

**CAN VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS SUCCESSFULLY  
ENGAGE WITH THE NEW DEAL FOR YOUNG PEOPLE?**

**A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester  
for the degree of PhD in the Faculty of Humanities**

**2007**

**ANDROULLA SOTERI-PROCTOR**

**SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

ProQuest Number: 10954456

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10954456

Published by ProQuest LLC (2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.


This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

(ETHG-9)

~~TH~~ 3106Z

✓



## Contents

List of Tables and Figures	4
Abstract	5
Declaration	6
Acknowledgements	7
Glossary	8
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>1 The New Deal for Young People employment programme</b>	<b>15</b>
1.1 The wider context	15
1.2 The Main Features of the NDYP	16
1.2.1 <i>The NDYP framework</i>	17
1.2.2 <i>The overall structure of the NDYP</i>	21
1.2.3 <i>The NDYP in Greater Manchester</i>	26
1.3 Existing Research on the New Deal Employment Programmes	27
<b>2 The voluntary sector</b>	<b>32</b>
2.1 Defining the Voluntary Sector	32
2.2 Research on Assessing Voluntary Organisations' Missions	34
<b>3 The method</b>	<b>43</b>
3.1 Research Aims	43
3.2 Research Approach	45
3.2.1 <i>Rational for qualitative approach</i>	45
3.2.2 <i>Sample and sampling frame</i>	47
3.2.3 <i>Semi-structured interviews</i>	51
3.2.4 <i>The pilot</i>	55
<b>4 The Voluntary Organisation Individual Placement Providers</b>	<b>56</b>
4.1 IPP Pen portraits	56
4.1.1 <i>Types of organisation</i>	72
4.2 Contractual Arrangements	79
4.2.1 <i>The length of the NDYP work placement</i>	79
4.2.2 <i>Money</i>	80
4.2.3 <i>IPPs' responsibilities</i>	81
4.3 Reasons for engagement	82
4.4 Types of work	87
4.5 Conclusions	92



<b>5</b>	<b>The Benefits</b>	<b>94</b>
5.1	Instrumental Benefits	95
5.1.1	<i>Indirect instrumental benefits</i>	95
5.1.2	<i>Direct instrumental benefits</i>	99
5.2	Determinant factors	113
5.3	Other Benefits	123
5.3.1	<i>Young New Dealer Beneficiaries</i>	123
5.3.2	<i>Continued benefits</i>	125
5.3.3	<i>Diversification of the workforce</i>	126
5.3.4	<i>Money</i>	129
5.4	Conclusions	130
<b>6</b>	<b>The Problems</b>	<b>132</b>
6.1	Young New Dealers	132
6.1.1	Attendance and time keeping	132
6.1.2	Work skills	136
6.1.3	Personal problems and personal and social skills	139
6.2	Variations of success and contributory factors for this	143
6.2.1	Pattern and frequency of types of problem	144
6.2.2	Variation of impact	146
6.3	Structural and operational aspects of the programme	156
6.3.1	<i>Recruitment</i>	156
6.3.2	<i>Disciplinary procedures</i>	161
6.3.3	<i>Training</i>	168
6.3.4	<i>Change</i>	174
6.4	Conclusions	181
<b>7</b>	<b>Discussion</b>	<b>183</b>
7.1	Overall levels of success	183
7.1.1	<i>Successful Outcomes</i>	186
7.1.2	<i>Variable and unsuccessful outcomes</i>	190
7.2	Continued engagement with the programme	194
7.2.1	<i>Active Organisations</i>	195
7.2.2	<i>Passive Organisations</i>	197
7.2.3	<i>Organisations that no longer engaged</i>	200
7.3	Sustained engagement with the programme	205
7.3.1	<i>If the programme remains the same</i>	205
7.3.2	<i>If the programme changes</i>	207
	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>212</b>
	Bibliography	221
	Appendix A Interview schedule	228

Word count: 87, 325

## Tables and Figures

Table 2.1	Summary and illustration of frequently used terms in impact assessments	38
Table 4.1	IPPS' key characteristics and their relation to the NDYP programme	71
Table 4.2	Service organisations' primary missions	73
Table 4.3	Organisations' initial involvement with the NDYP programme	83
Table 4.4	Proactive organisations' reasons for involvement	83
Table 4.5	List of New Deal jobs offered by the voluntary organisation IPPs	88
Table 5.1	Type of instrumental benefit gained from the organisation IPPs	95
Table 5.2	Summary of indirect benefits	98
Table 5.3	Frequency of direct benefit by type of organisation	99
Table 5.4	Summary list of <i>direct</i> benefits by type of organisation	109
Table 5.5	The work available to young New Dealers by type of organisation	114
Table 5.6	Determinant factors for gaining instrumental benefits by type of organisation	122
Table 6.1	List of problems to do with young New Dealers	143
Table 6.2	Frequency of problems by type of organisation	144
Table 6.3	Summary of impact of problems by types of organisation	155
Table 6.4	Problems to do with structure and operation of the NDYP programme	181
Table 7.1	Overall levels of success	185
Table 7.2	Overall levels of success by type of organisation	193
Table 7.3	Summary of factors that contributed towards overall levels of success	193
Table 7.4	Continuation with the programme by type of work and level of success	194
Table 7.5	Summary of the organisations continued engagement with the programme	203
Figure 1	Organisations and work-skills training	168
Figure 2	Flow diagram on whether or not organisations are likely to sustain engagement	211

## **Abstract**

The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) is one of the government welfare-to-work programmes. The primary aim of these programmes is to help long-term unemployed people improve their employability skills so that they can move into non-subsidized work. They are being delivered through 'forged' partnerships with the public, private and voluntary sectors. Unique compared with other partners, the voluntary sector has the additional aim of delivering social benefits to the community.

Despite a plethora of research undertaken on the NDYP programme, there are few studies that look at the voluntary sector's engagement with the programme. In my research I examined the extent to which voluntary organisations offering temporary employment opportunities on the NDYP could deliver the aims of the programme and gain (sustained) success by advancing their own missions; and, thereby, deliver additional social benefits to the community. I undertook semi-structured interviews with staff from 29 different voluntary organisations in Greater Manchester.

My research findings demonstrate that despite almost all of the organisations in my study gaining a multitude of diverse benefits that contributed significantly (directly and indirectly) towards their missions, in most cases the organisations also experienced problems with the programme. This is because the young New Dealers placed in their organisations lacked fundamental work, personal and social skills and in extreme cases had severe personal and social problems. More often than not, the level of the disruptions arising from problematic young New Dealers and the resources necessary to support them turned out to be far greater than the organisations had originally anticipated. Subsequently many of the organisations found it necessary to use their own already-stretched resources to support their engagement with the programme. Even worse, in some cases, the disruptions were a direct impediment towards fulfilling the organisations' missions.

In spite of disruptions caused by problematic young New Dealers, some of the organisations still managed to gain net benefits from their engagement with the programme. In the main, this tended to be the organisations that obtained sufficient additional amounts of money from the programme to hire extra staff who could support the young New Dealers. These were cases in which the programme operated at its best: the organisations were able to provide a variety of work opportunities to the young New Dealers and benefit from this. Without sufficient external resources, the organisations most able to gain net benefits were those that offered unskilled manual work that could contribute significantly towards their missions. Most of the organisations in my study, however, neither obtained sufficient external resources nor did they have the option to offer unskilled manual work that could contribute significantly towards their mission. In these cases, they could still benefit if they were fortunate to be in receipt of good quality young New Dealers. Given the mix of young New Dealers, this was not a sustainable option.

To conclude, my findings illustrate that for the voluntary organisations to provide the opportunities of meaningful employment and to increase the young New Dealers' employability skills (the primary aim of the programme), they need stable and sufficient external resources. Once these resources are in place, the organisations can get on with delivering their missions and thereby deliver the second aim of the programme: social benefits to their communities.

**Declaration**

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning

**COPYRIGHT STATEMENT**

1. Copyright in text of this thesis rests with the author. Copies (by any process) either in full, or extracts, may be made only in accordance with instruction by the author and lodged in the John Rylands University Library of Manchester. Details may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made. Further copies (by any process) of copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the permission (in writing) of the author
2. The ownership of any intellectual property rights which may be described in this thesis is vested in The University of Manchester, subject to any prior agreement to the contrary, and may not be made available for use by third parties without the written permission of the University, which will prescribe the terms and conditions of any such agreement
3. Further information on the conditions under which disclosures and exploitation may take place is available from the Head of School of Science

**Acknowledgements**

Andy, thank you for being the breadwinner, for encouraging me when I have been down and for your love and support. Thanks to Rebecca whose encouragement for me to finish my doctor of 'Bilosoby' kept me going. To Peter Halfpenny for his guidance, support, pastoral care (and the occasional tissue). To my mum and dad who have supported me in more ways than I would like to admit; but whose support is so valued. To Frances and Ted who gave me a place to stay, for feeding me and for listening to my constant moans. To Hazel who was good enough to read random chapters in a very short space of time and for her comments. To Angela for her help in producing my flow diagram. Finally, I'd like to thank all the participants in my study.

In memory of my gran, yiayia Pinou.

## **Glossary**

DSS	Department of Social Security
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions
DfEE	Department of Education and Employment
ES	Employment Service
ETFO	Environmental Task Force Option
FTETO	Full-time Education and Training Option
IPPs	Individual Placement Providers
NDPA	New Deal Personal Advisor
NDYP	New Deal for Young People
UD	Units of Delivery
VSO	Voluntary Sector Option

## Introduction

In this thesis I examine the extent to which voluntary sector organisations can sustain engagement with the government employment initiative the New Deal for Young People (NDYP). In particular, I focus on whether or not the organisations can advance their missions by offering temporary employment opportunities to young New Deal participants, and sustain that advance over time.

The NDYP is one of several welfare-to-work programmes. These programmes are a central component of the government's wider mission to reduce social exclusion and promote social inclusion (2005). The concept social exclusion came to prominence in UK politics with New Labour in the 'nineties.<sup>1</sup> The definition and the usefulness of this concept has been the subject of intense debate. Generally, however, it is used to refer to individuals, groups and neighbourhoods who experience multiple disadvantages across a variety of aspects of their lives. The factors and the emphasis of what constitute social exclusion are highly contested and can include aspects such as: health; crime; education; employment; and social, economic and political participation (for a discussion, see for example, Percy-Smith 2000; Hills et al. 2002; Byrne 2005).

The government's description(s) of the concept tend to oscillate between the cause and effect of disadvantage across different aspects of life. To illustrate, the Social Exclusion Unit (that was specifically set up to identify issues and develop policies to tackle exclusion and poverty in England)<sup>2</sup> describes social exclusion as a consequence of interconnected disadvantages:

... a shorthand label for what happens when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low income, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown  
(SEU 1997: 1 cited in Percy-Smith 2000: 4)

The government clearly considers it to be a multidimensional concept; going beyond disadvantages associated purely with income and expenditure. Nevertheless economic

---

<sup>1</sup> Briefly, in politics the use of social exclusion can be traced to continental Europe during the '70s and '80s whereby French politicians used the term 'les exclus' (the excluded) to refer to individuals who fell through the net of the Bismarckian social insurance system. For some, however, the term is traced even further back to the German social theorist Weber who referred to social closure as a process in which one group secures a privileged position at the expense of another. For further discussion see Burchardt et al. 2002

<sup>2</sup> These responsibilities are devolved and other units with different names have been set up elsewhere in the UK

factors, particularly low income and long-term unemployment, are considered to be central contributory factors to poverty and disadvantage. This view is expounded in the government's Green Paper Towards full employment in modern society (2001) in which long-term unemployment is said to be 'causally linked' with a variety of social, health and economic inequalities such as: poverty and insecurity; poor health (both mental and physical); and, in some cases, premature death.

Moreover, the government considers social exclusion to be a serious problem that transcends the excluded and threatens society at large. To illustrate, the government views 'worklessness' or 'inactivity' as a problem that society is paying for both economically and socially in terms of, for example, lost revenue from taxes, higher spending on benefits, higher debt repayments and other related issues, such as high crime rates (Ogbonna and Noon 1999; HM Treasury 2001).

In response to these concerns, the government has introduced an array of policy initiatives to tackle a variety of disadvantages with the aim to reduce social exclusion. Some of the core policy initiatives include: Welfare-to-Work programmes with the primary aim to increase employability skills (see chapter 1); the Sure Start programme that provides intervention during the early years of childhood to prevent social exclusion in the future (Clarke 2006); Health Action Zones and Education Action Zones to help reduce and prevent inequalities in health and education (see, for example, Barnes and Sullivan 2002; Dickson et al. 2002); and initiatives to reduce teenage pregnancy and barriers to education and employment for teenage mothers (see, for example, Bullen et al. 2000). Whilst these initiatives are explicitly aimed towards reducing social exclusion, they (and other initiatives) are part of the government's broader vision to create an 'inclusive society'.

What this inclusive society ought to look like and how it should be achieved, if at all, is highly contested (see, for example, Byrne 2005; Levitas 2005). For the government, and in particular the Prime Minister Tony Blair, the idea of an inclusive society is heavily influenced by communitarian perspectives about the individual and society in which individuals have duties and obligations to develop what is sometimes referred to as 'civic' and 'civil' society (Deacon 2000; Alcock and Scott 2002). Indeed, reference



to terms such as 'individual rights and responsibilities', and 'citizenship' frequently recur throughout government reports and speeches.

At the heart of everything New Labour stands for is the theme of rights and responsibilities. For every right we enjoy, we owe responsibilities ... you can take but you give too. That basic value informs New Labour policy.

(Blair 1996 cited in Deacon 2000: 11)

This underpins a wider philosophy about the importance of an inclusive or civil society whereby individuals acting collectively can help tackle social problems.

social problems of modern societies can only be addressed when citizens acting collectively in their local communities take on the responsibility for identifying and meeting social needs through voluntary action. Citizens therefore have responsibilities and obligations for giving, as well as getting; in acting collectively to do this, they forge new social relations between the sector and the market...

(Blair 1998a cited in Alcock and Scott 2002: 114)

The Labour government considers the voluntary and community sectors to be well placed to encourage and promote civil renewal and citizen participation within communities and they are considered to be key players in the delivery of government initiatives working towards this (Alcock and Scott 2002; HM Treasury 2002). This is epitomized in the government's introduction of the 1998 Compact: although this initiative is not legally endorsed, local authorities are strongly encouraged to work in partnership with local agencies that engage in civil renewal, and explicitly referred to the voluntary and community sector (Home Office 1998; Lewis 1999a).<sup>3</sup>

Partnership working has become a central vehicle in the delivery of government initiatives. Indeed, it is part of the government's "Third Way" politics to modernise the British Welfare State (Giddens 1997; Blair 1998b). It is, however, by no means a new phenomenon. Partnership, in the loose sense of the word, between the state and other sectors has existed for centuries (Giddens 1997; Lewis 1999a; Lewis 1999b; Alcock and Scott 2002). In the case of the voluntary sector, scholars have traced its involvement in the delivery of welfare provisions as far back as the 1601 Poor Law (Powell and Glendinning 2002). Furthermore, up to the mid-20th century the voluntary sector was considered to be an important provider of basic welfare provisions (Lewis 1999a). With the creation of the post-war welfare state, however, its role and visibility diminished: the government took on the primary role for the delivery of welfare services to citizens, and the voluntary sector took on a more junior role (Craig and Taylor 2002). Despite

---

<sup>3</sup> A variety of literature about Compacts can be found on the National Council for Voluntary Organisation's website: <http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/compactadvocacy>

these changes, the voluntary (and other) sectors have continued to provide welfare services alongside and sometimes in opposition to the state.

It is now widely recognised, of course, that despite the 'welfare state' reforms of the mid-20th century, which established the major public services for health, housing, education, income support and social care in the UK, there has always been a mix of providers – public, private and voluntary – supplying welfare services to citizens. This variation is usually referred to as the 'mixed economy of welfare'

(Alcock and Scott 2002: 113)

In the late 20th century, the voluntary sector's role in the delivery of welfare provisions moved back to the centre when the Conservative government attempted to 'draw them into a market of welfare suppliers' (Halfpenny and Reid 2002: 549). During the Thatcher administration a neo-liberal market-based approach to governing the country, including the Welfare State, was adopted and voluntary organisations, amongst other agencies, were invited to compete for contracts to deliver welfare services. This is an era that has commonly been referred to as New Public Management and the contract-culture (Deakin 2000). The emphasis on the voluntary sector's engagement was arguably an economic one in which, for example, partnership was seen as getting 'more for less' (6 and Leat 1996; Lewis 1999a; Alcock and Scott 2002). Indeed, this is illustrated in the title of a government review of partnership between these sectors, *Efficiency Scrutiny of Government Funding of the Voluntary Sector. Profiting from Partnership* (Home Office 1990).

The Labour government has continued the theme of partnership working in the delivery of welfare provisions and there has been an increased and explicit emphasis on the additional social dimension of working with the voluntary and community sectors. Indeed, voluntary organisations are one of the partners in the delivery of the welfare-to-work programme and they are seen as having the additional (albeit ill-defined) advantage of benefiting communities (Scott et al. 2002).

Partnership between these sectors is not without problems. For instance, whilst scholars have recognised that partnership work can bring about benefits to the sector such as an increased availability of funding opportunities, equally there are discussions about the negative impact this can have on the sector. For example, there are discussions about the voluntary and community sector organisations' ability to engage effectively with local and central government initiatives, in which the latter have tended to be the more powerful in terms of setting the agenda, dictating conditions, and being the source of

funds (Craig and Taylor 2002). Other problems include: the erosion of diversity and independence of the sector; a shift from working with marginalised groups and other individuals that may reduce their ability to meet outcome targets; and being distracted from delivering their mission in an attempt to achieve required activities and administrative duties for government funded projects.<sup>4</sup> For example, the sheer volume of administration necessary to engage with a government employment initiative almost led to the demise of a voluntary organisation because it distracted them from achieving their core objective of recruiting volunteers (Osborne and Ross 2000).

Several of these and other concerns about voluntary-state relations are discussed in a report produced by what is commonly referred to as the Deakin commission (NCVO 1996). Despite the recognition of a diverse sector that is difficult to define, this report recommends a 'concordat' between the sectors in which the interest of the voluntary and community sectors is supported and not compromised through partnerships with local and central government. This report has been subject to criticism and questions raised about the practicalities of the recommendations (for further discussions, see for example, 6 and Leat 1996; Lewis 1999a; Alcock and Scott 2002). Nevertheless, the Labour government has heavily referenced this report in its promotion of partnership work with the voluntary and community sectors. Furthermore in print, at least, the government has stipulated that such partnerships should not compromise the characteristics of the voluntary and community sectors (Labour Party 1997). However, as several scholars have pointed out, the recognition of this does not, in itself, resolve problems arising with partnership; that problems with partnership (whether it be with government or others) are entrenched in factors associated with, for example, historical relations and the imbalance of resources and power (Balloch and Taylor 2001; Glendinning et al. 2002).

My own study investigates the extent to which voluntary sector organisations can sustain engagement with the NDYP welfare-to-work programme. In particular, I examine whether or not they can advance their mission(s) by offering temporary employment opportunities to young New Deal participants. In essence, the aim of the

---

<sup>4</sup> A review of reports that discuss a range of concerns and implications about voluntary-statutory partnerships can be found in Halfpenny and Reid, 2002.

study is to examine voluntary sector organisations' ability to engage with government employment initiatives that are set within a framework of tackling social exclusion (and to promoting social inclusion). It is not the intention to examine the voluntary sector's ability to combat social exclusion. The findings have implications for the government's aim to deliver welfare-to-work programmes through the voluntary sector.

## **1 The New Deal for Young People employment programme**

In this chapter I describe the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) employment programme. I divide the chapter into three main sections. In the first section, I provide a brief introduction to the NDYP in its wider context of the New Deal employment initiatives. I then move on more specifically to discuss the main features of the NDYP programme. In the final section, I close the chapter with a rapid overview of the research on the NDYP programme; particularly those to do with the voluntary sector.

### **1.1 The wider context**

Turning first to the wider context of the NDYP, this is one of several New Deal employment initiatives<sup>5</sup> that aim to move individuals from welfare dependency and into non-subsidised employment. Initially, there were six programmes. These are the New Deal for: Young People; 25 Plus; Lone Parents; Partners of Unemployed People; Disabled People; and 50 Plus. Since this time, there has been an additional programme, the New Deal for Musicians. Some of these programmes are mandatory and others are optional. To recall from the introduction, these programmes are at the core of the government's broader mission to reduce social exclusion and to increase social inclusion. Indeed, despite the various policy initiatives introduced since the Labour government's administration, a central thread throughout has been a concern about the economically inactive and the importance of moving people into work (DTLGR 2002; HM Treasury 2004). Indeed, employment is considered to be one of the solutions to poverty and to social exclusion; in the government's own words, 'employment is the surest route out of poverty (and social exclusion).' See, for example, the Labour Party's website<sup>6</sup> and the Green Paper 'A new deal for welfare: Empowering people to work', DWP (2006).

The New Deal employment initiatives can be considered as activating labour policies in which the aim is to move recipients from dependency and into the labour market. In the main they are designed to assist individuals by offering them opportunities to improve their employability and to prepare them for 'job readiness' (Philpott 1999; NAO 2002).

---

<sup>5</sup> These six New Deal programmes directly address unemployment and should not be confused with other initiatives to which the government has extended the label 'New Deal', for example, New Deal for Communities.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.labour.org.uk/employment04>

This includes personal development and skill training courses. Ultimately, however, if the participants fail to move into non-subsidised work within a certain time they are offered the option to move into education or to take up work experience with a participating organisation (Individual Placement Provider, IPP). On some of the programmes, failure to do this can lead to benefit sanctions.

Whether or not these schemes are effective, the importance of them is reflected in their immediate implementation and the amount of money reserved for them. To illustrate, the programmes were laid out before the elections and launched as a key flagship programme to target long-term unemployment the same year the Labour Government was elected (Levitas 2005). In addition, for the first five years, £5.2 billion generated from a one-off 'wind-fall' tax from excess profits of privatised utilities companies was set aside for these initiatives (Philpott 1999; Millar 2000). Amongst these initiatives there was particular emphasis on the NDYP programme: the government promised to move 250,000 long-term young unemployed people into non-subsidized work by 2002 (NAO 2002). Moreover, the UK was one of several European countries to sign a declaration to reduce youth unemployment by 2002 (Behrens and Evans 2002). Further, the importance of the NDYP in comparison with other schemes is reflected in the immediacy of its implementation and the amount of money allocated to it. It was the first of the original six programmes to be implemented: piloted in 12 'pathfinder' areas in January 1998 and implemented at national level in April of the same year. In addition, it received half of the total budget, £2.6 billion (Milne 1998; Training & Environment Network 1998).

## **1.2 The Main Features of the NDYP**

I now move on to discuss the main features and the overall design and delivery of the NDYP programme. This, however, is a sketchy and incomplete picture that is largely due to the programme itself. This is because it is incredibly convoluted and complex with continual diversification built into the programme. The continual diversification is an inherent and intentional aspect of the programme in which flexibility was built in to the design to allow it to be tailored to specific local needs and circumstances and to allow it to be changed over time (see, for example, OECD 1999; Sunley et al. 2001). On top of this, there were constant changes to the agencies engaged with the programme; including changes to the organisational structure and the remit of the

Executive Agency 'charged' with the responsibility to deliver the New Deal programmes (discussed further on).

Despite endless efforts to track material about the NDYP there were several occasions in which I arrived at a loose end. This was often due to staff and agency changes whereby the successors did not know the whereabouts of public documents to do with aspects of the programme. Given this and the complexities with the programme, my attempt to provide even a remotely coherent picture of the presently evolving diverse New Deal programme is one pulled together from fragmented and multiple pieces and is incomplete. Indeed, the intricacies of the programme remain obscure to me even though I have still managed to undertake my research. As it turns out, almost all the interviewees for my study (staff from voluntary organisation IPPs) talked about their confusion with the programme and found it difficult to keep up with; as one interviewee put it, 'the constant changes of goal posts'. Indeed, this was problematic for their organisations and has relevance to my own research findings. This is discussed in more detail in chapters six and seven. For now, I make some attempt to provide an overview of the programme and divide this into two main sections. The first section consists of an outline of how the NDYP framework operates for the young New Dealers. The second section consists of an overview of how the New Deal is designed and delivered at a structural level. Throughout this, however, the reader should bear in mind that due to the complexity and constant diversification of the programme there are likely to be nuances and qualifications at every level of description. Moreover, if this is not already out of date it will rapidly become such.

### *1.2.1 The NDYP framework*

Turning to how the NDYP framework operates for the young unemployed people, here after referred to as young New Dealers, I discuss four main features of the NDYP programme. These are: the overall objectives; the target group; the mandatory aspect; and the main phases that comprise the NDYP. In general, these features are shared at a national level.

First, in the case of the overall objectives, like other New Deal employment initiatives the aim is to provide (young) New Deal participants with opportunities to help them move into non-subsidized work; to improve their prospects of remaining in

employment and to increase their long-term employability. Ultimately, the aim of this is that it will, in turn, contribute to tackling social exclusion (NAO 2002). Second, the target group for this particular programme is young unemployed people between 18 and 24 years old (inclusive) who have been registered unemployed for at least six uninterrupted months. The latter aspect is, however, variable: if the New Deal Personal Advisor (discussed in more detail below) identifies a young unemployed person as having multiple problems that may prevent them from entering non-subsidized work they can enter the scheme at an earlier time (DfEE 1997a). Third, this is one of the mandatory New Deal programmes: those who are unemployed for six consecutive months may face benefit sanctions for non-compliance (Hoogvelt and France 2000; Hyland and Musson 2001; Morris 2001). In my own research, several of the interviewees said this aspect of the programme presented problems for their organisations as they were frequently in receipt of reluctant young New Dealers, or as one interviewee put it 'conscripts'. This is discussed in chapter six (section 3.1).

The fourth shared feature of the programme is the main phases that comprise the programme. These are the: Gateway; Option and Follow-Through. Although these phases are sequential they are not necessarily distinct from each other time-wise, and can overlap depending on individual's circumstances and needs. The Gateway can last for a maximum of four months. The overall aim of this phase is, first and foremost, to prepare the young New Dealer for non-subsidized work. If this is not successful, however, this a period in which the young New Dealer is prepared for entry into the next phase of the programme; the Option (discussed below). During the Gateway, the young New Dealer is assigned a New Deal Personal Advisor (NDPA). The NDPA is a frontline staff from what is now known as the Jobcentre Plus.<sup>7</sup> This is a time in which the young New Dealer is expected to attend regular interviews with their assigned NDPA, and can expect to receive help and support in a variety of ways. This includes help with: job searches and careers advice; preparation for the next phase of the programme (if applicable); and personal development and skills training courses (Ogbonna and Noon 1999; Hyland and Musson 2001). The level of the advice and

---

<sup>7</sup> Jobcentre Plus agencies were formed in April 2002, after the merger of the Employment Service in March 2002 with most of the Benefits Agency in order to create a "new integrated Agency for all welfare recipients of working age." During my fieldwork, this organisational restructure was in transition: some of the areas had the newly merged Jobcentre Plus agencies and others still had the old style agencies; that is, separated Jobcentres and Benefit Agencies. See, for example, Employment Service, 2002b.



support is likely to differ for each young New Dealer. This is because the programme is designed to be flexible and tailored to the individual young New Dealers. This is a diverse group of young people that can include graduates who are looking for work through to those with severe and multiple problems that may prevent them from entering work in the first place; such as: housing, drugs and mental health problems (Hayman 1998). Indeed, one of the roles of the NDPA is to identify problems that may prevent the young New Dealers from entering employment and to provide appropriate support and advice to help them prepare for work (Milne 1998).

Following the Gateway is the Option phase. As the title suggests this comprises options that are offered to the young New Dealers. Initially there were four options within the national framework. These consist of the Full-time Education and Training Option (FTETO); subsidized work with an employer; work experience with a voluntary organisation (the Voluntary Sector Option, VSO); and work experience with an environmental organisations (the Environmental Task Force Option, ETFO). An additional fifth option was later introduced: self-employment. As noted earlier, there is local flexibility built into the programme and local employment areas can provide a combination of at least three of these five options. Given this, there are local variations on what options are available to the young New Dealers. There are some Employment Areas in which all options are available to the young New Dealers and there are other areas in which combinations of at least three options are available to the young New Dealers. For example, in Fermanagh (Northern Ireland) there are three options available to the young New Dealers. These are the FTETO, the VSO and the ETFO.<sup>8</sup>

In general the work options consist of 26 weeks and the full-time education option is for one year. Once again, however, there are variations to this. For instance, in one of the six Employment Areas that operates in Greater Manchester (discussed later on), the Employment Service obtained additional amounts of money from a combination of sources that allowed them to provide an enhanced programme to the young New Dealers: they offered an enhanced 12-month work experience instead of the standard

---

<sup>8</sup> See the Department for Education website:  
[http://www.denidata.nics.gov.uk/insp/inspection\\_reports/1999\\_08](http://www.denidata.nics.gov.uk/insp/inspection_reports/1999_08)

six months. Further, they merged the VSO and the ETFO (Simmonds and Finn 2000; Scott et al. 2002). This is discussed in more detail in chapter four (section 2).

The entrance into the options can be either referrals or mandatory and the young New Dealer is expected to remain with their assigned organisation until they have completed the option phase or have found non-subsidized work, whichever is the soonest. The referrals depend on a combination of interconnected factors, including: the young New Dealer's preference; the NDPA's advice about what is appropriate and available; and the employer (the IPP). Mandatory referrals are organised by their NDPA. Theoretically, this involves matching the New Dealer's circumstances, skills and needs with an available IPP. The IPPs are not required to take on unsuitable New Dealers (Morris 2001).

Initially at least, there was an order in which the young New Deal participants could enter an option: the young New Dealers who entered the Education and Training Option could do so any time after one month on the Gateway; those who entered the subsidised Employment Option could do so any time after two months; and those who entered the Voluntary Sector and Environmental Task Force Options could do so after three months on the Gateway. The rationale for this is unclear and some scholars argued the chronological order created a hierarchical element to the programme in which the VSO and the ETFO were treated as the 'sink options' (see discussion in, for example, Morris 2001). This is because the most employable young New Dealers are likely to be placed first and thus are likely to be offered the FTETO and subsidized work. In contrast, the young New Dealers who are least employable are likely to remain on the Gateway and eventually found work placements on the VSO and the ETFO. Indeed, this is a view echoed by some of the interviewees who referred to these young New Dealers as: "the dregs", "those with baggage" and "the bottom of the bottom of the barrel" (for a detailed discussion about this, see chapter 6.3.1).

The third and final phase of the programme is the Follow-Through. This is a time in which the young New Dealers can expect to receive continued support from their NDPAs during and following the Option phase, if they have failed to move into non-subsidised work (O'Connor et al. 2000). During the Option phase the young New Dealers are offered the equivalent of one day a week to attend personal development

and skills training courses. This is intended to be tailored to the needs of the individual and can include training on, for example, CVs and interview techniques.

### *1.2.2 The overall structure of the NDYP*

I now move on to discuss the overall structure of the programme. As noted earlier, this is an incredibly complex and fluid programme in which there was some flexibility built in to allow each Employment Area district office to tailor it to their local needs and circumstances. Nevertheless, the government has maintained the power to devise key aims, objectives and guidelines for the delivery of the New Deal and 'charged' the then Employment Service<sup>9</sup> (former Executive Agency to the Department for Education and Employment) with the responsibility for leading the delivery of the New Deal programmes. This responsibility has been inherited by the newly established Jobcentre Plus, the present Executive Agency to the Department for Work and Pensions, DWP<sup>10</sup> (DfEE 1997a; ES 2002b).

The pyramid shape is a useful metaphor to describe the structural procedure of the design and the development of the NDYP and other New Deal programmes. For simplicity, I divide this into three main layers: at the top of this pyramid are government agencies and representatives that set the national guidelines and targets. This is then mediated to the 11 Jobcentre Plus Districts that cover Great Britain, and is then filtered down towards the bottom where there are several representatives predominantly from the individual Jobcentre Plus agencies that are involved in the design and the delivery of the programme at a local level. There is constant fluidity within this pyramid structure in which communication and decision-making processes are made at various levels and in multiple directions: upwards, downwards, horizontal and diagonal. As outlined earlier in this chapter, it is not possible for me to provide a complete picture of this structure; nevertheless, some description about each of these

---

<sup>9</sup> The DWP was established in 2001 to bring together aspects of the then Department for Education and Employment (such as the Employment Service and the Employment Service Directorate) and the Department for Social Security. This was part of a move to integrate services to people of working age who do not work and claim state support whether this is Jobseekers' Allowance or benefits such as Incapacity Benefit. One of the principle aims of the DWP is the implementation of the Government's Welfare to Work strategy. For further information about the restructure and the DWP's remit see, for example, DWP, 2003; 2002a and 2002b

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

layers can help to provide a glimpse of the design and the development of the programme.<sup>11</sup>

Turning first to the top layer, this consists of several government representatives and agencies, including the: Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, DWP's ministers, Home Office; and New Employment Partners (previously the New Deal Task Force). The involvement of both the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and the DWP was introduced following the restructuring of Department of Education and Employment (DfEE) and the Department of Social Security (DWP 2002b). Prior to this, the Secretary of State for Education and Employment with the DfEE were largely responsible for planning the design of New Deal employment initiatives (Nativel et al. 2002).

In relation to the New Deal programme, the role of these agencies is multiple. They include setting up the: national guideline and framework; national targets; financial regulations; and administrative procedures. In addition, they are expected to provide recommendations about the partnerships to be involved in the local delivery plans and are expected to respond to queries and clarifications that are raised from below.

The middle layer of the pyramid consists of what is now known as 11 Jobcentre Plus Districts (JPDs) that operate across Great Britain.<sup>12</sup> In a sense, the 11 JPDs can be considered as the intermediary communicators between the government agencies at the top and the individual Jobcentre Plus agencies at the bottom of the pyramid: in receipt of the (top layer of) government agencies' instructions and guidelines, it is their task to develop 'directives' concerning the size and choice of New Deal delivery models for their local District Offices. In addition to this role, they are expected to communicate on a horizontal level with other agencies across sectors for the purposes of learning and sharing "good practice" and developing partnerships (Nativel et al. 2002).

---

<sup>11</sup> A useful outline of the early design and delivery of the New Deal can be found in Nativel et al. 2002

<sup>12</sup> The 11 Jobcentre Plus Districts cover the whole of Great Britain. In the order presented in the Jobcentre Plus Annual Report 2002, these are: London; North West; North East; West Midlands; East Midlands; South West; South East; East; Yorkshire and Humber; Scotland; and Wales. See DWP, 2003.

The bottom of the pyramid consists of a variety of players that are involved in different aspects of the design, delivery, management and administration of the New Deal at the local level. They are predominantly from the Jobcentre Plus's agencies and include: Business Managers, who are responsible for compiling local labour market information and managing NDPAs; District Managers (DMs); and New Deal Coordinators who are responsible for coordinating the activities of the DM, Strategic Partnership Group, and agencies involved in training and providing options for New Dealers, and the front-line staff (NDPAs).

At this bottom level, the programme is delivered by what are now 90 Jobcentre Plus District Offices across the 11 Jobcentre Plus Districts in Great Britain;<sup>13</sup> this is a recent restructuring from the previous 144 Units of Delivery<sup>14</sup> (UDs) across nine Employment Service Regional Offices. The replacement of the 144 UD's with 90 Districts is not simply a change in the geographical boundaries with which the agencies operate but also, as noted earlier, consists of bringing together aspects of the Employment Service and the Benefits Agencies. During my research this change was in transition and it is expected to take several years to complete. For simplicity, I refer to the Units of Delivery and the Jobcentre Plus District Offices as Employment Area Offices; on occasions, however, when referring to one in particular I use their original name.

Each Employment Area Office covers a separate geographical area and is made up of different numbers and sizes of local Jobcentre Plus offices (ALI 2002). As noted by some scholars, the boundaries in which the Employment Area Offices operate are not easily identifiable (Sunley et al. 2001; Nativel et al. 2002). Nevertheless, there are some approximations in which the boundaries overlap and can be divisible by local authority areas.<sup>15</sup> The Employment Area Offices are responsible for organising the New Deal programmes in their area. Initially, to do this the Employment Area Offices were required to set up Strategic Partnership Groups (SPGs). It is not clear to me whether or not some or all of these SPGs have ceased to function and if so whether or not another body has taken their place. Nevertheless, during the early years their core role was to

---

<sup>13</sup> For a list of the 90 districts and the 11 JPDs with which they operate see Appendix 3 in DWP, 2003.

<sup>14</sup> Amongst the literature I have collated there is a discrepancy in the total number of UD's. A list of 144 UD's can be seen in CESI, 2002.

<sup>15</sup> A list of these 90 Districts and the local authorities falling within each can be found in United Kingdom Parliament, 2002.

design and develop the New Deal delivery plan at a local level, and to devise a strategy for implementing and delivering the New Deal.

Depending on local resources each of the SPGs were expected to consist of representatives across public, private and voluntary sector organisations, including: Local Enterprise Councils (LECs) in Scotland and organisations such as Local Authorities and Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) in England and Wales. They vary in size and composition, but generally consist of between 24 and 30 members (see, for example, Tavistock Institute 1999a).

The aim to create multi-agency SPGs is based on the assumption that involving a variety of organisations from different sectors can create a wider pool of knowledge and contribute towards making more informed and effective strategies to tackle issues such as: unemployment; barriers to employment; the profile and needs of client groups; local labour market issues; and existing networks of help and partnerships that are specific to their community. Whether or not the composition of the SPGs is mixed is not examined in my own research. There is, however, research to show that several of the SPGs that were set up tended to have historic relevance: they consisted of organisations that were engaged in previous ventures with the Employment Area Offices (see, for example, Tavistock Institute 1999a).

Inevitably, the proposals developed by the SPGs are unique to each of the Employment Areas. Thus, originally in theory there was at least 144 different ways in which the New Deal programmes were designed, implemented and delivered. As noted earlier, this diversity and specificity is an inherent and intentional aspect of the New Deal programmes. Despite this, however, as described earlier, the local design of the programme is constrained by national guidelines and is expected to reflect directives from the appropriate Jobcentre District. Indeed, the SPGs were given three main delivery models from which they could choose for administering and delivering the New Deal employment programme. These are outlined in a report produced by the former Department for Education and Employment and is paraphrased as follows:

- in some areas the lead delivery partner will be the Employment Service, in others it will be a private company or public agency. The partnership may

choose to ask the ES to undertake the contracting for the Gateway services and the New Deal options on its behalf;

- a second arrangement would be for partners to form a consortium with the capacity to take forward the delivery of all or a large part of the New Deal under contract to the ES. Such consortia are usually expected to include key strategic players like the Local Authority, the TEC/LEC, careers services and private and voluntary sector organisations;
- a third option would be the emergence of consortia with which the ES would contract to take forward the delivery of specific elements of the New Deal such as the Environmental Task Force

(DfEE 1997b)

Several authors have identified four delivery models that are a slight variation of the three models above, and are not necessarily contradictory to the above description. These are: the Employment Service Single Contract; Private Sector-led model; the Joint Venture Partnership; and the Consortium; (Woodfield et al. 2000; Morris 2001; CESI 2002; Nativel et al. 2002). The first two models can be interpreted as belonging to the first of the three models above.

Out of the three models identified by the DfEE, by far the most frequently adopted model was the Employment Service delivery model, (adopted by 99 of the then 144 UD's). In contrast, 19 UD's adopted the Joint Ventureship Partnership (the second of the three models) and 17 UD's adopted the Consortium (the third of the three). The least frequently adopted model was the Private Sector Led model (an interpretation of the first model), which was adopted by nine of the then 144 UD's. For a detailed discussion about the different types of delivery models and the different contractual obligations for them (see, for example, DfEE 1997a; DfEE 1997b; Milne 1998; NCVO 1998).

In practice, the application of these models is far more complex and fluid than I have presented here. For example, the first of the three models described above can include more than one organisation leading the delivery model and can include organisations from different sectors, including the Employment Service themselves. Further, the choice of model may change over time. Aside these complexities, the organisations that are selected to deliver the programme are responsible for administering one or more of the options offered in the Employment Areas (Morris 2001) and are known as Option administrators. In some literature, they have also been referred to as Managing Agents

(Scott et al. 2002). To avoid confusion between Option administrators and administration within organisations, I use the term Managing Agents and Agents. The responsibilities of the Managing Agents vary depending on their contract with the Employment Service but in general they are responsible for the recruitment and management of the organisations that provide temporary employment opportunities and skills and training courses.

The organisations that provide temporary employment opportunities and skills and training courses are in a sense the very bottom of the bottom layer of the pyramid: they are the agencies at the frontline that deliver opportunities to the young New Dealers. There are variations in the amount of resources obtained, if any, from these organisations to delivery the programme. This is decided between the Managing Agents and the Employment Services in a given Employment Area; there is no national guideline for this (Morris 2001).

To recall from the introduction, it is the voluntary organisations that offered temporary employment opportunities on the Voluntary Sector Option that I examine in my research (VSO IPPs). Unique to other partners, in addition to the primary aim of increasing New Deal participants' employability skills the VSO IPPs were given the additional aim of delivering (undefined) social benefits to the community.

