenuous one. Situated in the 'belly' of the new Dominion, somewhat too large in both area and population to be properly called an enclave (it is approximately the size of the United Kingdom and had a population then of

²⁹Spence, J.E., "British Policy Towards the High Commission Territories", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 2, 1964, pp. 221-246, at p. 242.

³⁰Ibid., p. 243.

³¹Ibid., p. 229.

about 16 million),³² eighty-five per cent of its people were Hindu, though the rulers of the princely state were Moslem, and it possessed important mineral deposits. Which is to say that, unlike the case of Lesotho, expansion for the larger entity, India, would not involve having to cope with a population whose ethnic (and cultural-ideological character) was substantially different from its own.

But the nature of the existence of an entity which, like Lesotho accedes to statehood, becoming in effect what we have called an 'appendage state', is likely to be one of extreme penetration - involving easy permeability of both physical and systemic boundaries;³³ its condition is likely to be one of extreme, to use a phrase of Boulding's, conditional viability,³⁴ and a perception of this may be one of the reasons which led South Africa to reject constitutional incorporation, in favour of an already existing, and increasing, systemic incorporation. The ease with which the viability of an entity of this kind can be greatly affected or destroyed, is indicated by the situation of Hyderabad between the signing with India of the One-Year Standstill Agreement and its forcible incorporation into the Dominion. During this period,

"Hyderabad complained of systematic stoppage of trade, the freezing of her holdings in India of Indian securities, the denial to Hyderabad of currency and facilities for payment across the border, and the interruption of air transport. The measures taken were effective, even to excluding medical supplies and chlorine for purifying the water supply."³⁵

³²Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1947, p. 8667.

³³For a discussion of the concept of 'penetration', see Ch. 6.

³⁴Boulding, K., Conflict and Defence (N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), Ch. 4 and, in particular p. 58: "A party that can be absorbed or destroyed by another is conditionally viable if the party that has the power to destroy it refrains from exercising this power". (*Italics in the original*).

³⁵Eagleton, C., Op. cit., p. 290.

The economic and other penetration of Lesotho by South Africa has been well described,³⁶ a description which suggests that pressures similar to those exerted against Hyderabad could easily be applied to Lesotho. And it must be an awareness of this that led to the inclusion, at the very point of Lesotho's accession to independence, in a joint statement between the Prime Ministers of Lesotho and South Africa, the observation that,

"It has been agreed that the Republic of South Africa will do its best to aid Lesotho's independence celebrations by assisting visitors and guests in transit in whatever way possible..."³⁷

Now, though it may be true that in legal terms, while "for sovereignty there must be a certain amount of independence... it is not in the least necessary that for sovereignty there should be complete independence",³⁸ for the student of politics, the point at issue lies precisely in the discussion of the problem of the point at which it can be observed, or argued, that the autonomy of rulers is so qualified, that it can no longer be said that the state over which they rule still maintains any of the attributes of sovereignty. Thus degree of independence or autonomy is important. The point has been neatly made by Liska. Remarking that "the fate of smaller communities is a vital clue to the character of the forces at large in any historical period", he suggests that,

"At stake are not only the formal attributes of sovereign independence and equality of smaller states. Much more essential is a degree of effective self-direction and international co-direction within the limits set by interdependence

³⁶Robson, P., Op. cit.

³⁷Keesing's, 1966, p. 21670.

³⁸Judgement of the House of Lords, Law Reports A.C./1924/, p. 797, quoted in Eagleton, op. cit. at p. 281.

"and power differentials among nations. Translated into the problem of individual freedom and self-respecting citizenship, the three basic requirements are thus not only constitutional self-government and national self-determination, but also a decent measure of international self-direction. If the latter is absent, the other two degenerate into a deceptive fiction and a dangerous fallacy. The rights of active citizenship are negated by the passive object-ness of the state governed by external forces".³⁹

In the contemporary period, however, actual recognition of an entity as a sovereign state represents less a view about the capacity of that entity (for example, Lesotho) for self-maintenance and self-direction, than the use of recognition as a mechanism for solving some pressing problem of international order. In the case of Lesotho, it represents the attempt of the colonial power concerned to upgrade, under pressure, the status of that entity; and since a majority of states in the international society will not recognize an intermediate legal status between that of the colony and that of the sovereign state, sovereign independence becomes, in general, the only solution. Further, since the entity, (Lesotho) was not viewed as being symbolically or strategically significant to the major powers, no offer of even treaty guaranty of the new enclave state was made.⁴⁰

³⁹Liska, G., International Equilibrium, p. 33. Our italics. Our concern here is not really with requirement of the internal "constitutional" aspect of self-government; though the United States has in the past oscillated in its policy between recognizing and not recognizing governments, depending on the constitutionality of their regimes. See for example, Hyde, C.C., International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States. (Boston: Little Brown, 2nd ed. 1947), Vol. I, p. 173.

⁴⁰Though, as Morgenthau has pointed out, treaties of guaranty must be "effective in their execution, and their execution must be automatic", and these requisites are, for small states, difficult to obtain in the contemporary period. See Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, p. 297. (3rd ed. Knopf: N.Y., 1963).

Recognition, then in the contemporary period, becomes, in our view, a political act, and the criteria used by the recognizing state are very much a matter of unilateral determination, not often corresponding with the traditional criteria of international law. Further at the point of deciding on recognition of an entity's statehood, other states often, given the 'unilateral political act' rather than the 'legal duty' conception of recognition, consider as relevant to their decisions, the character of the entity's government; thus the problem of government as well as state recognition is important here. The events surrounding the approach to independence of the former British Guiana, represent a recent example of this.⁴¹

All this is indicative of two factors: first, that, as Kaplan and Katzenbach have pointed, as compared with the period of the classical balance of power, "today the doctrinal basis of recognition is more confused than ever." What they say of recognition can also be said of sponsorship of entities to statehood by imperial power, as well as the acceptance of such sponsorship by other states. As they further remark, with respect to the United Nations, "recognition has become a collective subject for joint determination".⁴²

⁴¹ Though not in this case predominantly, the democratic or constitutional character of the entity's government, but its 'ideological' character. See for a discussion of approaches to the problem of government recognition, Lauterpacht, H., Recognition of Governments, in Essays on International Law from the Columbia Law Review (N.Y. 1965), pp. 235-319; and on the general problem Kaplan, M. and Katzenbach, N., The Political Foundations of International Law (N.Y. Wiley, 1961), Ch. 5; and Higgins, R., The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (London, Oxford U.P. 1963), pp. 136-140; see also on the changed conditions of recognition, Hoffmann, S., The State of War, p. 11/11. On British Guiana, see Schlesinger, A., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965), pp. 774-79; 886.

⁴² Kaplan and Katzenbach, op. cit., p. 133. See also Higgins, R., op. cit., pp. 34 ff in the section entitled "The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice".

Secondly, as we have earlier suggested, a breakdown has occurred of the imperial powers' own self-erected criteria for statehood, especially with respect to entities considered of no strategic importance. This is illustrated by the activity of the United Nations Special Committee of 24 (on Colonialism), as described by a recent Chairman of that Committee. Writing about small non-self-governing territories, with particular reference to those of the Indian and Pacific Ocean areas and in the Caribbean, he took the view that,

"While the Committee has recognized that their small size and population, as well as their limited natural resources and, sometimes, geographical isolation posed peculiar problems, it remains firmly of the opinion that the Declaration of 1960, on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories⁴³ is fully applicable to them. Accordingly, the Committee has urged the administering powers to ensure without delay that the people should be enabled in complete freedom and without any restrictions whatsoever, to express their wishes concerning the future of their countries!"⁴³

In fact, one of the points of the Resolution referred to above, (adopted by the General Assembly by 90 votes to none, with nine abstentions) was that, "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational criteria, should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence". Higgins remarks that "this makes some worrying inroads upon the criteria for statehood", and that,

"Even for a commentator favourably disposed towards a liberal interpretation of the right of self-determination this resolution has many undesirable aspects, and the total lack of opposition displayed reflects sadly upon the failure of these governments (such as that of the United Kingdom) who most loudly insist upon Big Power responsibility to vote against resolutions which they

⁴³Malacela, John S., "The United Nations and the Decolonization of Non-Self-Governing Territories", in Swift, R.N. (ed.), Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1966-1967 (Oceana Publications Inc.: N.Y. University Press, 1968), pp. 85-97 at p. 195.

"do not support when public opinion is mounted against them".⁴⁴

An early example of this disjunction between international law criteria of statehood and the political criteria of state recognition can be seen in the case of the recognition by the United States of "the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel" in 1948, in the face of arguments by the opponents of that entity that it did not, because of the indeterminacy of its boundaries, fulfill the traditional criteria.⁴⁵ Philip Jessup, a distinguished international lawyer, then Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council, defended the action of that country by noting that,

"we already have among the Members of the United Nations some political entities which do not possess full sovereign freedom to form their own international policy which traditionally has been considered characteristic of a state",

and that,

"the term 'state' as it is used and applied in article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations may not be wholly identical with the term 'state' as it is used and defined in classic textbooks of international law".

Further,

"According to the ... classical definition, we are told that a state must have a people and a territory. Nobody questions the fact that the state of Israel has a people ... The argument seems chiefly to arise in connection with

⁴⁴Higgins, R., Op.cit., pp. 100-101. The portion of the resolution is also quoted from this source, at p. 100.

⁴⁵The arguments about the fulfillment of the "traditional criteria" follow; but the United States seems to have used as the rationale for even considering the claim of Israel, two assertions: one relating to the 'legitimacy' of the promise of the so-called Balfour Declaration, and the other, that (as was argued in a State Department Memorandum on "Recognition of Successor States in Palestine of May 13, 1948), given the political control vacuum created by the withdrawal of Great Britain, "the law of nations recognizes an inherent right of people lacking the agencies of social and political control to organize a state and government". See Whiteman, Op.cit., Vol. I, pp. 226 (on Balfour) and 224.

"territory. One does not find in the general classic treatment of this subject any insistence that the territory of a state must be exactly fixed by definite frontiers. We all know that many states have begun their existence with frontiers unsettled. Although the formulas in the classic treatises vary somewhat one from another, both reason and history demonstrate that the concept of territory does not necessarily include precise delimitation of the boundaries of that territory".⁴⁶

This case is peculiar in terms of the third of our boundary-setting principles - the limits imposed by 'historical' administrative power' - in that the mandatory power concerned, the United Kingdom, had divested itself by the Palestine Act of 1948 of jurisdiction over and responsibility for, the government of Palestine, leaving to the populations involved and to the United Nations, the task of arriving at some viable arrangement for government of the now-contested area. There could, in this case be no limits of historical administrative power except the vague promise of the Balfour Declaration in favour of the "establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" - a declaration which implied no territorial limits. The case, then, differed from that in which the state of Trans-Jordan had been carved out of the region and granted independence by the Mandatory Power.⁴⁷

With no 'authority' to be drawn for boundary-setting from historical administration and with location and social composition both objects of dispute within the region, independence of the entity Israel, could

⁴⁶All the quotations are from Whiteman, pp. 230-231.

⁴⁷Ibid. pp. 224-28 and Brown, Philip M., "The Recognition of Israel", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, 1948, pp. 620-27; and in general, particularly with reference to United States' Practice, Briggs, H.W., "Recognition of States: Some Reflections on Doctrine and Practice", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 1949, pp. 113-121. The so-called "Palestine Plan" worked out by the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, had failed to become operative, though it envisaged two separate independent states, linked by economic union, with Jerusalem the international territory.

could only come through unilateral declaration supported by the determination of the population of the new 'state' to defend the boundaries which it had set itself. In this light, de facto recognition of the provisional government by the United States, and de jure recognition by the Soviet Union, can be seen as a form of 'moral' support, assisting the entity to demonstrate its initial international viability. And the failure of the United Kingdom to give recognition, on the grounds that Israel did not fulfill the "basic criteria" of Statehood, reflects the opposite: doubt even about the entity's short-born viability.⁴⁸

STRATEGIC VALUE OF LOCATION, SOCIAL
COMPOSITION AND STATE CREATION.

The cases of Lesotho and Israel are examples of the situation in which the imperial power wishes, for a variety of reasons, to divest itself of colonial territories as quickly as possible. State creation is deemed proper either in terms of the 'readiness' of the entities for self-government, or in terms of the fact that no other status can be found for them. State creation, then has, in the contemporary, especially post mid-1950's, period, often been the consequence of what Mendès-France with respect to Indo-China, is reputed to have called the desire for a "stock-clearance sale".⁴⁹

⁴⁸The British view about the possibilities of governmental and state organization in the area as reflected in the statement of the Attorney General as late as May 10, 1948, may be seen not simply, in the perspective of history, as myopic, but as reflecting the degree of uncertainty then prevailing about the immediate future organization of Palestine: "... Palestine clearly will not be an independent sovereign State and for some time, at least, it will not have an independent government, assuming, as we must assume, that it has a government at all". Quoted in Whiteman, Op. cit., pp. 228-9, from House of Commons Debates (5th Ser.) at Col. 1320 (March 10, 1948).

⁴⁹Quoted in Hannon, John S., "A Political Settlement for Vietnam: The 1954 Geneva Conference and Its Implications", Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, 1967, pp. 4-93 at p. 25.

Where, however, some strategic or prestige value is attributed to an entity the claim to statehood is unlikely to be conceded with such facility. The case of the statehood of Cyprus can be used as an example of this situation, for it also allows us to examine the case of an entity whose social composition, in addition to making it an object of dispute, is also seen as constituting an argument against the claim of capacity for statehood.

A British Member of Parliament, J. Enoch Powell, after the conclusion of the Cyprus agreements in 1959, gave in the United Kingdom House of Commons an historical assessment of the problem of state-criterion as it affected certain small colonial territories. "It is", he remarked,

"not a settlement which anyone, until quite recently, was at all expecting in this form. If one goes back five or ten years, we find that the very notion of an independent Cyprus, a Republic of Cyprus, which is the essence of this solution, was regarded as fantastic. It was taken as axiomatic by people on all sides [all parties in the House of Commons] ... that Cyprus as a separate entity was not 'viable'. That, I think was the word which was most favoured".⁵⁰

After quoting a number of statements by prominent members, and official publications of both parties to support this assertion, he continued,

"I believe that there is a lesson in this unexpected change in our point of view which has a value extending even beyond the affairs of the island of Cyprus. ... We have been much too ready to assume that this or that territory, because it is small or poor or labours under some disadvantage, is not capable of being a sovereign independent country in the world today. The map of the world is dotted with territories which, if today they were dependent, everyone would be ready to deny could ever be independent. One does not need, either, to point to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg or the Principality of Monaco as examples; much more substantial cases will occur to hon. Members of territories which, if they were colonial today, we should regard as not viable, as countries for which there could be no independent future. ... It was only yesterday that independence for Cyprus otherwise than through Enosis or partition, that is union partly with Turkey and partly with Greece was conceived by anyone".⁵¹

⁵⁰ Powell, J. Enoch, H.C. Debs., Vol. 602, 1959, col. 694.

⁵¹ Ibid., col. 695-6.

And indeed, the ethnic character of the population of Cyprus had led the representatives of Turkey to argue that there could be no such phenomenon as a "right to independence" for Cyprus. The "right to independence", a Turkish representative at the United Nations is reported as remarking,

"could be granted only to nations in accordance with their expressed will, not to geographical entities. In the particular circumstances of Cyprus, independence should be granted, if at all, in accordance with the national will of the island's two communities. A Cypriot nation, or a concept of 'Cypriot nationalism' did not exist, for the two national communities on the island identified themselves with the independent nations of Turkey and Greece, possessed no common aspirations, lived separately, and were linguistically, religiously and socially distinct Thus there were no single Cypriot nation whose independence could be recognized".⁵²

The third important strand in the argument, at the time, against Cypriot independence, related to the strategic value placed upon its location. For large, high status powers see themselves as having a general responsibility for "international order" which may supersede the claims of particular entities to independence. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was arguing, in 1958, before the U.N. General Assembly, that,

"The island is important to us from a military point of view so that we should be able to fulfill our international obligations",

and that,

"the island is of great strategic importance to Turkey, covering its southern ports"⁵³

⁵²Reported remarks of Mr. Zorlu in U.N. General Assembly Official Records: 13th Session, First Committee, 996th meeting, 25 November, 1958. These remarks are somewhat similar in character to those of General de Gaulle with respect to French Somaliland.

⁵³See Command Paper 735: United Nations No. 1 (1959) - Report on the Proceedings of the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Held at New York, Sept. 16 - Dec. 13, 1958 (1959): Annex I, Speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on Aug. 14, 1958 on the Middle East, at p. 104.

On the basis of similar arguments, a British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs concluded that,

"Cyprus is not simply a colonial problem. It has become an international problem as well".⁵⁴

Anthony Eden, British Prime Minister at the time, later summarised in his memoirs, the strategic arguments which, in the view of the British Government, made the Cyprus problem a British one, as well as one of international order, thus inhibiting a consideration of independence for Cyprus, or indeed, any change in the international status of the island:

"The action which the British Government could take was circumscribed by international considerations. First came the strategic value of the island. Our military advisers regarded it as an essential staging point for the maintenance of our position in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf. There must be some security of tenure. It was not then thought enough to lease certain sites on the island from some future administration on whose policies we could not depend. ... The Turks, in 1955, wished to see the status quo preserved in Cyprus ... I knew that they regarded Cyprus as the last of their off-shore islands and were convinced that its ownership by Greece would menace their safety. This was quite apart from the position of the Turkish minority in Greece. Collaboration between Turkey and Greece was important to N.A.T.O. and could not be maintained if Enosis were granted".⁵⁵

The idea of independence for Cyprus, or even of some other institutional form of meeting the claim to self-determination of, in particular Greek Cypriots, was, at this time, tending to become dissolved in a variety of arguments of a predominantly 'external relations' character:

⁵⁴Ibid. Annex IX, Speech by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on Cyprus in the First Committee on Nov. 25th, 1958, at p. 131.

⁵⁵The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 396.

"In geography and in tactical considerations, the Turks have the stronger claim in Cyprus; in race and language, the Greeks; in strategy, the British, so long as their industrial life depends on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf".⁵⁶

It was, then, to the British, only logical that a plan for the solution of the Cyprus problem should be one in which these external relations characteristics predominated. The plan advanced in 1958 conceded that Cyprus should have "a system of representative Government with each community exercising autonomy over its internal affairs. The United Kingdom Government therefore suggested "a new policy which represents an adventure in partnership", along, inter alia, the following lines:

"I. Cyprus should enjoy the advantages of association not only with the United Kingdom ... but also with Greece and Turkey

III. The Greek and Turkish Governments will be invited to appoint a representative to cooperate with the /British appointed/ Governor in carrying out this policy

VIII(d) External Affairs, defence and internal security will be matters specifically reserved to the Governor acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments".

It was then further suggested that,

"if the Greek and Turkish Governments were willing to extend this experiment in partnership and cooperation, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, at the appropriate time, to go further, and subject to the reservation to the United Kingdom of such bases and facilities as might be necessary to the discharge of her international obligations, to share the sovereignty of the Island with their Greek and Turkish Allies as their contribution to a lasting settlement".⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Ibid. p 415. A view of rising and increasingly extensive Greek Cypriot nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century is given in, "Cyprus, the British Empire and Greece", in Toynbee, A.J., Survey of International Affairs, 1931, (London: Oxford U.P., 1932), pp 354-394 and especially pp. 362-365.

⁵⁷ Cmnd. 455: Cyprus - Statement of Policy (H.M.S.O., June 1958, pp. 2 - 3. Italics ours.

By 1959, however, arrangements had been reached that would allow Cyprus to proceed to independence, possessing characteristics of three of the types of small state that we have enunciated in Chapter 2 - those of being an appendage multinational and treaty state.⁵⁸ And Enoch Powell was to argue that, in addition to the others, the strategic arguments which had led the United Kingdom Government to search for a constitutional status for the island other than that of full sovereignty, had been based on at least one fundamental misconception, which in succeeding years, seemed to become increasingly obvious. This criticism of the assumptions about viability, he observed, was

"Closely linked with another assumption also made hitherto on both sides of the House that sovereignty was necessary to the discharge of Britain's obligations and the fulfillment of her requirements - that it was an infeasible necessity of the situation. Here, again, neither party, until yesterday, so long as that party bore responsibility, had departed from the concept of British sovereignty in Cyprus as being an essential for British requirements.

The utility of these areas [two enclaves, sovereignty over which was retained by the United Kingdom Government for use as military bases] to Britain, whatever be the forms adopted and whatever we say about sovereignty, will and must depend upon the good will of the people of that island".⁵⁹

Here, Powell is making an observation that must also have been recognized by South Africa in the case of Lesotho (referred to above) and similarly placed entities: that sovereignty is no longer necessary for the exercise of a large degree of control and influence; it may, in fact, be an inhibition to this.

We can see, then, that three considerations had, by 1959, become increasingly clear and important enough to the colonial power,

⁵⁸ For the arrangements, see Cmnd. 1093: Cyprus (H.M.S.O. July 1960).

⁵⁹ H.C. Debs., Op. cit., cols. 696-697.

the United Kingdom, to allow her to meet (and indeed sponsor) the demand for independence for Cyprus by the Greek majority: the increasing intractability of the local situation to the point at which it was becoming a "burden of external relations" and a "dilemma" of United Kingdom domestic policies; the need to preserve in the face of this situation some of the requisites of what she considered her international order tasks - the retention of some area of Cyprus as a military staging post; and the persistent demands of other entities in the international society, through the United Nations, for her submission to the Greek Cypriot insistence on the right of self-determination.⁶⁰ These considerations, or variations of them, have faced most colonial powers, resisting the demand, once made, for self-determination, on grounds of strategic or prestige value. As one commentary on France's colonial problems noted, in 1954:

"The nature of France's difficulties in meeting the demands of its two North African protectorates is peculiar because of their nearness and strategic importance, and even moreso because of the presence there of French residents seeking rights on non-French soil. Both Tunisia and Morocco are sovereign states related to France by virtue of international treaties; both have, over the years, come to be directly ruled by French officials; both now challenge this arrangement and want to stop it ..."⁶¹

The sequel to this "challenge" both in terms of its success and its effect on French internal and external relations is well known.

⁶⁰ Eden had earlier described the intervention of the U.N. (through some of its members) as no more than a "complication". See Memoirs, op. cit., p. 396.

⁶¹ The Economist (London), "Tunisian Stepping Stone", 4 December, 1954, pp. 804-5. See also, the same journal's comments on France's Indo-China problems: "Without Dishonour", 24 July, 1954, p. 266.

CHAPTER FOUR

VIABILITY II: STATE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE

"Laos is less a nation-state than a conglomeration of tribes and languages ... less a unified society than a multiplicity of feudal structures".¹

Cyprus was an entity composed of two major ethnic groups each with a strong national consciousness, which became what we have called a 'multinational small state'. The consciousness of nationality among groups in such entities may itself be limited by an awareness that a variety of other factors impose limitations on the translation of a demand for the right of self determination into a status of separate independence.² The arrangements arrived at in order to satisfy groups in such multinational (or at a minimum, multi-ethnic) entities, and the relationship of these arrangements to state viability demand separate consideration, for they have important implications for domestic political efficiency.

¹Dommen, A., Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964) p. 17.

²Note Max Weber: "A nation is a community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own"; and MacIver: "There are nations then which do not rule themselves politically, but we call them nations only if they seek for political autonomy". Gerth, H. and Mills, C.W. (eds.). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948) p. 176, and MacIver, R., and Page, C., Society (London: Macmillan, 1961) p. 298. See also the distinctions which Stanley Hoffmann makes between 'national consciousness', 'national situation' and 'nationalism' in his, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", Daedalus, Vol. 95, 1966 pp. 862-915 at p. 867.

We shall, therefore, be concerned in this chapter with the conditions of state maintenance for multi-national (or at least poly-ethnic) states. In these cases the process and method of state creation is seen as being closely related to conditions in the international environment and the requirements of international order, especially where within the environment states exist of a similar ethnic character to those in the small multi-national state. We shall, in addition, attempt to discuss the case of the small entity which because of its location, again finds that both the conditions of its establishment and of its maintenance as a state are defined, or at a minimum limited, by the requirements of international order.

A further set of cases with which we shall deal is that in which, for a variety of reasons, a large multinational state or empire comes under disintegrative strains and political or national entities within attempt to force actual disintegration and the establishment of separate statehood through secession. The rationale for considering this is that if one takes the view that state recognition is a political act, then it is important to recognize in turn that the period between the announcement by the leaders of an entity of its secession (the putting into effect of a "unilateral declaration of independence") and the recognition of this independence - or the failure to gain recognition - by a substantial number and variety of powers or by some major powers, is, in fact, a period in which the entity attempts to demonstrate short-term international viability - a capacity for self-maintenance.

This view of recognition which we accept is well expressed by Brierly who writes that,

"... the granting of recognition to a new state is a political rather than a legal act. It does not bring into legal existence a state which did not

exist before and a state may exist as a state without being recognized The primary function of recognition is formally to acknowledge as a fact something which has hitherto been uncertain, namely the independence of the state recognized, and to declare the recognizing state's readiness to accept the normal consequences of that fact"³

This political character of recognition is no more clear than in the case of its exercise with respect to secessionist entities, when in Brierly's words "the granting or withholding of recognition can be used to further national policy".⁴

VIABILITY OF THE SMALL MULTI-NATIONAL STATE

We deal here with the case in which the multi-national entity as a condition of its independence becomes what we have called a Treaty State, and with the implications of this status. A treaty which allows the possibility of legitimate intervention in a state by some Power or group of powers, indicates an assumption on the part of those Powers of a tendency to internal disturbances of some kind within the state, which might constitute an occasion for intervention by some other Power or group of Powers. The character of the disturbances might be general internal or civil war or a persecution of minorities. Historically, of course, such 'legitimate intervention' has not been limited to multi-national states, a classical case in the pre-war period being perhaps the introduction into the Consti-

³Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nations (London: O.U.P., 2nd ed. 1938) pp. 104-5. Our emphasis. See also on this problem De Visscher, C., Theory and Reality in Public International Law (Princeton U.P., 1957) p. 228.

⁴Brierly, op. cit., p. 105.

tután of Cuba of the so-called Platt Amendment.⁵ But multi-national or poly-ethnic states in which the ethnic groups demonstrate some degree of national consciousness, intimating not simply a desire for, in Lenin's words, "cultural autonomy" but for an element of "political self-determination" within the state, are often deemed to be likely candidates for internal war: civil or factional war.⁶ This consideration, in effect, constitutes the link between domestic politics and the constraints imposed from the geographically-external environment on the multi-national entity.

Now, the Treaty Small State generally has, as a consequence of the very terms of the treaty, what we may call "a self-liquidating clause" conditioning its independence - a clause allowing for external intervention and thus for a derogation of sovereignty from that state. It may, however, be argued that insofar as those negotiating the constitutional instruments of independence of the state agree to this self-liquidation clause, it can hardly be considered a derogation from sovereignty; but these very individuals are prone to argue, as we shall see, that their agreement to such terms of independence was in some manner 'forced' and therefore, in the circumstances,

⁵There was, at the time, a prolonged discussion as to whether Cuba could therefore be called an 'independent' state. See Hyde, Charles C., International Law (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), pp. 56-60. Fitzgibbon, R.H., Cuba and the United States 1900-1935 (N.Y., Russell and Russell Inc., 1964), especially pp. 89-93.

⁶'Deemed to be' on somewhat a priori grounds: in the sense that the theory of national self-determination implying the transition from 'nationhood' to 'statehood' does not allow for the possibility of two national groups claiming political autonomy to have that claim recognized through, or issue in, co-existence of the two groups within one state, or on a single piece of territory.

unavoidable.⁷

We can first take the case of Cypriot independence as an illustration of the above generalization. The agreements reached at the Zurich conference of February 1959, and the Constitution of Cyprus agreed at the London Conference later that month, constituted a complex of arrangements that recognized both the poly-ethnic (and multi-national) nature of Cypriot society and the strategic and political interests of other powers - Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom - in that country. Bearing in mind the ethnic affinity to the main groups on Cyprus, of Greece and Turkey, we can say that the agreements (the Draft Constitution and the Treaties) demonstrated recognition of the systemic linkage, of a cultural and political character, between Cyprus and those two countries; it recognized the possibility, in certain circumstances, of a "political spill-over" into these countries of interaction between the Greek and Turkish communities in the island. The concept of "spill-over" as here used, indicates the degree to which internal events in one country, stemming from ethnic conflicts with a 'national community' character are likely to be viewed by countries with similar dominant ethnic strains as having effects on the political perceptions of their own citizens; such geographically internal events are then viewed as part of the systemic environments of the 'recipient' countries and thus as a sphere of legitimate interference.⁸

⁷ See the discussion that follows. (pp.169 ff). But the Cuban case is interesting in this respect. Fitzgibbon writes: "Root /Secretary for War/ gave the /Cuban/ committee the imperatively modest executive interpretation of the depth of the amendment, told the Cubans that he thought intervention would only follow a constitution of 'anarchy' in the island, and also informed them that Cuban acceptance of it was a definite prerequisite to withdrawal by the United States from Cuba". Op. cit., p. 83. Our italics.

⁸ The concept of "spill-over", though drawn from the writings of E.E. Haas, is here used in a more restricted sense. See Haas, E.B., The Uniting of Europe, Stanford, California, Stanford U.P., 1958) especially pp. 291 ff.

Now, the aspects of the constitutional arrangements with which we are concerned are three: the system of political representation within the state, the prohibition of enosis or union with Greece and the guarantee of the Constitution by other powers.

The system of political representation was one which while giving the Greek Cypriots overall political dominance granted, in its form, capabilities to the Turkish Cypriots which would certain legislative and diplomatic actions by the Greeks. In brief there was devised a system of proportional representation in all areas of representation, recognizing the existence of two already existing (partly as a consequence of the preceding period of internal war) parallel political-cultural structures with only tenuous linkages between them. The aim of the devised "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus" would seem to have been to create primarily administrative linkages between the two structures in order to create a working, unified governmental order.

This analysis of the assumptions underlying the form of political systems devised for this multi-national state is based on an analysis previously made by this writer of relationship between the socio-cultural structure and the political order of another kind of multi-national state - what we have called the Racist Small State. Here, the essential characteristic of the state is its

"... two-tier nature ... virtually two societies and political systems ... within the geographical boundaries of the territory Here a dual political system has been created, and in turn, forms the base of the governmental system. There are separate political rules for the two societies, ordained by those in control of the state".⁹

⁹Lewis, V.A., "Britain and the Rhodesian Rebellion", New World Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1968, pp. 41-54, at p. 46. *Italics in the original.* In addition in the racist state, in this case Rhodesia, "the freedom of the white society (freedom of debate in Parliament, a multi-party system, etc.) has as its concomitant, if not as the condition of its existence, a political autocracy exercised over the black society". Ibid.

The assertion here in relation to Cyprus is not that it constituted a racist state system, but that within the rubric "multi-national state" there are certain rules of the governmental order common to states falling under this rubric. It is the way in which the dominant political system manipulates the rules of the governmental order, that may lead to the characterising of the state as a Racist one.

Within the proposed Cypriot state in which the Greeks constituted approximately 81 percent of the population and the Turks 18 percent, in general a 70 percent - 30 percent split for representative purposes was ordained. Thus, while "executive power" in certain defined spheres was to be vested in the President and Vice President (respectively always a Greek and a Turk) with each having the "right of final veto", the Council of Muslims was to contain 7 Greeks and 3 Turks, elections to the House of Representatives were to be undertaken separately with representation 70 percent for the Greek and 30 percent for Turkish communities. Each community was to have separate Communal Chambers. Representation "so far as this will be practically possible in all grades of the hierarchy in the Public Service" was to be allotted also according to the 70 percent - 30 percent split, and similarly in the internal security forces; while in an Army of 20,000 men, 60 percent were to be Greeks and 40 percent Turks. Further, "forces which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a proportion approaching 100 percentum, only by members of one Community, shall belong to that Community". The supreme Constitutional Court was to be composed of one Greek, one Turk and a neutral judge as President - that is, a President of the Court from neither of these nationalities nor from the U.K., nor nationals of Cyprus. (The first President of

the Constitutional Court, was, in fact, of Swiss nationality).¹⁰ Similar rules applied to the constitution of the High Court, the highest appellate Court of the Republic.

The two Treaties that were part of the Cyprus settlement, the one between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom guaranteeing "the independence, territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Republic" and the Treaty of Military Alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, were to be basic articles of the Constitution, this being specified in Article 181. Article I of the first treaty declared that the Republic of Cyprus "undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever". It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any State or partition of the island".¹¹ The Draft Treaty of Alliance made provision for the establishment in Cyprus of Greek and Turkish military contingents (950 officers, non commissioned officers and men from Greece, 650 from Turkey).¹²

The prohibition of any political or economic union of Cyprus with another state was aimed, substantially, at making illegal any promotion of enosis or union with Greece, and Article 185 of the

¹⁰ See "Draft Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus". Appendix D in H.M.S.O., Cmd. 1093 - Cyprus. (London, 1960). Articles 46 to 57 on the powers of the President and Vice President, Art. 62 on the House of Representatives, Part V on the Communal Chambers, Article 123 on the Public Service, Articles 129, 130 and 132 on the Army and Security Forces, Article 133 on the Supreme Constitutional Court, Article 153 on the High Court. All these Articles with some defined exceptions relating to particular paragraphs within them were to be "basic articles of the Constitution" and could not "in any way be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal". See Article 182 and Annex III of the Draft Constitution.

¹¹ See Cmd. 1093, Appendix B. Our italics.

¹² Ibid. Appendix C.

Constitution emphasised this, stating that "the integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence "is excluded", this section of the Article being also a basic one.

Finally Article IV of the Draft Treaty of Guarantee stated that:

"In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representation or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may or may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty".¹³

Each of the parties to this Treaty had an interest in allowing for the possibility of intervention, but Turkey in particular would wish for this in order either to inhibit any attempt at enosis or to inhibit pressure being placed at any time by the representatives of the dominant population on the Turkish Cypriots.

Now, all these proposals which became the Constitution of Cyprus were essentially those contained in the proposals of the Zurich and London Conference and of subsequent meetings. Archbishop Makarios, on the one hand, had welcomed the Zurich agreement as laying "the foundation for an immediate and final solution of the Cyprus issue under which Cyprus will become an independent state",¹⁴ and the Prime Minister of Britain, Harold Macmillan, after the London Conference of the same month (February) described the settlement as "one which recognized the right of the people of Cyprus to an independent status in the world which recognizes the Hellenic character of

¹³ Ibid. Appendix B. Our italics.

¹⁴ See Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1959, pp. 16645

the majority of the Cypriot people also one which protects the national character and culture of the Turkish Cypriot community".¹⁵

Makarios himself was to say of the results of the London Conference:

"Yesterday I had certain reservations. In overcoming them I have done so in a spirit of trust and good-hearted goodwill towards the Turkish community and its leaders we can work together in a way that will leave no room for any dissension about any written guarantees".¹⁶

Thus Cyprus became a Treaty Small State. But in subsequent years, difficulties were to arise that cast doubt on the capacity of the internal political arrangements to work satisfactorily, and, especially, in the minds of the Greek Cypriot leaders, on the extent to which the Treaties, and the conditions under which they were arrived at and agreed, made the independence and sovereignty an excessively limited one. The difficulties, which led in effect to the threat of military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey in March 1963 and external intervention in August 1964, were over a series of issues concerning both national and municipal administration. The details of these issues need not be dealt with here; it is enough to say that they concerned the abolition, after a dispute, of the municipal administrations by the President (Makarios), a dispute over the power of the government to tax, over the mode of establishment of the Cypriot Army and over 13 proposals by Archbishop Makarios for amendment of the

¹⁵Op. cit., p. 16660.

¹⁶Op. cit., p. 1666. Both Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Kutchuk for the Turkish Cypriot community were noted in a Memorandum as accepting the White Paper (Cmd. 679) that was the consequence of the London Conference "as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus". Keesing's, 1959, p. 16660.

Cypriot Constitution.¹⁷

Already during the period of "administrative" disputes in 1962, the Foreign Minister of Turkey had "refuted a statement by the Archbishop that the disputes were an internal matter in which outside interference could not be allowed. The Turkish Government ... did not regard them as an internal matter, since the London and Zurich Agreements were protected by the Treaty of Guarantee involving Turkey, Greece and Britain"¹⁸

In a similar manner, the Turkish Government protested in December 1963 against the attempt to amend the constitution. Makarios's response was that amendment of the Constitution also was "a strictly internal affair" and that while the Guaranteeing Governments had been informed of the proposals, this had not been done "in expectation of either a positive or a negative reply".¹⁹

It seems fair to say Turkish intervention in early 1964, after fighting had broken out between Greeks and Turks in March of that year, was averted by the intervention of a contingent of U.N. Troops and by a strongly worded letter to the Prime Minister of Turkey from the President of the U.S.,²⁰ but, as we have already remarked, intervention did occur, consequent upon the outbreak of fighting in August of 1964. Thus

¹⁷ Keesing's, 1963, p. 19257 and 1964 p. 20113 and on the intervention by the Turkish air force, p. 20264. See also on the various disputes and the President's amendments, United Nations Security Council, Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus /Galo Plaza/ to the Secretary-General, 5/6253, March 1965, pp. 15-17.

¹⁸ Keesing's Cont. Archives, 1963, p. 19257.

¹⁹ Op. cit., 1964, p. 20113.

²⁰ See "Correspondence Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966", Middle Eastern Journal, Vol. 20, 1966, pp. 386-393. Makarios, in March 1964, repudiated the Treaty of Alliance as it related to Turkey and herself. The Turks, in turn, rejected this repudiation.

intervention (which took place on August 9) was an invocation of the Treaty of Guarantee, the consequence of a "political spillover" that was itself the result of the fact that in the view of the Turkish government, the Turkish Cypriot community was being subjected to pressure and was liable to be reduced to "ghetto status".²¹

The constitutional difficulties of 1962 to 1964 had already convinced Archbishop Makarios that the status of a Treaty State was too restricting. The President had announced in July of 1964 that he would ask the next session of the U.N. General Assembly to state that Cyprus had a right to "unrestricted independence, on the basis of which the Cypriot people will be able to determine their future".²² The subsequent internationalisation of the issue was therefore, for him, only further proof of the restricted nature of Cypriot independence imposed by its establishment under, and adherence to, the obligations of the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee. The attempt of the United States to mediate through discussions with the Greek and Turkish Governments, which the President qualified as "unacceptable", and the "Acheson Plan" that was the consequence of this mediation, only served to confirm him in his view.²³

²¹Keesing's, 1964, p. 20264. As a consequence of a Security Council Resolution, a ceasefire was accepted by both Turkey and Cyprus on August 10. Op. cit., p. 20266. This inhibited military intervention by the Greek Government which had promised to support the Cypriot Government "with all military means" if the Turkish Government did not withdraw by a specified time.

²²Keesing's, 1964, p. 20266.

²³The "Acheson Plan", never formally publicly disclosed, was alleged by a Greek Government spokesman to have suggested: "(i) The union of Cyprus and Greece; (ii) the cession by Greece to Turkey of Castellorizo, the easternmost of the Dodeciman Islands, lying off the Anatolian coast; (iii) establishment of a Turkish military base in 'Greek' Cyprus; (iv) the formation of two 'cantons' in Cyprus under Turkish Cypriot administration; (v) payment of compensation to Turkish Cypriots wishing to emigrate". Keesing's, 1964, p. 20269. For an extensive discussion of Greek and Turkish Cypriot reactions to other proposals see U.N. Security Council, Report of the United Nations Mediator, loc. cit.

The President's line of approach in response to his own perception of the political status of Cyprus contained three aspects. First, as implied in his remarks quoted above, on the need for "unrestricted independence" for Cyprus, he was suggesting that treaty obligations which included a right of intervention were not compatible with the status of sovereignty and independence. This assertion is to be seen in the light of the decision of the Government of Cyprus to assume a diplomatic stance of non-alignment in international affairs.²⁴

The traditional international law view, which without doubt the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the U.K. took in 1959/1960, is in conflict with the Makarios's assertion. Oppenheim, for example, writes:

"... a state may ... by treaty obligations be in some respects restricted in its liberty of action with regard to its citizens. Thus the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 restricted the personal supremacy of Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Rumania in so far as these states were therefore obliged not to impose any religious disabilities on any of their subjects, and the policy of protecting racial, religious and linguistic minorities by means of treaty obligations was carried further in the treaties concluded at the end of the First World War".²⁵

It is in fact our view that the Cypriot solution was a conscious attempt to apply this 'traditional' mode of problem solution to the Cypriot issue, in accordance with their perception (which relates to our view of the "fractioned" nature of the international society), that the problem resembled in certain major respects similar problems arising in the nineteenth century. But another author,

²⁴ That the Government had taken the decision to participate in the Belgrade Conference of non-aligned countries without consulting him, was one of the complaints of Dr. Kutchuk. See Keesing's, 1962, p. 18641.

²⁵ Oppenheim, L., International Law, Vol. I, (8th ed. by H. Lanterpatch) p. 296.

writing more recently, makes the relevant observation, that such treaties, in so far as they give a right of intervention based on humanitarian grounds (and here we might bear in mind the Turkish Government's view that Turkish Cypriots were being reduced to "ghetto status") are not compatible with contemporary international relations.²⁶

The second line of approach was one in which Makarios and the Cypriot Government took the view that the circumstances surrounding their accession to the Agreements were not conducive to their obtaining a solution favourable to the establishment and maintenance of a fully independent Cyprus. The general argument about agreement under constraint we have alluded to earlier, and it was perhaps in order to inhibit any renegeing on the part of either Greek or Turkish Cypriots, that both Makarios and Kutchuk were noted in the memorandum to the London Agreements as accepting the proposals then laid down.²⁷ And Article 195 of the Draft Constitution declared that,

"Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution contained, the person elected as first President of the Republic and the person elected as first Vice President of the Republic, whether before or after the investiture as in Article 42 provided, conjointly shall have, and shall be deemed to have had the exclusive right and power to sign and conclude on behalf of the Republic ...",

the Treaties establishing the Republic, of Alliance and of guarantee.²⁸

We have noted Makarios's statement of his initial 'unhappiness' just before signing the London Conference proposals. In January of 1962 he is quoted as saying that he was "convinced that I acted rightly"

²⁶ See Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States, (O.U.P. 1963) who writes: "The institution did not conspicuously enhance state relations and was applied only against weak states. It belongs to an era of unequal relations"(p. 340).

²⁷ See above at note 16.

²⁸ Draft Constitution, op. cit., our italics. Neither Makarios nor Kutchuk, nor for that matter, representatives of the British Government were present at the Zurich Conference.

in signing the Zurich and London agreements, though threatening to revoke them if, in his view, the Turkish Cypriots continued to "abuse these constitutional rights in a manner affecting the normal functioning of the State machinery".²⁹ In April of 1964, the Archbishop tried to put all these sentiments in historical perspective, so as to demonstrate the 'forced' nature of his agreement:

"At the Conference at Lancaster House in February, 1959, which I was invited to attend as leader of the Greek Cypriots, I raised a number of strong objections and expressed strong misgivings regarding certain provisions of that Agreement. I failed, however, in that effort and I was faced with the dilemma either of signing the Agreement as it stood or of rejecting it with all the grave consequences which would have ensued. In the circumstances I had no alternative but to sign the Agreement. This was, of course, dictated to me by necessity".³⁰

The Turkish government and Turkish Cypriots would hardly accept this view, preferring on grounds of obvious self-interest to follow the traditional legal view of the problem of 'signing under duress' if such indeed were the case:

McNair writes:

"The traditional opinion accepted by the majority of writers has, at any rate until recently, been that a treaty becomes and remains binding upon a State in spite of the fact that the State was acting under coercion in including the treaty, and that the invalidating effect of coercion must be confined to cases where it is applied to the representative of a State engaged in the final act which concludes the treaty, either signature in the case of a treaty not requiring ratification, or ratification where that is required. It is reasonable (though we are not aware of express authority) that, even though a treaty may have

²⁹ Keesing's, 1962, p. 18641.

³⁰ Quoted by Erlich, T., "Cyprus, the 'Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis", Stanford Law Review, Vol. 18, 1966, pp. 1021-1098 at p. 1060 note 184, from Makarios, Proposals to Amend the Cyprus Constitution, International Relations (Athens), April 1964, p. 8..

been signed as the result of the threat or the application of force to the representative of a State, nevertheless if that treaty requires ratification and has been freely and knowingly ratified by the appropriate organ of the State, that ratification should wipe out the effect of the threat or application of force to the person signing the treaty".³¹

It may, however, be argued that Archbishop Makarios's "unhappiness" with at least the constitutional procedures and machinery, related to the fact inter alia that the proportion (30 percent) for representation given to the Turkish Cypriots far exceeded their actual numerical proportion of the population (approximately 18 percent), thus treating the latter as a separate "community" rather than as a mere "minority",³² and, secondly, to the fact that he may have perceived that certain elements of the Constitution had, as he was to observe in 1963, "a utopian and inapplicable character" which might "paralyse the state machinery".³³

If these two complaints are taken together, Makarios's new constitutional proposals are, from the point of view of the Greek Cypriots, easily comprehensible. He was now inclined to argue that the institutional arrangements should recognize the existence of the Turks not as a "community", with cultural and national-political

³¹ Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (O.U.P. 1961) pp. 207-8. As Erlich has already pointed out in his article, McNair also remarks that "As a question of law, there is not much to be said upon the revision of treaties", this being, he argues "a matter for politics and diplomacy". (McNair p. 534). It may, in the case of Cyprus be debated whether the signing of, or acquiescence, in a treaty 'under duress' is to be equated with signing because this is "dictated by necessity".