### *1.2.3 The NDYP in Greater Manchester*

I now move on to briefly discuss the way in which the Employment Areas are organised in the Greater Manchester conurbation. This is because my study was carried out in this area.

Greater Manchester is part of the North West English region and is made up of 10 local authorities. These are: Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Manchester, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford and Wigan.

During the inception of the New Deal programmes Greater Manchester was part of the North West Employment Service Region that comprises 20 Unit of Delivery (UD). Seven UD were located in Greater Manchester. These are: Bolton; Bury; City Pride (which covered Manchester, Trafford, Salford and Tameside); Oldham; Rochdale;



Stockport; and Wigan. Greater Manchester is now part of what is now known as the North West Jobcentre Plus District that makes up 14 District Offices; six of which make up the Greater Manchester conurbation. The size of the North West region and the Greater Manchester conurbation have not become larger or smaller, but within these areas some Employment areas have merged and others been further broken down. In the case of Greater Manchester, the CityPride unit no longer exists and the six District Offices are: Bolton and Bury; Manchester; Salford and Trafford; Stockport and Tameside; Oldham and Rochdale; and Wigan. However, to complicate this further, during my research some of the newly established Employment Area District Offices were in operation whilst others were at different stages of transition. Thus, using the original seven UD's, like the pattern across Great Britain the most frequently adopted delivery model was the first of the three discussed earlier. In six UD's, organisations from the public and voluntary sector led the delivery of the programme with the Employment Service. In one UD the consortium delivery model was adopted.

### **1.3 Existing Research on the New Deal Employment Programmes**

I now move on to the final section of this chapter and close this with an overview of the research undertaken on the New Deal programmes, with an emphasis on the NDYP. There is no shortage of such literature: one only needs to go on to the DWP's website to see the numerous research reports that were produced for them during the early years of the programmes. Indeed, the research produced for the DWP is a dominant source of literature, which is likely to do with the present government's attitude towards evaluation research (for a discussion about evaluation research see chapter 2.2). The government is an avid advocate of evaluation-type research, and is particularly keen to develop and progress social policy through 'evidence-based' knowledge and 'what works'. Whether or not evaluation research in which the government has set the targets and the outcomes to monitor the progress of policy initiatives is useful has been the subject of methodological debates (see, for example, Sanderson 2004). Aside from this, the importance ascribed is reflected in the money allocated for this: a budget in the region of £10 million pounds over a five year period was provided specifically to evaluate the New Deal programmes, including establishing the New Deal Evaluation Database (Millar 2000).

Most of the research undertaken on the New Deal programmes is to do with the NDYP. As noted earlier, initially at least, this was the largest programme in terms of the amount of money set aside for it and the number of participants. Much of the research can be divided into two main categories: macro and micro research. Macro research has tended to consist of work in which existing data is used to examine the flow of employment and unemployment to examine the programme's impact on the labour market and the economy (see, for example, Riley and White 2002). In contrast, micro research has tended to consist of participant surveys and examinations of the impact on the individual New Deal participants; particularly their employability skills. In addition, there have been several studies in which a mixture of methods have been used to examine barriers to employment and the disengagement of New Deal participants at both an individual level and in relation to being part of a group and include studies that relate to ethnicity (see, for example, Ogbonna and Noon 1999; Hoogvelt and France 2000; Fieldhouse et al. 2002).

Much of this research has concentrated on the more frequently used options, especially work in education and training and the private sector (see, for example, Blundell et al. 2001). There is an early study that focused on the participants of the Voluntary Sector Option (Dewson and Eccles 2001) in which different aspects of their experience on the Gateway and the Options phase were examined (to recall, these are the first and second phases of the New Deal programme respectively). In the case of the Gateway, Dewson and Eccles (2001) found that several of the young New Dealers who entered the VSO received inadequate careers advice; were not given sufficient support and training to prepare for non-subsidized work and for entry into the Option phase; and were given little information about the different options available to them. In addition, young people on the VSO were more likely than their non-VSO counterparts to: spend longer on the Gateway; less likely to get the support they needed from their NDPA; and less likely to get suitable training.

Whilst the Gateway and the young New Dealers themselves were not aspects that I focused on for my own research, several of the interviewees from my study (staff from VSO IPPs) talked about issues that support some of the research findings described immediately above. For the most part, interviewees talked about the poor quality of services provided to the young New Dealers on the Gateway. Indeed, one of

interviewees referred to it as 'the virtual Gateway'. This is because she said the young New Dealers placed in her organisation were not aware they had been through it at all; this was a view echoed by others in my study.

There is an eclectic mix of research undertaken on different aspects of the programme to do with different stakeholders. As noted earlier, there has been research on Strategic Partnership Groups (Tavistock Institute 1999a; Tavistock Institute 1999b). In addition, there are several studies on the organisation IPPs. Once again, however, much of this research concentrates on the more frequent options. The Institute for Employment Studies is compiling a digest of evaluations of the costs and benefits to organisations of the option that offers subsidised jobs in the private sector (Atkinson and Pollard, 2001).

There are far fewer studies on voluntary organisation IPPs. Further, according to Scott et al. (2002) even when research has included voluntary organisations this has tended to provide 'undifferentiated and uncritical pictures' and has been 'tantalizingly vague'. In the main there are three research projects that have some relevance to my own study whereby the costs and the benefits to the organisations engaged with the VSO have been the subject of interest. These are: Kumleben (2000) on issues to do with the volunteer workforce; Morris (2001) on contracts; and Scott et al. (2002) who looked at broader issues to do with the programme and the different levels of impacts on the organisations.

Turning first to Kumleben (2000), this is a small qualitative study undertaken for a Masters dissertation. The focus of this paper was to examine the effects of the New Deal on volunteering. Briefly, Kumleben identifies benefits to do with increasing the organisations' workforce and the costs to do with the displacement and alienation of volunteers and goes on to conclude that the potential benefits outweigh the costs. This paper provides a useful insight into the potential impacts of the programme on volunteers in voluntary organisations. Nevertheless, it fails to account for the differences amongst voluntary organisations.

Morris' research (2001) focuses on the implications of the programme's contracts on the charities engaged with the programme. In short, Morris (2001) found that several of the charities did not understand the legal and contractual obligations of their contracts,

which were complex, consisted of local variations and were subject to constant changes. In addition, Morris found that several of the organisations did not receive as much money as anticipated. This was due to a discrepancy between the amount of New Deal participants they expected and the actual number of New Deal participants placed with them. Subsequently, some of the organisations did not recoup the cost of the initial outlay spent in preparation for the New Deal and found themselves using their own existing resources to compensate for this. Again, Morris argues this has legal implications for the organisations in which they used existing resources that were dedicated for particular charitable purposes for their engagement with the programme.

In the third study Scott et al. (2002) undertook research in one of the Greater Manchester UDs to examine the costs and the benefits to voluntary organisations engaged with the programme. In contrast with Kumleben (2000) and Morris (2001) they examined broader aspects of the programme. In the main, they found there was a general lack of understanding amongst the VSO Managing Agents (as noted earlier, also known as VSO administrators) and the Employment Service about the amount of work the IPPs needed to put into the programme. In the main, these were to do with the large amounts of administration and the high levels of training and supervision that was needed to support young New Dealers. Further, the IPPs were not given adequate resources to do this. Subsequently, as with findings in Morris (2001), in many cases the voluntary organisations found themselves in situations in which they used their own resources to support their engagement with the programme. The authors identified four main impacts to the organisations, including: impacts on their core capacity; finances; operation; and their volunteer work force.

In each of the three studies discussed immediately above, the authors identified benefits that could (and were) gained from engagement with the programme and in some cases these outweigh the problems arising from the programme. What, however, has not yet come under scrutiny is the extent to which the voluntary organisations can gain overall levels of success by advancing their missions and whether or not this success can be sustained. I aim to address these questions in my own research. They are particularly salient to the current policy climate: to recall from my introduction, there is a growing and explicit interest from the government to include the voluntary sector in their public policy agenda. The voluntary sector is considered to have the ability to add value,

especially social benefit, to government initiatives. In addition, they are considered to be well placed to deliver the government's broader mission to create a more 'socially inclusive society'. Given the importance placed on the sector, this research has a wider relevance to understand their ability to engage in partnership with the government. I now move on to the next chapter to introduce the very varied voluntary sector.

## **2 The Voluntary Sector**

As noted in the introduction and the previous chapter, this study is not about young New Deal participants or the NDYP programme in general. Instead, it is about the voluntary organisations that engage as Individual Placement Providers (IPPs) with the NDYP programme. More specifically, it is about whether or not these voluntary organisations can advance their specific missions by providing temporary employment opportunities to young New Dealers and whether they can achieve this in a way that is sustainable to them. To understand the context of my research and the rationale for the approach I adopted, in this chapter I introduce the notion of the voluntary sector in the UK and then move on to provide an overview of the research that has been undertaken on the sector in which there have been attempts to measure and assess their missions.

### **2.1 Defining the Voluntary Sector**

Several terms have been commonly used to describe the voluntary sector, including the non-profit sector, the third sector, Non-Government Organisations and the voluntary and community sector(s). In this thesis I normally use the term voluntary sector although I occasionally use others either to highlight a particular point or because I refer to other work in which these terms have been used. The voluntary sector is a fluid, heterogeneous and non-discrete entity that consists of a panoply of agencies. They differ in multiple ways. To name a few, these include: their size; their structure and the way in which they operate; how they are resourced; and their missions. For example, they range from large official organisations that operate with budgets into the millions through to informal agencies that may operate from someone's living room with little, if any, financial resources. They may be a branch that belongs to an umbrella organisation or independent organisations that serve local, national and international communities. They may have a hierarchical or oligarchic structure and may operate purely with paid staff, solely with volunteers or with a combination of the two. They may have different functions: some, for example, may focus on advocating and campaigning for others and for themselves and some may deliver personal or impersonal services. Their beneficiaries may be spatially defined to include local, national or international communities or a combination of these. Others serve an interest group, such as victims of violence, ethnic groups, or people with disabilities.

Given the sheer diversity it is difficult, if not impossible, to devise a satisfactory all-encompassing definition to capture the agencies that make up the sector. Indeed, definitions of the sector have been persistent and highly contested topics of debate. A useful review of some of the different ways in which the sector has been defined can be found in Kendall and Knapp (1995). In their article they famously describe the voluntary sector as 'a loose and baggy monster'. Like several other scholars they argue it is impossible to create an all-encompassing definition of what is an entity with 'blurred' and 'fuzzy' boundaries; let alone make claims about its uniqueness. Nevertheless, for research purposes at least they recognise the necessity of definitions and go on to devise five characteristics to help them determine whether or not organisations could be counted as falling within the voluntary sector. These are: formal; self-governing; independent of government; not-profit distributing (and primarily non business); and voluntarism (see also Kendall 2003). Kendall and Knapp (1995) recognise there are problems with this definition. For instance the first, 'formal', excludes smaller, less formalised groups that may operate without profit and with social objectives (often referred to as the community sector). This includes agencies that some people argue constitute the majority of organisations falling in the voluntary and community sector (NCVO 2006b).

For reasons outlined above, any definition that claims to identify the unique characteristics of this sector will be presented with problems about what is and is not included in this multifarious and fluid sector. For Kendall and Knapp (1995) this is unavoidable and they go on to conclude the most useful way to define the sector is to reflect on the purposes of the research (see also Kendall and Knapp 1996). This is a view echoed by several others, for example, Halfpenny and Reid write:

Diversity within the sector combined with convergence and blurring of boundaries between sectors suggests that thinking in terms of discrete sectors within distinctive properties is less useful than focusing on particular outputs (for example, care for the elderly) ...

(Halfpenny and Reid 2002: 541)

There are, however, several studies in which the voluntary sector has been defined in a universal and simplistic manner in attempting to separate out a homogeneous and discrete sector. Whilst creating such definitions can be appealing, making the process of research much smoother for analytical purposes, it can contribute to creating a false homogeneity about the sector. Further, such definitions can contribute to misleading research findings: the type of definition devised and adopted for research can constrain

the types of data selected and excluded for a research study, ultimately playing some role in the shaping of analysis and research findings (for further discussion see, for example, Halfpenny and Reid, 2002).

Despite difficulties in its definition, there are conservative estimates to suggest that this is growing sector, both in terms of the number of organisations and the sizes of their income: there have been recent trends in the growth of 'super-charities', with budgets going into the millions per annum. Nevertheless, the sector is predominantly made up of a very large number of small organisations. Despite this, the sector is making an increasingly significant economic contribution towards employment in the UK. In 2004 it was estimated that 2.2% of the UK workforce was employed in this sector (NCVO 2006a; NCVO 2006b).

Turning to my own research purposes the parameters by which the voluntary organisations were selected was predefined: the voluntary organisations included are those that engaged with the NDYP Voluntary Sector Option (VSO). There are two main issues with this. First, there are some ambiguities about the organisations that engaged in this option, for instance, there was a small project set with the NHS, which reflects the difficulties of defining the sector in a general way. Second, due to my sample being confined to a pre-selected population of organisations it is not likely to be representative of many other people's categorisations of the organisations that comprise the voluntary sector. The organisations that comprised my sample frame and those that were selected for my study are discussed in chapter three and chapter four respectively.

## **2.2 Research on Assessing Voluntary Organisations' Missions**

Another issue is that the sheer diversity of the sector raises questions about how to identify the organisations' specific missions as the first step in my examining whether or not they have gained benefits from their engagement with the NDYP programme. To help me devise tools or, at the very least, consider the most useful way to do this, I now move on to review some of the main literature about research that assesses and examines voluntary sector organisations' missions.

There is a burgeoning literature about ways to examine the delivery of voluntary organisations' missions. Much of this is grey material produced by or for voluntary



organisations themselves and tends to fall under the umbrella of evaluation research. It is impractical to provide a comprehensive picture of this work in the short space available here. Given this, I focus on some of the main types of evaluation research and other research that has been undertaken in relation to the delivery of voluntary organisations' missions.

Evaluation research is no simpler to define than the voluntary sector. Like the loose and baggy monster, evaluation research is not a discrete entity and there are several definitions and different perspectives about its purpose and the methods that it ought to use (Stern 1992).<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, a useful starting point is a general definition in which evaluation research has been described as a process whereby an evaluator assesses or measures 'what has been achieved during or after a particular activity' (Wainwright 2000). In this context, activity is the unit of analysis: on a micro level it can be, for example, a project or a partnership and on a macro level it can be, for example, the overall contribution of the voluntary and community sectors. Some of the work discussed below may not be considered by some people to constitute evaluation research. However, I include this work in my thesis not because I necessarily consider this to be evaluation research but because in one way or another it addresses ways in which the delivery of organisations' missions can be examined.

Evaluation research undertaken on voluntary organisations came into prominence during the 1980s and '90s. There was a plethora of work that examined the delivery of organisations' missions in which different models and frameworks were adopted. Despite the variety, however, this source of literature was dominated by attempts to 'measure' achievements of the organisations that focused on what are commonly referred to as the three Es: efficiency; effectiveness and equity. I have intentionally used the term 'measure' rather than 'assess' here. This is because there was a tendency to convert phenomena into numerical values to use in formulae that could provide

---

<sup>16</sup> Amongst academics, at least, and not specific to the study of the voluntary sector, the appropriate methods for evaluation research are highly contested. This is largely associated with different epistemological viewpoints. Crudely speaking, there are researchers who favour more statistical approaches to measure concepts of, for example, benefits and costs, and there are those who are more concerned with process and tend to focus on qualitative descriptions. There are also those who have been referred to as 'realists' because their choice of method has largely depended on the research question and they have used a combination of methods. For a more detailed discussion about this see, for example, Kendall 2003; and Sanderson 2004.

quantified information on, for example, the amount of services delivered to the organisations' beneficiaries: terms such as 'inputs', 'activities' and 'outputs' were frequently used for this. Briefly, inputs are the resources, such as staff and volunteer time and equipment used in a programme or activity. Activities are what an organisation does with its resources in order to achieve its aims, such as training and counselling. Outputs are the direct products achieved by a programme - for example, the number of classes, workshops and training courses delivered (Wainwright 2000).

The growing attention to this type of evaluation is concomitant with the increased visibility of the voluntary sector's engagement in the delivery of public and welfare services (see introduction); and lies in the wider context of what has been referred to as the era of New Public Management. This is an era in which agencies across different sectors operated in a climate of increasing contractual competition in which there were growing external and internal demands for organisations to demonstrate, for example, public accountability and transparency; efficiency; the ability to meet targets and to assess achievements and outcomes; to identify gaps in services to help improve and inform policy-making decisions; and to assess the implementation of projects and organisations' management practices. For further discussion about this and other related topics see, for example, Kendall (2003) on the UK's voluntary sector; Jacobs et al. (2000) for the UK's public sector; and Flynn et al. (2001) for the US's non-profit sector.

These earlier types of evaluation research are useful for particular purposes, such as demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of the delivery of a project, an organisation and the sector as a whole. Nevertheless, there have been increasing criticisms and (intense) debates about their uses and limitations. One of the main criticisms has been the failure to account for the multitude of less tangible (immediate and long term) benefits arising from the work of the voluntary organisations; benefits that some people argue constitute the main embodiment of these organisations' work and missions. To illustrate, a formula that is used to produce information about the amount of swimming lessons that have benefited a specific number of individuals with special needs does not capture the benefits arising from this work, such as: improvement to the beneficiaries': self-esteem, social network, health, and quality of life. These are benefits that might be at the very core of the organisation's missions. Further, it does not take into

consideration benefits that extend to others such as friends, families and the community in general.

In more recent years and partly in response to these inadequacies, there has been a growth of research undertaken to examine the social contributions arising from the delivery of organisations' missions (and services). This type of research is commonly referred to as impact evaluation. Like evaluation research in general, impact evaluation is not a discrete type of research with a universal definition. To the contrary, there are variants of impact evaluation research in terms of the definition employed and the methods and tools used. Despite this messy pottage, terms such as input, output and activity continue to have relevance but there is an additional emphasis on other terms such as: outcome and impact.

Some evaluators question the distinction, or do not attempt to distinguish between these two terms. According to Wainwright (2000), however, there is a distinction between them. Outcomes tend to be planned and set out in an organisation's objectives, and can be described as benefits or changes that are intended for the beneficiaries of an organisation's activities or programme. She divides these into two main categories: hard and soft outcomes. The former would be, for example, getting an unemployed person back into employment. A soft outcome might, for example, be a change in attitude towards work such as an increase in self-confidence. In other words it is a change that has come about through intervention and may lead to, or flow, from achieving the hard-outcome. In contrast, she describes impacts as change that go beyond the recipients and benefit others around them, such as their families, friends, immediate community and society as a whole.

...long-term and sustainable changes introduced by a given intervention in the lives of beneficiaries. Impact can be related either to the specific objectives of an intervention or to unanticipated changes caused by an intervention; such unanticipated changes may also occur in the lives of people not belonging to the beneficiary group. Impact can be either positive or negative, the latter being equally important to be aware of.

(Blankenburg 1995 cited in Wainwright 2000:9)

There are three important points worth drawing out from the quotation above about impact evaluation research. First, impact is long term and about sustainable change: that is, change that remains after the duration of a project or activity. Second, it includes unintentional consequences arising from interventions. Third, these consequences can be positive and negative (Wainwright 2000).

Using a hypothetical organisation, I have adapted Wainwright's five terms input, activity, output, outcome and impact and illustrated them in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. Summary and illustration of frequently used terms in impact assessments

Term	Definition	Examples
Input	Resource used for a programme or activity	Paid/Unpaid staff time, computer equipment
Activity	What an organisation does with resources in order to achieve its aims and/or mission	provide training skills
Output	Product achieved by programme	The number of workshops provided
Outcome Hard –	Benefit to the recipient of service that achieves the aim	The number of beneficiaries that get a job
Soft-	Change to the recipient of service, which may or may not lead to achieving the aim	Increase in self-worth; improve skills
Impact	A change to those other than the recipient or organisation, such as family or to the community or society in general and can be economic, social or environmental	Gaining employment or improving skills or confidence can, for example, contribute to a happier family life

It is worth bearing in mind that there is no universal definition for each of these terms. Further, as Wainwright (2000) notes in particular reference to outcomes and impacts, they do not occur at a fixed point in time, are often intangible and difficult to capture and measure.

A disproportionate amount of literature on impact evaluation is grey material produced by and for voluntary organisations and comprises both evaluations undertaken by independent researchers on voluntary organisations and 'tool kits' to help voluntary organisations carry out such evaluations themselves. The impact evaluation undertaken on organisations are dominated by studies that have tended to adopt quantitative methods for their own individual cases to count social benefits, which they have selected from long lists of indicators (see, for example, *Our Social Report* FRC Group (2003)). In the case of tool kits, they tend to comprise guidance on a variety of 'do-it-

yourself' approaches to evaluation. These toolkits are often aimed at small organisations, tend to claim to be general and adaptable and some, for example, focus on ways to demonstrate the extent of community and neighbourhood renewal. See, for example, '*Social Auditing for Small Organisations*' (Pearce et al. 1996), '*Social Audit Toolkit*' (Spreckley 2000), and '*Prove It: Measuring the effect of neighbourhood renewal on local people*' (NEF 2000).<sup>17</sup>

Amongst the literature on impact evaluations undertaken and the toolkits, extensive discussions are dedicated to the variety of indicators available to capture the benefits arising from the delivery of the organisations' work and missions. These lists are multifarious, including benefits to individuals, communities and to society at large. They cut across a variety of aspects of life, to name a few, these include: social, health, crime and economic contributions. Further, many of them utilize concepts such as: citizenship, quality of life and human and social capital. There are discussions about whether or not perspectives from different stakeholders, such as beneficiaries, funders, (paid and unpaid) staff ought to be sought when selecting indicators. In addition, there are discussions about considering the option of participatory approaches to include different stakeholders in undertaking all or part of the research. Indeed, there are advocates who argue this can bring about further benefits such as improving social networks and skills (for further discussions see, for example, NEF, 1998 and 2000).

On the whole, this literature tends to be descriptive and lacks comparative analysis across different organisations and across time within one organisation. Further, studies have tended to be unreflective about the limitations of the methods and tools adopted. This is not true of them all because some reports produced with the practitioner in mind have raised methodological questions to do with, for example, reliability and validity and the difficulties of assigning causal links to a specific intervention (see, for example, Wainwright 2000; The UK Voluntary Sector Research Group 2003).

The dominant trend of using quantitative methods tailored to the needs of individual cases is likely to reflect the purposes for which the research has been undertaken: this is

---

<sup>17</sup> A further list of reports about, and organisations interested in, social auditing can be found on the following website address: <http://www.cbs-network.org.uk/SocAdbib.html>; and <http://www.ces-vol.org.uk/>

usually research that has been carried out for practitioners within the voluntary sector rather than for an academic audience. Indeed, in the report *Our Social Report* (FRC Group 2003), the authors point out the purpose of their evaluation is to demonstrate transparency and the work carried out by the organisation. Further, they go on to say it is without theoretical frameworks and is not designed for the 'social audit anorak'. Consequently, however, despite the large amount of research on impact assessments undertaken on the voluntary sector using quantitative methods, these tend to be tailored to individual organisations in a way that does not allow systematic comparisons to be made. To illustrate, the New Economics Foundation produced a report *Prove It!* as a resource for organisations to develop tools to assess and measure the effects of their projects on local people and the relationships that exist in their communities, which they refer to as 'social capital'.<sup>18</sup> In the case of measurements, they identified over 100 indicators for organisations to consider and, even then, suggested organisations may want to look at other (sources of) indicators to measure the impact of their work (NEF 2000). Briefly, these 100 indicators are divided into three main headings: attitudes (about how people think or feel about themselves or others); abilities (the skills that exist to nurture social capital); and actions (behaviour that contributes to trust or are itself signs of trust).

In addition to these types of evaluation, there are other studies that are more systematic and in which comparative analysis has been made across and within organisations; and include research using quantitative and qualitative approaches. In the case of quantitative research, there are several examples in which social phenomena have been converted to numerical values and converted to ratios to demonstrate (often economic) contributions arising from the delivery of voluntary organisations' missions. Examples of this type of work can be found in *Economic Impact of Community-Based Training* (Richmond 1996) and *Social Accounting for Nonprofits* (Richmond et al. 2003). In the latter article two models: the 'Community Social Return on Investment Model' and the 'Expanded Value-added Statement' are selected and applied to two different community agencies.

---

<sup>18</sup> Social Capital is a highly contested term and goes beyond the remit of this study. For discussion about this topic see, for example, Putnam, 2003 and Davies, 2001

These models involve converting 'social outputs' into monetary value in order to create a flow of incoming resources (inputs) and outgoing resources (outputs) that are then converted to a ratio that demonstrates the social return on investment – or added value, depending on which model is adopted. Social outputs are categorised under three headings: primary, secondary and tertiary. Primary outputs are the direct effects of the organisation's services on its clients; secondary outputs are indirect effects to clients; and tertiary outputs are the effects on groups other than the clients – such as the community, though this is not defined.<sup>19</sup> One of the models was applied to an organisation that trained multiply disadvantaged individuals in preparation for re-entering employment. Whilst the training of all service users was costed so too was a value assigned to the organisation's achievements for users who went on to employment and those who did not. For those who were employed, salaries were aggregated and incorporated into the accounts. For those who did not get employment, figures were calculated to take into consideration the increase in their chances of gaining employment. Other 'social items' that were assigned a monetary value included the saving to the community from, for example, income benefits and other related services. In the paper, values are assigned through estimations and comparing costs elsewhere and the result for this model was a return ratio of 1:1.81 - that is, for every dollar spent, 1.81 dollars were returned to the community (for more detailed discussion about these models see also Quarter et al. 2003).

These approaches are a laudable attempt to move away from measuring only immediate financial successes or failures and a move towards telling a more complete story of organisations' performances that take into consideration social achievements. In this respect they are substantial achievements since they take into account an aspect that has been systematically ignored in previous conventional accounting and performance-based evaluation research undertaken in this field. This said, however, the very strength of counting the social, and thus including the social achievements of an organisation or programme, is also its weakness: it involves reducing social benefits to fit into a financial accounting framework. This process of assigning pounds – or in this case dollars – raises questions about how, and more importantly, whether benefits such as

---

<sup>19</sup> This division is very similar to hard outcomes, soft outcomes and impact outlined in Table 2.1

quality of life and community engagement can be adequately assigned monetary value (see also, Kendall, 2003: 90 for a critique on approaches that attach monetary values to the 'products' of the voluntary sector).

There are several pieces of qualitative research undertaken to examine voluntary organisations' missions. Amongst these is an eclectic mix of research undertaken on different topics, including for example: research on the contribution services have made to beneficiaries' and the enabling and constraining aspects of partnership work between voluntary organisations and organisations in other sectors (see, for example, Glendinning et al. 2002; Yates et al. 2004). In addition, there are several other studies that adopt a variety of approaches. These include Toupin (2001) and more recently is the work of Kendall (2003) in which an eclectic use of methods and theories have been used to place the UK's voluntary sector in a comparative context both across different sectors in the UK and across the international voluntary sector.

Overall, however, the majority of research undertaken on voluntary organisations focuses on their performance and it often seeks to promote their benefits on their contributions to civil society. Further, the tools are often pseudo generic and individually tailored for the purposes of specific organisations and are unreflective. The sheer diversity of the sector is likely to contribute to these specific adaptations of indicator lists; there is no generic tool that can capture all of the work of these diverse agencies that comprise the voluntary sector. Given this, in my own research, I adopt a qualitative research approach. This will allow me to identify the specific missions of a variety of organisations, which will then allow me to examine whether or not their missions have been enhanced as reported to me by interviewees from within the organisations. This is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.



### **3 The Method**

In the previous chapter I concluded that the mass of literature on research undertaken to examine UK voluntary organisations' missions is dominated by examples of research in which pseudo generic methods have been adopted and tailored for individual needs; usually to assess (or promote) the contribution of a specific organisation or project. In this chapter, I move on to describe my own research approach. The chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section I describe the overall aims of my research. This includes the rationale for choosing my subject and my specific research questions. In the second section I discuss the way in which I carried out my research. This last section is further divided into four main parts: the use of qualitative research and the rationale for this; the sample frame and sampling; the interview method; and the pilot study. I close this chapter with a rapid discussion of the way in which data was stored and coded for analyses. The chapter is presented in a way that suggests a tidy orderly sequence. In practice, however, throughout the research there was some overlap between the different research phases and it was necessary to jump between them. Indeed, during my fieldwork I was constantly revising my approaches. This was largely due to challenges arising with the access to data, the diversity and constant changes built into the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) programme (see chapter 1) and the complexity and specificity of the voluntary organisations. In addition, the research questions were refined in response to data generated from the pilot and from my fieldwork.

#### **3.1 Research Aims**

Turning first to the overall aims of my research, as noted in earlier chapters the focus of my study is to understand the voluntary sector's ability to engage (successfully) with the government's New Deal employment initiatives. The relevance of this work lies in the wider context of central government's growing (and explicit) interest in the promotion of the voluntary sector's engagement in the delivery of public and welfare services and wider policy initiatives; whereby the sector is considered to bring about added-value by delivering benefits to the community and to society through their engagement with schemes such as those to help 'combat' social exclusion and to promote social inclusion. Indeed, with specific reference to the New Deal employment programmes the voluntary sector organisations are expected to provide work that can benefit communities (see introduction).

There is a growing body of literature on research undertaken to examine the sector's ability to engage in partnership with, for example, central and local government organisations. In many of these cases, and as noted at the beginning of my thesis, scholars have argued that whilst partnership initiatives with large institutions (including voluntary organisations themselves) can bring about opportunities for voluntary organisations such as increased funding opportunities they can equally be detrimental to them. For example, the need to meet government targets for one project may distract them from delivering their own aims and missions (for further discussions on partnership see, for example, Deakin 1995; Balloch and Taylor 2001; Glendinning et al. 2002). The voluntary sector's ability to successfully engage with the New Deal employment initiatives is, however, poorly understood: to recall from chapter one, despite the plethora of literature on research undertaken on New Deal employment initiatives there are only a few studies to do with the voluntary sector. Given this, my research aims to contribute towards filling this gap of knowledge using the example of voluntary organisations that operated as Individual Placement Providers (IPPs) and offered temporary employment opportunities to young people on the New Deal for Young People programme.

To address whether or not the voluntary sector can successfully engage with the programme I pose two main questions. The first: can voluntary organisation IPPs gain net benefits from the New Deal for Young People programme to enhance their missions? Originally, I anticipated I would identify their specific missions to, then, examine (as reported to me) whether or not the organisations were able to increase existing and to create new projects and services to achieve their missions. This was later extended to include direct and indirect contributions towards improving the quality of the delivery of existing projects and services; improvements to the organisations' daily operational aspects; and, in some cases, the benefits to the young New Dealers who were amongst the organisations' beneficiaries. The rationale for these amendments is discussed towards the end of the chapter. The second question is to do with whether or not the organisations are able to sustain engagement with the programme. Originally, I aimed to address this question by examining answers to the first question in connection with whether or not (and how and why) the voluntary organisations continued with the NDYP programme. However, once again, I have incorporated an

additional component; that is, whether or not the organisations that continued with the programme at the time of my fieldwork are likely to be able to maintain (successful) engagement with the programme in the longer term. This was in response to the perpetual changes built into the programme that are likely to have implications for the organisations' ability to (successfully) continue with the programme in the future. In particular, there were changes being implemented during my fieldwork that included significant reductions to both the amount of money made available to (some of) the organisations and the length of the New Deal placements (see chapter 6.3.4). Aside from these imminent changes, the additional question proved to be a significant component that contributed towards understanding whether or not the voluntary organisations can sustain engagement with the programme in general and is discussed in more detail in chapter seven.

To summarise, my research questions are:

- can voluntary organisation IPPs gain net benefits from the New Deal for Young People programme to enhance their missions?; and,
- can voluntary organisation IPPs sustain engagement with the programme in the long term?

### **3.2 Research Approach**

To remind the reader, from the literature reviewed in chapter two I concluded there is no generic tool to examine satisfactorily voluntary organisations' specific missions and therefore considered a qualitative method to be the most useful approach; in particular the semi-structured method.

#### *3.2.1 Rational for qualitative approach*

As noted in chapter two, using a qualitative approach allows me to gain information about the delivery of organisations' specific missions. I would, however, be misleading the reader if I suggested this to be the only reason for my choice. There are other methodological reasons for this. In particular, there is the inadequacy of approaches that involve converting social phenomena into numerical values to insert into formulae to calculate whether or not the organisations are able to deliver more or less services as a result of, for example, their engagement with the NDYP programme. As outlined above, one of the central questions in my research is to what extent the voluntary

organisations' engagement with the NDYP programme enhanced their missions. This requires understanding the positive and negative impacts arising from the programme to assess whether or their engagement led to overall net benefits that contributed towards advancing the organisations' missions. This, however, is not a tidy, straightforward task that can be captured from a formula to weigh up the benefits and the costs arising from the programme. For example, it is difficult to ascribe numerical values to soft impacts such as: the improvement to beneficiaries' (and to others') quality of life and improvements to the relationships between the organisations' staff (paid and unpaid) and the beneficiaries. In addition, it is impossible to anticipate and therefore account for unintended impacts. Interconnected and separate from this, impacts can materialize in a variety of ways across different levels in and outside of the organisation. Some impacts are more tangible than others that are softer and less obvious; some are more immediate than others that take longer to materialize and may not even be captured during the research process. Further, some may contribute directly, for example, to the processes of fulfilling (or obstructing) the delivery of the organisations' missions; whilst others have a more indirect impact. Even when benefits and problems are tangible, immediately obvious, and direct it is often very difficult to prove a casual link between, for example, the New Deal employment programme and the effect it has on the services that organisations deliver to their communities. This is because the organisations and their communities do not interact with young New Dealers in isolation; and other internal and external factors can produce changes in the quantity and quality of services delivered to communities.<sup>20</sup>

To complicate this further, it was apparent during the interview process that several of the voluntary organisation IPPs have (or had) multiple contracts with the same or different Managing Agents and whilst interviewees were asked to separate their comments about young New Dealers from those on other schemes, some found this difficult; particularly those who had relatively little direct contact with individuals on placement, and those who were describing experiences that occurred several years ago.

---

<sup>20</sup> Several of these points have been raised and discussed at length by scholars interested in evaluation research in general and on the voluntary sector; see for example, Kendall, 2003; and Sanderson, 2004

Tempting as it may be to design and implement a formula using tidy units of analysis to calculate, for example, whether or not the organisations achieved an increase in their output and outcomes to provide a concise picture of the benefits and the costs brought about to participating voluntary organisations this would create a false picture of what is a complex and fluid process. Given these reasons and the specificity of the organisations' missions, for this particular study I consider a more qualitative approach is better to address my research questions. In particular, I selected the semi-structured interview method and considered paid staff who worked in the voluntary organisation IPP as the most useful stakeholders to provide me with information relevant to my research questions. I discuss the interview method and my choice of stakeholder in more detail later on. For now, however, I move on to discuss how I selected the voluntary organisation IPPs.

### *3.2.2 Sample and sampling frame*

The study was carried out in Greater Manchester. Rather ambitiously and perhaps naively, my original intention was to compile a list of all the voluntary organisations that acted as IPPs on the NDYP Voluntary Sector Option in Greater Manchester since the programme's inception. This list would then be used as a sampling frame from which I would select a sample that would be representative of them. To compile my frame, I would need to contact representatives from each of the Jobcentre Plus's Employment Areas (then known as Units of Delivery, see chapter 1). In the very early stages of my fieldwork, however, it was apparent this task alone could take up most of the time designated to fieldwork and with little guarantee that I would be able to generate a comprehensive list of voluntary organisation IPPs. This was largely due to obstacles in gaining access to such lists. In the main, as explained to me by Jobcentre Plus's staff, this was to do with what they referred to as 'commercial confidentiality': the Jobcentre Plus's staff that I spoke to explained to me they were unable to provide names and contact details of any organisations with which they did not directly contract. I was advised about two alternative ways to collect the list.

The first way was to seek permission from what is now known as the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) and to then contact each Jobcentre Plus for their list of voluntary organisation IPPs (if I obtained permission). I was, however, advised the initial process of seeking permission could take several months. This presented me with

practical problems to do with risk and time. The risk that I would not get permission and the time waiting for this decision alone was likely to take up a large part of the time designated to fieldwork. The second option suggested by the Jobcentre Plus's staff was to contact each individual Managing Agent to request the lists of voluntary organisation IPPs. I was told there was a website on which I could find a list of all the agencies with which the jobcentres currently and directly contracted for the NDYP VSO. This list, however, turned out to include all agencies with which the Jobcentre Plus directly contracted for the NDYP VSO: training providers, managing agents and large IPPs. Again, however, due to the practical problems of risk and time this was not a viable option: the risk they would not provide the information I wanted and not enough time to decipher which of the organisations were the Managing Agents and to then contact each of them for their lists.

Given these difficulties, it was necessary to revise my approach and to concentrate my efforts on generating a more specific list of voluntary organisation IPPs from which I could draw a sample. The consequence of this, however, is that I cannot make any claims about whether or not my sample frame and thereby my sample is representative of voluntary organisation IPPs in Greater Manchester. This is because the population is unknown to me. On top of this, I cannot claim my research findings reflect the entirety of the diverse voluntary organisation IPPs in Greater Manchester. I return to this in my conclusions. Suffice to say, an alternative and more focused sampling frame was the most realistic option if I was to undertake and complete my research.

There are infinite ways I could select the Managing Agents. To name a few these include selection depending on: the socio-economic demographics of the area within which they operated; the delivery model adopted by the different employment areas; the different voluntary organisations that operated across the different areas in Greater Manchester; and a combination of these and other ways. There is always a sense of arbitrariness in the selection process. In the end I adopted an approach that can be considered as a variant of the second listed above; that is, I selected a number of Managing Agents, which I then contacted for the list of voluntary organisation IPPs with which they contracted. The choice and the number of Managing Agents was, however, determined by the selection of local authorities; I aimed to select local authorities that reflected mixed socio-economic demographics. Once these were

chosen, I then identified the Managing Agents that operated within these areas. Fundamentally, my selection was determined by practical issues: I selected local authorities that I could access by public transport (as I do not drive). I based my selection on local authorities instead of employment areas for two main reasons: first, in comparison with employment areas the local authorities' boundaries were relatively more constant. Indeed, as part of the restructuring of the Employment Service, Employment Areas were undergoing changes at the time of my fieldwork. Second, public information on socio and economic demographics can often be examined using local authorities rather than employment areas as a unit of analyses.

The two local authorities chosen: borough A and borough D comprise areas of affluence and pockets of severe local deprivation. Indeed, despite the affluence in these areas, they are amongst the three local authorities in Greater Manchester that have the highest unemployment rates. In addition, both areas comprise ethnically diverse populations in which one is notorious for its ethnic tensions.

Once selected, I identified three Managing Agents that (currently) operated in these areas: two in borough A and one in borough D. I managed to get access to lists from two of the three Managing Agents that covered the two boroughs: Agent X that operated in borough A and Agent Z that operated in borough D. Despite persistent and very determined efforts with letters, emails and endless telephone calls, I was unable to obtain lists from the third agent.

At the point of compiling the lists from the two Agents, it turned out that Agent X was responsible for serving an employment area that falls approximately within the boundaries of three Greater Manchester local authorities and, subsequently, provided me with a list of organisation IPPs in all three areas. I could see no reason not to include them in my study, On the contrary, this gave me the additional advantage to include IPPs from four rather than two of Greater Manchester's 10 local authorities.

In addition, there are three main variants in the way in which these two Agents operated that is to do with the local specificity built into the programme (discussed in chapter 1). In the case of Agent X, they served on an enhanced programme whereby the young New Dealers were given 12-month rather than six-month placements and the Voluntary

Sector Option and the Environmental Task Force Option were merged. Second, Agent X subcontracted an additional intermediary agency to manage smaller voluntary organisation IPPs (referred to as Agent Y). Third, Agent X directly contracted with large voluntary organisation IPPs with which there were significant variations in the amount of money available to each of them. In addition, some of the larger IPPs placed their young New Deal participants elsewhere, including public sector organisations. In contrast, Agent Z served in an employment area that covered one local authority; the young New Dealers participated on the standard six-month programme; on the VSO option alone; and the Agent offered uniform contracts to their IPPs. These differences contributed to the mess of potage that makes up the NDYP programme. Nevertheless, these differences were fortuitous for my research: they contributed to a richer understanding of the different factors that contributed towards explaining the organisation IPPs' different overall levels of success. This is discussed in more detail throughout later chapters.