³² This distinction between a national "community" and, in the words of the Turkish Deputy Premier "an ordinary minority" has been constantly reiterated by both the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots. See Keesing's, 1964, p. 20113 and the discussion, without attempting to resolve it, of the distinction by Galo Plaza, the United Nations Mediator, in his Report. Op. cit., pp. 17, 26, 47.

³³ August 5th, 1963, Keesing's, 1964, p. 20113.

autonomy aspirations, but as a mere "minority" whose well being it would be the duty of the majority population (and thus of the Greek Cypriot Government) to protect. The underlying principle of his proposals was, therefore, that the numerical proportion of the population which the Turks constituted, did not merit a form of representation in the institutions of the state that would constitute a counter-vailing power to the political desires - and therefore, legislative requirements - of the dominant population. His substantive proposal was thus for a centralized governmental system that gave the Greek Cypriots virtually uninhibited legislative authority and institutional predominance in other spheres.³⁴

Also at the basis of these proposals was the assumption, on the part of Makarios, that the constitution, as evolved in 1959-1960, did not in fact allow the Greek-Cypriot majority properly to express and implement its "right of self-determination". His new proposals were, in addition, then, an attempt to do this. This took two forms: First, the unification proposals, to which we have just referred, as a means of ensuring full internal autonomy for the Greek Cypriots; and secondly, the attempt to remove the constitutional prohibition on enosis, and the Treaty Agreements associated with it. What Makarios seems to have desired was not the union of Cyprus and Greece, but the retention of the right to exercise this option in the event that the time might come when the Greek-Cypriot population indicated a wish to do so.³⁵

³⁴See Keesing's, 1964, p. 20113. Makarios's proposals were made on November 30, 1963.

³⁵Thus his assertion, in Athens, on July 30, 1964, that the U.N. General Assembly would be asked to authorize Cyprus' claim to "unrestricted independence, on the basis of which the people will be able to determine their future". Keesing's, 1964, p. 20265. (Our emphasis).

The United Nations Mediator (Galo Plaza) saw the enosis option as inhibiting a peaceful solution, and in any case difficult, on practical grounds, to implement. The Turkish-Cypriots, in their discussions with the Mediator, were only willing to re-open the "self-determination" question if it implied, for them, the option of a partition of the territory and a consequent regrouping of the Turkish population. This the Mediator also saw as incapable of implementation.³⁶

One conclusion that we can draw from this analysis is that, given its social composition and geographical location (and, in particular since its social, that is, ethnic composition is linked with its geographical context, and the relationship between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey is not simply a militarily strategic one), it is unlikely that Cyprus can be other than a Treaty State, as long as the Turkish population insists on its status as a national community. Even if the Greek-Cypriot constitutional proposals were to be accepted, making the state a unitary one,³⁷ the effect of a spill-over of "inter-nation" conflict between the two ethnic groups, will, given the consciousness of their respective mother-nationalities (the states of Greece and Turkey) and their capacity to intervene, incline the latter towards protective intervention in Cyprus.³⁸

³⁶For the U.N. Mediator's view of enosis, see Report of the United Nations Mediator ..., op. cit., pp. 52-55; on his view of the Turkish proposals for what we can call "quasi-partition", see pp. 57-59.

³⁷By 'unitary' here we mean that the constitution would cease in its institutional provisions to reflect the ethnically divided character of the society.

³⁸Other factors in the international society may inhibit this intervention at particular times, but the point here is that such inhibition still does not affect the general 'right' which they claim to intervene. On the United States' reaction to a Turkish threat of intervention early in 1964, see, "Correspondence Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu, June 1964, as released by the White House, Jan. 15, 1966", Middle East Journal, Vol. 2, 1966, pp. 386-393.

Not until what we have called the 'recipient' countries no longer view the activities of their respective national groupings in that state as within their systemic environments, with respect to the issue-areas of political and cultural self-determination, can Cyprus lose this characteristic.³⁹ A case that illustrates this is the experience of the state of Belgium - a multinational entity based on populations once claiming self-determination on the basis of linguistic differences. At present, though the two communities existing within the state are both concerned that its constitution should reflect their claims to political and cultural determination, it is now unlikely that the neighbouring countries with which they bear a cultural affinity (France and Holland) would consider that a conflict between the communities could constitute for them a peculiar right of protective intervention. The communal tension between the groups, therefore, has little extra-systemic significance (the boundaries of Walloon-Flemish relations no longer extend into either France or Holland); and, in turn, the constitutional relationships arrived at are not, and are unlikely to be, a subject for external approval.⁴⁰ Belgium has, in this sense, evolved from the necessity for being a Treaty State. (Though,

The Turkish Air Force actually intervened in Cyprus on August 9, 1964, after fighting had broken out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. See Keessing's, 1964, p. 20264.

³⁹ On the concept of 'issue-area', see Rosenau, J., "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in Farrell, R.B. (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, pp. 27-92, Pt.V and the definition at p. 81.

⁴⁰ For recent discussions, see Hugget, F. "More Troubles in Belgium", The World Today, Vol. 25, 1969, pp. 93-95, and Van Bogaert, E.R.C., and Vermeylen, P. "Belgium: Two Clashing Cultures", The Year Book of World Affairs, 1969 (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969), pp. 82-100. For a discussion of the significance of the 'linguistic question' for Belgium's international relations after the First World War, see Toynbee, A.J., Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 (London: Oxford U.P. 1925) pp. 72-79.

of course, not simply for this reason: as in the case of Cyprus, location was also the basis for attribution of strategic value).

The evolution to the status of Treaty State depends therefore on both the consciousness of other states with similar ethnic or cultural characteristics as the multinational entity, and on their capabilities for protective intervention. Two cases, those of Lebanon and Guyana (then British Guiana) illustrate some of the problems involved here: that of Lebanon showing that the relevant systemic environments of the multinational entity need not, depending on the specific issues giving rise to contestation, be the same as the immediate geographical environment; and that of Guyana being used, for our purposes, to indicate some of the internal viability problems of a newly-independent multinational entity.

The social composition of Lebanon has led to its characterization as both a Christian and a Moslem State in a region that is predominantly Moslem. It has, as in the case of Cyprus led to agreement on a Constitution which requires a form of proportional representation in the institutions of the state for the two main ethno-religious groups.⁴¹ With the increasing virulence, in the post-war period (and especially after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952) of Arab nationalism, Lebanon political leaders found it necessary to ensure that the foreign policy of the state should not give the appearance of seeming to be too partial towards the diplomatic requirements of the major states of the West, and thus too hostile to the ideological inclinations of the major Arab states in the area. The necessity for maintaining a balance became more important after the period of diplomatic activity engaged in

⁴¹Almost half of the population (1963 estimate, 1.75m.) is Christian of various kinds and the remainder are Moslems (Sunnis and Shi'ites) with a minority of Druzes and Jews. For details of the constitutional system, see Stateman's Year Book, 1967/1968, p. 1230. In 1958, the London Economist described the Lebanon as "in, but not entirely of, the Arab world". Economist, 2 August 1958, p. 373.

by the Western Allies that culminated in the Baghdad Pact and after the enunciation of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'.⁴² And the primary means of ensuring a balance in external policy was that of maintaining an institutional and policy balance within the state itself - that is, as between the two culture-religious groups.

A civil war that broke out in 1958, between factions representing the two groupings, brought interferences, direct and indirect, from both the major Arab power, Egypt, and the major Western power, the United States, the latter at the invitation of the then President Chamoun, a Maronite Christian.⁴³ The civil war was occasioned by suggestions on the part of the President that the constitution should be amended so as to allow him to stand for election for a second term of office; these suggestions must be seen in the context of the President's avowedly pro-Western orientation in a regional political situation in which, after the events of 1956, immense sympathy had accrued to Egypt and the cause of Arab nationalism in general. (Even his putative opponents among Arab political leaders within the region were constrained, after the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion, to distance themselves from their Western Allies).⁴⁴

Chamoun's decision threatened to upset the precarious political and institutional balance of the Lebanese political community and Egypt lost no time in using its communications facilities to point this out

⁴²Both of these were viewed with hostility by a number of Arab countries including Egypt. On the documents relating to the organisation and development of the Pact, and for statements giving the reaction of the Arab League, see Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (London: Oxford U.P., 1958), Part 3; and for the Arab reaction to the "Eisenhower Doctrine", see Documents on International Affairs, 1957 (O.U.P., 1960) pp. 241 (Syria) and 257-8 ("Joint Statement on Talks between President Nasser, King Saud, King Hussein and Sabri al-Asali, Cairo, 19 January, 1957").

⁴³According to the Constitution of Lebanon, the President must always be a Maronite Christian and the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem.

⁴⁴Jordan, for example, proceeded to terminate its treaty with the United

to the Moslem sector of that community. President Eisenhower, in fact, asserts that this potential imbalance had begun to be a focus of concern for the United States government in 1957:

"The pro-western orientation of President Chamoun's government, while gratifying and helpful, had its dangers in that it accented the cleavage within his own country. In the summer of 1957, for example, Foster Dulles, in reporting on the parliamentary elections which had just been held, expressed concern that the elections had gone so completely our way as to create internal tension".⁴⁵

The United States, however, had to balance this danger against what it perceived to be an increasing Egyptian influence in the region as a whole - an influence whose content it, in turn, felt was equating itself with Soviet objectives in and perspectives on, the Middle East. Eisenhower remarks that "it seemed likely that Lebanon occupied a plan on Colonel Nasser's timetable as a nation to be brought under his influence".⁴⁶ Hence the significance of his earlier message to a joint session of the United States Congress (January 5, 1957) which came to be called the "Eisenhower Doctrine". In this he requested the Congress to "authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism".⁴⁷

The United States was, therefore, examining and acting upon the

Kingdom. See Survey of International Affairs, 1956-1958, pp. 144 and 168.

⁴⁵Eisenhower, D.D., The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961, (London: Heinemann, 1965), p. 265. Our emphasis.

⁴⁶Ibid. p. 265.

⁴⁷See Documents on International Affairs, 1957. (London, Oxford U.P. 1960) pp. 233-240 at p. 238.

problem as a national (that is concerning the Lebanese nation) and regional as well as an international one. Eisenhower's hesitancy to respond to Lebanese Government suggestions that military intervention might be necessary, indicates that up to almost the end of June 1958, however, distinctions were being made between these levels of relationships;⁴⁸ though the Lebanese Government had created the necessary institutional linkage between them by formally signing in April of 1957 an agreement with a visiting United States representative, "thereby indicating its acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine".⁴⁹ A particular event dissolves, as it were, the boundaries between these levels: this was the coup d'etat in Iraq which overthrew the pro-western regime of Nuri es-Said, abolished the monarchy and established a military regime on July 14. On the following day, Eisenhower announced that the United States had "despatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defence of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity" - and this in response to "an urgent plea" from President Chamoun.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Survey of International Affairs, Op. cit. p. 372: " ... Chamoun /towards the end of June/ told a press conference that he would ask for military assistance through the United Nations or from friendly powers. Meanwhile London and Washington were hoping that the United Nations would manage to find and apply a formula of reconciliation". The "regionalist" level of activity became more significant after the unification of Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958, into the United Arab Republic.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 170.

⁵⁰ "Statement by President Eisenhower announcing the dispatch of United States forces to the Lebanon on 14 July 1958 (15 July 1958)" in Documents on International Affairs, 1958, pp. 287-88 at p. 287

Lebanon had, in fact, assumed the informal status of a treaty state with a systemic relationship to the United States based on cultural-political transactions: that is, on the feeling on the part of the United States of the need to protect from absorption by the Moslem sector, the "western" and Christian-oriented sector of the state. This feeling was certainly reciprocated by the Government of President Chamoun. The transactions took the institutional form of the unilateral commitment by the United States - the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the written reciprocation of that commitment by the Lebanon Government. The purpose of these transactions, as far as the United States Government was concerned, would seem to have been to provide itself with a mechanism for inhibiting the spread of Moslem nationalism even further throughout the region.⁵¹ For, in the view of at least one analyst, the specifically internal problems that were at the basis of the Lebanese conflict were at least approaching solution prior to the United States' intervention: "In the Lebanon", Wall writes, "prior to the Baghdad coup and the American landings, there had been signs that a solution of the internal political crisis was not impossible".⁵²

The central problem for a small polyethnic state like the Lebanon, however, whose government aims at an informal treaty status is that the terms of the transactions, while bilateral, are weighted on the side of the protective intervener. The latter holds the

⁵¹On the "regionalist" perspectives of the United States, see the following chapter. The decision to respond to Chamoun's request and to act to hinder the spread of Moslem nationalism seems to have been occasioned by the Iraqi coup.

⁵²Survey of International Affairs, 1958, p. 376.

initiative in determining the timing and scope of intervention, factors which may themselves have to be considered not simply in terms of the requirements of the small state, but from a wider, in this case, regionalist perspective.

The final case which we analyse here is that of Guyana, again a polyethnic state in which the two major ethnic groups are of relatively equal proportions. Here a thrust during the early 1950's for an extended form of self-rule, led by a government and party that united both ethnic groups was met, in 1953, with a determined negative response from the colonial power involved. This response was explained as necessary by the colonial power, the United Kingdom, on the grounds that the party and government were of a predominantly Communist orientation.⁵³ Further, it is situated in an area, the Caribbean, with an international history whose fundamental characteristic has been that of integration and disintegration: that is, constant grouping and re-grouping of island units and continental enclaves in terms, primarily, of the administrative requirements of the colonial powers. Given this history, there has tended to be some degree of doubt as to the institutional form which full legal sovereignty would eventually take.

Now, seen in the light of our three boundary-setting principles, Guyana's viability problem can be examined in the following way. First, in terms of economic size it is a small country - with a G.N.P. per capita of approximately \$300 (U.S.). In terms of physical size, (population and land area) it is a small country in a relatively large land area. Thus, though it is approximately the size of the United Kingdom, and has a population density of about seven persons per square

⁵³ See Jagan, Cheddi B., Forbidden Freedom: The Story of British Guiana (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1955) for the nationalist view on this; and for the alternative view reflecting the views of the colonial authority, British Guiana: Suspension of the Constitution, Cmnd. 2480 (London: H.M.S.O. 1953) and Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission, Cmnd. 9274 (London: H.M.S.O. 1954).

mile, the living space of the population of about 600,000 is, at present, limited mainly to the coastal strip.

Of this population, about 350,000 are of East Indian origin and over 200,000 of African origin. These are populations large enough, and claiming sufficiently distinct cultural heritages, as to consider themselves "national communities". On the other hand their spatial cohesion (95 percent of the population is confined to about 5 percent of the land area), would seem to have induced, up to 1953 at least, a "nationalist" perception of themselves which allowed the leaders of the anti-colonial movement to lead a unified Indian-African organisation; the consequent evolution of national-community sentiments cannot, therefore be causally related simply to their original cultural differences.

Since the governmental elite which assumed control of the state at independence was, at the same time, provided with little in the way of material capabilities for effecting an accommodation between current small size and the large land area, its viability problem can be seen to have two aspects, as it relates to size. First, there is the perceived difficulty of trying to maintain the boundaries of the state, as defined by the former imperial power; the present communications structures (transport infrastructure, transport capabilities) are insufficient given the present economic capabilities of the state, and the challenges to the physical boundaries of the state by neighbouring powers.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Surinam, which bounds the country on the east, and Venezuela which bounds it on the west, have both made territorial (as distinct from mere boundary revision) claims on the Guyanan state. For a Guyanese comment on the Venezuelan claim, see "Guyana/Venezuela Relations", Guyana Journal, Vol. 1 No. 2, Dec. 1968 (Georgetown: Ministry of External Affairs), pp. 55-60.

Secondly, the communications infrastructure does not permit the rapid economic development of the state that would be capable of supporting both an increase in population and a spreading of population over the expanse of territory possessed. These aspects have, further, to be looked at in terms of what we can refer to as the two "mythologies" which are part of the national consciousness of the state's population; they are, in other words, part of the historical memory of the population. These are, first, the mythology of "El Dorado" - of the potential wealth and (it is therefore assumed) power, in the region, of the state;⁵⁵ secondly the mythology of the potential effects of size and location - of continental destiny.

Then, in terms of our second boundary-setting principle of "the limits of national affinity", the state, at independence, found itself with, as one of the internal effects of imperial rule, a polyethnic population; this tended to inhibit the assertion of the claim to self-determination in terms of an existing cultural-national cohesion. Given the insufficiency of resources to which we have referred above, pre-independence governments (especially that of the P.P.P.) had difficulty in the attempt at conversion of a polyethnic population into a multi-national state. For there had developed during the colonial

⁵⁵ Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, " ... the Government and People of Guyana will not yield one square inch of this, our El Dorado". But the Guyana Development Plan: " ... so little is known about the country's resources - what will grow in various areas, what the forest species are, what minerals exist, or even where the contours run There are promising indications of copper, gold Molybdenum and oil, but it is too early to say whether these minerals exist in economic quantities". The proven mineral (exploitable in economic quantities), is bauxite. For the first quotation, see The Prime Minister of Guyana: Report to the Nation (Guyana Information Service, no date, circa, June 1965); for the second, British Guiana (Guyana) Development Programme (1966-1972), Georgetown: Government Printery) Ch.II pp 5.

period, in effect, two parallel political-cultural structures (P.P.P. and P.N.C.) linked in a predominantly administrative form to the government of the colony.⁵⁶

The state's viability problem then, in terms of our criteria, was at independence an essentially acute one. It placed severe limits on the methods which either of the political-cultural structures could use to gain control of the state just prior to independence, and to deal with the problems which any under-developed state (but particularly this one as a multi-national entity with a small population in a large land area) is faced: the maintenance of sovereignty viewed in terms of maintaining control of its own population; the maintenance of 'national security' here seen in terms of the inhibition of penetration of distant borders by predatory states; national economic development seen in terms of the fulfillment of promises to the population by a government assuming office on the basis of universal suffrage; a population that had become something less than 'national'.

An illustration of the ambiguities involved in the attempts to effect solutions to these problems, can be seen in the approaches in the representatives of the political-cultural structures to the larger problem of the integration of the area (the Caribbean region). There has seemed to be an awareness on the part of both Jagan and Burnham that regional integration could be a means either of inhibiting national integration, or, on the other hand, of furthering internal political control on the part of one of these structures. For, in a polyethnic unit and multi-national state, especially where there are, in the regional area, units of a similar kind, ethnic conflicts within the state tend to have what we have called a "spill-over effect", whose

⁵⁶For a useful discussion of this period, see Fitzpatrick, Miles, and Decaires, David, "Twenty Years of Politics in Our Land", New World Quarterly, "Guyana Independence Issue", pp. 39-45.

feedback is likely to be one of political intervention from the region in the state.⁵⁷

Thus, as early as 1963, the responses of the two leaders to the problem of regional political integration:

QU: "Is there a possibility of British Guiana-Trinidad confederation?"

JAGAN: "I do not suppose so for one moment We are all so engrossed in our own domestic matters I have always been in favour of a regional approach to questions small countries (in the modern world) cannot hope to survive if they have to go it alone and have a completely integrated economy of their own But something we shall have to look at in the future is this question of the Three Guianas".

BURNHAM: "I would say of course this is possible economic cooperation between British Guiana and her neighbours is virtually compulsory and could lead to political union".⁵⁸

Here, then, an example of the difficulty of solving the problem of 'nationality' in a state of this kind, and thus the problem of national independence itself. In the West Indian context it relates to the historical characteristic to which we have already referred of the continual and unresolved search for a meaningful institutional solution to demands of peoples for political self-determination. And all these concepts - nationality, national independence, political self-determination - can be encompassed within the general notion of viability: the conditions of state creation and state maintenance within the international society.

⁵⁷ But on the limits of even mediatory as distinct from protective intervention in the region, with particular reference to Guyana, see "Trinidad and Tobago and the British Guiana Question", Speech by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago in the House of Representatives 22nd and 27th November, 1963 (Trinidad & Tobago Government Printery, 1963).

⁵⁸ Sunday Gleaner (Jamaica), March 3rd 1963. Mr. Burnham has subsequently made numerous statements similar to that quoted.

SECESSION AND VIABILITY

We have already suggested that the crucial period for an entity which breaks its constitutional and institutional relations with a state of which it has been a part, by a unilateral declaration of independence - thus claiming to constitute itself a state - is that between its declaration of secession and its attainment of recognition of the status of statehood which it claims. Such recognition might come either from the state from which it has seceded, or from some major state or states in the international society which claim an interest in the now diminished state, or in the region in which it is situated.

Secession is an instance of forced or unilateral partitioning; it may have as its consequence a further partitioning of the existing entity.⁵⁹ But it is not to be equated with the act of partition itself, which is usually an act imposed by some external power or powers, as was the case with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,⁶⁰ or at best, an act of mutual separation.⁶¹ Secession is a disruptive act, transforming a period of tense relations between a group representing one section of a state and the state itself, into one of crisis. Partition is usually the consequence of a period of tense relations, and is a mechanism for avoiding crisis. Alternatively, it is the consequence of a crisis; but it does not, however initiate a crisis of inter-unit relations.⁶²

⁵⁹This, we argue below, is sometimes the consequence desired by the seceding entity.

⁶⁰See Macartney, C.A., Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937 (London: Oxford U.P., 1965, first published in 1937).

⁶¹As in the case of dissolution of the Malaysian Federation.

⁶²That is, between the entity claiming statehood and the original territory, with war, blockades or sanctions being the responses of the latter.

We attempt here, to examine the stages of sustenance of independence - through secession, and to look at the factors in the contemporary international society which either militate against it, or serve to promote it. Here historical evidence is useful, for an examination of a variety of cases tends to suggest that the modes of establishing and trying to sustain a secessionist independence are relatively fixed.⁶³ Technological changes in the forms of warfare and communication have not affected these modes in any substantial manner, so that for our analysis of contemporary cases, it seems useful to establish a framework based mainly on historical cases. It is not, in other words, that, for example, changes in methods of communication (transportation of capabilities and information) are not important, but that the extent of their significance in particular cases, is a function of other factors. The form of communication is a dependent variable.

We commence with a general proposition concerning secession: that the desire for secession is a consequence of two factors - a persistent feeling of humiliation on the part of some sector of a population, within a relatively clearly defined geographical area, plus some perception on the part of that sector of an advantage to be gained in the present. The advantage may be either psychological or material, but is, more often, the latter. We must distinguish between the desire for secession and the impetus to secession. The impetus to secession is contingent on some event or set of events that allows the leadership of the humiliated sector of the population to persuade its constituency that the persistent or continuing sense of humiliation is no longer bearable, and on a calculation, on the part of that

⁶³Partly because international law recognizes certain statuses for a seceding entity, which other states are required to recognize, between secession and recognition of statehood.

leadership, concerning its capacity to use the resources of, or accruing to, the entity for the purpose of short-run insulation of the entity from undesired penetration. Success at short-run insulation is the prerequisite for the prime objective of the secession: recognition by other entities, whether international organizations or states, considered relevant by the seceding entity. Further, short-run insulation of the entity involves not only the inhibition of undesired penetration, but the capacity to inhibit particular systems internal to the seceding entity from extending beyond the geographical boundaries of the entity, where such extension may be of negative utility.

A successful secession, therefore, (that is, one that succeeds in attaining recognition of claimed statehood), is dependent on the capacity of the entity to control both relevant internal and external systemic relations. 'External systemic relations' are those emanating from within the geographical boundaries of the entity and extending beyond them, as well as those outside the boundaries of the entity, but which are directed towards (and therefore within) those boundaries. Viability of the entity is, then, to be identified with its durability over some projected period of time, calculated on the basis of assessments of present resources and the short-run use of perceived advantages. Both of these must be looked upon as short-term assets, since their use will be contested by the party from which the secession is being attempted, as well as, possibly, by other elements in the international society. Resources, over time, may become incapable of transformation into capabilities.

Secession is, primarily, a strategy of small-state independence. Large entities, as long as they can control internal system relations, can survive in the international society without acquiring either recognition by any other major states in the international society, or

membership of international organizations in that society. Small entities require recognition of the statehood which they are claiming, or, at least, acquiescence, by relevant major states in their de facto assertion of independence. Further, the case for secession and, consequently, statehood, is easily legitimated only where the attempted separation is from a relatively large state, that is seen as not capable of maintaining its 'homogeneity' in such a way as to assist the maintenance of order in the international society. Conversely, an attempted secession is most difficult, where the existing entity is a relatively small one, for then, the utility of the secession for order-maintenance in the international society is likely to be taken as negative.⁶⁴

It follows that the optimum conditions for a successful secession are those in which (a) the existing state is subjected to further separations from its territory, either because of the activities of the seceding entity or because the existing state loses its capacity for maintaining internal control and other major states in the international society are not averse to the consequent disintegration; and (b) the seceding entity can demonstrate that its own homogeneity is such as to distinguish it clearly from the existing state, and to allow it to maintain internal control without competing claims from elements within it of politically significant heterogeneity.

If we take point (a) first, it can be seen that it becomes a matter of deliberate strategy that the seceding entity should attempt to persuade entities geographically contiguous to itself that their

⁶⁴ Thus a secession of Turks from Cyprus, or of Indians from Guyana is not taken as a viable strategy. The same applies to partition. Further it is usually not the case that, in a small state, the 'humiliated' sector of the population is concentrated overwhelmingly in one geographical area within the state.

separation from the existing territorial state can be a viable and beneficial act. The contiguous states become the first stakes of competition between the secessionist and the existing entities. Thus at the beginning of the American Civil War, "Secession leaders confidently expected that all fifteen slaveholding states would secede" and "the four states of North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi sent commissioners to the other slave-holding states to urge them to act" to this effect;⁶⁵ in any case, the seceding states hoped that their act would be the impetus to the complete disintegration of the state:

"During the first year following the secession of South Carolina, there were widespread hopes that the Union might disintegrate far beyond the slave South, that a Pacific Republic might form, that the Northwestern states might organize a republic, even that New York City, which had long been disgruntled over the treatment it received from the state, might secede and set itself up as a free city. ... In those troubled and uncertain waters the Confederacy was willing to fish".

So,

"to woo the Border slave states and even the states northward, the Confederate Congress early declared the Mississippi River free and open to the navigation of all states touching it or its tributaries ..."⁶⁶

This strategy has become virtually a constant of secessionist activity, though the tactics for attaining it may differ. In the case of the Katangese attempted secession from the Congo, Article 1 of the Katanga Constitution contained the assertion that "Katanga will open negotiations with [other regions of the former Congo] ... to constitute with them a confederation founded on the equality of partners".⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Coulter, E. Merton, The Confederate States of America 1861-1865 (Louisiana State U.P., 1950), Vol. VII, p. 3.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 53-4.

⁶⁷ Quoted in Gerard-Libois, J., Katanga Secession, (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 111-2.

For the ethnically heterogeneous Katanga, with ethnic groups spilling over its borders, a possible adherence to it of other contiguous territories (especially, in this case, South Kasai) would have to be an important consideration. Thus, we are told constituting an aspect of the "major controversy" within both Katanga and Belgium after the declaration of independence, was the question of whether " ... and independent Katanga" should "try as soon as possible to confederate the neighbouring border regions in a new political entity, covering, for example, Katanga, Kivu, Kasai (as a whole or at least the south), Rwanda, and Burundi".⁶⁸

Similarly, in the case of the secession of the entity calling itself Biafra from the Federation of Nigeria, the Biafran leader, helped by "unrest ... developing in the Mid-Western state, owing to increasing agitation by resident Ibos for a merger with Biafra" soon conducted a military campaign that succeeded in attaining Biafran control of the Mid-Western state.⁶⁹ The Biafran proclamation of independence, also, contained the provision that "We shall keep the door open for association with and would welcome any sovereign unit or units in the former Federation".⁷⁰ All of this was done in the context of, and with further trying to promote, some degree of uncertainty among other constituent units, about the viability of the Federation. Thus during the period of tension within the Federation, according to one source, an important political figure within the state,

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 109.

⁶⁹Keesing's, 1967, pp. 22242-3.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 22088: point 7 of the proclamation.

"Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the former Premier, resigned on April 25th from the ad hoc constitutional committee, and on May 1 he declared in Ibadan that if Eastern Nigeria were allowed to secede from the Federation, both West Nigeria and Lagos should stay out of the Federation. He stressed that only a peaceful solution could arrest the present worsening stalemate and restore normality, and added: 'There is no vital and abiding principle in any war between the East and the North'.⁷¹

It is, in fact sometimes difficult to discern whether perhaps a declaration of independence and certainly the attempts to disrupt relations between the remaining elements with the existing state, are perceived by the secessionists as tactics towards the control, at a subsequent period, of the whole of the original state, or are the prelude towards the creation of a system of inter-state relations that can assist the seceding entity in the long-run search for viability. In all the cases discussed here, there were doubts about this. In the American case,

"In the early days of the movement there was much talk and some fear that the people did not consider secession permanent. It was merely taking a position of vantage, from which a trade or compromise could be made to bring them back into the Union. Thus, in the very beginning, did the word reconstruction gain currency. In fact, one of the luring arguments of the secessionists had been, 'We can make better terms out of the Union than in it'.⁷²

In the case of the secession from the Congo, another point of major controversy centred around the question:

⁷¹Ibid., p. 22087. Our emphasis.

⁷²Coulter, op. cit., p. 18, emphasis in the original. He goes on to remark, however, that "there was in reality slight vitality in the sentiment of returning to the Union". (p.17).

"Was independence to be ... only provisional and tactical (a means to escape the influence of Leopoldville as long as the central authorities were Lumumbists), while awaiting a more favourable conjuncture in Leopoldville; was it not more worthwhile merely to support all provincial attempts at secession or semi-secession, without creating a new political grouping, if the future lay in the construction of a confederal or federal Congo within the present confines of the Republic?"⁷³

With respect to Nigeria, Colonel Ojukwu, starting from the assertion, before the declaration of independence, that, given the humiliations suffered by the Ibo peoples, that he was "unalterably convinced that to save the very semblance of Nigeria as one country we must drift a little apart",⁷⁴ argued, after, secession that the condition of some sort of reconciliation was that "the sovereignty of Biafra is irrevocable and cannot be a subject of negotiation", but made proposals in a "memorandum on future association" for, essentially, a confederal relationship between Biafra and Nigeria, that could be engaged in "without prejudice to the separate and individual identity of each state".⁷⁵ After the conquest of the Mid-Western state, the individual now in charge, Colonel Banjo, proclaiming that the forces in his charge would "for the moment remain independent", expressed his willingness, however to assist Ojukwu, claiming that he had made the following proposition to the latter:

"I requested from that when I shall have joined my effort with his to contain the Northern troops, and this being achieved, he on his part would assist me by providing me with the forces that we would need to save Nigeria".⁷⁶

⁷³Gerard-Libois, op. cit., pp. 109-110. See also the discussion on p. 111.

⁷⁴Keesing's, 1967, p. 22087.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 22245

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 222242-3.

The circumstances in which major states do not show any great aversion to a disintegration of some large state initiated by entity secession are varied. Sometimes it may be that for other states, the existing state has too great a predominance in the systems of relations in which they are concerned; they see secession as a means of reducing such predominance, the assumption being that the latter is due mainly to size. At other times, the existing state may simply appear an 'un-natural' unit, perhaps because of a heterogeneity of ethnic groups considering themselves separate nationalities and making a claim to statehood on this basis; here recognition of the principle of self-determination is the principal element of diplomatic strategy. The claims of assertive national groups are enhanced, if the existing state does not, over time, demonstrate, in addition, a capacity to physically control the scope of its territory. Thirdly, other states may simply perceive some material (economic) advantage to be gained from the dismemberment of a large state, where that dismemberment is conducted in a reasonably ordered manner.

The first case is best illustrated by an example, again, from the American Civil War, though the expression of sentiments were not "official" (made by a State). A prominent British journal of the time, the Economist, argued that,

"We sympathise with the South (so far as we sympathise at all) ... because we think that politically, the Southern States had a right to leave the Federation without hindrance and without coercion; because their behaviour towards England has been more decent and courteous than that of their antagonists; and because they were desirous to admit our goods at 10 per cent duty, while their enemies imposed 40 per cent".⁷⁷

The journal then goes on to give additional reasons for its belief that

⁷⁷ The Economist, September 28, 1861, p. 1066, in a leading article.

"the dissolution of the Union will prove a good to the world, to Great Britain, and probably in the end to America herself":

"The Great Republic of the West had grown in population, in prosperity, and in power at a rate and in a way which was not well either for her neighbours or herself. Her course had been so triumphant, so unparalleled, so free from difficulties, so unchequered by disaster or reverse, that the national sense and the national morality had both suffered in the process ... They /the people/ believed that no other nation could stand up against them, that none had a claim to interference with them or thwart them, that the rest of the world had no rights which could for a moment be suffered to stand in the way of their interests or designs. They were so rough, so encroaching, and so overbearing, that all other Governments felt as if some new associate, untrained to the amenities of civilised life, and insensible alike to the demands of justice and of courtesy, had forced its way into the areopagus of nations; - yet ... nearly every one was disposed to bear with them and defer to them, rather than oppose a democracy so ready to quarrel and so capable of combat. The result was, as might be expected, an increase of arrogance This being so - and who can gainsay it? - with what colour of consistency of reason can we be charged with selfishness⁷⁸ or want of generosity, because we rejoice that an excess of power which was menacing to others and noxious to themselves has been curtailed and curbed"⁷⁹

Arguing that "in future they will have to share the common lot of European nations, and to develop their resources and pursue their progress under the wholesome restraints of powerful neighbours and rival forms of polity", the journal denied that a multiplicity of states formed by the dismemberment of the Union could lead to chaos, as was seeming to happen in South America:

"If, indeed, there were any rational ground for the apprehension ... then there would be reason for re-considering our views. But ... even if the vast territory belonging to the old Republic, and stretching from Canada to Mexico, were to be severed into four independent States, each of them might be wider in extent,

⁷⁸The Economist was somewhat irked at the change of the Spectator that it was more concerned with protection of the cotton interest: that the editors had "stopped our ears with cotton wool against the cries of the maltreated slaves".

⁷⁹Economist, ibid.

richer in resources, and ultimately more populous and powerful, than the mightiest Monarchies of Europe".⁸⁰

The argument for the recognition of a right to self-determination in the context of the 'un-natural unit' assumption about the existing state, can be found in General de Gaulle's statements with reference to the Nigerian Civil War. Asserting that he was not sure that,

"... the concept of federation which replaces in certain places that of colonisation is always a very good one, or very practical, especially in Africa ... [because] in a word, it consists in arbitrarily putting together sometimes very different peoples, who therefore are not keen on it at all. What one has then is an ethnic element imposing its authority on all the others".

Thus,

"even before the present tragedy of Biafra took place, one could ask oneself how Nigeria might live in view of the upheavals it was going through In this affair France has assisted and is assisting Biafra to the limits of her possibilities. She has not taken the step, which for her would be decisive, the step of recognition ... because she thinks that the development of Africa is above all a matter for Africans".⁸¹

But de Gaulle was forthright in his support for the Biafrans "right of self determination"; and there could, M. Debre, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was to argue later, be "no possibility of negotiation unless this right is recognised".⁸²

The argument concerning loss of physical control from which is drawn the inference that no moral claim on, or responsibility for, a seceding territory continues to exist, is made by an American statesman

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 1066-67.

⁸¹ Keesing's, 1969, p. 23161; press conference of September 9, 1968.

⁸² Keesing's, ibid., Address to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly, December 12, 1968.

and former diplomat with respect to the declaration of independence by Rhodesia. Dean Acheson was here contesting the arguments of the United States Government that the secession was a concern of the international society, rather than, at best, a problem of the politics of the British Empire:

"... the British Government has conceded since 1923 that Rhodesia is not only self-governing but responsible for its own defence and security. Therefore, to assert de jure as well as de facto independence is not a transgression / of international law /".⁸³

The argument seems, in fact, to be two-fold: that if the British Government could not maintain order in the seceding territory, then it could hardly contest the territory's claim to statehood; and secondly, that in terms of the constitutional history of the territory, an independence of fact existed, and the international society had no right to interfere if the government of the territory attempted to claim in law what already existed in fact. Further, transgressions against "moral law" or contemporary practice - in this case, the non-representative character of the Rhodesian voting system - were, again, not sufficient cause for justifying international intervention.⁸⁴

⁸³Dean Acheson, letter to the Washington Post, reprinted in Africa Report Vol. 12, 1967, p. 56. The views of the United States Government which Acheson was contesting can be found in, Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations: The U.S. Position (Reprint from the Department of State Bulletin March 6, 1967), Department of State Publication 8214, March 1967.

⁸⁴United States Ambassador to the U.N., Arthur Goldberg (as a response to whose statements Acheson had written his letter) had in the Security Council argued, inter alia, that Southern Rhodesia had "unilaterally declared the independence of Southern Rhodesia, not in the interests of a majority of the people upon which a genuine declaration of independence might depend / our emphasis / but in the interests of a privileged minority, making this a spurious declaration of independence". Op. cit., (footnote 83 above) p. 4. Acheson's position is consistent with views on recognition expressed in 1949 when he was U.S. Secretary of State; see Acheson, Dean, "Waging Peace in the Americas", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 534, Sept. 26, 1949.

There is some consistency in these arguments with the general international law view that in order to make an effective demonstration to the international society that it has a valid claim to oppose an entity's independence, the state which is being seceded from must give some intimation that it has a capacity to assert its control. As one writer has put it, with respect to the Rhodesian case,

"The moral of the story is clear enough: negative legal controls are not a substitute for positive administrative powers. If a state wishes effectively to treat a certain territory as part of its domain, it must govern it, not merely lay claim to legal sovereignty over it. If it is not prepared to do this it is better to avoid legal entanglements".⁸⁵

In fact, as will be observable from the cases cited above, there are various types of entities, differentiated in terms of their social composition and location, which attempt to assert independence through secession; and any analysis of claims to independence has to be made in terms of the differences between these types. The types can be adumbrated in the following way. There is,

- (1) The secession of an ethnically homogenous group of people within some single geographical area claiming, on the basis of this to be a nationality, and claiming, consequently, a right of self determination through the institution of statehood.

⁸⁵Honore, A.M., Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 83, 1967, pp. 146-48 at p. 148, in a review of Palley, Claire, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1885-1965 (Oxford U.P., 1966). Our emphasis. For a view questioning even the efficacy of the "negative legal controls" that existed, see Palley, Claire, "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as Appellate Court - the Southern Rhodesian Experience", Public Law, Spring 1967, pp. 8-29.

- (2) A secession led by a group within a specific geographical area, which is the dominant ethnic group within the area, and which claims statehood for the whole area. The claim to independence is, often, not made in terms of nationality, but of a capacity to control the territory more effectively than the existing legal sovereign. The claim to leadership and independence may be made in opposition to other ethnic groups within the territory; thus dominance as here used indicates superior general capabilities rather than superior population.
- (3) The secession of groups within some area which are not ethnically homogenous, but which form an alliance based on interest. Here the claim to independence may constitute a tactic, rather than the total objective of the groups.
- (4) Secession and independence by imitation. This is the case in which a successful secession has the "demonstration effect" of secession of other entities of an original state.

The Stages of Secession

It now remains to delineate the various stages through which a secessionist entity may pass, or which it may set for itself, in order to arrive, at best, at the goal of recognition of independence; or at a minimum, at a stage where the original entity has ceased to actively contest its claim to independence, and other members of the international society acquiesce in its de facto independence.

We can commence with the obvious assertion that where a unilateral

declaration of independence is made, the original sovereign (the state from which the secession is being attempted) has two options: the first, to acquiesce in the declaration, and while perhaps not recognising the entity itself, to engage in no activity to persuade or inhibit other international actors from granting recognition. The second option is simply to oppose the accession by directing various forms of sanctions against the entity. The kinds of sanctions imposed against the entity will be a reflection both of the original sovereign's perception of its capacity to physically control the territory, and of its estimate of the length of time which it will take to attain the re-integration of the secessionist entity. This estimate is significant in terms of its capacity to minimise the probable opposition from other members of the international society to the attempt to attain re-integration.

The minimum sanction is one which engages no capabilities of the original sovereign itself, because it does not possess them - relative to the objective which it wishes to achieve; either because it perceives from the beginning that the seceding entity has vastly superior capabilities; because it itself wishes for a reduction of its territory (a partial self-liquidation); or because the secession is sponsored by another state with, again, capabilities superior to those which it possesses. The sanction here is, then, one which is dependent for its effectiveness on the behaviour of other states or international actors: the sovereign requests other states to abstain from recognition and to inhibit the normalisation of relations between themselves and the seceding entity (and where such relations exist, to dissolve them). This we refer to as the "external-dependence" sanction. The success of this strategy is contingent on only two factors: on the effectiveness of the moral case of the sovereign, or on the perceptions of the relevant actors that the allowance of the

secession would damage their own interests - where "interest" is defined to include the avoidance of an undesired disruption of international order.

The major sanction is the use of military force against the seceding entity, coupled with the use of capabilities for "closing" the conflict area from unwanted actor penetration from the rest of the international environment. And since such actor penetration may depend on the extent of transactions which the seceding entity is able to maintain with that environment, it might also be necessary to close the channels of structural connectedness, and, therefore, penetration.

The middle-level sanction (and in certain cases the optimum one) is that which is both dependent on unilateral action by the sovereign (use of force, inhibition of transaction between the sovereign and the seceding entity), and "external-dependent", that is, involving the minimum sanction in some degree. The efficacy of the "external-dependence" sanction, in the context of this combined strategy is related to the status of the sovereign, as determined by its "weight" in the systems of relations in which it is involved in the international society.

Now, we have argued that the impetus to secession is the consequence of a collective feeling of humiliation and a perceived present advantage. It follows that the sanctions against the secessionist entity will be directed against that entity's capabilities for realising the anticipated advantages. Hence the linkage between the first three stages in the secession process: (1) the declaration of independence; (2) the acceptance or non-acceptance of the claim to statehood, and consequently, the recognition or non-recognition of the entity as a state; (3) the decision, if there is no acceptance of the secession, on the kinds of sanctions that can be imposed on the entity. The advantages will be of two kinds: the immediate objective of self-rule,

as against what will, after the secession, be characterised as "alien" rule, and, secondly, the anticipation of a capacity to exploit some material resource, which, by means of secession it is hoped to remove from the control, and subsequently, from the authority of the original sovereign. We concentrate here on the second of the perceived advantages.

It is the value of the perceived material advantage that often constitutes the link between the desire for and the impetus to secession.⁸⁶ The value of this advantage makes it a stake of competition between the seceding entity and the sovereign, as well as between these and other actors in the environment. The objective of the original sovereign will therefore be to inhibit the acquisition or exploitation of the stake by the secessionist, by closing the channels through which transactions in it are conducted; the objective of the secessionist entity will be to keep such channels open. In many cases of secession, the stake is some exportable commodity, valuable to many actors in the international society - whether cotton, as in the case of the American Confederacy, copper, as in the case of the secession of Katanga, or oil, as in the case of the secession of Biafra. Hence the importance of the tactic of blockade, for the original sovereign, as a means of demonstrating to other actors that the seceding entity is unable to ensure the supply of the commodity valuable to them; and for the seceding entity, if it should gain control of the locus of production of the commodity, the importance of the selective use of the embargo, to demonstrate to the same actors the value of non-recognition or inhibition of the blockade,

⁸⁶The dependence of the English and French cotton industries upon southern cotton, and the seeming dependence upon the cotton industries of England and France for their existence, caused the southern people, led by Christy, Hammond and de Bow, to conclude that the need for southern cotton would force England and France to interfere on behalf of the South in case of secession and war. ... By 1860 the belief in the power of cotton to force European intervention was almost universal". Owsley, F.L., King Cotton Diplomacy (University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed. revised, 1959), p. 23. Our emphasis.

and the entitlement of the seceding entity to payment for the commodity. Payment for this commodity, given the possibility of the closing of other types of transactions, is likely to constitute the basis of the seceding entity's exchequer.

Thus in the case of the American Confederacy, the assumption that,

"A new nation would give the South a chance to profit from its own wealth and prevent the North from siphoning away an estimated \$100,000,000 annually ... The South would save enough on cotton to pay the cost of a new government".⁸⁷

It was confidence in this assumption, when added to the feeling of further humiliations in the future, that made the case for secession complete,⁸⁸ the central problem being to ensure that the financial returns from cotton could be continually secured.

Similarly, in the case of Katanga, a prime objective was now to ensure that the returns from the major stake of competition, copper, accrued to the exchequer of the new entity, and this its Government was able to do, as long it could ensure that production and export of the mineral would continue:

"The mining enterprises, the chartered companies, and the Office Special d'Imposition de Brussels (the tax bureau) acknowledged the fact that 'since the proclamation of independence, on July 11, 1960, Katanga has become the collector of taxes and mining royalties and of all obligations to the state' ... Assured of duties and fiscal receipts as long as mining activities and transportation of the output could be maintained, the Katangan state had at its disposal important revenues since it no longer remitted any funds to Leopoldville. These revenues constituted the ideal means of providing for the operations of the state".⁸⁹

⁸⁷Coulter, E.M., op.cit., p.13; see also Ch. XI, "Cotton Finances Abroad: Cotton as a Basis of Credit", in Owsley, op. cit.

⁸⁸"It was not simply the fact of Lincoln's election that induced the South to secede ... it was the fact that a sectional program dangerous to the other section had come into power". Coulter, op. cit., p.13.

⁸⁹Gerard-Libois, J., Katanga Secession, pp. 115-116.