Returning to the list of IPPs I compiled, in addition to the lists obtained from Agent X and Agent Z, I obtained a list from Agent Y (as noted above, this is the agent with which Agent X subcontracted to manage smaller voluntary organisation IPPs). From these Agents, I collected names and contact details for 115 organisations. This, however, is by no means a comprehensive list of all the voluntary organisations that engaged with the NDYP VSO in the four local authority areas. This is for several reasons. First, this does not necessarily include organisation IPPs from any previous Managing Agents that may have contracted in these areas. Second, as noted earlier, one of the Agents that operated in the areas did not provide me with a list of their VSO IPPs. Consequently, I cannot claim that my research reflects the entirety of voluntary organisation IPPs in these areas alone, let alone across Greater Manchester. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out the Agent that did not provide a list had only just started to operate on the NDYP VSO option in borough A. Further, it later transpired during my interviews that this agent started to recruit voluntary organisation IPPs that had existing contracts with Agent X. This suggests there would have been overlap in the list of IPPs. Third, some of the organisations engaged with other New Deal employment programmes and not on the NDYP programme and some engaged with the NDYP had not been in receipt of a young New Deal participant at any time. On top of this, there was a variety of organisations that do not fall into some people's definitions



of the voluntary sector; including private limited companies and projects in local authorities and the National Health Service. In addition, there were organisations that fall into the fuzzy, blurred boundaries, such as registered charity shops.

From the limited information available to me I excluded public sector and private sector organisations. Subsequently, I was left with a list of 99 organisations. This was equally spread across the three agents. Initially I aimed to devise a criterion to ensure a selection that reflected different characteristics of the voluntary organisations; including, for example, their total annual income; whether or not they were a branch organisations; whether or not they provided personal services; the types of services provided. However, I did not have complete information for this. Further, a sampling matrix resulting from the contribution of these criteria used more cells than organisations in my list. In the end, I used the criteria only as a rough guide to select a reasonable variety of the listed organisations.

I selected 30 organisations; 10 from each of the Agents. From this selection, three had closed or moved away; two were not suitable;<sup>21</sup> and three refused to participate in the study. I managed to replace seven of these eight. In total, then, I carried out interviews with representatives from 29 organisations engaged with the NDYP VSO and ETFO. These were conducted between 2003 and 2004; between five and six years since the inception of the programme. The sample is discussed in more detail in chapter four.

### *3.2.3 Semi-structured interviews*

As noted earlier, the qualitative approach adopted was semi-structured interviews. In all except one case, interviews were carried out with paid staff who had some direct involvement with their organisations' engagement with the programme. In the exception, at the time of my fieldwork the interviewee was on the management committee and previous to this was a member of staff during the organisations' engagement with the programme.

---

<sup>21</sup> one of the organisations engaged with the New Deal employment initiatives, but not specifically on the NDYP; the second organisation engaged with the NDYP but had never been in receipt of a young New Dealer

The people who it was most appropriate for me to interview were identified for me by staff within the organisations. They were the people who were considered most closely involved or best able to provide me with information about their organisations' engagement with the programme. In a few cases I was able to interview more than one paid staff member. In most cases, however, I was given one main contact point. This stage was relatively straightforward; I had anticipated staff to have moved elsewhere; particularly in the cases of the organisations that had engaged with the programme some time ago. Fortunately the organisations were relatively stable and formal. I return to this point in chapter four.

Turning to my rationale for choosing to interview paid staff from the voluntary organisations, to recall from the previous chapter, paid staff are one of several stakeholders who are interested in the work of voluntary organisations. Others include, for example, management and trustee board members; volunteers; beneficiaries; and funders. In the context of the NDYP, there are additional stakeholders, including: the young New Deal participants, the Managing Agents (usually the labour suppliers) and the Jobcentre Plus. Further, in previous chapters I noted there are people who advocate participatory approaches and the inclusion of different stakeholders' perspectives when undertaking research on the voluntary sector. I adopt neither of these. First, participatory approaches are not appropriate for the purpose of a PhD. Second, due to time and resource constraints I found it necessary to focus on one main group of stakeholders. I considered paid staff to be in the best position to provide me with information about their organisations' ability to engage with the NDYP programme. I am aware, however, that different stakeholders can provide different and useful angles and perspectives on this. Indeed, as discussed in chapter one, there has been research undertaken to examine the impact of the New Deal employment programmes on volunteers in voluntary organisations (Kumleben 2000).

For my research purposes I adopted the semi-structured interview method. This was considered more useful than other qualitative methods. In comparison with the observation method, for example, I considered the interview method to be more useful for two main reasons. First, for practical reasons to do with time and resources I would have to confine an observation study to a smaller number of organisations. However, I wanted to include several organisations in my study that would allow me to identify

different factors associated with the organisations themselves that may or may not contribute towards their overall levels of success with the programme. Second, the observation method would have meant confining my research to the organisations that were still engaged and in receipt of young New Deal participants. This would result in gathering data skewed towards those organisations that have been successful and those that have continued with the programme. In contrast, the interview method allowed me to include voluntary organisations that have withdrawn from the programme as well as those that did not have young New Deal participants at the time of my fieldwork. Indeed, during my fieldwork it became apparent that several of the organisations had not been in receipt of young New Deal participants for some time and were no longer continuing with the programme. As it turns out, there are reasons for this that are significant to addressing my research questions, as discussed in more detail in later chapters on the research findings.

The semi-structured interview method was considered more useful than both structured and unstructured interviews. In contrast with structured interviews, semi-structured interviews provided me with a sufficiently flexible tool to allow interviewees to identify what they considered to be pertinent issues to do with the benefits and the challenges arising from the programme; this is particularly useful in the context of researching an area where there is little existing information. In comparison with unstructured interviews, semi-structured interviews allowed me to identify common factors and make more systematic comparisons to understand the interviewees' different subjective accounts.

My interview schedule comprised a series of questions about the organisations themselves and about the way in which they engaged. In the case of questions about the organisations, these include their: missions, existing projects and services, their total annual income, the number of paid and unpaid staff, and whether they belonged to a network of bodies or a larger umbrella organisation. In the case of their engagement with the programme, questions included: the type of work given to the young New Dealers; the number of young New Dealers taken on in total and at any given time; the resources provided from the programme; and additional duties arising from their engagement with the programme; the benefits and problems arising with the young New Dealers; whether or not their organisations gained overall levels of success from

their engagement with the programme; and whether they continued and are likely to continue with the programme (see Appendix A).

The interview schedule was designed to gather information to examine the benefits and the costs arising from the programme and to elicit interviewees' subjective evaluations about their organisations' overall levels of success (and lack of success) with the programme. Subjective evaluations are a useful starting point to address my research questions and were used to analyse the extent to which the organisations gained net benefits to advance their missions and to understand the combination of factors that determined the overall levels of success. Clearly, my research relies heavily on constructed accounts. Indeed, in no way do I purport to have collected 'objective' and 'factual' evidence on the benefits and costs arising from the voluntary organisations' engagement with the programme. This does not make my approach any less valid or valuable than other research methods; albeit in different ways, all sociological methods of data collection are in the business of gathering information that is socially constructed. In observation methods, for example, the observers' selection, interpretation and analysis of what has been observed is constructed and in the survey method constructed meanings and definitions occur at, for example, the stage of devising questionnaires; during the collection of data (by the interviewer and the interviewee); and when interpreting and analysing data. This is a subject that has been extensively discussed (see, for example, Berger and Luckmann. 1966; Becker 1996). I neither have the time or the space available to me here to dwell on the philosophical issues associated with this. Suffice to say, in the context of my research the interviewees' perspectives are useful not only because they are well placed to understand the voluntary organisations' engagement with the programme but equally because the staff are in a position in which they are likely to play an influential role (directly and indirectly) in deciding whether or not (and how) their organisations' continue with the NDYP programme. Indeed, their perspectives can have important consequences on the organisations engagement with the NDYP programme; in this context, as William Thomas famously wrote, "If men define situations as real they are real in their consequences".<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> W. I Thomas *The child in America: Behavior problems and programs* (1928), cited from <http://en.wikipedia.org>

### *3.2.4 The pilot*

Turning to the pilot phase, the interview schedule was tested on three of the 29 organisations. The three pilot organisations are: one charity shop; one local community organisation; and one organisation that provided personal services to the local community (see chapter 4 for a description of these different types of organisations). Subsequent to the pilot, I dropped my final question in which I asked interviewees to identify ways the young New Dealers 'added benefits to their community' using seven different headings (see Appendix A). This is because it was apparent from the pilot that the interviewees did not think about the young New Dealers' contributions in this way (if at all). In part, this is because the young New Deal participants were given work that benefited the organisation's everyday operation rather than directly benefiting their communities. Moreover, it is because the interviewees did not consider contributions in such a divisive way. I did not consider a replacement question necessary because data about the contributions arising from the young New Dealers and the programme was generated from other questions in the interview-schedule.

The interviews were transcribed verbatim and data was stored and analyzed using the software package Atlas/ti.

#### **4. The Voluntary Organisation Individual Placement Providers**

In the previous chapter I discussed my main research questions and my approach to address them. In this chapter I describe the voluntary organisation Individual Placement Providers (IPPs) included in my study. To recall from chapter one, IPPs are organisations that provide temporary employment opportunities to the young New Dealers). I have divided the chapter into four main sections. In the first section I have written a pen portrait for each IPP in which I describe some of their key characteristics and their relation to NDYP programme. Next, I discuss the contractual arrangements between IPPs and the Managing Agents (as noted in chapter 1, Managing Agents are also known as the Option Administrators). In the third section I examine the voluntary organisation IPPs' primary reasons for engaging with the programme. And, finally, I move on to look at the type of work offered to the young New Dealers with a closing paragraph on the distribution of the New Deal posts that were filled at the time of my fieldwork.

##### **4.1 IPP Pen portraits**

Like the voluntary organisations that comprise the 'loose and baggy monster' described in chapter two, the 29 IPPs in my study vary on several dimensions. For instance, some of them aim to benefit a specific community of interest, such as: the young, the elderly and victims of crime, whilst others serve those who live in a particular area or have broader missions to an unspecified group. There is a mix between those who offer direct services to clients and others who do not. Some are independent organisations, whereas others operate within a wider framework of structures, belonging to, for example, a parent body or a federation. They vary in their size, including: the number of paid and unpaid staff and their total annual income. On top of this they differ in the way in which they engage with the NDYP programme, including: the number of young New Dealers they take on and whether they are on the standard six-month or enhanced 12-month programme (see chapter 3.2.2). To provide a clearer picture of the 29 IPPs in my study, I introduce each of them using pen portraits, outlining some of their key characteristics. I have assigned numbers to them. These numbers bare no relation to coding assigned to quotations in later chapters. This is, as far as possible, to retain the IPPs' anonymity.

### Organisation 1

This agency is a branch of a wider national network organisation and is one of three in the district with which it is located. The services primarily offered by this branch are general and legal advice to residents and to those who work in the local area. For example, advice on welfare benefits, debt and family relationships. This particular office operates a telephone advice service for clients across the district. The office is open one day per week for clients to call in. In addition they offer outreach services at, for example, GP practices and the local hospitals. The organisation has access to the district budget, a total annual income of almost £1 million. This branch has 13 out of the district's 43 paid staff. The majority of the 13 paid staff is full-time. In addition, the branch has 15 out of the district's 60 volunteers. These 15 volunteers are primarily long-term, having worked in the organisation for more than 10 years. There are two main types of work: advice and administration. Those staff (paid and unpaid) who do advice work are required to undergo internal training.

This organisation engaged with the standard six-month NDYP programme for approximately five years and took on a total of three young New Dealers. Prior to and during the time of their engagement with the NDYP, this branch (and others belonging to the same parent organisation) was struggling to recruit paid and unpaid advice workers. The organisation took on young New Dealers to 'plug the gap', with the long-term view to recruit suitable young New Dealers as paid staff. Nevertheless, this particular branch organisation only offered administration work. This is because it would take longer than six months to train them for advice work. The organisation no longer engages with the NDYP programme.

### Organisation 2

This agency is part of a national federation that share the same philosophy but operate independently from each other. The organisation's primary aim is to provide legal advice and in some cases representation to clients who live and work in their district. The organisation has an annual income of approximately £1 million. There are 11 paid staff, anticipated to increase to 13 staff in the next few months. The paid staff are a mix of part- and full-time members. In addition, they have four volunteers, again part and full time. Volunteers tend to be well educated and training in certain fields of the law.

This organisation engaged with the standard six-month programme and offered administrative work to the young New Dealers. The organisation's length of engagement with the programme was not known but they had supervised at least three young New Dealers. The willingness to take on (future) young New Dealers was dependent on the availability of suitable volunteers.

### Organisation 3

This agency is part of a network of over 400 branch organisations across the UK and is one of 14 that operate under the guidance of a Head Office covering Greater Manchester. Their main aim is to support victims of crime. This involves a variety of work including general advice and practical support, such as fitting locks to doors and windows for those who have been burgled. In addition, they are involved in strategic partnerships with other organisations across sectors on issues to do with crime and disorder. These 14 organisations have a total budget of almost £2 million, which is distributed by the national parent body. This money funds 37 paid staff across Greater Manchester. The organisation in my study has six paid staff. Their local authority contributes towards the salary of one of these six staff. In addition, the organisation has a relatively stable group of volunteers, approximately 23. They deliver most of the front-line services to the organisation's clients, including home visits. To do this, however, they must undergo extensive internal training.

The organisation has engaged with the standard six-month programme over the last two years and has been in receipt of a total of five young New Dealers. As a general rule, the young New Dealers were given a variety of work to do in the office; however, in one exceptional case, the young New Dealer was given the opportunity to work with clients. This organisation has not been offered young New Dealers for some time; subsequently, the organisation's staff assumed the programme was defunct.

### Organisation 4

This organisation is what is commonly referred to as a community centre and is set within a multiply deprived area of Greater Manchester. The centre offers affordable space to community groups, including those that serve senior citizen groups and outreach work to those with disabilities. In addition, the centre offers before- and after-school clubs for children whose parents work and are in full-time education. There are



eight staff, one is full-time and is the manager of the centre. The remaining staff are: cleaners, caretakers and child carers. The organisation has a total annual income of £77,000.

This community centre has engaged with the standard six-month programme since 1998 and taken on approximately six young New Dealers in total. They take on two at any given time and offer caretaker and administrative work. As yet, none of the young New Dealers have completed their full-term in this centre. Like the organisation described immediately above, this centre has not had any young New Dealers for some time.

#### Organisation 5

This is an established community centre that primarily offers services to local residents who are from South Asian origin, in particular Pakistan. The centre is located in a new purpose built property but has served the local community for over a decade. The centre offers diverse services and activities that reflect the needs of their local community. These include advice on housing, employment opportunities and health. In addition, the centre offers activities for the young and for the elderly. Their total annual income is approximately £115,000.

The centre has engaged with the standard six-month NDYP programme since 1998, that is, for six years. They have been in receipt of a total of two young New Dealers who were given administrative work. Again, this organisation has not been in receipt of young New Dealers for some time.

#### Organisation 6

This is an established community centre that has been in existence for over 20 years. This organisation has an annual income of approximately £120,000 and is located in a modern renovated building. Prior to this, the agency worked in less desirable office and had a much smaller total annual income. The centre offers a diverse range of services to its local community and whilst it aims to offer services to a variety of individuals, a large proportion are from South Asian backgrounds; reflecting the socio-demographics of the local area. The services include: advice on disability, health, benefits and immigration. Outside agencies come to help provide these services. The centre offers

youth services, such as: youth clubs and advice about routes in to employment. In addition, they offer classes, including: sewing, keep-fit, beauty and karate. There are also after-school clubs and several other services.

This community organisation engaged with the standard six-month programme approximately three years ago and has only placed one young New Dealer during this time.

#### Organisation 7

This is a shop located on a side street off the local town shopping mall. The main aim of the shop is to make money for their parent body. The aim of the parent body is to alleviate poverty at international level. The shop primarily sells donated goods, nevertheless they also sell their own brand goods, including fair-trade consumables. There is one paid full-time staff, the shop manager and an estimated 22 staff who are a mix of volunteers and unpaid workers from various employment and skills training programmes, some of whom are full-time and others part-time.

The shop has been engaged with the standard six-month programme for approximately 18 months. In this time, they have been in receipt of approximately five young New Dealers. The young New Dealers are given stockroom and shop floor work, including: sorting, steaming and pricing stock, serving customers and operating the till. At present, the shop does not have any young New Dealers but two were due to start within weeks of my interview with the shop manager.

#### Organisation 8

This shop is one street away from the shop described immediately above. The shop's main aim is to make as much money as possible for the parent body. This in turn has an aim to fund research on mental health and to advocate for improvements on the delivery of mental health services. The shop employs one full-time paid staff, the manager. There are several other staff, including volunteers and workers from different employment and skills training schemes.

Again, like the shop described immediately above, this shops offers young New Dealers shop floor and stockroom work. The shop has engaged with the six-month

programme for several years. In total the shop has been in receipt of approximately eight New Dealers. They were not in receipt of New Dealers when I interviewed them.

#### Organisation 9

This shop is near the two shops described immediately above and has a prominent position by the town's shopping centre. The shop's main aim is to raise money for their parent body, which in turn aims to raise awareness about physical health and to support structures for training professionals in the care, research and development industry. There are two paid staff: one full-time manager and one part-time stock controller. The remaining staff consist of volunteers and individuals from employment and skill training schemes. At present they have approximately 10 unpaid staff; until recently there were up to 30. The reduction is due to the end of placements on schemes and younger volunteers moving into paid work. They have a total annual income of £280,000. It was unclear whether this annual income is district or nation wide.

The shop is engaged with the six-month programme and at present has three young New Dealers. Like other shops in my study, the young New Dealers in this shop were given a variety of tasks to prepare stock, including: sorting, hanging, steaming, pricing and till-work. Since the (new) manager's arrival the shop has been in receipt of 10 young New Dealers.

#### Organisation 10

This agency operates across one of the Greater Manchester districts. There are other equivalent agencies that operate under the same name across the UK. Their main aim is to improve the quality of elderly people's lives. This is achieved through a variety of activities and services, including: advocacy, care work and insurance sales. This particular agency operates with an annual income over £800,000 and employs 60 staff, full and part-time. In addition, they have a substantial volunteer force.

This organisation engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme in 1998 for two or three years. It is one of the larger organisations that bid for funds that were based on economies-of-scale (discussed later on). At the time of their engagement, this organisation offered different types of work to the young New Dealers, including:

cleaning, cooking, care and administration and sales work. This organisation no longer engages with the NDYP programme.

#### Organisation 11

This agency belongs to a larger company of enterprise organisations with social objectives; some of which are registered charities. The overall aim of the company is to provide help to those who are 'under served' and who are excluded from mainstream society. They do this by offering a variety of services on, for example, employment and skills training; advice on housing and on health problems. The agency in my study offers employment and skills training opportunities, has 25 paid workers and has a total annual income of £4 million. Whilst there may be volunteers elsewhere, this agency did not have them.

The organisation engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme between 1998 and 2002 (inclusive). During their first year of engagement they were contracted for 15 New Deal posts at any given time. In subsequent years this increased to 20, 30 and 40. They were given sufficient amounts of money from the programme to hire additional staff to support their young New Dealers. A variety of posts across the different organisations within the company and elsewhere were offered to them, and includes: childcare, community development and general office and administration. Precise figures on the total amount of young New Dealers taken on was not available, but was estimated at over 100.

#### Organisation 12

This organisation is situated in the back streets of a busy city centre. It is part of a wider national network of branches with several layers of structures. The aim of the organisation is to offer general and legal advice to citizens and residents in their area. Including this branch there are six that operate across the district, of which this is the head office. The total annual income for all six branches was estimated at £1.1 million.

This branch engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme in 1998 for approximately three years. During their engagement, young New Dealers were offered two types of post: administrative and advice work. Broadly, this reflects the type of work available in the organisation for paid and unpaid staff. The New Dealers who did

administrative work were given external training and those who did advice work were given internal training. This organisation was given additional amounts of money for their engagement with the programme. Nevertheless, this was not sufficient and they made several (failed) attempts to negotiate and increase this. They subsequently withdrew their engagement from the programme.

### Organisation 13

This organisation is the equivalent to that described immediately above, in a neighbouring district. There are five offices that operate across the district, of which this is the head office. There are 30 paid staff in this branch, the majority of who are full-time workers and 60 volunteers. The staff are evenly distributed across three types of work: administration, advice (general and specialist); and outreach. The total annual income for the organisation is just under £1 million district-wide.

Again like the organisation described immediately above, this organisation engaged with the enhanced-12 month programme until approximately 2001. They offered two types of work to the young New Dew Dealers: administrative and advice. The former received external training and the latter internal. Approximately 15 young New Dealers were given work at any given time. Unlike their equivalent branch described immediately above, they managed to obtain increased (significant) amounts of money from the programme after the initial year of their engagement. Nevertheless, like their equivalent organisations, they still withdrew their engagement from the NDYP programme.

### Organisation 14

This IPP is one of several organisations across the UK and operates across one of the 10 districts in Greater Manchester. It is made up of different organisations some of which are registered charities and others that are company limited but that have social objectives. They have broad aims to help promote and create a more sustainable environment. They run a series of projects at various levels (national, regional and local) that cut across different sectors in society. For example, this organisation has delivered projects to encourage elderly people to use communal areas and go for walks to help develop friendships and improve their health. Other projects include encouraging businesses to come together to look at ways of improving, for example,

street lighting. The total annual income for this particular group is estimated at £2.6 million.

This IPP (and other affiliated organisations) was one of the players in the design and consultation of the NDYP Environmental Task Force Option (ETFO). They have engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme since 1998. In comparison to other IPPs in my study, they offer the highest amount of young New Dealer posts: a maximum of 90 at any given time, some of which are seconded elsewhere. At present they obtain significant amounts of money from the programme to hire additional staff to support their young New Dealers. The work offered to the young New Dealers has been created specifically for them and include: street patrollers and cleaners. The street patrollers work in the city centre and can help shoppers and residents with directions and report incidents such as fly tipping and needles. The latter clean up the areas and maintain and paint public furniture. Other work with partnership local authorities include: landscaping and collecting residents' refuse.

#### Organisation 15

This organisation is located in an area that is set for a series of regeneration initiatives, including: house clearance and the creation of sustainable homes. The main aim of this IPP is to promote cultural, economic and environmental sustainability, with particular emphasis on the environment. Several of their projects are specific to the community within which they are located; nevertheless, their aims are much broader and they work at district and national level. The projects they have undertaken include: a community garden for local residents, healthy eating for local residents and children at local schools and the restoration of a derelict building using reclaimed materials (for their offices). The organisation has six core staff, many of whom are part-time. They employ additional staff on a project basis. In addition they have ad-hoc volunteers who work on particular projects and help with the organisation of conferences and events. Their total annual income is £231,000.

This IPP is engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme. Unlike most other organisations in this study, their engagement was for two discrete years to work specifically on two (of their three) building phases. In the first phase, they took on 15 young New Dealers and in the second they took on 10. Using the money they obtained

from the programme and from elsewhere, they bought in specialist building companies to train young New Dealers in carpentry skills.

#### Organisation 16

This is a housing association. Their aim is to offer affordable homes to rent and to buy and is for residents in one of the Greater Manchester districts. There is a complex structure with subsidiary organisations and a recent merge with another organisation. On its own, the organisation operates with 121 staff (part-time and full-time) and with the merge extends to 297. Generally, the organisation does not tend to have volunteers. The total annual income of the organisation is £3.3million (with the merge). Despite what appears to be a large amount of money, as a housing association there are high material costs (bricks and mortar) in comparison with many other organisations in this study. Further, the figure of paid staff is a recent reduction; during the process of restructuring there have been many redundancies.

This IPP has engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme since 1998. Generally, they take on approximately 25 young New Dealers at any given time; some of which are placed elsewhere. In the past they have offered a variety of posts, including: painters and decorators; building assistants; estate rangers; community and safety officers; and general office and finance administrators. At present this organisation is in receipt of a few young New Dealers. This is due to changes being made to their NDYP contracts. Further, the variety of posts they offer to the young New Dealers is currently under review and is due to changes being implemented to the programme at the time of my fieldwork (see chapters: 6.3.4 and 7.3.2).

#### Organisation 17

This organisation is not affiliated to any other organisation and is a registered charity. Their main aim is to provide affordable transport to community groups and those who are less mobile. The organisation has 40 minibuses and has a total annual income of £370, 000. They have 23 paid staff: six are full-time and the remaining are part-time workers.

This organisation engaged with the enhanced programme in 1998 until they relocated offices a couple of years ago (2001). During their engagement with the programme,

they took on approximately eight young New Dealers at any given time and an estimated total of 20. They offered a mix of posts, including: general office and administration, cleaning and maintaining vehicles and driving minibuses (depending on appropriate driving licences). There are plans for this organisation to relocate and reengage with the programme.

#### Organisation 18

This IPP is a project situated within the NHS. It operates across one of the Greater Manchester districts. Their main aim is to provide support to clients who experience problems with mental health, alcohol and drug use. Generally, they are offered help to become volunteers, access education and training opportunities and employment. The resources for this IPP have recently been reduced and subsequently the number of staff has gone down from three to one full-time and one part-time staff. A few volunteers are used on a needs basis to help with, for example, administration and producing reports. The total annual income for this project is between £30,000 and £60,000.

The organisation engaged with the enhanced 12-month NDYP programme during the earlier years of the programme (exact year unspecified). They have taken on a total of two young New Dealers who did primarily office work. They have not been in receipt of young New Dealers for some time.

#### Organisation 19

This organisation operates across the North West region and is part of one UK charity that has been around for over two decades. There are several equivalent regional offices elsewhere in the UK. Their main aim is to help disadvantaged young people by, for example, offering financial assistance, mentoring and personal development. Their total annual income for the North West is approximately £4.3 million.

This organisation engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme in 1998. Their primary role was not as an IPP; instead they were contracted as a Training Provider. Nevertheless, during their engagement they offered one New Deal post in administration. They engaged with the programme for three years but were not successful in their subsequent bid to be a New Deal Training Provider.



### Organisation 20

This IPP is located in an area of multiple deprivation that is densely populated and surrounded by high rise flats. The IPP was set up over 20 years ago to serve the local community. They offer activities such as pool for the young, bingo for the elderly and crèche facilities for families with young children. In addition, they offer a variety of services depending on the needs of their community, including: advice on housing and benefits, projects to engage young people, such as bike repairs and employment guidance. This IPP has three paid staff: one full-time and two part-time and a team of volunteers. The number of volunteers is variable. All staff (paid and unpaid) 'chip' in as and when needed; there are various types of work depending on the needs at the time. Their total annual income is approximately £80,000.

This organisation engages with the enhanced 12-month programme and is not in receipt of money for this. So far, they have taken on approximately five young New Dealers over five years. Except for young New Dealers who are given the administration post, they are expected to work on a variety of projects and activities.

### Organisation 21

This IPP is located just off a main road and backs into a residential area that has high concentrations of black minority ethnic households, particularly Asian. It is purpose built and shares the same land as the affiliated Mosque. Like the IPP described immediately above, this IPP is a community centre for local people. Unlike the organisation above, the services offered are primarily for those who are of Asian background. The IPP offers a variety of activities, including: IT classes, fitness classes, health and drug awareness workshops. In addition, other services are dependent on the needs of their local community. They have an annual income of £30,000. Despite having a much smaller income than, for example, the organisation above it has more full-time staff: approximately five. One of these staff is paid directly through the organisation; the remaining four are seconded from other organisations.

The organisation has been engaged with the NDYP programme since 2000. The young New Dealers are expected to do a variety of work depending on the individual needs of the organisation's community. In total they have been in receipt of one young New Dealer.

### Organisation 22

This IPP is set within the back streets of a busy vibrant city centre. They have been in operation for over two decades. Their main mission is to promote (access to) art to marginalised communities across their district by giving them money to produce art. For example, a refugee was given money to help bring together people from socially deprived areas to put on a performance. This IPP has four full-time core staff. Nevertheless, they paid over 100 freelances in their previous financial year. This IPP does not usually have volunteers in the office, but volunteers do work on the different art projects funded by them. The IPP's total annual income is £305,000.

This IPP engages with the enhanced 12-month programme and is not currently in receipt of money for doing this. They had two young New Dealers at the time of my fieldwork and approximately four in total. Like other core staff, the young New Dealers work in the office and do administrative work.

### Organisation 23

This is an established organisation that has operated for over 20 years. Their main aim is to bring together elderly people from a particular Asian background to reduce the risks of isolation. They serve a community across Greater Manchester and neighbouring conurbations. The organisation has grown rapidly in recent years and has 13 paid staff: four full-time and nine part-time. They have approximately 40 volunteers and their total annual income is £365,000.

This IPP has been engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme since 2000. They do not obtain money for doing this. In total, they have taken on one young New Dealer who did administrative work. They are hoping to take on another young New Dealer in the near future.

### Organisation 24

This IPP is set on a street with several warehouse units. It is one of seven organisations across the UK. Their main aim is to alleviate poverty by offering affordable furniture and transport to those in need. In addition, they work on environmental issues, particularly recycling and land waste. There are 10 paid staff: nine full-time and one

part-time. In addition, they have volunteers; the numbers fluctuate at any given time. Their total annual income is £1.9 million nationwide.

This IPP has been engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme since 1998. The young New Dealers are offered a variety of posts, including: sales, lifting and shifting and driving. At the time of my fieldwork, two young New Dealers had just finished and two were near to completing their work experience. The organisation has taken on at least seven young New Dealers in total. This figure may be higher, however, there was some confusion about other workers in the organisation who may be on the NDYP programme (with a different Managing Agent).

#### Organisation 25

This IPP is a branch of a wider national network of organisations. This particular branch has been around for almost two decades and receives directive from its head office (at district level). Their main aim is to help those who have been victims of crime; this involves a variety of work including general advice and practical support, such as fitting locks and chains to people's doors (see also organisation 3). This agency operates with two paid full-time staff and 14 volunteers. The paid staff work in the office and the volunteers are trained to provide support to the organisation's clients. The total annual income for all the branches that operate in Greater Manchester is £2.6 million.

This branch has engaged with the enhanced 12-month NDYP programme since 1998 and does not receive money for this. Like their paid staff, young New Dealers are given administrative and general office work. In total they have been in receipt of two young New Dealers, one at any given time.

#### Organisation 26

This agency is located in a residential area. It is part of a national network of organisations that aim to work towards ending violence against women and children. They offer a variety of services, including: temporary accommodation, help with solicitor and hospital visits and general support to their clients and their children. This particular IPP has four paid staff and does not have volunteers.

The IPP has been engaged with the NDYP programme since 2001. They are in receipt of one young New Dealer at any given time and have had a total of three. They offer the young New Dealers posts in play work.

#### Organisation 27

This agency has been around for a decade. It is located on a wide road in a residential area. Their main aim is to alleviate poverty by providing affordable furniture and household goods to those in most need. Other aims include volunteering and training opportunities and to support the environment through recycling and reusing material. Through their recent success in obtaining money from a national funding body they have increased their total annual income to £100,000. Subsequently they increased from one to five paid staff. The number of volunteers is variable and can range from two through to eight on any given day.

This organisation does not engage with the NDYP programme and, therefore, has not been in receipt of any young New Dealers. They have engaged on several other New Deal employment programmes. There was some confusion about their status of engagement on the NDYP prior to being interviewed.

#### Organisation 28

This IPP is supported by a national registered charity that aims to improve children's lives. The IPP is located in an area with high levels of multiple deprivation. The IPP's main aim is to support local families. This support includes services to improve their: physical and mental health; education; training opportunities. They also offer crèche facilities to families with young children. The agency has approximately 30 paid staff (a mix of full and part-time) and their total annual income is £543,000.

The organisation has been engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme since 1998. Despite advertising two New Deal posts, they have only had one young New Dealer at any given time and have taken on approximately five in total.

#### Organisation 29

This is a typical registered charity shop located in the side street of a small shopping centre. Like other shops in this study, their ultimate aim is to raise as much money as

possible for their parent body through the sell of primarily donated goods. The parent body aims to fund research and to promote aspects of health across the UK. The shop has one full-time staff and several volunteers who vary in their time and commitment.

The shop has been engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme for several years. They obtain a small amount of money from the programme for this. In total the organisation has been in receipt of approximately six young New Dealers. These young New Dealers are given a variety of shop work from: pricing, till operator, sorting and steaming. At national level, the parent organisation has a total annual income that goes over £100 million.

The pen portraits immediately above provide a snapshot for each of the 29 IPPs. Their key characteristics are summarised in the multi-layered table below, Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 IPPS' key characteristics and their relation to the NDYP programme

							No.
Branch or larger network	Yes						

Table 4.1 immediately above is not an accurate summary of the organisations' key characteristics. This is because some of the numbers are estimates, others have been produced from ranges (in these cases I have calculated the average and rounded up to the nearest figure) and because some information varied at any given time. Despite this, the table can provide an overview of the IPPs in this study. In brief, the majority are branches and part of a larger network (20 out of 28 IPPs) and more than half had the equivalent of four full-time paid staff (17 out of 24 organisations). Furthermore, the total annual income tends to be more than £250,000. This figure, however, is a less useful indication on the size of the IPPs in this study. This is because it was sometimes at district, regional and national level. Aside this, what can be said is the IPPs in my study tended to be more established organisations (discussed in more detail later on). In relation to the NDYP programme, most of the organisations engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme (19 out of 28 organisations) and took on between one and two young New Dealers at any given time (17 out of 26 organisations). The variations in their contractual arrangements and the types of work offered to the young New Dealers are described in more detail later on.

#### *4.1.1 Types of organisation*

To manage the data about the IPPs I have sorted them into three types of organisation: community, service and retail-charity shop. Briefly, the first type consists of agencies that primarily aim to serve a spatially defined community; usually their local neighbourhood. In addition, they tend to provide flexible and responsive services, depending on the needs of their community. In contrast, the second type, service organisation, consists of agencies that offer services to a specific interest group, such as the homeless and the elderly, and those who offer specialized services (often to a less defined community), such as legal services. The third category, retail-charity shop, consists of agencies that trade primarily in donated goods to raise money for their parent body.

It is difficult to make any definitive distinctions between these three types and the boundaries between them can sometimes blur; particularly service and community organisations. Indeed, depending on what is compared and examined, it is likely that some of the organisations will have more in common with those falling into different

categories than with those sharing the same one. However the categories are helpful to begin to sort and describe the mass of data collected about the various organisations in this study.

Amongst the 29 organisations there is a high concentration of service organisations (19 out of 29 organisations). The remaining 10 consist of six community organisations and four retail-charity shops. This uneven distribution reflects the sample frame from which they were selected.

### Service Organisations

In the case of the 19 service organisations, there were variations at several levels. For instance, some offered services to an interest group, including the young, elderly, homeless, individuals with mental or drug-related problems, and victims of crime. There were other organisations that offered personal or impersonal, specialised or specific services to a less defined community. These include legal advice, the provision of affordable furniture and affordable transport. In these cases, despite serving a less defined community, they tended to serve the socially and economically excluded in a broad sense. Indeed, frequent reference was made to 'the vulnerable' and 'the marginalized'. In addition, there were other organisations that offered services to a less tangible community, such as the environment at large, and tended to serve a particular geographical area. To provide a glimpse of the variety of service organisations, I have listed their primary missions in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Service organisations' primary missions

Service organisations' main mission	No.
To help victims of crime (including domestic abuse)	3
To offer general and legal advice and campaign for people's rights	3
To provide advice and care for the elderly	2
(one of which is for a specific ethnic group)	
To create sustainable communities, with an environmental focus	2
To create access to the arts for marginalized communities	1
To provide affordable furniture and affordable transport	1
To provide affordable furniture	1
To provide opportunities for the 'under served' and campaign	1
To provide affordable transport	1
To provide and maintain affordable homes	1
To help the young disadvantaged	1
To support those with drug, alcohol and mental health problems	1
To provide legal advice	1
19 Service Organisations.	
Source: PhD dataset, 2004	

In addition to the diversity across the organisations' missions, several had multiple missions and all of them offered several types of service and activity to their community. To demonstrate, one service organisation alone has multiple missions to help create a borough that is sustainable in a 'cultural', 'economic', 'environmental', and 'social' sense; and provides a variety of projects to different geographical communities. These include local projects to benefit their neighbourhood, such as: community outreach work, supporting and maintaining a community garden; and the delivery of fruit and vegetables to schools. In addition, they offer projects at a borough level. Overall, their vision for sustainability surpasses geographical boundaries and their work directly and indirectly benefits those with similar interest.

... different people benefit in different ways... [we] work with what we call our community of interest: that is people [borough A]-wide, Greater Manchester-wide, and even nationally; [those] who are already campaigning on the sort of issues that we're supporting. So this [place] is used as a venue for a lot of national conferences and things. People can come here and access resources... and other centres are benefiting from what we're doing because what we've actually discovered is we're actually quite unique, lots of other centres are educational centres or they're community centres ... we we're trying to do a bit of everything, so we do sort of outreach and education...

Service Organisation: P19 (5)<sup>23</sup>

The diversity within one organisation alone is a recognised characteristic of voluntary organisations. Indeed, in the article that I referred to in chapter two, *A loose and baggy monster*, Kendall and Knapp (1995) argue this very characteristic makes it difficult to define the voluntary sector by the mission and the services its component organisations deliver.

In addition, there are variations to do with the staff across my services organisations. In all 19 cases they had paid staff and most of them took on a mixture of unpaid staff. These include volunteers and those from a variety of employment and skills training schemes. Further, there were variations in the way in which they trained and managed paid and unpaid staff and the extent to which they depended on the unpaid staff to deliver their missions.

Despite the variations described above, most of the organisations are branch service organisations attached to a larger parent body (15 out of the 19 service organisations;

---

<sup>23</sup> Unless otherwise specified, throughout this thesis the quotations are sourced from PhD dataset, 2004



more than half of the 29 organisations in this study). Consequently, as noted earlier the total annual income figures collected about them are not straightforward because they figures on different scales, including county, regional and national level. As of result, it is not possible to say anything definitive about the size of the organisations in terms of their annual income, which is one of the most common ways in which voluntary organisations are classified (NCVO 2006a). To illustrate, from the available data, the majority of the service organisations generated incomes near to £1 million per annum. One might therefore conclude these are large service organisations. Nevertheless, the majority of organisations in my study were branch organisations that did not have access to such budgets and several of them could only afford to hire a small number of paid staff (see Table 4.1). Despite difficulties in being able to say anything definitive about the size of service organisations in terms of income, what can be said is they are not the smallest or the largest of the organisations comprising the voluntary sector.

### Community Organisations

In the case of the six community organisations in my study, because of the way in which I have defined this type, all six primarily aimed to serve their local community. In three cases there was the additional dimension in which they aimed to benefit individuals from a particular ethnic and religious group. Like service organisations, all six community groups offer multiple services and activities. Unlike service organisations, however, these services tend to be flexible and responsive, tailored to the needs of their beneficiaries. This is typically described by one of the organisation interviewees:

[the organisation's mission is] to provide for the needs of the local people and generally it is identified by them; it's no point in us identifying for them – they know what their needs are, they tell us and we provide accordingly...

Community Organisation: P22 (2)

Like many other voluntary organisations, the life span and the extent of the services provided by community organisations varies and, to a large extent, is dependent on the capacity of staff and volunteers and the project funding available to them. It is not unusual for community organisations (whether by choice or because of their limited capacity) to obtain funding for small-scale, short-lived projects. For example, one organisation obtained three months funding to hold fitness classes for women:

... I managed to obtain a really small grant for Asian women because there was a survey done which said that Asian women comparatively aren't participating enough within

health-related services which are on offer. So we actually with that grant we actually got someone who's a qualified aerobics teacher to run classes here. Unfortunately, the money was only for three months and is about to run out.

Community Organisation: P23 (6)

This means that, other than the general aim of providing needs for their local community, service provision in community organisations are often time-specific.

This ad-hoc, short-term service provision by community organisations tends to contrast with that of service organisations. Whilst service organisations, like other organisations, vary across time, their service provision is relatively more constant than those of community organisations. For example, one service organisation that focuses on providing general and legal advice has undergone many organisational changes during its existence; nevertheless it continues to deliver services similar to those at its inception:

... we've been doing some research into cases we used to deal with in the 'sixties... and when you look the cases are no different... they're still you know lots of relationship problems and money problems and things like that...

Service Organisation: P1 (6)

Returning to the community organisations, their total annual income tends to be smaller than that of service organisations, and ranges from £30,000 to £543,000. However, unlike most of the service organisations, the annual income figures provided for community organisations were generally generated by and used by the immediate organisation itself. These income figures are generally proportional to the number of salaried staff. This said, the organisation with the lowest income had more paid staff than one might expect from their annual income. This is because it received donations-in-kind; including paid staff seconded from elsewhere. Further, the organisation with the highest annual income belongs to and is financially dependent on a larger association. Given these points, if the lowest and highest figures are removed the total annual income range changes to £77,000 to £123,000.

Despite their relatively small budgets and even though they are likely to have experienced changes to the way in which and the extent to which they are organised and funded, several of the community organisations in my study are surprisingly stable. They have been established in their community for several years, some for several decades, and many have paid staff who have worked in the organisation for some time. In addition, two of the organisations are affiliated to other organisations; one is attached

to a religious building and the other is associated with a larger UK charitable association.

Like the service organisations, all of the community organisations had paid staff and only some had volunteers. In comparison, community organisations that took on volunteers were more likely than their service organisation counterparts to have an informal arrangement with their volunteers in which they were used on an ad-hoc bases. This, however, did not make the volunteers any less useful to the organisation, but instead reflects the less formal way with which the community organisations operated.

### Shops

I now turn to the four retail-charity shops, hereon mostly referred to simply as shops. In contrast with the service and the community organisations, the shops' primary purpose does not involve direct service delivery to benefit the community. Instead, in all four cases it is to raise revenue for their larger parent body; as one interviewee typically stated, the primary aims is 'to make as much money as we possibly can'. Ultimately, the profit generated from them is used to support the charitable purposes of the parent organisation. Indeed, income from retail-charity shops has become an increasingly important source of charity funding (Whithear 1999; Parsons 2004).

The profit generated from the shops in this study support wider, and even global, missions. These include benefits to people who suffer with mental and physical health problems, and on a wider scale, the relief of poverty and suffering around the world. In addition to these broad benefits, the managers from all four shops talked about different ways in which shop activities benefited the local community. By local community, shop managers often referred to the shops' volunteers and their customers.

... I think it [the shop] plays a big part in the community, with volunteers. A lot of the volunteers get a lot out of it: they're not just helping us you know, we help them as well. It's a two way thing. A lot of people come to us when they're bereaved, or got personal problems and it helps them get over things like that. Within the community it's seen as a place to drop in and have a chat, you know as well as being able to buy whatever they need here ... I think it serves a good number of causes, but obviously the main overall cause is to make as much money as we can.

Shop: P7 (10)

The evidence of pastoral care in shops, which is clearly captured in the quotation above, is also recognized in academic literature about this sector (Parsons 2004).

Once again, like most other organisations in this study, the shops belonged to a larger parent body; and the annual income figures they provided were at a wider, often national, scale; three of the four shops' annual income went well into the millions. As with service organisations that belonged to a parent organisation, the relationship between shops and their parent body was not examined in depth for the purpose of this study. Generally, however, they operated on a top-down basis in which shop managers received directives and targets from above. In this respect, shops are generally no different from service organisations belonging to a parent body.

Like service and community organisations, all four shops had a mixture of paid and unpaid staff. Unlike service and community organisations, however, the shops depended primarily on their unpaid staff to deliver their missions. In all four cases, there was a paid manager and in one of these cases a half-time paid deputy manager. All other staff were unpaid and consisted of a mixture of volunteers and individuals from a variety of employment and skills-training initiatives.

As anticipated in earlier chapters, despite the variety of organisations in my study, they do not reflect the entirety of the very varied voluntary sector. In part this is because of the predefined parameters of the organisations included in the NDYP Voluntary Sector Option and Environmental Sector Option (see chapter 2.2.1). In addition, this is because the organisations were selected from an incomplete sampling frame (see chapter 3.2.2). Nonetheless, there are some features of my sample that support existing research on the voluntary organisations that engage with mainstream government initiatives. First, the high concentration of service organisations in my study reflects those organisations that are most likely to engage with other government initiatives because of their primary role in service delivery (for a discussion about voluntary organisations' role to deliver contracted services, see for example, Lewis 1999b; Alcock and Scott 2002). Further, the majority of organisations tended to be relatively stable: they have been around for some time and many of them are affiliated to larger parent bodies with access to internal and external support and resources. There was a clear absence of the very large number of very small organisations in the voluntary sector; particularly grass root agencies (NCVO 2006a). The stringent and complex procedures that the voluntary organisations were expected to undertake to qualify as an IPP may well have squeezed out smaller more local organisations. Furthermore, it is likely

organisations that were considered least able to meet targets and outcomes were excluded from the programme. Indeed, this view was echoed during an interview with a former staff member from one of the three Agents with which the IPPs in this study contracted. The consequence of this is a missed opportunity to help involve the very small organisations that provide direct benefits to the local community.

## **4.2 Contractual Arrangements**

I now move on to the second section of this chapter to discuss the variations in the contractual arrangements between voluntary organisation IPPs and the Managing Agents. As described in chapter one, the design and operation of the NDYP is dogged with complexities and variations at several levels. The contractual arrangements between the IPPs and the Managing Agents are no exception. Consequently, once again, the local specificity and the constant evolution built into the programme make it difficult to provide a straightforward account of the contractual arrangements between the Agents and IPPs. Doing so at any great length would go beyond the scope of my research, which is primarily to examine whether or not voluntary organisations can advance their missions by engaging with the programme and whether or not these advances can be sustained. Nevertheless, some of the variations may contribute towards the organisations' different outcomes with the programme.

To remind the reader, there are three Managing Agents with which my 29 IPPs contracted, Agents X, Y and Z. As outlined in the methods chapters, as a result of the selection criteria, the organisations were evenly distributed across three Managing Agents: Agent X (10 organisations); Agent Y (10 organisations); and Agent Z (9 organisations). Agent X and Agent Y operated in the Employment Area that covers boroughs A, B and C, and Agent Z operated in borough D. This, however, is where the simplicity ends. As noted in chapter three (section 2.2), there were variations in the way in which they operated on the NDYP programme. These are to do with the length of the New Deal work placement, money available to the IPPs and the IPPs' responsibilities. In part, these variations are largely to do with

### *4.2.1 The length of the NDYP work placement*

Turning to the length of the New Deal placements, nine out of the 29 organisations were contracted (with Agent Z) to offer the national standard six-month placement. In

contrast, however, the remaining 20 IPPs (with Agent X and Agent Y) were contracted to provide 12-month work placements, what I refer to as the enhanced 12-month programme. The enhanced programme was made possible because the then Employment Service District responsible for the Employment Area within which they operated was successful in obtaining additional money for this (from, for example, the Single Regeneration Budget and European Social Funds).

#### *4.2.2 Money*

In the case of the variation to do with money, by far the most complex arrangement was that between Agent X and the IPPs with which it directly contracted. To recall from chapter three, Agent X was ultimately responsible for 20 of the 29 organisations in this study. However, Agent X subcontracted Agent Y to manage smaller voluntary organisations (10 of my 29). Setting aside these 10 smaller IPPs, the 10 IPPs with which Agent X directly contracted had differing contracts in which they received different amounts of money. There are two main reasons for this. First, economies-of-scale: how many of the young New Dealers were placed with each of them. Second, what the IPPs included in their bids when trying to calculate the anticipated costs of engaging with the programme. These included the cost of tools for the young New Dealers, the cost to train and support them, and the cost of the administration and the paperwork they were expected to complete. As one interviewee said:

... there were the various things that you could bid for, the various elements that you would include in your proposal and so that would include the fees for the young people and that was going to be repaid to you, there was tool element so that might have been computer, a set of knives, you know, safety clothing catering-wise, desks, locker, so there was that element. There was a management element, there were probably a couple more but I don't remember,

Service Organisation: P12 (37)

To add to this complexity, the amount of money obtained by these 10 IPPs was fluid; varying from one contractual period to another. In the early years at least, some of the IPPs managed to obtain increased amounts of money for subsequent years of engagement. In contrast other organisations were, at best, offered the same amount of money. In more recent years, however, concomitant with the wider national streamlining of the programme, the IPPs that have remained with the programme have been offered less money to engage with the programme.

In contrast, excluding the factor of time, the remaining 19 voluntary organisation IPPs had relatively uniform contractual arrangements with their Agents. In the case of the IPPs with which Agent Y and Agent Z contracted, the organisations obtained little, if any, additional money for their engagement. As one interviewee noted:

... it was about £40 per week [supervision fee] – I mean, 160 a month paid the phone bill, so you know there was a financial incentive to us ... but [borough A] who are based in [name of local neighbourhood] they took one on board but [name of Agent] who was the controlling agent, they didn't pay.

Service Organisation: P2 (218)

#### *4.2.3 IPPs' responsibilities*

The third variation is the different level of responsibilities which the IPPs were contracted. In the case of Agent X's IPPs, in addition to providing temporary work opportunities they were expected to undertake administrative work in order to be paid and for monitoring and evaluation purposes. In contrast, the remaining IPPs (with Agent Y and Agent Z) were only responsible for providing work and daily supervision to the young New Dealers placed with them; the Agents undertook the administrative work on their behalf. To some extent, the division of responsibilities was reflected in the amounts of money that the IPPs obtained; those taking on the extra administrative work were expected to cost this in their bids and have extra payments included in their contracts.

There were yet other variations; for example, some organisations provided placements elsewhere in other organisations. A detailed description of the numerous contractual variations between IPPs and the Managing Agents goes beyond the remit of my study. Nevertheless, suffice to say, it is evident there are variations in the contractual arrangements within each Employment Area as well as across them. This finding is supported elsewhere (see, for example, Morris 2001; Sunley et al. 2001; Nativel et al. 2002). The implications of such complex structural and operational aspects of the programme can make it incredibly difficult to understand the programme in one locality let alone others. Nevertheless, as it turns out, the variations described above, along with a combination of other factors, have been useful in my examination of the extent to which the voluntary organisations can successfully sustain engagement with the programme and the variations are discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

### **4.3 Reasons for engagement**

As described in the section immediately above, most of the organisations in this study received negligible, if any, financial remuneration for their engagement with the programme. This leads me into this next section of the chapter: why then did the voluntary organisation IPPs engage with the programme? Is it because, as many believe, they are 'nice', have altruistic tendencies and want to help disadvantaged people? Or, is it because the programme could potentially benefit their community and themselves? Or was it for a combination of these and other reasons? Unfortunately, the data available to address the question about their primary reason for engagement is incomplete. In part, this is an oversight of mine because, at the time of my fieldwork, I did not consider it to be important for my study. I merely used the topic to open up discussion in a section of the interview rather than pursue it in its own right. However, there are methodological reasons too, relating to the passage of time. For example, at the time of my fieldwork, many of the organisations' initial involvement with the programme dated as far back as six years. Some of my interviewees did not work for their organisation at that time and, even if they did, some did not play a part in the organisations' initial decision to engage. Furthermore, my data, as with any information elicited from interviewees' recounting past events, relies on the interviewees' memories and in some cases their memories of other peoples' accounts. Despite these difficulties and my consequent incomplete data, I have dedicated a small section of the thesis to the question. In the main, this is because from the evidence available it is clear the organisations' primary reason for engagement is an important factor in understanding the interviewees' evaluations about their organisations' overall levels of success with the programme. Furthermore, it contributes towards understanding whether or not the organisations continued with the programme (see chapter 7.2).

Of the 29 organisations in my study, interviewees from 19 talked about their organisations' initial engagement with the programme. These accounts fall into two categories: Proactive and Reactive. The first category, Proactive, consists of accounts in which the interviewee talked about their organisations actively seeking to become IPPs. The second, Reactive, includes accounts in which interviewees talked about their organisations being invited to engage with the programme (usually by the Managing Agent). The two categories I devised are not designed to suggest that the process of becoming an IPP can be reduced to one event. On the contrary, each organisation



underwent unique and complex processes both within their organisation and with Managing Agents. Examining these processes and describing each organisation's account in detail goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, my two categories were created to help sort and describe the data in a more manageable format. The frequency of the different types of initial contact can be seen in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Organisations' initial involvement with the NDYP programme

Initial contact	No. organisations
Proactive	12
Reactive	7
Total	19
19 organisations Source: PhD. dataset, 2004	

Of the 19 organisations 12 have been classified proactive and seven reactive.

#### Proactive

Turning to the organisations that fall into the proactive category, the interviewees talked about six main reasons for their organisations' initial involvement with the programme. These are summarised in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4. Proactive organisations' reasons for involvement

Reason for involvement:	No.
The need for staff	6
Volunteers moving on to the New Deal employment programme	3
Training a potential future workforce	2
Unspecified benefit or support for the organisations	2
Benefit the community	2
National directive	1
Total	15*
12 organisations Source: PhD. dataset, 2004 *interviewees talked about more than one reason	

The reasons listed in this table are by no means all the reasons given by the interviewees; and several of them talked about more than one reason. Nevertheless, what clearly came out of interviews, and is summarised in Table 4.4, is that the primary reason for engagement was to do with benefits to the organisations themselves. The most frequent reason was to do with immediate instrumental benefits; that is, the benefits arising from the work undertaken by the young New Dealers (6 out of 12 organisations). Several of the interviewees referred to this as the need for 'extra pairs of hands' and 'extra bodies'. Below is a quotation that captures the need for immediate instrumental support:

... I'm the person who sort of initiated all that ... one of the things I quite quickly realized as I started working for the centre was that it needed admin. support because you know a lot of my time was being spent on typing things and phone calls you know, administration-type of things rather than the management side of things, because I was the only worker ... [I had] some time to organize things you know just before we moved [offices] ... that's when I found out that you know this New Deal scheme was quite a useful scheme, where I can get somebody to come in and help me out with some administration duties right and obviously it would also benefit the client on the New Deal ...

Community Organisation: P6 (46)

There is another point worth drawing out from this quotation which is echoed by several other interviewees. That is, in addition to benefits to the organisation, there was an interest in benefiting the young New Dealers. This, however, was by-the-way of benefiting the organisations themselves. This is an important distinction to make when understanding the interviewees' evaluations of whether or not their organisations successfully engaged with programme.

In addition to immediate instrumental benefits, two interviewees said one of the primary reasons for their engagement was to train a potential future workforce. The interviewees were from branch organisations that belonged to the same parent body that aimed to deliver general advice and legal services:

... we discussed two sides of it [getting involved in the New Deal]. One would be what we would get as an organisation and plug the gaps ... that we couldn't fill because we didn't have the funding for it and hopefully ... we might then be able to recruit the staff that had been in [New Dealers]. So that the people that we had in would have had the experience and would then be able to get a job either with us or we'd then give them a reference for another organisation

Service Organisation P1 (117)

In a few cases, the organisations' primarily engaged with the NDYP programme to retain existing volunteers. This was less opportunistic, but nevertheless, was again in

order to benefit the organisations. In one of the three cases this was to retain instrumental benefits. To explain, in this case, the Project Manager was reluctant to engage with the New Deal programme and explained that the organisation did nevertheless participate in order to prevent any further losses of valuable long-term volunteers who were 'conscripted' on to the New Deal 25+ employment programme.

... I don't think the organisation ever really wanted to go down that road [get involved in the New Deal employment programmes] until three of our regular volunteers were sent up to the desk at New Deal ... that's when it seemed like a good idea for us to get involved in New Deal because otherwise we'd lose some long term volunteers

Service Organisation P29 (88)

Ironically in this case becoming an IPP did not protect the organisation from losing some of its long term volunteers, who were (unwillingly) placed elsewhere to undertake work experience. Whilst this was the only organisation to become an IPP solely for the purpose of retaining its volunteers, several organisations mentioned they had lost or ran the risk of losing some of their volunteers to one of the several New Deal employment programmes. This illustrates that whilst the New Deal employment schemes have the potential to help participating voluntary organisations deliver their mission and further benefit their communities, in some cases it has reduced their capacity to deliver their mission due to the loss of long-term volunteers. Further, it is likely that this loss of volunteers to the New Deal employment programmes, and most likely other government work initiatives, has occurred across the UK voluntary and community sector.

In the remaining two (out of three) organisations that engaged primarily because of their volunteers, the interviewees said their primary reasons were to benefit and open opportunities for their volunteers.

... I think we initiated it because ... we had a young woman ... she had been homeless, who had I think joined the group [project run by organisation]. The theatre group kind of like changed her life considerably and she was looking for opportunities really to move on. So we thought it would be ideal to be able to use the New Deal for [name of New Dealer] to come and work here in the office and like gain some employment skills and she'd be also working in an environment that she'd feel comfortable ... What we felt we could offer her was I suppose a step, a step up for her in an environment that we knew would work for her but also we'd give her some basics skills that were transferable skills as well because you know a lot of the stuff that you learn in this office would be very transferable in terms of employability

Service Organisation P24 (87)

In these two cases engagement for their volunteers was not about instrumental benefits for the organisations and clearly they were interested in the opportunities the

programme could offer their volunteers. Nevertheless, in both of these cases the volunteers were among the beneficiaries of the organisations; and although the interviewees did not explicitly say their organisations' engagement was primarily to benefit their missions, ultimately to benefit their volunteers was to benefit their mission.

Only one of the interviewees from the 12 proactive organisations talked explicitly about benefits to their mission and thereby to their community:

... well originally where I was coming from was the New Deal seemed to be quite a good thing in terms of young people and being able to help them and we were you know quite happy to be involved with that. But our motivation was to be able to see more clients, and I saw the New Deal programme as a really good opportunity to train people so we had people full-time, once we had put the time into training them they'd actually be here with us full-time and then we could see more clients, so that was our motivation ... Our aims was to do our job better, to see more clients. New Deal seemed to be a good opportunities for helping us to do that.

Service Organisation: P14 (57)

### Reactive

In the case of the seven organisations I categorised under reactive, as discussed earlier I did not always prompt for their reasons to become IPPs and, consequently, I have incomplete data for this. Nevertheless, from the available evidence, once again the organisations tended to engage with the programme for instrumental reasons. For example,

I just wondered whether it was going to be a lot of work ... but felt that it was somebody here for a set number of hours, something like 20 odd ... Whereas my volunteers are nearly all half-days ... different people different days., whereas with somebody on the New Deal you have somebody with you for three to four days a week and then they can get – hopefully, you can then get up to teaching them a system and the you can leave them to do a job. Your volunteers, you can leave them to do a job, but they are only with you half a day ...

Shop P8 (82)

This quotation is a clear illustration of the shops' engagement being primarily to do with the potential instrumental benefits arising from the work undertaken by the young New Dealers. Further, the manager made comparisons between the young New Dealers and their volunteer workforce. As noted in an earlier section of this chapter, unlike most other organisations in this study, the shops predominantly relied on their volunteer workforce to deliver their missions. Taking this into account, if the benefits arising from the young New Dealers outweighed those from the volunteers, this could bring about significant successful outcomes to the shops engaged with the programme. I return to this point in later chapters.

For now, returning to the question I raised at the beginning of this section, given that several of the organisations did not receive significant financial remuneration for delivering the programme why then would so many choose to become IPPs? From the available data, there is little if any evidence to suggest the organisations engaged for purely altruistic reasons, solely to help the young New Dealers. Indeed the organisations did not change or widen their missions to include them. Instead, the main reasons for their initial engagement were to do with obtaining support for their own organisations, particularly to contribute to their short and long-term operation costs. And, whilst very few of the organisations explicitly mentioned becoming involved to increase the output of their mission to benefit their communities, this was implied by their interests: the benefits to the organisation contribute (directly and indirectly) to the delivery of their missions and thereby to their communities. This does not mean the organisations were not interested in helping the young New Dealers. On the contrary, several of the interviewees talked about their organisations' intentions to help the young New Dealers. However generally this was by-the-way of benefits generated for the organisations. These findings provide a useful context for understanding the interviewees' evaluations about their organisations' ability to gain overall success within the programme, which is discussed in more detail in later chapters. Furthermore, despite the incompleteness of this data, the findings are further supported in interviewees' discussions about whether or not their organisations continued and are likely to remain on the programme in the future (see chapter 7).

#### **4.4 Types of work**

I now turn to the final section of this chapter to describe the type of work the voluntary organisation IPPs offered to the young New Dealers. This is followed by a closing paragraph on the distribution of young New Dealers placed in the organisations at the time of my fieldwork. This section is useful for two main reasons. First, the type of work offered to the young New Dealers contributes towards understanding the benefits arising from the work given to them (discussed in chapter 5). Second, the closing paragraph helps to identify which of the organisations were most likely to continue to engage and be used by the labour suppliers (the Managing Agents).

Turning first to the types of work available to the young New Dealers, at least 16 different types of New Deal posts were offered across the 29 organisation IPPs. These are listed in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 List of New Deal jobs offered by the voluntary organisation IPPs

Job title	Duty/jobs included	No.
Administration	Inc. administration; financial administration; office junior and reception	18
Driver	Drivers and driver's assistant	4
Shop Assistant	All tasks related to shop	4
Childcare	Inc. play workers, and carers for 5s and under	4
Advisor	General information officer, advocates for different services	3
Cleaning	Maintaining and cleaning vehicles; cleaning public spaces; recycling and disposing of refuse	3
Community worker	Inc. liaising with community, keeping environment tidy and safe	3
Labourers	Ins. Builders' and joiners' assistants	3
Care Assistant	Exc. children under 5	2
Gardeners	Inc. landscaping	2
'Lifters and shifters'	Transporting furniture	2
Caretaker	General care and maintenance for building	1
Painters and decorators	Painting and decorating housing tenants homes	1
Trading	Inc. selling insurance products	1
Video and digital assistant	One-off vacancy	1
Variable	Depends on the need at the time and New Dealers' interest	3

29 organisations  
Source: PhD. dataset, 2004

The types of work summarised in Table 4.5 is by no means a comprehensive, static and up-to-date list: some of the listed New Deal posts are no longer available and some

posts that are now available are not listed. There are several reasons for this. For instance, some of the 29 organisations have withdrawn their engagement from the programme and some of the organisations have continued but offered reduced and different types of post. In addition, some of the interviewees were not able to recall all the posts and others did not know about all the different posts available in their organisations. Indeed, interviewees from large service organisations with which Agent X contracted were the least able to provide this information. As discussed earlier, this reflects the complex and various contractual arrangements between the large IPPs and Agent X.

Despite these complexities, Table 4.5 is a sufficient tool to demonstrate the variety of opportunities available to the New Dealers undertaking work experience in voluntary organisations participating on the NDYP programme. Further, from the available data it is clear the most frequent type of work offered across the different IPPs was administrative work (provided by 18 out of 29 organisations). The main duties of this type of work generally involved supporting other staff by typing and photocopying documents, writing letters, and answering telephone calls. None of the remaining 15 types of New Deal post listed in Table 4.5 were offered by more than four organisations.

This information is, however, limited as it only shows the range of different work experience available and the number of organisations providing each type of work. It does not show the number of vacancies available in each organisation for each type of job. More often than not this information was not readily available during the fieldwork. Nevertheless, I did obtain sufficient information to demonstrate that there were sometimes large numbers in some of the less frequent types of post. For example, only three organisations offered cleaning and recycling posts but one organisation alone offered 60 of these posts.

Furthermore, there are some characteristic patterns in the work opportunities available across the three different types of organisations I defined in the first section of this chapter: shop, community and service organisations.

### Shops

In the case of the shops, all four of them belonged to different parent bodies. Despite this, however, all four offered relatively uniform types of shop work experience to the New Dealers. A typical quote illustrates this:

They [New Dealers] do pretty much everything really. They'll do processing of stock, the hanging of stock; the steaming; the pricing, even – that's one that comes later when people have got a feel for it. But we have pricing, shop work, the tidying of the shop, till work – even the banking of money depending on whether they're comfortable with that.

Shop: P9 (13)

In addition, in all but one case the shops offered more than one New Deal post at any given time.

### Community organisations

In contrast, community organisations were slightly more varied in the work experience they offered to the young New Dealers. The more defined types of work offered included caretaking, administration and childcare. Two organisations offered less defined work that cut across the different types of projects they undertook, including ad-hoc projects and drop-in services for their clients. As one manager describes:

... it sounds like it is very loose, but it isn't ... everybody does everything apart from perhaps specifically the admin work, whose role would be to do the admin bit. It [the New Dealer's work] would also be to help and support in the centre and specifically at a time say if we have a play scheme on for the whole of the summer and the whole of the Easter Holidays, but generally they will do whatever was required of them on a day-to-day basis. Which I've said before could vary from day to day. It's meeting the people that come in the after noon and dealing with whatever they come in with...

Community Organisation: P22 (160)

The work of New Dealers in this and other organisations may seem 'loose' and ill-defined; however the type of work they undertook was similar to that of paid staff, and reflected the more responsive, bottom-up approach these organisations employed to deliver services to their community of interest. Community organisations provided New Deal placement on a smaller scale than shops, usually offering between one and two placements at any given time. Of those providing more than one vacancy some offered only one type of work and at the most two different types of work.

### Service organisations

As noted earlier, the most incomplete data about the type of work offered was from the service organisations; particularly the larger ones. Nevertheless, from the available information the service organisations offered by far the widest choice of work experience to young New Dealers; bar shop work they offered opportunities across all



types of work listed in Table 4.5. Further, in many cases the organisations offered a choice of at least two different types of jobs, offered multiple placements within each type of work and in some cases on a much larger scale than any of their counterpart IPPs. In addition, the types of work available tended to be more closely defined than those offered in the community organisations.

Clearly, there was a variation of work available across the voluntary organisation IPPs. Due to incomplete data and the fluidity of their engagement with the programme, it is impossible to capture exact figures of the distribution of work available to the young New Dealers. Suffice to say, there were a very large number of low-skilled manual work placements concentrated in approximately eight of the organisations. On a small scale, this tended to consist of shops; in all but one case they offered approximately five posts at any given time. On a wider scale, this consisted of a few large service organisations with which Agent X directly contracted. In one of these cases, an organisation offered approximately 90 New Deal posts at any given time, all to do with refuse, recycling and street cleaning but some of which were placed elsewhere in other organisations. In contrast, there were several IPPs, small and large, that offered more skilled (manual and non-manual) work. The smaller organisations tended to offer between one and three posts and their larger counterparts tended to offer between 10 and 30 posts (also see summary table of the IPPs' key characteristics, Table 4.1).

At the time of my fieldwork, it was evident the young New Dealers were placed within in a small concentration of voluntary organisation IPPs (eight out of 29 organisations). In part, this uneven distribution is to do with the different number of young New Dealers entering the Voluntary Sector Option across the different Employment Areas. For instance, in the case of Agent Z there was the meagre number of just three young New Dealers entering the VSO NDYP programme; this is a figure reflected elsewhere in Greater Manchester and the UK. However, despite the variety of IPPs available to Agent Z, all three young New Dealers participating on the VSO were placed in one organisation: a charity shop.

There were more young New Dealers entering the merged VSO and ETFO with Agent X (and Agent Y). At the time of my field work this was estimated to be around 90 to 100 young New Dealers. In this case there was a strikingly uneven distribution in which

approximately 90 of them were placed with the two large service IPPs; one of which placed an estimated 60 of the young New Dealers in cleaning and refuse posts. The remaining 10 young New Dealers were spread across six other organisations.

From the interviews it was evident that some organisations have been used more frequently than others and that most of the organisations in this study have not been used for some time. As it turns out, there are significant reasons for this that go beyond the original uneven distribution of work available to the young New Dealers. Instead, it is to do with which of the organisations were most successful in their engagement with the programme. I return to this in chapter seven.

#### **4.5 Conclusions**

To recall, this chapter consists of four main sections: a description of the characteristics of the voluntary organisations; variations in their contractual arrangements; their primary reason for engagement with the programme; and the types of work they offered to the young New Dealers who entered the VSO and ETFO. Clearly, the organisations in my study varied over numerous dimensions. Despite this, however, they do not reflect the entirety of the diverse voluntary sector. In part, this is likely to do with my sample frame, in which I only selected organisations across four boroughs or Greater Manchester (see chapter 3). On top of this, it is likely to do with the distribution of the organisations engaged with the programme. Indeed, the majority of the organisations in my sample are skewed towards the larger and relatively more robust organisations that have a more stable history compared with the very large number of smaller, more volatile organisations in the wider voluntary sector (NCVO 2006a). It is likely that the complex monitoring system and outcome demands of the NDYP have squeezed out smaller more local organisations and consequently missed the opportunity to engage organisations that deliver direct benefits to the local community.

Nevertheless, my study provides some evidence to show there has been widening participation: some community organisations and shops have engaged for the first time with a mainstream government initiative. Whether or not they can successfully sustain engagement with the programme is another matter, which is addressed throughout later chapters.

In addition to the variety of the organisations, there are variations amongst the organisations' contractual arrangements, particularly in the case of large organisations with which Agent X directly contracted. This has made it incredibly difficult to create a straightforward account of, at the very least, the amount of money they were given and the length of New Deal placements. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, these variations have turned out to work to my advantage and are used as factors to examine the organisations' different levels of outcomes with the programme. These are discussed in detail throughout the following chapters.

Despite all variations amongst the organisations in my study, there are some striking similarities between them. First, from the available evidence, most of the organisations engaged with the programme to benefit themselves. This is crucial towards understanding the interviewees' subjective evaluations about their organisations' overall levels of success. This is because overall success was not about the benefits to the young New Dealers; but instead about the benefits and the problems that directly and indirectly contributed towards their missions. This is discussed in detail in chapters five to seven and the implications of this are discussed in the concluding chapter.

In addition, despite the variety of organisation and the different types of work offered to the young New Dealers, at the time of my fieldwork there were emerging patterns that showed that most of the young New Dealers were being placed in a smaller number of organisations than was available, namely larger organisations involved in recycling and refuse collection. Further, there was evidence that several organisations were not in receipt of young New Dealers for some time. As noted earlier, there are significant reasons for this that go beyond the original uneven distribution of work available to the young New Dealers. This is explored in detail in chapter seven and the implications of this are discussed in the concluding chapter.

## **5. The Benefits**

In the previous chapter I described some of the main characteristics of the voluntary organisation IPPs in my study, their relation with the NDYP programme, their reason for engagement and the types of work they offered to the young New Dealers. In this chapter I move on to examine the benefits arising from their engagement with the programme. Here, I focus on the benefits that contributed towards the organisations' missions; I do not discuss the benefits to the young New Dealers or to the programme as a whole unless this is by the way of benefiting the organisations. This is because my research is on the voluntary sector's ability to engage with the NDYP programme. To recall from chapter three (section 1), one of the central questions of my research is whether or not voluntary organisations can engage successfully with the programme by advancing their missions. Again, to recall from earlier chapters, I refer to organisations' missions in a generic sense as the delivery of projects, services and activities that benefit their community.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first I discuss instrumental benefits. These are benefits arising from the work the young New Dealers did that contribute (directly and indirectly) towards the organisations' missions. This is followed by a discussion on the combinations of determinant factors that contributed towards such benefits. Finally, I describe some of the other benefits arising from their engagement that contributed (directly and indirectly) towards the organisations' missions. These include: young New Deal beneficiaries; continued benefits; the diversification of the workforce; and money. Much of the emphasis in this chapter is on instrumental benefits. This is because by far it was the most frequently talked about benefit and because interviewees tended to give this type of benefit more weight than others. Indeed, as discussed in the earlier chapter this was the primary reason for several organisations' engagement with the programme (see chapter 4.3).

Before I move on to the first section it is worth noting that the way in which I have organised benefits is not necessarily the way in which organisation interviewees talked about them. Often, benefits were multiple, intertwined and fluid. Furthermore, interviewees frequently talked about them alongside problems arising from the programme (discussed in detail in chapter 6). Nevertheless, conceptually I have

separated these benefits to begin to sort and describe my data. In practice, however, there was often overlap between them.

### 5.1 Instrumental Benefits

Turning first to instrumental benefits, in all bar one of the 29<sup>24</sup> organisations, interviewees talked about a variety of ways in which the young New Dealers' work made a positive contribution to their organisations. In the one exception, a manager found all of the young New Dealers placed in the organisation to be such 'high maintenance' that she was reticent to identify any benefits arising from them (for a discussion on the problems arising from the programme see chapter six).

Turning to the 28 organisations in which interviewees talked about benefits arising from the work the young New Dealers did, all 28 interviewees talked about (instrumental) benefits that contributed *indirectly* towards the organisations' missions and thereby to their communities. These are benefits that tend, for example, to contribute towards the general operation of the organisation to help fulfil their mission. In addition, 23 of the interviewees talked about (instrumental) benefits that *directly* contributed towards their organisations' missions. These tend, for example, to include contributions that directly benefit the organisations' communities.

Table 5.1 Type of instrumental benefit gained from the organisation IPPs

Instrumental Benefits	No.
Indirect	28
Direct	23
28 (of 29) IPPs that gained instrumental benefits Source: PhD. dataset, 2004.	

I discuss each type in more detail below.

#### 5.1.1 Indirect instrumental benefits

---

<sup>24</sup> For now, I include the organisation that engaged with the New Deal employment initiatives but not the NDYP. In the final chapter, however, I remove this from my analysis.

Turning first to indirect benefits, one of the most frequent benefits that interviewees talked about was that in which the work of the young New Dealers helped to free up existing paid staff's time (and sometimes unpaid staff's time) that then allowed them to get on with other work. A typical example in which this situation arose was in the cases where young New Dealers were given administrative work. As one interviewee explains,

... as administration workers they [New Dealers] won't have any direct impact on any of the work that we do because that work is all done by project officers right; but indirectly because they're providing that additional support for project officers ... that's the only benefit that the community would get, it would be indirect ...

Community Organisation: P6 (72)

In this case the interviewee clearly identified that the work the young New Dealer did contributed indirectly to the organisation's community by supporting the organisation's existing staff. This is a view echoed by other interviewees who described, for example, the young New Dealers' work as 'lightening other people's [existing staff's] workload' and 'supporting the staff'.

The extra support received by existing staff meant they could spend more time on their own work. Subsequently, in many of the cases this led to them being able to 'provide better services' and to give 'more rounded support to clients'. In addition, several interviewees said the existing staff were able to see more clients. To illustrate, in one case a young New Dealer was given administrative work that relieved one of the existing core staff from administration duties.

... we had a very good experience with her [young New Dealer], she used to do everything. It was literally my half of the job was relieved, she was doing all the typing and computing and funding applications and so many things, so the job really, really was done. The centre really, really benefited from the admin worker...I can only say that [the] centre definitely benefited from the work ... it was too much work on myself, with my outreach work I used to do all the typing and this and that so I was relieved, I would have done more home and hospital visits

Service Organisation: P25 (68&81)

In this case, the young New Dealer was competent and able to do the work given to her. The benefits of this meant the existing paid staff member was relieved from the administrative work she would normally undertake and instead was able to spend more time on, for example: outreach work with clients; prescription drop-offs and medicine collections at the pharmacy; and 'more home and hospital visits'. This case is a good illustration of how the work of young New Dealers contributed indirectly but significantly towards improving the quality and increasing the quantity of the organisation's outputs.

So far the cases I have described above are examples of organisations that offered New Deal administrative posts. To recall from the previous chapter (section 4), this was by far the most frequent type of placement offered across the organisations (18 out of 29 organisations). Nevertheless, indirect benefits arising from the work the young New Dealers did were not isolated to the organisations that offered administrative placements. On the contrary, indirect benefits were echoed across all 28 organisations. In shops, for example, to recall from chapter four the young New Dealers were given fairly uniform shop work that consisted of a variety of unskilled manual tasks. In many ways, their work primarily contributed directly towards the shops' missions to raise money. Nevertheless, their work also contributed towards reducing backlogs and improving the process of getting donated goods on to the shop floor. Again, in these cases the existing paid staff members (usually the shop manager) were relieved from such duties and had more time to undertake other tasks. To demonstrate, in one case the shop manager explained she had more time 'to help business', including going out and building a rapport with other businesses in the community so that she could put out donation boxes:

The best is you get help, you get help in the shop which means you can get on with things that may be get left like bits of paperwork that are essential to [the organisation's mission] but tend to get left and left and then become a bit of a nightmare, then you've got to do them ... you can just keep on top a lot easier, you can start using your [own] time for things that maybe affect business you know things like going into the community, finding places to put you know build rapport with people to get people to get your [donation] box in the shop ... or going talking to you know a new company like [Agent Z] about the possibility of getting volunteers ... whereas if you haven't got the people in the first place you're fighting a losing battle. You are just opening the shop really.

Shop: P9 (287)

In most of these organisations the indirect benefits contributed towards supporting continuous projects that are central to the organisations' missions. In addition, there were a few cases in which interviewees talked about the New Dealers' work contributing towards ad-hoc projects, which had little or no financial resources:

From the campaigning work side of things it's useful to have an extra pair of hands particularly because we've got no money for campaign work so, for example, in March when we went down to London at the start of this campaign on a demonstration and we were making you know things... banners... it was great to have someone you could just sort of [ask] "can you go down to B&Q you know, get some wood?" ... and do things like that...

Service Organisation: P3 (232)

There were however cases in which the benefits arising from the work of the young New Dealers contributed to tasks that were not a priority; jobs that would often be

neglected. These tasks included creating a leaflet ordering system and tidying stationery cupboards:

... there were things that we didn't do because they weren't priority and they would be simple things like coming up with a really good leaflet ordering system, where previous to them [young New Dealers] it would have been a bit ad-hoc and when they ran out we would get some more, and she [young New Dealer] was in control of things like that. So there were lots of smaller things that she'd do that we would just never have got time to do if she hadn't have been here... you know generally keeping the stationery cupboard tidy... so there were a lot of things that she did that you didn't actually realize, but all of a sudden something was sorted and she had done it.

Service Organisation: P1 (15)

It is likely that many of the New Dealers undertook such tasks at some point during their work experience. If the bulk of New Dealers' work consisted of such tasks this would raise questions about how much New Dealers contributed to organisations and their communities and whether these voluntary organisations were providing 'meaningful' employment. Indeed a few service organisation interviewees did report giving some New Dealers a large amount of laborious, non-priority tasks. However, these interviewees mentioned that they did so with problematic New Dealers. Often this was in an attempt to minimize the negative impact they were having on their staff and communities. Problem placements and the impact of this on the organisations is discussed in the next chapter.

The main ways in which the work the young New Dealers' did indirectly contributed towards the organisations' missions are summarised in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Summary of indirect benefits

<b>How young New Dealers' work indirectly benefited the organisations' missions</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• free up existing staff's time who can then, for example, do more with their clients, see more clients, develop new services</li><li>• work on projects the organisations have little or no financial resources to do, for example, campaign work</li><li>• can work on non-priority tasks that staff do not always have time to do but are useful, for example, tidying up the stationary cupboard, leafleting system</li><li>• can help towards general improvements to daily processes, for example, getting donated stock out to the shop floor</li></ul>



### 5.1.2 Direct instrumental benefits

In the case of *direct* benefits, several of the interviewees talked about a variety of ways in which the young New Dealers' work contributed directly towards their organisations' missions (23 out of the 28 organisations in which interviewees talked about instrumental benefits). Like indirect contributions, many of the direct benefits led to improving the quality and increasing the quantity of the organisations' existing outputs. In contrast, however, there were a few cases in which the work the young New Dealers did contributed directly towards the delivery of new services and projects. For clarity, and yet still maintaining some of the detail about the different benefits and the way in which they contributed towards the organisations' mission, I discuss them by the three types of organisation: shop, community and service (see chapter 4.1.2).

Out of the 23 organisations that experienced direct instrumental benefits, these consisted of three (of 5) community organisations, four (of 4) shops and 16 (of 19) service organisations. See Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Frequency of direct benefit by type of organisation

Type of Organisation	No.	Out of:
Community	3	5
Shop	4	4
Service	16	19
		28
28 organisations		
1 IPP (community organisation) did not experience any benefits		
Source: PhD. dataset, 2004		

#### Community Organisations

Turning first to the community organisations, two of the three interviewees talked about a variety of ways the young New Dealers directly benefited their organisations' community, including: providing support and advice, building relationships with individual members, and working on a variety of projects and activities offered by the community. This diversity reflects the variety of work that was offered to the young New Dealers in the first instance; as one interviewee describes,

... everybody does everything [includes staff, volunteers, New Dealers and other placement trainees/students] apart from the admin worker ... if we have a play scheme on then it would be all hands on deck, because you need everybody ... generally they will do whatever was required of them on a day-to-day basis which I've said before could vary

from day to day. It's meeting people who come in the afternoon and dealing with whatever they come in with like the young people, working with young people ...it could be just playing pool and table tennis, but it's not just playing pool and table tennis, it's building up relationships, talking to that person ... it could also be people like [name of a beneficiary] on a Monday afternoon and a Friday – afternoon we have what we call the over 50s but most of them are over 70, and working with them on a Monday – they have Bingo and that ...

Community Organisation: P22 (160)

The diverse tasks given to the young New Dealers reflect the characteristics of this type of organisation. As described in chapter four the community organisations tended to provide a variety of flexible and responsive services to the community; services and activities that varied on a daily basis.

In addition, in the first of the two cases, the interviewee talked about occasions in which the presence alone of the young New Dealers benefited the organisation's community. To explain, this was to do with the minimum legal requirement of staff needed to keep the activities in the centre and sometimes even the centre open.

... We couldn't function because if we've got all rooms open and the outside as well you're looking at four areas where you need – possibly five if somebody was on the football pitch – and you have to have at least one worker in each area... so New Deal has been a Godsend ... potentially there would be days that we would be closed without the New dealers because it's about having – we're legally obliged to have so many bodies in the centre before we can open the front door

Community Organisation: P22 (166 &186)

This is very much a grassroots, 'hands on deck', community organisation with a total of three paid staff: one full-time and two part-time. During staff absences such as holidays and sickness and when there were not enough volunteers available to keep aspects of the centre open the New Dealers were a vital resource and contributed towards the continuity of delivering such services to the community.

In the second case, in addition to being given work 'wherever it was deemed appropriate to help' the young New Dealer was given the opportunity to focus on areas of her interest and, as a result, she worked with and benefited the young people who used the community centre's facilities. On top of this, the interviewee talked about ways in which this went beyond the individuals who used the community and benefited the wider community.

... in particular the young people benefited from her [the young New Dealer] because she kept them engaged through her mentoring. I think the community also benefits there as well, because the mentoring is exclusively for people who are fairly anti-social ... with behavioural problems ... I think the more you work with them the more you keep them engaged, the less chances of them being out there [the wider community] and perhaps being destructive or doing something anti-social.

Community Organisation: P23 (188)

The New Dealer's work with 'anti-social' youth benefited those young people who used these services and the wider community: by keeping the young people engaged in meaningful activities, they were not outside participating in anti-social behaviour.