The attempts of the Biafran leaders to gain for their entity returns from oil sales were not as immediately successful, but this was also a prime and continuing objective. Eastern Nigeria (now called Biafra by the secessionists), being the locus of the major proportion of oil production in Nigeria, Colonel Ojukwu, having declared the independence of the region, set out to gain the revenues by "ordering all companies to supply information on oil revenues" now, it was claimed, payable to the new state. Biafra's physical control, at that time, of the oil-producing and refining areas, faced the oil companies, for example the largest Shell-BP "with the dilemma of whether to pay the Federal Government revenue in respect of property over which the latter no longer had de facto control, or whether to accede to demands by the unrecognised regime in Enugu (the capital of Biafra), which was in physical control of most of the Shell-BP assets in Nigeria".⁹⁰ When it became known that Shell-BP in Biafra had agreed to pay revenues to that Government, in the form of a token royalty (though it was later claimed that this had been done under duress), the Government of Nigeria took the next obvious step - the imposition of a "blockade on the movement of oil tankers to and from Bonny, the terminal of all Nigerian oil pipelines".⁹¹

In a sense, payment by other international actors, for resources controlled, becomes in the short run a more important objective than state recognition itself. For recognition would also depend on

⁹⁰ Keesing's, 1967, p. 22241.

⁹¹ Ibid., Shell-BP having, now, decided not to make any payment, the Biafran Government proceeded to expropriate its assets and to inhibit the Company's operation. The British Government objected to the blockade as invalid in international law, but the Nigerian Government denied this. The additional problem for the U.K. Government was that these events were taking place at a time when, as a result of the Arab-Israeli war, it was threatened with being temporarily denied oil from the Middle East. See Ibid.

the relations of these actors with other actors in the international society. In addition, until it becomes clear that the declaration of independence is a total objective, rather than a tactic, recognition might become embarrassing to the state doing so. The tactics of states wishing to continue normal relations with the secessionist entity, become either to, as a temporary measure, recognise a "right of self-determination" as was the case with France in relation to Biafra, thereby demonstrating some degree of sympathy for the secessionist cause; to plead incapacity to do otherwise than continue normal relations, on the grounds that such relations are important for the maintenance of its own viability; or to continue relations on the grounds that the secessionist entity is the only one capable of protecting its interests in the original state.

Switzerland's response to the British imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia is a partial illustration of the second of these. The argument here was that to engage in sanctions would negative the status of neutrality that Switzerland had always claimed as the basis of its external relations. In fact, a compromise policy was attempted:

"The Swiss Government supported Britain's economic measures against Rhodesia ... by temporarily blocking the Rhodesian Reserve Bank's account in the Swiss National Bank. At the same time the Swiss Foreign Minister (then Professor Friedrich Wahlen) announced that Switzerland had not recognised Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence or the regime headed by Mr. Smith; that the Swiss Government would ban the export of arms and ammunition to Rhodesia; and that all Rhodesian goods entering Switzerland would require import licences which would not be granted above the normal volume of imports in recent years. Professor Wahlen added, however, that Switzerland would not take part in any economic sanctions against Rhodesia ..."⁹²

The attitude of the South African Government to the British imposition of sanctions, can also be seen in the context of the viability argument, though in this case there was a complete hostility to even minimal disruption of normal economic relations. Arguing that the secession did not constitute an international problem, but was to be regarded as

⁹²Keessing's, 1966, p. 21176.

"a domestic issue between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia", the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, further justified a policy of "non-interference" on the grounds that,

"It would be idle to hide ... that most South Africans are convinced that it would neither be just, advantageous nor wise to White or Black in Rhodesia to seek to hasten Black Government ... Black supremacy would ... damage peace and harmony in this part of Africa, lead to economic deterioration and unemployment, and create either distress or danger on South Africa's border ..."⁹³

The domestic issue argument in effect links, in the case of secession from empire, the 'viability' tactic with the 'right of self-determination' one. As suggested in the remarks quoted from Dean Acheson's statement, secessionists might consider it easier to make the case for recognition when the declaration of independence is from an empire - at least in the contemporary period.⁹⁴

The last of the tactics, the secessionist entity as the only capable protector of interests, is, essentially, the one used by Belgium after the secession of Katanga. On July 16, 1960, the Belgium Cabinet announced that while "the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Belgium by the Congo is not an accomplished fact", it was bound to take cognisance of the fact of "the absence of governmental action in Leopoldville and the state of anarchy which reigns in part of the Congo". On the other hand, it noted "the fact that the Government of Katanga has proclaimed its independence, that order reigns there and economic life has been resumed. It also notes that the Katangese Government has requested the collaboration of Belgian technicians. The support of our collaboration is assured to Katanga, as to all the other

⁹³All these quotations from Keesing's, 1966, p. 21245.

⁹⁴In the case of Katangese secession, it is reported that, "Les artisans de cette independence avaient pense ... qu'il serait plus aise de 'forcer' la decision alors que le gouvernement belge administrait le Congo, que de l'obtenir sous le gouvernement congolais". Ganshof Van Der Meersch, W.J. Fin de la Souverainete Belge au Congo (Bruxelles: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1963), p. 586.

regions of the Congo where security and order exist".⁹⁵ At the same time (in fact on the following day), the Prime Minister's chef de cabinet reportedly asserted that "while Belgium had no intention of interfering in Katanga's internal affairs, she was prepared to give economic and technical aid, including the organisation of the police and security forces", though this was not meant to "imply any degree of recognition by Belgium".⁹⁶

The tactic would seem to have been to use the stabilisation of Katanga as the basis for the reconstruction of the Congo on different lines, while not antagonising, through recognition, other significant international actors.

Where, then, sanctions against the seceding entity are of an economic character (or where blockades or embargoes form part of an economic, as distinct from a military strategy), the degree of success of the entity is dependent not so much on immediate recognition, but on its capacity for resisting the closure of existing channels of communication, as a means of demonstrating its durability. In this situation of peaceful (non-war) opposition on the part of the original state, the continuance of de facto relationships in a context of non-recognition is the mechanism for delaying recognition until the arrival of more propitious circumstances.

Where, on the other hand, sanctions are of a military character, they are inevitably coupled with economic sanctions. The stake of competition here is more territory; but this is another way of saying that the stake is the "status of belligerency". The original state, while trying to achieve the recognition of military blockade, must at

⁹⁵Keesing's, 1960, p. 17645.

⁹⁶Reported remarks of Count Harold d'Aspremont-Lynden in Elisabethville, July 17, 1960, Keesing's 1960, p. 17646.

the same time attempt to prevent the recognition by other powers of a state of belligerency between itself and the seceding entity. On the other hand the recognition of belligerency is for the latter an advantage, for the international society now recognises its de facto control of territory, and of assets valuable to that society. It is perhaps true that the recognition of belligerency is "nothing more than a recognition that a war rather than a street fight ... [is] in progress", that the rules of war apply to all parties,⁹⁷ and that it legitimises the blockade imposed by the original state; the danger for the latter, however, is that the conditions occasioning the recognition of a status of belligerency should prolong themselves (it is on the other hand, the advantage for the secessionist entity), and lead to demands by other international actors for armistice and mediation between the combatants.

The context in which demands for armistice and mediation are made has scarcely varied with time. We use here, a description of the case of the American Civil war:

"The Economist came out with a strong editorial ... advocating mediation ... There are several conditions, continued the Economist in which mediation is justified: when the object of war has become unattainable; when combatants are so evenly matched that war would be indefinitely prolonged without a decision; when the conflict shows signs of degenerating into a barbaric war of extermination; when neutrals are being injured beyond what might be expected to be endured; and when the situation seems to indicate a line of settlement. The Economist thought most of these conditions were present. The North would never conquer or hold the South, the two were evenly balanced in a military way; ... the industries of Europe had suffered more than was just from the war; and the military situation indicated fairly well the line of settlement".⁹⁸

⁹⁷The description by Coulter (op. cit., p. 187) in the context of the simultaneous recognition of the Confederacy by England and France. We view belligerency as indicating that more than a civil war exists between the entities; from this period, in our view, the original state has to plead for time: to demonstrate that it is making progress towards subordination of the secessionist entity. The latter, on the other hand, has, at a minimum, to try to maintain the status quo.

⁹⁸Owsley, F.L., King Cotton Diplomacy, pp. 297-8. The reference is to The Economist, June 14, 1862.

It becomes, then, the task of the original entity to insist that the situation described above is not the case, and to demonstrate that it is still not in the 'interest' of significant international actors to engage in diplomatic intervention that has the objective of mediation.⁹⁹

The additional variable in the contemporary society is that of the existence of international institutions, for example the United Nations, which incline to the maintenance of, rather than 'balkanisation' of existing states, where the latter are not imperial states. The international institution, depending on its resources, may assume the functions of the original state, so that it becomes necessary for those interested in mediation to show that not only is the government of the state unable to maintain "security and order", but that the international institution, also, is unable to do so. Counterbalancing this, however, is the fact that the substantial resources of the international institution for this task are likely to come from significant international actors; the success of its activity will depend, therefore, on the extent of commitment of these actors to the maintenance of the original state.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Another useful historical case here is that of the attempted secession of the Sonderbund from Switzerland. See the series of reports published in The Spectator (London) on September 4, 11, 18, 25 and October 2, 9, 16, 1847. These were written by George Grote and later published in book form under the title Seven Letters on the Recent Politics of Switzerland. See also The Spectator, December 11, 1847, p. 1183, and The Economist, "The Progress of Strife in Switzerland", Oct. 23, 1847, p. 1217.

¹⁰⁰ See in the case of the Congo, Hoffmann, S. "In Search of a Thread: The U.N. in the Congo Labyrinth". International Organisation, Vol.16, 1962, pp. 331-61.

CONCLUSION

The present chapter and the preceding one have attempted to create frameworks for analysing the prospects for viability of states in two different sets of circumstances: where problems of location and social composition are central to the survival of the state, so that the initial conditions of independence are an indication of the state's capacity for continuing autonomy; or where the entity is, from the beginning of its statehood subjected to forms of, for example, treaty arrangements, which are at one and the same time supports for some degree of autonomy and restrictions on that autonomy. The case of Cyprus illustrates the extent to which such restrictions constitute the condition of the sponsorship of independence; that of Lebanon the situation in which the state accepts linkages with other states through treaty arrangements, which may, in terms of its location in a particular geographic area, inhibit its activity in the policies of that area. Where location and social composition are important, then the systemic size of the state, (its transactions beyond its physical boundaries) is a major determinant of its survival as a physically-bounded political unit.

Secondly, we have examined the problems of seceding entities: important because, the capacity of the entity to survive while its claim to statehood is contested is the condition of its attainment of independence. De facto international existence is, for it, in the short run, the test of viability. We have argued that in the analysis of secession and opposition to secession, the conditions of international society seem sufficiently similar, to allow the use, to some advantage in the analysis, of frameworks based on historical cases.

The following chapters are, in effect, also concerned with the problems of small-state viability. But there we ask how the state can

sustain (maintain and develop) the conditions making for its survival as a recognisable international unit. We examine the situations in which such survival, given forms of linkages in the international society, is more de jure than de facto. But in order to do this, we have, first, to examine the perspectives that major actors in the international society have of small states; and this is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

OBJECTS OF MANAGEMENT DIPLOMACY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE GREAT POWERS

"The UK is not accustomed to receiving advice from small Balkan countries".¹

A Great Power is one which, finding itself at the centre of an international crisis, that is, one which it interprets as likely to have major effects on its national interests and security unless controlled or resolved, is able to formulate a policy or strategy for the resolution of that crisis without the necessity for prior consultation with either its "allies" or its opponents. On the basis of this definition, we would assert that only the United States and the Soviet Union qualify as "great powers" in the contemporary international society.

Now, this is in large measure, a subjective definition - one limited to the particular powers' own definition of themselves. But it bears a relation to two objective criteria. First, given the on-going and dynamic character of the systems of international relations (to which we have alluded in Chapter 1), we assume that the taking of decisions, by any power, towards the resolution of an international crisis, is done on the basis of some relatively objective assessment of capabilities possessed; and the Great Power is one which, as we have earlier suggested, demonstrates a capacity to direct, control or influence such extensive areas of the international environ-

¹Reported remarks of the Head of the British Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, to the Yugoslav Ambassador, during the Suez crisis of 1956. Quoted in Thomas, Hugh, The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966, 1967) p. 133.

ment which, as a consequence of its size and other attributes, it finds itself involved in.

Next, an assertion about international stratification (quoted in our Chapter 2) by Raymond Aron, introduces the historical, as well as the capabilities, dimension into what we use as our second criterion. Aron has suggested that "international society involves a hierarchy of prestige which approximately reflects the hierarchy established by preceding combats".² There is a danger here of ex post facto analysis; but if, in addition, we extend the notion of "combats" to include all spheres of competition (that is, peaceful competition as well as military conflict) the assertion can be justifiably used as a means of indicating the changing relationships of powers to each other and to the systems of international relations. It is useful, also, for indicating (what is important for us, dealing with, in particular, the post-1945 period) the extent to which great powers can gradually lose that status: for illuminating the status, for example, of the "declining imperial power". For the Great Power must, on balance, over some period of time, establish its predominance on a range of issues in which it becomes involved in the international environment. And predominance here is taken to include psychological, as well as material predominance, the former being a much more transient phenomenon than the latter.

Both of our criteria must, however, be amplified by another consideration: that the Great Power is one which must not only feel itself capable of taking, unilaterally, decisions towards the resolution of an international crisis, but must, in so doing, be able to inhibit other powers in the society from intervening in the process of implementa-

²Aron, R., Peace and War, p. 69.

tion of these decisions. The process of implementation of decisions must here be distinguished from the consequences of implementation; the point being that even where consequences are disadvantageous to the Great Power, decisions relating to the reversal of policy remain predominantly with that Power itself. Since all these processes are observable ones, the analyst is able to make some judgement, over time, about the loss of, or accretion to, power and status of a state.

We can look at some examples that illustrate the utility of the criteria we have suggested. First, we take the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Here, as one analyst has observed, in spite of the implications of the crisis for the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole,

"...the Cuban crisis was not handled as an alliance crisis; instead an executive committee of seventeen senior members of the U.S. Administration - 'the Ex-Comm' - was formed which wrestled for four days with differing views of what the American response should be. Only when it had been decided ... was the OAS asked to endorse the American decision and was Mr. Dean Acheson despatched to brief the NATO Council, a few hours before the Soviet Union was confronted publicly in the Security Council.... The President made up his mind how he was going to handle this Soviet challenge and then asked his allies for their support"³

Buchan quotes A. and R. Wohlstetter to the effect that allied support on the basis of information rather than consultation was of prime importance. "Can we be sure" they ask,

"that a welter of doubts and alternative proposals might not have altered Khrushchev's estimate of the singleness of American resolve? If it had, the crisis might not have ended where it did".⁴

But considerations relating to the importance of dissent must be weighted against, and seen in the context of, Kennedy's warning to

³Buchan, A., Crisis Management (The Atlantic Papers, Nato Series II Boulogne-sur-Seine, France: The Atlantic Institute, 1966), p. 33.

⁴Ibid., p. 34, Quoted from their Controlling the Risks in Cuba, Adelphi Paper No. 17, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies).

to potentially wayward Latin American Governments after the 1961 Bay of Pigs crisis, that,

"should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action - if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration - then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation",⁵

and of Kennedy's assertion, during the missile crisis itself, that,

"This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum - in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful - without limiting our freedom of action".⁶

In a crisis of this nature, all other powers (that is, other than the protagonists) are reduced to being spectators. They can play no mediatory role, but are forced to limit their activity to approval or disapproval. As Harold Macmillan, then Prime Minister of Britain, explained the position of his Government, "After sending this message [of support for the American position] which made clear where Britain stood, one could not help wondering what would happen next.

There was no more that we could do except wait and see what would happen".⁷ So that, though one participant in the decision-making

process was later to write that the "diplomatic effort" engaged in by the United States towards its allies "was of great significance",⁸

the important point in relation to this is, that diplomacy was carried

⁵"Address by President Kennedy to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 20 April, 1961", in Documents in International Affairs (London, O.U.P., 1965), pp. 23-26 at pp. 23-4.

⁶"Address to the Nation, October 22, 1962", in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1962 (Doc. III-49), (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1966), p. 402, our emphasis.

⁷In his report to the House of Commons, see H.C. Debs., Vol. 666 at col. 40, 30th October, 1962. Our emphasis.

⁸Robert Kennedy, McCall's Magazine, November 1968, p. 150.

on with the purpose of obtaining allied support, an attributed role which the allies perceived and entered into.

A second relevant example is that of the case in which Britain, France and Israel were involved in the invasion, in 1956, of Egypt. Here, Britain and France, "official" great powers of the post-war period, assumed that, in a protracted crisis with international implications which had already been, and was continuing to be, the subject of extensive international discussion and negotiation, they could undertake without the knowledge of the United States, the preparation and initiation of a military intervention in Egypt. These countries, starting from the assumption that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt affected their national interests and security more significantly than it did that of the United States or the Soviet Union, decided to act (given our definition) "like" Great Powers in the international society of the 1950's. The secretive manner of their preparations (undertaken without the "official" knowledge of the United States) is indicative of their assumption that they possessed a capacity for unilateral decision-making and execution in what was an international crisis, and for the control of the relevant systems of the international environment that this implied.

But it is not simply the secretive aspect of the intervention, or even its consequent failure, that is suggestive of both of these powers' loss of status as great powers in the international society. Rather it is the incapacity of either Britain or France to insulate their action and its consequences from the possible intervention of the United States and Britain, that illustrates their "non-great" power status. Whatever they may have thought during the period of planning for their bi-lateral resolution of the crisis, it can be

seen ex post (though it might have been predicted before the events⁹), that the boundaries of their systems of action extended across the Atlantic and were incapable of being controlled without the participation of elements in that sector.

Unlike the United States in the Bay of Pigs crisis of 1961, which Buchan describes as being "like Suez... conceived and conducted largely as a conspiracy within a [the U.S.] government",¹⁰ Britain and France were unable to resolve the crisis in which they were concerned as major actors, even if to their disadvantage, on the basis of autonomously determined modes of decision-making. Britain, for example, responded, substantially, to threats of financial pressure from the United States. This is the case in which the state found itself engaged in a structure of relations weighted in such a manner as to reflect its dependence on some other unit (in this case, the U.S.), and was no longer able, in the crisis, to take locally (nationally) determined decisions. This was not simply a matter of not being able to exercise control of decision making or of the consequences of decision-making, but that control would have to be exercised within a structure of interdependence that reflected a position of subordination from which

⁹The London Economist had commented, before the intervention, on the inefficiency of a military intervention as a means of resolution of the crisis. See "Long Haul at Suez", Aug. 11, 1956, pp. 463-464. According to one account, Mr. Macmillan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had hoped that the United States reaction to military intervention might be a passive one, that Eisenhower would assist by "lying doggo" while Britain and France proceeded in their activities. See Thomas, Hugh, op. cit., p. 133. Instead, apart from mere disapproval, the U.S. threatened financial pressure against the British economy. See, on the whole episode, the choleric but useful account in Finer, H., Dulles Over Suez: The Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964). Finer (p. 276) describes Macmillan as "the strongest advocate within the Cabinet of a punitive treatment of Nasser".

¹⁰Op. cit., p. 32.

bargaining was impossible.¹¹

The example is important in illustrating the distinction which we made in Chapter 1 between "administrative international relationships" and "international political relationships" (supra pp. 49/50). Another writer makes a distinction which seems similar to this, between what he calls "command relationships" and "bargaining relationships".¹² We would suggest that as the Suez adventure evolved, Britain, for example, found herself responding to the international environment in a manner that reflected a perception of herself as being located in a situation that approximated more closely to administrative (or command) rather than an international political (or bargaining) relationship.

The distinction here developed seems useful, for it allows us to make status gradations among great powers themselves in relation to specific issues, on the basis of their location within a structure of relationships along a continuum between the administrative and the political; and it is useful in helping to discern the extent to which the same state may, at different times, attain to different statuses within the international society.

The case of the United Kingdom can again be used in further illustrating this, by means of two examples. The decision, in December of 1962, on the part of the United States to cease manufacture of the

¹¹The loss of financial reserves led to the fear within the British Government of the possibility of a devaluation of the pound. The Government was forced to request financial assistance from the U.S. and from the International Monetary Fund. Finer suggests that this was agreed to but only on condition that Britain called an immediate ceasefire. See Finer, op. cit., pp. 428-9; also Moncrieff, A. (ed.), Suez, Ten Years After (London: BBC Publications, 1967), for the views on this of Paul Bareau, Peter Calvocoressi and C.M. Woodhouse at pp. 24-27.

¹²McDermott, John in the symposium, "No More Vietnams?" Part 2, at p. 111 in The Atlantic, Vol. 222, No. 6, December 1968.

Skybolt missile which, as the consequence of a previous agreement¹³ it had agreed to sell to the United Kingdom, disrupted the system of expectations on the basis of which the British Government had devised a defence strategy. An analysis of the details of this case suggests, fairly clearly, that the extent of consultation between the U.S. Government and the British Government before the decision had been taken to cancel the production of the missile was minimal. It also seems that when informed, the British Government was therefore constrained to accept the decision.¹⁴

In effect, the United Kingdom found itself in the subordinate position in this bilateral relationship, nearer the administrative (command) end of the continuum. This was the consequence, mainly, of three factors related to the structure of dependence of this relationship. First, the terms of the relationship (the Agreement embodied in a so-called "minute of intent") made, no doubt on account of her financial situation, for no degree of British participation, and therefore integration, in the process of manufacture of the weapon, so that she had no control of the relevant decision systems concerning its development. Secondly, the United Kingdom did not perceive it useful to use as a bargaining weapon, the other element in the

¹³See on this Keesing's, 1960, p. 1746; and Keesing's, 1961, p. 18118, for the debate on the Report on Defence, 1961 of February 28, 1961 at which the announcement that Britain would buy the Skybolt was made.

¹⁴Though there was much insistence on the part of the British that no formal decision had been taken, or would be taken by the U.S., before extensive consultation with the British Government the tenor of remarks by Mr. McNamara, Secretary of Defence (11th December 1962) and Mr. Kennedy (12th and 17th December 1962) made it quite unlikely that the U.S. Government could be persuaded to reverse their inclinations at the Kennedy-Macmillan meeting in Nassau of 18th to 21st December. See Keesing's, 1963 pp. 19173-4; also Schlesinger, A., A Thousand Days, pp. 856-66.

Agreement which might have been considered an asset - her commitment to allow the U.S. to use part of her land area (the Holy Loch), as a military site for its Polaris submarines. And thirdly, within the terms of the system of Atlantic defence, the Skybolt could not be considered an important stake.¹⁵

The somewhat different second example is that relating to the British negotiation of a loan from the United States, at the end of the Second World War. Here, again, the United Kingdom had, initially, found itself at the end of the war, in a subordinate administrative relationship as is suggested, at least in the eyes of the British, by the abrupt cancellation of the Lend-Lease Agreement by the United States. Here, again, was a disruption of the expectation and role systems, at least as far as the British were concerned; for they had assumed that the Americans would continue the Anglo-American relationship immediately after the war in terms of the notion, or value-orientation, of "equality of sacrifice".¹⁶ A new loan which the United Kingdom Government was seeking, however, was to be within the terms of a more general agreement concerning the objectives that the United States had for a re-arrangement of international monetary and commercial relations in the post-war period. Here, the U.K. was able to balance its desire for a loan, against the U.S. objectives and requirements, and therefore, to place itself in a bargaining relationship with the U.S., in spite of its (the United Kingdom's) own relatively weak national economic position.

¹⁵ Note however in the subsequent agreement that Britain would buy Polaris missiles from the U.S., to replace Skybolt, the emphasis put on the necessity for the integration of Polaris in the Atlantic (N.A.T.O.) defence systems. See "Statement on Nuclear Defence Systems", Keessing's, 1963, pp. 19174-5, especially points 6 to 9.

¹⁶ See Gardner, R., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956) Ch. 9. Though, Gardner remarks, "Unfortunately, British opinion showed little awareness ... of clear statements of American policy" to the contrary (p. 177).

As Gardner puts it:

"Without the loan, Britain would not join the Bretton Woods institution. Without Britain, the Fund and the Bank could not begin operations. For the same reasons, there would be little prospect for the early establishment of an International Trade Organization. Thus rejection of the Financial Agreement [by Congress, for example] would not only upset existing plans for the revival of multilateral trade; it would blight the outlook for multilateralism for an indefinite future".¹⁷

So far, we have been discussing the relationship of states of fairly extensive capabilities to each other, and the extent of and limits on their activities in international crises in which the largest (in material capabilities) and highest status states - the Superpowers - are from the beginning immediately involved; or become involved as the consequence of a perception that a particular crisis is likely directly to affect their national security or interests. These are states (the Superpowers) whose capabilities allow them (as we have suggested in Chapter 2) to control or, at least, exercise a dominating influence both on the directions of international transactions, and over a variety of role and expectations systems through the international society. Such control or dominating influence as we refer to, need not be, and we suggest, frequently is not in the contemporary society, institutionalised, in the sense that it may be possible to argue that the British control of colonies, protectorates and domination of treaty relations institutionalised its imperial control.

Now, most analysts would agree that the state of highest status in the contemporary international society is the United States: an assertion stemming from assessments of its predominance in the

¹⁷Op. cit., p. 224. Further, "The British leaders made it clear on several occasions that the American loan was for Britain a prerequisite to Bretton Woods (p. 224, nt. 1). However (p. 224), "Deprived of transitional aid from the United States and Canada... Britain would face a drastic cut in its living standards and a serious setback in its reconstruction plans".

possession of relevant physical attributes, as well as of the extent of its dominance in structures of transaction among the elements of international society; it possesses the largest systemic size. Magdoff, for example, makes the factual assertion, in a discussion of United States' trade and aid policy, that as far as that country is concerned,

"there are two dominant and interrelated ends [of foreign aid policy] toward which control and influence is exercised: (a) to keep the outer rim of the imperialist network as dependencies of the system, and (b) to sustain and stimulate the growth of capitalist forces - economic and political - within these countries".¹⁸

The inference is clear that on the basis of foreign economic policy, a large degree of political control in the international society is exercised by the United States. Thus, for him, though none of the institutional paraphernalia of colonialism characteristic of the period of British imperial control exists:

"In effect, there exists in the United States... an underlying unity of the domestic economy, the foreign economic activity of industry and finance, the military, and international diplomacy".¹⁹

This requires that,

"...international political and military activity must be directed to establishing and sustaining political and military control. Here... the issue is not which comes first. Economic control, military control, and political control mutually support and stimulate each other".²⁰

It is interesting that in another analyst, George Liska, far removed from an inclination to the use of Marxist methodology should come to a somewhat similar conclusion, though in terms of a mixture of factual and normative assertions. Arguing on the basis of analogy with

¹⁸Magdoff, H., The Age of Imperialism, p. 139.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 166.

²⁰Ibid., p. 167.

the Roman Empire, he defines an "empire" as "a state exceeding other states in size, scope, salience, and sense of task... a state that combines the characteristics of a great power, which, being a world power and a globally paramount state, becomes automatically a power primarily responsible for shaping and maintaining a modicum of world order".²¹ He then goes on to conclude that "...the United States has built its pre-eminent position with the aid of immemorial instruments of empire".²² It is "an imperial state planted at the focus of the international system".²³

Both of these writers therefore take the view that the United States, because of its large systemic size, becomes involved, in some significant manner, in problems of order in the international society, wherever they may arise. It is their normative evaluations of that country's position that differ. The position of the Soviet Union might, then, be looked upon as being simply less extensive in scope. "The United States" Liska argues, "is not the sole major power in the relevant world, even if it is the primary power".²⁴ Another writer has already made this point, by means of the use of a graphic description by Nikita Khrushchev, in 1960, of the Communist bloc's position in, and objectives towards, the international society:

²¹Liska, G., Imperial America, pp. 9 and 10. Our emphasis

²²Ibid., p. 24.

²³Ibid., p. 26. Liska asserts that three "specific key features" define the United States as such: "One is the tendency for other states to be defined by their relation to the United States; another is the great and growing margin for error in world affairs which guarantees that barring an act of folly, the United States can do no wrong under the unwritten law of balance of power; and yet another has been the slow, hesitant, and still inconclusive movement toward containment aimed at America's supremacy" (p. 26. Our emphasis). For a critique of Liska's arguments see Hoffmann, S., Gulliver's Troubles - or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (N.Y.: McGraw Hill Paperbacks, 1968), pp. 46-51.

²⁴Ibid., p. 109.

"The world is ... made up of socialist and capitalist countries. They can now be regarded as two communicating vessels. At present the capitalist vessel is, in terms of number of states, the larger. But this is a temporary situation, History is developing in such a way that the level in the capitalist vessel will be dropping while the socialist vessel will be filling up".²⁵

The perception here is of the Soviet Union in a subordinate material and status hierarchical system in which the United States is at the apex.■

All these descriptions seem to assume a direct relationship between predominance in non-political transactions and control of political processes on the part of the high-status powers. But the view of Richard Falk, seems to introduce a different and perhaps useful, dimension. He argues that "the altered structure of international relations brought about principally by nuclear technology, the appearance of new states, and the growth of international organisation" in the post war period, has made it more difficult for high-status states to impose the conditions that constrain lesser states to adhere to the norms justifying their practices:

"A norm cannot gain effectiveness in the contemporary world because it serves the interests of a powerful state; the absence of consensus among the most powerful states leads them to be unable to use this power except, and even here to a diminishing extent, against weaker states within their immediate sphere of influence. This virtual neutralization of the big states gives effective reality to the sovereignty of the weaker states. As a general proposition, this makes an active consent among the weaker states, or at least their consensus, a necessary precondition to the effectiveness of a contemporary rule of international law".²⁶

²⁵Quoted in George Liska in his, The Communist International System, from Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 12, No. 23, 1960, pp. 4-5. There is some similarity here to Mao Tse Tung's phrase: "The East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind".

²⁶Falk, Richard, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (N.Y.: Syracuse U.P. 1964) pp. 18-19.

Falk, perhaps, overstates the case, if his description is taken as relating to the present situation. It would be necessary to differentiate between small states (developed as against under-developed), in order to suggest that much norm-making is not directly applicable to a large number of small states: for example, in the realm of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Given differences in capabilities, norms relating to this can be taken as irrelevant. Where they are seen as relevant by small states,²⁷ the latter find themselves in a partly administrative relationship with the high-status powers, in the sense that they have to balance the benefits gained from refusal to adhere to norms or rules, in whose enunciation they have taken little part, against the capacities of the high-status powers to withdraw or refuse assets presently required.

But Falk, nevertheless, makes a point which we accept and extend: that, although there may be a fair degree of coherence of transactions and processes, weighted towards the high-status, or even large developed powers, it is more difficult at present, as compared even with the immediate post-war period, for these powers to define and sustain coherent systems of roles and expectations that match their predominance in 'material' systems. Such an assertion is more or less valid depending on the issues in which the powers become involved, but it sets the context of our earlier proposition that the international society is best viewed as a fractioned one, in which systems of relations cannot a priori be assumed to be, in relation

²⁷The case of Israel is, as an example, instructive here. For a discussion of the problem of small-state adherence to super-power instituted legal rules in this area, see Vital, D., "Double Talk or Double Think? A Comment on the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty", International Affairs, Vol. 44, 1968, pp. 419-433.

to all issues and areas, tightly linked one to the other.²⁸

We now suggest a categorisation for distinguishing between different kinds of dominant powers in the international society. The distinctions which we prefer to make with respect to states of high status is between:

- (1) Dominating High Status States - referred to in the contemporary society as Superpowers
- (2) Mediating High Status States
- (3) Regionally-restricted Dominating States
- (4) Regionally-restricted Mediating States.

The first of these categories we have already discussed. When we refer to them as 'dominating' in the international society, we do not wish to suggest that they 'control' all systems of international relations, but that their predominance in an extensive set of these systems implies that all other actors of the international society take them (their predominance) into account in the determination of their own policy. But it would be erroneous to assume that the dominating high-status powers can direct and control the execution of unilaterally-determined policy, to their advantage, throughout the international society over time and in relation to all issues; though they may be able to do so in relation to some restricted

²⁸ We would not here, therefore, accept the empirical assertion that the United States controls an imperial system where this is viewed as an international political system, and where one is meant to draw the inference that the United States can direct all systems of international relations in the society. However we accept that the U.S. does have control or domination in a number of systems, and as such, begins at the initiation of conflict or collaboration with an 'advantage' in relation to other actors with which it comes into contact. For some of these systems penetrate the domestic political systems of these actors.

range of issues concerning, specifically, their own competition-collaboration.²⁹

Mediating high-status powers are those whose penetration of and predominance in systems of international transactions in the international society is less extensive, and whose lack of particular kinds of capabilities inhibits them from further extending penetration. Such powers' location in systems of transactions is, however, not regionally (that is, geographically) restricted. A former imperial power such as the United Kingdom can be placed in this category; and much of the debate concerning the optimum defence 'load' of that country has centred around the questions of, first, whether her extensive 'presence' in systems of economic transactions in the international society requires to be matched by parallel institutionalised military presences; and secondly, the extent to which diplomatic influence is contingent on an extensive military presence in the international society, as well as on an institutionalised political presence.³⁰

²⁹In the sphere, for example, of nuclear war technology between themselves (the United States and the Soviet Union). See a recent article by Beaton, L., "Superpower Exclusivism", The Times (London), November 5, 1969. That the United States tended to assume that it was possible to 'control' the Atlantic Alliance with respect, particularly, in relation to its desire to determine the relevance and disposition of nuclear weapons, and that it, inevitably, failed in this, is the central theme of Henry A. Kissinger's The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

³⁰We return to this problem of the conditions for the exercise of diplomatic influence by the mediating high-status power, and particularly with respect to the United Kingdom, in the next section. But the above discussion is relevant to other countries that might be placed in this category. See, Nish, I.H., "Is Japan a Great Power", Year Book of World Affairs, 1967, (London: Stevens & Sons, 1967), pp. 71-87; and "India as a Middle Power", Indian Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1969, pp. 107-121, by Seth, J.

Within this category, powers, depending on their capabilities and the extent of their dominance in the transactions in which they are involved, have, or can develop, a capacity to act either as mediators or as intermediaries during international crises that do not directly involve the dominating high-status powers.³¹

A discussion of the next two categories of states which we have enunciated we leave to a later chapter.³² The following section attempts to explore in more detail, problems relating to states in the first categories, especially as they relate to small states.

AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE U.S.A.

The evolution of United States policy in the post-war period has been the subject, in recent years, of much debate. The central theme of this debate has been the process by which the United States policy-makers have so interpreted the notion of "cold war" as to use it as the linchpin for the creation of a system (in the institutional sense) of alliances, throughout that part of the globe which was not under the administrative control of the major Communist Powers - the Soviet Union and China. The debate is a continuing one, and even

³¹A useful analytical distinction, utilized by Henry Kissinger in his A World Restored (New York: Grossett & Dunlap, 1964, University Library Edition) p. 53: "Austria, it [a memorandum prepared by Metternich] maintained, was not a mediator but an intermediary. It was the role of a mediator to dictate terms of peace; it was the function of an intermediary to carry conditions of peace from one camp to another.... Great Britain and Russia were asked to make mediation worthwhile; to define, not the conditions of peace, but the general framework which might justify Austrian action". (Emphasis in the original.) In practice these roles may merge.

³²Ch. 7 on "Small State Systems".

participants in policy-making are likely to dispute the meaning of the discussion and activity that ensued in the years, in particular, of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.³³

We choose, here, to deal with two aspects of United States policy - as reflecting the perspectives of the major dominating high-status state in the international society: that power's interpretation, at a specific time, of the significance of its international behaviour as defined by military alliance treaties and other forms of political commitments to other states in the society; and the effects of changes in the technological basis of international relations (with reference, particularly, to military weaponry), one of which was, in our view, a change in its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union - the other half of that combination which Raymond Aron has entitled "freres ennemis"³⁴ and with the second level of states which we have referred to as mediating high-status powers. (Here, the example we will use is that of the United Kingdom.)

For our purposes, two political events set, in the post-war period, the framework of United States policy: the British withdrawal of economic and military assistance from Greece and Turkey, and its replacement by the United States in terms of what came to be called the "Truman Doctrine";³⁵ and the events in Indo-China leading to the

³³As George Kennan's recent memoirs, giving his interpretations of the meaning of 'containment' make clear. See Kennan, G., Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1967). Interpretations of the origins and the development of the Cold War are varied. See, Fleming, D.F., The Cold War and Its Origins 1917-1960 (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961) 2 vols.; Horowitz, D., From Yalta to Vietnam (Rev. ed. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967); Halle, Louis, The Cold War as History (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967); and Patcher, Henry, "Revisionist Historians and the Cold War", Dissent, Nov. - Dec. 1968, pp. 505-518.

³⁴Aron, R., Paix et Guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1968) Ch. 18.

³⁵See "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947", pp. 176-180 in Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman 1947. (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1963.)

withdrawal of France from that area, with the consequent initial extension, by the United States of economic and military assistance to the states whose entry into the international society is definitively noted in the agreements of the Geneva Conference of 1954.³⁶ Both of these events illustrate the institutionalisation of an international presence on the part of the United States, towards the rationalisation of which there had to be developed a suitable language of international politics.

From this point onwards, the United States becomes a firm adherent of the "vacuum theory" of international politics: a theory which allowed her to describe the new role which she had defined for herself as the dominating high-status power in the international society, replacing what we have called the declining imperial powers. Truman's statement that,

"I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures",³⁷

is a prime indication of this. Thereafter, all other states in the international society had to decide whether they wished to be viewed and 'acted upon' in the context of the world view implied in Truman's statement. Cambodia's announcement in 1956 that the SEATO doctrine be not applied to her suggests, at least a partial rejection of the framework of order implied in the Truman Doctrine;³⁸ and the explicit

³⁶ See, Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, 21 July, 1954, Document No. 33 in Cmnd. 2834 Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict (London: H.M.S.O., 1965), pp. 83-85.

³⁷ Public Papers, pp. 178-9.

³⁸ Though this was done primarily on grounds that membership of SEATO was incompatible with its self-declared status of neutrality; the Geneva Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos also declared that that country would not "recognise the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO". See Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, Geneva, 23 July, 1962; Document No. 106 in Documents Relating to British Involvement..., pp. 178-181, at p. 179.

rejection by some Middle Eastern states later, of the relevance to them of the Eisenhower Doctrine contained, also, a rejection of the vacuum theory. What, in our view, can be taken as the imagery of the United States world view over the post-war period, can be seen in a recent description by one analyst:

"Under an American nuclear 'umbrella', shielded from powerful revisionist powers and shorn of European tutelage, the former colonies of Africa and Asia emerged as weak new protagonists in the world drama. They were assimilated into the United Nations on the basis of a carefully maintained fiction of sovereignty, given 'purchasing power' in the world markets by grants and loans, and propped up against rivals and near neighbours by imported armaments".³⁹

The arguments that might be opposed to this view of the majority of actors in the international society as too weak to be more than "objects" of great power activity, can be seen in the comments referred to above, of some Arab governments on the Eisenhower Doctrine:

"The Eisenhower Plan was discussed. Each state attending the Conference made its own remarks on the plan. All agreed on not recognising the vacuum theory. It was agreed that Arab nationalism was the only principle of which account could be taken in their countries, and that their countries could not become spheres of influence for any foreign Power".⁴⁰

At this time too, the Government of Syria took the view that,

"...the vacuum theory...[is] an artificial one, used as a pretext by imperialism to justify its interference and domination".⁴¹

Our description, in an earlier chapter of the attitude of Lebanon

³⁹Wilcox, Wayne, "The Protagonists and the Third World", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 386, 1969, pp. 1-9, at pp. 3-4.

⁴⁰"Joint Statement on the Talks Between President Nasser, King Saud, King Hussein and Sabri al - Asali, Cairo, 19 January, 1957", in Documents on International Affairs, 1957, pp. 257-8, at p. 257.

⁴¹"Statement by the Syrian Government on President Eisenhower's Message, 10 January 1957", in Documents, op. cit., p. 241.

to the Eisenhower Doctrine constitutes one indication that other states have been, on the other hand, inclined to accept the line of policy and the vacuum theory implied in the Trueman Doctrine. The United States, for its part, has felt it possible to generalise the relevance of the theory to other areas of the world, and to make it a central theme of its foreign policy. Thus in 1966, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, after referring to that section of the Doctrine which we have quoted above, went on to remark,

"That is the policy we are applying in Vietnam in connection with specific commitments which we have taken in connection with that country".⁴²

Now, a dominating high-status power, a power which perceives itself as having responsibilities for the maintenance of order throughout (or over a substantial part of) the international society, proceeds to ascribe roles to other actors in the society, as a means of best effecting these responsibilities. Collaboration, competition, tension and conflict develop, in the international society as a consequence of this ascription. For its capacity for control and direction of the environments of which the actors are a part, determines the degree to which the dominating power is, or is not, able further to develop or enforce expectation systems that accord with the execution of its responsibilities, and thus, order and predictability in the international society.

It is in the context of the dominating power's role and expectation systems, and in the context of their own capabilities, relative to such a power (or powers), that other actors are either active members of the society, giving direction to those environments

⁴²The Vietnam Hearings (Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. January-February, 1966, published in book form with introduction by Senator W. Fulbright), (Vintage Books, 1966), p. 4.

relating to their own location, or become, on the other hand, objects of a management diplomacy of the dominating power.⁴³ Other states are categorised by the power in accordance with its own devised role system. We have been able to discern, as far as the United States is concerned, a fairly systematic categorisation of this kind, for the post-war world.⁴⁴ The categorisation we suggest is as follows:

- (1) States or regional systems, the maintenance of whose allegiance is fundamental to the prescription of the desirable international order;
- (2) Key Peripheral Countries - also referred to as states on the "bloc periphery", or on the United States' "defence perimeter";
- (3) States the maintenance of whose friendship is deemed important for United States national security;
- (4) States or regions of "special strategic significance";
- (5) States or regions with raw materials of importance to the United States;
- (6) States which are not "friendly" - which may at times be unfriendly - which are worthy of attempts to exert and maintain influence.⁴⁵

⁴³The phrase "management diplomacy", I take from George Liska. Drawing on a variety of historical examples he writes: "Management diplomacy with regard to lesser and at least conditionally friendly powers was at all times different from manoeuvre diplomacy, which characterizes relations between equal and at least potentially antagonistic powers". Imperial America, p. 20.

⁴⁴The movement away in the Communist bloc from a strict administrative international system, in addition to the need to develop relations with the ex-colonial states has led the Soviet Union to re-evaluate its own role system. The statement on the 1960 Conference of the Communist movement (see New York Times, December 7, 1960) and the recent Soviet statements on the concept of "limited sovereignty" are instances of this.

⁴⁵It will be noticed that we refer here to "regions" as well as states. We see this as legitimate in terms of the view which we will propose below that major powers tend to see, and determine policy concerning particularly small states, with a regionalist or some area perspective, rather than as single actors in the international society.

It is on the basis of this kind of categorisation that decisions have been taken by the United States on the types and extent of economic and military 'commitments' which it was desirable and possible to enter into with other states. And role and expectation systems, as well as commitments, change, or are changed (making allowance for a time lag) as the structural relations of the international environment change - whether such structural relations are of an ideological character, or of a more material character, such as changes in the technology of weapons production or of economic processes.

We have earlier observed two fundamental characteristics of United States' foreign policy: its extensiveness throughout the international society, and the assertion of a large measure continuity in the basic premises of that policy during the post-war period. Extensiveness seems to be justified on the grounds of the country's size, capabilities and status. In the words of Senator John Stennis,

"As a truly great power, we cannot afford to become overly preoccupied with one area of the world or one set of problems".⁴⁶

Thus, commitments formally entered into, cannot be seen as indicating the limits of the areas of, or issues in the environment in which the United States can become involved. As Dean Rusk put it,

"No would-be aggressor should suppose that the absence of a defence treaty, congressional declaration or U.S. military presence grants immunity to aggression. For one thing and most important, the responsibilities of the United Nations with regard to aggression are world wide".⁴⁷

But, the Secretary of State went on to remark,

"The United States does not consider itself to be the world's policeman".⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Worldwide Military Commitments, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 89th Congress, 2nd Session, August 25-30, 1966, Part I. (U.S. Washington G.P.O., 1966) p. 3. [Hereinafter referred to as Worldwide Military Commitments].

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

The two quotations taken together suggest a certain ambivalence about the limits of United States intervention; this may, in fact, be deliberate, in order to prevent opponents from being themselves too certain about the sphere of United States activity, in the sense of the United States consciously 'defining out' certain areas or countries. This is done as Mr. Rusk put it, with the circumstances of the outbreak of the Korean War in mind, "to prevent miscalculation on the part of the other side".⁴⁹ Thus, while trying to reject the view attributed to him, that "I thought it was our task to defend the peace everywhere and anywhere", Rusk observed:

"I can imagine - if I may speak hypothetically, and I am hesitant to do so on such a serious subject - I could imagine, for example, that although Trinidad is not at the moment a member of the OAS system, if there were an attack on Trinidad of a sort that was a threat to this hemisphere, I do not believe that the Inter-American States as a group would look with indifference upon such attack".⁵⁰

Further, Rusk attempted to define the objectives, as far as United States was concerned, of entering into alliances:

"...the purpose of the alliances into which we have entered since 1945 is not to extend our commitments in the sense of hoping thereby to bring them into operation, but as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee put it, in recommending approval of the Southeast Asia Treaty, there are greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy what he can expect of us, and in failing to disabuse him of assumption which might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.... The first purpose of a treaty is to prevent the miscalculation which would produce the action so threatening to our vital interests that we would be required to take action".⁵¹

In fact, certain treaty commitments entered into by the United States, contained in their language, definitions of a limiting character, though whether, again, such definitions were sufficiently

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 51.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 66-7

⁵¹Ibid., p. 67.

unambiguous to serve as self-limiting elements is problematic. As Rusk, however, pointed out in 1966 with respect to the extent of United States commitment in SEATO,

"Inasmuch as the United States was the one party to the treaty without territory of its own in the region, its commitment was limited by the understanding, amde a part of the treaty, that only Communist aggression would be regarded as necessarily dangerous to its own peace and security and thus would activate its commitment to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional process".⁵²

The continuity of premises and policies has also been stressed by Rusk:

"... our basic commitments... seem to lie in those areas which are vital to the security of the United States - in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, in this /the Western/ hemisphere. If we were to start today to consider that question all over again and consider it deeply and seriously, the security requirements of the United States and our appropriate part to play in the organization of a peaceful world, my guess is that our judgements now would not be very different from those in the late 1940's and the 1950's".⁵³

This statement might be taken as suggesting a perception of a certain degree of stability in the character of the international society during the period 1945 to the end of the 1960's. More likely, it is meant to indicate that changes in the international environment have required, on the part of the United States, not so much a change or re-ordering of premises and policies, as an extension of original policies and methods.

It is in the light of this that we need to consider United States' views on her relations with other actors; the latter we divide into two classes: her relations with mediating high-status powers and those with all others that find a place in the categories

⁵²Ibid., p. 7. Our emphasis.

⁵³Ibid., p. 30. Our emphasis. Rusk refers to Southeast Asia as being of "great importance, sometimes it was referred to as of vital importance, to the security of the United States" and goes on to remark that this "has been consistently the view of successive administrations ...". Ibid., p. 33.

that we have earlier suggested.

The mediating high-status powers with which we deal here are primarily those on the continent of Europe, though we will make some reference to others. With these the United States has two sets of relationships - those concerning issues arising from within the continent itself, and those arising in other parts of the globe, and in which the European high-status powers have, or are deemed to have, an interest. The first set of relationships are of concern to us here only insofar as they suggest a view of how the United States relates to a number of states (primarily within the North Atlantic Alliance) which she has described as being "the absolute foundation of our series of alliances"; the second set of relationships are of interest, in terms of showing how the United States acts in relation to countries of the second rank, many of which have been responsible for the sponsoring of the small states which have entered the international society, and with which they still maintain relationships of interest and influence. For it is our view which we advance here as an hypothesis that the capacity for manoeuvre of small states is significantly dependent on the capacity for manoeuvre, vis-a-vis the dominating high-status states, of the mediating high-status states.

The relevant question, here, then, is to what extent have changes in the structure of international relations affected the capacity for manoeuvre of the mediating high-status states, or put another way, the extent to which the United States views its capabilities as providing her with a sufficient number and range of mechanisms for directing relevant areas of the international environment, without the need for intervention, as mediators rather than as mere executants, of the mediating high-status powers.

Coral Bell has observed that,

"The diplomatic groupings of any period should... be related to the ruling strategic conceptions of the time. Normally the latter change only slowly, but occasionally there is so rapid a shift that one can see a particular diplomatic arrangement almost simultaneously against the old and the new strategic backcloth".⁵⁴

The diplomatic grouping whose coherence the United States has, as we have hinted above, seen as essential to the success of its own activity is that based on the North Atlantic Alliance. In 1966, Mr. Rusk was remarking that,

"The security of the two sides [the United States and Europe] of the Atlantic seem to me to be indissoluble. They just have to be taken together.... So it is not my view that the Western European countries generally, or indeed Eastern European countries, feel that they can resolve ... issues in which we have such a great interest, without our participation.... the security and safety of North American and Western Europe just have to be taken together".⁵⁵

But it has been argued that the relationships of the North Atlantic grouping in the post-war period, up to, perhaps, the second half of the 1950's were of what we have called an administrative, rather than a bargaining, character, insofar as these relationships concerned specifically European issues; and that, further, the United States has had a certain difficulty in the 1960's in changing the form of diplomatic relationships to accord with structural changes (particularly economic) in Europe. Kissinger has remarked that,

"Faced [after 1945] with a ravaged Europe, the United States came to deal with its allies paternalistically... American policy-makers often acted as if disagreement with their views is due to ignorance which must be overcome by extensive briefings and insistent reiteration.... As a result, the United States and Europe have often conducted their dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint manufactured in America".⁵⁶

⁵⁴Bell, C., Survey of International Affairs, 1954 (O.U.P., 1957), pp. 7-8.

⁵⁵Worldwide Military Commitments, pp. 52, 55, 61.

⁵⁶Kissinger, H., The Troubled Partnership, p. 6.

Kissinger refers to this era as the "period of American hegemony".⁵⁷ But paradoxically, as the European states were able progressively to put their economies on more sound bases, and, it might have been expected, to engage in bargaining relationships with the United States, other structural factors now began (in the 1960's) to operate that had the effect of restricting the development of the bargaining context:

"An ever-widening gap... appeared in the field of nuclear weapons technology/ between the sophistication of United States technical studies and the capacity of Allied leaders to absorb them - a gap that makes meaningful consultation increasingly difficult".⁵⁸

Now, if, however, we extend the scope of United States-European diplomatic relationships beyond the European continent itself, we see, on the other hand, during what Kissinger has called the "period of American hegemony" a more flexible system of relationships than characterized specifically North Atlantic relations: mediating high-status powers, particularly the United Kingdom, acting as mediators and intermediaries in many 'crisis' issues of the 1950's - Korea, Indo-China, the Middle East. It is in the 1960's that we perceive, in other areas, parallel phenomena to that which Kissinger describes - a closing of systems of international relations by the United States to mediating high-status power diplomatic intervention. This reflects, in fact, a response by the dominating high-status power to changes in structural relations between itself and the mediating powers: the imperial withdrawal - politically and military - from extensive areas of the globe with a concurrent perception, on the part of the United States that both her transactions and commitments (formal and informal) throughout all systems of international relations were becoming of an increasingly 'direct' nature, necessitating less and less diplomatic intervention

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 7.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 20.

from powers that no longer possessed institutional interests within these systems.⁵⁹ In turn, this left less capacity for manoeuvre for even other non-European powers, for example India, which had acted as mediating powers during the 1950's; it also eliminated the linkages between mediating powers and smaller powers which had allowed the latter to exercise some influence (or at least, to be deemed diplomatically relevant) in the solution of issues that affected the regions in which they were located.

What, in summary, we are arguing here, is that the United States seemed to wish to reduce the "fractioned" nature of the international society, on the assumption that her capabilities and commitments now allowed her to create (unmediated) linkages between herself and all other actors in the international society. The assumption seems to have been that the reduction of mediating linkages reduced the complexity of diplomacy. All this, in our view, has provided the rationale for the analytical assumption made by many authors, that there now existed an international political system.⁶⁰ In our view this is a mistaken assumption; the relationship between degree of direct transaction structures (unmediated linkages) and successful diplomatic intervention, is not necessarily a direct one.

Even in the 1950's, of course, diplomats and analysts were beginning to perceive the development of a directive hierarchical

⁵⁹This is best reflected, in our view, by the diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis, but even moreso, in the diplomacy of the Vietnam war.

⁶⁰Using Morton Kaplan's phraseology we can say that there developed an assumption of movement in the international society from a state of "sub-system dominance" to a system operating on directive hierarchical principles. Note the title of a book coming to our notice after this was written, by Scott, Andrew M., The Functioning of the International Political System (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1967).

system, based on superior United States capabilities. This must be the analytical context of a remark made in an American journal after an interview with Mr. Dulles, that during the Indo-Chinese crisis, "Mendes-France and Eden found themselves able to bargain from Dulles' strength at Geneva",⁶¹ and of the "recipe" for diplomatic activity proposed for Britain, after the Suez invasion, by an English journal:

"We must learn that we are not the American's equals now, and cannot be. We have a right to state our minimum national interests and expect the Americans to lead. And they, on their side, must accept, as they have not done, the obligation to protect our interests and provide, as they have not provided, clear leadership. It is a relationship that requires far more, even brutal, frankness on both sides (our doubts about Mr. Dulles have been vastly too muted), but on ours a sure loyalty and willingness to follow the lead when given".⁶²

Yet the diplomacy of a crisis like that of the Indo-China war was not conducted in a manner that matched this. Coral Bell hints at the diplomatic autonomy of mediating actors in remarking on "the audible failure of Britain, France, and the U.S.A. to compose their differences [which] provided a steady counterpoint to the [Geneva] Conference" of 1954, and she writes of British policy operating "as a friction preventing American commitment in Indo-China".⁶³ In regard to British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, there was left, Bell remarks, "not perhaps a power vacuum, but a certain amount of room for manoeuvre in the area" (the Middle East);⁶⁴ in the context of imperial withdrawals from both Asia and the Middle East, other states with capabilities related to the issues arising in these areas at the time,

⁶¹Quoted by Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs, 1954, p. 71. from "How Dulles Averted War", Life, 16 January, 1956.

⁶²"The Alliance", The Economist, 17 November, 1956.

⁶³Survey of International Affairs, 1954, pp. 1 and 5.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 6.

assume roles either as mediators, or increase their status to the point where they had to be taken into account in dominating-power diplomacy. Egypt, Bell observes,

"... indeed was becoming a singularly important country, as important to the Western Powers in the Middle East as India was to them in South Asia".⁶⁵

The context of diplomatic activity by middle level powers, particularly at this time is, no doubt, a degree of ambivalence in the perspectives of the dominating power (or powers) in a geopolitical situation of changing structural relationships.⁶⁶ And Anthony Eden, in his memoirs, gives a good impression of the diplomatic links arising, that connected mediating high status powers (not necessarily of similar levels of capabilities) with each other, and with small powers:

"Doubts as to the wisdom of the current trend in American policy were increased by the effects it was producing on Indian opinion. In measuring our chances of success at Geneva, I felt strongly that the outcome would depend to a considerable extent upon the position taken up by India and other Eastern nations in a settlement.... it was essential not to alienate India by our actions in a part of the world which concerned her closely..."

At this point, (April 30, 1954, at Geneva) Eden presented to Dulles a memorandum in which he described the British position on the future defence of Southeast Asia. This included the points that,

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 6. Bell continues, "A number of factors conspired to make it Egypt more formidable than its military strength would seem to suggest: its strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean: its physical control of the Canal and the British base installations, the appeal of the revolutionary nationalism of the junta to similar forces in other Arab countries, the growth of pan-Arab feeling and the prospect that Egypt, with its cultural leadership of the Arab world, would be the beneficiary of this sentiment. All this meant that the impact of its typically post-revolutionary foreign policy was felt right across the Arab world from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, and down into the Muslim areas of Africa."

⁶⁶An impression of the ambivalence, both in domestic and external relations of American policy towards Indo-China can be gleaned from Roberts, Chalmers, "The Day we Didn't Go To War", in Gettleman, M.A. (ed.), Vietnam (Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 103-112.

"We should aim to get the support of Burma as well as Thailand, as the immediate neighbours of Indo-China. But Burma will not come in unless the project commands some sympathy from other Asian countries, particularly the Asian members of the Commonwealth".

Further,

"If we cannot win the active support of all Asian countries of the area it is important that we should at the very least, secure their benevolent neutrality".⁶⁷

The role which Eden had adopted in trying to persuade lesser powers into other roles, meant, he observed, that

"My own position was becoming increasingly embarrassing.... I was continually producing proposals, because if I did not we stuck fast.... Since neither the Americans nor the French had established any contacts with the Communist representatives, I had been compelled to adapt the role of intermediary between the Western Powers and the communists. My activities in this respect were open to every kind of misrepresentation. I was concerned about their effect on Anglo-American relations".⁶⁸

Eden was in fact criticised for paying too much attention to maintaining the sympathies and diplomatic cooperation of India, which was itself performing activities that, like those of the United Kingdom, combined the mediatory and intermediary roles.⁶⁹

The room for mediating activity reflected, in our view, a United States' perception of their incomplete capacity for directive action throughout an institutionally fractioned international society. This very fractioned character the United States had been attempting to diminish, by creating the variety of treaties - institutionalising defence arrangements - and bilateral agreements that involved either

⁶⁷Eden, Anthony, Memoirs: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 94.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 128.

⁶⁹On the activities of Khrishna, Manon, Mr. Nehru's personal representative during the Indo-China crisis, see Bell, op. cit., p. 47; and on Eden's mediating role, p. 73. We do not discuss here what is also of importance to note: the mediating high-status role of China in this crisis.

its formal or informal participation as the dominating power, in the control or adjudication of international events.⁷⁰ By the beginning of the 1960's this network of agreements is established, and in the following period there is simply an extension (enlargement) of capabilities, to match the perceived new tasks of the era of bipolarity,⁷¹ and of the 'proxy' wars that were deemed to be a part of it.⁷²

The argument advanced here is not that the dominating high-status power dismissed the role of mediating high-power diplomacy, but that there was now an attempt to locate this role within the framework of the dominating power's own diplomatic strategy, rather than allowing the degree of diplomatic autonomy for the mediating powers. The status

⁷⁰ See Appendices I and II on United States "commitments" and "involvements" throughout the international society; also the recently published work by Osgood, Robert E., Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968). For a discussion of the influence of technological development on the possibility of fulfilling commitments in geographically distant areas, see Wohlstetter, Albert, "Strength, Interest and New Technologies", pp. 1-14 in The Implications of Military Technology in the 1970's, Adelphi Papers, No. 46, March, 1968 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).

⁷¹ We are putting some emphasis on this section on United States' perceptions of its location in international transactions, role, and tasks in the era which comes to be characterised by the "doctrine of bipolarity". We choose the beginning of the 1960's as marking the establishment of bipolarity, for then, the scare created by Kennedy's "missile gap" false alarm is replaced by notions of relative equality or definitive U.S. superiority in the realm of modern weapons technology. On the "missile gap" see Schlesinger, A., A Thousand Days, p. 317. On bipolarity see Zoppo, Ciro E., "Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity and International Stability", World Politics, Vol. 18, 1966, pp. 579-606.

⁷² The domestic institutional reflection of this is what Schlesinger calls the period of "Reconstruction of Diplomacy" op. cit., Chapter 16. This is the period, also, of increased emphasis on "counter-insurgency". A book that reflects the interest in these problems is Wolf, Jr., Charles, United States Policy and the Third World.

of the latter in the international society is, consequently, reduced. Kenneth Waltz seems to put forward a combined descriptive and normative analysis that approximates to this:

"The extent of the difference in national capabilities makes the bipolar structure resilient. Defection of allies and national shifts of allegiance do not decisively alter the structure. Because they do not, recalcitrant allies may be treated with indifference; they may even be effectively disciplined. Pressure can be applied to moderate the behaviour of third states or to check and contain their activities. The Suez venture of Britain and France was stopped by American financial pressure. Chiang Kai-Shek has been kept on a leash by denying him the means of invasion. The prospective loss of foreign aid helped to halt warfare between Pakistan and India, as did the Soviet Union's persuasion. In such ways, the wielding of great power can be useful.

The above examples illustrate hierarchical control operating in a way that often goes unnoticed because the means by which control is exercised are not institutionalised. What management there now is in international relations must be provided, singly and occasionally together, by the duopolists at the top".⁷³

We would differ slightly from Waltz in suggesting that the structural situation that he describes is also the consequence of a degree of voluntarism, on the part of the mediating powers, in the scope of their diplomacy, related, as in the case of the United Kingdom, for example, to perceptions of domestic demands on resources, and to a consequent desire to reduce the "burden of external relations".⁷⁴ We do not necessarily agree that his normative conclusion becomes itself a permanent structural fact.

⁷³Waltz, K., "International Structure, National Force and the Balance of Power", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, 1967, pp. 215-231 at p. 231. Our emphasis.

⁷⁴Compare for example, the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Part I: The Defence Review, Cmd. 2901, (London: H.M.S.O., February 1966) with the Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1968, Cmd. 3540 (London: H.M.S.O., Feb. 1968). See also, Buchan, Alastair, "Is Britain Still a World Power", The Listener, March 17, 1966, pp. 373-75.

The Definition of United States Commitments

We can now turn to looking at the view of the United States of its own commitments to, and involvements with lesser powers in the post-war period, but particularly in the decade of the 1960's. We do this on the basis of the categories (see p. 22) that we have earlier outlined.

1. The Key Peripheral Countries. In discussions in 1963 on the Military Assistance Programme for 1964, the American Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, observed that about seventy percent of United States aid under this programme would go to only "nine key countries in South Asia, the Far East and the Near East, each of which is on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and confronts a direct threat of Communist aggression". These countries, recognised as markedly different in many respects are, through definition in strategic terms, viewed as one bloc; they are Vietnam, Thailand, the Republic of China, Korea, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan and India.⁷⁵

The countries are defined as being on the "defence perimeter" of the United States in relation to its major competitor, the Communist bloc. All of them are attributed a strategic value on the basis of location, and with the exception of India (to which we return below) are deemed too small by the United States, to autonomously provide themselves with the capabilities required to perform the functions arising out of the value attributed to them. None of them, in McNamara's words, "could afford the foreign exchange resources required to build up the necessary military force structure to deter external

⁷⁵Statement of R.S. McNamara, Secretary of Defence, in Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, First Session, on S. 1276 - A Bill to Amend Further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, As Amended, And for Other Purposes, June-July 1963 (Washington, U.S. G.P.O., 1963), p. 171.

aggression" or, in the case of Vietnam to deal with aggression undertaken by guerillas. The attributed strategic value determines the form of other kinds of relationships that the United States develops, or has developed with them, for "except for relatively insignificant contributions by other countries in one or two cases, the U.S. military assistance programme is the sole source of military equipment" for them.⁷⁶

Countries like South Korea and the Republic of China, now located in a United States' dominated system meant "to deter the exercise of ... [Chinese and North Korean] power against our own security interests"⁷⁷ are expected to act on a basis of reciprocity:

"Our investment in their equipment and training is proportionate to the reliance we place upon them for immediate and appropriate response to any attempted aggression."⁷⁸

The attribution of strategic value to small countries is to be seen, in looking at United States commitments, in terms of that country's attribution of value to a regional area rather than to the particular small country itself. Thus, for example, General Lemnitzer's view of the "strategic importance" of Korea:

"... if we withdrew support from Korea, it would be only a matter of months before the Communists would walk in and take over, and the impact of such a fundamental change in policy on the rest of our Asian allies would be tremendous... If we lost Korea, Japan would be in the Communist pincers formed by the Kurile and Sakhalin Islands to the north, and by Korea on the south. The loss of Korea would completely

⁷⁶Ibid., our emphasis.

⁷⁷Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 88th Congress 1st Session, Part 2. (Washington: U.S. G.P.O. 1963, p.63.

⁷⁸McNamara, ibid., For McNamara's discussion of Greece and Turkey, see ibid., p. 127.

change the strategic position of Japan and render it vulnerable".⁷⁹

Similarly, in the case of Laos,

"The situation in Laos would complicate security problems in Southeast Asia because of the strategic value of Laos.... If Laos goes Communist there will be a very long Communist frontier opened up on the borders of Thailand.... In addition the loss of Laos would open the long frontier of South Vietnam to the Communists which would further complicate the security problem in Southeast Asia".⁸⁰

Given the perception of the need to keep the region from control by Communist forces, elements within it also become of strategic value. Thus, in McNamara's words, the United States' "effort" in Korea is "absolutely essential to our military security" and the "action" in Laos, becomes "at least as vital" to that security.⁸¹

However, once strategic value is attributed to a country on the grounds that it is functional to the maintenance of a regional system, which is itself of crucial significance for United States security, the provision of defence facilities and the establishment (in some cases) of a 'defence presence' give to the country a political and psychological value. The three attributes, strategic, political and psychological, become intermingled, so that it is sometimes difficult to discern the 'real' value of the entity, particularly as the attribution of value is unilaterally determined by the dominating power. The case of Laos can be taken as an illustration of this.

⁷⁹General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chief of staff, in International Development and Security, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Part 2, May/June 1961 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1961), p. 649. Senator Fulbright had earlier referred to the area in which Korea is situated as "a little area that is not worth too much to anybody unless it has some mysterious value to our security". Ibid., p. 647. Our emphasis.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 649.

⁸¹International Development and Security, pp. 654 and 655.

Roger Hilsman, in a discussion of the United States' perception of the significance of Laos has remarked that:

"From the time of its birth in the Geneva Agreements of 1954, Laos presented the United States with a problem of foreign policy out of all proportion to the intrinsic importance of a country so poor, so remote, and so lightly populated. But its geographic location had given Laos a strategic significance and the twists and turns of history had given it political significance. The United States had to deal with Laos whether it liked it or not".⁸²

We notice the process whereby a country whose "intrinsic importance" is in doubt, is attributed, because of an assessment of its "geographic location" a "strategic significance", and is then imbued by "history" with a "political significance" for the United States.

This suggests a certain ambivalence about the significance of Laos, but well indicates the mixture of attributes (political, strategic and psychological) taken into account; Arthur Schlesinger's analysis suggests something similar. Writing, retrospectively, of Laos in 1954 he remarks that it,

"... had an evident strategic importance. If the Communists gained possession of the Mekong Valley, they could materially intensify the pressure against South Vietnam and Thailand. If Laos was not precisely a dagger pointed at the heart of Kansas, it was very plainly a gateway to Southeast Asia".⁸³

Schlesinger then records Kennedy as saying, in 1961, that Laos was not a country "worthy of engaging the attention of great powers". He then paraphrases Kennedy's further remarks to the effect that,

"the effort to transform it into a pro-western redoubt had been ridiculous and that neutralization was the correct policy. But he knew that the matter was not that simple any

⁸²Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (Dell Publishing Co.: A Delta Book, 1968, first published by Doubleday & Co., 1967), p. 104. Our emphasis. Hilsman was during the Kennedy Administration, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department and later Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

⁸³Schlesinger, A., A Thousand Days, p. 324. Our emphasis. Schlesinger was a Special Assistant to the President, during the Kennedy Administration.

longer, For the effort had been made, American prestige was deeply involved, and extrication would not be easy".⁸⁴

The encompassing of Laos, is, in Kennedy's view, a dubious diplomatic policy, gave the country a political significance, based on perceptions of the psychological effect on both the domestic population and the allies of the United States, of an American withdrawal. Thus, in Kennedy's words,

"We cannot and will not accept any visible humiliation over Laos".⁸⁵

And finally,

"The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its neutral independence. Its own safety runs with safety of us all... I know that every American will want his country to honour its obligations to the point that freedom and security of the free world and ourselves may be achieved".⁸⁶

Two remarks are appropriate here. First, Schlesinger's emphasis on the importance of the Mekong valley, suggests an analytical disaggregation of the state; it may be not the existence of the state per se, that is important, but the fact that the state is situated and has legal jurisdiction over an area (the Mekong) to which is ascribed strategic value, in terms of a perception of the region.⁸⁷ This has implications for the dominating power's receptivity to the idea of partition. Secondly, the regionalist view indicates a holistic perspective on small-state agglomerations which may not see themselves within this perspective; their ascribed role is determined

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 329.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 332.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 333. Remarks, quoted by Schlesinger, at a press conference on March 23rd, 1961. Our emphasis.

⁸⁷Laos, Schlesinger remarks, "was a state by diplomatic courtesy". Op. cit., p. 323.

by the functional significance, for the dominating power, of the behaviour of the region, seen as a (connected) whole.

2. We deal now, briefly, with states, the maintenance of a relationship with which is important for United States national security.

It seems to be usually states of large size which come into this category - a case in point being India. The justification for United States' assistance to a state of this kind rests on the fact that its size and potential capabilities make it an autonomous 'balancer' of some similarly large Communist power in its geographical vicinity, and thus a significant element in some defined regional balance system.

In McNamara's words,

"A completely successful Communist invasion of India would completely shift the balance of power, not only in the subcontinent, but in the rest of Southeast Asia and have waves of adverse effect into the Pacific. Therefore the preservation of India's independence is of great importance to our national security".⁸⁸

3. States of Special Strategic Significance. These are states to which a strategic significance is attributed, but which do not fall (geographically) within the defence perimeter of the United States. The determination of ascription of status bears, however, a similarity to that of countries within the "bloc periphery", in that their significance may be, again, region or area-determined. Their internal stability is important to the maintenance of the stability of the area, and assistance is therefore directed to development of this. The distinctions between the different kinds of states (bloc periphery as against special significance) are indicated in the following statement:

⁸⁸ Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, p. 150.

The Near East remains an area of great political instability and uneven economic development. While some of the nations in this region - Greece, Turkey and Iran - border on the Soviet Bloc and are thus directly exposed to Communist military power, the more immediate danger to the peace and stability of the area is internal.... Although we do not share with the other [than Greece, Turkey, Iran] Near East countries membership in any formal regional military organisation, our interest in supporting stability and peace in the area has been well established and, we believe, is clearly understood by the countries involved".⁸⁹

Assistance is here directed to the creation of conditions which will inhibit Communist 'subversion'. Otherwise such countries are strategically significant in playing second-order or supporting roles to the central United States strategy:

"Our own security interests on the continent of Africa are primarily focussed in Morocco and Ethiopia, where we maintain communication facilities, and in Libya where we have an air base. We are, of course, greatly concerned with the African nations bordering on the Mediterranean because of their special strategic importance in relation to the southern flank of NATO, and with the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Somalia) because it guards the southern approaches to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The strategic significance of these areas has also been recognised by the Soviet Union...."⁹⁰

4. States or regions possessing raw materials of importance to the United States. The African continent in general has been characterised by a United States official as "important to the United States as a source of essential raw materials".⁹¹ There is a similar

⁸⁹"Statement of R.S. McNamara", Department of Defence Appropriations, 1966, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Department of Defence of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 89th Congress, 1st Session, Feb. 1965. (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1965), pp. 22 and 23.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 25.

⁹¹Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, Statement of General Stephen O. Fuqua, Jr., Military Assistance Programme (MAP) Director of the Near East, South Asia, and African Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, May 23, 1963, p. 295.

recognition, noted in 1963, of the Near East and Southeast Asia area (defined as "the area extending from Greece on the west to include India on the east and south to the tip of the Arabian peninsula") as possessing "65 percent of the world's proven petroleum resources which are not behind the iron curtain";⁹² and of the Far East as having "significant assets of great importance to the Western World... Vast economic and human resources, still untapped, are located here. The potential of Indonesia is still to be realised, as is that of Southeast Asia. It is in our interest that this potential not be developed by and for communism".⁹³

5. The final group is of "marginal" countries: those not necessarily friendly, but worthy of influencing, in terms of the competition of the "freres ennemis". As Secretary Rusk has described this category:

"...there are some marginal countries where there is a contest for influence - countries that we don't see eye to eye with on every point or even on some very important points critical to us. And there the question is whether it's worth maintaining a relationship, some sort of presence, some sort of basis on which we might be able to build a better relationship over time, and this would apply to a country like Yugoslavia or Poland, and with some others who have acted in a way that we don't think are [is?] in accord with our interests".⁹⁴

The giving of assistance represents "partly a calculated effort to sustain a relationship which, given the breaks, will work in our interests".⁹⁵ In the case of a country like Yugoslavia, located next to countries within the NATO Alliance, the maintenance of independence,

⁹²Ibid., pp. 353-4 and 355.

⁹³Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, Statement of Rear-Admiral Heinz, Director of Far East Regions, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, May 27, 1963, pp. 415 and 416. See on the economic and strategic importance of Indo-China Eisenhower, D.D. - Mandate for Change (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963) pp. 332-33.

⁹⁴Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, Dean Rusk in discussion, at p. 54.

⁹⁵Ibid.

even though not necessarily a 'friendly' independence, becomes important for the United States. This may be the justification for giving relatively larger amounts of assistance to "marginal" countries as against allies, or countries more susceptible to direct control.⁹⁶

On the basis of the above analysis, we can see that assistance policy is directed towards a variety of objectives. First, there is the objective of assisting in the maintenance of the autonomy of relatively large states that have a potential for sustaining regional or local balances of power. Secondly, there is assistance given to states of "special strategic significance" as subordinate elements in the "bloc periphery" strategy. Such assistance "enhances the security of the United States by helping to insure our continuing access to overseas bases and installations which are still essential to optimum development of our own military strength and to the successful accomplishment of our forward strategy".⁹⁷ Military assistance here is meant to have the "bi-product" of providing internal security - "the prerequisite to political stability and economic progress".⁹⁸

⁹⁶On the relative amounts of military and economic aid given to Yugoslavia and Latin America as a whole, see the evidence of Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs in 1963 in Castro-Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Feb.-March 1963 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O. 1963) at p. 42.

⁹⁷According to Secretary McNamara, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1964, p. 60.

⁹⁸Ibid.

Thirdly, there is the perceived need to maintain a general influence on small states which are the objects of competition between dominating powers, which have some important raw material⁹⁹ or which have facilities, mainly because of their location, needed by the dominating power for its military strategy. The substantive aim is the maintenance of a coherent system of relationships, directly organised to as great a degree as is possible, throughout the international society, and in the context of existing bipolar competition.

⁹⁹It is the problems of organizing relationships with this second group of countries, in an era of nationalism which puts some emphasis on the state's control of its own resources, that are explored in Carlston, K, Law and Organization in World Society (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1962). Carlston is particularly concerned with nationalization of foreign-owned property.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PENETRATION OF SMALL STATES

"How can the British expect me to have faith in the French when their agents and their gold undermine my authority and they scatter leaflets over my country boasting that they will return"?¹

In the previous chapter we have been partly concerned with the means by which states of high status acquire facilities in, and attempt to extract commitments from, other countries (mainly of lesser status) in pursuit of the maintenance of their own security. We have also seen that this objective may entail the grant by the high-status state of various kinds of assistance for stabilising the domestic societies of other states, on the assumption that such stability (often referred to as necessary for the maintenance of "internal security") is a necessary element in the prime objective of the preservation of the high-status states' security. The acquisition of 'facilities' over some estimated long-term, presupposes a relationship between high and lesser status states whereby the normative aspect of the structure of relationship between them (the system of expectations) permits this.

In this normative context, the influence relationship, though initiated by the high-status power is perceived by both states as mutually beneficial. Thus the maintenance of these facilities, providing 'access' in some other state may be exchanged by the latter, against some other good or value: for example, an obligation to protect the state from aggression or to provide the state with economic aid for its own development.

Where the influence relationship threatens to break down -

¹President Shukri al-Quwwatli of Syria, quoted in Kirk, George, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950 (O.U.P., 1954), pp. 107-7.

when for example, the lesser state no longer sees the normative system as according with other aspects of its own activity, and begins, then, to doubt the extent of benefit gained from the relationship - the high-status state may, if it perceives the maintenance of the facilities as necessary for material or prestige reasons, attempt to change the influence relationship into a power relationship; that is, to force the lesser state to accede to the maintenance of the facilities even though it no longer adheres, or wishes to adhere, to the system of expectations that formed the structural basis for their coming into existence.

The success of the high-status power in either persuading the other state to retain its commitment to the normative system (therefore to maintain or revert to the influence relationship) or in constraining the state to maintain the facilities in spite of its rejection of that system, is related to the character of their systemic relations: the character of the 'organisation' between them. The character of organisation will be (and will have been in the past) reflected in, to adapt a phrase used in a slightly different context, the "sensitivity of events in one country to what is happening" in the other;² and this will in turn, indicate the autonomy of one state relative to the other. Where it is the power relationship (or constraint relationship) that comes into existence, then the question of the extent of 'intervention' of one state in another becomes clearly relevant. But it may also arise in terms of the influence relationship, though less obviously so, where for example, the acceptance of facilities on the basis of an influence relationship by a government does not reflect (especially

² Richard Cooper writing of the process of international economic integration: "This process involves the increasing sensitivity of economic events in one country to what is happening in its trading partners" in Cooper, R.N., The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (N.Y., McGraw Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 10. Emphasis in the original.

in the contemporary period) popular opinion, or the homogeneous opinion of the governing elite as a whole.³

Now it will be clear that we are using definitions of the much disputed (at the analytical level) terms, power and influence, suggested by Etzioni, and to which we have referred above (see pages 103-4). Further, we accept the inclination to intervention and control as the staple of states' international activity, with the exercise of power and influence as a means to that end. What we now seek to do is to analyse the relationship between a variety of terms - power, influence, intervention, control - and to devise a framework for understanding the context of activity of small states which are subject to the attempts by other, mainly high-status states, to establish facilities on their territory, or so to control the structure of relationships in which they are involved, as to exercise influence, power or control over the small states' activities, in order to maximise their own (high-status states) policy objectives.

The Concept of Penetration: Critique

Though, as has often been pointed out,⁴ the problems to which we have referred in the previous paragraph are not new, the decolonisa-

³What one analyst refers to as the "consensus" factor. See Hanreider, W., "Compatibility and Consensus: A proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy", American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, 1967, pp. 971-981.

⁴See for example, Beloff, M., "Reflections on Intervention", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XXII, 1968, pp. 198-207. The whole issue of the Journal is devoted to the subject "Intervention and World Politics". See also, Fliess, Peter J., Thucydides and Politics Bipolarity (Baton Rouge: Louisiana U.P., 1963).

tion process in the post-war period, involving the coming into existence of a large number of small states economically and military weak, has brought them back into prominence, and has induced renewed attempts to analyse them. Recent discussions have proceeded in terms of a number of concepts - penetration, intervention, systemic linkage. We take up, first, the concept of penetration, recently advanced and analysed in detail, by James Rosenau.⁵ Arguing that "foreign policy analysis lacks comprehensive systems of testable generalizations that treat societies as actors subject to stimuli which produce external responses", and that it is important to analyse systematically the "causal relationships between external behaviour and internal processes",⁶ Rosenau has proceeded to assert that the working of contemporary international society suggests the need to devise a concept to describe a form of national political system (state) that is not of the traditional kind. This he calls the "penetrated political system". Rosenau's key propositions with respect to this would appear to be the following: that it is necessary to conclude, if one examines contemporary international relations,

"that cogent political analysis requires a readiness to treat the functioning of national systems as increasingly dependent on external events and trends ... [that it is necessary also] to identify a new type of political system that will account for phenomena which not even a less rigid use of the national-international distinction renders comprehensible. Such a system might be called the penetrated political system, and its essential characteristics might be defined in the following way: A penetrated political system is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of

⁵ See his "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in Farrell, R.B. (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, pp. 27-72.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 32 and 33.

its goals. The political processes of a penetrated system are conceived to be structurally different from both those of an international political system and those of a national political system. In the former, nonmembers indirectly and nonauthoritatively influence the allocation of a society's values and the mobilization of support for its goals through autonomous rather than joint action. In the latter, nonmembers of a society do not direct action toward it and thus do not contribute in any way to the allocation of its values or the attainment of its goals.⁷ ... The existence of a penetrated system is determined by the presence of nonmembers who participate directly in a society's politics and not by their affiliations and responsibilities".⁸

Now, Rosenau is clearly distinguishing the phenomena he describes from what Herz has called the increasing "permeability" of states in the contemporary period. There has occurred, Herz remarks,

"the decline of that specific element of statehood which characterized the units composing the modern state system in its classical period ... their 'territoriality' or 'impermeability'.⁹

Nor is he simply arguing that the internal politics of states can no longer be protected from external interferences or influences, the capacity for which inhibition had long been recognised as the hallmark of legal sovereignty, and the prime characteristic of political independence. For Bismarck had already seen this problem, and had attempted to do for Prussia, what all states had assumed, at least in principle, was the first task of governmental leadership with respect to external activity:

" ... I determined to regulate the movements of our home policy in accordance with the question whether it would support or injure impressions of the power and coherence of the state. I argued to myself that our first great aim must be independence and security in our foreign relations; that to this end not only was actual

⁷Ibid., p. 65. Emphasis in the original.

⁸Ibid., p. 68.

⁹Herz, John, International Politics in the Atomic Age (N.Y. Columbia U.P., Paperback edition, 1962), p. 96. See also p. 40.

removal of internal dissension requisite, but also any appearance of such a thing must be avoided in the sight of the foreign Powers and of Germany; that if we first gained independence of foreign influence, we should then be able to move freely in our internal development ..."¹⁰

As Hanreider has argued in a useful critique, Rosenau seems to make his definition of the "penetrated political system", "unnecessarily restrictive",¹¹ in suggesting that the political system can be called "penetrated" only when participation in value allocation is accepted by existing members as authoritative. Is it, in any case fair to argue as a description of present-day national societies, that "non-members of a society do not direct action toward it and thus do not contribute in any way to the allocation of its value"?¹² Clearly, Rosenau's main objective is to distinguish and analyse as distinct phenomena, the societies where non-member participation is accepted as legitimate either by governments or populations, and to insist, as he does, that these are "relatively permanent forms of political organisation" in contemporary international society.¹³ Further, he wishes to cleanse the concept of penetration of its pejorative overtones, and to make it a relatively neutral concept. As he writes:

"This designation is nonevaluative. Although the word 'penetrated' is sometimes used in connection with subversive activities, nothing invidious is intended by its use here".¹⁴

¹⁰ Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman - Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto Prince Von Bismarck (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1898, Translated by A.J. Butler) Vol. II, p. 61.

¹¹ Hanreider, W., op. cit., p. 979.

¹² Our emphases

¹³ Rosenau, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 65, footnote 75.

But the question requires to be asked whether the phenomenon of penetration is markedly different in structural characteristics when non-member participation is not authoritative, from when it is, and whether in an era of popular participation and interest in governmental decision-making processes, the grant of authority and legitimacy to non-member participation in a society can be viewed as a long-term (almost static) phenomenon. Acceptance by one government of non-member participation as authoritative at one point in time, may not be continued by another government in the same society. In fact it may be the cause of the former's dismissal. Hanreider recognises these problems, and argues, in attempting to extend Rosenau's definition, that "penetrative processes may take place without the direct, personal, or authoritative participation of nonmembers of the national system"; he suggests a new definition:

" ... a political system is penetrated (1) if its decision-making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events, and (2) if it can command wide consensus among the relevant elements of the decision-making process in accomodating to these events".¹⁵

Hanreider attempts to do two things here: first, to suggest that penetration may not necessarily be conscious and therefore personal - that it may relate to the effects of 'events' as well as to personal decisions, and that there can be penetration without non-members having to physically enter the penetrated society. Secondly, he prefers to characterise non-member participation as of a penetrative character, as long as it is accepted by "relevant elements of the decision-making process"; penetration, he seems to imply can be informally legitimate without being (formally) authoritative, that is legal.

We do not see the need to insist that a society or state can

¹⁵Hanreider, op. cit., p. 979. Emphasis in the original.

be described as penetrated only when penetrative processes are accepted by, and therefore visible to, relevant elements in the decision-making process. In our view, this attributes an unduly static character to the process. It is, on the other hand, precisely the unstable and unpredictable character of the notion of 'acceptance' that makes the meaning of penetration, with respect to any particular society, problematic. The same circumstances of penetration may be acceptable to particular elements in a society at one time, and not acceptable to the same elements at another: the legitimacy of penetration may disappear. Further, and here we are in agreement with Hanreider, we do not see the process of participation as relating only to individuals. For us, penetration can be defined to include, and can further emanate from, physical emplacements (what we have referred to previously as 'facilities') in a society that belong to individuals, or the government, of another society.

As will be explained below, we see penetrative processes and phenomena as the base elements, from which internal and external linkages can be derived, connecting one society with another, individuals or units within one society with those in another, or making the processes of one society 'sensitive' to changes in the processes of another or, generally, to changes in the processes of non-governmental units in the international society. Non-member participation in the decision-making process of a society, whether authoritative or non-authoritative, is, then, only one aspect of the process of penetration. We see the penetrative process as having effects, the pejorative or non-pejorative assessment of which by members of the national society is important to the sources from which penetration is derived. Thus, while penetration may be seen as, in itself, a neutral process or set of processes, its effects are subject to normative interpretations, insofar, in particular, as they impinge on the processes of

subordination and superordination within the national society. And here we would agree with Rosenau, though we have moved away from his definitions and analytical framework, that penetrative processes must be analysed in relation to particular issues (or as he calls them "issue-aréas"), that the national society deems relevant at some particular time.

Once we see penetration as the base phenomenon, or analytically, as the controlling concept, we can link (since penetration is, by definition, always external in origin, though not necessarily initiated from an external source) the key problem of the control, by nationals of the governmental processes of the society, with that of the response of the national society or state, especially where it is small and open, to external events - the effects of physical penetration; or the cases in which systemic boundaries not corresponding even minimally with geographical boundaries, decisions affecting the state do not seem to nationals to have any internal referent. In the latter case we will be dealing with the problem of state autonomy, as well as that of sovereignty.¹⁶

A Framework for the Analysis of Penetrative Processes

| Given the connectedness of systems in which states, as a consequence of their particular objectives, locations and forms of internal social composition, are involved, they tend to be affected by, or at least to be sensitive to, events in their environments. The manner in which they react to these events, vis-a-vis other elements in the environment, is related to their 'weight' in the structures of connectedness. And

¹⁶On these concepts see Deutsch, K., "External Influences on the Internal Behaviour of States", in Farrell, R.B., op. cit., pp. 5-26; and Cooper, R.N., op. cit., pp. 4-5.

the extent to which they control such structures and thus, other elements, is determined by the kinds of capabilities which they possess (or which are at their disposal), and which allow them the flexibility continually to adapt in as extensively a unilaterally-determined way as, given their objectives, is possible.

The resources and capabilities that a state possesses allow it to determine the number and kinds of presences that it can dispose of in international, and other national, systems, and to inhibit, in systems relevant to its own activity, the emplacements of undesired presences by other states. What we have referred to previously as the 'facilities' that a state can obtain is one aspect of its general presence in the global environment. To talk of the presence of a state in the global environment, is another way of referring to its systemic size, and of the extent to which its systemic size allows it to adapt - therefore to exercise power and influence.

The mechanisms through which resources and capabilities are converted into presences are what we can call instrumentalities. Unless a state can, therefore, transform its capabilities into instrumentalities, it is incapable of developing or maintaining presences. And since presences bear a direct relation to the scope of policy which a state can undertake, it is instrumentalities that form the connecting link between capabilities and policy. In summary, then, resources and capabilities, instrumentalities and presences, the core elements of the penetrative process, are all, also, indices of systemic size. They determine the extensiveness of, and limits on, a state's capacity to exercise power and influence in relation to systems or elements of the international environment; and power and influence are the modes of achieving various kinds of objectives that the state, as a matter of policy, sets for itself. It is useful to demonstrate this diagrammatically, in the following way:

(1) Resources and Capabilities

- (a) Economic capabilities, including the state's location in and diversity of, trading systems.
- (b) Weapons capabilities and means of transportation (including means that determine the operational significance of 'distance').
- (c) Population or Human Resources.

(2) Instrumentalities

- (a) Economic investments
- (b) Economic and technical assistance
- (c) Military assistance
- (d) Financial contributions to international organizations
- (e) Character of domestic, Political and Social base, in relation to policy objectives (i.e. Domestic Political Efficiency)

Problem: To what extent these are capable of transformation into:


(3) Presences

- (a) Military Establishments
- (b) Multinational Corporations
- (c) Cultural facilities
- (d) Embassies and other manpower presences

Problem: To what extent these are capable of conversion into:

Determinants of:

- (4) Power and Influence Towards
- (5) Policy Objectives



From the point of view of the state possessing them, presences can have either a positive or negative value. A situation of negative value can be arrived at, where, though the emplacement of presences is the consequence of, initially, the attribution of positive (for example strategic) value to the recipient state, the possessor of the presences finds itself gradually constrained, where this is against its own policy objectives, to support the objectives of the recipient. This is the case of the small state, which, as Aron has remarked, takes the great state, as protector, in directions which the latter would not normally wish to go. In exchange for subordination in certain aspects of policy, the small state gains, through the granting of facilities for presences, attributes which it considers valuable to the maintenance of its own existence.

Towards one end of a continuum one finds the case in which the existence of a presence may lead to a relationship of dependency, a relationship that reflects some large degree of recipient state dependence for a viable existence on systems controlled by the possessor of the presence. Such presence may denote a small degree of autonomy within the terms of legal sovereignty and independence. A set of circumstances of this kind forms, for example, the context of arguments about the significance of the terms neo-colonial as a description of small states in a dependent relationship. Neo-colonialism is a description of a set of economic circumstances relating to a state, the further assumption being that such economic circumstances lead to the development, in turn, of a situation of extreme political constraint on the small state.

Green and Seidman, to take one analysis, assert that the "pattern of neo-colonialism" is one of "political independence associated with economic dependence on one or more external power"; and that "quite clearly economic relationships and policies do not comprise the whole

of dependence. Political, military and cultural aspects are also of major significance".¹⁷ They further argue that African states, for example,

"are dependent in large measure because they are economically small. The larger the relative size of exports and imports to national product, the higher the share of foreign capital to domestic investment, and the greater need for expatriate managers, technicians, and teachers, the less meaning has political independence".¹⁸

It is, in addition to size, the underdevelopment of states, and the generally centralised character of colonial rule which, where it establishes the facilities for some degree of autonomous activity does so by linking them with those of the 'mother' country, that lead, especially in the contemporary period to dependence on usually one source. For it is not dependence in itself that has the effect of diminution or loss of autonomy,¹⁹ but the extent to which dependence is directed to one locus or to a few major loci; and the extent to which there develops little of reciprocity in any set of transactions. If, therefore, we assume that a large degree of economic and trading dependence will be a necessity for small states, the problem of the relationship of dependence to degree of autonomy must find its resolution not in the elimination of dependence per se, but, as we will try to illustrate in specific terms below, the diversification of

¹⁷Green, R.H. and Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (England, Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 92 and 97.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 92. See also p. 93 for their attempt to "list the main structural characteristics of [economic] dependence in a quantifiable format"; and Hoselitz's description of a "satellite" economy: "a society which draws all its capital for development from abroad and which develops only those branches of production whose output is entirely exported. If we further stipulate that all or the bulk of the capital imports come from one source and that all or the bulk of the exports go to one destination, we have the ideal type case of a country with a 'satellite' pattern of growth". Quoted in Green and Seidman pp. 91-2 from Hoselitz, B., Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth, (Free Press, Glencoe, 1961), p. 93.