In these two cases the New Dealers did so many different activities, some of which were spontaneous, and often overlapped with the work that other (paid and unpaid) workers did. This makes it difficult to create an accurate and concise picture of their work, let alone isolate their contributions from other workers. The manager in the first of the two cases mentioned that very little paperwork for monitoring and evaluation purposes was undertaken about the organisation's work in general or the New Dealers' work. Consequently, there were no records of the number of occasions New Dealers' presence benefited the community. It is therefore impossible to provide figures about the frequency that this occurred. Nevertheless this does not make New Dealers' work less important. On the contrary their work and presence were valued. Indeed, the manager described them as a 'Godsend'; enabling the continuation of the organisation's activities and services; and thus making a significant contribution to the organisation's mission and to their community. In many of the instances these benefits included soft impacts such as 'building up relationships' that occurred through activities like 'playing pool and table tennis'.

Unlike the previous two community organisations, the third case was an organisation that focused on delivering services to families in the local neighbourhood and offered the young New Dealers more specific and defined work; childcare in the centre's crèche. In this case, the organisation had one New Dealer at any given time. In addition to soft outcomes such as more time spent with the children, in cases where the organisation was in receipt of good quality New Dealers three additional crèche places could be made available, potentially benefiting three families.

... I wouldn't say there was anything that we couldn't have done but more children will have benefited from it because there was that extra member of staff that means that you could have another three children.

Community Organisations: P30 (92)

On the other hand, however, if New Dealers were problematic there was a risk that this would affect the quality of services provided, which could have a negative impact towards achieving the organisation's mission. The negative impacts arising from problematic young New Dealers is discussed in detail in chapter six.

## Shops

In contrast with the community organisations, as described in chapter four (section 4), the shops offered relatively uniform work. In all four cases, the young New Dealers were given a variety of low-skilled manual work primarily to prepare donated goods for sale on the shop floor. Some of the main tasks necessary to do this include: sorting through goods; steaming garments; pricing; and till work. The very essence of this work contributes directly towards achieving the shops' mission to raise money. As one interviewee explains,

... what it means is whilst we've got people [New Dealers] in here that we can leave the processing, like this morning, we got a delivery upstairs so I'm cracking on with that and it means I can leave downstairs, here, and I know it's going to work. I've got somebody processing, I've got somebody steaming and somebody pricing. So the work is continuing even though we've had extra work put on us today and if they weren't here then it would wait, which would mean we wouldn't get the stock out, which means sales would be affected and the money wouldn't be made.

Shop P9: (149)

The interviewees did not quantify these benefits; nevertheless, it was clear that they significantly contributed towards increasing the shops' outputs. Indeed, in three of the four cases, the shop managers talked about the advantages of young New Dealers over their main workforce of volunteers because of longer, more regular hours worked by the New Dealers.

## Service Organisations

Turning to the 16 service organisations, in comparison with their shop and community organisation counterparts, there are greater degrees of complexity and diversity in the ways the young New Dealers contributed directly towards their missions. The greater diversity is partly because there are far more service organisations in my sample. Moreover, the service organisations had less in common with each other and offered a greater variety of work to the young New Dealers (see chapter 4). To recall, in the case of shops, all shared the primary aim of making money for their parent body and all shops provided New Dealers with similar work to directly contribute towards their missions. Community organisations, on the other hand, were more diverse, although they shared a similar broad mission to benefit their local communities. In contrast, very few of the service organisations had one primary mission or employed New Dealers for one type of work that could contribute directly towards their missions (see chapter

4.1.2). Indeed, most of them provided different types of work opportunities that could contribute to one or more of their main missions.

Like their community organisation and shop counterparts most of the benefits to service organisations arising from the work the young New Dealers did contributed directly towards the delivery of existing services and projects (14 out of 16 organisations). Unique from their counterparts, however, in three of the 16 cases the young New Dealers' work contributed directly to the delivery of new projects and services.

Turning first to the 14 organisations in which the young New Dealers' work benefited the organisations' existing services and projects, these include: care and play work with children; care for the elderly; transport for individuals and groups; and advice work.

In some of the simpler cases, New Dealers were employed in several areas that could directly contribute towards an organisation's single mission. For example, a large service organisation with the primary aim to promote the health and well being of older people offered young New Dealers several different types of New Deal posts, including: care work; sales; cleaning; and administration. Those New Dealers in care and sales work were most likely to contribute directly towards the organisation's mission. Nevertheless, all work was considered to contribute 'towards a common goal'. In some of the other cases, New Dealers were given one type of work that could directly contribute to one of multiple missions. For example, two branch service organisations from a large, national parent body have two main missions. Briefly, these are to ensure that individuals do not suffer through lack of information about their rights and to influence policy-making decisions. Young New Dealers were placed in two types of posts where their work could contribute towards the first of these missions. These are administrative work and advice work. As discussed earlier, those New Dealers who did administration work had the potential to indirectly contribute towards the organisations' mission. In contrast, those New Dealers who worked in advice could (and sometimes did) directly benefit the organisations' clients, thereby directly contributing towards one of the organisation's missions:

... there were some [offices] we look back and said we only kept them open because we had New Deal staff and since we've stopped having New Deal people we have had to restrict the service, we just don't have enough advisors to staff the rotas ... the community now have less access - well when we had New Deal, people [clients] were

getting more advice. And the other things that were good was that they were often from ethnic minority backgrounds ...

Service Organisation: P14 (92)

... about five or six years ago we were a failing [name of organisation] service, we were under quite a great deal of pressure and they allowed us a very quick boost of labour to keep our high street service running, effectively. They also, in a very pragmatic way, allowed us a useful income stream that contributed in no small part of avoiding quite great financial difficulties for us. So there are two very, very pragmatic contributions to our service delivery. As time moved and we were able to become a more robust service and become more financially secure we went through a wave of quite marked expansion and then the scheme started to genuinely function as an intermediate labour function. In that, we were restricted on our expansion, not by our ability to secure additional contracts and funding but by ... quite a sharp labour shortage in the sector. And actually, the New Deal skill helped in the way that it was meant to work in that sense ... the fact that we continued to function of itself meant that quite a large number of people benefited. I can't remember how many people we - I think something like 30,000 people were using our services five years ago and I mean that's now in the turn of 50,000 people. More people used [the service organisation] last year that voted for [name of] council. More people used us than turned out to vote in the last local election. So on that level it's a sizable benefit, but it's very hard for us to say what proportion of that benefit came down to the New Deal.

Service Organisation: P15 (115)

In the two cases immediately above the interviewees from each branch talked about a critical labour shortage in the advice sector and talked about their difficulties in recruiting volunteers and trained advisors for paid work. In both cases, the organisations' engagement on the New Deal programmes brought about multiple benefits that directly contributed towards the first of their two main missions. The 'very quick boost of labour' helped to keep offices open, helped to provide more people with advice and information and to run services more effectively. In addition, in the case of the second branch organisation there was the 'very, pragmatic [financial] contribution', which helped the organisation through a period of financial crises. There were also other less immediate, indirect contributions that benefited these organisations, such as the advantages of increasing the diversity of their work force and are discussed later on.

In other service organisations, there were more diverse ways in which the work of New Dealers directly contributed towards organisations' missions. This is partly because some organisations had more than one mission and because they offered different types of work opportunities to New Dealers that could contribute directly towards their missions. For example, an interviewee from a service organisation with multiple missions talked about the different ways the New Dealers directly contributed towards the organisation's missions:

... we wouldn't be able to do as much work as we do, if we didn't have the New Deal people to be honest, because the guy that we had before, the long-term volunteer who only works in the mornings, we only used to be able to send the van out in the mornings,

now because I know that we've got people here all day, I can send it out in the afternoons as well. So we've not doubled our work rate but it's increased significantly because of that – so we are in a position to provide a greater service to the community because of the New Deal people yeah. And the same with the minibus drivers, because I know they're going to be here or I know they're going to be available at certain times, whereas before if somebody wanted a bus I'd have to say yeah well I can provisionally do it but I'm going to have to ring round to see if I can get a driver for you ... I can book it in straight away, so it's enabled us to expand and increase our workload on that front as well ... well we couldn't have run the warehouse for the last six months without them [New Dealers working in the warehouse showroom] to be honest .... Basically the money that we make on the warehouse allows us to run the minibuses at non-profit, so again it's like a domino effect. If all the income dried up from that and we couldn't source income from somewhere else like a grant or funding or whatever, it would ultimately mean that we wouldn't be able to run the minibuses...

Service Organisation, P26 (152)

In this case, the service organisation had three primary missions: to provide affordable (second-hand) furniture to those who would not otherwise have access to such goods; affordable transport for community groups; and to reduce bulky waste. Although all New Dealers, like staff (paid and unpaid) were expected to 'muck in' and help out with what needed to be done, each New Dealer was placed in one of three posts and was expected to work mainly in this area. These posts are: 'lifters and shifters'; drivers; and showroom sales. The main work of New Deal 'lifters and shifters' involved the collection of unwanted furniture from people's homes, moving it to the organisation's warehouse showroom and delivering purchased furniture to clients. Prior to the organisation's engagement with the New Deal employment initiative this work was predominantly carried out by volunteers. The availability of volunteers meant that this work was restricted to mornings only. The additional New Deal staff (and those from other employment and skills-training initiatives) meant that this service could be extended to the afternoon. The work of New Deal 'lifters and shifters' directly contributed to two of the organisation's interconnected missions: they contributed to the first mission by making more (used) furniture accessible to clients and, simultaneously, helped towards another mission to reduce bulky waste, which also made wider contributions to the environment. Those New Dealers who drove minibuses helped to 'expand' and to create a more efficient transport service and New Dealers in the warehouse showroom improved services to customers. The work of New Dealers in the warehouse showroom had a 'domino' effect, benefiting the community minibus service: the income they helped to generate was then used to support the transport service provided to community groups.

Turning to the three organisations in which the work the young New Dealers did contributed directly towards the delivery of *new* services, in these cases specific projects were set up, enabling such an outcome. To illustrate, a large service organisation with the main mission to build and manage affordable housing offered a variety of young New Deal posts that could contribute to existing services. In addition, they created a new project for the New Dealers: the 'painting and decorating' team. This project was part of a new service to be delivered to the organisation's tenants and approximately six young New Dealers were placed at any given time and were trained and supervised by paid members of staff.

... probably the Tenant Reward project is the only one [new project], the painting and decorating – that's the only one that wouldn't have worked at all [if there were no New Dealers] ... I suppose it's possible that it might have been decided that it was such a good thing that it would be worth paying permanent members of staff to go and do that work but it seems a bit unlikely ...

Service Organisation: P17 (132)

The Tenants' Reward Scheme is an innovative project in which tenants who are not in rent arrears and who do not have a record for anti-social behaviour become eligible to have their homes painted and decorated by a New Deal team (and their supervisors). The benefits of this work contributed directly towards the organisation's mission to manage affordable homes. Simultaneously, the design of the scheme encouraged good tenancy practice, which has the potential to make wider benefits to other tenants and the neighbourhood at large.

Another service organisation that created new jobs for New Dealers is a large, environmental organisation with the broad mission to 'build sustainable communities'. This organisation was the one in my study that took on the highest number of young New Dealers; some of which were placed elsewhere with local authorities undertaking a range of work, including refuse collection, recycling and landscape work (see chapter 4). The two New Deal posts available in the organisation itself are the street patrollers and caretakers:

... They're the eyes and ears for the city centre [New Deal patrollers] ... you could walk up and say can you tell me where [name of place] is and they'd be able to direct you ... The other things they do is whilst they are walking around again they could find that there are a couple of needles on the floor so they will, with the radio, will contact the relevant department who will come along and remove the needles. It could be a couple of dustbins that have been kicked over you know and again obviously the big issue at the moment in the news last week was about fly posting ... [New Deal Caretakers] now these are guys that remove fly posting, they will also repaint the street furniture, anything within the city centre that just needs a bit of paint ...

Service Organisation: P18 (39)



In this case all work opportunities given to New Dealers contributed towards the organisation's mission; to improve the environment.

... the employment that they're doing [New Dealers] is improving the environment, so not only are they actually working for us; they're also actually putting something back into the environment, which we hope then other people will pick up ...

Service Organisation: P18 (27)

In addition, the benefits were extended to others in the community as well as to the individual young New Dealers.

... ultimately everyone [benefits] ... they themselves are benefiting, because they've been long term unemployed, they're now back into the work ethos ... hopefully they benefit because they get training. For many of them it's the only qualification they've got so far in their lives or in their careers should I say ... they ultimately benefit if they get a job but in the meantime the local residents are benefiting because the place is looking smarter, cleaner and again safe ...

Service Organisation: P18 (60)

The interviewee talked about how the work of each team of New Dealers benefited the wider community. Generally, this was because their work helped to make 'streets safer' and more attractive to visitors and shoppers. The interviewee also talked about young New Dealers benefiting the community by acting as a deterrent for opportunity crime.

The third interviewee who talked about new ways that New Dealers contributed directly towards their organisation's mission was also from a large service organisation. Their overall mission is to promote environmental, cultural and economic sustainability. Unlike the previous two organisations discussed, this organisation placed all New Dealers within the organisation. Further, all New Dealers were given similar work and were recruited from the local community. Each of these distinguishing features influenced how New Dealers benefited the organisation and their community. The work that New Dealers did (with their trainer and supervisors who were from a subcontracted building firm) involved working on one large project. This was renovating an old derelict building with reclaimed material, and installing eco-friendly products, such as solar-power and compost toilet systems.

They [New Dealers] were refurbishing this building – so they were clearing out the stuff that was in here already and knocking through windows and laying floors and putting up walls and then sort of doing what's called second finish, which is door frames, sort of putting locks on doors, you know, all sorts of finishing touches, once you've got the basic structure ...

Service Organisation: P19 (63)

Again, the New Dealers' work was distinct from that of permanent, paid staff and volunteers. Paid, permanent staff did office work and volunteers worked on an ad-hoc basis for occasional events, such as conferences. New Dealers (and their trainers) on the

other hand worked on creating a tangible outcome, the renovation of an old derelict building to provide office space for the service organisation. This literally produced the physical structure of the organisation. It is a long-term significant benefit that contributed directly towards the organisation's mission, which is to promote economic and environmental sustainability. This work also contributed towards the organisation's mission by providing office space at a reduced rate to other voluntary organisations that shared similar missions, allowing the organisation to further contribute to economic and environmental sustainability.

In addition to the benefits brought about from the production of this building, this process of training New Dealers contributed directly towards the organisation's missions:

... it's been educational for them [New Dealers] in terms of them learning about joinery and so on but they've also learnt life skills and all those sorts of things, but they also learnt about reclaimed materials, you know, that had to sit for hours denailing a bit of wood that's come out of a skip and then seen that turn into a door frame. They learnt about solar power, they've learnt about compost toilets ... so you know if our mission is to try and get those sort of messages out into the community then it's done that ... those New Dealers are members of this community, we played the system a bit. We wouldn't take anyone unless they were living around here, so you know that really benefited our community work ... one of the first things that we did was create 15 jobs in the community and that was really positive and you know I go around schools now and see the kids of the trainees... employing somebody on a normal basis is not particularly radical you know it happens all the time, whereas actually employing someone to train them and support them all the way through that I think that's the thing ...

Service Organisation: P19 (74)

The provision of training New Dealers and the creation of work opportunities that could educate the New Dealers about environmental sustainability was a service that directly contributed towards the organisation's mission in two main ways. First, the content of what New Dealers learned promoted the message of environmental and economic sustainability. Second, because New Dealers were recruited from the local community, the message and the training were delivered to a key section of the organisation's beneficiaries. This case is a clear example of multiple significant direct contributions towards the organisation's mission in terms of what New Dealers produced and the process of training New Dealers.

A list of the different types of direct benefits experienced by the three types of organisation are summarised in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 Summary list of *direct* benefits by type of organisation

Community	Shop	Service
Existing Services (3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Building relations with community members</li> <li>• Providing a variety of responsive services, inc. support and advice to community members</li> <li>• Working on projects and activities and keeping them (and even the centre) open</li> <li>• Improving the quality and increasing the services, for example: child-care and increasing the places in crèches</li> </ul>	Existing services (4) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increasing the shops' output (and therefore the amount of money)</li> </ul>	Existing services (14) Improving/increasing the following services, for example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Care and play work</li> <li>• Advice, support and care for the elderly</li> <li>• Transport for individuals and groups</li> <li>• Advice work</li> <li>• Affordable furniture</li> <li>• Environment</li> <li>• Reducing bulky waste</li> </ul> New services (3) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improving tenants' homes (painting and decorating)</li> <li>• Environmental – refuse collection, recycling</li> <li>• Renovation of derelict building (for organisation, the community and other groups)</li> </ul>

23 IPPs  
Source: PhD. dataset, 2004

To summarise, the majority of the organisations gained instrumental benefits. That is benefits arising from the work the young New Dealers (28 out of 29 organisations). In all 28 of these cases, interviewees talked about ways in which the young New Dealers indirectly benefited their organisations' missions. In addition, 23 interviewees talked about ways in which the young New Dealers directly benefited their organisations' missions. Generally benefits (direct and indirect) contributed towards improving the quality and increasing the quantity of the organisations' existing outputs. There were, however, a few cases in which these contributed towards new projects.

It is worth noting that benefits that contributed indirectly towards the organisations' missions were not necessarily considered to be any less important or valuable than the benefits that contributed directly towards organisations' missions. Instead, the value of this work was dependent on a variety of circumstances and factors. In the main, this was dependent on the needs for such work. For instance, in one case, an interviewee from a non-branch organisation that was undergoing a funding crisis during its initial involvement on the NDYP programme saw New Dealers' (administrative) work as an opportunity to contribute to their core infrastructure:

... we couldn't take on a New Deal employee without the understanding that that person could contribute to the work of the company, it has to be a two-way. Although there's the training and the development side of it, the main idea that I understood was that what they would be doing, by working in the office, is contributing to our basic core infrastructure: having more people in our office really to deal with the everyday tasks, answering the telephone, enquiries and dealing with members of the public. So that was so like the basic infrastructure, really, strengthening the infrastructure... she [young New Dealer] actually contributed and the contribution she made to the company was enormous, because we had a real crisis with the infrastructure, and if she hadn't have been there I don't quite know how I, you know we, would have coped to be honest. She was absolutely incredible and for somebody who wasn't terribly experienced she was just so conscientious and so hard working and really helped to keep the going really.

Service Organisation: P24: (217&253)

During this time, the Director explained that there was a need for extra staff to support the organisation but that finances were not available for this. And, though in this case the reason for becoming involved on the NDYP programme was not purely because of their staff shortage, the programme was seen as an opportunity to help alleviate this problem. Without a doubt, the Director said that their first New Dealer, who was already familiar with staff, made an 'enormous' contribution to the organisation, and helped to strengthen its core infrastructure. However the Director found it more difficult to talk positively about the impact of subsequent New Dealers, partly because the situation of the organisation had changed, but mainly because other New Dealers were not of the same calibre as the first one.

A second interviewee, discussed earlier, also from a non-branch service organisation, talked about desperately needing extra staff to support the main work of the organisation. But unlike the first organisation, this was not because of a financial crisis but instead because the organisation was undergoing rapid growth. This organisation's annual income increased along with the commitment to deliver more services to the elderly in Greater Manchester and in other parts of the North West Region. However, the money received to do this work did not cover the costs of the administration work required to support staff delivering these services. The NDYP programme made available an important alternative workforce that did not need to be paid by the organisation:

... we got the grant to run the centre [contract with social services] ... to look after elderly people... but ... it was very difficult to get the funding for admin worker. Not a single charity was ready to fund that admin. post; and the centre hasn't got that funding to appoint anybody ... so New Deal was very, very helpful to help the staff and being a charity it was helpful for the charity, and also she [young New Dealer] gets very good ... training... As soon as she finished her year she got a job.

Service Organisation: P25 (42)

As with the New Dealer mentioned by the previous interviewee, the New Dealer in this organisation did not work directly with communities. Instead, her work involved supporting core staff's work, by doing most of the administration.

In both these cases, organisations were undergoing changes that produced difficulties, and staff needed instrumental help for different reasons. Both were fortunate to receive good quality New Dealers. And, though their New Dealers did not work directly with their organisation's communities, by supporting staff's work they made a significant contribution to the process of achieving these organisations' missions, and therefore indirectly benefiting their organisation's communities

In the main, whether the young New Dealers could potentially contribute *directly* towards the organisations' mission was dependent on the work opportunities offered to them. Further, in the case of the complex and diverse work, whether or not the organisations offered such work opportunities is likely to do with the length of the programme (and in some cases the additional amounts of money made available to them). To illustrate, as described in chapter four, the primary mission of community organisations tends to be to benefit an immediate local community and the means for achieving this often involved providing a variety of activities and services, which tended to be developed in response to their community's needs and interests. Reflecting the nature of work in these organisations, staff's work was unique, complex, and diverse and required a sensitive approach. Consequently, to train New Dealers for such work and for them then to reap the benefits of this requires time. This is because, concomitant with New Dealers' developing work skills, many interviewees felt that for New Dealers' work to successfully benefit their organisations' mission (and communities) it was essential that New Dealers become familiar with their organisations' communities, staff and general style of work. Therefore training New Dealers to work directly with local communities is likely to require more time compared with those who, for example, also worked in community organisations but predominantly carried out administrative tasks such as photocopying and filing or those in shops who did tasks such as pricing and preparing garments for sale. Indeed, community organisation interviewees who talked about New Dealers contributing directly towards their organisations' mission said that 12 months was (just about) sufficient to reap rewards from their New Dealers' work. Thus it is likely that

participating in the enhanced 12-month programme allowed organisations to provide New Dealers with the options to train and work on interesting, diverse, sensitive and complex work – an option which was less possible for organisations participating on the standard six-month programme.

Evidence to support the notion that the length of New Deal placements influenced whether community organisations were prepared to give New Dealers opportunities to work directly with their communities (and thus contribute directly towards their mission) was found in the interviewees' accounts about whether or not their organisations are likely to continue with the newly modified truncated NDYP programme (towards the end of my field work the NDYP programme was undergoing some significant changes, locally and nationally). One of these changes included a reduction from 12- to six-month placements on the enhanced programme. In the light of these changes, two of the three community organisation interviewees who talked about New Dealers contributing directly to benefiting their organisations' communities expressed uncertainty and reservations about whether they would continue to participate on this modified, truncated scheme. Further, they suggested that were they to continue to participate, they were likely to give their New Dealers work that required less training, such as administrative tasks. At the request of their Agent, the third interviewee was already streamlining their previously successful New Deal post, to make it less demanding and complex. Similar points are raised by several service organisation interviewees. The implications of this change are discussed in chapter seven.

Again, several service organisations that offered complex and diverse work said this was only possible because of the length of the programme (and the amount of money given to them). Indeed, in the case of the two branch organisations discussed earlier that were suffering from skills-shortage in advice work, time and money were essential for their organisation to provide work opportunities to young New Dealers. Indeed, to further support this, these branch organisations can be compared with a third branch from the same parent body that engaged with the standard, six month NDYP programme. In contrast with the first two branch organisations, the third branch organisation did not provide work opportunities to young New Dealers that could contribute directly towards the organisation's missions because there was not sufficient

time (and money available) for them to do this. As a result, all young New Dealers placed in this branch organisation were given administrative work that could potentially contribute indirectly towards the organisation's mission.

To a large extent, the work opportunities offered to the young New Dealers determined the types of benefits that could arise from the work the young New Dealers did. Nevertheless, these benefits are not a guaranteed outcome. In the next section I discuss the combination of factors that contributed towards making this process possible. This is an important aspect towards understanding the organisations overall levels of outcome with the programme (see chapter 7).

## **5.2 Determinant factors**

As noted earlier, the type of work given to the young New Dealers played an important role in whether they directly or indirectly contributed towards the organisations' missions. This alone, however, was not sufficient to explain whether or not the organisations would benefit from the work the young New Dealers did. There was unique and complex circumstances in each of the organisations that contributed to this. Nevertheless, I have identified a combination of factors that played a determinant role. These are: the type of work given to the young New Dealers, in relation to the level of skills needed and whether or not this involved delivering direct services to, for example, clients; the internal and external resources of the organisations; the length of the programme; and the existing capital of the young New Dealers. To discuss this, I examine these factors by the three types: community, shop and service organisations. This has two purposes. First, it allows me to sort and describe a mass of complex data about the different contributory factors. Moreover, there are some distinctions between the community organisations and the shops that helps to draw out comparisons amongst service organisations; in particular the importance of the work given to the young New Dealers and its interplay with other factors.

Before discussing the interplay of factors, I list the different types of work offered to the young New Dealers by the three types of organisation in Table 5.5. For more detail on the types of work and the limits of the available data see the discussion in chapter four (section 4).

Table 5.5 The work available to young New Dealers by type of organisation

Community Organisations (6 organisations)	Shops (4 organisations)	Service Organisations (19 organisations)
Caretaking Administration Childcare Variety of (responsive) work with communities; depending on their needs	Shop work: sorting, steaming, pricing	Administration Childcare and playwork Drivers Advisors Cleaners Community workers Labourers (carpenters) Care assistants Gardeners Lifters and shifters Painters and decorators Traders Video and digital designer
		29 IPPs
		Source: PhD. dataset, 2004

### Community Organisations

Turning first to the six community organisations, five of them talked about gaining (direct and indirect) instrumental benefits. Like a very large number of the organisations in this study, they operated on stretched resources to achieve their own missions and obtained little, if any, additional money to deliver the aims of the NDYP programme (see chapter 4.2). Nevertheless, they still gained instrumental benefits. In these five cases, the main determinant for this was the existing qualities of the young New Dealers; such as their: work, personal and social skills and their willingness to learn. For instance, in the example of the case described in the previous section where the NDYP was described as a 'godsend', the very same manager qualified that the ability to gain benefits was dependent on the quality of the New Dealer placed with them.

New Deal has been a lifeline for us – obviously it has been down to individuals – it depends on the person that you get, we've had some really good people ... obviously they're coming because they're looking to learn another activity, string to the bow, job, whatever ... she's [the New Dealer] got a really good relationship with the workers; with the pensioners who we also work with; with people in the area; with the children; the teenagers. She really has worked very very hard ...

Community Organisation: P22 (21)

This is a view echoed by other interviewees who felt that the benefits to their organisation were 'providing that the candidate was the right person'.

And, depending on the type of work, they needed different skills. For example, in the case of community organisations that offered low-skilled administrative work, they



tended to gain benefits from young New Dealers who had, for example, existing basic keyboard skills and a good telephone manner. In other cases where the young New Dealers worked directly with the organisations' communities, the interviewees tended to talk about the importance of existing personal and social skills and enthusiasm rather than existing work experience and qualifications.

... that would be the most important thing, their [New Dealers] enthusiasm ... well they might have loads of enthusiasm and not have the qualification and not meet the criteria, but we don't expect somebody coming from New Deal to have to fit that strict criteria and person spec ...

Community Organisation: P30 (141)

It is worth noting that the dependence on the existing qualities of the young New Dealers did not mean they expected the young New Dealers to have skills equal to that of their paid (and sometimes unpaid) staff. Indeed, the interviewees talked about the need to train and support the young New Dealers and of giving them 'junior roles'. Nevertheless, due to the organisations' lack of internal and external resources they could not afford to provide high levels of support and training to young New Dealers who lacked existing human capital. Subsequently, there was a reliance on the existing quality of the young New Dealers for the organisations to benefit from them.

### Shops

Like community organisations, the shops (four out of the 29 organisations) operated on stretched resources to achieve their missions. Further, they belonged to the large number of organisations in this study that received little, if any, additional amounts of money to deliver the aims of the NDYP programme. Unlike the community organisations, however, the shop interviewees did not tend to talk about the quality of the young New Dealers as a necessary requirement for the shop to benefit from the work given to them: as long as the young New Dealers did the work given to them this was sufficient for the shops to gain significant benefits. This was mainly because the type of work offered to the young New Dealers was unskilled manual work. To explain, training New Dealers so that their work could contribute directly to the shops' missions was a simpler and less intensive process than that required for New Dealers who contributed directly to community organisations' missions. This is therefore likely to explain the different expectations from each of the type of interviewees. The differing expectations of New Dealers should, however, not be interpreted as New Dealers placed in shops as being of less value to their organisations. On the contrary, the New

Dealers' work and the contributions they made directly (and indirectly) towards achieving shops' missions were highly valued by shop managers.

The different requirements and expectations community organisation and shop interviewees had of their New Dealers can largely be explained by the distinctive types of work carried out in each of these two types of organisation and, subsequently, the length of time it took to train New Dealers to do such work and for the organisation to benefit from this. For example, the means towards achieving community organisations' missions are multiple and responsive, reflecting the needs of their local communities. Thus, in the cases of community organisations that offered such work opportunities, the New Dealers' tasks were diverse, complex and flexible. In addition, they were expected to build relationships with their community organisations' beneficiaries. Given the personal skills and diverse tasks involved in such work community organisation interviewees felt that it was important that New Dealers should, at the very least, be enthusiastic and interested in their work. In contrast, whilst shop work involved a variety of tasks, these tended to be relatively monotonous, simple and repetitive tasks, such as pricing and preparing stock. Consequently, training New Dealers to do such tasks was less time consuming and relatively straightforward; and therefore produced quicker returns.

### Service Organisations

The combination of factors contributing to whether or not the service organisations gained instrumental benefits is by far more diverse than that identified for the shops and the community organisations. To recall from the previous chapter, the service organisations offered a greater diversity of missions, personal and impersonal, a greater variety of work and, on top of this, had the most varied (and fluid) contractual arrangements. Nevertheless, there were some clearly emerging patterns on the extent to which the organisations gained benefits that was largely connected to the type of work offered to the young New Dealers.

Turning first to the organisations that offered manual work to the young New Dealers (five out of 19 service organisations), like shops, in four of the five cases the young New Dealers were offered unskilled manual work. Once again, the tasks were mainly simple manual low-skilled work, which meant the organisations' existing staff could

provide on-the-job training and gain quick returns from this. To illustrate, in one case where the service organisation provides affordable furniture to its local community, the main work given to the young New Dealers was 'lifting and shifting' and was similar to that of most other staff (paid and unpaid) in the organisation. Given the nature of the work and that other staff in the organisation did similar work, the training for young New Dealers was immediately available within the organisation. Further, most of this training involved on-the-job training, which produced a quick return from the work of young New Dealers.

In contrast, however, one of the five organisations offered skilled manual work to the young New Dealers and a different combination of factors contributed towards whether or not the organisation benefited from the work given to them. These are: training, money and the length of the programme. In this case, the service organisation engaged with the New Deal employment initiative to help renovate an old derelict building. To recall, in this service organisation the existing (paid and unpaid) staff worked in an administrative and managerial capacity, whereas as the young New Dealers worked alongside additional paid staff subcontracted from a building firm. Unlike the work in the same organisation discussed immediately above, this work was skilled and required specialist training. Given the nature of the placement, it was essential that this organisation bought in workers who could provide specialist training to the young New Dealers to equip them with the skills to do the work given to them (and to undertake the building project itself). As such, money was needed. Indeed, a sufficient amount of money was generated from this organisation's contract with Agent X and from other sources to undertake the building project and to provide on-site, full-time training for young New Dealers to develop the work skills needed to successfully contribute towards the project. The third factor that played an important role was the length of the enhanced programme: the trainers had sufficient time to provide high quality specialist training to young New Dealers on a variety of skilled manual tasks; and, in turn, for the service organisation to reap the rewards from this. Without all three factors in place, it is highly unlikely that the organisations would have engaged with the NDYP programme for this specific building project.

In the two cases above, the training provision for young New Dealers was important. Beyond this, however, there is variation of the level of importance of time and money.

This variation is interwoven with the type of work young New Dealers were expected to do and the internal resources immediately available within each of these organisations. For instance, in the first case described above, young New Dealers were expected to do predominantly unskilled manual work. This work was similar to that of existing staff (paid and unpaid). Given these circumstances, young New Dealers could be given on-the-job training that was immediately available. Money was therefore not needed to bring in outside trainers. Further, because of the nature of the work, training produced a quick return. Thus, although this organisation participated on the enhanced, 12-month programme this was not an important determinant factor for the organisation to successfully benefit from the work of its young New Dealers. Indeed, this service organisation engaged effectively with a variety of New Deal and other employment initiatives, which provided both short and long term work placements. In contrast with this, the second service organisation that provided young New Dealers with skilled manual work needed to pay outside trainers. This is because the skills and knowledge necessary to train young New Dealers was not immediately available from the organisation's existing staff. The (enhanced) length of the programme was also necessary because training took longer and, in turn, more time was needed to reap the rewards from this.

Unlike the community organisations but like the shops, interviewees from the above two cases did not talk about the importance of the young New Dealers' existing capital. To a large extent this is likely to be because the work given to the young New Dealers did not involve large amounts of direct contact with the organisations' communities. In the first case, whilst young New Dealers placed in this organisation interacted with clients at the point of furniture sales, collection and delivery, the bulk of their work occurred in the warehouse or transporting furniture. In the second case, the organisation's community was less tangible. This organisation's community was the local community in general and society at large. As described earlier, the benefits brought about through the work of young New Dealers (like staff) tended to produce overall intangible benefits to human kind in general, such as improving the environment.

Like these two cases, other interviewees from service organisations in which the main services did not involve extensive, personal contact with their organisations'

communities tended not to talk about the personal qualities of young New Dealers as playing a central role in influencing whether the work of young New Dealers successfully contributed towards their organisations' missions.

Turning to the remaining 14 of the 19 services organisations, these organisations tended to provide a variety of non-manual low- and high-skilled work to the young New Dealers. In addition, in several cases this work involved a large amount of direct and personal contact with the organisations' other existing staff and their community (such as care for the elderly or children, or advice and information of a personal and sensitive nature). Of these cases, nine of the service organisations belonged to the large number of organisations that obtained little, if any, amounts of money from the programme. Further, despite several of them belonging to a parent body, they operated on already-stretched resources. Once again, like community organisations whether or not they gained instrumental benefits was largely dependent on the quality of the existing capital of the young New Dealers. For example, two interviewees from the same branch service organisation (interviewed together) that provided a safe environment for women and children who have suffered domestic abuse talked about the personal quality of their young New Dealers playing a vital determinant role in whether the work of young New Dealers successfully benefited their clients and thereby directly contributed towards their organisation's missions. The work given to young New Dealers was play work with children who stayed at the branch organisation's safe house. The main tasks involved building a rapport with the children to help create a stimulating and safe environment. It was therefore important that play workers were approachable and sensitive to both children and their mothers' needs. To do such work, young New Dealers were given on-the job training and attended external training at a further education college (funded through the NDYP programme). Whilst this training could equip young New Dealers with work skills to carry out play work, the interviewees emphasized the importance of personal and social skills necessary to successfully do this work. The interviewees talked about one of three young New Dealers having the appropriate personal qualities to directly benefit children (and thereby directly contribute towards the organisation's missions).

In addition to the importance of the personal qualities of young New Dealers, both interviewees from this service organisation talked about the importance of time. The

organisation engaged with the enhanced, 12-month programme with Agent Y. This time was needed for young New Dealers to be trained and to build relationships with children and, in turn, for the organisation to reap the rewards of the work that young New Dealers did. The importance of the personal quality of young New Dealers and the time needed to build relationships with the organisation's communities was echoed by other interviewees from community organisations whose young New Dealers worked directly with their organisations' communities.

In the remaining five of the 19 service organisations, again the organisations offered non-manual low- and high-skilled work. In contrast, however, these organisations were much larger and took on a higher number of young New Dealers at any given time (between 15 and 45 young New Dealers). In these cases, whilst the existing personal qualities of young New Dealers was important, there was a combination of other factors that played a determinant role in whether or not they gained benefits from the young New Dealers. For instance, two service organisations (branches of the same parent body) provided general advice and information services to the organisations' local communities. In each branch, some young New Dealers were taken on to train and work as advisors. A large amount of their work involved providing advice of a sensitive and confidential nature to the organisations' clients. Given this, it was not surprising that both interviewees talked about the personal qualities of young New Dealers (such as sensitivity and approachability) playing an important factor in determining whether the work that young New Deal advisors directly benefited the organisations' clients (and missions). In addition, these interviewees talked about three other interdependent factors playing a determinant role. These are: training, time (the length of the New Dealers' placement) and money. Training was essential to equip young New Dealers with the necessary knowledge and skills to deliver services to the organisations' clients, which required learning about diverse and complex issues. Given this, approximately one year was needed to train young New Deal advisors and for the organisations to reap the rewards from this. Indeed, the two interviewees said that for their organisations to benefit from the work of their young New Deal advisors, it was essential that these New Dealers (like paid and unpaid staff) undertook specialized, in-house training. Although this training was available internally, the training was a costly and a time-consuming process. Because of this, money was needed for the organisations to provide training. Indeed, after (contentious) negotiations between the CEOs of these branch

organisations and their contracting agent (Agent X), money was made available for these organisations to provide tailored, in-house training to young New Dealers who worked as advisors. In these two cases, it is clear that all three interconnected factors: training, time and money (along with the personal qualities of young New Dealers) contributed towards the work of some young New Dealers directly benefiting the organisations' clients (and thereby directly contributing towards the organisations' missions). Further, without all three of the interdependent factors in place, it is highly unlikely that these organisations would have engaged with the NDYP programme in such an enabling capacity.

For all three cases above, the three factors: personal qualities of young New Dealers; time; and training provisions played a determinant role in whether the work of young New Dealers directly contributed towards these service organisations' missions. Beyond this, however, there is a considerable variation of the level of importance money played as a determinant factor. This variation is interwoven with the type of work young New Dealers did (which is tied into the nature of these organisations' missions and the type of services offered to the organisations' communities) and to the type and cost of training available within these organisations. For instance, in the case of the branch organisation that provided play work, although young New Dealers were given on-the-job training they were also expected to undertake further suitable training that was not available within the organisation. This training was, however, available through the wider NDYP programme. Thus, although it is likely the money could bring additional benefits to this organisation, money was not needed by this organisation to train young New Dealers for the work that they did. In contrast with this, young New Deal advisors in the two branch organisations previously discussed were required (like other staff) to undertake in-house, specialized training. Suitable training was not available elsewhere through the NDYP programme. On this premise, and because the training was time-consuming and costly, the interviewees from these organisations were clear that for their organisations to viably (and effectively) engage with the NDYP scheme money for training was an important contributory factor.

Without attempting to underplay the unique circumstances that contributed towards whether or not the organisations in this study were able to gain instrumental benefits from the work given to the young New Dealers, there are some emerging patterns in

which a combination of factors interconnected with the type of work the young New Dealers came into play. In the main, these are to do with the training resources; money; the length of the programme; and the existing qualities of the young New Dealers. To demonstrate, like their counterpart community organisations, those interviewees from service organisations that provided complex and various tasks were more likely than those from service organisations (and those from shops) that provided relatively simple, manual tasks to talk about the importance of time (and sometimes money) to train their young New Dealers. Further, those interviewees from service organisations where young New Dealers carried out work that predominantly involved direct, personal contact with the organisations' communities (whether this be in the form of, for example, care work or providing advice and information) were more likely than those from service organisations and those from shops where young New Dealers' work did not involve extensive personal, direct contact with their organisations' communities to talk about the importance of the qualities of young New Dealers.

The combinations of factors that contributed towards determining whether or not the organisations in my study gained instrumental benefits are summarised in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Determinant factors for gaining instrumental benefits by type of organisation

<b>Community (5)</b>	<b>Shops (4)</b>	<b>Service Organisation (19)</b>	
Existing skills of the young New Dealers, incl.: social, Personal, and work	As long as the young New Dealers work, they can benefit	Impersonal Service and services without an immediate community (5 out of 19)	
		Un/low-skilled manual work (4 out of 5)	Skilled manual work (1 out of 5)
		Like shops, as long as the young New Dealers work, they can benefit	Time to train the young New Dealers
			Money to hire additional staff to train and support the young New Dealers
			Training to give them the skills
		Personal services (14 out of 19)	
		Little, if any, additional money (9 out of 14)	For those with additional money (5 out of 14):
		Like community organisations, existing skills of the young New Dealers: social, personal and work	To a lesser extent, personal qualities;
			Time (to train)
			Train (to skill up)
			Money (to hire staff to support New Dealers)
28 IPPs, 1 IPP did not gain any benefits			
Source: PhD. dataset, 2004			



### 5.3 Other Benefits

I now move on to the third section of this chapter to discuss a variety of other benefits the interviewees talked about arising from their organisations' engagement with the NDYP programme. I have categorised the main benefits as follows: young New Dealer beneficiaries; continued benefits; diversification of the workforce; and money. In comparison with instrumental benefits I have dedicated far less time to each of these benefits. This is because although interviewees talked about the ways in which such benefits contributed (long- and short-term, direct and indirect) towards their organisations' missions, these benefits were given little weight in comparison to instrumental benefits in the interviewees' subjective evaluations of their organisations' overall levels of success with the programme. Moreover, again in comparison to instrumental benefits they played little if any role in whether or not the organisations continued with the programme.