¹⁹See Cooper, R., op. cit., pp. 4-5.

sources and therefore systems of dependence controlled by large, developed states. This is, for us, the relevance of Sommerhoff's distinction to which we have earlier alluded (see Chapter 2 note 25), between the 'activity of adapting' and the 'relationship of adaptedness'. States of similar physical size may, within the same relationship, demonstrated different capacities in the activity of adapting to environmental changes: and this is illustrative of differences in, and different levels of complexity of, their systemic sizes.

Most small states in the contemporary period have attained independence from colonial systems. As such, their previous administrative relationship with the 'mother' country has created extensive links of dependence in the spheres, for example, of international economic relations, and of their capacities for internal administration. The consequences of the decision of the people of Guinea not to subscribe to the new 'community' system of General de Gaulle in 1958, but to create an independent state illustrate this point. According to one source,

"... on the very day on which the referendum results were declared, a senior French official arrived in Conakry ... to tell Sekou Toure that Guinea was, by its vote, held to have seceded from France, that there would be no more French financial aid and that all French officials would be withdrawn within two months"²⁰

France subsequently decided not to withdraw her officials within this period, but the relative dependence of the two countries on each other is indicated in the following quotation:

"Until the end of November Guinea can stay within the franc monetary zone, and she can continue to benefit from the lower customs duties by which France protects products from countries within the French Community. In particular Guinea's bananas, at present her main export, fetch about a third more on the French market than they would elsewhere, and Guinean coffee about a tenth more. The lower customs duties between French

²⁰"The Man Who Said No", West Africa, October 4, 1958, p. 941.

territories also benefit French manufactures, particularly cotton cloth which would otherwise be out-priced in Guinea by British, Italian or German goods. France also gains from the dollar and pound sales of Guinea bauxite, coffee and iron ore"²¹

Where states exist in a dependency relationship of this kind, the small state in particular can only attempt to counter-balance the potential for command relationships implicit in export-import, monetary and infrastructural dependency with the potential for bargaining relationships that lies in its possession of a valued material resource (such as bauxite in the case of Guinea). But the capacity for autonomous activity (for adapting in a unilaterally-determined manner) is clearly a constricted one. Thus, in recent years states have tried, as an alternative to the maintenance of the dependency relationship, to diversify sources of imports and exports, of financial assistance and institution servicing assistance - hence some insistence in recent years on multilateral rather than bilateral assistance.²²

We can, here, make a distinction between three broad categories of dependency: dependency in structural relations, institutional dependency with structural effects, and satellitism - extreme structural and institutional dependency. First, dependency in structural relations inhibits a state from controlling systems relevant to itself, emanating from outside of its physical boundaries, but which are essential to the viability of the state's internal (political, social, economic) systems. Monocrop economies with one main source for exports of the crop would fall within this category - the small state 'petroleum economies' being a particular example of them. Structural dependency of this kind can also be the consequence of linkages created by sudden large-

²¹Mitchinson, L., "Guinea and the French", West Africa, November 8, 1958, p. 1067.

²²See Chapter III, "Bilateral Assistance Trends" and Chapter IV, "Multilateral Aid: Evolution and Problems", in O.E.C.D., Development Assistance - 1968 Review (1968).

scale economic expenditures for products or resources in scarce supply, which the small state possesses at the particular time. A case in point is the effect on South East Asian countries' exports (for example those of Singapore and South Korea) directed so as to match United States expenditures to meet her Vietnam War requirements.²³

Secondly, there is what we have called institutional dependency with structural effects. Here the physical emplacement of presences leads to other forms of dependency. The presence, for example, of large military bases in small countries, is the source of important amounts of foreign exchange and local employment for those countries. The establishment of military presences then becomes for the small state not simply a problem of external relations (that is, a possible means for providing for its defence), but of internal relations with respect to issues of an economic character. This is an important factor for the state in deciding on its attitude to, for example, a policy of non-alignment; and it is an important element for the analyst who tries to determine the degree of non-alignment which such states are actually capable of sustaining.

Another form of institutional dependency with structural effects is that in which the small state gives another a legal right of intervention in certain circumstances. In fact, the mere grant of the 'right' can be seen as constituting a presence, and the effect of the right, when exercised, is the control of the state that is the recipient of the intervention. The Platt Amendment with respect to Cuba is perhaps one of the more famous examples of this, but the agreements (which we

²³"Problems of Economic Adjustment: The Impact of Hostilities in Vietnam" in U.N. Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1967, E/CN. 11/825, (Bangkok, 1968), pp. 8-10. Thus unless particular kinds of adjustments are made by themselves and by the United States, the ending of the war would actually be detrimental to the economies of these countries.

have previously referred to) that allowed for intervention by treaty partners in Cyprus, is another. Here, the constitution of the state contains, in effect, a self-liquidating clause - implying, that is, the liquidation of its sovereignty at worst, its autonomy at least. And it is the presence of the constitutional clause that constitutes the penetration - intervention and control being effects of that form of penetration, as well as having the potential for making more extensive the penetrative process.²⁴ In general, then, presences where institutionally established by agreement (and where maintained even by force on the basis of some constitutional agreement or treaty as in the case of the Guantanamo base in Cuba,²⁵ constitute the bases for the exercise of influence, power and, at the extreme, control. This applies to presences of the kind that we have outlined in the above diagram: military establishments, multinational corporations, embassies, cultural facilities, and manpower presences in the form of the various kinds of technical and administrative assistance that are granted in the contemporary period. It is the last of these that here most closely approximates to Rosenau's notion of penetration. An example of it is suggested in a report on Gabon which indicated that, after independence, the Government of that country agreed to allow control of its Treasury to be maintained by French administrators, subsequently, however, relegated to the role of "technical advisers."²⁶

²⁴The constitutional 'right' of great power intervention must be distinguished from inclination to intervention by the great power, based on some view of 'spheres of influence'.

²⁵See Lazar, Joseph, "International Legal Status of Guantanamo Bay". American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, 1968, pp. 730-739.

²⁶"Control of Gabon's Treasury which until now has been administered by France, in the absence of suitably qualified Gabonese, was on October 1st handed over to Gabon's Ministry of Finance. Frenchmen will continue to work in the Treasury as technical advisers". Africa Research Bulletin - Economic, Financial, Vol. 2 No. 9, 1965, p. 365.

It is this category of institutional dependency that encompasses the greatest variety of penetrative processes and effects of these processes. We take one example, again concerning Gabon, which illustrates the potential lines of activity opened as a consequence of military agreements. A French Foreign Ministry official attempted to explain his country's intervention in Gabon, in 1964, in the following terms:

"The French Government was in duty bound to give aid and assistance to the legal government of the Gabon Republic, since events there had involved its responsibilities evolving from agreements reached with Gabon. It did so acting on a request submitted through diplomatic channels. The French forces were given the mission of ensuring the freedom and security of the President of the Gabon Republic and they carried out this mission ..."²⁷

A request for assistance of this kind implies control of the state passing from its government to that of the intervener - a self-liquidation in times of a civil crisis that directly challenges the authority and legitimacy of the government. The autonomy of that state is, in a factual sense, minimal, and the amount of time in which it remains in that status, has implications for other states' assessments of its de jure status - its sovereignty.

The third extreme case of dependency is that of the satellitic relationship. The concept of satellite has often been used to refer to all situations in which dependency is pronounced, but we try here to restrict its use to a particular kind of dependency. An attempt has already been made to do so by Murphy,²⁸ and it is his analysis that we

²⁷Quoted in "Gabon: Putsch or Coup d'Etat" Africa Report, Vol. 9 No. 3, 1964, pp. 12-15 at p. 13. Our emphasis. For a general discussion of the French military presence in Africa see, Apple, Jr., R.W., "French Still Maintain 7,000-Man Force in Africa", New York Times, May 4, 1969.

²⁸Murphy, George H., "On Satellitship", Journal of Economic History, Vol. 21, 1961, pp. 641-651. Murphy is himself following an analysis by Lattimore, Owen, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 1955).

follow. Murphy argues that,

"Satelliteship consists of the exercise by a single decision-maker of a dominant country of complete authority over a smaller country. This authority is used to engineer broad and sweeping programmes of social change in the smaller country to suit the preferences of this decision-maker."²⁹

This relationship is of a command character - what Murphy refers to as involving a "directive, hierarchical decision structure". He attempts further, to make a distinction between satelliteship and colonialism, on the grounds that while in the latter "native elites had no power of decision ... it seems true to say that governments as opposed to general forces of cultural diffusion did not attempt to make vast and sweeping changes in the behavioural habits of native populations ... The range of decisions which came within the purview of the imperial government was narrow. The Soviet or Chinese Government in dealing with a satellite feels that most social phenomenon are variable".³⁰

We accept this distinction, though it seems useful to emphasize the fact that we would in any case restrict the application of the concept of satellite to entities which are de jure states. The formal (that is, constitutional) instruments necessary for the evolution from colonial status to that of statehood, is not necessary in the evolution from satellitism to de facto independence.³¹ Further, there can be no concept of, and therefore no debate about, ultimate authority (where this is a legal as well as a normative term) in the colonial relationship, resting in the colony.

We can now further outline the characteristics of the satellite.

²⁹ Murphy, G., op. cit., p. 642.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 650-651.

³¹ The case of Southern Rhodesia illuminates this. Though there might have been a gradual ceding of autonomy to the entity and a delegation of authority, there could be no question as to where ultimate legal authority lay. In the case of the satellite this lies in the state that is satellitic. X

At least two things are peculiar to it:

- (1) The objective of the dominant state is not simply to establish a coincidence of decisions, between itself and the satellite, relating to external affairs; but to make the decision-making processes of the satellite isomorphic with those of its own with respect to both internal and external processes. The dominant state wishes to establish an identity of social and political processes, thus doing away with the need for bargaining relationships in order to effect desired decisions on the part of the satellite. Towards this end the dominant state establishes,
- (2) An institutional penetration of the political system of the satellite, establishing dominance in each institutional sector, or parallel bureaucracies in each institutional sector; this establishes direct linkages between the bureaucratic institutions of the satellite and those of the dominant state.

The paradigm case of satellitism in the contemporary period has been the set of relationships established in the Communist bloc after 1945. The prime mechanism for this has been the party, seen as a means of negating the internal/external distinction characteristic of relationships between sovereign states. The establishment of the party in all significant social sectors allows for the 'dissolution', in practice, of state boundaries, and the creation of systemic boundaries to coincide with the physical boundaries of the Communist State system as a whole. The polemics between the Government of

Yugoslavia, and that of the Soviet Union illustrate this: the Yugoslavs wishing to maintain the distinction between State and Party relations, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, denying the relevance of the distinction. Thus, to the observation of the Yugoslavs that,

"... he [the Russian Ambassador], as Ambassador, is not entitled to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party, - this is not his business. Such information can be obtained by the CC [Central Committee] of the CPSU(B) from the CC of the CPY",³²

the Russians replied that,

"We consider that this statement of Comrades Tito and Kardelj is fundamentally incorrect, anti-Soviet. As can be seen, they place the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist who represents in Yugoslavia, the Communist Government of the USSR before the Yugoslav Government, on an equal footing with an ordinary bourgeois State, whose duty is to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav State ... Do they realise that such an attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador means the denial of friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do they realise that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible Communist ... has not only the right but also the duty to discuss with the Communists of Yugoslavia all the questions they might be interested in? ... We do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official ... We do not deny him the right to seek information from anyone on the work of our Party. On becoming Ambassador, he did not cease to be a Communist".³³

In this kind of satellite system, then, State and Party relations become intertwined in the interest, on the part of the dominant state, of complete institutional penetration and control of satellite decision-making:

³²"From a letter by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to J.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, of April 13, 1948", Document No. 9, in Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania Towards Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1951), p. 63.

³³"From a letter by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia of May 4, 1948", Document No. 10, Ibid., p. 64.

"The Soviets made decisions concerning which countries should produce certain articles ...; assisted in the drawing up of long-range plans in most Bloc nations; and chose important government officials in various countries. The USSR also operated certain enterprises in every country (except Poland) and participated in policy-making in other firms in these nations which were producing goods for reparations. In the DDR after 1945, all high economic functionaries had their 'partner' in the Soviet embassy whom they consulted for every important move ..."³⁴⁴

Institutional penetration, therefore, occurs in relation to industrial development,³⁵ military relations through military advisors, general economic development through what in Yugoslav-USSR relations were called "civilian specialists" (what today might be referred to as 'expert technical assistance'), and in relation to state and system security, through coordination of intelligence services.

Three points need to be taken into account here. First, the salience of institutional penetration, and therefore, the capacity to resist or evade it, and its effects, varied throughout the Communist State system. The semi-autonomous nature of the Yugoslav and Albanian liberation from Nazi domination, gave them some scope for resistance to undesired penetration. Secondly, state ownership or state pre-dominance in the control of economic and social activities facilitates extensive institutional penetration. Thirdly (this point being related to the second), the nature of authority relationships within the satellite determines the extent to which dominant state/satellite relationships are of a purely command or directive kind, as distinct from the extent to which bargaining relationships, involving the exercise of influence, are introduced. It is in relation to this,

³⁴Pryor, F.L., The Communist Foreign Trade System (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.) 1963, pp. 200-1.

³⁵On a form of institutional economic penetration through the mechanism of "joint companies", see, "Joint Yugoslav-Soviet 'Juspad' and 'Justa' Companies as A Form of the Policy of Unequal Economic Relations", pp. 321-335 in White Book on Aggressive Activities ..."

that there arise analytical problems in the definition of penetration that Rosenau suggests. He insists on "authoritative" participation of non-nationals as an index of characterisation of a national political system as "penetrated". But Hanreider's qualification, suggesting that the penetration should "command wide consensus among the relevant elements in the decision-making process" seems more useful. For it may give us some means of determining when, and among what sectors, even a penetration that was once accepted as legitimate, is losing that legitimacy. The capacity of the 'leadership' of the penetrated state to respond to such loss of legitimacy with respect to non-national participation, gives an indication of the capacity or incapacity of the state to evolve from its satellitic status. The loss of legitimacy may be illustrated by a certain paralysis of the machinery of government; Pryor reports that in the Eastern European countries, "the Russians were often resented; many times the Russian advisory teams were looked upon as spies; and some officials in the Central European nations attempted to withhold information".³⁶

On the other hand, the loss of legitimacy on the part of non-national participants within a satellite state may be counterbalanced by the salience of dominant power institutional sector-penetration, so that the small state's ability to negate its satellitic status is impossible. The salience of penetration may allow the dominant state to monitor resistance to its dominance, and so inhibit it. But, more importantly, this is the case of penetration without consensus.

Now, in the modern period, the capacity to effect desired and similar decisions through an identity of socio-political processes need not necessarily be attained through the mechanism of the party, as in the Communist system. Large scale economic, technical and

³⁶ Pryor, F.L., op. cit., p. 202

military assistance by major powers inclines them to attempt to institute mechanisms within the small state for monitoring the use of such assistance. One analyst of the Laotian situation has attempted a rationale for this:

"The traditional American taboo against 'interfering' in another country's affairs would also have to be re-examined; when the United States is providing three-quarters of a country's budget, it has responsibility, as well as honour, at stake in that country's actions".³⁷

And Allen Dulles, then head of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, has argued that the United States intelligence services ought, wherever possible, to

"help to build up local defences against [Communist] penetration by keeping target countries aware of the nature and extent of their peril and by assisting their internal security service wherever this can be done, or possibly only be done, on a covert basis ... Many of the countries most seriously threatened do not have internal political or security services adequate to the task of obtaining timely warning of the peril of Communist subversion. For this they often need help and they can get it only from a country like the United States, which has the resources and techniques to aid them".³⁸

³⁷Dommen, A.J., Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), p. 302.

³⁸Dulles, Allen, The Craft of Intelligence, pp. 231-2. (Our emphasis).

Penetration and Control: Concepts and Practice

The forms of dependency which we have discussed above give rise to the exercise of a variety of ranges of power, influence, and control. We attempt now, to further develop our framework by a discussion of these effects of penetration, of the effects of these on the penetrative process itself. For the penetration by high status states of other states in the contemporary period is, to use one description of that of the United States, "multiforme et multitentaculaire".³⁹ The diagram below suggests what we see as the main stages of penetrative effects.


We can, first of all, make some conceptual distinctions among the various effects of penetration. First we view intervention as an act of government, or of an agency under the control of government. It is a conscious act, involving the exercise of power as we have defined this.⁴⁰ It is an act of last resort, the use of the mechanisms of intervention implying that the exercise of influence has failed, even where this has been attempted on the basis of the establishment of various forms of presences. Intervention is a coercive act, but it is itself an act of relatively short duration, rather than a continuing process.⁴¹ By this we mean that the act of intervention is intended to

³⁹A phrase attributed to Prince Sihanouk, describing United States aid to Cambodia. Quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLIII No. 2, Jan. 9, 1964, p. 51.

⁴⁰That is, following Etzioni, The Active Society, pp. 359-60. We have quoted him on the concepts at *supra*, p. 103-4.

⁴¹James Rosenau seems to be expressing the same idea in remarking on "the finite and transitory nature of interventions", p. 32 in "The Concept of Intervention"/mimeo/, Paper Prepared for the Conference on Intervention and the Developing States, sponsored by the Princeton International Law Society, held at Princeton, New Jersey, November 10-11, 1967. Quoted with author's permission. The paper has been reprinted under the title, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept", in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XIII, 1969, pp. 149-171.

PENETRATION AND ITS EFFECTS



have immediate effects, either, that is, the acquiescence in some decision desired by the intervener, the emplacement of further presences on the territory intervened in, or the usurpation of the government of the latter, and control (formal or informal) of its decision-making processes.

Intervention can, in fact, be viewed as representing a further penetration aimed directly at the machinery of government of the entity intervened in. Thus while penetration, which can be both a governmental and privately-inspired process, does not in itself necessarily represent an intervention, though it may constitute the basis for it; intervention, as an act, can either lead to direct control of the state intervened in, establish further presences, or be ended.

It will be clear that we are using a restrictive definition of intervention. We accept Oppenheim's, perhaps traditional, view of intervention as,

"... dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things ... But it must always be emphasised that intervention proper is always dictatorial interference, not interference pure and simple. Therefore intervention must neither be confused with good offices, nor with mediation, nor with intercession, nor with cooperation, because none of these imply dictatorial interference."⁴²

If we accept the distinction that this implies between intervention, mere establishment of presences, influence, and acts of control or attempted control, then we cannot accept the view of Cottam that it is analytically useful to "erase the distinction between what is loosely called 'normal diplomatic behaviour' and interference" and that "to

⁴²Oppenheim, L., International Law, Vol. I (7th ed., H. Lanterpacht, London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1948), pp. 272-73. Emphasis in the original.

search for a fine line dividing normal diplomatic behaviour, interference, and intervention is not only futile but tends to obscure the important point that there is a continuum from slight to intense interference".⁴³

Similarly we cannot accept the formulation, advanced by Baldwin, that equates intervention with influence, on the grounds that,

"First, almost everyone's definition of intervention would be included, since there is widespread agreement that intervention is a type of influence. Second, normative arguments that are unlikely to lead to agreement would be avoided. The breakdown in the consensus regarding what kinds of influence are legitimate often mires discussions of intervention in fruitless arguments over values. A third advantage of equating 'intervention' with 'influence' is that it helps us understand what the developing states are really complaining about ... Only a very broad definition of intervention will allow us to discuss the matter in a way that is relevant to the concerns of these nations".⁴⁴

It would, in our view, be more proper to say not that "intervention is a type of influence", but that intervention forms the basis for the exercise of power, which is also its purpose. Rosenau⁴⁵ argues that influence is defined as "the production of intended effects", is "both the central purpose and process of intervention". We assume that influence and power are in this conception taken to have the same meaning, but if, as Rosenau later correctly remarks, one of the

⁴³Cottam, R.W., Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, p. 36). Cottam (ibid.) defines interference as "any act by the government or citizens of one State designed to influence the policy of another state or to influence the internal developments of that state, whether they be political, economic or social. Thus defined, interference would include both acts of persuasion and acts of coercion. Similarly, acts that are tolerated by a target government and people as well as those which are not would be classed as interference". This seems to us too inclusive.

⁴⁴Baldwin, David A., "Foreign Aid, Intervention and Influence", World Politics, Vol. xl, 1969, pp. 425-47, at p. 426.

two main characteristics of intervention is its "convention-breaking character",⁴⁶ it seems to make sense to distinguish between events and decisions which are, for example, the consequence of influence based on some degree of norm or value identification between entities, and events and decisions based on a power-interaction, and in which any norm identification that may exist is broken.

If the definition of intervention that we propose is acceptable then the most relevant connection between intervention and influence must be seen in terms of Etzioni's concept of "persuasive power". This, he writes,

"is the most similar to influence, since both are symbolic and draw on sentiments. The difference between them rests in the depth of their effects; persuasion suppresses the actor's preferences without changing them; it, hence, resembles influence on the surface, but there is really an exercise of power beneath ... When persuasive power is very effective and influence superficial, the two are very similar, but, in general, it is not difficult to distinguish the one from the other. Persuasive power works more quickly and is less costly in assets than influence, but is more alienating and less commitment-inducing and has an impact that is more superficial and temporary".⁴⁷

When, then, we talk of influence-exercise, as a continuing relationship between two or more entities, and see it as occurring as a consequence not simply, or most often, of intervention but of mere penetration (the establishment of presences in a 'non-dictatorial' context in the contemporary period especially), it becomes important to distinguish between different kinds of influence that can exist in a relationship. We can, in sum, distinguish between decisions and policies of actors that have an externally-originating impetus, and are the consequence of: (a) the exercise of influence, (b) the exercise of influence and persuasive power, (c) the exercise of mere power - the case in which

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 32.

⁴⁷ Etzioni, A., op. cit., p. 360. Our emphasis. He remarks in a footnote, "When we seek to deal with influence and persuasive power together, we refer to normative control". (Emphasis in the original).

the relationship between the penetrated unit and a dominant unit is based on a form of coercion meant to change decisions without changing necessarily sentiment. But all this does not imply that the modes of activity that are the consequence of a power-relationship cannot, over time, come to be accepted as conventional. Put another way, we can say, that, over time, the perception of the coerced or penetrated unit that it is acting under constraint, diminishes, and the sense of being controlled is replaced most often by an ethical and role system emphasising autonomously-decided policy within certain perceived structural limits. Constraint, becoming part of the "culture" is no longer recognised as such.

We can now examine the relationship, in practice (that is, in terms of looking at some cases), between penetration, dependency, influence and control.

It is in the nature of contemporary international economic relationships, in which most states in the society are willing to accept private investment from external (that is, non-national) sources, that many small states are subject to economic penetration by nationals from the high-status states. Private investment and the economic and social processes that it implies, in the territory of small legally-sovereign states, is one index of penetration. It is not itself a form of influence, power or control of the internal systemic process of the small state, but can provide a basis for these. If we assume that most small states are (foreign) trade-dependent, then the emplacement of economic presences on their territory effects a variety of linkages between the economic processes of the countries which are the sources of the investments and those of the states which are the subjects of those investments.

The level of their acceptance by governmental elites, by other political elites, and finally by populations as a whole in small

countries, over time, is an important index of the political consequences of economic presences and the linkages which they create. The latter may in some way be construed as 'neutral' (as conventional occurrences in the international society), but the focus of analysis for the investigator must be their social and psychological effects which, over time, are not static but dynamic, and which cannot therefore be considered, in terms of their relevance to a particular political system, as neutral. As one observer with reference to pre-Cuba states,

"Quite apart from the question as to whether this explanation was actually the basis for U.S. government policy at the time, the critical point to remember is that the objective nature of relations between the United States and Cuba made it easier for Castro's followers, to believe, that the motivation of the United States stemmed from a desire to protect its economic interests".⁴⁸

Secondly, the changing relationship between the three levels of acceptance (government, general political elite and population), and between them and the source of the economic presences, must be taken into account. As is also observed in relation to Cuba,

"A critical aspect of the revolution involved Castro's ability to transfer the hatred his followers felt for Batista to hatred of the U.S. government and its business interests".⁴⁹

In this context, then, though it may be true, as Baldwin argues (see earlier quotation) that trying to discern "what kinds of influence are legitimate and what kinds illegitimate often mires discussion of intervention in fruitless arguments over values", it remains of importance that the analyst should, from the perspective of relations within the small state itself, attempt to perceive how and when

⁴⁸Johnson, L.L., "U.S. Business Interests and the Rise of Castro", World Politics, Vol. XVII, 1965, pp. 440-459 at p. 455. Emphasis in the original.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 448.

presences begin to be viewed as illegitimate, or on the other hand, how governmental elites try to maintain the legitimacy of presences which they have accepted when they discern a development of hostility towards such presences.

Another area of both practical and analytical significance is that of the nature of the linkage between private economic presences in a small state, and the attitude of governments whose territories are the sources of those investments towards the presences. The United States Government, for example, has in the post-war period created a number of institutional relationships between foreign private investment and American economic aid as a means of protecting economic presences established by its nationals in other states. Similarly it has established institutional forms to provide its nationals with an inducement to invest in other countries in spite of risks involved stemming from other states' hostility to such investments. With respect to the latter, one mechanism is the Investment Guaranty Programme under the 1948 Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 which protects United States investors against "(1) the inability to convert foreign currency holdings into dollars; (2) the loss due to expropriation or confiscation; and (3) the loss from damage to tangible property caused by war, revolution, or insurrection".⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Lillich, R.B., The Protection of Foreign Investment (N.Y., Syracuse U.P., 1965), p. 147.

Establishment of Processes: Economic

We now attempt to deal here with two problems: first, the relationship between private foreign investment, the protection of this by the governments of the investors, and the granting, by those governments, to states which are the loci of investment of economic aid; secondly, we examine the problems involved when small states attempt to inhibit certain kinds of effects of foreign economic presences. The United States, perceiving in the post-war period, that the growth of nationalism in excolonial countries was leading to pressure against the governments of those states to establish some degree of local control over investments that were the consequences of exploitation of indigenous resources, took steps to protect the foreign investments of its citizens through, as we have suggested, the introduction of legislation in the United States itself.⁵¹

One of the most important bits of such legislation was the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment which took the form of an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 - the relevant amendment becoming Section 620(e) of the Act.⁵² The relevant portion of the Act requires to be quoted at some length:

⁵¹For a discussion, giving details of instances of expropriation of property of U.S. nationals in the post-war period, see "Exhibit I, Appendix 8: Letter from the Department of State to Senator J.W. Fulbright Concerning U.S. Private Investments, With Attachment 'Major Instances of Expropriation of Property Belonging to U.S. Nationals Since World War II', May 7, 1962" in Congressional Record U.S. Senate, Vol. 109, 88th Congress, 1963, pp. 2137-2138.

⁵²See Congressional Record, Vol. 108, 1962, p. 15187. The original section amended was Section 701(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962. For a useful discussion of the Hickenlooper Amendment, see Lillich, R.B., op. cit., Ch. 3.

"(e) The President shall suspend assistance to the government of any country to which assistance is provided under this or any other Act when the government of such country or any governmental agency or subdivision within such country on or after January 1, 1962 -

- (1) has nationalised or expropriated or seized ownership or control of property owned by any United States citizen or by any corporation, partnership, or association not less than 50 per centum beneficially owned by United States citizens, or
- (2) has taken steps to repudiate or nullify existing contracts or agreements with any United States citizen or any corporation, partnership, or association not less than 50 per centum beneficially owned by United States citizens, or
- (3) has imposed or enforced discriminatory taxes or other exactions, or restrictive maintenance or operational conditions, or has taken other actions, which have the effect of nationalising, expropriating or otherwise seizing ownership or control of property so owned,

and such country, government agency, or government subdivision fails within a reasonable time (not more than six months after such action, or in the event of a referral to the Foreign Claims Commission of the United States within such period as provided herein, not more than twenty days after the report of the Commission is received) to take appropriate steps, which may include arbitration, to discharge its obligations under international law toward such citizen or entity, including speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange, equivalent to the full value thereof, as required by international law, or fails to take steps designed to provide relief from such taxes, exactions, or conditions, as the case may be; and such suspension shall continue until the President is satisfied that appropriate steps are being taken, and no other provision of this Act shall be construed to authorize the President to waive the provisions of this subsection".

By a further amendment (of 1963), the "assistance" which the President was required to suspend was defined to include governmental aid under United States Public Law 480 (the Food for Peace programme), the Export-Import Bank and the Peace Corps.⁵³ The link is now clearly made between

⁵³Lillich, R.B., op. cit., pp. 124-5.

modes of expropriation repugnant to the United States Government and economic and technical assistance by the Government. The American Administration at the time had, in fact, initially opposed any legislation of this kind, especially as it was in part the consequence of expropriations by a state government of Brazil of U.S.-owned property, and it was considered that immediate suspension of assistance to the Government of Brazil might cause extensive damage to United States-Brazilian relations.⁵⁴

In April, May and June of 1962, however, the Government of Ceylon, under its Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act of May 29, 1961, conducted an expropriation of properties belonging to, among others, citizens of the United States: vesting properties belonging to the Esso, Caltex and Shell Oil companies in a Ceylon Petroleum Corporation created under the Act, and giving that Corporation the exclusive right "to import, sell, export or distribute most petroleum products".⁵⁵ The expropriations had been restricted to the distribution facilities of the companies - as far as U.S.-owned companies were concerned, these being "83 gasoline stations and other properties belonging to ... Esso Standard Eastern Inc., and Caltex Ceylon Limited".⁵⁶ The Corporation Act had given the Minister of Trade of Ceylon powers to vest in the Corporation,

⁵⁴Op. cit., pp. 117-20. The Administration by 1963, however, came out in support of the Amendment. (See p. 139).

⁵⁵Amerasinghe, C., "The Ceylon Oil Expropriations", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 58, 1964, pp. 445-450 at p. 445. This summary is based on that article. See also International Legal Materials, 1, 1962, pp. 126 ff.

⁵⁶"Statement of the United States: U.S. Assistance Programme Suspended in Ceylon". Press release issued by the U.S.A.I.D., Dept. of State, 8 Feb. 1963, International Legal Materials, 2, 1963, pp. 386-7 at p. 386-7 at p. 386. The third company whose assets were expropriated was the predominantly British-owned Shell Oil Company.

"any moveable or immovable property other than money, which had been, or is being or is or was intended to be used for

- (a) the importation, exportation, storage, sale, supply, or distribution of petroleum, or
- (b) the carrying on of such business as may be incidental or conducive to the purposes referred to in paragraph (a)".⁵⁷

In February of 1963, the United States Agency for International Development announced that the American economic and technical assistance in Ceylon programme had been suspended, under the terms of the relevant provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. The Director of the Agency, David Bell, is reported as remarking in a statement that,

"The Government of the United States ... did not then and does not now contest the right of Ceylon, as a sovereign state, to nationalise private property. However when such property belongs to a citizen or a company of a foreign country, the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation is required by international law ... The Government of Ceylon has not denied its obligation to pay compensation and has in fact given repeated assurances to this effect. However, the actions taken by the Government of Ceylon are not regarded by the United States Government as 'appropriate steps' /to fulfill its obligation within the meaning of section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act/ because they do not insure the prompt payment of compensation representing the full value of the property as required by international law".⁵⁸

The Government of Ceylon, in response, asserted that "it was at all times ready and willing to pay compensation to the oil companies" and that, in fact, provision for that purpose already existed in the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation Act; that,

⁵⁷Quoted from Amberasinghe, op. cit., p. 445.

⁵⁸"Statement by the United States", op. cit., pp. 386-7. (Our emphasis). Bell is further reported as stating that "the United States Government hopes that prompt, adequate and effective compensation will be paid in this case, not only to satisfy the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, but also so that a favourable climate will be re-established in Ceylon for the investment of foreign capital". (p. 387).

" The Government of Ceylon even decided that in order to arrive at a speedy settlement negotiations should be instituted between the Government and the oil companies for the payment of lump sum compensation. The Embassy of the United States of America was informed of the Government's decision and was requested to accept the fact of commencement of negotiations for the payment of lump sum compensation as satisfying the requirements of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act.⁵⁹

But the Ceylon Government's further explanation gives an indication of the area of contention (itself implicit in the U.S.A.I.D's statement) between that Government and the United States Government and the oil companies, that led the U.S. to conclude that Ceylon had not taken 'appropriate steps.' "The oil companies' claims were received", but

"as certain information necessary for the proper assessment of compensation was not furnished though it had been specifically sought, and as this was a serious impediment to any negotiations designed to arrive at an assessment of lump sum compensation two further meetings took place; ... It was the intention of the Government's negotiations to discuss a tentative assessment of lump sum compensation ..."⁶⁰

The Government's conclusion from these experiences was that,

" ... reliance on foreign aid could entail some measure of surrender of a country's freedom of action in regard to the adoption of policies which receive the full endorsement of its own nationals".⁶¹

What is clear is that there were disagreements concerning the valuations which the Government of Ceylon on the one hand, and the oil companies on the other, put on the properties expropriated; that the United States Government interpreted differences as inhibiting the taking of "appropriate steps" towards the payment of compensation by the Ceylon Government; and, finally, that a difference between private international corporations and the Ceylon Government was now transposed

⁵⁹Government of Ceylon Communiqué, issued 8 February, 1963, reproduced in International Legal Materials, 2, 1963, pp. 393-94.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 394.

⁶¹Ibid., See for a further argument of their case, the Statement issued

into a difference between the latter and the 'national protector' of those corporations, the United States Government. Thus, complications concerning one set of presences in the small state had a deleterious effect on another set of presences within that state - forms of assistance granted by the protector state. In a real sense, then, the (United States) legislation linking private investment with governmental economic arrangements (in this case, development assistance) must be considered another form of presence in the relevant systemic environment of the small state. In that systemic environment, the small state finds itself the weaker member in the structural transactions in which it is engaged, and becomes subjected to 'command' international politics.⁶²

The impasse was not resolved until the assumption of office by a new government in Ceylon, more inclined to a sympathetic view of private foreign investment.⁶³ The relationship between foreign investment, foreign government assistance, and local government economic policy, in the context, specifically, of Ceylon, was illustrated by a statement by a consultant to the British Confederation of Industries,

by the Ceylon Information Office in Ceylon Today, July, 1963, on behalf of the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs and reprinted in International Legal Materials, op. cit., pp. 963-66.

⁶²The British-owned company involved acted in concert with the American ones. See "Joint Statement of Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., Caltex Petroleum Co., and Shell Oil Company, July 23, 1963", reprinted in International Legal Materials, op. cit., pp. 967-68. The forms of assistance suspended, are given in the section entitled "Effects of Suspension" in "Background Information on Suspension of U.S. Aid to Ceylon", International Legal Materials, op. cit., pp. 388-391 at pp. 389-91.

⁶³See the Ceylon Petroleum (Foreign Claims Compensation Bill), presented to the House of Representatives 22 July 1965 and as an example of the settlements reached Compensation Agreement Between the Government of Ceylon and the Shell Company of Ceylon, Limited (Ceylon: Government Press, 1965). See also, for a comment on the negotiations with the new Government, "Ceylon: Compensation in Hand", Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 22, No. 6, Jan. 1965.

Sir Norman Kipping. Expressing his satisfaction with the compensation settlement that seemed to be about to be agreed, and with the new Government's national budget, he went on to assert that what remained to be seen was "whether Ceylon will take the other steps which will, so to speak, re-establish her in the eyes of foreign investors". Further,

"I have been informed about a White Paper which is in a late stage of preparation disclosing the Ceylon Government on foreign investors. From all I have heard it appears to be very helpful ... Secondly, I have made it clear that the present moratorium on the remission of earnings to parent companies must be radically overhauled before there is any hope of attracting any further investment ... In this context Ceylon has now an opportunity to reconsider her priorities in the light of aid promises. Assuming that these steps are taken promptly ... I see no reason why Ceylon should not take her place among other Commonwealth countries such as Malaya as a worthy candidate for appropriate investments".⁶⁴

One of the factors, in the view of the Government of Ceylon, leading to the nationalisation of the oil companies' distribution facilities, was that the prices of petroleum products imported by the Companies were such as to worsen the already deteriorating foreign-exchange position of Ceylon. It was therefore the aim of the Government to seek some of these products elsewhere - namely in the Soviet Union - at a price lower than paid by the oil companies.⁶⁵ The main objective was a degree of diversification of petroleum imports, and a lowering of the prices of petroleum products.⁶⁶

The case for diversification of imports, as far as small

⁶⁴Quoted in "Ceylon - The Way Back", The Times (London), 14 February, 1965.

⁶⁵See "Statement of the Government of Ceylon" and "Joint Statement of Esso Standard Eastern Inc., Caltex Petroleum Co., and Shell Oil Company". The Ceylon Government argued that expropriation was a final measure taken after the companies had refused to attempt to work out other arrangements with the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation.

⁶⁶The oil companies argued that Ceylon was attempting "to take advantage

countries are concerned, is that it introduces a complexity into their external relations that reduces dependence on the whims of those controlling the sources of imports. Such complexity is assumed to increase the security of the state, especially where the imports are vital to the normal activities of its population. Complexity reduces dependence and thus the prospect of local control. Switzerland has attempted to pursue such a policy in relation to its sources of energy, and we now examine a case arising there.

In the autumn of 1963, an oil company, the Raffineries du Rhône S.A., largely locally owned (the Société Financière Italo-Suisse having a 60% interest), undertook the refining of oil in that country; it was the first substantial refining organisation in Switzerland. It attempted to operate independently of the major international oil companies, having arrived at an agreement with a Russian agency, Sovneft Export, to provide, over a period of seven years, about half of its crude oil requirements at a price that would have allowed the sale of refined product at prices operative in Switzerland at that time. According to the source referred to in the previous footnote, the Standard Oil Company immediately opposed this arrangement on the ground that (1) "there was sufficient crude oil in the non-Communist world" and (2) "that the agreement had not been concluded according to normal commercial rules".⁶⁷

of cut price Russian oil - temporary though the price cut may be, as once Ceylon is mainly dependent upon Communist oil, the price will most likely go up above the Oil Companies' price ..." and that this would involve "a new dependence upon sources of oil governed by other than commercial and economic considerations". Ibid., p. 968.

⁶⁷See Murcier, A., "Les géants du pétrole maintiennent fermement leur emprise sur le marché mondial", Le Monde Diplomatique, Jan. 1966, p. 3. Our translation.

However, a slump in petroleum product prices soon after the Company went into operation, led to its achieving substantial losses up to 1965, at which point it appealed to the Federal Government for state assistance; this, however, was refused. By 1966, the company was constrained to sell its assets to a new company comprising some of the oil giants (Esso with 30% participation, BP with 25% and ENI with 20%). An analyst, remarking on the "less than cooperative attitude of the Federal Government", argued however that,

"The company started its refining venture without first securing adequate local outlets for its products and in spite of the discouraging experience of operators similarly placed in other European countries ... It frequently happens, not least in Switzerland, that outsiders /non-established major companies/ establish useful footholds in existing markets, especially if they are in a position to underbid the established distributors, but it hardly ever pays to incur the high investment cost of a modern refinery, and then just hope that output will find buyers, at remunerative prices".⁶⁸

It has been argued that the attitude of the Swiss Government towards Raffineries du Rhône is to be seen in the context of a generally "restrictive policy on refinery expansion" which was "based on a highly contentious concept of security". It is useful, therefore, to examine the Government's own arguments in this respect. The Director of the Federal Department concerned with energy requirements in answering criticisms in 1965, pointed out, first, that "Foreign energy sources, mineral oil and coal covered 78% of our /Switzerland's/ energy requirement, which demonstrates the high degree of our dependency upon outside,

⁶⁸"A Swiss Dilemma", Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 23, 1966, pp. 216-218, at pp. 216-7. The account in this paragraph is based on this source. It was part of the new arrangement that "the new owners of the refinery will not be legally responsible for their predecessor's contractual obligation to take delivery of Russian crude" (p. 216).

of our energy sources".⁶⁹ A minimisation of the possible constraints on the country's capabilities arising from such dependency was thus the Government's first concern. The Director admitted that the slump in prices that affected the viability of the project "was particularly marked in Switzerland" and that it had been "a subject of controversy whether it was a result of the interplay of supply and demand or whether it was consciously fostered [by the major companies] in order to create difficulties for new and untoward companies". The sale of the company to a group including the major international companies was now regrettable, for it meant that an organisation important to the local Cantonal economy and that of the surrounding region "had entered into a state of dependency upon the international companies".⁷⁰

The institutional basis of the Government's policy was the Pipeline Act of 1963, the object of which was "to avoid a state of dependency of our supplies, which was against the general interest of our country"; Government policy was that "the security of our supplies of raw material [should rest] in the most complex possible network of sources, supply-routes, and means of transport. This concept would be contradicted by a supply of crude-oil which came almost exclusively from Mediterranean ports, which would use almost exclusively the Pipe Line as a means of transport and which had only two countries of transit".

⁶⁹This, and the following quotation are from the "Reply to the interpellation of Mr. Lampert of the Standerat on the 11th October 1964, made by the Director of the Eidg. (Federal) Department for the Administration of Transport and Power", (December 13, 1965) obtained from the Swiss Embassy, London. The translation of this reply, originally in German, was privately obtained.

⁷⁰The Federal Government's capacity to intervene in the operation or instruction was a limited one, this being a cantonal responsibility. See Petroleum Press Service, Ibid. However, the Pipeline Act of 1963, coming into force after the Raffineries du Rhône went into operation, "gives the Government the possibility of influencing the choice of sites of future refineries and their capacities". Letter to the writer from the Commercial Section of the Swiss Embassy, London, 26 January, 1966.

One of the aims of policy was "that not more than 70% of the country's requirement in liquid oils and combustibles should be imported by pipeline whilst the rest would be brought into the country via the accustomed trade routes and traditional means of transport."⁷¹ And "the Federal Council ... not any Mineral Oil Company is in a position to decide whether a given disposition of supply is likely to involve a state of dependency, which runs contrary to the general interest of the country ..."

The Government's position was, further, based on two assumptions. First, "that independent refineries have difficulty in surviving on the market without State support", and secondly, that "where an internal refining capacity, able to cover the whole of Switzerland's requirement, is the case, there arises the danger that the large international oil companies could form on the Swiss market a closed and narrow oligopoly characterised by the individual companies taking up a parallel position"; this would have "detrimental political consequences". The optimum oil policy was, therefore, one "which also leaves room for the import of finished products on traditional lines".⁷²

Here, then, the acceptance of a necessary dependency, but the attempt by the country to avoid a transformation of dependency into a state of excessive influence or control of the local situation, such as to affect the country's "security". The mode of inhibition of such

⁷¹The Director was concerned to deny that the Government was engaged in mere protection of existing shipping and railway companies, or of the international oil companies. See also Letter to the writer from Swiss Embassy: "The Swiss Federal authorities have been rather suspicious about the economic feasibility of an independent refinery to be set up in Switzerland and have told the Raffineries du Rhône consortium from the beginning that they should not expect any preferential treatment or government subsidies".

⁷²Our emphasis.

a transformation was the creation of a system that was complex (systemically large) both with respect to supplies of crude oil, finished products and means of transportation. One of the prices of this strategy was the rejection of the idea of national (local) self-sufficiency in the economic context of an international oligopolical situation.⁷³

Establishment of Presences:

II - Governmental Presences and Intervention

In the previous section we have been concerned with the effects of private (non-governmental) economic presences and the linkages created through governmental protection of such presences. We now deal here with presences established by governments themselves, either through agreements with governments of small states or through what we have called, following Oppenheim, 'dictatorial interference'.

Governmental Agreements

We examine, first, a case illustrating the problem of continued acceptance of a presence existing over some period of time - in this case that of the Canal and Canal Zone in Panama. The United States, having acquired this presence as a consequence of (more realistically as the price of) its assistance to Panama in gaining independence from Columbia in 1903,⁷⁴ found itself in the 1960's under pressure from

⁷³For a discussion of an attempt to introduce complexity into the energy supply situation, also in the context of the security of the state, but this time with an emphasis on attaining as much national self-sufficiency as possible, see "Precautionary Moves in South Africa", Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 23, 1966, pp. 219-20 and "South Africa's Need for Oil", Ibid., Vol. 24, 1967, pp. 456-59.

⁷⁴"By a Convention of 18 November 1903 [Hay-Varilla Treaty] Panama granted to the United States 'in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of Zones of land and land under water for construction ... and protection' of the Panama Canal ... In such a case the residual suzerainty remains with the grantor. However, not only has the exercise of all rights of jurisdiction been delegated but the grantor might seem to have renounced even the right of disposition. A licence can be terminated; a grant in perpetuity by definition cannot", Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); see also Hyde, C.C., International Law, (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1947) Vol. I, pp. 63-70.

nationalist elements in the society to renegotiate the conditions of existence of this presence. The government of Panama at the time, a coalition of eight political parties, itself under considerable pressure from its electorate, undertook up to 1967, negotiations with the United States government, in which it attempted to gain certain concessions that might appear to its electorate, more beneficial than those gained from previous treaties.

The whole process illustrates the problem of attaining, in Hanreider's phrase, "concensus" for the maintenance of a presence, accepted as inevitable in some form, when it is unpopular on the national level. At first, the Panamanian Government tried to attain concensus only at what we have called the governmental elite level, hoping on the basis of this, to sign the new treaties and then present them to the general political elite and then to the population, as the best that could be attained by a government committed to the interests of the nation. But, according to one source, this "plan to maintain silence until the treaties ... [were] signed" had to be "discarded in the face of a vigorous nationalistic onslaught by opponents of the Government from extreme left to extreme right".⁷⁵ For the substance of the proposed treaties had been leaked and had been found unsatisfactory by the broad political elite. The Government's argument was one of having to negotiate under the constraints implied in dealing with a country much larger than itself, and with a dominating influence (either on its own part, or through its nationals) in the economy of the country:

"Foreign Minister Fernando Eleta and two of the Panamanian negotiators, Roberto Aleman and Diogenes de la Rosa appraised Panama's limitations in negotiating with the United States ... Mr. de la Rosa said Panama had to abandon her maximum aspirations,

⁷⁵Giniger, Henry, "Panama Officials Defend U.S. Pacts", New York Times, 10 September, 1967.

which were to have the canal completely for her own ... 'But Panama has approached her maximum desires ... we have participation in the canal'. He said that the United States had refused to give up a majority position in the new authority and Panama had had to yield".⁷⁶

In fact, one of the proposed new treaties had indicated a further penetration - providing for a United States option to build new military bases "for continued United States defence of this canal and any future canal".⁷⁷ This conflicted with the "maximum aspirations" of the general political elite, as suggested in the proposals of the local bar association; these being,

"the assertion of Panamanian sovereignty over the present canal, the end of the perpetual United States rights and privileges in the Canal Zone, the end of military bases through neutralization of the Canal and the refusal to give an exclusive commitment to the United States to build a new sea-level canal".⁷⁸

In order to gain maximum consensus at the governmental elite level, the President "had been careful to go through a long and cumbersome process of consultation with his Cabinet, with the former Presidents of the Republic and with prominent citizens, including former foreign ministers."⁷⁹ But members even of his Cabinet, and of this broader body (including the country's Council of Foreign Relations) were unwilling to commit themselves, publicly, fully to the proposed new treaties. The area of consensus-making therefore had to be widened, the negotiators deciding to speak "to 500 leading citizens and intellec-

⁷⁶ Ibid., The main export crop of Panama, bananas, is controlled by the United Fruit Company. In addition, "Panama City's water is supplied from the Canal Zone and its telephone and electric services are under American financial control", Giniger, "Pressure of Panamanian Opposition Puts Fate of Canal Treaties in Doubt", New York Times, 14 September, 1967.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Giniger, N.Y. Times, 10 September 1967.

⁷⁹ Giniger, "New Pacts Meet Delay in Panama", N.Y. Times, 8 September 1967.

tuals ... and to the whole country by radio", in a series of meetings "to rally public opinion behind the canal settlement".⁸⁰

The Government was forced to return to the U.S. with the promise of attempting renegotiation of parts of the treaties, though fully cognisant that the weight of the U.S. in Panamanian-American transactions was too predominant to allow them to obtain more than minor revisions. In this respect, as far as the U.S. was concerned,

"Although the strategic importance of the Panama Canal itself has diminished somewhat in the nuclear age, it remains vital for transport, particularly oil and industrial raw materials, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In addition, most supplies and equipment going to Vietnam pass through the Canal, and U.S. control of the Canal prevents enemy use of it for belligerent purposes, such as arms shipments from Cuba and Russia to Pacific coast countries, or Red Chinese assistance to Cuba".⁸¹

And the Foreign Minister of Panama would seem to have been warned that the "United States intended to build a new sea-level canal in any case and that if Panama did not grant an option, the United States would go elsewhere".⁸²

In this context, it is possible to reiterate that the level of acceptance of penetration through physical emplacements, varies over time and through different sectors of a population. And in a (from the perspective of the small state) constraint situation, the perception of levels of ambiguity in national acceptance of foreign emplacements is an important aspect of the tolerance, and therefore the legitimacy, of penetration.

Now, where emplacements, not only physical, but of personnel, are directed to the organisation of the small state's internal security,

⁸⁰Giniger, N.Y. Times, 10 September 1967.

⁸¹Lieuwen, E., The United States and the Challenge to Security in Latin America, (Ohio State U.P., 1966), p. 11.

⁸²Reported remarks of the Foreign Minister in Giniger, New York Times, 10 September, 1967.

the penetration of that state may reach a situation paralleling that which we have described in the case of the satellitic state. The case for total bureaucratic penetration on the part of the dominant state, is not necessarily a prima facie one. Two sets of arguments arose, in this respect, in the case of South Vietnam:

"According to one school of thought, advice should be supplied only at the highest echelon of the government in order to encourage local initiative and force the Vietnamese to develop their own method of solving problems ... The opposite view which has become United States policy, is that the governmental, administrative, and military structure of South Vietnam can best develop if an American adviser is at the side of every Vietnamese in a position of authority. Without close supervision ... programmes get sidetracked and aid does not reach the people in the countryside ... Furthermore the magnitude of the commitment and the pressure for success is so great that the United States can no longer risk the failure of its major programmes".⁸³

The last sentence of this quotation suggests that the existence of a presence of one kind, in a situation like that of Vietnam, has a self-extending aspect. Further presences, over time, seem to be necessary in order for the dominant state to exercise influence or control, or more properly, in Etzioni's phrase, "persuasive power", in order to obtain the objectives for which the original presences were brought into existence.^{83a}

Where such presences are accepted at the Governmental level, a normative system seems to come into existence, whereby the accepting state finds itself constrained, but has no inclination to reject policies suggested by the possessor of the presences. This is so, because where the small state accepts presences in the interest of the

⁸³Berle, P.A.A., "The Advisers' Role in South Vietnam", The Reporter, Vol. 38, Feb. 8, 1968, pp. 24-26 at p. 24.

^{83a}George Liska remarks: "Once aid to a country is initiated, it will generate pressure for more aid to protect the initial investment. As the investment grows, it is ever harder to risk the return on it ...", in Liska, G., The New Statecraft (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 29.

development of its internal security and economic organisation, linkages between itself and the dominant state become intermingled over a range of areas particular to the survival of the small state. But the relationship is a complex one, being based in part on mutual normative expectations concerning the limits and uses of pressure by the dominant state. Thus, in the case of Taiwan, one analyst asserts that,

"The U.S. AID Mission had a strong, persistent, and generally beneficent influence upon the formation of Chinese economic policies ... The major reason for the large measure of U.S. influence ... was that there was agreement between the governments of the two countries on fundamental aims. A broad set of mutual interests in military strength and economic progress were recognised ... A major 'weapon' of AID influence upon the Chinese government was a promise to increase or a threat to reduce the level of aid ... The record shows that on several occasions AID did offer to stimulate Chinese action with more aid and did threaten to reduce assistance if there was failure to act. The Chinese regarded these promises of reward or penalties as real, and the actions were, in fact, effective in producing desired results ... Most of the time, however, it was unnecessary to resort to proposed adjustments in the aid level. Analysis, exhortation, and discussion were the standard tools of U.S. influence".⁸⁴

Where there is a thorough bureaucratic as well as economic penetration by the dominant state, accepted by the government of the other, the former's capacity for exercising persuasive power becomes even more substantial, though its effects may sometimes be conflicting (in terms of the dominant state's objectives) in a case like that of Vietnam, where there is no single mechanism, such as the party in Communist movement relations, to perform the function of overall coordinator.⁸⁵

A final aspect of penetration which we can consider in this section, is that in which a penetrating state, on the basis of its presence in a particular institutional structure within another state, attempts to extend its influence through partly covert dissemination of

⁸⁴Jacoby, N.H., U.S. Aid to Taiwan, (N.Y., Praeger, 1966) pp. 132, 134, 135.

⁸⁵In principle, the Embassy of the dominant state should do this. For a description of the linkages involving the United States Military Assistance Programme see, U.S. Department of Defence: Military Assistance and

information that may not be acceptable to the government of the penetrated state. Here, governmental acceptance of one area of penetration is not paralleled by acceptance of others, and the attempt at extended penetration in the search for more extensive influence is deemed illegitimate. This was, in part, the basis of the dispute between the Governments of Communist China and Cuba in 1965-1966. Then, Prime Minister Castro asserted that,

"The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces reported that a massive distribution of ... material was being systematically carried out by the Chinese Government representatives among officers of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba. ... propaganda was being sent to the General Staff ... to the staff of the armed services, to the staffs of the army corps, to the divisional staffs, to the staffs of the commands of various military branches, to the leaders of the sections of the political department ... on occasions Chinese representatives tried to contact Cuban officers directly, and in some cases even approached officers obviously on missions to win them over, either for the purpose of proselytism or perhaps for the purpose of intelligence".

The Cuban state, he argued,

"could not permit this kind of presumption to influence military and administrative cadres ... [this being] an encroachment on the sovereignty of our country and harmful to the prerogatives that exclusively belong to our Government within our frontiers; ... [we told them] that whatever the cost, our Government would not tolerate such things".⁸⁶

Here, the Government in question (Cuba) attempted to generalise its attitude to the population, in order to emphasise the illegitimacy of this area of penetration. The case is, in some respects, reminiscent of the U.S.S.R.-Yugoslave experience.

Foreign Military Sales-Facts (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defence, International Security Affairs, May, 1967): a description of U.S. bureaucratic penetration in Vietnam, is given in Berle, P.A.A., op. cit.

⁸⁶ See "Castro's February 6 Anti-China Statement", Peking Review, 9, Feb. 25, 1966, pp. 14-22 at p. 21. This was part of a statement of general antagonism to China, based on difficulties, promoted, in the view of the Cuban Government, by China, with respect to trade agreements relating to Cuban sugar and Chinese rice; and aimed at influencing Cuban policy decisions. See also "Renmin Ribao Editor's Note on Prime Minister Castro's Anti-China Statement", Peking Review, Ibid., pp. 13-14, "Facts on Sino-Cuban Trade", Peking Review, no. 3, Jan. 14, 1966, pp. 21-3; and "Further Remarks on the Sino-Cuban Trade Question", Ibid., No. 6, Feb. 4, 1966, pp. 15-16. See also an editorial, "Logique Fideliste", Le Monde, 8 Feb. 1966.

Dictatorial Interference

"Sheer access" George Liska observes, "is indispensable for a measure of control, although it does not insure control".⁸⁷ We have so far been concerned with governmental access gained through private investment and through agreements between governments. Now we consider the situation in which the first means of access is that provided by direct military intervention in the small state. We attempt to show, by use of an historical example, the forms of activity engaged in by the intervening state, in order to attain the objectives of the intervention, and, further, the penetrative effects of that intervention. We justify the use of the historical case - mainly that of the United States intervention in Haiti in 1915 - on the grounds that recent cases of intervention indicate the use of similar kinds of mechanisms for the attainment of influence and control.⁸⁸

There are a variety of reasons or public explanations for which a dominant power can penetrate another state, in peacetime, by means of physical emplacement of its troops on the territory of that state - that is, through military intervention. Where a situation of civil war, or in the view of the dominant state, conditions likely to lead to civil war exists, the dominant state may take the view that in terms of its own strategic requirements, its intervention is necessary to inhibit other states from taking advantage of the situation. A legitimacy (in the dominant power's view) is usually established in terms of a doctrine that implies intervention to prevent the exploitation of chaos in its

⁸⁷The New Statecraft, p. 22.

⁸⁸Our main sources are the extremely useful work of Millspaugh, A.C., Haiti under American Control 1915-1930 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931); and the volumes for those years of Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (U.S. G.P.O.). Millspaugh was the Financial Adviser-General Receiver (a United States official) in Haiti between 1927 and 1929.

sphere of influence.

One source of explanation might be the following:

"The situation in the Dominican Republic is approaching a crisis and we ought to determine immediately a course of action as otherwise revolution and economic disaster are imminent".⁸⁹

and,

"the only possible solution of this serious problem will be the proclamation of military occupation and the establishment of martial law in the Republic".⁹⁰

This early example of United States intervention does not differ substantially from later instances. In the case of the intervention, in 1965, in the Dominican Republic, the United States Ambassador, Bennett,

"recommended that the U.S. government give serious thought to 'armed intervention which goes beyond the mere protection of Americans' and not only seek to establish order but to prevent another 'Cuba' if the 'loyalist' San Isidro forces collapsed as seemed likely".⁹¹

The public, though not unconnected, explanation, however, in the case of United States practice seems to be "that American forces be landed ... that American and Foreign interests be protected;"⁹² or as President Johnson put it in 1965,

"American forces have been in Santo Domingo in an effort to protect the lives of Americans and the nationals of other countries in the face of increasing violence and disorder ... We took this step when and only when, we were officially notified by police and officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no longer in a position to guarantee the safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and order".⁹³

⁸⁹"Secretary of State [Lansing] to President [Wilson] Nov. 22, 1916", in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (Washington: G.P.O. 1925), p. 240.

⁹⁰"Secretary of State [Lansing] to the Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 27, 1916". Ibid., p. 242.

⁹¹Martin, J.B., Overtaken by Events (N.Y.: Doubleday & Co. Inc. 1966) pp. 656-7.

⁹²"Instructions of Secretary of State Lansing", Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, pp. 475-6.

⁹³"Statement by the President on the Situation in the Dominican Republic", April 30, 1965, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1966), p. 465.

Now, where an emplacement of troops is undertaken in a situation deemed to be one of confusion, such presence is likely to be one that usurps the functions of the "de jure" government of the state that is the object of intervention (we refer to the latter as the 'object' state); it is therefore unlikely to be of short duration, the removal of the presence becoming contingent on the development of, in the view of the intervening state, of a government that is effective: that is, inter alia one capable of protecting the lives and property of its nationals. The dominant state then finds itself maintaining its presence in the other for the purpose of effecting "the creation" in it "of stable conditions" - in the contemporary period, for the purpose of stabilising the economy and the internal security of the object state, on the assumption that these are the requisites of stable government. In any event, once a military presence is effected in these conditions, there develops, in the words of Admiral Caperton in 1915, a variety of "civilian matters and negotiations ... [which] grow out of military control".⁹⁴

Where there is some resistance from those claiming de jure or de facto authority in the object state, the attempt to remove that resistance can be seen to involve a number of stages - from the exercise of what we have called persuasive power, to the threat of total military control. It is useful to outline these stages since they can be taken as applying to attempts to enforce policy even after there is a military presence of some duration. We do this by means of a number of descriptions of the case of Haiti in 1915:

- (1) First, the exercise of "ordinary and extraordinary diplomatic methods".⁹⁵ When these have failed,

⁹⁴Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 33. for the first quotation, and p. 37.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 33.

- (2) "American tactics became less impersonal and shifted from vague promises [financial inducements] to guarded threats";⁹⁶
- (3) Then the implementation of threats through "exercising military pressure at propitious moments in negotiations";⁹⁷ finally if all these fail, the threat that,
- (4) the "Government will forthwith proceed to complete pacification".⁹⁸

If the authorities in the object state submit to the final threat, then the circumstances are likely to be such that they do "not in fact function as an independent government".⁹⁹ The stages involved in the transition from the use of persuasive power through "vague promises" made in the context of a military presence, to threats of complete military control are, we argue here, present in dominant power intervention in small states in the contemporary period.

One reason for this is that where intervention is undertaken in states of underdeveloped economies, and, insofar as the governments of the latter are concerned, non-responsive social systems, dominant powers find themselves, as we have suggested earlier, creating the conditions for further intervention in all aspects of the social order of the object state. The dominant state may not necessarily develop a coherence in the control of the processes relating to the new presences created, however, and it finds it necessary to resort to the exercise of a variety of modes of persuasive power to effect

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 45.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 49.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 53.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 60.

adherence to the policies that it proceeds to enunciate.

In the discussion of intervention in Vietnam to which we have referred in an earlier chapter, Samuel Huntington remarks on some comments of Sir Robert Thompson, to illustrate the problem that arises here. Noting Thompson's comment that "the prospect of going in to Vietnam as a political reformer frightens me more than anything else", Huntington observes,

"As one looks at the programme of priorities Sir Robert advanced earlier, he gives first priority to building up the administrative structure - taxation, communication networks, economic assistance, including social services and a rural aid programme - in that order. This is pretty much what we have tried to do, not very effectively, in Vietnam. It is an administrative, technical and economic approach to what is essentially a political problem.

The reason it doesn't work in Vietnam, is, I submit, not because of any inherent defects in the way we went about it, but simply because it is only at best marginally relevant to the major problem there, which is one of a lack of political organisation and cohesion. An administrative programme like Sir Robert's presupposes the existence of a political system which is precisely the thing lacking and causing the problem in Vietnam".

Huntington goes on to remark that,

"after we put in our combat troops, we lost our leverage. In point of fact, one of the interesting aspects of our progressive involvement ... is that our leverage decreases as our involvement increases. Our stake in this thing gets so high that nothing we can say or do to gain leverage will be credible to the government we are trying to help".¹⁰⁰

But this form of relationship between involvement and leverage is problematic not simply because a sufficient "priority" is not given to "politics" (in Huntington's words), but also because the administrative framework developed by the dominant power in the object state, while being one that approaches the situation of satellitism, is not completely that, but is more a system of dual control exercised by the

¹⁰⁰ "No More Vietnams?" Part 2, The Atlantic, Dec. 1968, at p.108. Our emphasis.

dominant power and the local government, with the former having the major capabilities of control, but the latter having a sufficient capacity (partly because the dominant state continues to recognise the fiction of object-state sovereignty) to obstruct.

The situation of dual control and its consequences are noted by Millspaugh in the Haitian case. He remarks that by 1922, it was possible to conclude that "the Haitian problem was no longer primarily one of foreign relations",¹⁰¹ and that "the active participation of the [U.S.] High Commissioner in Haitian government affairs ... was tacitly and informally ... accepted by the Haitian Government"; and "the tendency was now to centralise authority in the [Haitian] President and in the High Commissioner".¹⁰² The institutional penetration was such that up to 1929, "American officers of the gendarmerie continued to act as financial advisers of municipalities and as disbursing officers for the general receiver".¹⁰³ But this form of dual control did not entirely rebound to the prestige of the United States, for the acceptance of American participation, by the Haitian governmental elite, did not inhibit a tendency to rejection of this by the more general elite. Millspaugh quotes one observer to this effect. The linkage between U.S. officials and the Haitian President,

"ended in identifying our officials and President Borno as one and the same. It has put both in a position where each may be condemned for specific matters, for the sins of the other, but where neither can afford to disown the other. All of which constitutes a vicious circle of centrifugal force, ever widening the gap between most of the articulate

¹⁰¹Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 101.

¹⁰²Ibid., pp. 102 and 107.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 112. Millspaugh (p.193) describes the U.S. as having during the period, "control over Haitian governmental functions".

Haitians, on the one side, and the Haitian Government and our intervention officials on the other".¹⁰⁴

Thus, when a change of government occurred, at the end of the period of military occupation, "American prestige and influence was, at least temporarily, reduced".¹⁰⁵

The description which Millspaugh gives of this period of "joint dictatorship", in which the U.S. institutional penetration becomes ever more extended, leading to both financial and more narrowly defined political control, can be seen in the contemporary period in, for example, the Dominican Republic, if we follow the account of an American Ambassador there during the 1960's,¹⁰⁶ What is perhaps more prominent at the present time is, first, the linkage between dominant state advisers and local officials concerned not simply with economic stabilisation, but with economic development. There arises a structural and psychological dependence on dominant state officials, in situations, in particular, where the social and political fragmentation of the object state's domestic system exists. Martin, for example, remarks that, in 1962, he,

"urged our programme on him [President Bonnelly] agrarian reform, tax reform, trial of calié and military, and OAS election help. He liked it but he was not sure the Consejo [Council of State] was yet strong enough to attempt it at all. He did not have the votes inside the Consejo for agrarian reform. I told him I had to go to Washington and he looked shocked - he didn't want me to leave".¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴Quoted from Streit, Clarence, "Haiti: Intervention in Operation", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 6, 1928, pp. 626-7 in Millspaugh, p. 108, note 16. Our emphasis.

¹⁰⁵Millspaugh, p. 192.

¹⁰⁶Martin, J.B., Overtaken by Events. He deals predominantly with the period leading up to the intervention, in which there is already a substantial U.S. institutional penetration. See also, on the period of intervention itself, Draper, Theodore, The Dominican Revolt (Commentary Report, 1968).

¹⁰⁷Martin, op. cit., p. 111.

A second aspect of contemporary significance is the multiplicity of entities that now involve themselves in institutional penetration. Discussing the aftermath of the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, U Thant remarked on the fact that "for the first time a United Nations peace mission ... found itself operating in the same area and dealing with the same matters as an operation of a regional organisation, in this instance the Organisation of American States", and that "this circumstance has given rise to some special and unfamiliar problems in the way of relationships and liaison ..."¹⁰⁸ And Martin remarks of the Dominican Republic between 1962 and 1963, that

"In addition to the U.S. government missions, several important international bodies sent technicians in and out of the Republic - the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, the OAS, and various United Nations agencies. So did the Ford Foundation and other private foundations. 'Technician' became a magic word. In fact, at times, there seemed more technicians than Dominicans".¹⁰⁹

The existence of this multiplicity of entities aggravates the problems involved in dominant state exercise of influence and control, even though that state's intervention usually creates the basis for the penetration by the other entities; and in spite of the fact that there may exist linkages between the dominant state and these entities. Yet, where the object state is incapable of maintaining, reasonably autonomously, domestic political efficiency, and thus cannot summon the "nationalism" of its population in opposition to external influence and

¹⁰⁸"Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, June 16, 1964 to June 15, 1965", U.N. Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 2 No. 9, 1965, pp. 92-117 at p. 106. This was a mild expression of the problems arising. See also an editorial, "Negotiators All", The Times (London), May 17, 1965.

¹⁰⁹Martin, p. 146.

control of policy, except sporadically, the continuing penetration to which it is subject suggests that it is not possible to say that, in its relations with other international entities, it is conducting "foreign relations". It is, in law, sovereign; it is, in practice, non-viable.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SMALL STATE SYSTEMS: COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION

"The regional approach has no intrinsic justification. There are no mystical qualities in geographical proximity that make neighbouring nations a 'unit' in any real sense, culturally, politically or economically".¹

The previous chapter should have suggested the precariousness of the existence of small states, especially underdeveloped ones, in a society where penetrative processes are so extensive. As a means therefore, of maintaining some degree of viability and autonomy, one of the strategies of activity that are at the disposal of such states is that of cooperation or collaboration with other states in geographical proximity; the objective here being to gain greater control over the immediate environment, and so to inhibit undesired penetration.

Here arise two notions - federation or political unification, and regional integration. The first was the mode of collaboration favoured by colonial powers for entities which they considered as not having, and not being capable of developing, the attributes of state viability. This strategy involved the ceding of sovereignty itself, and has for the most part been unsuccessful. The ceding of sovereignty has to be placed against the demands of groups within the federated unit for some form of self-determination; and federation, as a processual and institutional formula has been unable to cope with these demands.² The second formula, regional integration, is an

¹Myrdal, G. Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations (N.Y. Pantheon, paper 1968) Vol. 1, p. 39.

²A case of federation that has survived and repays study is that of the Cameroun Republic. On the problems relating to the survival of federation see Etzioni, A., Political Unification (N.Y. Holt, Rinehart, 1965) and Watts, R.L., New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

umbrella term that covers a number of processes susceptible to different kinds of institutionalisation. In addition it is not, a priori, to be considered as a means of sustaining viability; the vagaries of the inter-war regionalisation experiments in Europe bear testimony to this. Nevertheless, it is the processes of collaboration stemming from the attempts to seek or strengthen viability through forms of integration, and the inter-state competition implicit in these, that we will be concerned with here. And in order to do this, we start with the concept of small-state system itself.

THE SMALL STATE SYSTEM AND THE REGION

In principle, a small state system need not be either a regional or a subordinate one. In actuality, however, analysts tend to be concerned with small state systems within some defined geographical area or zone - within a geographical region - so that both contiguity and proximity become important defining characteristics of the concept of small state system. Similarly in the contemporary period, given the economic and political predominance of the high-status powers in the international society, small states, perceived as located within a 'region' are in fact usually in a position of systemic subordination to various international systems: a position that has significant implications for their coherence as system, and their autonomy both as small states and as regional systems.

It is, however, possible to conceive of a small state system that is geographically disparate (non-contiguous); in the sense, for example, that there have been, from time to time, suggestions that Cuba, North Vietnam and Korea, as small communist states, might develop linkages of a systemic character that might allow them to act and to be defined as a small state system, subordinate to the general communist

international system. Similarly it is at least possible to conceive of a small state system, regionally defined, that had sufficient characteristics of autonomy and, therefore, self-activity as a diplomatic system, so that it could be referred to as a small state system that was not at the same time a subordinate one. Its activity could then be analysed in terms of the same kind of framework as would be applicable to state systems with highly-developed systemic linkages. In this case the distinguishing characteristic between small-state systems and systems composed of large states would lie in the weight of the 'stakes' of competition and collaboration peculiar to each form of system, the assumption being that differences in weight of stakes would imply, if not different modes of activity, that certain modes open to large systems would not be open to small-state ones. (A specific example might be that in which recourse to war in a small state system, because of its lack of certain kinds of capabilities, could not be conceived in terms of the option of the exercise of nuclear weaponry, or where the benefits of warfare were of a comparatively low level; or at the extreme where warfare was impossible.) We return to this below.

As Bruce Russett has argued, the number of attributes that can be attached to the concept of region, in pursuit of trying to develop a comprehensive and analytically useful definition of it, often makes the concept a hazy one. One could, he argues, "settle upon a definition or group of definitions - perhaps [socio-cultural] homogeneity, or homogeneity plus interdependence [economic] plus geographical separateness".³ But this would only be to begin an examination of

³Russett, Bruce, "Delineating International Regions", in Singer, J.D. (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (N.Y., The Free Press, 1968) pp. 317-352 at p. 319.

the problem. One would, he suggests, have to go on to "delineate" the region, that is to determine with some degree of precision its scope, and to decide whether there can be any lower limit on the extent of area which could properly be called a region. "If", he writes, "there is among analysts no agreement about indices for delineation, even more clearly there is no consensus on the proper magnitude of a 'region'".⁴ Finally, there is the problem of trying to determine the limits of regions - of "identifying the boundaries".⁵ On the basis of his own analysis Russett concludes however, that while he has used the "geographic term 'region' loosely",

"For historical reasons regions and socio-cultural groupings often coincide, but they need not. Yet in four of the five cases the 'regions' which emerged from our analysis do correspond to generally recognizable geographic groupings, and all make substantial cultural sense".⁶

We have argued in Chapter One of this essay, in attempting to distinguish between subordinate state systems and (processually defined) subsystems, that both the characteristics of identification of the regional area, and its boundaries, must be seen in terms of the particular problem being analysed; and that the internal coherence of a subordinate system is an indication of the extent to which its boundaries are likely to be externally delimited. Further, the terms of such delimitation differ according to the unit attempting to draw

⁴Ibid., pp. 319-20. Emphasis in the original.

⁵Ibid., p. 320.

⁶Ibid., p. 337. See also Russett, B., International Regions and the International Systems: A Study in Political Ecology (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), where he writes (p. 168): There is no region or aggregate of national units that can in the very strict sense of boundary congruence be identified as a subsystem of the international system". (Emphasis in the original). For a critique of Russett's approach, see, Young, O.R. "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor", World Politics, Vol. 21, 1969, pp. 486-511.

boundaries. We now argue here that for most of the small states with which we are concerned, their significance as regions up to the present time has to be determined by two factors: the first the institution of colonialism from which the states have only recently emerged, and the second, the geopolitical interests of the high-status powers in the international society. And as these interests change, so have the magnitude and boundary-limits of the particular regions to which those interests are related. The central problem of the contemporary era arises when units within formerly externally-delimited subordinate regional systems composed of predominantly small states and organised on an administrative basis attempt to redefine the region in terms of their own requirements, economic, political and strategic.

In an interesting essay, Davison⁷ has shown how, with respect to the area known as the "Middle East", the attempts to delimit a "regional" area have given rise to much confusion; the delimitation being made in terms of the external powers' perceptions of how easily some particular crisis in which they had become involved could be solved. He shows how the criteria of delimitation changed, being at various times, strategic, geopolitical, geographical unity, the location of a "centre of gravity", psychological. He concludes that,

"It looks as if the search for a single criterion of unity, or even a set of criteria, is bound to fail when applied to so heterogenous an area. For, as the term "Middle East" has developed in history to its present condition, the unifying principle has always been the political and strategic interest of outside powers, especially of Britain".⁸

⁷ Davison, Roderic H., "Where is the Middle East", pp. 13-29 in Nolte, R.N., The Modern Middle East (N.Y. Atherton Press, 1963).

⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

A set of remarks similar to these, referring to the Balkans suggests also, the general difficulty of regional delimitation:

"Quels sont les pays qui composent la région balkanique? Tantôt on y exclut la Turquie comme trop asiatique, tantôt c'est la Roumanie comme trop liée à l'Europe centrale. Et je passe sur les nombreuses appellations qui prétendent cerner quelques-uns de ces pays et qui ne font qu'ajouter à la confusion: Europe danubienne, de Sud-est, Proche-Orient, Europe méditerranéenne, auxquelles s'ajoute depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale une dissociation brutale entre, d'une part, l'Europe de l'Est communiste et, d'autre part, la Grèce et la Turquie devenues curieusement pays 'atlantiques', comme si l'opposition des idéologies pouvait s'effacer du jour au lendemain ce qui fait l'originalité des Balkans".⁹

Attempts to delimit regions must clearly take into account the forces of coherence and competition internal to any set of units under consideration, in addition to the 'power' of external delimitation. Particular geographical areas seem to present, over time, coherence-competition forces which restrict the operational significance of external delimitations. It becomes possible, in spite of the effects of colonialism, "by emphasizing elements of continuity throughout... to identify basic patterns in international relations against which the significance of elements of change and of novelty, whether of indigenous or foreign provenance, can be evaluated".¹⁰ Two caveats might be introduced in relation to this view. First, that where the original inhabitants and culture of a particular culture have been liquidated, the 'basic patterns' which constitute the 'originality' of the unit relations in the area are less easy, if not impossible to discern. But here inter-unit relations can be seen in terms of the effects of cultural inheritances from the imperial power in what become "lands of

⁹Kitsikis, D., "Les projets d'entente balkanique 1930-1934", Revue Historique, Tome CCXLI, 1969, pp. 115-140 at p. 115.

¹⁰Cowan, C.D. "Continuity and Change in the International History of Maritime South East Asia", Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 9, 1968, pp. 1-11, at p. 2.

settlement". Secondly, especially in the contemporary period, the effects of linkages that are the consequence of penetrative processes, on indigenous coherences, have to be taken into account.

Small State Systems and International Systems

The literature on the relationship of subordinate systems to what has been termed the global system, has, in the last few years been a growing one, starting, it would seem, with the work of Leonard Binder on the Middle East, and Michael Brecher on Asia.¹¹ One must distinguish here, however, between subordinate systems which may, in principle, be composed completely of large though not highly-industrialised states, and a subordinate state system in which all or most of the constituent states are of small size. Both of these state systems may (as we have argued in the previous chapter with respect to individual states) have complex or non-complex relations with the entity to which they are subordinated (the relations may be systemically large or systemically small).

Our emphasis, here, is on the extent of subordination involved in a set, or sets, of relationships between small states and international systems dominated by (though not solely) large states of higher status. And our particular focus is on the extent to which subordination allows for more or less state-system integration and autonomy. The two last terms (integration and autonomy) do not

¹¹ Binder, L. "The Middle East as Subordinate International System", World Politics, Vol. 10, 1958, pp.408-29; Brecher, M., "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate System of Southern Asia", World Politics, Vol. 15, 1963, pp. 213-35; Zartmann, W., "Africa as a Subordinate System in International Relations", International Organization, Vol. 21, 1967, pp. 545-64; Brecher, M., "The Middle East Subordinate System and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, 1969, pp. 117-39; Bowman, L., "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, 1968, pp. 231-61.

necessarily have a direct relation, where the emphasis is on integration of a particular set of small states. A small state may well find its autonomy and viability increased by integrating itself in system relations predominantly outside the regional environment, rather than in systems whose coherence is primarily internally-determined. And this inclination may be great in the contemporary period where the existing, and most economically beneficial transactions in the immediate post-independence period of the small state's existence are extra-regional. In this case, to use the terms of Deutsch, "the incoming flow of external information" will not be "overridden to a significant extent by internal memories and preferences."¹²

We find two sets of definitions, which are not mutually exclusive, as forming the basis of much work on subordinate state systems. First, Hoffmann following Aron, describes the North Atlantic Area as a "partial international system", asserting that,

"Despite the fuzziness of its geographical boundaries, the area meets two of the criteria suggested by Raymond Aron for the identification of subsystems:

- (1) Its notions 'spontaneously live a common destiny and make a distinction between what happens within and what happens outside their geographic-historic zone' - a criterion which separates the area from Japan or Australia and New Zealand, as well as from the underdeveloped countries (including Latin America).
- (2) The nations of the area are 'a theatre of diplomatic operations' in which the relationship of major tension - the Cold War - takes forms different from what it is elsewhere.
- (3) I would add a third criterion that identifies the North Atlantic area as a subsystem; this characteristic is a revision of another one suggested by Aron and has obvious connections with the second. The area is characterized by a distinctive configuration of military forces. While some parts of the world can be called subsystems because of a regional balance of military power (for instance, the Middle East), the North Atlantic group, like the Soviet bloc, is a

¹²Deutsch, K., The Nerves of Government, p. 219.

subsystem because of the pre-eminent presence of the military power of one member - in this case, the United States".¹³

This definition is one in which the main determinants of partial or subordinate system are cultural and strategic, and it stresses the importance for the components of the subordinate system of the existence of what we can call the 'pivotal' state - in this case, the United States. Even the diplomatic configuration that is the consequence of the 'relationship of major tension' in the area is, in part exogenous - the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union for 'stakes' which are only partly situated in the North Atlantic area.

The second formulation is that of Michael Brecher, in which he asserts that,

"A subordinate state system... requires six conditions for its existence: (1) delimited scope, with primary stress on a geographic region; (2) at least three actors; (3) objective recognition by most other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region, or segment of the global system; (4) self-identification as such; (5) units of power relatively inferior to units in the dominant system, using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) more intensive and influential penetration of the subordinate system by the dominant system than the reverse".¹⁴

Here, again, we find a geopolitical cum cultural definition stressing the asymmetrical aspect of the interdependence relationship between the subordinate system and the dominant system.

The difference between the two sets of definitions is indicated in a comment by Raymond Aron, in which he points out that as far as the Middle Eastern subordinated system is concerned (he refers to it

¹³Hoffmann, S., "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic as a Partial International System", International Organization, Vol. 17, 1963, pp. 521-49, at p. 523.

¹⁴Brecher, M., "The Middle East Subordinate System and Its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy", op. cit., p. 117.

as the Near East), there exists an "equilibrium of local forces" which is "a decisive factor in the situation", though "this regional equilibrium cannot be envisaged without considering global conditions."¹⁵ On the other hand, he refers to Europe, rather than the North Atlantic, as constituting a subordinate system, his definition of this taking in a different, in fact more extensive, geographical area. Noting that "in abstract terms a subsystem acquires a reality since, even in the absence of a local equilibrium of military forces, states or peoples spontaneously experience the solidarity of their destiny and observe a difference between what is happening inside and what is happening outside their geographical-historical zone",¹⁶ he goes on to argue that,

"Europe does not constitute a subsystem merely on account of the equilibrium between the two coalitions or on account of the awareness of a common civilization: the direct impact of the two superpowers and the constitution of military blocs make Europe a subsystem, or if one prefers, a theatre of diplomatic operations with a certain autonomy".¹⁷

It appears from Aron, that the superpower 'condominium' over Europe determines the "equilibrium of local forces" and at the same time allows the subsystem some degree of autonomy. In the case of the Middle East, the autonomy springs, more decisively, from local circumstances, though it too, is limited and conditioned. We can put this another way, in saying that, in the case of the Middle East, the competition leading to conflict or potential conflict (in Aron's phrase "a state of war") derives its impetus much more from the local situation than would be the case in the European subsystem. Thus in addition, autonomy with respect to resolution or adaptation to specific

¹⁵Aron, R., Peace and War, p. 390.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 391.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 392.

issues cannot be related to mere size (the wealth of the European system as compared, in this case, with that of the Middle East).

Bearing all this in mind, we can go on to delineate systems and subordinate systems, first in somewhat abstract terms, and then to set out the relevant variables to be considered in examining the behaviour of such systems.

We can outline five kinds of systems that would apply to conglomerations of formally independent states.

- (1) The Self-controlling, self-defining system with, therefore, a capacity for unilaterally-taken decisions as the predominant factor in the solution of system problems. This is almost the pure case, for it suggests a capacity of the system-directors to 'close' the system at will, while still retaining a capacity to control the external environment.
- (2) The self-defining, predominantly self-controlling, but open system. This system is environment-dependent, but has the capacity, on issues most relevant to its survival and development, to control that environment - a capacity for self-insulation from processes originating in the external environment. This system has, therefore, predominance in the transaction structures in which it is engaged.
- (3) The self-defining, but externally unit-penetrated system: therefore not completely self-controlling. This is a subordinate system in which the penetrating unit is only concerned, however, with specific issue-areas of the system. This system has sufficient attributes of homogeneity, as to be self-defining, and thus to inhibit complete encapsulation into the penetrating unit. Domination by the penetrating unit is not extensive enough to have automatic command-relationship effects. The system has a large degree of autonomy insofar as its maintenance in the manner in which it has defined itself is of crucial

significance for the penetrating unit. We can view the European subordinate system in this light.

(4) The subordinate of a control or hegemonic system. This system has no capacity for the expression of anti-hegemonic autonomous activity. It is in fact defined by the hegemonist predominantly for its own purposes. The institutional mechanisms maintained by the hegemonic unit are of prime importance for its maintenance of the subordinate system; this is therefore a penetrated system, but one in which the legitimacy of the subordinate system's adherence to the hegemonist is in doubt. The subordinate system is satellitic and its capacity for autonomous activity in non-hegemony areas is an unstable one. The states of the Communist bloc, seen as constituting a subordinate system of the Soviet Union are an example of this type. What Hoffmann refers to as the North Atlantic partial international system can be placed somewhere between systems (3) and (4).

(5) A fully penetrated system: a subordinate system characterised by structural-institutional dependence; its identity as system being based mainly on attributes giving it cultural coherence. It possesses, however, little capacity to define its boundaries once other criteria (economic, strategic) become of relevance. It is within a 'relationship of adaptedness' over which it has no control, and thus no capacity for engaging in unilaterally-determined directions of activity. One can, however, distinguish between (i) a subordinate system of this kind that is penetrated by a variety of non-coordinated types of systems, and which seeks to engage in autonomous activity through exploitation of this non-coordination, and (ii) Subordinate systems which are penetrated predominantly by one state, or by systems controlled predominantly from one source, and whose autonomy is therefore extremely limited. Most of the subordinate systems that have

emerged from colonial domination are of one of these two kinds of penetrated system.

Now any system, as we have suggested, has both coherence and competition attributes co-existing at any point in time. The subordinate system is characterised by the fact that both of these attributes have their locus partly, sometimes predominantly, outside the subordinate system, where this is geographically defined as region. The coherence-competition components of the subordinate system we see as the following:

- (i) The cultural system or systems
 - custom
 - religion
 - language
 - historical domination leading to a 'sense' of separateness
- (ii) The 'stakes' of the system
 - territory
 - zones of influence
 - valuable resources
 - the present and future social and ideological structures
 - the sets of economic transactions
- (iii) Extra-system unit inputs
 - unit inputs as aid or constraint on system autonomy within the systemic limits of subordination: the character of penetration
 - the linkage between unit inputs and the 'core centre' of the system.¹⁸

Now for any set of units, its character as a subordinate system and as an identifiable "theatre of diplomatic operations", is the consequence of the forms of relationship between these three sets of attributes. Thus the form of the cultural system gives an indication of the extent to which there exists an identifiable role system, and therefore expectations of unit behaviour based on general acceptance

¹⁸We are here accepting Brecher's distinctions concerning his division of the Middle East, between 'core', 'periphery' and 'outer ring'. Brecher, op. cit., p. 118.

of norms. It also gives an indication of the degree to which the norms of behaviour are, at least partly, the consequence of exogenous system penetration.

Similarly the nature of the stakes involved in inter-unit transactions is an important indicator of not only the size of the subordinate system, but of the extent to which it is capable of particular kinds of conflict for problem-resolution. More significantly the nature of stakes suggests whether unit actors will be inclined to 'balance-of-power politics' or 'political integration politics', bearing in mind that the diplomatic operations involved in both of these include some element of the other. Questions about system stakes can be posed in the following ways (a) Are they current - that is do they exist in the present, and are they the foci of current competition? (b) Are they future-oriented, that is, is the form of inter-unit activity based on assumptions among the units about the capacity of present stakes and transactions concerning them to produce additional stakes? Or is cooperation between units based on the assumption that mere cooperation is likely to attract stakes into the system?¹⁹ (c) Are they considered as having sufficient 'value' to induce cooperation, and what level of cooperation are they then able to induce? Are the stakes of competition with 'value' weighted in favour of, or possessed by, predominantly one or a few of the units, and does this unit (or units) prefer to engage in transaction structures outside of the defined region rather than within it? This last set

¹⁹Aron Segal asserts, in this vein, that "The 1960 Treaty establishing the Central American Integration Bank which was initially financed by \$16 million of credits from the U.S. provided that a condition of access to Bank loans was ratification of the Integration (Central American Common Market) Treaty", in Segal, A. "The Integration of Developing Countries: Some Thoughts on East Africa and Central America", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 252-82 at p. 267, note 29.

of questions is related to that of the strength of the material basis of inter-unit regional activity.

Finally the relationship of extra-unit inputs into a set of unit relations brings into focus the question of the strength of coherence forces within the subordinate system when compared with that of transactions inducing coherence outside of the subordinate system. This juxtaposition of forces determines the degree to which extra-system units on the one hand, or intra-system units on the other, are able to prevail in determining the definition of the boundaries of the regional system, and in determining the centre or core area within it.

When these three relationships are considered together, we are able to make judgements about the extent to which small state system activity has a level of autonomy as to be susceptible to analysis in 'traditionalist' balance-of-power terms; or, on the other hand, the extent to which the value of stakes is so low, and extra-system transactions so dominant, that a form of penetrated-system analysis is preferable.

THE DYNAMICS OF SUBORDINATE SYSTEM ACTIVITY

We can say, by way of summary, that the behaviour of a subordinate system is determined by two factors. The first is its material size, and therefore the level and kinds of stakes which that size gives rise to and can support. The second is that of its systemic size - the forms of linkages it has with other units in the international society which give these units the capacity to exploit, if not determine, the inter-unit relationships of the subordinate system, and at times, to define that subordinate system's boundaries.

At the same time, however, the nature of the linkages (the systemic relationships) may allow the subordinate system or units within it to use their relevant environments as supports, rather than to have to tolerate them as externally-originating constraints. Systems and subsystems (processually defined) therefore are of prime importance for subordinate system (institutionally defined) activity.

The Size of Subordinate Systems

We look now at some implications of material size for subordinate system activity. To do this, we examine three sets of regional groupings which are each at some level a "theatre of diplomatic operations", and attempt to compare them. We have chosen, first, the set of states comprising what Brecher has called the "Near East Core" of the Middle East Subordinate System. For Brecher, these states are Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the United Arab Republic and Israel.²⁰ We have added to these, however, Saudia Arabia (which Brecher perceives as being on the "periphery" of the core group), on the grounds that it is a significant competitor within the Arab grouping of the core: in terms, first, of its tradition of competition with the Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq (subsequently with Jordan only); secondly, because it is a religious focus within the area, having within its borders Mecca; thirdly in terms of the competition between mainly Saudia Arabia and the United Arab Republic and other 'conservative' regimes, over the future ideological character of the social systems of the Arab states; and finally, because of the competition for political influence between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R., in other Arab countries, mainly, recently, in the Yemen.

²⁰See Brecher, op. cit., p. 118.

The second regional area chosen is that of the Conseil d'Entente in West Africa, comprising for most of its existence, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta. Although Legum remarks on the "lack of any clear economic, geographic or historic bases" for the grouping,²¹ it was, as he suggests a mechanism for the diplomatic strategy of the Ivory Coast, the most wealthy of the units comprising it. In order to attract other countries, however, the Ivory Coast had to give it the character of a predominantly economic integrationist and developmental organisation. Nevertheless as Legum observes, "while the framework of the Entente has survived, its unity has remained fragile largely because of the Ivory Coast's reluctance to implement fully the financial terms of the agreement".²²

The Entente is also important as the forerunner and nucleus of the much larger organisation, the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), one of the pivotal units in which was the Ivory Coast.

But, for our purposes, we add to this group the states of Senegal and Guinea, since one of the Ivory Coast's main concerns in the formation of the Entente, was to inhibit the development of a cohesive diplomatic grouping based on Senegal, the other relatively wealthy country in the set of ex-French West African colonies; and Guinea, after leaving the French colonial system tended to become a pole for the development of a radical ideology of state activity, a circumstance that led it into various forms of competition with both the Ivory Coast and Senegal.

²¹Legum, Colin, Pan Africanism (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965, 2nd revised edition) p. 80.