#### 5.3.1 Young New Dealer Beneficiaries

Turning first to the category I have called young New Deal beneficiaries, some of the interviewees said the young New Dealers were amongst their organisations' beneficiaries. In these cases, then, in addition to any benefits arising from the work the young New Dealers did any improvements in developing New Dealers' work and life opportunities benefited their missions. To illustrate, one of the large service organisations provided temporary employment opportunities in their own office and elsewhere. Irrespective of where their New Dealers were placed (or the type of work they did) the organisation gained additional benefits that contributed towards fulfilling their missions. This is because the young New Dealers were considered to be amongst the organisation's beneficiaries: the target group they aimed to help are what they refer to as the 'vulnerable' and the 'under served'.

... it [the New Deal employment initiatives] fell into our priorities which was to create opportunities for those under served people really, supported employment fits very nicely [with] our client group ... our agenda is basically ... for the individual, it's not for the profit or the growth of capacity building. It's to do with the individual – so it's actually bringing into the organisation that ethos about developing somebody [the New Dealer] ... it sort of like creates those opportunities for people who wouldn't normally wouldn't you know – creating a meaningful, valuable role for them as opposed to working in like ASDA. I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that and that's right for some people, but there's a lot of people out there who don't know what they can do... they're assessed here to see where their skills lie. ... you know we've had people who have come as crèche workers who have ended up working as Community development workers in the end

Service Organisation: P13 (44, 54, 161)

Interestingly, the interviewee from this service organisation talked about the majority of New Dealers placed through this organisation as having multiple problems:

... the jobcentres used to send us all the people that nobody else would have... it's a very, very difficult client group... there's a lot of issues with alcohol, maybe drugs as well, issues with maybe getting up, attending, work ethics ... all sorts of issues

Service Organisation: P13 (160)

For several service (and other) organisation interviewees these types of problems were considered to be a potential obstacle towards achieving their organisation's missions (discussed in the next chapter). In contrast, however, given this organisation's mission to train and provide work opportunities to such New Dealers was a service that directly contributed towards the organisation's mission: 'just being in the centre itself you're providing a service for people [New Dealers] to have places, vulnerable people'.

To add to this complexity in another example, the interviewee of a community organisation providing services to families in the local vicinity described how New Dealers who moved into employment contributed to their organisation (and to others):

well when it's been excellent and it works as we envisaged it would in the first place you end up with somebody who has come to us as a parent, they become involved, they gain confidence, they've started volunteering, we've told them about New Deal, they've gone to New Deal, they become employed and come back to us on placement so that's somebody within – another person within the community who's not unemployed anymore, who's got some independence and confidence and it benefits their children and their whole family so they're then employed when they leave us, they go on to employment ... We have people who work in local schools who have started on new Deal and now working in local schools and we've had people working in after school clubs locally ...

Community Organisation: P30 (95)

The above quotation is illustrative of the multitude of immeasurable benefits the NDYP programme has brought to a wide range of individuals. In this instance the organisation took on New Dealers who were beneficiaries of its mission. Any improvement to New Dealers' lives, particularly moving into employment, was seen as having a domino affect: benefiting New Dealers' families, the community as a whole, and contributing to the organisation's mission. At an even wider level, the interviewee from this organisation talked about instances when ex-New Dealers successfully moved into non-subsidized, local employment in childcare. She talked about this as having the additional benefit of delivering local childcare services to the local community. This is a long term, sustainable benefit, which was seen as directly benefiting local families and the wider community. When this occurred it made a significant contribution towards achieving the organisation's mission, which is primarily to improve local services for local families.

In essence, by developing the aims of the programme these organisations are in effect delivering their own missions. Given this, on the surface, one might consider such

organisations to be the most likely to gain net benefits from the programme. Nevertheless, my own research shows this is neither a necessary nor sufficient explanation for whether or not the organisations can gain net benefits from the programme. I return to this point in later chapter seven and the concluding chapter.

### *5.3.2 Continued benefits*

Another benefit the interviewees talked about is what I have called continued benefits. These are benefits the organisations gained from former young New Dealers who remained with the organisation as paid and unpaid staff. For example, in one of the (four) shops the manager described how having an ex-New Dealer as a member of staff helped towards training other New Dealers:

... we've got [name of Assistant Manager] who was a New Deal, , who understands these trainees as well as I do cos we've had an Assistant Manager in the past that didn't care for trainees, didn't want to know, she wasn't getting paid enough

Shop: P31 (177)

This could be seen simply as a benefit only to New Dealers. However, supporting the operation of the NDYP programme contributed in other ways too, particularly by supporting the everyday running of the shop.

In another case a community organisation interviewee talked about different ways in which their organisation continued to reap benefits from one New Dealer who had moved into employment elsewhere through networks established during her youth work experience. First, during her work experience she trained as a mentor for young people in the community and continued to provide mentoring services on a voluntary basis:

... and also she's [young New Dealer] now a trained mentor as well. And she's had a young person herself to mentor for nearly a year, so even though she's not working with us anymore through New Deal, she nevertheless is still registered with us now as one of our mentors that we've trained ... so we still maintain the contact through that project as well.

Community Organisation: P23 (171)

Secondly, the organisation with which this New Dealer is currently employed provides services to young people in the community organisation she undertook her NDYP work experience. Her familiarity with these young people's needs contributes to delivering services to this community, to her former placement organisation and to the organisation with which she is now employed.

Of the three types of organisation, interviewees from service organisations were more likely to talk about taking on New Dealers as paid staff in their own organisation. In two particular cases, two branch organisations belonging to the same parent body, this

was a much needed benefit as they had experienced difficulties in recruiting trained paid staff and volunteers to undertake advice work due to a 'shortage of skills in the advice sector'. Given this, in these two cases at least during the early years of engagement at least, the programme was a useful resource to train a future workforce, a long term instrumental benefit.

### *5.3.3 Diversification of the workforce*

In addition to gaining new staff who had already received training, this new resource of staff helped bring in a newer, younger type of staff into the organisation, which the CEO described as a 'breath of fresh air'.

... we had two people [New Dealers] who within a year had got jobs as advisors with local authorities and they were earning more than the people who had been supervising them. So we had some people who were very good. We have some people who we've taken on as our own staff as jobs become available, not usually immediately after the New Deal ... it was also a breath of fresh air having some really young people in the organisation, it was good for the organisation, it was good for our image, people you know young clients would see young people working here, it was just a very positive thing all round.

Service Organisation: P14 (58)

A view echoed by the interviewee from the second branch of the same parent body:

The best legacy is... we have 4 or 5 people now on that team of 30 paid staff who came from the New Deal ... they bring a slightly fresher approach to our work than what otherwise would have been the case. They've created a different kind of diversity than we were used to thinking about, which I think is a lasting value.

Service Organisation: P15 (152)

This new pool of staff was seen as having a 'lasting', positive contribution to widening the existing demographics of staff in these two organisations: by having staff of a similar age range to their younger clients and by improving the organisations' image. However, it has to be noted that both CEOs of these organisations felt that this longer term instrumental benefit of recruiting New Dealers as paid staff was only made possible because they were engaged in an enhanced 12-month NDYP programme, as opposed to the six-month national programme that is being carried out in most parts of the UK. Both these organisations have since withdrawn from the scheme for various reasons (discussed in chapter 7). The implications of this are discussed in the concluding chapter.

In addition, several interviewees talked about the socio-economic and ethnic background of their current workforce being broadened through their engagement with the programme. In the case of shops, the managers mainly talked about this diversity as making their job more enjoyable, interesting and challenging. In other cases, however,

several interviewees talked about benefits that contributed (directly and indirectly) towards their missions. For instance, some of the interviewees from service organisations talked about New Dealers from different ethnic backgrounds bringing in the additional resource of languages that were not available in their organisation:

... Sometimes the New Deal person has been involved if we needed someone to speak another language, if we didn't have you know that language immediately there

Service Organisation: P3 (84)

This was a benefit that only service organisation interviewees talked about. This is likely to be because the use of other languages was not seen as a necessary part of delivering services in the shops. In the case of community organisations providing services to ethnic communities, the languages needed to deliver services were usually available from their existing staff (and volunteers). In contrast, many of the service organisations provided specialized services to less defined communities (see chapter 4.1.1) and did not always have a range of other languages available; often because their staff did not reflect the diverse communities that they served. To illustrate, in one case an interviewee from an organisation that provided legal advice and assistance talked about one of the New Dealers who spoke a language that was not immediately available to the organisation.

... we would be involved in sign posting so for example if someone phones up or comes to reception and there would be some diagnostic work done by whoever was dealing with that person, which is why only specific people do that, and not all the volunteers would do that, and it would be unusual for the New Deal person to do that. Sometimes the New Deal person has been involved if we needed someone to speak another language if we didn't have you know that language immediately there in the [name of organisation]

Service Organisation: P3 (204)

In the case above, the young New Dealers' resource of an additional language helped to create opportunities for her to work directly with clients (in a limited capacity); thereby directly contributing towards the organisation's missions.

Several other service organisation interviewees talked about the benefit of additional languages made available from their New Dealers. The benefit of additional languages made available to organisations through New Dealers should not be underestimated. It was not only an additional resource used to deliver services (making a direct contribution); it was also an important factor that some interviewees attributed to their organisation becoming more accessible to their communities – a resource which made an important, indirect benefit to help organisations achieve their mission and cannot be quantified. As the interviewee quoted below explains:

... another good aspect for the [name of organisation] is that New Deal exposes us to another group of people that we might not come into contact with cos okay we've got a bunch of professionals, we've got some admin staff, we've got the volunteers, who

generally speaking have got law degrees.... What we tend to have is okay we've got ... a bunch of working class [name of Local Authority] clients but not, generally speaking, people from that group working in the [name of organisation]... and it's possible through New Deal if we get that you know, which is valuable for any organisation

Service Organisation: P3 (317)

In addition, several interviewees talked about how such diversity helped them to develop new and rethink existing approaches to working with their communities. For example, one interviewee said it was useful to 'bounce ideas' off young New Dealers to improve their accessibility to younger clients:

... we say we're a service for young people but none of us are that young to know what young people want, so we could say what do you think of this? what do you think of advice by text message? ... you know things like that

Service Organisation: P 1 (355)

A more profound, long lasting change brought about by the diversity of young New Dealers included an interviewee describing how their New Dealers were an 'impetus' for 'modernizing' a rigid, out-of-touch organisation:

I think they've [young New Dealers] broadened the sort of age and ethnic profile of the organisation and perhaps opened us, made us a bit more accessible – made more languages available ... made us rethink our style. I remember when we had somebody working in the tenant liaison team ... as an assistant and when he first came in, I remember the first letter they did out to tenants to introduce himself, which said "Hi, this is so and so. I'm new at the centre" ... we had to bite our tongues, stand back and think what's wrong with that? ... lets just give him free reign there and go with it and see what happens; and of course he was hugely, hugely popular ... to me that was quite an interesting example of how they kind of blew open what may have been a rather rigid, steady [way of working] ... Our intention was to move with the times and to be open and accessible and everything ... we've paid lip service to and thought we were doing, but when we actually got people challenging the way we did things it just makes you realize there's quite a big gulf between what you think is maybe cutting edge and maybe what somebody else coming in from the outside without any background in the organisation might think ... but to me, it really made me stop and think wow ... [the NDYP programme] was contributing to the change of image and a modernization of the organisation, plus you know in practical terms there were the painters contributing to the maintenance to the properties...[continues listing other benefits from other New Deal workers]

Service Organisation: P17 (107)

This interviewee's description of how young New Dealers contributed to helping the organisation change, and to bring about a fresher and more accessible approach to working with their communities was echoed by other organisations. However, the changes were more profound in this organisation compared with others. This may partly be because this organisation had the luxury of having larger numbers of staff, and received significant financial remuneration for its involvement on the programme. This was, however, an organisation undergoing staff-cuts. The key is more likely to be about some staff being open to giving young New Dealers 'free reign' – a risk that staff took and benefited from.

In addition to the young New Dealers being a resource for "growing your own staff", an implicit and positive consequence of this was the reduction of staff recruitment costs, a benefit that some of the partner organisations experienced too. As the interviewee quoted directly above explains,

... certainly a benefit of cutting [staff] recruitment costs because so many people have come in through the New Deal and either got permanent jobs with us or with our partner organisations, you know we might have somebody placed at [name of placement organisation] who has then gone and got a permanent job at [another placement organisation]. And I might just get a phone call from the personnel manager at a partner organisation saying oh we've got a job coming up at so and so , have you got anybody suitable amongst your New Deal trainees ... so that's just brilliant.

Service Organisation: P17 (147)

This benefit of training a future workforce was more frequently reported amongst the larger branch service organisations. This is not surprising as they are most likely to be the larger employers.

#### *5.3.4 Money*

Aside from the large service organisations that obtained additional amounts of money from the programme to hire staff to train the young New Dealers, some of the interviewees from smaller organisations talked about the additional benefit arising from the small amounts of money they obtained from the programme. In the main, these were shop managers. Out of the four shops, there were three shops in receipt of money for the supervision of each New Dealer placed with them. This monetary benefit contributed directly towards the shops' mission. This is because although all four shops were affiliated to different parent bodies, which had different missions, all shops shared the same primary mission to raise revenue for their parent body (see chapter [4.1.1]). New Dealers' presence therefore had the potential of generating a significant additional contribution to increasing these shops' revenue. Further, while shops worked autonomously from each other, on a national scale (those belonging to the same parent body) had the potential to make a substantial, cumulative financial contribution to raise funds for their parent body. For example, whilst an interviewee representing one of these shops at national level was not prepared to 'divulge' exact figures of the money they received through their engagement on the NDYP programme; he confirmed that it was 'significant':

I couldn't tell you no [the total national figure of money received from the organisation's involvement on the NDYP programme]. I can't really divulge that; it's a significant figure

Interviewee representing charity shop at national level, P32

In contrast, a few other interviewees from community and service organisations that also received money for supervision talked about monetary benefits contributing indirectly towards their organisations' mission by, for example, contributing towards the payment of the telephone bill.

In addition to these and the instrumental benefits described earlier on, there were other less frequent benefits identified by interviewees. For example, there were a few interviewees who talked about the benefit to increasing young New Dealers' knowledge and awareness of their organisations' work. And, in the case of large service organisations there was the strengthening of their relationships with partner organisations occurring as a consequence of placing good quality New Dealers with them. In the same breath, however, some of these interviewees also talked about the tensions that arose when they placed difficult New Dealers with partner organisations.

#### **5.4 Conclusions**

Clearly, as described in this chapter, in almost all cases the organisations clearly gained instrumental benefits, which for most organisations was the primary reason for their engagement (see chapter 4.3). In addition, several of the interviewees talked about other benefits arising from their organisations' engagement; some of which were not anticipated. These benefits were multiple, diverse, short- and long-term. Moreover, they were dependent on a combination of factors; some of these factors were more important than others depending on the type of work given to the young New Dealers. For instance, in the case of organisations that could offer unskilled manual work that had the potential to significantly contribute towards their mission, the organisations relied on the least amount factors: because the work was simple and less intense, the existing staff were able to provide on-the-job training and gain quick returns from this. In contrast, the organisations that offered more skilled and complex work needed additional amounts of money to hire extra staff to train and support the young New Dealers and sufficient time to reap the benefits from this. Without these resources, these organisations were dependent on the existing capital of the young New Dealers.

The benefits arising from the programme and the combination of factors that contributed to this are central towards understanding the extent to which the organisations could gain overall levels of success and whether or not this was



sustainable success. Nevertheless, whether or not the organisations gained benefits is only one aspect of a very complex and messy story. In the next chapter I move on to discuss the problems arising from the programme and the impact this had on the delivery of the organisations' missions.

## **6. The Problems**

In the previous chapter I described the different ways that voluntary organisation IPPs in my study gained benefits from their engagement with the programme. Often, these benefits were multiple, intertwined and contributed (directly and indirectly) towards their missions on several dimensions. What was not scrutinized in the previous chapter, and is equally important in the examination of the whether or not the organisations could gain overall levels of success is the problems arising from the programme and the extent to which this impacted on their missions. These are the topics of this chapter. Like benefits, these were often multiple, intertwined and difficult to separate. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes, I have separated them into two main groups. These are problems to do with the young New Dealers and problems to do with the structure and the operation of the programme. The chapter, however, is divided into three main sections. In the first section I describe the problems arising with young New Dealers and the effects this had on the organisations. This is followed by a discussion about the variation of these effects and the combination of factors that contributed towards the organisations' different abilities to manage the disruptions arising from these problems. In the third section I discuss problems to do with structural and operational aspects of the programme that compounded these problems.

### **6.1 Young New Dealers**

Turning first to the problems arising with the young New Dealers, almost all interviewees talked about multiple problems arising with New Dealers (25 out of 29 organisation); some of which led to disruptions that were an impediment towards achieving the organisations' missions. I have categorized the most frequently reported problems under three subheadings. The first is to do with the young New Dealers' attendance and time keeping. Second, is to do with their (lack of) work skills. The third is to do with personal problem and social and personal skills.

#### *6.1.1 Attendance and time keeping*

Turning to the first of the three categories: young New Dealers' attendance, several of the interviewees talked about problems with some of the young New Dealers who did not turn up for work, were late and, in some cases, turned up for work and would later disappear from the organisation. Although several interviewees talked about this as a problem, the degree to which such problems impacted on the organisations and on their

missions was variable. In a few cases, for instance, some interviewees talked about lateness as a minor issue, or as one interviewee put it, 'a hiccup'. This tended to be in cases where the young New Dealers' work did not impact on others' work. For most interviewees, however, young New Dealers' poor attendance and time-keeping caused disruptions to the organisations themselves. Often, this was because these organisations' staff (paid and unpaid) were distracted from doing their own work because staff needed to: undertake the absent young New Dealers' work; reschedule planned activities or work; and, when necessary, liaise with the staff from the Contract Agents about those young New Dealers who were persistently late or absent (this led to further problems with the Contract Agents and is discussed later on). Other disruptions to organisations included work spilling into other days and, in some cases, scheduled jobs being cancelled or postponed:

... there's been a couple [of young New Dealers] that have not been great to be honest. Most of the time it's to do with the unauthorized absence and bad time-keeping ... it can mean that that we have to cancel a whole day's jobs, for instance, if I've got a driver and a warehouse person that I'm expected to come in and they don't turn up, I've got nobody else here to do that work that day, so I have to cancel. So we've lost a whole day's work there, which then means it dominoes to the rest of the week. If they come in the rest of [the] week, everybody is having to do twice as much work...

Service Organisation: P26 (154)

In one of the large service organisations that took on higher numbers of young New Dealers compared with most others in this study, the frequency of young New Dealers' absence and lateness led to the creation of a separate disciplinary procedure. This is because there were concerns that the frequency of disciplinary action taken against the young New Dealers was too demanding on the organisation's trustee board members (who were part of the panel for the existing disciplinary procedure). Thus, to reduce the burden on these trustees, a new disciplinary procedure consisting solely of paid staff was established.

... we just had lots of problems with the New Dealers not realizing that this was a job and when we said you start at nine that wasn't sort of optional and you can breeze in about half past 10. We expected people to come in at nine and it was that sort of problem, people not understanding the authority that working in an organisation means and not understanding the relationship between an employee and an employer. And I was frequently saying to people the sort of conversation like, you know, this isn't a cooperative, this is a hierarchy, this is how it works: I tell you what to do and you do it [laughs]. You know, sometimes we had to actually get to that level, it was something they had no notion of what it meant to work somewhere ... We had lots of problems with very poor time keeping, we actually had to establish a separate disciplinary procedure of New Dealers because our normal disciplinary procedures for paid staff involved the panel made up from the personnel, from the committee and we found that you know we would have driven the trustees mad, so ... we developed one for the New Deal that involved disciplinary hearings with paid staff so we didn't have to keep ringing the trustee board.

Service Organisation: P14 (63 & 65)

Indeed, whilst the newly established disciplinary procedure did help to reduce disruptions to the trustees, it was a time-consuming process that interrupted the organisation's paid staff from their existing work. Consequently, the young New Dealers' persistent lateness and absence was an indirect impediment towards achieving this organisation's missions.

Further, in many cases, despite repeated requests, several interviewees talked about some young New Dealers who failed to inform their placement organisations' staff about lateness or absence.

... nobody [young New Dealers] bothered phoning in telling us they weren't coming in so there was no staff in so it was stand still yesterday, but I mean that's not just because they're New Dealers, it could have been a volunteer, it could have been anybody. But yeah sometimes I think generally and this is a general, general comment you don't get a great deal of sort of respect from a lot of New Deal people, they're not that courteous as to phone up and let you know even though they're supposed to and you can reiterate a million times, it doesn't happen and that can be a bit of a nightmare at times

Shop: P9 (163)

The lack of young New Dealers' communication compounded these disruptions; nevertheless, most of the organisations still managed to deliver their missions.

In addition to the effects on organisations themselves, there were some cases where young New Dealers' poor attendance and time-keeping had more serious implications; directly affecting organisations' communities (and thereby directly impeding on the delivery of the organisations' missions). This was most likely to occur when young New Dealers worked directly with the organisations' communities and when an immediate replacement worker was not available. To illustrate, two interviewees from the same branch organisation (which provides services to women, and their children, who have fled abusive family circumstances) talked about one particularly problematic young New Dealer who worked as a play worker with children. These interviewees made references to an incident where the absence of this young New Dealer led to the cancellation of an outing organised for the children who lived at the organisation's refuge:

028b: well most of the things [problems] is ... a team member (young New Dealer) didn't turn up and didn't seem fit to ring in so we didn't know when she was going to be off, you couldn't plan you know. The problem with children's work you know children get into a pattern, they want to be in the play room, I mean this

028a: and especially in the holiday time when you've planned and they know what the rota is because they've seen it displayed, so they know where they're going ...

028b: and then the worker also knew as well to choose exactly when you know when you're going on the trip or whatever and just not turning in, it's not good. You've got an inspection coming and she knows ...

Int: so how would you say that impacts on the children and the women?

028b: oh disappointment, a very small thing would be disappointment, but anger and upset

028a: yeah because it disheartens them

028b: well what happened then is what the next week when we were supposed to go out they didn't turn up, they probably thought well if you can do it to us, we can do it you know. I know it sounds childish but they were let down, so...

028a: some of them had appointments and things and we were taking the kids so they can see solicitors and doctors, that's when they get that wee bit of time that we can do that – and even for the rest of team members you know when you have to go off work

Service Organisation: P27 (328)

On the day of the outing, the young New Dealer's presence was needed to meet the minimum legal ratio required between staff and children. Although the young New Dealer was aware of the outing, she did not telephone the organisation's office to let staff know that she would not be attending work on this day. As a result of this, and because an immediate replacement worker was not available, the children's outing was cancelled. This caused disappointment to the children and inconveniences to the children's mothers: some of whom had appointments to see, for example, doctors and solicitors. In addition to the immediate disruptions caused to the organisation and to the community, the cancellation of the outing had a profoundly negative effect on the relationship between the organisation's staff and community. According to the two interviewees in this organisation, this was compromised as a result of cancelling the outing. Indeed, at the next organised outing – out of disappointment and anger – none of the women turned up with their children, resulting in another cancelled outing. Given the nature of the organisation's community, it was essential that services delivered helped to create trust and a stable environment between the staff and the community. This is a powerful illustration of how young New Dealers' poor attendance and time keeping can be a severe impediment towards achieving the organisations' missions.

On top of this, the two interviewees discussed immediately above (like others from organisations with problematic young New Dealers who worked with children) talked about their concerns about the effects that young New Dealers' lateness and absence could have with OFSTED (Office for Standards of Education).<sup>25</sup> OFSTED inspect organisations that provide child care services to ensure that they meet basic national standards on, for example, health and safety and the quality of services provided to young children. Organisations that do not meet these basic national standards are given time to improve their services. In some cases, action, which can include closure, can be

---

<sup>25</sup> OFSTED is a non-ministerial government body that inspects schools and childcare services for children, including some child minders, for more information see <http://www.ofsted.gov.uk>.

taken against such organisations. Given this, young New Dealers' poor attendance (particularly unauthorized absences) could have a detrimental impact on the future of organisations' childcare delivery services. Although there is no evidence to suggest this occurred during these organisations' engagement on the NDYP scheme, several interviewees said this was a serious concern to them.

... if we've got somebody who is going to be with us for a year then we can count them as a member of staff. If we count them as a member of staff it means we can bring more children in so if we bring more children in and they don't turn up we are over our ratio ... and that is quite a serious issues with OFSTED and it's very frustrating because you can't do the planned activities that you planned to do because you've not got that member of staff there

Service Organisation: P30 (111)

### *6.1.2 Work skills*

Another factor that caused disruptions to these organisations was young New Dealers' lack of basic work skills. Indeed, despite almost all organisations offering the young New Dealers work of a more junior role (with support) than their paid staff (and sometimes volunteers), several interviewees talked about young New Dealers who lacked the ability to successfully carry out simple tasks. According to many interviewees, this is largely because several of the young New Dealers lacked fundamental work skills, including elementary literacy and numeracy. To illustrate, one interviewee talked about young New Dealers who did not know how to address an envelope by hand; and another talked about having to physically demonstrate how to use a mop. And, often, 'with the best will in the world', some young New Dealers failed to follow simple instructions.

... some of them [young New Dealers] we couldn't send out to get stamps, which is a really basic thing ... because they'd forget it or they'd get the wrong order, you know we need 500 first class stamps and one girl came back and they hadn't got any in ... so she came back with 2000 second class stamps instead of 500 of each, which didn't really help us and then people [paid and unpaid staff] would say "oh New Deal" ... I mean at the end of the day, they're human beings aren't they, probably acting in the best way they thought

...

Service organisation: P2 (326)

Although interviewees whose young New Dealers did office work were most likely to talk about these young New Dealers' inability to carry out simple tasks, this was a problem reported by interviewees across different types of organisation. Indeed, even shop managers, whose young New Dealers did relatively simple, monotonous tasks, talked about such problems.

... [frustrated because] when you get a lot of people [young New Dealers] who are not up to scratch and you're having to tell them over and over and over to do something – what you think is really simple and they're not getting a grip and you're thinking, you're getting really angry but when you step away from it you're like well they just need more

support, but you haven't really got the time to support them, then you're sort of, well what is my job? Am I shop manager or a support worker?

Shop P9: (185)

Interviewees frequently said that at times it was quicker to do some tasks themselves rather than to ask a young New Dealer. Like the interviewee who exclaimed, '*am I a shop manager or a support worker?*', this is a dilemma that several interviewees talked about: in which, there was a constant tension between the time spent with young New Dealers and how much time was spent doing their own existing work (to contribute towards their organisations' missions). This was clearly the case for interviewees from small organisation that did not receive adequate additional resources to supervise young New Dealers, for example:

... well I've talked to others and it's worked well for other people [other centre managers] ... whether they've got somebody else who can help with that supervision because otherwise you find that organisations like this, like ours, we don't get that much money, we can only afford to pay people from that money that comes in, you know, so we're fairly tight on the staffing side to give you know, you can't just say to somebody well you can support that person for six months because they've got their own job to do... I just feel as though we're now, if I dare say it, scraping the bottom of the barrel...

Community organisation: P5 (210)

To recall from chapter four (section 3), several organisations engaged with the NDYP programme primarily to gain instrumental support from young New Dealers: the young New Dealers would be trained to do the work given to them and, in turn, the organisation would benefit from this. However, for many interviewees, the degree of young New Dealers' lack of basic work skills meant that the support these young New Dealers needed was too high for their organisations to achieve net benefit from the programme. Indeed, interviewees who were (originally) optimistic and keen to support the aims of the NDYP programme found that the 'dire' calibre of some young New Dealers meant that it was not cost-effective for their organisation to continue with the programme:

when I first came to the [organisation] I was really idealistic about them, I thought great everybody benefits here: the [organisation] benefits, we're going to get somebody to work for us, we're doing something good, we're helping someone into work etcetera ... and then realized that it was unless you've got the right person it was horrifically hard work. And I was quite frankly appalled at the standards of people we got ... you know, really dire. And so I then had to think well you know there is no point – whilst it's noble to take someone on, we don't want to encourage someone. *If it takes so long to train someone it's just not cost-effective ...*

Service Organisation P3 (106)

This dilemma was not exclusive to small organisations. Interviewees from relatively large organisations (compared to others in my study) that did not receive enough money

from the NDYP programme to employ (sufficient) additional staff to supervise these young New Dealers talked about similar difficulties (discussed later on).

In some cases, the lack of fundamental work skills was because some young New Dealers with disabilities were mismatched to jobs, and were not given appropriate support. It is worth noting here that young New Dealers' disabilities are not a necessary impediment to the delivery of these organisations' missions. Instead, the disruptions arising were often to do with the mismatch between the (dis)abilities of young New Dealers and their work; which was compounded by the Agents and the Jobcentre Plus's failure to recognise and to notify placement organisations about these young New Dealers' disabilities. Like young New Dealers who lacked basic work skills, these young New Dealers needed extensive support and supervision. Again, this led to tensions between how much time the existing staff spent supporting the young New Dealers and doing their own work to achieve their organisations' missions. In some cases, there were instances in which the mismatch between New Dealers' disability and (inappropriately supported) work led to severe disruptions to the general running of the organisations.

well there were times when it did actually inhibit [the organisation's missions], we had several dyslexic admin workers; how the jobcentre let us have dyslexic admin. workers I don't know. But I remember we had one day when there was absolute panic because somebody had misfiled loads of things and we had the solicitor who was going to a ... big hearing and we could not find the files and the whole place was in pandemonium for a couple of days. So when it was bad it was very bad ... if we hadn't have managed to find [the file] that could have been dreadful for the individual client. As it is the solicitor nearly had a heart attack but was ill you know from it, so it definitely was detrimental ...

Service Organisation, P14 (98)

In this organisation, as a result of one dyslexic young New Dealer who did administration work, a client's case file was incorrectly filed. This had severe consequences to the organisation. This is because the case file contained information needed for an imminent court hearing. Although the files were found in time, the situation caused 'pandemonium' in the office. There were high levels of stress and anxiety amongst the organisation's staff, several of whom spent two days looking for the misplaced file. Consequently, this distracted the staff from carrying out their existing work that contributed towards the organisation's missions. Further, the situation contributed towards the solicitor concerned becoming seriously ill.

Interestingly, those interviewees least likely to report conflicting interests between supporting both young New Dealers and their organisations' mission were invariably



those from organisations where young New Dealers were amongst the organisations' beneficiaries and from organisations where one of their multiple missions was to train individuals. Nevertheless, even in these cases the interviewees talked about the necessity to obtain additional amounts of money to hire extra staff whom could then provide what proved to necessary high levels of support for such young New Dealers.

#### *6.1.3 Personal problems and personal and social skills*

An additional factor that caused disruptions to the organisations was young New Dealers' personal problems and lack of social and personal skills. Interviewees talked about an array of such problems. These included young New Dealers' lack of: confidence; communication skills; personal qualities such as 'empathy' and 'trust'; and ability to interact with others. There were other problems to do with self-presentation and hygiene. In the more extreme, but frequent, cases there were young New Dealers who had personal problems, such as violent and abusive behaviour and drug and alcohol dependency.

The least disruptive of these problems tended to be young New Dealers' shyness and lack of confidence, which many interviewees put down to young New Dealers' age and their limited (if any) work experience. Many of these interviewees talked about providing support to these young New Dealers to help build their confidence. Indeed, several interviewees talked about success stories in which, over the course of the young New Dealers' work experience, these young New Dealers developed and, in turn, contributed towards the organisations' missions.

Unlike young New Dealers' shyness, several interviewees talked about young New Dealers who lacked other social and personal skills (and qualities), such as communication skills and empathy, as having a potentially detrimental affect on their organisations. Further, most of these interviewees did not talk about instances where these young New Dealers successfully developed these skills or qualities during their work experience. In part, this is because interviewees were less willing to expose these young New Dealers to tasks that could have a potentially hazardous effect on their organisation's community; but also, in some case, because they did not feel it was possible to train young New Dealers to develop certain personal skills, such as 'trust' or 'empathy'. To illustrate, several interviewees talked about young New Dealers who

lacked communication skills, including the ability to talk to people on the telephone. This was more likely to be a concern to those interviewees from organisations delivering personal and care services to an immediate community:

... you must understand we're a personal contact basis organisation, if fanny Adams rings up or Mohammed rings up, it's a face to face contact, it's telephone ability, it's being able to talk to people. Unfortunately a lot of the New Deals don't have that skill and I mean you know fair enough may be but when they're sort of - we were getting them around the 20 mark they had no personal skills at all but you know the staff used to say well that's why they're on the New Deal because they can't get jobs. And I used to feel sorry for them because they can't get off the ground can they? If they arrive at 18, 19 and they've got no personal skills, they can't speak to people properly or be able to assess people and be able to speak to them in a way that's helpful to them [organisation's community] because they're victims of crime

Service Organisation, P2 (198)

This interviewee is from an organisation providing personal and sensitive services to an immediate community of interest: victims of crime. It is, then, not surprising that this interviewee said that it was vital that young New Dealers (like paid and unpaid staff) were able to talk appropriately to the organisation's clients. However, only one 'exceptional' New Dealer placed in the organisation had such abilities. Given this, in order to reduce the negative effects this could have on the organisation's community, almost all young New Dealers were given tasks that involved little (if any) direct contact with the organisation's community. Consequently, although these young New Dealers did not contribute directly towards the organisation's missions, even the most difficult of these young New Dealers could be found work that could contribute indirectly towards the organisation's missions.

Nevertheless, in several other cases providing young New Dealers with such work was not an option. This is because all work carried out had an impact on their organisations' missions. For example, one interviewee talked explicitly about the importance of 'empathy', and the necessity for young New Dealers (like staff) to have an 'affinity' with elderly people (the organisation's community), irrespective of the type of work that young New Dealers did.

... what we're trying to achieve is not something that you can always train or impose on somebody, if they've not got that let's say empathy or frame of mind, that they've got an affinity to older people and the needs of older people it's difficult... when you're dealing with people of a certain age you've got to have the empathy towards them, you've got to get into their frame of mind and if you can't then it's difficult to do the jobs that you do. Obviously if you're dealing with people over the age of 65 that have got various problems, health problems, memory problems and things like that then it's difficult, and if you can't communicate with them as well, if you've nothing to communicate this is where I go back to the life skills and you know, the older person might have been better ... I think that is a difficulty of having the younger element of the New Dealers in, I mean after saying that you know I mean we've got two classic examples of when it worked ... It's different, if you've not got an affinity with the client base you're trying to help you know whether it be somebody with terminal illness or learning difficulties or whatever if

you've not got that affinity it's probably not going to work, I mean you could you say well it doesn't really matter because they're only in the kitchens but it does matter because it's the client you know you can't say well you know cos they're in the kitchens they don't have contact with the client. Of course they have contact with the client, they see the client everyday, they see the people that they're cooking for and that can or should have an affect on how to behave and how to present themselves you know.

Service Organisation: P10 (34)

According to this interviewee all tasks that young New Dealers did had an effect on the quality of the services delivered to the organisation's community; the elderly. Thus, if young New Dealers did not have qualities such as 'an affinity to older people', these young New Dealers' work would not benefit the organisation's community. Further, this interviewee explained that these qualities are not something that can be imposed neither could young New Dealers be trained to develop such qualities (or skills). Indeed, many of the young New Dealers placed in this organisation did not have such qualities. Given these points, those young New Dealers who lacked personal and social skills were a burden to this organisation; and did not contribute (directly or indirectly) towards the organisation's mission.

In more extreme, but not necessarily rare, cases interviewees talked about young New Dealers who had multiple personal problems, including: financial and housing difficulties; mental health problems; violent and abusive behaviour; and, drug and alcohol dependency. These types of problems were often severe and likely to be the very reasons why these young New Dealers were not engaged in full-time employment in the first place. As one interview described,

There were quite a lot of personal problems and pastoral problems that we hadn't really considered ... New Deal[ers] had a high level of pastoral and care needs, and we ended up meeting those needs. Now there is a kind of expectation in an organisation like this that one is about assisting the world at large to involve working volunteers, and there is a high level of pastoral care than the average organisation ... but that was stretched by New Deal. We were dealing with all sorts of life problems that people presented to us ... that took a great deal of energy ... [such as] ... acute levels of maybe domestic violence, or violence in the household, alcohol and drug dependency issues. These are things that prohibited people being fully engaged in the employment market in the first place, which is why they ended on a form of conscription. Well at the end of the day the New Deal was a sort of half arm twist in to a placement for many people and there were reasons why they were at that point anyway, often social reasons and those social reasons haven't really been resolved by anybody until they found themselves in an organisation like us, I mean we would end up being involved in trying to assist people, but I can think of certainly drug, alcohol dependency issues, relationship issues. We were almost sometimes acting as kind of foster parents for people on placement. Many people, they might be 20 years of age, but they seemed to be working socially at a much less mature level than you might otherwise expect...

Service Organisation P15 (121)

Like others, this organisation did not anticipate such severe cases and found they, as the interviewee immediately above said, 'ended up meeting those needs'.

The extensive needs of these young New Dealers meant they needed extremely high levels of pastoral care that often went beyond the organisations' contractual arrangements with the programme. Indeed, there were instances in which supervisors went beyond their call of duty to try and help them. For example, one supervisor offered temporary accommodation to a young New Dealer who was about to become homeless as a result of debt problems. In another case, a supervisor spent part of his weekend with a young New Dealer to help him learn to manage his finances:

... for some of them a lot of personal issues are affecting their [New Dealers] work, for example, maybe alcohol or drug misuse, so we're actually starting to do workshops ... so they'll be some on budgeting. I had one lad, he was always coming in saying he was skint, had no money etcetera. And then he got behind with his council tax, so he got a court case. We sat and said right what are you spending your money on, and he was spending like £3.50 a day on lunches you know just buying Kentucky Fried Chicken or MacDonalds ... easily his outings were greater than his incomings and we had to get to address that and say you know what here is not essential and it was for him to realize what it was. In the end, I actually took him on a Saturday when I did my own shopping and said come on I'll go shopping with you, you know, and show you how we can make lunches and I said well there's a loaf of bread and "but won't it go off?" [New Dealer] and I'd say yeah but you've got a fridge, you've got a freezer compartment ... he didn't realize he could put bread in it. It was really going back to basics and saying you know well what to do - you eat ham or cheese or whatever it was. You know well there's enough lettuce or ketchup ... crisps ... buy six cokes because it's cheaper than buying one at 70p everyday, and just getting him to realize

Service Organisation: P18 (103)

This same interviewee talked about several other cases in which he had to deal with problems arising with, for example, mental health and illegal drug use.

In even more severe cases there were interviewees who talked about disruptions arising from those young New Dealers who displayed violent behaviour. For example, there was one case in which one young New Dealer had 'fisticups with their supervisor' and in another case a young New Dealer put a board of nails under a supervisor's car. Violence was not isolated to supervisors. In an extreme case, even for this category, there was an altercation between a young New Dealer and an unpaid staff from another employment scheme that ended up with a replica gun being brought on to the organisation's premises.

... so we learned on the job what the [young New Dealers'] baggage was ... and that was terribly hard and very scary at times to you know dealing with guns being produced ... two trainees had a falling out about actually a young woman ... and somebody's relative came with a gun and threatened one of the New Deal trainees... I am not a sheltered a violent ... but I do not expect to find them in one of my day centres or outside one of my day centres with a gun, and so that was challenging ...

Service organisation: P12 (37)

Like others, this interviewee talked about several experiences with different young New Dealers who had multiple problems, which she referred to as 'baggage'. Once again, these problems were disruptive to the organisation: staff struggled to support and work

with these young New Dealers whilst continuing to do their own work. Even worse, these disruptions were disabling and compromised the safety of (paid and unpaid) staff.

Clearly, the interviewees across the different organisations talked about a variety of problems arising from the young New Dealers, these are summarised in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 List of problems to do with young New Dealers

---

**Summary list of problems**

---

Attendance and time keeping, for example:

- Lateness
- Unauthorised absence
- Disappearing

Work skills, for example:

- Little or no work skills
- Unable to follow simple instructions
- Mismatching disabilities and post

Personal problems, social and personal skills, for example:

- Lack of confidence
  - Poor communication
  - Lack of empathy
  - Inability to interact (appropriately) with others
  - Self presentation and hygiene
  - Violent and abusive behaviour
  - Mental health
  - Drug and alcohol dependency
- 

## **6.2 Variations of success and contributory factors for this**

The problems discussed in the first section (immediately above) are not necessarily unique to young New Dealers. Indeed, some interviewees talked about occasional difficulties arising with their organisations' existing staff (paid and unpaid). However, the degree and the frequency of these problems arising from young New Dealers were off the scale in comparison with other paid and unpaid staff. Consequently, many of these organisations underestimated and were not prepared for the level of support and pastoral care that was needed for these young New Dealers. Nevertheless, the extent to which the organisations were able to cope and manage disruptions arising from problematic young New Dealers was variable and depended on each organisation's circumstances. Despite their unique situations, however, there are patterns in which these variations can be understood. In this section, I examine the variations and some of the key characteristics that contribute towards understanding these differences. As in the previous chapter, I do this by the three types of organisation: community, shop and

service. In part, this is to help sort and manage the data. Moreover, this division allows me to draw out the key characteristics. They include: the type of work the young New Dealers did, and how much this work (or the problems) affected the organisations' existing staff and missions; whether it was possible to contain disruptions arising from problematic young New Dealers (to reduce their impact on others); the resources available to each organisation; and the supervisors' willingness and ability to support these young New Dealers. In addition, this was influenced by the types of service that the organisations provided, and whether or not the organisations served an immediate, tangible community or society at large.