²²Ibid., p. 79, and see p. 78 on the organization's structure. Zartman refers to it as a "loose non-political, economic cooperation formula for the autonomous states of West Africa", observing that Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast was attempting its formation because of a "desire to avoid isolation". See Zartman, I.W., International Relations in the New Africa, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1966), p. 20.

The third regional area is that of the group of countries within what is termed the Commonwealth Caribbean. The four, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana are in fact the only sovereign entities within the group, as well as constituting its most wealthy members. It can therefore be seen as the core of that regional system. This grouping is attempting to develop an institutional structure relevant to its desired diplomatic operations. We suggest this group on the basis of its own self identification as having operational boundaries that, presently at least, distinguishes it from other units in geographical proximity, for example, Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

The relative sizes of the groups are shown in the tables below; we also attempt to give some indication of military capacity and amount of expenditure on this.

REGIONAL SYSTEMS COMPARED BY SIZE *

	Population (mid-1966 estimate)	Area (Sq. Km.)	Market Prices GNP (1965) (\$ mil.)	VALUE OF (1966) (\$ mil. U.S.)	
				Imports (c.i.f.)	Exports (f.o.b.)
MIDDLE EAST					
U.A.R.	30,147,000	1,001,449	5,310	1,070	604
Iraq	8,338,000	434,724	2,081	493	935
Jordan	2,059,000	97,740	505	187	36
Lebanon	2,460,000	10,400	1,026	533	103
Syria	5,400,000	185,180	936(1963)	288	173
Israel	2,629,000	20,700	3,645	811	477
Saudi Arabia	6,870,000	2,149,690	1,120(1963)	394	1,640
TOTAL	57,903,000	3,899,883	14,623	3,776	3,968

*Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1967 (N.Y. 1968).

CONSEIL D'ENTENTE	Population (mid-1966 estimate)	Area (Sq. Km.)	Market Prices GNP (1965) (\$ mil.)	VALUE OF (1966) (\$ mil. U.S.)	
				Imports (c.i.f.)	Exports (f.o.b.)
Ivory Coast	3,920,000	322,463	958	257	310
Upper Volta	4,955,000	274,200	220(1963)	38	16
Niger	3,433,000	1,267,000	294	45	35
Dahomey	2,410,000	112,622	169(1963)	34	11
Togo	1,680,000	56,000	169	47	36
Guinea	3,608,000	245,857	333(1963)	53	58
Senegal	3,580,000	196,192	777	161	149
Total	23,586,000	2,474,334	2,920	635	615

COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN

Jamaica	1,839,000	10,962	890	321	229
Trinidad	1,000,000	5,128	634	456	426
Barbados	245,000	430	101	77	40
Guyana	662,000	214,969	198	118	109
Total	3,746,000	231,489	1,823	972	804

MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND STRENGTHS OF ARMED FORCES

<u>MIDDLE EAST (1965)¹</u>	<u>Military Expenditures (Mill. \$U.S.)</u>	<u>Armed Forces (Thousands)</u>
U.A.R.	392	180
Iraq	197	79
Jordan	60	40
Lebanon	30	12
Syria	95	60
Israel	413	250
Saudi Arabia	<u>131</u>	<u>30</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>1,318</u>	<u>651</u>

CONSEIL D'ENTENTE (1965)

Ivory Coast	13	4
Upper Volta	3	1
Niger	6	1
Dahomey	4	1
Togo	3	1
Guinea	11	5
Senegal	<u>15</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>17</u>

COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

Jamaica (1966-67)	3 ⁽²⁾	2 ⁽³⁾
Trinidad (1966)	2	.8
Barbados (1966-67)	.6	-
Guyana (1966)	<u>5</u>	<u>.5</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>10.6</u>	<u>3.3</u>

- (1) Figures for Middle East and Entente from World-Wide Military Expenditure and Related Data.
 (2) Approximations by author on basis of countries' Annual Estimates.
 (3) Information privately obtained by author.

It is clear from these tables that on all the criteria of material size that we have used, the Middle East core area constitutes the largest regional system. Where, for example, there is an approximation in one area - as in geographical size in the case of the Middle East system and the Entente plus Senegal and Guinea system, this cannot be taken as sufficient to constitute a general argument for size similarity. In the case, for example of the countries of largest land areas, Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Niger on the other, we have to take into account that much of this land area is not currently exploited (in terms of mere habitation or otherwise), and is thus not relevant to the general size argument. Geographical size cannot therefore be taken as currently contributing to economic size.²³ But it might be of significance if land becomes a stake of competition within the system itself.

In spite of immense differences in land area, the Entente system and the Commonwealth Caribbean core group bear some similarity in value of trade, with the Caribbean group being predominant in spite of its relatively small land area. Both of the groups can be said to possess two economic poles of attraction, Ivory Coast and Senegal in the case of the Entente, Jamaica and Trinidad in the case of the Caribbean. Wealth, in particular value of exports, we take as an index of two factors: the first, it suggests the extent to which the units within systems may have assets of a size substantial enough to constitute major stakes of current competition among themselves, or whether particular units within the system have assets of sufficient

²³Nor, in the case of Niger are there present other resources or capabilities that might be used to exploit land size: "The Niger lacks power resources, raw materials, capital, supervisory personnel and industrial traditions: its industrialization prospects are thus, perforce, modest....". "Industrial Development in the Niger", pp. 275-280, at p. 280 in U.N. Industrial Development in Africa, ID/CONF. 1/RBP (N.Y. 1967).

value to induce cooperation or subordination on the part of other units. Secondly, the direction and character of exports gives an indication of extra-region unit stakes and therefore interest in, particular kinds of structure and behaviour of the system. If the trade systems between regional units and extra-region units are substantially weighted in favour of the extra-region units, then one factor exists towards the maintenance of the regional area as a subordinate system. It might be noted, in this connection that the state with the highest value of exports in the Middle East system is Saudi Arabia, one of the countries in the area almost all of whose revenue is attained from the export of petroleum.

Next, the tables pertaining to military capacity (here we use mainly size of armed forces and expenditure on them) again suggest the predominance of the Middle Eastern System. This is reflective not only of differences in size of populations of the three regions, but of the capacity of the units of the Middle East to devote a larger amount of financial resources to the development and support of armed forces in terms, however, of their perceptions of the indigenously-originating character of the "state of war" in the area.²⁴ The stakes of competition having a potential for warfare are larger, and deemed to be more 'valued' in this area than in the others. In the Middle East region, land, zones of influence, and populations are seen as war-inducing elements, introducing, as they do, competition between the separate units.

²⁴On the sources of military assistance, and of assistance in areas with military implications, see Wood, David, The Middle East and the Arab World: The Military Context (Adelphi Papers, no. 20, July 1965, London: Institute for Strategic Studies pp. 6-9; Kemp, G., Arms and Security: The Egypt-Israel Case (Adelphi Papers No. 52, October 1968, London: Institute for Strategic Studies). A study attempting to deal with the general problem of analysis of military expenditure is, Benoit, E., and Lubell, H., "The World Burden of National Defence" in Benoit, E., (ed.) Disarmament and World Economic Independence (N.Y., Columbia, U.P., 1967).

And the competition for them has a determining effect on governments' perceptions of levels and forms of armaments required.

One factor distinguishing the Caribbean system from the other two is the non-contiguity of the units involved, in the sense that they, in addition to not sharing common boundaries, do not constitute what we can call a 'land state-system' (in contradistinction to an 'island state system'). It might then be argued that problems stemming from movements of populations in large numbers, would not be as significant and therefore competition-inducing as in the land systems (given, in particular, the relatively paucity of mass-transportation media). But boundary-sharing, as we shall suggest more extensively in a later section, can be looked at as, in principle, a 'neutral' variable - that is as either a coherence or competition-inducing factor.

We conclude from all this that the stakes of competition internal to the various regional systems are relatively small and few in number in the case of the Entente and the Caribbean, and relatively large and extensive in the case of the Middle East. Taking the Middle East system as a whole, there exists the significant factor that does not exist in the other two systems, that is, the competition for one of the units - Israel.²⁵ The level of armaments in this case, becomes one deriving from relations of competitive-interdependence between the unit that is the stake in this process on the one hand, and the other states, or pivotal states among the latter. Further in the Middle East system there does not exist a simple equation between units claiming to be, or perceived by others as, the leading or 'pivotal' units of the core

²⁵And this is to be distinguished from competition among units stemming from the desire to promote the installation of kinds of governments favourable to themselves. This form of competition (to which we refer below) exists in the "Entente plus Senegal-Guinea" region.

group, and units that have the most easily available financial resources. In this context any attempt to introduce command relationships on the part of the pivotal state becomes a difficult one. Bargaining relationships, based on ownership of different kinds of resources valued by all participants in the system, become the norm.

In the Middle East this is most significantly the problem of Egypt, even where the competition-inducing problems do not stem from the presence of Israel.²⁶ Its GNP per capita is the lowest of the units within the grouping that we have selected; the state whose existence is considered by all others as a stake of competition in the system has the highest GNP per capita (Israel); and the state which constitutes the focus along with Egypt in the competition over the current and future ideological and social structures of the units within the system (Saudi Arabia) has a much larger per capita income than Egypt and a much smaller population.²⁷ "Central to any understanding of the role of Egypt in Arab affairs", Binder remarks, "is the economic plight of Egypt", and

"Egypt is overpopulated. It has nearly 28 million people, and its population is growing at the rate of more than half a million a year.... The basis of Egyptian wealth is primarily land, or rather the water of the Nile; the availability of which limits the land which can be cultivated. The high dam at Aswan will increase the availability of water for irrigation, but it is clear that agricultural resources

²⁶ Colonel Nasser's Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (written in 1953) can be read as an attempt to show that Egypt was, or should be in the future, the pivotal state in the Middle East. Binder writes that, "Central to any understanding of these [Inter-Arab] relations is the key position which Egypt now plays in Arab affairs. Inter-Arab relations are essentially the relations of the Arab states with Egypt rather than their relations with one another. See Binder, L., The Middle East Crisis: Background and Issues (Univ. of Chicago Centre for Policy Study, 1967), p. 17.

²⁷ GNP per capita: Egypt-U.S. \$159; Iraq - \$233; Jordan - \$244; Lebanon - \$437; Syria - \$208; Israel - \$1325; Saudi Arabia - \$354. The figures are for the year 1965 and are taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: World-Wide Military Expenditures and Related Data, pp.10-11.

are sharply limited so that soon enough population will outrun them..."²⁸

The necessity on the part of a state considering itself pivotal to seek resources from both the intra and extra-regional environment, raises the question of the extent of its autonomy for decision-taking on issues relevant to the area. We argue here that the substantial dependence of the pivotal state (or set of pivotal states within the core group) for extra-regional sustenance makes the whole system subordinate to the particular extra-regional units in respect of such issues as the pivotal state assumes the responsibility for resolving. As we have suggested in looking at the circumstances of the Ivory Coast's formation of the Entente, the pivotal state attempts an organisation of surrounding units to inhibit its isolation, especially where there are other poles of attraction within its environment.²⁹

The final problem arising here concerns the question of whether the size of the subordinate system bears any relationship to the form of inter-unit competition-cooperation. If we assume, to take the case of the Middle East, that within the regional area a pivotal state exists, but that it has to co-exist with a state (in this case Israel) also of significant material capabilities, but whose very existence constitutes one of the stakes of the system, then the system is likely to be a predominantly competitive one. We would expect the pivotal state to attempt to organise a set of mainly command relationships

²⁸Binder, L., op. cit., pp. 17-18.

²⁹The American diplomat Robert Murphy writes that, "During Nasser's five hour talk with me /during the Lebanon crisis of 1958/, he gave a long dissertation about the United Arab Republic, explaining the necessity of Arab unity for the security of a small weak country like Egypt." Murphy, R., Diplomat Among the Warriors (N.Y. Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1964), p. 414. We are not here suggesting that the Ivory Coast relative to its own regional system can be treated as similar to Egypt.

with lesser units in the area, and attempt a gradual absorption of them. The consequence would be a bipolarisation of the regional system with the enlarged pivotal state at one pole, and the 'stake' state at the other. This we can call the Bismarckian model.³⁰

In such a configuration, the principle of unit activity in external relations becomes that of raison d'etat.³¹ The presence of at least two relatively large states along with a number of predominantly small-sized states would have the effect of the creation, not of a predominantly small state-system, but of the conditions in which there is a predominantly single-state domination of the system. (We assume here that because the other significant state in the system constituted a 'stake' for all other states, it could not easily establish a command system). The aim of the pivotal state would be to establish dominance over lesser states, as distinct from mere collaboration. In Bismarck's words,

"... the question is whether we are a Great Power or a state in the German Confederation; and whether we are, conformably to the former quality, to be governed by a monarch or, as in the latter case would be at any rate admissible, by professors, district judges, and the gossips of the small towns ... [We must be] first of all a Great Power, and German Federal state afterwards."³²

But the model does not apply precisely in the case of the Middle East. The relative material weakness of Egypt has not permitted the leaders of that state to follow it; though it might be argued

³⁰After Bismarck's attempt at polarization of German international politics between Prussia and Austria.

³¹See Meinecke, F., Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, first published 1924. See also Arnold Wolfer's essay on "Political Theory and International Relations" in his Discord and Collaboration.

³²Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, pp. 2-3. Emphasis in the original.

that the experiment of the United Arab Republic represented an initial attempt. (And notwithstanding the fact that the union was the consequence of Syrian initiatives.) Malcolm Kerr argues that at this time (1958),

"the centre of the contest for influence in the Arab world was in Syria, and the principal protagonists were Iraq and Egypt. This competition began well before the Egyptian revolution of 1952, and at heart had nothing to do with ideology. It was a geopolitical struggle....Iraqi leaders... sought on repeated occasions to bring about a Syrian-Iraqi unification under the Hashemite Crown, or failing that, a close alliance. Correspondingly they were opposed on each occasion by the Egyptian government of the day and by Saudi Arabia."³³

The unification of Egypt and Syria therefore changes the structure of diplomatic relations, though, as the political union evolves, the problems, for Egypt, of control become increasingly intransigent.³⁴ With the secession of Syria and the dissolution of the union, the complexity of regional diplomatic relations reverts at least to its former state. The pretensions of one of the pivotal states in the area to control the state system through command relationships, fails, and the mode of diplomatic operations becomes that of balance of power. For the structure of transactions in the area rules out the other alternative - consensus integration.³⁵ In the balance

³³Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War 1958-1964 (London: Oxford U.P. 1965), pp. 2-3. Binder remarks, in a review article of works including that of Kerr, that "I don't know if there is a geopolitical pivot of the Middle East, but if there is one I very much doubt that it is Syria.... The strategic importance ... attributed to Syria ... is not due to Syria's intrinsic power-political significance. This importance is due rather to the history of Syrian-Egyptian relations". Binder, L., "The Tragedy of Syria", World Politics, Vol. 19, 1957, pp. 521-549 at pp. 524-531.

³⁴For a discussion of the problems of the U.A.R. union, see Abdel-Malek, A., "Crisis in Nasser's Egypt", New Left Review, no. 45, 1967, pp. 67-81 and Rouleau, E., "The Syrian Enigma", ibid., pp. 53-65.

³⁵On attempts of this kind, hardly to be considered successful, see MacDonald, R.W., The League of Arab States (N.J.: Princeton U.P. 1965).

of power system, no state has the capabilities sufficient to attain predominance in, and control of the mode of diplomatic operations; while at the same time, the stakes of competition are too substantial to encourage integration. Here also, enough states in the core group of the system have sufficient capabilities to induce other states of relatively similar capabilities to engage, on particular issues, in bargaining relationships. In particular, one of what Kaplan refers to as the "essential rules" of a balance of power system, applies here: "Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organising principles".³⁶

If we accept a variant of balance of power analysis as useful for explaining the behaviour of particular kinds of regional system behaviour (specifically here that of the Middle East), the question that arises is to what extent the mode of balance politics changes when the regional system is subordinated in various issue-areas, to that of some dominant system or systems.

Systemic Size and Subordinate System Activity:
I - Pivotal Units and the Definition of the
Theatre of Diplomatic Operations

We have been suggesting that one of the characteristics of pivotal units or poles of attraction within the system that we are considering here is, that none of them possesses sufficient capabilities to sustain dominance or command over the systems on a broad range of issues relevant to cooperation and competition within them. A second characteristic of these pivotal units is that as underdeveloped states

³⁶Kaplan, M., System and Process in International Politics, p. 23. For a recent useful discussion of 'balance of power' see Wight, M., "The Balance of Power," in Butterfield, H., and Wight, M., Diplomatic Investigations, pp. 149-175.

they are engaged in sets of economic transactions with developed units in the international society, in which their 'weight' in these reciprocal relations is less than that of the developed states. In the Middle East, for example, Egypt has been dependent on the United States for food supplies crucial to the survival of its population, and has found it necessary to make concessions, regarding its Middle Eastern strategy, to the United States, in order to obtain these.³⁷ And one of the factors playing a part in the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, was the refusal by the United States, after laying down certain conditions requiring to be fulfilled by Egypt, to grant a loan for the construction of the Aswan Dam. As Finer writes,

"Among the conditions laid down by the State Department for the making of the loan were these two: all contracts must be on a competitive basis; and Egypt's internal resources must be so managed as to avoid further inflation, now and during the years when she would be applying her share of the resources needed to build the Dam. Furthermore, the World Bank ... went further, according to its statutes and regulations: it would review the investment programme and propose to Egypt how she should adjust her total public expenditures to her financial resources".³⁸

In addition, Egypt has been the recipient of extensive economic aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. According to one source, "between 1945 and 1965, United States' aid to Egypt was \$1,173m. and that of the Soviet Union \$1,011 m. (\$835m. in Soviet credits were made available between 1963-1967.) During the first five-year plan (1960-1965), actual American aid expenditures of about \$970m. were double those of the Soviet Union and East Europe".³⁹

³⁷See an editorial in Le Monde, 24 June, 1965: "'Reconciliation' americano-egyptienne".

³⁸Finer, H. Dulles Over Suez, p. 39.

³⁹Hunter, R.E., The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Part I: Problems of Commitment, Adelphi Papers, No. 59, 1969 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 8, note 16. His calculations are based on Tansky, L., U.S. and USSR: Aid to Developing Countries (N.Y. Praeger, 1967).

Further, "by 1968, the long term economic debt had reached \$1.5 billion and annual servicing obligations amounted to about \$270 million".⁴⁰

The cases of Saudi Arabia and Israel, states in the region in substantial competition with Egypt also demonstrate a degree of economic dependence. Saudi Arabia is a mono-crop economy, the direction of whose petroleum exports is predominantly with the Western countries. Her small population and relatively large revenues however give her a certain autonomy with respect to diplomatic operations within the subordinate system. For example, since the 1967 Middle East war, she has provided Egypt and Jordan with \$120 million annually; the linkage here created must have the effect of inclining Egypt to take cognisance of Saudi policy objectives in relation, for example, to the Yemen.⁴¹

Israel has been, and remains, a recipient of extensive external economic assistance that has given her a certain degree of internal flexibility:

"Israel, like its Arab neighbours, has depended on outside financing to underwrite much of its development. However, most of the money Israel has needed and has received has come from private individuals, as either donations or bond purchases, or from Germany... In consequence, Israel has no major debt service problem...."⁴²

⁴⁰Lenczowski, G., (ed.) United States Interests in the Middle East (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968), p. 64. But also Lenczowski: "The common notion of a Soviet mortgage on Egyptian cotton is not supported by evidence. The major expansion of Egyptian cotton sales to the Communist countries took place in 1957 and 1958.... Communist purchases probably saved Egypt from financial disaster in those years, but they have never been of equivalent importance since" (p. 60). The currency in which these amounts are expressed is U.S. dollars.

⁴¹On Saudi Arabian financial contributions to Egypt, see Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 69. Kuwait and Libya agreed at the Heads of Government Conference in Khartoum to make similar kinds of contributions.

⁴²Lenczowski, p. 73,

The Entente system, with the exception of Guinea (of the states we have here added to the Entente proper) are involved in a reasonably coherent set of transactions with France and the European Community. Those transactions must be seen as a continuation of the colonial pattern, as well as in terms of Ivory Coast political strategy of the development of the international system "Eurafrica". The pattern of metropolitan economic dominance cannot be doubted, and in addition it is linked with a monetary system directed by France.⁴³ Finally, the trading arrangements of the Caribbean core group show a similar dependence,⁴⁴ and, in general, the governmental elites of the area do not perceive any form of rationalisation that could change or reduce the significance of this situation.

Now, we cannot assume a direct and necessary relationship between economic and monetary subordination, and subjection to political influence and control. Robert Hunter has argued, in this vein, that although "the Nasser regime appears to have become increasingly dependent on Soviet military and economic support,... its dependence should not be exaggerated", and that "it has long proved difficult to calculate the relationship between the involvement or presence of an outside power and its actual influence with, or control over, particular regimes". Similarly, Binder, noting the incoherence and unpredicta-

⁴³See "The CFA Franc System", I.M.F. Staff Papers, Vol. 10, 1963, pp. 345 ff. and "Financial Arrangements of Countries Using the CFA Franc System", ibid., Vol. 16, 1963, pp. 289 ff.

⁴⁴See McIntyre, A., "Aspects of Development and Trade in the Commonwealth Caribbean", Preliminary Draft for the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Doc. E/CN12/712, 1965; De Boer, C.N., Promotion of Intra-Caribbean Trade: Fruits and Vegetables, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, Holland, 1963); and in general Segal, A., The Politics of Caribbean Economic Integration, Special Study No. 6 (Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico, 1968) especially Chapter 3.

bility of behaviour of the Syrian political system, has remarked upon "the near impossibility of great-power influence upon that country".⁴⁵ But insofar as particular high status powers possess interests of a material kind, and deem themselves to have strategic and 'symbolic' interests in an area, and establish linkages throughout that area for their protection, then the status of subordination is, for the analyst, established. The problem for the regional area as subordinate system, or, in terms of action, the problem for the pivotal states within the subordinate system, is that of the extent to which they can exploit that subordination to establish, on issues relevant to their own systemic environments, dominance at particular points in time over the subordinate system. This problem has two aspects: the first, to what extent the pivotal units can satisfactorily delimit the area, that is establish subordinate system boundaries, in the process of resolution, to their benefits of conflict-cooperation issues; and secondly, to what extent the subordinate system is susceptible to internal definition by units within it, at best by the pivotal units.

The notion of subordinate system exploitation of the dominant-subordinate relationship arises, in the context of our assertion, in Chapter 5, that high-status powers because of their interest in the 'value' of states and regions, are sometimes prepared to 'concede autonomy' to units with respect to issues arising within the subordinate system, especially where the issues are internally-originating and the system therefore has a local dynamic. This is best illustrated in the case of the Middle East, where a stake of competition is land, either in the form of contested zones, surrounding ill-defined local boundaries, with assumed mineral potential, or a pivotal state itself

⁴⁵Hunter, R., op. cit., p. 15 and Binder, L. op. cit., p. 531.

(Israel). Here, the balance of power arrangement operates in the context of systemic subordination, but there does not follow from this dominant system control on issues relating to military conflict. The autonomy of the subordinate system is enhanced, in this case, where the systemic subordination is made more complex by competition between elements in the (dominant) system for stakes (therefore for influence and control) within the subordinate system.⁴⁶ And military conflict is a means of redefining the subordinate system internally. In sum, the capacity to exploit the complexity of dominant system competition in the interests of a redefinition (by pivotal units) of the subordinate system is 'autonomy'.

The other two regional systems with which we are concerned here, have less capacity for systemic exploitation, because there are few stakes with locally-originating dynamic, and less substantial capabilities for determining the outcomes of competition for the stakes that exist. Though, for example, in the Entente system, the mixing of populations induces a tendency to conflict, the capabilities that the separate units possess for resolving the conflicts in a manner satisfactory to themselves are limited.

We can take, for example, the attempt of the Ivory Coast to attract greater allegiance to the Entente system on the part of other member units by exploiting this very mixture of populations. In December of 1965, the Government of the Ivory Coast attempted to effect a system of double-nationality for the nationals of members of the Entente, partly in order to solve the pressing problem for Dahomey of an excess of administrative cadres. Dahomey had, during the

⁴⁶An illustration, in our view, of this process, is the set of circumstances leading to the June 1967 war. Israel here, was more successful than ~~Egypt~~ Egypt in exploiting the systemic subordination of the area.

colonial period, developed a large group of this kind, servicing the colonial administrative system throughout French West Africa. Relatively large Dahomean minorities existed in these countries therefore, for example in Ivory Coast, Niger and Senegal. One of the reasons inclining Dahomey to adhere to the Entente and not to the Mali Federation was precisely that these countries would agree to allow the Dahomean cadres to remain in their states.⁴⁷

Houphouet-Boigny, cognisant of the fact that Dahomeans formed an important group in the public and private sectors in the Ivory Coast, and that experience had shown that they could easily become the objects of antagonism of the local population, was using the double-nationality scheme to normalise their status in his country. But the reaction to this of the Ivory Coast population was one of such hostility that the President had to withdraw the proposed scheme, remarking,

"Les Ivoiriens souffrent d'un complexe d'infériorité du au fait que leurs frères de certains pays voisins ont bénéficié du temps de la colonisation d'une meilleure scolarisation et sont donc plus aptes qu'eux à occuper certains emplois".⁴⁸

Thus a pivotal state in the system was unable to find resources to minimise the potential for conflict within it.

Another weaker state in the system, Niger, in response to pressures from its own population actually, in 1963, expelled the Dahomean cadres. But here Dahomey had some advantage since the land-locked Niger used its port of Cotonou and the Dahomey-Niger railway for the export of its products. The Dahomeans closed these points of exit in reprisal, and left the Entente. But Dahomey subsequently opened

⁴⁷See Bonzon, S., "Les Dahoméens en Afrique de l'ouest", Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 17, 1967, pp. 718-26 at p. 721.

⁴⁸Quoted in Bonzon, op. cit., p. 722.

them again at the beginning of 1964, and rejoined the Entente in January of 1965, apparently under pressure from the Ivory Coast⁴⁹ and without any effective resolution of the original problem leading to the dispute. The resources for conflict resolution again could hardly be said to be prominent within the system; this restricts the development of a meaningful balance of power system, or put another way, of subordinate system autonomy of any effective kind. Conflicts remain in stalemate, in externally-originating resolution, or in threats of the latter. And as a substitute for effective mechanisms of conflict resolution (mechanisms possessed either by the separate units or by the system as a whole), verbal violence and threats become an almost functional part of the system.

The basis of many of the disputes arising within the subordinate system tends often to be the perception on the part of the governments of the states that each is continually contesting the legitimacy of the other through exploitation of the sentiments of minorities.⁵⁰ This has affected the relations between the Ivory Coast and its allies on the one hand, and Guinea on the other, or the former group of states and a state on the periphery of the subordinate system that we have suggested, Ghana. And since none of the states has sufficient resources to serve as mechanisms of relatively long-term attraction of other states, the diplomatic groupings within the subordinate system are likely to be continually changing. The behaviour within the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) of Mauritania during 1965 is a good illustration of this,⁵¹ as are

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 723-24.

⁵⁰See an editorial "Tension entre communautés africaines", Le Monde, 11 February, 1966.

⁵¹See, "La politique extérieure de la Mauritanie inquiète les dirigeants de l'O.C.A.M.", Le Monde 28 April, 1965, and "La Mauritanie a décidé de quitter l'Organisation commune africaine et malgache", Le Monde, 8 July, 1965.

the frequent attempts of Senegal to constitute itself, if not a pole of competition at least a pole of alternative attraction within the system.⁵²

The year 1965 saw the competition between the OCAM group and Ghana reach its high pitch, mainly at the instigation of M. Houphouët-Boigny who had by then stabilised the domestic politics of his country; secondly, in 1966, there arose disputes between the OCAM group and Guinea, consequent upon the overthrow of President Nkrumah. During that year, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, Upper Volta and even Cameroon claimed that the Government of Ghana had instigated minorities against their governments with the objective of removing them. The Entente group, the impetus being provided by Houphouët-Boigny, set out collectively to attempt to isolate Ghana, in diplomatic terms, from its neighbours,⁵³ and then so to extend the limits of the newly formed OCAM as to include the Government of the Congo-Leopoldville (then headed by M. Tshombe), to which Ghana had been opposed.⁵⁴ The latter aspect of Ivory Coast strategy was the occasion for the departure of Mauritania from the O.C.A.M., but at least according to one source, the strategy achieved a re-arrangement of African inter-state diplomacy favourable to, in the last resort, the Ivory Coast:

⁵²"Sénégal: une diplomatie en mouvement", Le Monde, Special Supplement, 8 June, 1965.

⁵³See "Plusieurs états poursuivent une offensive diplomatique contre le Ghana", Le Monde, 17, April, 1965; an editorial "L'isolement diplomatique du Ghana", Le Monde, 22 April, 1965; and "La prospérité économique de la Côte d'Ivoire favorise son influence politique dans l'Ouest-Africain", Le Monde, 24 April, 1965.

⁵⁴"Les dirigeants de l'O.C.A.M. vont discuter de l'admission du Congo-Léopoldville", Le Monde, 25 May, 1965.

"La conférence ... marque veritablement l'accession des Etats moderes d'Afrique francophone au premier plan de la scène politique africaine... les dirigeants de l'O.C.A.M. ont simultanément realisé deux operations importantes: l'isolement du Ghana, aujourd'hui tenu en suspicion par un grand nombre de ses partenaires de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine; la rentrée politique de M. Tshombe,... Les assises d'Abdijan sont aussi un succes pour la diplomatie ivoirienne...."⁵⁵

The OCAM had been formed in February of 1965 (as a successor to the Union Africaine et Malgache de Cooperation Economique), and Sekou Toure of Guinea had perceived that it was intended, in part, to be an arm of Ivory Coast diplomacy. His hostility to the organisation gave rise to that verbal violence and counter-violence that we have characterised as a substitute for the possession of substantial conflict resolution mechanisms. Touré responding to the Ivory Coast diplomatic offensive, described the OCAM as the "organisation commune africaine de menteurs", to which President Yameogo of Upper Volta responded that he was not as "a Head of State... fit to sit beside those who really wish for African unity", since he was a "vain, lying, jealous, envious, cruel, hypocritical, ungrateful, and intellectually dishonest man";⁵⁶ and Houphouet-Boigny was later to remark that "it is not by insults and lying accusations that Sekou Toure will halt the desperate flight of thousands of his compatriots to the Ivory Coast".⁵⁷

Finally, after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the invocation of the resources of the dominant system by the Ivory Coast, as a threat to Guinea was resorted to by Houphouet-Boigny:

⁵⁵An editorial "M. Tshombe et le 'club francophone'", in Le Monde, 28 May, 1965. See also Le Monde, 8 July, 1965: "Le president Moktar Ould Daddch [of Maruitania]... se refusait a cautionner l'orientation donnee a l'O.C.A.M. par le chef d'état ivoirien et ses amis, et reprouvait l'admission du Congo-Léopoldville".

⁵⁶Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1966, p. 20894

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 21260

"Sékou Toure et le peuple guinéen doivent savoir que la Côte-d'Ivoire est liée par des accords de défense non seulement avec les Etats du Conseil de l'Entente, mais aussi avec la France qui, immédiatement, lui apporterait tout le poids de sa puissance".⁵⁸

The problems that we have been considering concerning the disputes of the Entente states with Ghana, raise the question of the relationship between the core states and those on its periphery which are capable of intervening in the subordinate system (defined as the core group) or themselves become stakes in attempts by units within the subordinate to re-arrange their own relationships.⁵⁹ But the question suggests the proposition that in the movement of inter-state relations from the context of what we can call 'colonial community' to that of 'international system', there exists large scope for organisation and disintegration of diplomatic groupings, and thus of subordinate systems. Where the influence of the dominant system is substantial, this phenomenon is not indicative of structural re-arrangements of the transaction systems of the regional zone.

Finally, in a continuum that runs from 'balance of power politics' through 'balance plus integration politics' to 'consensus integration politics', while we have placed the Middle East in the first category, it should by now be clear that it is difficult to categorise the Entente system. It does not, in our view possess sufficient of attributes to fall into the 'balance plus integration'

⁵⁸ Le Monde, 18 March, 1966. Verbal insults have characterized the Middle East system and the Commonwealth Caribbean prior to the disintegration of the Federation. It is to be seen not as developing from the quirks of particular leaders, but as a structural aspect of the system.

⁵⁹ Take for example the significance of Kuwait both as an object of desired absorption by Iraq and as a substantial lender of financial resources within the Middle East. On the latter, see, El Mallakh, R., "Kuwait's Economic Development and Her Foreign Aid Programmes", The World Today, Vol. 22, 1966, pp. 13-22.

category. It is too subordinate a system, with insufficient local dynamic, to possess a balance system with some degree of autonomy; but there exist, also, substantial impediments to the development of integrative processes. Nevertheless, we attempt now to discuss the problem of integration in subordinate systems, and shall have cause to make reference to the Entente system and that of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

SUBORDINATE SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION

As we have earlier suggested, the solution of imperial powers to the problem of viability of small states in close proximity to each other, was political unification, in the form, most often, of federation. This was, essentially, an administrative solution, with a genuflection to differences among the states, or to social differences within them - that is, to the problems of political incompatibility of the federated units. Most of these experiments in political unification have failed.⁶⁰ But two other perceptions still survive to induce among high-status powers, the idea that some form of political unification is necessary, among small states which they deem not to have the resources for sustaining long-term viability.

The first is their tendency, as we have earlier argued, to see geographically contiguous small states in holistic terms - that is as political regions, and to plan and execute policies of, for example, economic and technical assistance in these terms. In such cases, we can say that for high-status country policy purposes, the boundaries of small state activity are externally delimited. The objective of this is that policy determined from a regionalist perspective will

⁶⁰The outstanding case is that of the Cameroun Republic.

contribute to the establishment of sets of structural relationships between the small states that will induce institutional-political cooperation, if not unification. The second perception stems from theories of economic integration. This is that if small states wish to sustain some degree of autonomy in the international society, and this is assumed to require a particular level of economic development,⁶¹ then the optimum manner in which this might be done, is through economic integration with other contiguous small states; to take one statement of the argument in this respect,

"In conventional theory, the economic characteristics of the countries of Africa make the formation of customs unions between them a matter of small importance. In reality the contrary is the case. It is the low level of intra-African trade which makes the customs union question a fundamental one."⁶²

And any integration of this kind is assumed to imply some initially minimum level of political cooperation.

Two factors militate against these perceptions. The first is that the concept of political regionalism, externally-defined, leaves little scope for the phenomenon of nationalism, a significant force in the contemporary era. With the breakdown of federal and other 'community' systems (like those in pre-independence French colonial Africa), governments of new states find the appeal to nationalism use-

⁶¹To attain economic independence, a state must have an economy basically oriented to production for national needs. It requires a high level of technological capacity. It must be able to generate nationally at least the bulk of the investment and educated or skilled manpower necessary for rapid and sustained growth.... The divided states of Africa cannot achieve economic independence in this sense", Green, R. and Seidman, A., Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism, pp. 91 and 129. Our emphasis.

⁶²Hazelwood, A., p. 7 in Hazelwood (ed.) African Integration and Disintegration, (London, Oxford U.P. 1967). Our emphasis. He adds, however: "Customs unions must not be thought of as the deus ex machina of industrial development". (p. 11).

ful, and even necessary, in sustaining the coherence of the entities which they have inherited. Further, mass demands for economic welfare induce among neighbouring states protectionist economic policies, which tend to make them mutually antagonistic, since in the interest of economic growth they tend to be pursuing the same kinds of economic development strategies.⁶³

Secondly, the structures of economic transaction which these states have inherited make geographic contiguity not coterminous with trade and monetary system contiguity. As we have already noted, the directions of economic transactions are predominantly with former imperial countries, and again, the strategies of economic development undertaken by the states with which we are concerned, are such as to have the objective of maximising the gains from such transactions; rather than of redirecting economic transactions intra-regionally where, to take the example both of the Entente system and that of the Commonwealth Caribbean, the immediate gains to the separate states from such re-direction are deemed not to be great.⁶⁴

⁶³On the significance of 'protectionism' for Jamaica during the discussions on West Indian federation, see Mordecai, J., The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968), pp. 55 ff. On the significance of 'nationalism' in the integration process, see Proctor, J.H., Jr. "The Effort to Federate East Africa: Post Mortem", Political Quarterly, Vol. 37, 1966, pp. 46-69; Mazrui, A.; "Tanzania versus East Africa: A Case of Unwitting Federal Sabotage", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 3, 1965, pp. 209-225; and Nye, J.S. Jr., "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration", reprinted in Nye (ed.) International Regionalism, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), pp. 330-49.

⁶⁴One has thus to distinguish between government's perceptions of gains to their particular states over some short term and the gains to the region as a whole, from a regional economic policy. We deal with this again below. On Central and West Africa, however, "preliminary studies have shown the area to be relatively well-endowed in a wide range of resources, the economic exploitation of which is not profitable on the basis of sales to domestic markets. On the other hand, it has been shown that most of the countries are mainly dependent on external trade, characterized by a narrow range of exports to one or few countries. The intra-regional trade is, with few exceptions, marginal. The a priori

These two factors themselves, however, as limiting the inclination to regional integration, are counteracted by another. This is the 'power' of dominant systems. For insofar as the units within subordinate systems are themselves in positions of inferiority in the economic and other transactions in which they are engaged, the policies which they undertake are continually receptive and therefore reactive to, the strategies of units in the dominant systems. And dominant units tend to be discriminatory in their treatment of subordinate units, attempting thereby to induce changes in the strategies of the latter; their capacity for this has, in spite of the possible local anti-regionalist perspectives, to be taken into account.

This point, of the significance of extra-regional states upon subordinate system behaviour has recently been the subject of emphasis and analysis,⁶⁵ but the discriminatory capacities of dominant units might be illustrated by the example of the view of one source of the strategy and effects of the United Kingdom's entry into the European Economic Community. It was argued that, with respect to this,

"For Britain, New Zealand, is a very special case. The ties of race and culture are probably closer between these two countries than between Britain and any other member of the Commonwealth. Moreover, the New Zealand economy is almost totally dependent on the British market".

But,

argument which follows is that the formation of customs union would contribute to a better utilization of resources and an increase in intra-regional trade". Nowzad, B. "Economic Integration in Central and West Africa", I.M.F. Staff Papers, Vol. 16, 1969, pp. 103-39 at pp. 113-4.

⁶⁵See for example, Hoffmann, S., "European Process at Atlantic Cross-Purposes", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3, 1965, pp. 85-101; Kaiser, Karl, "The U.S. and the E.E.C. in the Atlantic System: The Problem of Theory", Ibid., Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 388-425; and Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers", World Politics, Vol. 21, 1968, pp. 84-107.

"The position of the Commonwealth sugar producers is different - not that they are less dependent on their exports of one commodity. But sugar is a world rather than a Common Market problem. Their long term future is more likely to be safeguarded through world-wide agreements made under the auspices of the Gaat than through any safeguard found by Britain with the Community."⁶⁶

Clearly, the indicated perceptions of countries in the dominant system with respect to this set of transactions would have a major influence upon the strategies adopted by the sugar countries (among whom are the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean system), in pursuit of the protection of this resource. And the existing system of preferences already constrains the Commonwealth Caribbean to undertake negotiations as a region rather than as separate states.

We are concerned, in what follows, in sketching an approach to the analysis of political integration processes. We are not concerned here to devise a model of political integration insofar as 'model' would imply a framework indicating an optimum strategy of political integration. Our purpose is to locate areas of inhibition of and impetus to, the political integration process. In this sense, our sketch is not policy-oriented, but is rather an attempt to clear some analytical ground. Within our understanding of the concept of the 'political integration process', we take as relevant the processes of the 'politics of economic integration' insofar as these fall within the definition of political integration that we give below; and on the grounds that a large part of the external relations of small states, intra and extra-regional, is concerned with strategies for deriving maximum advantage from the economic transactions in which they find themselves.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ An editorial, "Butter, Sugar and the EEC", The Times (London), 4 May, 1967. We do not use 'discriminatory' in any pejorative sense.

⁶⁷ See Segal, A., The Politics of Caribbean Economic Integration, which is both analytical and policy-oriented.

A digression: We have defined certain subordinate systems (our example here being the Middle East one) as not possessing, at present, a sufficient number of factors with local dynamic that would incline the systems to political integration; rather they incline the systems to balance of power politics that are essentially competitive, one of its (temporary) mechanisms being unification through absorption.⁶⁸

We are concerned with political integration, a process whose logical end-point is political unification. The latter indicates a form of political system in which all important policy decisions involve, in principle, the acquiescence of some authority higher in constitutional status than the units unified; in principle because in a unified group of formerly distinct entities it may not be the case in actuality that all major decisions be taken by the supra-unit authority itself. The distinction is that between form and function or process. But since we have already suggested that in federal systems, in which the balance of authority in decision-making among units is a more formally complex one than in unitary systems, have not been particularly successful as modes of integration, our focus here is on a process of integration in which states do not, at the beginning, derogate authority to some supra-national unit. Our focus is that of integration as a process in which there is a gradual meshing of the various decision-making processes and mechanisms of national societies into some new set of decision-making processes and structures upon which there devolves the function of direction of citizens and interests of citizens in these societies.

Now there is here an intimation of integration as having the characteristics of a teleological process. In this we differ from the implications of the definition offered by Leon Lindberg who sees

⁶⁸On the benefits for the Middle East regional system of Israeli economic integration into it, if other inhibiting factors did not prevail, see, Zarhi, Shaul, "L'avenir économique d'Israel dans le Moyen-Orient", Esprit, September 1966, pp. 262-72.

integration "as a process but without reference to an end point".⁶⁹ In an abstract sense Lindberg is correct; structural processes may have latent effects that are contrary to the objectives of those who set in motion an integration process or set of processes: "spill-over" processes may not be governmentally determined or capable of inhibition by governments. But we would hold that governmental elites who initiate political integration processes tend to have some idea of an "end-point", if even in the negative sense of knowing the point, which, for a variety of reasons they would not like the integration of the decision-making mechanism of national societies to go beyond.⁷⁰ That such perceptions are important, even to the extent of inhibiting attempts at even minimal attempts at integration, is suggested by the case of relations between the Gambia and Senegal which, in one analyst's words, form "a single natural unit geographically, economically and ethnically".⁷¹ Yet, the different objectives of the two states with respect to desirable end points of integration differ - Senegal having as its objective a complete absorption of the entity, which it sees as an artificial creation, Gambia; and the latter wishing to retain, through the foreseeable continuing existence of the integration process, some identifiable status as a sovereign state.⁷²

⁶⁹Lindberg, L., The Political Dynamics of European Integration (London: Oxford U.P., 1963), p. 6.

⁷⁰This seems to be the point of the strictures of Stanley Hoffmann in his, "Discord in Community: The North Atlantic as a Partial International System", op. cit.; and his "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe", reprinted in Nye, J. Jr., International Regionalism, pp. 177-230.

⁷¹Proctor, J.H., "The Gambia's Relations with Senegal: The Search for Partnership", Journal of Commonwealth Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 143-160 at p. 144.

⁷²For a discussion, see Robson, P., Economic Integration in Africa (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968), pp. 273 ff. especially p. 286.

We emphasise the necessity for the identification of the existence of new and distinct decision-making processes and structures, as the index of political integration in order to distinguish this process from other structural integration processes, and, more importantly, from mere governmental agreements. We illustrate this with an example. We cannot see a treaty between two or more states which set up a situation of free movement of labour or populations, but which, from the start, contains provision for unilateral state revocation of the treaty, as initiating a process of political integration. Where structures common to the internal processes of the states or entities involved do not automatically become involved in the making of decisions that affect them, then there is no political integration, if, as we suggest here, the term is meant to indicate a process of consensus integration, and not mere structural integration that is the consequence of dominance of one state in a structure of transactions. A constraint situation such as the latter does not have as its basis the meshing or inter-linking, on a consensus basis, of decision-making structures, and does not involve reciprocity at the level of political processes and institutions.⁷³

Similar considerations and distinctions apply, in our view, to economic arrangements like free trade areas. A free trade area, if the experience of the European Free Trade Area can be taken as a guide, we see as a set of mechanisms for freeing and therefore increasing trade between states, and consequentially increasing the rates of economic growth of at least some of the separate states, while preserving the

⁷³This latter is the case of the involvement of the nationals of states like Lesotho and Malawi, in the South African labour market. We do not deny that this might lead to a system of political unification. But this would be a case of absorption, following what we have called the "Bismarckian model". Alternatively, the British imperial system can be taken as an instance of 'absorption' rather than 'consensus' integration.

states as separate cultural and political, and to some extent economic, entities.⁷⁴ As far as geographically contiguous small states are concerned, we see it as an attempt on their part to come to terms with existing structural patterns inducing economic integration, as well as with the regionalist-perspective requirements of the dominant external powers. By subscribing to this limited form of integration on an inter-governmental (essentially treaty) basis, the small states hope to retain as complete control as is possible over domestic, especially economic, policies. They therefore attempt to ensure that as little automaticity as is possible is built into this integration process: there is no meshing of internal structures, rather the creation of inter-governmental ones.

For in spite of the governmental elite perspective of the need for control of internal social forces as a means of maintaining national coherence, there is also the perception of the lack of prospects for long-term unit viability. Statements of the following kind by the Prime Minister of Barbados can be taken as generally representative of this perception:

"Our heritage, problems and objectives are similar. Any West Indian politician who thinks he can go it alone in the face of world economic competition, stiff tariff barriers and special subsidies to marketing associates is either blind or insane."