### *6.2.1 Pattern and frequency of types of problem*

Turning first to the pattern and frequency of problems arising from the young New Dealers across the three types, this is summarised in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Frequency of problems by type of organisation

Type of organisation	No. of organisation	Out of
Community	3	6
Shops	4	4
Service Organisations	18	18
25 out of 28 IPPs <sup>26</sup>		

To recall from the previous section, the problems arising from young New Dealers are to do with their: poor attendance; lack of social, personal and work skills; and severe personal problems. These problems were generic, cutting across all three types of organisation. To remind the reader, interviewees from 25 (out of 28 organisations) talked about problems arising with the young New Dealers. Out of these 25, all interviewees from shops (4) and all interviewees from service organisations (18) compared with half of the community organisation (3 out of 6 organisations) experienced problematic young New Dealers. It is likely that community organisation interviewees were less likely to report these problems because they took on the smallest number of young New Dealers cumulatively and at any given time compared with the other types of organisation in this study. Indeed, the three community organisation interviewees who did not talk about problems arising from the young New Dealers

<sup>26</sup> As noted in a previous footnote, I will now be going to exclude one of the 29 organisation IPPs from analyses as they did not engage with the NDYP programme. This is a service organisation.

placed in their organisations had a total of one or two young New Dealers throughout their engagement with the NDYP programme. In addition to this, two of these three community organisation interviewees talked about a close and positive relationship with their Contract Agent (Agent Y). Thus, it is also possible that the Contract Agents' staff's (positive) familiarity with these placement organisations contributed to making appropriate matches between the young New Dealers' interest and skills and the needs of these two community organisations.

Despite these similarities, there were differences in the frequency in which these problems were reported within each of these types of organisation. For example, although all four shop interviewees talked about problems arising with young New Dealers, these problems tended to be infrequent – or, as one shop manager put it, 'that one-off'. In contrast with this, whilst community organisation interviewees were least likely to talk about problems arising with young New Dealers, of the three community organisation interviewees who did, problems arising with young New Dealers were frequently reported. These problems tended to be with young New Dealers' poor attendance and lack of basic social, personal and work skills. In contrast with both the shops and community organisations, there were greater variations amongst the service organisation interviewees' accounts of the frequency in which problems arose with young New Dealers. Like shops, some service organisation did not experience frequent problems with young New Dealers. Other service organisations, like community organisations, experienced frequent problems that were mainly to do with young New Dealers' poor attendance and lack of social, personal and work skills. There was also a distinct subgroup within the service organisations that consisted of large service organisations that contracted with Agent X. This subgroup of large service organisations was frequently exposed to a range of problems with young New Dealers, including severe personal problems.

There are two interconnected reasons that contribute to understanding why this subgroup of large service organisations frequently experienced a wide range of problems. First, these service organisations contracted with Agent X. This Contract Agent operated in some of the most extensively multiply deprived neighbourhoods across the UK. Given this, Agent X was likely to have a higher number of young New Dealers with multiple problems in comparison with other Contract Agents. This

explanation in isolation, however, is not sufficient. This is because Agent Y also operated in these areas: as noted in chapter three Agent Y was subcontracted by Agent X to manage small voluntary organisation IPPs. Instead, it is likely that it is a combination of this reason and the high number of young New Dealers that these large service organisations took on (see chapter 4.2). There is another plausible reason: it is possible that Agent X considered large organisations as having the capacity to manage difficult young New Dealers both because they had more internal resources and because they received a greater amount of money to engage with the NDYP programme in comparison with the small organisations that contracted with Agent X and Agent Y. This said, data about the process in which Contract Agents matched or allocated young New Dealers to placement organisation was not systematically collected as it is beyond the remit of this research study. Given the issues that have arisen about the (mis)match between young New Dealers and placement organisations and the consequences of disruptive young New Dealers; this is an area that deserves further research.

#### *6.2.2 Variation of impact*

Another variation across the three types of organisation is the different degree to which problematic young New Dealers disrupted organisations. In the case of shops, the infrequent event of problems arising with young New Dealers tended to be contained and caused minimal disruptions to the shops and to their missions. In contrast with this, in community organisations the effects of (similar) problems were difficult to contain and impacted seriously on these organisations, undermining their credibility in the eyes of their beneficiaries. Consequently, problematic young New Dealers were a direct and indirect impediment towards achieving these community organisations' missions. In the case of service organisations, once again, there were far greater variations amongst interviewees' accounts. For some service organisations, like shop interviewees, problems were contained and caused little disruption to the organisation or to their mission. In contrast with this, for some service organisations, like community organisations, problems were more difficult to contain and caused disruptions to the organisations and in some cases to the organisations' missions.

In part, the level of disruption in these organisations was determined by the amount of problems arising with young New Dealers: the higher the number of problems, the greater the disruption to the organisation (and vice versa). This said, the likelihood of



problems arising was largely determined by a combination of factors, including: the type of work given to the young New Dealers; the type of communities that these organisations served; and the ability to support and supervise the young New Dealers. Setting the frequency of problems aside, the interplay between the problems, themselves, and these same factors influenced the extent to which disruptions arose in the organisations. Interestingly, to a more or less extent, these factors varied across shops and community organisations and within service organisations, contributing to understanding why some types of organisation were less likely than others to report problems and disruptions caused by young New Dealers. I now move on to examine the distinctions between the shops and the community organisations. The comparison between these two types of organisation provides a focus that highlights the combination of factors that played a determinant role in explaining the different effects that problematic young New Dealers had on each of them.

Briefly, to remind the reader, the shops' main mission is to raise money for their parent body. This is achieved by selling goods; most of which are donated. To do this, there is a relatively structured routine that involves a variety of low skilled work such as sorting, steaming and pricing goods. The majority of this work is undertaken by volunteers and other workers who are from employment and skills-training schemes; and requires little training for the shops to benefit from this work. In many ways, the characteristics of community organisations are diametrically opposed to those of shops. Community organisations' main mission is to support and improve the lives of those in the local community. Thus, unlike shops, the community organisations delivered personal services to an immediate, tangible community. These services were dependent on the needs of their community; and were often flexible, varying on a daily basis. There are a variety of tasks; however, unlike shops, these tasks were often complex. Further, it took time to train the young New Dealers and for the community organisation to benefit from this work (see chapter 4.1).

Given that the tasks were much simpler in shops compared with the community organisations, it is not surprising that those interviewees from shops were less likely than community organisation interviewees to talk about problems with young New Dealers' lack of basic work skills. Indeed, the variety of simple and monotonous tasks in the shops meant that even some of the most 'dire' young New Dealers who lacked

basic work skills could undertake one or a combination of tasks. In contrast with this, although community organisations had a variety of tasks, these were often complex. Thus young New Dealers who lacked basic work skills presented difficulties for these organisations. Again, for similar reasons, the shops were less likely than community organisations to experience problems due to young New Dealers' lack of social and personal skills.

In addition to the shops' reduced chances of experiencing problems with young New Dealers' lack of basic social, personal and work skills, when (similar) problems arose in these two types of organisation, the effects were less disruptive to the shops. This is because it was possible to contain the effects of these problems, and to reduce their potential impact on, for example, the general public. For instance, in the case of young New Dealers who lacked personal and social skills, there were a variety of tasks that could be given to these young New Dealers, such as sorting and steaming, which took place in the stockroom (away from the general public). Over time, some of these young New Dealers were gently introduced to tasks that involved more contact with the shops' customers. In contrast with the shops, the community organisations had fewer opportunities to contain or minimize the disruptions caused by problematic young New Dealers. This is because, although community organisations had a variety of work, this mostly involved delivering direct services to an immediate and tangible local community. Indeed, there were several incidents where young New Dealers' lack of personal and social skills affected the community organisations' beneficiaries. Consequently, like some of the community organisations, this undermined some of the service organisations' credibility in the eyes of their beneficiaries.

Another reason for the different amount of problems and level of disruptions presented in these two types of organisation is associated with the extent to which these organisations' staff could provide constant support to the young New Dealers. And, once again, helps to understand why problems were less likely to happen and to be less disruptive to these shops in comparison with the community organisations. In general, shops' managers were enthusiastic and welcomed the challenge to support and train young New Dealers. On top of this, the work environment and the shop managers' existing role and responsibilities contributed to the feasibility of the shops' engagement on the NDYP programme. To illustrate, the shops' work environment consisted of two

main and relatively small work spaces: the shop floor and the stockroom. Given this, it was relatively easy for shop managers to provide constant supervision to young New Dealers without having to leave their own work environment, reducing distractions to their own work. In addition, one of the main duties of shop managers was to manage the daily routine within the shops, which involved organizing and providing support to the shops' workers to ensure that they did work such as sorting, steaming and pricing. Given this, the supervisors' role in the shop was compatible with the duties to support and train young New Dealers and therefore did not distract shop managers from their own work. Like those from the shops, supervisors in the community organisations had the willingness and the enthusiasm, initially at least, to support and supervise young New Dealers. This is, however, where the similarity ends. Often, the work in the community organisations was carried out across different work spaces, which made it difficult for supervisors to provide constant support and supervision to these young New Dealers without distracting these staff from doing their own work. On top of this, the community organisations staff had a variety of other work that they needed to do for their community organisations, which was independent from providing support and training for the young New Dealers. Given this, the support needed by problematic young New Dealers presented tensions for the supervisors: they were in constant tension between delivering their existing work and supporting these young New Dealers.

Although shops were less likely than the community organisations to experience problems and disruptions with young New Dealers, there were still instances in which problematic young New Dealers obstructed the process towards achieving the shops' missions, particularly (but not exclusively) to do with the young New Dealers' (unauthorized) absence and poor time keeping: at times, this caused a 'stand-still' and slowed down the process of getting consumable goods from the stockroom to the shop floor. Nevertheless, even in these situations, whilst such problems caused frustrations to the shop manager, the shops tended to be no worse off than if there were no young New Dealers present in the shop in first place. In contrast with this, in community organisations these same types of problem caused disruptions that were more serious and often directly impacted on the organisations' communities. Indeed, the absence of young New Dealers sometimes resulted in the cancellation of activities, which caused disappointment to the beneficiaries of community organisations. In these cases, in

contrast with the shops, the effects were directly detrimental towards the community organisations' missions.

The comparison between the shops and the community organisations draws out some of the key factors that contribute to the explanation of the different frequency of and varying effects problems with young New Dealers had on these two types of organisation. These factors include: the type of work that the young New Dealers did: which includes the level of skill required, the level of training needed and the extent to which this work impacted on others; the availability of other types of work that could help, for example, reduce disruptions to the organisation; and the supervisors' capacity to provide support and training to these young New Dealers. These same key factors can be used to draw out the variations amongst service organisations. Indeed, the variations in the frequency and the degree to which similar types of problems, more or less, reflect the characteristics that service organisations shared with shop and community organisations. Briefly, for example, those interviewees who were from service organisations with simple tasks that involved little contact with other staff and the community were less likely to report problems and disruptions compared with those interviewees from service organisations with more complex tasks that delivered personal services directly to a community.

In the case of the distinct group of large service organisations that contracted with Agent X, there was the additional factor of the different amount of money that was made available to them from the NDYP programme. To highlight this, I use three examples that were used earlier in this chapter that experienced severe problems with young New Dealers (see section 1.3).

Turning to the first case, this is a large service organisation that works on environmental issues. This organisation received the highest number of young New Dealers at any given time compared with other organisations in this study. Although the organisation placed some young New Dealers elsewhere, a large number of these young New Dealers were placed within the organisation. On a proportionate basis, it is therefore not surprising that this organisation received high numbers of problematic young New Dealers. However, despite the frequency and the severity of problems presented by some of the young New Dealers placed in this organisation, on the whole,

the work the young New Dealers did still significantly contributed towards the organisation's mission to promote and support environmental sustainability to the local community and society in general. Moreover, the benefits were achieved at little, if any, cost to the organisation.

The successful outcome of this organisation's engagement with the NDYP programme is largely explained by a combination of three factors: project design, type of work and money. Firstly, the project was designed specifically for young New Dealers in which their work took place out of the office and away from the organisation's existing staff, who worked on different projects. This meant that the disruptions arising from the problematic young New Dealers were contained and had relatively little impact on the organisation itself or on the delivery of the organisation's mission. In part, this is because when disruptions arose the organisation's staff did not face the tension (that so many others did) between delivering existing work and supporting these young New Dealers – since the staff whom supported these young New Dealers were hired specifically to work on the New Deal project. In addition, since young New Dealers had little contact with other staff in the organisation, they did not distract these staff from doing their own work. Second, the type of work the young New Dealers did was low-skilled, including: litter picking, city patrol work and painting furniture. The level of the skill meant that whatever the young New Dealers' existing skills, they could be found work they were able to do. On top of this, because young New Dealers' work involved few (and at most brief and impersonal) services to the organisation's community (providing directions to shoppers and distributing leaflets to local businesses), problematic young New Dealers had minimal effects on the organisation's community. Third, and by no means least, this organisation obtained money made available from the NDYP programme (and elsewhere) to hire additional staff to manage, support and deliver this project.

Another factor that contributed to the success of this organisation's engagement with the NDYP programme was the interviewee's ability to work with and support severely problematic young New Dealers. He was a former youth worker and was keen to help young New Dealers use the opportunities given to them through the NDYP programme. He was, therefore, well placed to support the problematic young New Dealers placed in this organisation. Nevertheless, putting aside this interviewees' personal qualities and

skills, this organisation was clearly still in a good position to benefit from the NDYP programme. In short, the disruptions caused by problematic young New Dealers did not distract existing staff from doing their work and involved little, if any, cost to the organisation. On top of this, any work that young New Dealers did that benefited the environment was an additional contribution, at no extra cost, towards the organisation's mission.

Like the previous organisation, the second example is a case in which a branch organisation obtained additional resources to hire extra staff to support young New Dealers and to do the financial and administrative paperwork necessary for the organisation to engage with the NDYP programme. However, unlike the previous organisation, the young New Dealers placed in this organisation were integrated with the organisation's existing staff (paid and unpaid) and did similar work to these staff. Given this, the disruptions that arose from problematic young New Dealers had the potential to and, at times did, distract the organisation's staff from doing their existing work. Nevertheless, they still managed to gain net benefits: on the whole, the benefits of the work that many of the young New Dealers did outweighed the disruptions caused even by some of the most problematic young New Dealers.

In part, the humanitarian aims of this organisation (which are to empower people by providing them with advice and information about their individual rights) placed the organisation in a good position to support those young New Dealers with personal problems. Nevertheless, the interviewee was clear that the organisation was not in a position, nor was he prepared, to support young New Dealers without the money made available from the programme, as this would compromise the services delivered to the organisation's community. The main contributory factor that made it viable for this organisation to engage with the programme was the additional resources made available from the NDYP programme; in which, the programme was 'well and truly paying its way'.

The third case was less fortunate with their engagement with the programme. This was the organisation discussed earlier in which the interviewee talked about multiple problems, including a replica gun being produced on their premises. In this case, first and foremost, their inability to manage and cope with these problems was due to the

inadequate resources made available from the NDYP programme. Because of this, the organisation was not in a position to hire additional staff to support many of the (particularly problematic) young New Dealers placed in this organisation or to undertake the large and copious amount of NDYP paperwork (discussed later on). Further, these young New Dealers were integrated with, and given similar work to, the organisation's existing staff. As a result of this, existing staff were in a constant predicament: to do their own work or to support and train and support young New Dealers. Consequently, the problems presented by many of the young New Dealers distracted staff from doing their own work and, in more extreme cases, the severity of problems with some of these young New Dealers compromised the safety of the organisation's staff and clients. The disruptions arising from problematic young New Dealers and other problems arising from the organisation's engagement with the programme meant that it was not cost-effective for them. There was an attempt on the organisation's behalf to renegotiate their contract with Agent X in order to obtain adequate resources to hire additional staff to support the organisation's engagement with the NDYP programme. This was, however, unsuccessfully; subsequently, the director of this organisation decided to withdraw from the scheme, in order to prevent any further compromises to delivering the organisation's missions. The organisations continued engagement with the programme is discussed in chapter seven.

On the whole, for this organisation, the disruptions caused by the organisation's engagement on the NDYP programme were far greater than the benefits gained. First and foremost, this was due to the inadequate resources made available from the NDYP programme. Consequently, the organisation was not in a position to hire additional staff to support many of the (particularly problematic) young New Dealers placed in this organisation or to undertake the large and copious amount of NDYP paperwork (discussed later on). Further, these young New Dealers were integrated with, and given similar work to, the organisation's existing staff. As a result of this, existing staff were in a constant predicament: to do their own work or to support and train and support young New Dealers. Consequently, the problems presented by many of the young New Dealers distracted staff from doing their own work and, in more extreme cases, the severity of problems with some of these young New Dealers compromised the safety of the organisation's staff and clients.

The disruptions arising and the interplay of factors that contributed towards this are summarised in Table 6.3.



Table 6.3 Summary of impact of problems by types of organisation

Type of organisation (features and level of risk)			
	Community	Shop	Service
	Typical features, include: variety of work needing different levels of skills (work, social and personal) Immediate interaction with community	Typical features: Variety of work, but tendency to be low -skilled manual work	<i>Personal services/ immediate community</i>  <i>Impersonal services/ less tangible community</i>
<b>Type of problem:</b>			
<b>Attendance and lateness</b>	<b>Medium-High</b> impact on staff and on the community, in severe cases this has included the cancellation of outings & compromised relations between staff and the community	<b>Low-medium</b> Impact on staff and can slow the process down and in severe cases can even bring to a standstill; nevertheless they are rarely worse off than they would be without the young New Dealers	<b>Medium-High</b> Again as with community organisations especially if they are relying on the New Dealer to work directly with the clients
<b>Lack of work, personal and social skills</b>	<b>Medium-High</b> Do not have the variety of useful menial work to give young New Dealers to keep them occupied and contain problems. Subsequently, when problems arise with young New Dealers this can take existing staff away from their own work	<b>Low</b> Have enough simple work to keep problematic young New Dealers occupied and to significantly benefit from this	<b>Medium-High</b> Whatever the type of work, this presents a risk but the extent of this is dependent on whether or not the organisation has additional amounts of money and time to train up the young New Dealers  <b>Low-medium-High</b> Depending on the level of work skills. Low skilled work: low risk Skilled work: dependent on the amount of money and time to train the young New Dealers to benefit from this
<b>Chronic personal problems</b>	<b>Likely to be high</b> but not reported as a problem arising	<b>Likely to be high</b> but not reported as a problem arising	<b>High</b> But organisations could manage with additional amounts of money and time to work with the New Dealers  <b>Low-medium</b> Still a problem if young New Dealers interact with other staff; not a problem if they were isolated from other staff

### **6.3 Structural and operational aspects of the programme**

Turning to the final section of this chapter, I now move on to discuss the problems to do with the structural and operational aspects of the NDYP programme. Interviewees talked about several problems with this. I have grouped them into four main categories: recruitment; disciplinary procedures; training; and change.

#### *6.3.1 Recruitment*

Turning first to the problems with recruitment, of the 25 (out of 28 organisations) interviewees who talked about problems arising with the young New Dealers, 18 of them put this down to a combination of three main reasons to do with recruitment. These are: the target group; the mandatory aspects of the programme; and the sequence in which young unemployed people were offered (or given) work across the different sectors that engaged with the programme.

##### Target group

In the case of the target group, as described at the very beginning of this thesis, the participants entering the NDYP programme had to be between 18 and 24 years old (inclusive) and unemployed for 26 consecutive weeks (see chapter 1.2.1). It was the latter criterion that several of the interviewees said was a problem. This is because amongst these young people were those who had difficulties that prevented them from entering non-subsidized employment in the first place. As one interviewee exclaimed, “these are young people who, the phrase that [Agent X] used to use were not job-ready, which is a euphemism for unemployable”.

To some extent, given the aims of the programme were geared towards benefiting the young New Dealers (to increase their employability skills), the organisations did expect to provide support, training and management for young New Dealers. Nevertheless, interviewees said they did not expect to provide the extremely high levels of support, training and pastoral care that these problematic young New Dealers needed. The disruptions arising from such problematic young New Dealers is described in detail in previous sections of this chapter.

### Mandatory aspect

Another feature of the NDYP programme that interviewees identified as a problem for their organisations was the mandatory aspect of the scheme (see chapter 1.2.1). In several cases the interviewees said they felt that young New Dealers were being 'pushed' with 'their arms up their back' to take work in their organisations. Indeed, several of the interviewees referred to these young New Dealers as 'conscripts'.

... the other thing about that [the NDYP programme] was that there were clearly people coming through the system because they'd been told by the jobcentre, they had to go on otherwise the benefits would stop

Service Organisation: P10 (45)

... some of them [young New Dealer] have a bit of a chip – I don't want to sound derogatory about them but some came in and it was very clear that they didn't want to be here. They've got to join the scheme [NDYP] ... it was a condition of their income support or whatever and they didn't really want to be here ...

Service Organisation, P2 (206)

Inevitably, this mandatory imposition on young unemployed people led to a pool of reluctant recruits entering the NDYP programme. On an abstract level, there were variations of these types of 'reluctant' young New Dealers. These are mainly those who: did not want to work at all; did not want to do the work that they were given; and, did not want to be in the organisation with which they were offered (or given) work. Aside from these variations, the presence of these reluctant young New Dealers led to problems for the organisations. Several of these problems are associated with those described earlier, such as young New Dealers' poor attendance and time-keeping. In addition, several of the interviewees felt that the presence of 'conscripted' young New Dealers was not conducive to their organisations' work environment as this impacted on other (paid and unpaid) staff's morale and motivation to do their own work.

... I've only been here for a year and I've experienced a few people [young New Dealers] coming in who've just not been interested ... they're just not interested at all, they don't want to work and I don't want somebody like that in here. I just want people who are not going to be too much hassle and who are going to fit into the team, because it's a nice team, because once you get somebody in like that it sort of spreads doesn't it, everybody picks up a bit of the laziness ....

Shop: P9 (263)

Another consequence of the schemes being mandatory is that it led to time wasted organising interviews for young unemployed people who did not turn up; turned up late; and were unresponsive during the interviews.

28a: we get people for interviews and they're not even interested in doing play. It's just a case of if I don't come for this interview I'm going to lose my benefits ...

028b: ... [one young New Deal interviewee] said because she was told to [go to the interview] ... someone didn't turn up for their interview because it was a wet day, another

one had a cold, another she couldn't be bothered coming that day. I went round to [Agent Y] so many times and I was losing so much patience.

Service Organisation, P27(084)

### Sequence of placement option

The disruptions arising from these reluctant and inadequately skilled young New Dealers applied to other sectors that engaged with the NDYP programme. However, they were amplified in the voluntary organisations due to an additional feature in the design of the programme, which is to do with the chronological order in which young unemployed people were referred to organisations across the five employment options available on the NDYP programme. To recall from chapter one (section 2.1), during the first month on the Gateway young people were offered work in the private sector. Following this, those young people who wanted (and who were eligible) to gain qualifications were referred to Further Education Colleges. In the final two months of the Gateway, young people were offered (and sometimes mandatory referred to) work in the voluntary and environmental organisations. Although I did not collect systematic evidence about the referral patterns, this was a view expressed by several of the interviewees.

... there's option 1 and 2, but we had option 3 and 4 [VSO and ETFO], because they were the people that couldn't get jobs initially under the options 1 and 2

Service Organisation, P20 (63)

Supporting this, several of the interviewees felt that their organisations received some of the most difficult young New Dealers who had 'multiple barriers that prevented them from working in the first place' – or as some interviewees put it: the 'dregs' and the 'bottom of the barrel'.

Consequently, the inheritance of this pool of reluctant and inadequately skilled young New Dealers presented several problems for the organisations. In part, as discussed earlier, this was to do with the frequency and the degree of the disruptions that the organisations experienced, which often impeded (directly and indirectly) the delivery of the organisations' missions (see section 2). Interconnected with this, for many of the interviewees, the unexpected high level of investment that was needed to support these young New Dealers raised further problems. This is because many of the organisations found themselves in the position of using already-stretched existing resources to engage with the programme. Subsequently, this raised questions about the extent to which these organisations could viably engage and gain net benefits from the NDYP

programme. This is an important consideration because (as noted in earlier chapters) although the scheme was primarily designed to benefit the young New Dealers, in the case of the VSO and ETFO there was a secondary aspect of the programme: to benefit the community. This secondary aspect was the central reason for many of these organisations' engagement with the programme (see chapter 4.3). However, the disruptions arising from problematic young New Dealers frequently raised tensions between the balance of delivering the NDYP programme's primary aim (to benefit young New Dealers) and the organisations' aim (to benefit the organisations' missions and thereby their community).

Despite these serious issues that are a consequential part of the structure of the programme, there were some cases in which both the young New Dealers and the organisations themselves benefited from the programme (see chapter 5). In part, this is because not all young New Dealers lacked basic skills or were 'reluctant conscripts'. There were cases in which some of the young New Dealers had basic skills and who were committed and willing to gain work experience. In these cases, young New Dealers benefited from the work experience gained from the organisation and, in turn, the work of these young New Dealers (directly and indirectly) benefited the organisations themselves and the organisations' communities.

In addition, not all initially reluctant and inadequately skilled young New Dealers remained reluctant and inadequately skilled during their work experience. There were cases in which some of the problematic young New Dealers later developed into valuable workers and contributed towards the organisations' missions: some of the young New Dealers who originally did not want to work later became interested in their work; and some of the young New Dealers who had little (if any) basic skills developed skills during their work experience. For example, in one organisation a young New Dealer was given work as a New Deal cleaner. During his work experience, the organisation's staff found out that he was unable to read and write. Using the organisation's own resources, the organisation's staff encouraged and supported this young New Dealer to attend literacy classes. This young New Dealer can now read and write. Further, he was subsequently hired within the organisation as a care worker. He is a valued member of staff, who cares for the organisation's elderly community. Once again, despite the structures of the scheme, in this and other cases, some of the young

New Dealers contributed towards the organisations' missions. Further, some of these young New Dealers continued to contribute towards these organisations' missions as paid and unpaid staff.

The example immediately above illustrates how, even in the face of initial lack of skills, some of the problematic young New Dealers did eventually benefit the organisations' missions. However, to achieve this outcome, for most of the organisations this involved (unexpectedly) using significant amounts of their own existing resources. In some cases, this investment paid off and both the problematic young New Dealers and the organisations benefited from this. In other cases, however, the outcome was less successful. Indeed, several of the organisations invested their own time and resources in problematic young New Dealers who remained disruptive to the organisations throughout their work experience. The unpredictable outcomes of this investment meant that this was a risk to the organisations. This is because in most cases the organisations were using already stretched resources to engage with the programme. The balance between these costs (some of which were unanticipated) and the benefits gained from the organisations' engagement with the programme played a determinant role in the extent to which organisations could viably engage and gain net benefits from the programme. Subsequently, some of the organisations withdrew from the scheme (see chapter 7).

The criteria for eligibility and the mandatory aspect of the NDYP programme were integral with the purpose of the programme: to increase the employability of those young people who had barriers that prevented them entering (non-subsidized) work. Subsequently, organisations engaged with the NDYP programme did not gain an adequate labour force; instead, they took on young people who needed to be trained and supported, who could then potentially benefit the organisation. Thus, organisations were expected to invest their resources in these young New Dealers. Whilst, in theory this could benefit both the young New Dealers and the organisations themselves, the additional feature in the design of the programme: that is, the 'hierarchy of options' in which young people were offered work, meant that the voluntary organisations were most likely to receive the most unemployable of these young people. Consequently, several of the voluntary organisations were swamped with problematic young New Dealers. Whilst, the disruptions caused by these young New Dealers were fluid and

some of them eventually benefited the organisations, the level of investment needed to provide support, pastoral care and management of these young New Dealers was extensive and was not anticipated by the organisations. Further, this investment was a risk. This is because the rewards reaped from investing in the young New Dealers could go down as well as up. Further, positive (and negative) experiences with one young New Dealers was not necessarily a good guide to the organisations' future experiences with another young New Dealer. Indeed, there were several cases in which organisations had overall positive experiences with one young New Dealer followed by negative experiences with another (and vice versa). These variations presented risks for the organisations because it was difficult to predict the outcome of their investment: a risk that they could ill-afford since many of these organisations were using existing and already stretched resources to engage with the programme. And, indeed, whilst many of the organisations had a combination of successful and unsuccessful outcomes with these young New Dealers (including the organisation that supported the young New Dealer who could not read or write) there were several cases in which problematic young New Dealers remained disruptive to their organisation. Given these variations across and within organisations it is difficult to quantify the extent to which the young New Dealers on the whole contributed towards or impeded the organisations' missions. Nevertheless, the balance between the costs and benefits of supporting these young New Dealers and the unpredictability of this are important considerations when examining the extent to which the organisations gained sustainable benefits from their engagement with the NDYP programme.

### *6.3.2 Disciplinary procedures*

The second problem the interviewees talked about that was to do with the structure and the operation of the programme was disciplinary procedures. In the case of the design of the programme, technically, young New Dealers were not employed by the voluntary organisations. As part of this, placement organisations were not (officially) allowed to deal with the problems presented by the young New Dealers. Instead, a third party (usually the Contract Agent) was responsible for this. In theory, this arrangement would not have been a problem if young New Dealers were of a high quality: with the appropriate skills and motivation to do the work given to them. Indeed, it was not discussed as a main concern by the few interviewees who said that their organisations did not have problems arising with the young New Dealers. However, in practice, there

was a high number of problematic young New Dealers who disrupted the organisations; subsequently, there were several disciplinary issues.

Of those organisations in which disciplinary issues arose, a small number of the interviewees said they were satisfied with the way in which disciplinary issues were managed: the Contract Agents effectively and promptly resolved problems. In these cases because the operation ran smoothly, the design was beneficial to these organisations: the organisations benefited from the work that young New Dealers did and they did not need to use their own resources to resolve the issues arising with problematic young New Dealers. In this respect, this was cost-effective to the organisations and contributes towards understanding the extent to which these organisations gained sustainable benefits from their engagement with the NDYP programme. In contrast, however, the majority of interviewees who talked about disciplinary issues said that the Contract Agents' interventions were inappropriate and led to further difficulties for their organisations. These interviewees talked about two main types of interventions that were problematic for their organisations. These are to do with how the Contract Agents approached problems arising with those young New Dealers: who severely disrupted the organisations and who flouted the New Deal terms and conditions.

#### Discipline and severely problematic young New Dealers

In the case of those interventions with severely disruptive young New Dealers, these tended to consist of cases of those young New Dealers who were aggressive towards the organisations' staff. For the interviewees these were clear cases of 'gross misconduct' in which the young New Dealers needed to be removed immediately to prevent further problems to the staff and to the organisations. However, instead, many of these interviewees said that their organisations were initially met with a series of meetings with the Contract Agent – or, as one interviewee put it, 'a series of ineffectual meetings'. It is likely that these meetings were a necessary protocol that the Contract Agents needed to follow. Nevertheless, for many of the interviewees this arrangement delayed the necessity to remove the young New Dealer. Consequently, this compounded existing problems and further impacted on the staff and the organisation. Further, for many of the interviewees the initial process of attending meetings was perceived as the Contract Agents showing 'resistance' to dealing with the issues and, in



some cases, led to (or contributed towards) tensions arising between the organisations and the Contract Agents.

On top of this, the failure of the Contract Agent to deal promptly and the organisations' lack of autonomy to deal with the problems, amplified that the organisations were unable to have a sustainable relationship with the young New Dealers. Indeed, one of the interviewees said that the 'worse aspect is we've [the organisation] not employed them, they're not really answerable to us':

... the worse aspect is we've not employed them, they're not really answerable to us in a sense. We had concerns once and we spoke to [Agent Y] and it was you know they were saying they would deal with it ... we weren't able to deal with it ... I was thinking what have I done to him [New Dealer]: he'd come in and look really dead angry ... I remember saying to my line manager at the time I'm not prepared to work, it's making me uncomfortable everyday you know in my own work place ... it was upsetting me basically. It was having an impact on me.

Service Organisation: P28 (366)

Compounding these problems, in some cases, the action following the meetings did not resolve the problems experienced within the organisations. In some of these situations, interviewees talked about having to insist on the removal of the young New Dealer concerned, until action was taken. Further, in a small number of cases, the organisations resorted to using their own existing resources to deal with the problems. For example, in the case described earlier in this chapter where a replica gun was produced, after a series of unsuccessful meetings and attempts by the Contract Agent to resolve the situation, the Director of the organisation brought in a security company to deal with the issue:

I am not a sheltered violet ... I have worked along some very dangerous people, but I do not expect to find them in one of my day centres or outside one of my day centres with a gun. And so, that was challenging enough one might have thought, however the systems that were in place within the managing [contract] agency to deal with that were completely inadequate. We had little support at the best of times from them, and in a situation like that where their manifesto would claim that they were able to bring in you know specialist expertise to deal with severe situations and one I would have thought that was particularly severe situation, you know two New Deal trainees, one of whose life is being threatened. They were absolutely not up to the task at all. They were terrified, they refused to engage, they made promises. They did bring somebody from outside, a third party - he was absolutely useless and they did nothing at all about it and in the end in fact, we had to go to our security company ... now that should not be my responsibility in you know working with trainees. That should have been the people who have a multi-million pound contract to actually have processes in place that manage risk, you know, assess it and manage it and they completely failed to do that in anyway ... People [the staff] were terrified: we tried to contain the people who knew because otherwise it would have infected the whole organisation ... It's just so messy, quite apart from dangerous, but you know just messy in terms of [name of the city in which the organisation is located] is a relatively small City. A lot of people know each other and so we were trying to contain it,

we were trying to maintain confidentiality and we were trying to manage that safely and as I say they [the contract agent] were absolutely no help whatsoever

Service Organisation, P12 (39)

Although this was one of the more extreme cases, it illustrates how the Contract Agent's failure to deal with the situation led to several problems for the organisation. In addition to compounding the existing disruptions to the organisation, these include: using already stretched resources, a cost that was not anticipated during the organisation's decision to engage with the scheme and trying to contain the problem, to protect the staff and the organisation's reputation – failure to do either of these could have led to long-term detrimental impacts for the organisation.

### Discipline and young New Dealers who flout NDYP terms and conditions

The second type of intervention that interviewees found problematic was to do with the way in which the Contract Agents dealt with the young New Dealers who flouted the New Deal contract's term and conditions. These were invariably to do with poor attendance and time-keeping. In spite of the disruptions arising from such problems, several interviewees said that they were prepared to continue to work with and support these young New Dealers. This was for two main reasons: the organisations still managed to benefit from the work that these young New Dealers did; and because the interviewees believed that there was some improvement taking place amongst these problematic young New Dealers. Despite the organisations' willingness to work with these young New Dealers, the Contract Agents decided to remove them. To illustrate, one interviewee talked about two separate instances in which young New Dealers were removed from the organisations due to lateness and absence, even though the organisation's staff were still prepared to work with both of these young New Dealers:

one person (young New Dealer) who was with us for about six weeks. He would have stayed longer but the criteria was so strict that you know he was supposed to phone in and say he couldn't come in, he had to phone up Agent Z and he didn't and we kept being warned and he didn't and they said right that's it now you have to stop the placement. Now I would have been quite happy to carry on working with him on that basis because I think sometimes it's extremely difficult for people you know I know it's a cliché but if nobody you live with is used to going out to work, is used to meeting deadlines you know you're actually doing a fair bit of you're just managing to get yourself there three days out of five. And I could see that he was improving but ... I would have given him the benefit of the doubt, whereas I know Agent Z are in a difficult situation because they're presumably answerable to someone else, so he wasn't able to stay with us... [after the removal of one young New Dealer] we then had a long gap and the someone else came who was with us on a long-term basis and we actually had to fight to keep her because she had some sick leave and they have, I don't know if it's still the case, but this ridiculous thing that you're only allowed 15 days for sick leave during your placement. Now she had some sick leave quite legitimately and she's you know reported as she should have done and then she was mugged in [name of the area] and of course had to have more sick leave, you know a horrible situation. We had no problem with it whatsoever ... it was very good

for her to be working at the [centre] because it was opening up a whole new world for her as well, so there were all sorts of benefits going on, and then Agent Z said well no she exceeded her sick leave that was it. And of course we were appalled so we actually fought her corner and she was reinstated. So the sick leave thing needs to be handled carefully and sensitively ..... here was a person through no fault of her own, who had been making really good progress on her placement, was then going to lose her placement because she just had more sick leave, which was totally at odds with our terms and conditions. So, it's very difficult to have one person working in our office on different terms and conditions from our members of staff, and that was over turned.

Service Organisation: P 3 (110 & 228)

Like this, in several cases, the removal of those problematic young New Dealers who breached the New Deal terms and conditions led to further problems for the organisations. Mainly, these include: a loss of investment and additional disruptions caused because of the loss of a worker.

In the case of lost investment, as described earlier, many of the organisations largely used their own existing resources to train and support the young New Dealers. Given this, the removal of problematic young New Dealers who managed (or who had the potential) to benefit the organisations meant that these organisations did not reap the full rewards from these young New Dealers. For most of these organisations, this was a cost that the organisations could ill-afford.

In addition, the removal of the young New Dealers led to rearranging and, in some cases, the cancellation of activities. This was inconvenient to the organisations and sometimes detrimental to the organisations' missions. For example, in a community organisation one of the young New Dealers was removed with little (if any) notification because of his poor attendance and time-keeping. Despite the problems arising with this young New Dealer, he still managed to benefit the organisation. This is because he built a rapport with the organisation's young community members and was involved in the delivery of activities for these beneficiaries; thereby contributing directly towards the organisation's missions. However, the Contract Agent's 'sudden' removal of this young New Dealer took away a member of the small team of staff in this organisation. Subsequently, this led to the cancellation of planned activities with the young community members and caused disappointment to these young people; and thereby was detrimental to the organisation's missions. Further, these problems (like in other cases) were amplified because the organisations received little (if any) notification about the removal of the young New Dealer. Ironically, for this and other organisations,

the Contract Agent's intervention was more damaging than the disruptions arising from the problematic young New Dealer's poor attendance and time-keeping.

It was an odd situation really ... they [Agent Y] decided to move him on. I mean I have to say that he was an appalling time keeper and some days he just wouldn't turn up at all and he had been told several times about it and then one day [Agent Y] just suddenly said look we'll find somewhere else for him where you know it won't be as open almost, that he will have to be there and if he does not attend there on a regular basis then he's finished. As a worker he was great with the kids and the kids loved him, but he wasn't dependable but I personally would have had him finish his time here. But they were like no sorry you know it's out of your hands now, we're the managers - so in that respect I wasn't happy about the way that worked because my feeling was they also told him that it was our request, because they actually told me that the request had come from here to remove him and I said no I'm sorry that has not happened, and she said well didn't you ask for him to be removed and I said I most certainly didn't, so she said it must have been your colleague then, it must have been [colleague] - now [colleague] was off at this time: she was on holiday ... eventually I contacted her [colleague] and asked did she ask for him and she said no not at all and when I got back to them it was like well no, this is best for him you know obviously our interests are for him and its best for him and I must admit I was a bit pissed off about that because it's like they've told him we don't want him here, which was a lie and because they didn't feel they had any control because he was coming and going when he wanted to but the young people had really built up a relationship with him. So, that was the only time it fell down really and that was through the management of [Agent Y] and the New Deal [programme]

Community Organisation: P22 (201)

The mechanisms that the Contract Agents adopted to deal with problematic young New Dealers is likely to be due to the poor design of the scheme. There were two major design faults that were to do with, on the one hand, the lax way which severely disruptive young New Dealers were dealt with and, on the other hand, the harsh way in which less disruptive young New Dealers who flouted their New Deal terms and conditions were dealt with. In the latter case, to ameliorate the disadvantage of the structure of the NDYP programme in order to protect the organisations' investment (the benefits arising from the work that young New Dealers did), some of the organisations adopted less formal arrangements with the young New Dealers in which the New Deal paperwork about attendance and time-keeping were not completed accurately:

... if they're off or absent, unauthorized absence, I think it's like three in a row they have to be kicked off. We used to lie about that - you know that's completely unrealistic, completely unrealistic when people are living the hectic lives that they're living.

Service Organisation: P19 (111)

The other bug bear is this wretched time sheet and on the first long term placement I used to have to check this every week and record the actual hours and it was fiddly, fiddly, fiddly. So before we started the new one I set up an arrangement with the New Deal person and said look I have not got the time to start adding up odd 5 minutes here and there, let's just say that you're going to do 9 to 5 and you have an hour for lunch and let's fill that in day in day out unless you are sick and you know I will know if you're not keeping those times and I will have to have a discussion about your time keeping. But it is not worth my while having to check up you know day by day time-keeping ... that person also coincidentally happened to be a good time keeper so we weren't into the issues of you know I need to discuss that even though you're saying on the time sheet, you're not

because already suggested that she put down the wrong time, do you see what I mean so that worked well. But the bureaucracy of the time sheet with the first New Dealer used to drive us both to despair, it was horrific ...the first time it was brief so it didn't really matter ... the second one was when we got snarled up in all this trying to keep actual hours and it was an absolute nightmare. The third one was where we said look let's just do 9 to 5, an hour for lunch and just fill that in everyday

Service Organisation: P3 (240)

In most cases, these informal arrangements were to the benefit of both the young New Dealer and the organisation: the young New Dealer was not constantly mithered about their attendance. In turn, the organisations benefited through the work that the young New Dealer did. In addition, the organisations' staff did not spend too much time completing parts of the paperwork (see section 3.4) and the organisations did not run the risk of losing the young New Dealers due to poor time keeping and attendance.