The Prime Minister saw three options for small states finding themselves in this prediction. First, to accept dependence on the metropolitan powers and wait for "crumbs" from external (United Nations and United States) agencies; or secondly, to sever all ties and "run blindly ahead"; or, thirdly, the regional integration option: "Tell the metropolitan countries thanks for your assistance but we are now joining

⁷⁴See Camps, M., Britain and the European Community 1955-1963 (London: O.U.P., 1964) passim; and Lambridinis, J.S., The Structure, Function and Law of a Free Trade Area: The European Free Trade Association (London: Stevens, 1965) Ch. 1.

hands with friends whose basic beliefs are in harmony with ours, who have similar interests and whose objectives are the same".⁷⁵

In fact, the commitment, on the part of small states to an effective regional integration process, even on the limited scale of the free trade area, tends to be contingent, given the small resource base of areas like the Commonwealth Caribbean and the Entente, for example, on extensive financial support from dominant powers.⁷⁶

A further consideration is relevant here: we suggest that where a region, whose units are involved in a free trade area integration process, is made up of units of diverse geographical and economic size, the larger units tend to see the relevance of adhesion to the institution precisely in terms of its being a mechanism for maintaining their political statuses, while depending on their superiority in economic transactions to absorb a major proportion of the economic benefits stemming from the freeing of trade within the region. Where there is more than one pivotal state in the region, a competition then develops between them to redefine the systemic scope of the region to their advantage, so as to maximise the benefits accruing from the integration, while at the same time inhibiting the growth of inter-linking mechanisms that might lead to the loss of their 'independent' status.

In this context, the 'power' of the states peripheral to the subordinate system as currently existing, is of some significance. We can take as an example of this the attempt of Jamaica to redefine the boundaries of what we have called the Commonwealth Caribbean system, and to redefine her status within her conception of the relevant new system. Discussing the question of the siting of the Regional Development

⁷⁵Errol Barrow, Prime Minister of Barbados, Daily Gleaner (Jamaica), April 14, 1963.

⁷⁶Thus the Caribbean Regional Development Bank (usually a complement of integration schemes) involves both the institutional and financial participation of Britain, the United States and Canada.

Bank⁷⁷, the Minister of Finance remarked:

"...we feel... that Jamaica is centrally located. There is a concept that the region is concentrated in the Eastern Caribbean. We feel that the Eastern Caribbean is but a fringe of the Caribbean; and we made the point that the region has now extended from Belize in the west, Barbados in the east, Bahamas in the north and Guyana in the south; and Jamaica lies in the mid-stream of all this. We had to remind the conference that the Western Caribbean still exists, that Belize is the second largest territory, that Jamaica is the largest contributor to the bank and that the Bahamas has the largest per capita income, and that these are all Western Caribbean members.⁷⁸

Now, where the objectives of units regarding an integration process are dissimilar, and one of the pivotal states in the region possesses a limited view about the end-point of the process, 'balance politics' is introduced into the system to counterbalance attempts to create inter-country structural linkages among the units of the system where such linkages are intended to have the effect of political integration. Thus the phenomenon, which we have suggested of 'balance cum integration politics'.

In this situation, 'stakes' are introduced by pivotal states into the working of the system, for reasons that are related to their perceptions of the end-point of the integration process in which they have become involved. Thus, in diplomatic negotiations, interpretations of the relevance of stakes differ. Thus the comment of the Jamaican Minister of Finance on the view of the Prime Minister of Guyana that the Regional Bank should be operated so as to induce the political integration of the units, emphasised his view of the institution as an independence-sustaining mechanism:

⁷⁷Jamaica had made her adherence to the Bank contingent on its being sited in that state.

⁷⁸Reported in Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, April 10, 1968.

"We do not agree with Mr. Burnham's view on this matter at all. We feel that the bank has a prime purpose to give financial support to the territories in their domestic matters".⁷⁹

In the same way, the entry of peripheral states into the system becomes a stake of competition. An editorial comment on the proposed entry of the Dominican Republic into the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) illustrates this:

"...there is another aspect to the whole question. From the very beginning of CARIFTA certain doubts were expressed in the Eastern Caribbean ... as to the possibility of success if there was no closer political unity. In other words, some West Indians think CARIFTA must not only have a common economic aim, but also a common political aim. The latter is an obstacle which has stood in the way of success of a number of other so-called free trade associations. The Dominican Republic, while situated in the Caribbean, has very little in common with the Commonwealth Caribbean. The language is different, the background of the people is different; and above all, their politics is different".⁸⁰

The implication is that the entry of the peripheral unit could be of assistance to the pivotal unit with the restrictive view of the integration process, as a counterweight to units with the opposite perspective.

Some Comments on Analytical Assumptions

What now follows constitutes to some extent a break from the preceding analysis, though it is meant to discuss some assumptions about the process of political integration, as a prelude to a further discussion concerning the mechanics of the process.

In their study of the scope for West Indian integration, Brewster and Thomas suggest that in terms of the political structures required for their maintenance and development, free trade areas, customs unions and common markets on the one hand, are qualitatively different

⁷⁹Ibid., our emphasis.

⁸⁰Daily Gleaner (Jamaica), April 14, 1969.

from economic unions, if an economic union is defined, as they do, as "a common market in which also monetary, fiscal, social and stabilisation policies are harmonized". As they rightly point out, this kind of "total economic integration involves the total centralisation of official policies in a supra-national authority".⁸¹ The supra-national authority we take to be the institutional representation of the meshed structures and processes to which we have referred.

In terms of this definition, therefore, we would not agree with the view of E. Haas and P. Schmitter, it is possible to "accept as relevant any form of 'economic union' which involves some measure of continuing central administrative control, whether on the basis of a supra-national or an intergovernmental principle of authority."⁸² For the "intergovernmental principle of authority" is unlikely to entail "administrative control" over the internal structures of all the units in the integration process. Control is left with the separate units. The example that they use is itself instructive; for they argue that in an economic union "actors are expected to desire not merely more unrestricted trade but also some measure of factor mobility".⁸³ But factor mobility need not require more than intergovernmental structures.

The problem, as these authors see it, "is to link the processes of economic and political integration, thus recognising the continuum of economics and politics."⁸⁴ But we would suggest that unless the

⁸¹Brewster, H. & Thomas, C.Y., The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration (Mona: U.W.I., 1967), p. 3.

⁸²In their article "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration", International Organization, Vol. 18, 1967, pp. 705-737 at p. 709.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid.

"continuum of economics and politics" is programmed in terms of some end-point which, either in the minds of planners or of the general population is recognised, the linking of the mechanisms of economic and political integration will come to a halt precisely at the point where the linking of significant state political processes and structures is likely to take place. It seems to us that this has been the experience of the E.E.C., and Haas would himself appear to recognise this in his paper on "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America".⁸⁵ There do not develop in customs unions or common markets political mechanisms that make the transition from these to economic union (which is by definition a substantial form of political union) an automatic one.

A view similar to this has been put forcefully by John Pinder in an essay in which he asserts, first, that "the motives for establishing or joining economic groupings such as free trade areas, customs unions, or economic unions usually have more to do with political orientation than with calculations of economic gain",⁸⁶ and then goes on to hold that "a common market is a far lesser thing than an economic union, and without economic union will prove to be unviable". With respect to the European Economic Community in particular, this, he argues, "having for good reasons made negative integration effective, will find itself compelled to swallow down ... a large dose of positive integration or seriously to water down the Common Market that has been achieved"; in order to avoid this the Community will have to "regain the political momentum" that it once possessed.⁸⁷

⁸⁵In the Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 315-343.

⁸⁶Pinder, J., "Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the E.E.C." The World Today, Vol. 24, March 1968, pp. 88-110 at p. 97.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 91 and 110. Our emphasis.

Another point seems implicit in these kinds of arguments: that concepts or phrases like "functional federalism", "integration by stealth" or "painless federalism", used as metaphors for describing processes by which national units are deceptively emptied of their political and economic meaningfulness, cannot be accepted as analytically relevant, especially in cases where, as we have argued, the policies and level of gains from economic integrating processes among small and underdeveloped states are likely to come into conflict with demands for immediate economic welfare, and elites' estimations of the unfinished tasks of internal social and national integration.⁸⁸

We are now in a position to suggest a comprehensive definition of political integration as we understand it. This is a process which involves the yielding of specific interests relating to state political viability, so that the forms or structures which maintain (or institutionalise) these interests, and the functions which create these interests are meshed with those of other states in such a manner as to lead to the formation of new structures extraneous to the original ones, but which are, at the same time, hierarchically (in the sense of performance of functional tasks) superior to them. Political integration does not involve the immediate disappearance of original structures and functions, but implies a change in their direction and scope. Seen as a process, rather than an act, it involves the initial retention of original structures by the integrating units, and a process of interaction between these and the new mechanisms, for the purpose of directing the pace and extent of development of interests yielded.

One implication of this definition is that in a system of

⁸⁸ See also on this, Lewis and Singham, "Integration, Domination and the Small State System: The Caribbean", op. cit., p. 125.

political integration, political contention or competition between units and between units and the new structures in some degree remains. This is a key difference between a political integrated system, as we define it, and a system created by an act of unification of institutions or a political system created through absorption, both of which latter imply a strictly hierarchical authority system - the imposition of new structures on original ones so that the latter cease to perform autonomously, any significant political functions. Absorption, for example, requires yielding of interests but not meshing of structures.

The definition of political integration that we suggest appears reasonably similar to, among the many that have emanated from the recent literature, that of Andren. Integration, for him,

"is a process which transforms a system in such a manner that the mutual interdependence of its components is increased. Such an interdependence can exist both between more or less equal components or parties, in fact or in principle, and as a relationship of subordination. In the latter case, however, it must be ensured that the condition of mutuality is fulfilled".⁸⁹

The second remark we would make in the context of our definition is that, while we see the concept of political integration as an organic one in the sense that Brewster and Thomas view the concept of economic integration, we are not sure of its meaningfulness in terms of the mechanics of the initial phase of the integration process. They interpret their organic view of economic integration to entail "the diffusion of attributes of strength and weakness throughout the integral parts of a system. This takes place in such a way that the compensatory

⁸⁹Andren, Nils, "Nordic Integration", Cooperation and Conflict: Nordic Studies in International Politics, no. 1, 1967, pp. 1-25 at p. 5. Emphasis in the original. Andren remarks that "my definition precludes any form of reference to ultimate goals" but seems to meet our point about goals in remarking that "we deal with Nordic integration, which operates on low levels within the systems and the goals of which are rather obscure (p. 6.). We would prefer to say that conflicting goals exist in response to structural integration trends.

balancing of these attributes destroys their localisation and invests each of the components with a potential greater than that of its pre-integrated state. It follows from this that the potential of the integrated system must be greater than the summation of the individual, unintegrated components".⁹⁰ Clearly, the key term here is "potential". But it seems also, that in developing countries of low resource bases, given immediate mass demands on the system, some short term/long term distinction has to be made in attempting to appreciate elite responses to such demands, and therefore the policy approaches to the mechanics of integration.

The point with reference to the political implications of customs unions arrangements, can be made in terms of an historical example - the case of the Zollverein. Where there is a predominant state, interested in economic integration with other states, this - what we have called a pivotal state - may see the short term potential of integration as negative for itself. But it may consciously decide (because it has other than simply reasons of economic gain) to bear, in the short term, these consequences, and allow the gains of integration to go for a period to the smaller, less economically secure states. Thus we are told, in an analysis of the Zollverein, in August 1827, Hesse-Darmstadt, (described earlier as far too small a state to be able to pursue for long an independent commercial policy, let alone to aim at any sort of economic self-sufficiency), approached Prussia about a commercial treaty:

"Motz Prussian Finance Minister was anxious to come to terms. He favoured not a commercial treaty but a customs union between the two countries. He recognised that Prussia would gain few economic advantages from such a union. It would extend the customs frontier to be guarded and would probably involve financial sacrifices. But political

⁹⁰Brewster and Thomas, op. cit., p. 1.

advantages would be secured. Prussia's influence in North Germany would be increased and the efforts to form customs unions in South and Central Germany might be checked. Prussia would also link up her western provinces with the important Federal fortress of Mainz".⁹¹

Again, in estimating the progress of the Zollverein, Henderson remarks that,

"The benefits derived from establishing the Zollverein were felt sooner in South Germany, than in the North. Prussia obtained only a comparatively small extension of markets and this was offset by a decline in customs receipts. Bavaria and Wurrtemberg, however, could now send their products to the populous districts of North Germany. So there was an expansion of Southern industries".⁹²

Thus,

"on the eve of the renewal of the Zollverein treaties ... most of the middle and small states had every reason to be satisfied Prussia's receipts, on the other hand, declined at first ... At each distribution of the Zollverein revenues Prussia made substantial payments to nearly all her fellow-members".⁹³

The writer goes on to observe that there was much criticism of this within Prussia itself, and there ensued a governmental memorandum suggesting that her continuance of the measures would in future be subject to acceptance of the reforms which she proposed.

We want to suggest then, that both political and economic integration, are forms of unbalanced growth or institutionalisation in which compensatory processes and benefits are not necessarily available (or of the required kind) in the short run. A pivotal state like Prussia, secure in its own estimate of its economic potential, interested in the political objectives to be gained from the economic arrangement, and not faced with the problems of universal suffrage, could make a viable

⁹¹Henderson, W.O., The Zollverein (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2nd ed. 1968), p. 51.

⁹²Ibid., p. 138.

⁹³Ibid., pp. 140 and 142.

equation of short term/long term negative and positive consequences.⁹⁴
A less endowed pivotal state like the Ivory Coast, interested also in gaining influence over neighbouring states, resisted integration processes because, for a variety of reasons, it did not feel itself able to make this equation.⁹⁵

Finally, political integration may be unbalanced, though stable in the short term, in the context of a prohibition being placed on the formation of particular inter-country processes and structures whose development may, in the long term, be necessary for the survival of the system. Thus, the condition for the maintenance of the Malaysian Federation laid down to the Singapore leaders by those of Malaya was, in effect, the prohibition of the development of Lee Kwan Yew's Peoples Action Party on the mainland. But here, even the short term compensatory factors available to Singapore were not acceptable, in the sense of being substantial enough to restrain them from breaking the prohibition. In the words of one analyst:

"...the Alliance and the PAP view of the advantages of Malaysia was not the same. For the Alliance, Malaysia was a means for negating the threat posed by leftist Singapore; it made the addition of 1½ million Chinese to the communal balance a practical possibility. For the PAP the advent of Malaysia promised independence, a chance to halt the left-ward drift, and, in that it made a merger possible, offered democratic socialism a chance to expand and survive. The Alliance hoped Malaysia would prolong the Malayan status quo while the PAP had no such illusions".⁹⁶

⁹⁴See also Etzioni, A., Political Unification, p. 299.

⁹⁵See Robson, P., op. cit., pp. 247-249.

⁹⁶Stockwin, Harvey, "Malaysian Approaches", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 5, 1965, pp. 252-4 at p. 253.

If then we view political integration as that set of processes - structures and functions - which connect the structural foundations of 'community' common to a number of units, with new institutions which affect the governmental decision-making structures of those units, we can make the further assertion that: the study of political integration is concerned with the compatibility of the integration mechanisms at any particular point in time; and it is the relationships between those mechanisms that constitute the focus of the study of integration.⁹⁷ It does not seem sufficient to say, as Etzioni remarks of the West Indies, that "The federation that failed never had much of a socio-political basis; it was an administrative structure without a union to support it".⁹⁸ The relevant problem is what are and who provides, the mechanisms for creating and then sustaining the link between the new administrative structure and the socio-political basis. Etzioni would seem to be hinting at this in referring to the necessity for the existence of an "elite-unit" (what we have called a pivotal state) with sufficient will and resources to invest in a federal venture. And to use the concept 'will' is to indicate the necessity for analysis of the perceptions of the elite-unit about the prospects for short-term/long term gains.⁹⁹

In the context of small, underdeveloped states, and small states

⁹⁷We take this to be one of the central themes of Leon Lindberg's "The European Community as a Political System", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, pp. 344-387. See also Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration", International Organization, Vol. 23, 1969, pp. 161-166.

⁹⁸Political Unification, pp. 182-3.

⁹⁹Lindberg raises this problem in his "Pattern and Catalysts in Regional Integration", International Organization, Vol. 19, 1965, pp. 870-884.

whose capacity for economic self-sufficiency as a basis for political viability is in doubt, the problem is two-fold: The first aspect of it relates to the conditions within nation states and in the international system which predispose, or act as a hindrance to, political integration, and the balance between predispositions and impediments at particular points in time. Robson makes allusion to this problem in the context of his discussion of Gambia/Senegal in remarking that "One factor which might cause Gambia to reappraise its attitude would be a decision by the British Government to taper off its substantial budgetary grant-in-aid", noting, however that "this seems a remote possibility".¹⁰⁰

The second aspect involves the process of integration itself. Here three questions seem relevant:

- (1) What are the developmental processes of the system - the processes which lead to the strengthening of the mechanisms and processes of integration;
- (2) What are the disintegrative processes of the system - processes that are either already existing, or are the result of unforeseen consequences of the working of the developmental processes, or are the result of malfunctioning processes. And we argue that both of these sets of processes (1 and 2) will exist within the system at the same time. This can be seen, to take one example, in the kind of relationship that Switzerland has with the European Economic Community. One analyst describes in the following way:

"... le problème qui se pose à la Suisse devant l'intégration européenne s'exprime en termes simples. Car la Confédération n'est pas une nation quelconque fondée sur une unité de sentiment, de religion, de race, de langue - elle est au départ une alliance politique. Des lors, si elle adhère à une Europe intégrée, elle n'aura plus à remplir sa fonction politique et elle se dissoudra tout naturellement dans cet ensemble plus vaste. Le problème se pose ainsi: les avantages

¹⁰⁰ Robson, P., op. cit., p. 287.

supplémentaires dont bénéficieraient les Suisses d'aujourd'hui dans l'Europe intégrée sont-ils suffisants pour justifier la disparition de la Suisse en tant que groupe politique vivant et autonome?"¹⁰¹

(3) What are the adjustment processes of the system - mechanisms designed specifically to counteract disintegrative processes or to balance the pace of developmental processes of distinct subsystems within the integrated system. The adjustment mechanisms are a necessary part of the process of integration. If they fail to work, or come into conflict with developmental processes, disintegration of the system is likely to occur. The choice of adjustment mechanisms becomes important. And we wish to stress here, therefore, the 'artificial' and thus partly 'mechanistic' aspect of the process of integration.¹⁰²

The Impetus to Political Integration

If we assume the existence of community among a group of units in a geographical region, then we can suggest that two processes are required to induce political integration: (i) An institutional or structural spur to integration and (ii) some level of consensus between the elite. Institutional spurs to integration may be of the following kind. There may exist:

(a) A pivotal small state: a state willing to bear the short term costs of integration in view of a variety of estimated long term benefits.

¹⁰¹ Monnier, Claude, "La Suisse n'aurait qu'à mourir..." Part III of a discussion on La Crise de l'intégration Européenne", Journal de Genève, February 6, 1968. For a description of Switzerland's relationships with the different economic groupings in Europe, see "Switzerland in the Setting of EFTA", EFTA Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 5, 1969, pp. 9-14.

¹⁰² 'Mechanistic' or 'artificial' in the sense of involving the necessity for conscious manipulation of adjustment processes and structures.

(b) There may exist an external hegemonist which may persuade a group of small states that it is in their interest and in the interest of order in the international system that they should coalesce. This was, for example, the case of the Malaysian Federation; and the external hegemonist is assisted if, as in this case, there exist certain structural relationships between the states which constrain at least one of them to resist disintegrative processes and subscribe to some level of political integration even when a higher level becomes impossible. Thus even after the ejection of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation, the Prime Minister of Singapore stressed the need for the development of other kinds of political integration relationships with Malaysia, pointing out that "apart from trade considerations, three quarters of Singapore's water supply came from rivers and reservoirs in Johore and only one quarter from Singapore".¹⁰³ Similarly under the secession agreements, the Singapore and Malaysian Governments agreed to engage in what we can call "security integration" in which they agreed,

"(1) to establish a joint defence council for external defence and mutual assistance; (2) that Malaysia would give reasonable and adequate assistance for Singapore's external defence, to which Singapore itself would contribute a reasonable number of units... (3) that the Malaysian Government would continue to maintain military bases within Singapore and would be permitted to use these bases for defence purposes; (4) that neither Government would enter into any treaty or agreement with a foreign country which might be detrimental to the independence and defence of either Government."¹⁰⁴

(c) Integration may be the result of competition for prestige among units within a region, so that a particular unit may attempt to increase its diplomatic strength vis-a-vis some other unit by entering into a process of integration with other units so that it has control over a larger diplomatic field.

¹⁰³Reported remarks of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Keesing's, 1965/66, p. 20892.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 20891

(d) Certain transnational groups of similar ideological persuasion gaining control over the state machines of various units may decide to integrate these units.¹⁰⁵ Conversely, dissensus among the elites controlling state machines becomes a source of concern, especially to pivotal states.¹⁰⁶

(e) A pivotal issue may arise, for example, the loss of the external hegemonist which gave the subordinate system economic or political coherence; similarly, it has been widely acknowledged that the development of perceived threats to the security of the separate units may induce elites to integration. We might note, however, that where, in the contemporary era, a system of external economic hegemony breaks down, the reaction of small states is as likely to be integration as it might be to seek an international systemic solution through assistance from international organisations.

But the impetus to integration can also be seen in terms of the competition, within a state, among politically relevant elites. In small, economically-underdeveloped states whose external orientation is often significantly determined by the kinds of economic transactions in which they are engaged, the economic elite is an important sector in the determination of the mode of political integration engaged in. We can list the following relevant elites:

- (i) The Political elite - governmental and non-governmental
- (ii) The Commercial elite
- (iii) The Manufacturing or Industrial elite
- (iv) The Agricultural elite

¹⁰⁵Kaiser, K., op. cit. pp. 90 ff. refers to the existence of transnational groups (particularly non-governmental ones) involved in integrative relationships as constituting the "transnational society subsystem".

¹⁰⁶See, for one case, "La conference des ministres de l'O.C.A.M. se preoccuper des changements intervenus en Afrique francophone", Le Monde, January 12, 1966.

(v) The Bureaucratic elite

(vi) The Information elite.

Any process of integration, especially at its inception, is likely to be characterised by a series of elite conflicts, differently involved, in particular, in external economic transactions. Thus the balance of advantage among elites becomes a key indicator of the propensity to integration, and of the relationship between integrative and dis-integrative processes. We take one historical example which we think is of relevance to the present. This is the set of disputes within the Zollverein concerning the utility of protectionism as against that of free trade, that occurred between the business elites and factions among the agricultural elite. Disputes within both the bureaucratic elite and the political elite tend to be reflections of conflicts between the politically relevant economic elites. Thus there occurred the "sharp division of opinion between the Prussian Ministry of Finance and the Board of Trade";¹⁰⁷ disputes of this nature, we suggest, are likely to occur in the present.

Conclusion

This discussion of subordinate systems and integration gives rise to the question of the extent to which it can be said that systemic relations in the contemporary period determine the nature of subordinate unit relations within a regional area. In answering it, we have tried to define different kinds of subordinate systems, and have found that we arrive at different conclusions to the question. The Middle East system,

¹⁰⁷Henderson, op. cit., p. 181.

we have suggested, is less dependent on extra-regional inputs as far as the sources of competition and the continuity of competition are concerned. It is, in part, dependent on the extra-regional environment for the level of conflict which the competition gives rise to and can sustain; though two factors make relationships here less asymmetrical than would, at first sight, appear.

First, the subordinate units have a capacity to exploit the competitive relationships between the dominant units in the international society arising from their search for influence within the subordinate system itself, a system which they see as a strategically and economically valuable area. Thus, though there may exist a capabilities-dependence on the part of the subordinate units, we cannot assume that this leads automatically to a power-dependence, in which influence and control are directed solely from dominant unit to subordinate unit (or from dominant system to subordinate system). As long as the terms of the relationships between the dominant units, with respect to issues within this area imply competition between them, then the subordinate units can attain some autonomy relative to them, and attempt to use this autonomy to affect subordinate system relations themselves.

Secondly, within the Middle East system, the levels and kinds of subordination of units are not similar. The main stake of competition itself, Israel, though trade and finance-dependent on certain systems of the international environment, demonstrates some degree of economic autonomy vis-a-vis the other units in the subordinate system. Further, its economic dependence on the international environment is counterbalanced by the weight of political assets that it possesses in that very environment. As one writer has put it, in remarking on one example,

"...a valuable resource available to Israel... is its concerned and generous co-religionists with political influence in the United States. Such friends in important states are precious for more than their material resources,"¹⁰⁸

The other pivotal state in the system, however, Egypt, demonstrates a resource and capabilities dependence on units both within and outside the subordinate system. With respect to dominance of the external environment, however, the capacity of the Egyptian elite to exploit the factor of nationalism as a means of persuasive power and influence-rejection, is significant; but this capacity assumes the maintenance of domestic political efficiency within the state itself. In relation to intra-unit system dependence (we refer here to intra-Arab relations), we find that such dependence does not induce a tendency to integration, since the other units possessing assets of value (for example Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) sustain a view of Egypt as having a "size/power" potential which might, over time, incline that state to attempt to exert control over them. What we find, therefore, is a balance system in which issues are resolved (or left stalemated) in terms of estimations of the utility of particular kinds of assets available to the separate units, and partly in terms of the effects of solutions on the behaviour of the subordinate system as a whole - that is, on the behaviour of Israel relative to the rest of the system.

When we turn to the other subordinate systems which we have considered, we find a greater level of influence from the dominant system on the subordinate system's behaviour, and a greater coherence in the relationships between the two systems. In the Entente system, for example, a processual dependence is fortified by institutional

¹⁰⁸ Fox, Annette B., in a review article "Intervention and the Small State", Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 22, 1968, pp. 247-256 at p. 250.

dependence, so that inclinations to both balance and integration politics are conditioned by the existence and activities of the dominant system; for this latter in large measure gives both units and inter-unit relations coherence. Further, in both the Entente and Caribbean systems, the disparity in size/power between units is not extensive. The regionalist perspective of extra-region dominant units induces a tendency to integration, in spite of inclinations to "national independence" policies. In these systems, policies vary along a continuum between independence with regional cooperation strategies and progressive integration strategies. And the direction in which the subordinate system develops, comes to depend on the extent to which a pivotal state within it wishes to sustain its insistence on the short-term requirements of national coherence, in spite of structural factors tending to diminish the autonomy of the state in international relations, especially in the sphere of economic transactions.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

It has been remarked that "much of our theorizing in international relations focuses upon the most active or influential nations and quite legitimately ignores or depreciates the others".¹ In this essay, we have decided to adopt a different starting-point, and to attempt to view the structures of international society and the behaviour of its dominant members from the perspective of, and in terms of their significance for, the small state. And this itself has implied examining the behaviour of the dominant powers, but in relation to the view that they have of the way in which the presence of small states in the international society affects their own relations and affects their capacities to "order" the international society as they see fit.

But another reason for adopting this perspective is partly empirical. If, as seems to be the tenor of much contemporary analysis, the present period is a "revolutionary" one, leading to re-arrangement of the systems of international society - a period that is the consequence of the significance of essentially two variables, the ideological and the technological, it seems useful to accept Hoffmann's view that a revolutionary period,

"puts the lesser units of world politics... in a position in which they enjoy far more attention and influence than their actual power would justify, precisely because military power becomes only one factor among many".²

¹Singer, J.D. and Small, M., "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940", World Politics, Vol. 18, 1966, p. 247.

²Hoffmann, S., The State of War, p. 187.

And the present analysis is based on the proposition that if the dominant powers themselves attribute 'value' to particular kinds of small states and attempt, as a consequence of this, to influence or control them, then it is important to examine how the small states see their own capacities for taking advantage of this and attempt, as it were, to exert a counter-influence with the objective of optimizing their chances of survival in the contemporary society.

But if we assert the view, as we have done, that small states tend to be in some relationship of dependence on the international environment, in which they begin, as once of the consequences of size, with less weight than other kinds of states, it becomes important in analysis, also to examine the structures and systems of the international environment in which they exist. This is not to say that the behaviour of small states is always system-determined. What we argue is that small states all find themselves in "relationships of adaptedness" within structures of connectedness, and have for themselves to solve the problem of the kinds of "activities of adapting" that are open to them. We admit the predominance of system (and therefore the relevance of systemic analysis), but see the problem of small states as the determination of relevant systemic environments, and the exploitation of the systemic size that they possess or are able to attain to. A fundamental analytical problem then becomes the relation between physical size and systemic size, and the implications of this relation for the autonomy of small states.

In the context of this perspective then, a first concern becomes the analysis of the relationships between various structures of the international environment, such relationships giving rise to international systems, Dominant or high-status units in the society attempt continually to control such systems, and thus to maintain an order in the society

that is favourable to themselves. Two things follow from this. First, the order which the dominant units attempt to impose on the international society, often in competition with each other, may not coincide with the 'natural order' of the systems that derive from structural relationships. The society may be too intractable to control. This is one of the main themes of the present essay: that in spite of technological capabilities for control which the dominant powers possess, it cannot be assumed, and it would not be empirically correct to say, that either of them are capable of creating from the systems of international society, an international political system through which mechanisms of control effectively penetrate. There is a hierarchy of states in the society, but this does not imply that the states at the apex exert continuous control in the areas which concern them. If the latter were, in fact the case, then it would be justifiable to refer to the relations of the international society as constituting those of an administrative international system.

Yet, as we have suggested, particularly in our discussion of the notion of penetration, it is fair to say that the material resources and the technology related to them, which dominant powers possess, does give them a capacity to institutionalise various kinds of presences in, in particular, small states; and it is this fact, (though it is not the only one) which makes the discussion of the viability of small states in the contemporary era perhaps the central theme of the whole essay. Now, it is true, as Herz among others, has suggested that that impermeability of states which was assumed in the past to be the fundamental property of state sovereignty, has, in the era of nuclear weapons particularly, disappeared. All states are, in varying degrees, permeable; and small, underdeveloped states perhaps more so than most. Yet we have suggested that we do not believe that the notion of state autonomy (and thus sovereignty) can be abandoned at this point.

For one of the main characteristics of the new states of the post-war period, is the importance that they attach to the concepts of self-determination and nationalism. Their attachment to them suggests to us that it must be seen as part of the structure - the normative structure - of the systems of international society. It is, for example, impossible to come to an understanding of the events in Indo-China since 1945, unless we include nationalism as an important structural variable. Yet this structural factor is countervailed by others, making an analysis of its significance problematic; hence the utility of attempting to determine the significance of nationalism by attempting, first to distinguish between types of small states in terms, both of the extent of their dependence on and linkages with the international environment, and of the extent of what we have called their domestic political efficiency.

The latter we view with some significance in terms, particularly, of the importance that small, and particularly the new, states attach to the problem of boundary-maintenance. If, as Stanley Hoffmann has asserted in the context of a discussion of the events in Indo-China, a fundamental characteristic of major states' attitudes and activities towards small states is their "devaluation of borders, of the national fact",³ when some of the dominant states at least attach such importance to the notion of sovereignty, then we are constrained to analyse the relationship between domestic political efficiency and the capacity of small states to inhibit "aggression" or invasion, from whichever sources this may come. And this leads us to the immediate conclusion that such dominant-power devaluation is itself reflective of a structural problem - the incapacity of small states inheriting artificial boundaries that are the consequence

³In "No More Vietnams?" Part I, The Atlantic, p. 116.

of imperial administration, to sustain social coherence within these boundaries.⁴ This could not be viewed, historically, as an abnormal phenomenon, were it not for the fact that the technology of communications which dominant powers possess, and the ideological competition between them, induces a greater awareness among them of possible effects upon their own existences and statuses, of events in parts of the world that might, previously, have been considered geographically, and in terms of communications (both physical and informational) distant. (We do not suggest here, however, that the new technology of communications necessarily implies greater organisation or connectedness between all the units in the international society, making the global society virtually an organic whole.)

The incapacity for maintaining social coherence, and by extension, domestic political efficiency, has at least two, somewhat contrary effects. First small-state actors' recognition of their deficiencies in this respect inclines them to "security-dependence" on the international environment and on the powers dominant in that environment. External relations (systemic linkages) then have, as one of their primary functions the maintenance of the internal security of the states; hence the immense penetration of governmental institutions and processes. Now this is not necessarily to be seen in terms of a "conspiracy" of governmental elites to maintain offices which they occupy; we prefer to see it, especially in situations where imperial powers have had a long sojourn of occupation in the regions of which small states are now

⁴We use "artificial" here not merely in the sense of "not organically evolved", but in the sense of not evolved, organically or through imposition, as a consequence of historical developments particular to the states themselves, or to the geographical regions of which the societies may have constituted a part. Boundary formation had, in other words, little to do with forces or events peculiar to the societies or regions.

constituted, as an aspect of "culture-dominance": elites are unable to perceive alternative strategies for maintaining the coherence of the entities for which they have assumed responsibility.

On the other hand, where a society is not cohesive, and its government politically inefficient, dominant powers even where they have engaged in a degree of penetration, are unable, as Binder has suggested in the case of Syria, to consistently exercise influence; they are unable to organise a directive system, given the fractioned character of the society's social and political relations. The converse of this would appear to hold: where a government is unable to maintain domestic efficiency, and accepts penetration, the exercise of influence and control throughout the society is possible. The tendencies of population and even middle-level elites to view penetration as legitimate or illegitimate, and the responsiveness of governments to these tendencies, become important indicators of the possibilities for dominant-state influence and control, and thus of, in one of its aspects, the viability of the state.

The pervasiveness of penetration by dominant states and the institutions in the international environment that they control, raises the question of the utility of political integration as a viable strategy for maintaining some semblance of small-state autonomy. Political integration among states in some geographical zone takes place, as we have suggested in the previous chapter, in a context of systemic subordination. Structural forces, which may not even be acceptable to small states concerned with the stabilisation of the 'national' entity, nevertheless induce some level of integration among these states. Multinational corporations concerned with the maximization of profit (an aspect of the international environment to which we have, perhaps, not paid sufficient attention in this essay) tend to undertake their

operations on a regional level at least, and are thus favourably inclined to strategies of regional political integration. It is an open question whether economic forces of this kind make regional political integration the optimum strategy for attaining the 'satisficing' of the peoples who constitute the small states that exist.

Finally, it is at least implied in the discussion above, that the problems we have raised concerning the relationship between linkages between small states and dominant units in the international environment, and the scope for the development of state viability, open up the practical question of the future of the small state as a viable entity, and the theoretical one of the usefulness of using the notion of small state as a meaningful focus of analysis. We have suggested that the mere presence of a myriad of small states in the contemporary society constitutes a problem of both practice and analysis; and that it is useful to approach the problem in the way that we have as long as we see the small state in the context of its systemic environment, and ask: what capacity has the entity, given its linkages with the environment and a necessary dependence, for exploitation of the systemic size that it may attain, and for exploitation of the unconnectedness of the systems of international relations that arises partly as a consequence of the competition for influence of the existing dominant powers?

But we must also view the problems arising from small statehood as arising from the necessity of small conglomerations of peoples, perceiving themselves as communities and then as nations, to effect some institutional solution to the problem of self-rule - the right of self-determination. The solution, stretching into the contemporary period, has been that of statehood, and the paraphernalia that goes with it. In the contemporary period, some of the reality of self-rule

- as statehood - has been swept away. Populations and political analysts have begun to ask themselves what precisely is the extent of the 'community' that calls itself a 'nation' and then attempts to transform nationhood into statehood; and whether what today we call 'the state' is the best institutional expression of community and its right to self-determination; what, in other words, is the relationship between scale and self-determination. For self-determination remains the ideal, and in the words of Max Weber, political theory,

"can be nothing but a more profound understanding of temporal action, a reflection upon the conditions within which our desires are expressed and an analysis of political choices in their relation both to reality and to our ideal".

APPENDIX I

U.S. DEFENCE COMMITMENTS AND ASSURANCES

Department of State, August 1966*

1. Provisions of Treaties and Other Formal Agreements
 - A. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945
 - B. Western Hemisphere
 1. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact), Sept. 2, 1947.
 2. Applicability of North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949.
 3. Bilateral Agreements
 - a. Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark, Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Concerning the Defence of Greenland, April 27, 1951.
 - b. Defence Agreement Pursuant to North Atlantic Treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951.
 - c. North American Air Defence, Command Agreement Effected by Exchange of Notes, United States-Canada, May 12, 1958.
 - d. General Treaty Between the United States and Panama, March 2, 1936.

*Presented as part of a statement by the Department of State in Worldwide Military Commitments, Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 89th Congress, 2nd Session, August 25-30, 1966, Part I, pp. 11-13.

1. C. EUROPE

1. North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949.
2. Joint Declaration Concerning the Renewal of the Defence Agreement of Sept. 26, 1953, United States-Spain, Sept. 26, 1963.

D. NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EAST

1. Applicability of North Atlantic Treaty since 1952.
2. United States Membership in CENTO Committees.
3. Bilateral Agreements
 - a. Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Imperial Government of Iran, March 5, 1959.
 - b. Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Turkey, March 5, 1959.

E. AFRICA

Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Liberia, July 8, 1959.

F. South ASIA

1. United States Membership in CENTO Committees.
2. Membership of the United States and Pakistan in SEATO.
3. Agreement of Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Pakistan, March 5, 1959.

G. SOUTH-EAST ASIA-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

1. Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954.
2. Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS Pact), Sept. 1, 1951.
3. Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Phillipines, Aug. 30, 1951.

H. EAST ASIA

1. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan, Jan. 19, 1960.
2. Mutual Defence Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954.
3. Mutual Defence Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, Oct. 1, 1953.

II. Provisions of Official Declarations

A. Western Hemisphere

1. Seventh Annual Message of President Monroe to Congress ("The Monroe Doctrine"), Dec. 2, 1823.
2. Statement by the Dept. of State on the Monroe Doctrine, July 14, 1960.
3. The Ogdensburg Agreement: Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister MacKenzie King of Canada, Aug. 18, 1940.
4. Joint Announcement on Defence, United States-Canada, Feb. 12, 1947.
5. Joint Statement at Washington by Pres. Kennedy and President Betancourt of Venezuela, Feb. 20, 1963.

B. EUROPE

1. Statement by President Eisenhower on United States Policy towards the Western European Union, March 10, 1955.
2. Communique, North Atlantic Council Ministerial Session, Athens, May 6, 1962.
3. Final Act, London Nine-Power Conference, Declaration by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, Oct. 3, 1954.
4. Statement by President Kennedy Regarding Berlin, in Address to the Nation, July 25, 1961.
5. Address by Vice-President Johnson before the West Berlin House of Representatives, Aug. 19, 1961.
6. Statement by Secretary of State Rusk Regarding Berlin, in Address at Davidson College, Feb. 22, 1962.

7. Joint Communique, President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer of Germany, Nov. 15, 1962.
8. Joint Communique, President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard of Germany, June 12, 1964.

C. NEAR EAST-MIDDLE EAST

1. Message of President Trueman to Congress ("The Trueman Doctrine"), March 12, 1947.
2. Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East ("The Eisenhower Doctrine"), March 9, 1957.
3. Tripartite Declaration (United States-United Kingdom-France) regarding Security in the Near East, May 25, 1950.
4. Multilateral Declaration respecting the Baghdad Pact, July 28, 1958.
5. Joint Communique, President Kennedy and the Shah of Iran (Mohammed Reza Pahlavi), Washington, April 13, 1962.
6. Letter from President Kennedy to Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Oct. 25, 1962.
7. Statement on Jordan and Saudi Arabia by Secretary of State Rusk, in a News Conference, March 8, 1963.
8. Reply by President Kennedy to a News Conference Question concerning the Middle East, May 8, 1963.
9. Remarks of President Johnson during Exchange of Toasts with President Shazar of Israel, Aug. 2, 1966.

- D. AFRICA /No assurances by Congress, President, Vice-President or Secretary of State of which the Department of State is aware/.

E. SOUTH ASIA

1. Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Nehru of India, Feb. 24, 1954.
2. Assurances to Pakistan Respecting the Extension of Military Assistance to India: Statement by the Dept. of State, Nov. 17, 1962.

F. SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf Resolution), Aug. 10, 1964.

2. Joint Communique, Sec. Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Koman [Thailand] March 6, 1962.
3. Declaration of Honolulu, Feb. 8, 1966.

G. EAST ASIA

1. Joint Resolution Authorizing the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores and Related Positions and Territories of that Area (Formosa Straits Resolution), Jan. 29, 1955.
2. Statement on Formosa and the offshore Islands by President Kennedy in a Press Conference, June 27, 1962.
3. Reply to Question at Press Conference in Korea by Vice-President Humphrey, Feb. 23, 1966.¹

H. SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

- L. Joint Communique, President Johnson and President Macapagal (Phillipenes), Oct. 6, 1964.

¹"The United States Government and the people of the United States have a firm commitment to the defence of Korea. As long as there is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarcation line, the whole and entire power of the United States of America is committed to the security and defence of Korea. Korea today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. We are allies, we are friends, you should have no questions, no doubts.
[Korea Times, Feb. 24, 1966. World wide Military Commitments, p. 29.]

APPENDIX II

DEGREE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
CRISES AND CRITICAL SITUATIONS, 1961 to MID-1966

(Presented as part of a Statement by Dean Rusk)*1

A. Direct Involvement

1. Vietnamese Struggle with Viet Minh and Viet Cong (1945-) - Partial (from 1950) to direct (from 1954) involvement as supplier of military assistance, military advisers, then combat troops at the request of the Republic of Vietnam.
2. Berlin (1948-) - Direct involvement as one of four occupying powers under 1945-194 quadripartite agreements.
3. Communist Chinese threat to Formosa Straits (1950-) - Direct involvement under Truman (1950) and Eisenhower (1953) instructions to U.S. Seventh Fleet and Formosa Resolution (1955).
4. Korea (1950-) - Direct involvement as a principal contributor of forces under U.N. command during Korean War and to present.
5. Bay of Pigs episode (1961-) - Direct Involvement as unofficial, partial protector of invasion force.
6. Panamanian-United States dispute over conditions in and administration of the Canal Zone (1962-1966) - Direct involvement as party to the dispute; OAS and U.N. action, bilateral negotiations.
7. Cuban missile crisis (1962-1963) - Direct involvement as power enforcing OAS quarantine on shipment of missiles to Cuba.
8. Cambodian complaint of border violations by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces (1964-) - Direct involvement as a party named in complaint; U.N. action.
9. Stanleyville (Congo) rebel mistreatment of European prisoners (1964) - Direct involvement in bringing matters to UN attention and in providing air-lift for Belgian para-commando reserve mission.

*Worldwide Military Commitments, Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 89th Congress 2nd Session, Aug. 25-30, 1966. Part 1 (U.S. Washington GPO, 1966).

¹This list does not include temporary crises brought about by coups d'etat (e.g. the Syrian Army coup of 1962) or by internal rebellion (e.g. the result of the Kurds in Iraq in 1962).

10. Dominican crisis (1965-1966) - Direct involvement through initial action to stabilize the situation; contributor to OAS peace force.

B. No Direct Involvement or only Limited Involvement

11. South African treatment of Indian minority (1946) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
12. India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir (1948-) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
13. Arab-Israel dispute (1948-) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
14. Netherlands-Indonesian dispute over West New Guinea (West Irian) (1949-1962) - No direct involvement; U.N. action; U.S. Good Offices.
15. South African Apartheid policy (1952-) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
16. Algerian independence movement (1954-1962) - No direct involvement; U.N. action; bilateral French-Algerian negotiations.
17. Disputed claim of Sultan of Muscat over Imam of Oman (1955-) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
18. Laotian struggle with Viet Minh-supported Pathet Lao (1959-) - Partial involvement as co-signer of 1962 Geneva agreements.
19. Tibetan revolt against Communist China (1959-1961) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
20. Congo crisis over secession of Katanga Province (1960-1964) - No direct involvement; U.S. financial contribution to air and carriage of U.N. power in the Congo.
21. Dominican Republic abuse of human rights (1960-1962) - No direct involvement; OAS action.
22. Threat of Castro Government of Cuba to political stability in the Western Hemisphere (1961-) - No direct involvement; OAS action.
23. Portuguese violation of human rights in Angola (1961-) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
24. Kuwait complaint of threat from Iraq (1961) - No direct involvement; U.N. and Arab League action.

25. French-Tunisian crisis over Bizerta (1961) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
26. Indian seizure of Portuguese colonies in India (1961) - No direct involvement; U.N. action.
27. Sino-Indian border war (1962-1963) - Partial involvement as supplier of increased military aid to India.
28. United Arab Republic - Saudi Arabian intervention in Yemen (1962-1965) - No direct involvement.
29. Southern Rhodesian apartheid policy and move to independence (1962-) - Partial involvement to the extent of implementing the oil embargo and refusing to purchase Southern Rhodesian sugar; U.K.-Southern Rhodesian negotiation; U.N. action.
30. Venezuelan-British Guianian border dispute (1962) - No direct involvement; U.N. Good Offices.
31. Cambodian-Thai dispute (1962-1963) - No direct involvement; U.N. Good offices.
32. Malaysian-Indonesian conflict (1963-1966) - Partial involvement in arranging cease-fire and supplying good-offices mission; U.N. action; multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
33. Haitian complaint of threats from the Dominican Republic (1963) - No direct involvement; OAS and U.N. action.
34. Algerian-Moroccan border dispute (1963-1964) - No direct involvement; O.A.U. action.
35. Greek-Turkish-Cypriot dispute (1963) - Partial involvement as principal financial contributor to U.N. peacekeeping force and through efforts to promote a peaceful settlement.
36. Somalian-Ethiopian border dispute (1964-) - No direct involvement; OAU action.
37. Indian-Pakistani conflict in Rahn of Kutch (1965) - No direct involvement.

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