To summarise, whilst the NDYP programme's disciplinary procedure was beneficial to a small number of organisations, most of the organisations experienced further disruptions due to the structure and operation of the programme's disciplinary procedures. In most of these cases, interviewees talked about one or a combination of the two types of interventions that led to further problems for their organisations. In those organisations that had severely disruptive young New Dealers, the initial (requirement) of attending meetings compounded existing problems and further compromised the safety of the organisation's staff. This distracted the organisations' staff from doing their work and thus impacted (directly and indirectly) on the organisations' missions. Further, in some cases, organisations still ended up using additional stretched resources to deal with those issues with which the Contract Agents failed. In those organisations that had less disruptive young New Dealers who were removed for breaching the New Deal terms and conditions, organisations had to cancel planned activities, which affected the delivery of the organisations' missions. Indeed, in some cases, this directly impacted (negatively) on the organisations' community. Further, these organisations did not fully benefit from the investment that they put into those young New Dealers who were removed from these organisations. In addition to these problems, both types of intervention amplified the problem that these organisations were not able to have sustainable relationships with the young New Dealers (and, sometimes, the Contract Agent) because they were unable to deal with the problems themselves. In addition, the organisations' disagreement with the way in

which the Contract Agents approached these problematic young New Dealers contributed towards tensions between the organisation and the Contract Agent.

### 6.3.3 Training

Another feature of the structure and operation of the programme that was problematic to the organisations was to do with training. As described in chapter one, during their work option the young New Dealers were allocated time for training. There were two main types of training: the first consisted of training in the area of work that young New Dealers did (by an accredited NVQ Training Provider), which I will call work-skills training. The second consisted of a variety of courses on job search skills and personal development, which I will call personal development courses. On the whole, both work-skills training and personal development courses were provided by external agents, Further Education Colleges and Contract Agents respectively. There were, however, structural variations built into the programme in which a few of the large service organisations that contracted with Agent X provided internal (NVQ accredited) work-skills training and personal development courses and a few others had a combination of arrangements in which young New Dealers received (NVQ accredited) internal or external work-skills training (depending on the work they did) and external personal development courses. Most of this variety is captured in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Organisations and work-skills training



The structural feature of external training provisions itself was not necessarily problematic for the organisations: if, for example, the external work-skills training contributed towards young New Dealers' acquisition of the necessary skills for the

work that was given to them, this could benefit the organisations. Instead, however, in many cases, this structural arrangement presented difficulties to several of the organisations because there were problems with the operational aspect of both external work-skill training and external personal development courses. These problems are mainly to do with the quality of these provisions and the failure (of one Agent) to inform organisations about young New Dealers' attendance on personal development courses. There were variations in interviewees' accounts about these problems, which is due to the operational variations of the NDYP programme's arrangements. In part, these variations reflect the different Training Providers used in different localities; further, it reflects the different work-skills training courses given to young New Dealers within and across Training Providers, depending on the work young New Dealers did. Given this, the quality of the training provisions given to young New Dealers was variable – as one interviewee exclaimed:

The training aspect has been successful to a greater or lesser degree - I think the internal training by my colleagues and partners has been very good and the external training has been very variable

Service Organisation: P17 (145)

#### External work-skills training

In spite of operational variations, in the cases where interviewees talked about problems arising with external work-skills training provisions, all unanimously talked about the (lack of) quality of these services. Indeed, one interviewee described external work-skills training providers as 'useless' and another exclaimed, 'they get away with murder these Training Providers, they talk the talk but they don't deliver and really it is criminal!' In particular, these interviewees felt that the content of this training did not match the skills that were necessary for the young New Dealers to do the work that was given to them:

[training – NVQ and would have to do something like health and safety, would have been more helpful to develop keyboards skills ... the worse I think they're giving them the wrong qualifications. They're giving them qualifications for the sake of it, rather than looking at what would be useful... I'll put it the other way round – the individuals are being sort of forced into a sort of qualification rather than looking at the individual and seeing a) what would be the most appropriate qualification for them to get.

Service Organisation: P3 (288&304)

This was a particular problem that impacted on several of the organisations since many of the young New Dealers lacked existing basic work skills. Therefore, to a greater or lesser degree, these organisations depended on the external work-skills training to

contribute towards bridging the gap between the young New Dealers' existing work-skills and the skills that were needed to do the work given to them. However, in several cases this did not happen. Consequently, this intensified existing problems arising with the young New Dealers who lacked work skills. Subsequently, these organisations were in the position in which they needed to compensate for the inadequate external work-skills training if they were to reap any benefits from the work of these young New Dealers. This, however, meant that the organisation needed to use their own existing resources to do this, which often led to further problems. To illustrate, one of two branch organisations that belonged to the same parent body and had young New Dealers who received internal and external training depending on the work given to them talked about some of these problems:

we had more trouble with the [young New Deal] admin workers than the [young New Deal] advice workers and that's probably because we've got a very well thought out training programme for advice workers that we just do it, it's just so second nature to us we don't even have to think about it. But, for admin workers ... we thought that the training that they got at college would have been as good as what we were giving advice workers, and they just didn't get any training. So that actually caused a lot of problems for us in the organisation ... we complained constantly to [Agent X] ... the admin workers were not learning anything at college. They were being told how to document the evidence, how to build a portfolio but no one was actually showing them at any stage how to do what the jobs they were supposed to be documenting and it was such a strain to our admin workers it caused big hassle in the organisation ... and it led to demands from admin workers for more pay, for different job evaluation because they said that they were training people, they were responsible for checking somebody else's work. ... that's one of the reasons why we definitely said towards the end we're definitely not taking on anymore admin workers...

Service organisation: P14 (65)

This case is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it highlights that that organisation experienced 'more trouble' with those young New Dealers who received external work-skills training (New Deal administrators) than those who received internal work-skills training (New Deal advice workers). Second, as a result of this difference, the organisation attempted to compensate for this inadequacy using its own existing resources: the organisation's administrative staff ended up with the task to train the poorly skilled young New Dealers. This led to further problems for the organisation in which these staff were distracted from their own existing work. Further, tensions arose within the organisation because the administrative staff demanded a pay review to reflect the additional responsibilities. This was an option that the organisation could not afford. Subsequently, this tension was one of the (several) main reasons why the organisation's managerial staff reviewed the viability of engaging with the NDYP programme and subsequently withdrew the organisation's engagement from the programme.



In the case of the second branch organisation (from the same parent body), again, the organisation 'subsidized' the shortfalls of the external work-skill training provisions given to young New Dealers:

... they [Agent X] had separate arrangements [external training providers] outside our own provision. That was perhaps the least effective ... we could clearly see they weren't getting very good services: [Agent X] weren't getting very good services; the placement, the people on the scheme [New Dealers] weren't getting very good services and the kind of learning opportunities were very limited. And we could have done more ourselves but we then didn't have an accreditation to award any qualification for that work and it wouldn't have been feasible on the scale.

Service organisation: P15 (89)

However, in contrast with the first branch organisation, the compensation for the inadequacy of this external work-skills training presented fewer difficulties to this organisation. This is because it was one of the few organisations that received additional and sufficient money to viably engage with the NDYP programme and gain net benefits. Indeed, through the NDYP programme's resources, this branch organisation received a significant contribution towards the payment of several additional staff, including half the costs towards hiring a Trainer.

Nevertheless, like the first branch organisation, most other organisations could not afford to compensate for the inadequacies of external work-skills training providers. This is largely because training itself is a costly process. Further, because of the dearth of many of the young New Dealers' existing work skills and other problems, it took more time and therefore more resources to train these young New Dealers compared with other paid and unpaid staff. To return to a quote in an earlier chapter, this point is poignantly captured:

... whilst it's noble to take someone on, we don't want to encourage someone on [young New Dealer], if it takes so long to train someone it's just not cost-effective. So, I was quite clear with [Agent Z] ... [that] we did want to support them [young New Dealer] but they needed to have some basic skills. And I mean it made me realize how the stuff you take for granted is just non-existent with some people... With the New Deal people, I have offered the same things [as other staff] and what I have noticed with New Deal people is that they tend not to - okay, I'm only talking about two people but it's difficult for them to retain information. I have tried all sorts of different ways to train people on things, and I have done quite a lot of staff training before but I need to repeat things and repeat things ... with New Deal people it is much more difficult for me to get information across and have that information retained, so that the work that I want done is always done consistently and I'm sure there's a variety of reasons for that.

Service organisation. P3: 106 and 276

There were variations in interviewees' accounts about these problems: these problems were reported more frequently by interviewees from those organisations that contracted

directly with Agent X and Agent Z than those from organisations contracting with Agent Y. There are three main reasons that can explain this difference. First, it is plausible that Agent Y used Training Providers that trained young New Dealers for the appropriate skills needed to do the work given to them. However, this is unlikely to be a sufficient explanation since Agent Y was subcontracted by Agent X and operated in the same areas (see chapter 3.2.2); and was, therefore, likely to use (some of) the same Training Providers as those used by Agent X. Second, organisations who were managed by Agent Y received fewer problematic young New Dealers. Indeed, these organisations tended to take fewer young New Dealers and were less likely to receive severely problematic young New Dealers than the organisations with Agent X. However, several organisations with Agent Z also had fewer young New Dealers than Agent X and were less likely to receive severely problematic young New Dealers. Further, the organisations with Agent Y (like others) experienced problems arising with young New Dealers' inadequate work, personal and social skills. Thus, again this is not a sufficient explanation for this difference. Third, and most likely, the variation is likely to be associated with the different types of work that the young New Dealers did in the organisations that contracted with these Agents. Throughout the quotations in this section, it is evident that interviewees referred to problems mainly to do with administrative work. Organisations that contracted with Agent X and Agent Z were more likely to provide this type of work compared with Agent Y. This work required more skills than some of the other types of work that young New Dealers did, such as 'lifting and shifting' and 'sorting and pricing'. In addition, this work was more difficult to provide constant on-the-job training compared with, for example, childcare work. For these reasons, it is likely that the inadequacy of external work-skills training provisions was more visible with this type of work compared to others; and therefore can explain the variation in the frequency of the interviewees accounts.

#### External personal development courses

Turning to external personal development courses, just like external work-skills training, several of the (same) interviewees said that the quality of the services were inadequate. These types of courses tended to be provided by the Contract Agents:

They're given no support whatsoever despite the fact that I gather they're doing job search things because I know ... I have spoken to two people who were here on long term placements, it was me ... within my limited time [that] I suggest[ed] where they looked

for jobs, how they looked for jobs ... I mean their letters were abysmal ... the level of support was abysmal ...

Service organisation. P3: (304)

The other thing that the programme was very bad for ... was the career advice that was often given ... at one point when we were so frustrated about the paucity of that provision, that we started to do it ourselves just to help the people on the scheme ... people were going for career progression training which was 'this is how you draft a CV' and if you sent a CV to Manchester City Council or Salford City Council asking for a job in the Housing Benefit department it's just binned. They weren't explaining how you apply for jobs, use a personal specification, writing application according to a personal specification. They weren't training people how to interview ... their career skills were completely misguided in this place and we had to do a lot of corrective work to put that right, which I suppose was an element that we subsidized on that scheme.

Service organisation. P15 (89)

Generally, the inadequacy of personal development courses was not necessarily problematic for the organisations since it did not impact on the young New Dealers' ability to work in the organisations. Nevertheless, in some cases, these problems contributed towards the organisations' negative perceptions of their Contract Agent and intensified existing tensions between the organisations and the Contract Agents.

Another operational problem associated with external personal development courses arose with some of the organisations that contracted with Agent Z. This was to do with Agent Z's failure to inform the organisations about the days that young New Dealers were expected to attend personal development courses. This led to disruptions associated with young New Dealers' absence (see section 1.1). In addition, once again, this amplified that the organisations could not have a sustainable relationship with these young New Dealers: the organisations had little say, and sometimes were not informed, about the arrangements or changes to arrangement for young New Dealers' attendance on personal development courses.

... one of the difficulties is that [Agent Z] would at the drop of a hat change the arrangements when they wanted someone [young New Dealer] to do their job search ... for example someone [young New Dealer] always does their job search on a Friday morning and then suddenly they [Agent Z] will ring and want to change that ... and they tend to do that by direct contact with the New Deal person, where it would be much more useful if they [Agent Z] were to telephone me and say I don't know how this will fit in with you, it would be much more useful if so and so could do their job search at such and such a time, is there any problem? 9 times out of 10 there wouldn't be, but it would be much better for me to know first rather than for the New Deal person to come to me and say oh well I'm doing a job search then. You know, it makes me feel out of the picture so that in a lot of instances it would be better for [Agent Z] to relate to me on what I would regard as an organizational issue. Fine I could see there would be a need to speak to the placement person and say would there be a problem with, but they also need to speak with me as well.

Service organisation: P3 (72)

On the whole, the main problem with the quality of external work-skills training courses was the gap between the skills that young New Dealers were taught and the skills that young New Dealers needed for the work given to them. Because of this gap, some of the organisations attempted to compensate for the inadequacies of the external work-skills training provisions. This, however, was a costly exercise that most of the organisations could not afford, and, in one case, led to tensions arising amongst staff that demanded a pay review to reflect the burden of training the young New Dealer. There were, however, variations in the frequency that these problems arose: organisations that contracted with Agent X and Agent Z were more likely than those contracting with Agent Y to talk about these problems. The most likely explanation for this difference is to do with the type of work that young New Dealers were given in the organisations: it is more likely that the inadequacy of external work-skills training provisions was more visible in the organisations that provided New Deal work that required higher levels of work skills where on-the-job training was more difficult to provide than with other types of work. There were also other less significant problems with the operational aspect of the quality of external personal development courses and the failure of one Agent (Agent Z) to inform the organisations about changes to arrangements for young New Dealers' attendance to personal development courses.

#### *6.3.4 Change*

Another feature of the NDYP programme that led to further difficulties for some of the organisations was the changing nature of the programme. Indeed at the time of my fieldwork, the NDYP programme was undergoing its 25<sup>th</sup> national phase of structural modification. This included dramatic changes to the length of young New Dealers' work experience, the reduction of money available to placement organisations, and the withdrawal of the NVQ work-skills training provisions for young New Dealers. On top of these changes, at a wider level, the Employment Service was undergoing major structural and operational changes (see chapter one); and, at a local level, there were changes of Agents and the organisational restructuring of one of the Agents. Given these (and other) changes and the different time that the organisations started (and in many cases withdrew) from the NDYP programme, it was exceptionally difficult to map the change and, thus, the effects of these changes across the organisations. Nevertheless, there were clearly effects of three types of change that had significant implications to organisations' sustainable engagement with the programme. These are:

the reduction of the enhanced programme from 12 to six months; the decrease in the amount of money available to the organisations; and paperwork. Indeed, the effects of these changes contributed towards several organisations' withdrawal from the programme. Once again, there were variations across interviewees' accounts about these problems that reflect operational variations. In this section, I discuss the effects of each of these three changes and the variations of interviewees' accounts. This contributes to understanding why the effects of some changes had greater implications to some of the organisations than they did for others; and helps understand the extent to which organisations were able to viably engage with and gain net benefits from the programme.

### Length of placement

In the case of changes to the length of the NDYP, the reduction of the enhanced programme from 12 to six months clearly had implications for many of the organisations' willingness to continue with the programme. Largely, this is because of the extent to which these organisations could viably train young New Dealers and gain net benefits from the work given to them during this time:

... it is the mither of you know recruiting, training and once you've trained them [young New Dealers] they're gonna say bye bye to you. It's not long enough ... six months is certainly not long enough.

Service Organisation: P20 (156)

... I wouldn't see the point of training someone up every six months: it's hard work, it's tedious you know to keep on doing that because you see our training process I mean for me to train in the administration side of [name of organisation] that could take you know a couple of weeks, but not only that they'd have to go on our [name of organisation] role of empathy, listening skills, diversity, domestic violence and things like that ... so that they're aware of the sensitivities surrounding our work; and that can take you know from say depending on what the course is ... about 2 months really. So six months wouldn't be worth it, they'd just be getting into it really. They'd only be getting into it after six months really.

Service Organisation: P28 (416)

In contrast, there were a few organisations that were prepared to continue to engage (and some were engaging) with the modified programme. This is largely because their organisations still managed to gain net benefits, and as one interviewee put it, 'it's better than nothing.' Interestingly, these were predominantly organisations that provided low-skilled manual work to young New Dealers. However, even in these cases, some of the organisations' continuation with the programme was also dependent on other factors, such as the availability of volunteers. In a few other cases,

interviewees were uncertain about their organisations' future engagement with the programme and some said that if their organisations were to continue with the programme they were likely to offer different types of work than originally offered to young New Dealers, which took less time to train for; such as, administrative work instead of play work. This supports earlier findings discussed in chapter five in which the viability of organisations' sustainable engagement on the standard six-month programme was largely determined by the type of work given to the young New Dealers. Indeed, the importance of time is captured in the quotation below from an interviewee who was from an organisation engaging with the newly truncated programme. This organisation is a host organisation that also offered work to young New Dealers elsewhere. The interviewee anticipated that there would be different outcomes of success that was (partly) determined by the type of work given to young New Dealers. She also anticipated that the host organisation would need to review and make adjustments accordingly:

... it will suit some trainees better because for someone of them a year is a hell of a long time, some don't need it, some can't hack it and for some six months you know as a sort of framework will feel very appropriate, because for some of them if they're doing something like admin and they've got a gift in that direction and just need experience and an opportunity to learn some skills they can be on top of it in three or four months, not all together but enough to be ready to go on to another job certainly and that will feel good, but for others I mean it would be very different because the trainees that we've had in finance before have done the full 12 months ... I imagine it will be very hard to recruit some of the posts, I think we'll have to have a rethink ... I don't see that we're going to get people through in finance very easily, and I think we may have to abandon the play work assistants, which again were very popular posts ... well they're based at [name of the organisation] that we work in partnership with and they can't consider anyone now unless the CRB check is up and done, and it takes quite a long time to get that through and where it's been worth waiting for a 12 month placement and again in that post, although obviously all the pressure has been on to move people out into jobs but effectively in the finance and the play work assistant post, people haven't moved on much short of 12 months because the training has been so vital and the experience has been so vital and then they've been worthwhile investment of their time because they've been so employable at the end of it. But if they're only coming for six months and there's no funding for training I don't think it's going to be worth ...

Service Organisation: P17 (88 & 91)

### Money

Turning to problems arising with the effects of changing amounts of money, ironically, this had far greater implications for organisations that received the most money (large service organisations with Agent X) than organisations that received little or no money (organisations with Agent Y and Agent Z). Focusing on the organisations that contracted with Agent X, during the initial years of the NDYP programme some of these organisations obtained increasing amounts of money than they initially obtained

(see chapter 4.2.2). However, in more recent years, due to structural and operational changes all the organisations that engaged long enough with the scheme experienced a decrease in the amount of money given to them. The effects of this had significant implications on whether these organisations would (or could) continue to engage with the NDYP programme. This is because the amount of money obtained played a pivotal role in whether these organisations could viably engage and gain net benefits from the NDYP programme. To illustrate, the interviewee from the organisations that became involved in the NDYP programme for a building project (see chapter 5) said there was a difference between the quality of skills acquired by young New Dealers who engaged in the first and the second stages of the building project whereby the young New Dealers who did work experience during the first building phase developed better skills than those who did work experience during the second phase. This difference between the young New Dealers was largely associated to the reduced amount of money given to the organisation in their second phase of engagement.

... I think that at the beginning of both schemes the paid staff and the New Dealers were miles apart, you know, the New Dealers had no experience. The most experienced ones had maybe put up a shelf with no more nails, which is glue. You know whereas the trainers we had on site were very very qualified joiners, who were teaching them how to do complicated things ... [known as] dove-tails. Well, you know, and they'd never done things like that before, they just used glue and nails, so it was miles apart. I think by the end of the first scheme there were few people who were really producing good quality work, and that was reflected in the kind of jobs that they got, some of them went on. Now one of them is running his business and he comes and does our maintenance here you know. [Whereas], the second scheme, I would say that the quality of training we got was not so good, so yes that gap was enormous from the beginning and it did close a bit by the time they had training, but probably not as much as it had closed the first time.

Service Organisation: P19 (58)

Even though the organisation gained net benefits from its engagement with the programme during both phases of the building project, this interviewee went on to explain that due to further reductions in the amount of money available it was highly unlikely that the organisation would engage with the programme for the third and final stage of the building project.

In two other examples, the reduction or the anticipation of the reduction of money contributed towards these organisations' withdrawal from the programme. In the first case, the young New Dealers were amongst the organisation's beneficiaries. The synonymous nature between the young New Dealers and the organisation's beneficiaries was not enough for this organisation to sustain engagement with the

programme. Largely, this is because young New Dealers were predominantly those with severe and multiple problems and because young New Dealers were not recipients of the organisation's services but instead were there as workers to be trained and supported to deliver the organisation's services. This was a costly exercise. Consequently, the effects of the decrease of money meant that it was no longer cost-effective for the organisation to engage with the programme; and the organisation subsequently withdrew from the programme. In the second case, a branch organisation that (eventually) successfully engaged and gained net benefits from the NDYP programme also withdrew from the scheme. In this case, the CEO was adamant that the organisation would withdraw from the NDYP programme on a 'high' rather than wait for changes such as the reduction of money to the programme to impact on the organisations ability to sustain engage with the programme. Indeed, this CEO anticipated that there would be changes to the programme and was not prepared to put the organisation in a vulnerable position of depending on the programme. To do so, he exclaimed, would put the organisation at the mercy of 'the swipe of a ministerial pen'. Thus, whilst the organisations' withdrawal from programme was not due to the effects of the changing amount of money, it was the anticipated effects this (and other factors) could have on the organisation that led the CEO to preemptively withdraw the organisation's engagement from the programme.

As discussed earlier in this thesis, money was clearly an important determinant factor for the extent to which several organisations could viably engage with the programme. Indeed, several organisations withdrew because the money they obtained was not sufficient for their engagement to be cost-effective. The continual decrease of the amount of money available led to more organisations withdrawing from the programme. Ironically, as noted earlier, the organisations most affected by the changes to the amount of money made available to organisations were the organisations that received most money for their engagement with the programme. In part, this is because these organisations took on more young New Dealers and therefore needed more money to support them. In addition, this is explained in association with the different arrangements between the organisations and their Agents. To illustrate, the organisations with Agent Y and Agent Z received nominal (or no) money for their engagement on the scheme. Thus, structural changes made to the amount of money available from the programme had less significant implications to these organisations.



In the cases where organisations experienced a reduction of money, whilst the initial money was beneficial to the organisations, it was not a significant amount of money in which the organisations were dependent on to viably engage with the programme. In contrast, however, for almost all organisations that contracted with Agent X, the amount of money accessed played an (explicit) determinant role on the extent to which the organisations could viably engage and gain net benefits from the programme.

### Paperwork

Turning to the third problem arising with changes, this is to do with paperwork. Once again, the effects had far greater implications for organisations with Agent X than others. This is largely because these organisations had larger amounts of paperwork to complete than other organisations (see chapter 4.2.3). Almost all interviewees from these organisations said that there were copious amounts of paperwork, as one interviewee put it, '[the paperwork was] plenty of trees!'. In spite of the large amounts of paperwork, some interviewees considered it to be important; for example, one interviewee said it was a useful 'safeguard' for both the organisation and the young New Dealers. In contrast, however, several of the interviewees said the paperwork was a costly, time-consuming process, and was described by some as 'cumbersome', 'obsessive' and unnecessarily bureaucratic. On top of this, for some organisations, the constant changes to paperwork amplified existing difficulties and had further implications on the extent to which these organisations could viably engage with the programme.

The other problematic area for us was the paperwork side of it. New Deal often changed the paperwork side, they were very focused on meeting targets and ticking boxes more so than I felt actually support the person on the placement and making sure that they were getting supported in their placement to actually be able to look for meaningful employment afterwards or even getting employment from the placement where they were. The paperwork was often changed without notification and there was a lot of letters went back and forth about the paperwork side and the paper work side of things was just far too time consuming and difficult to understand. You needed training to be able to understand the process ... we felt that we were spending far too much time completing forms and information about people rather than helping them to achieve a meaningful work environment. And my experience was people from what I saw weren't well supported by the mentors [from the Agents] that they had ... there just seemed to be concentration on this live document ... so there was a lot of emphasis to get the paperwork side of things done, not very much talking about how the actual person was doing on placement ..

Service Organisation: P11 (45)

In the case above the increasing complexity of the continually changing paperwork was one of the reasons for the organisation's decision to withdraw from the scheme. A view echoed by others. Indeed, in one case, the difficulties that arose from the complex,

continual change to paperwork intensified tensions arising between the organisation and the Agent and, eventually, the CEO refused to complete any further modified paperwork.

There were other effects of changes to the structure and operation of the NDYP programme, which impacted on fewer organisations or had less significant implications for the organisations' sustainable engagement with the programme. Nevertheless the effects of these changes contributed to some of the organisations' willingness to engage with the programme and include: frustrations arising due to the continual change and 'constant change in goal posts'; the lack of information given to and the lack of consultation with organisations about changes to the NDYP programme; and the recent withdrawal of NVQ accredited external work-skills training provisions for young New Dealers. Interestingly, the last of these issues was discussed by two interviewees who were from organisations with Agent Y: the organisations least effected by the inadequacies of external work-skills training provisions (discussed in the previous section). Further, for the first of these interviewees, training was part of the organisation's missions and for the second interviewee young New Dealers were amongst their beneficiaries. Indeed, in the latter case, the interviewee was concerned that to continue with the scheme without NVQ training provisions was 'setting them [young New Dealers] 'up to fail':

... people are coming to New Deal and coming here for placements cos they're interested in childcare as a career, you need a childcare qualification now to work anywhere in childcare and the minimum I would say it would take to get an NVQ2 if you've never done any training before would be a year. You can't get an NVQ2 in six months or certainly not in 13 weeks, you wouldn't cover the whole of the NVQ in that time ... I personally feel that we wouldn't be benefiting them, it would be using people because we know that they're coming in for so many weeks and that would help us for that number of weeks but it wouldn't really help that person ... They wouldn't be able to apply for work in childcare after doing, being in a placement for 13 weeks. It just wouldn't happen ... unless there's a qualification at the end of it in childcare then I feel you're setting them up to fail!

Community Organisation: P30 (167)

To summarise, there were clearly a variety of aspects with the structure and operation of the NDYP programme that had implications on the extent to which organisations could sustain engagement with the programme. The four most significant features are to do with: the recruitment for young New Dealers; disciplinary issues; external-training provisions; and the effects of change: in particular the length of the programme, money and paperwork. There were other issues to do with the structure and the operation of the

programme that affected fewer organisations or had less significant implications on the extent to which organisations could sustain engagement with the programme, but nevertheless contributed towards the organisations' ability and willingness to continue with the scheme. These include: delayed payments from their Agent; not being allowed to advertise New Deal work posts; the duplication of health and safety procedures; and the necessity of having at least one paid member of staff at all times. Some of these problems exacerbated frustrations with the programme, and some fuelled animosity between the organisations and the Agent.

The main types of problems to do with the structure and operation of the programme that impacted on the organisations' ability to engage with the programme are listed in the Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Problems to do with structure and operation of the NDYP programme

Aspect of structure and operation of the NDYP programme
<b>Recruitment:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Target group – 'not job ready'</li> <li>• Mandatory – reluctant pool</li> <li>• Sink option – 'the bottom of the bottom of the barrel'</li> </ul>
<b>Discipline:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under disciplining severely problematic young New Dealers</li> <li>• Over disciplining young New Dealers who flout NDYP terms and conditions</li> </ul>
<b>Training:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• External training doesn't match needs of work placement</li> <li>• Poor communication when changes to personal development courses</li> </ul>
<b>Change:</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduced length of work placement</li> <li>• Reduced amounts of money</li> <li>• Changes to paperwork</li> </ul>

## 6.4 Conclusions

In this chapter, I discussed the problems arising with the organisations' engagement on the NDYP programme. These problems were generic and to do with problems arising with the young New Dealers and to do with the structure and operation of the programme. On the whole, almost all interviewees talked about experiences with problematic young New Dealers. These include problems with young New Dealers who: lacked fundamental work, personal and social skills and, in some cases, had

severe personal problems. In many cases the problems arising with the young New Dealers were higher than originally anticipated and in the case of young New Dealers who had severe personal problems there was a unanimous view that they needed extensive levels of pastoral care, again, more so than originally anticipated. The disruptions arising from problematic young New Dealers tended to impact on the general running of the organisations, in particular the organisations' existing staff (paid and unpaid) experienced tensions between delivering their own work and providing support to these young New Dealers. In some cases, these problems were a direct obstruction towards the delivery of the organisations' missions. Nevertheless, these problems had different impacts on the organisations. Often this was dependent on a unique combination factors, including the type of problem itself, the internal and external resources available to the organisations, the young New Dealers, and the type of work given to them. In many cases these problems were brought to the fore and exacerbated by structural and operation aspects of the programme, including: the recruitment, discipline and training of young New Dealers and the constant changes built into the programme.

## **7. Discussion**

In the previous two chapters I described the different ways in which organisations gained benefits and experienced problems from their engagement with the NDYP programme. I now move on to bring this data together to address my research question: can voluntary organisations successfully engage with the programme by advancing their missions and sustain these advances. I do this by breaking down the question and discussing them under three main sections. In the first section I look at whether or not the organisations gained (overall) successful outcomes. This is followed by a discussion on whether or not the organisations continued with the programme. It might have been expected that whether or not the organisations continued was determined by whether or not the organisations experienced successful outcomes. However, I have kept these sections separate because there is no universal correlation between the two; successful outcomes did not always lead to continuation and vice versa. Finally I move on to the third question, which is at the core of the thesis. This is: whether or not the organisations can continue to sustain their engagement with the programme in the long term. The first two sections lay down the foundations for addressing this question.

### **7.1 Overall levels of success**

Turning first to whether or not the organisations gained successful outcomes from the programme, as a starting point I examined the interviewees' own evaluations of cost-effectiveness. These evaluations were not systematic; they did not consist of a clear analysis of the events they described to me. Instead, the interviewees talked about a mesh of benefits and problems arising with the agents, the organisation of the programme and the New Dealers. Their judgment about overall success, or lack of it, was not a formulaic exercise in which the benefits and problems were translated into numerical values to calculate where the balance lay. Indeed, the interviewees seldom talked about monitoring the overall outcome in this calculative way. Instead, in almost all cases, the interviewees' judgment of success was, implicitly, based on the extent to which the young New Dealers' work generated instrumental benefits for their organisation; particularly in terms of the everyday running of, and the services delivered by, the organisation.

In spite of the difficulties with the interviewees' subjective evaluations, on an analytical level it is possible both to discern variations in the extent to which the organisations

gained net benefit by successfully advancing their missions and to understand the combination of factors that directly and indirectly determined these different levels of success.

Atypically three of the organisations gained straightforward net benefits without experiencing *any* problems at all with the young New Dealers. There are two explanations for this. First, these organisations took only one and two young New Dealers. More importantly, however, this is likely to do with the selection of the young New Dealers. Two of the three organisations had a close and positive relationship with their labour supplier (Agent Y). It is likely the Agent's familiarity and closeness with these organisations put them in a good (and willing) position to make appropriate matches between the available young New Dealers and the organisations' needs and interests. In the remaining voluntary organisation, the Director explicitly stated that he was only prepared to train and support young New Dealers if the organisation was guaranteed to benefit from the work the young New Dealers did. For the Director, the selection of the young New Dealer was crucial to guarantee this outcome: he was unwilling to take young New Dealers who did not have the necessary basic skills, and who did not want, to work in the organisation.

Given the aims of the programme and the structural and operational aspects of recruitment (see chapter 1), these three organisations engaged with the programme in an unrealistic situation. I refer to this as 'unrealistic' because there were fewer good quality than there were problematic young New Dealers. Given this, the (implicit and explicit) selection process of matching young New Dealers to the organisations' particular needs could not, realistically, be extended to all the organisations: most of the organisations were offered (and given) at best a mixture of young New Dealers with different abilities and problems. Indeed, returning to the three atypical organisations, this is likely to explain why by being recipients of only good quality young New Dealers they were only offered one or two young New Dealers despite their willingness to take on more.

In contrast with these three atypical organisations, the remaining 24<sup>27</sup> IPPs in this study found themselves in a more realistic situation; in receipt of a mixture of young New Dealers. As a result, these organisations encountered disruptions arising with problematic young New Dealers. This unequivocally presented difficulties for the organisations. Nevertheless, this was not necessarily detrimental to them. In this more realistic situation, then, the question remains: in spite of disruptions caused by problematic young New Dealers, to what extent could these organisations deliver the aims of the programme (to train and support the young New Dealers) and successfully gain net benefits that directly and indirectly contributed towards the organisations' missions (the organisations' primary concern)?

The organisations' overall levels of success are summarised in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Overall levels of success

Level of Success	No. organisations
Successful	10
Variable	7
Unsuccessful	7
Total	24
24 IPPs	
3 atypical organisations excluded from this table	

On the whole, in spite of problems arising with young New Dealers, 10 of the 24 organisations still managed to advance their missions throughout most of their time on the programme. This was followed by seven that experienced variable success; on some occasions the organisations advanced their missions and at other times they did not. The remaining seven, however, experienced an overall lack of success with the programme. There are patterns across the interviewees' subjective evaluations of success (or lack of success) that make it possible to identify the combinations of factors that are likely to account for these evaluations and to explain the organisations' different levels of success. I now move on to discuss this.

---

<sup>27</sup> To remind the reader, one of the IPPs has been excluded as it did not engage with the NDYP programme. For the purpose of this chapter, another IPP was removed. This is because it operated primarily as a Training Provider, not an IPP.

### *7.1.1 Successful Outcomes*

Turning first to the 10 organisations that experienced overall levels of success in spite of problems arising from the programme, six are large service organisations and four are relatively small organisations: three shops and one service organisation.

First, in the case of the six large service organisations, these organisations belonged to the subgroup of eight<sup>28</sup> large service organisations that engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme with Agent X and were in the unique position to bid for additional significant amounts of money from the programme (see chapter 4.2.2). The six organisations that experienced overall levels of success reflect the diversity of the total eight large service organisations; both in terms of the way with which they engaged with the programme and the way in which, and to whom, they delivered their missions. For example, some of the organisations provided personal and care services to an immediate tangible community and others did not. Interconnected with this, the organisations offered different types of work in terms of level of skill and how much this impacted on the communities and other existing staff. Further, some organisations provided internal training and others did not, and whilst all the organisations offered the young New Dealers work within their own organisation some offered them work elsewhere.

Alongside these differences, there were also similarities amongst the six organisations; in the main they took on high numbers of young New Dealers and experienced frequent and often severe problems arising with them (see chapter 6.2.1). Without a doubt, the differences amongst these six large service organisations contributed towards the level of disruptions experienced and the benefits gained from the programme. In spite of this, however, in all but one of these six cases the additional amounts of money obtained (and, for some, the length of the placement) were the main determinant for their overall level of success with the programme. These five large service organisations obtained significant amounts of money from the programme (and, in one case, elsewhere) that allowed them to hire extra staff. The additional staff were able to provide what proved

---

<sup>28</sup> There were 10 service organisations with Agent X, 2 have been excluded from this subgroup – the first is previously mentioned as a Training Provider. The second organisation is a small project within the NHS and contracted with Agent X in similar ways to smaller organisations with Agent Y and Agent X.



to be necessary high levels of support and pastoral care to the young New Dealers and to undertake other necessary administrative tasks to do with the programme. As a result of this, the existing staff could, generally, get on with their own work. Indeed, even in the cases where the organisations' young New Dealers were amongst their beneficiaries, significant amounts of money (and the length of the placement) were central to their organisations' level of success. This is because for the IPPs the young New Dealers were not there primarily as recipients of their services; but, instead, were there as staff to generate benefits to advance the organisations' missions.

In addition to the substantial amounts of money obtained, the length of the placement was equally central to the level of success for the organisations that offered New Deal posts that consisted of specialized and high skilled work, such as: advice work and carpentry skills. Their engagement with the enhanced 12-month programme meant they had sufficient time to train and gain returns from the work given to the young New Dealers.

As noted earlier, there was variability amongst the organisations' level of success. In the five cases discussed above, this was correlated to money; the amount of additional money obtained influenced how many extra staff the organisations could hire to support and manage the young New Dealers (and to do additional administrative paperwork). To demonstrate using an example discussed earlier in chapter six, initially, a large service organisation's former CEO did not anticipate the high levels of pastoral care, support and on-the-job training that many of the young New Dealers needed. As a result, the CEO did not bid for sufficient amounts of money to hire additional staff to take on this extra work. However, like most other large service organisations, this organisation experienced frequent and severe disruptions with problematic young New Dealers. This led to difficulties and the organisation found itself in a predicament: the existing staff struggled to support the young New Dealers and to get on with their own existing work. This was particularly detrimental to the organisation because the existing staff were working in an already difficult environment in which the organisation was operating as a 'failing organisation': the organisation was already struggling to deliver their mission on their existing resources and subsequently was getting ready to close some of their smaller offices. Consequently, the organisation found itself doubly burdened with the programme. In response to this situation, the CEO's successor (who

was only too aware of the problems associated with the programme) renegotiated the organisation's contract and successfully obtained a significant increase in the amount of money from the programme. This allowed the organisation to hire additional staff who could then provide the necessary high levels of support, training and pastoral care needed to develop the young New Dealers (and to undertake other administrative tasks needed for the programme). Subsequently, in spite of the continuing disruptions arising with problematic young New Dealers, the programme was 'well and truly paying its way': at little cost to the organisation, the organisation was in a position to gain net returns from the work the young New Dealers did. Indeed, eventually, the young New Dealers' work contributed significantly towards the organisation's ability to keep the organisation's offices open and to serve more clients in the local area. Thereby, the young New Dealers' work (directly and indirectly) significantly contributed towards the advancement of the organisation's mission.

This case is a powerful illustration of the correlation between organisations' variability of success and the additional amounts of money obtained from the programme. This is a poignant point that I will return to when discussing whether or not the organisations continued with the programme and whether or not they could sustain their engagement with the programme in the long-term.

Unique compared with the five large service organisations discussed above, the remaining large service organisation's level of success was not due to money; indeed, this large service organisation did not obtain sufficient additional amounts of money to hire extra staff. Instead, the organisation's success was due to an amalgam of factors that placed it in a strong position to contain most of the problems and simultaneously to maximize the benefits arising from the young New Dealers. First, the organisation was able to provide a (willing) staff member to support and supervise the young New Dealers. In addition, the organisation offered a variety of New Deal posts: some of these consisted of skilled work, such as: driving and financial (and other) administration work; others, however, required little and no skill, such as: taking basic telephone calls and cleaning vehicles. Invariably, in spite of the level of skill needed, all the types of New Deal work had the potential to contribute (directly and indirectly) towards advancing the organisations' missions. Although perhaps not calculative, this meant that even the young New Dealers with the poorest personal, social and work

skills could be found work they were capable of doing and that caused minimum disruptions to the organisation and their community. At the same time, in the case of the New Deal posts that consisted of low skilled work, the organisation was able to gain quick returns. In the case of more complex tasks, there was also time available on the enhanced 12-month programme to train and gain net returns from the work they did.

The remaining four, smaller organisations that experienced overall levels of success with the programme consisted of three shops and one service organisation (that provides affordable furniture, community transport and other environmental services). To recall, like most other organisations in this study, they did not have the option to bid for additional amounts of money and instead were given nominal, if any, amounts of money from the programme (see chapter 4.2.2). Given this, like the unique large service organisation discussed immediately above, their level of success was not determined by money. Instead, again, their success was determined by a combination of factors that put them in a strong position to contain disruptions and gain maximum benefits arising from the young New Dealers. Briefly, to illustrate, all four of the organisations were able to provide (willing) staff to supervise and to provide on-the-job training to the young New Dealers. In addition, the organisations offered a variety of mainly low-skilled manual work; as a result, the organisations could usually find something the young New Dealers were able to do. On top of this, if necessary, especially in the case of shops, it was possible to give the young New Dealers work that could minimize their impact on the organisations' customers and, if necessary, other staff. At the same time, given the simplicity of the tasks, the organisations were able to provide on-the-job training and gain quick returns from the work given to the young New Dealers. Indeed, this was the case whether they engaged with the standard six- as well as the enhanced twelve-month programme. This is particularly significant for understanding whether or not the organisations continued with the programme and whether or not they could continue to sustain their engagement with the programme in the long-term. This is a point I return to later on.

On top of these factors, there were other circumstances that contributed towards their level of success. In particular, prior to their engagement with the programme, all four organisations relied heavily on a volunteer workforce to drive their mission forward. In comparison to volunteers, then, the NDYP programme made available a workforce that

offered (relatively) greater stability and more labour hours. Further, when problems arose with, for example, young New Dealers' lateness and poor time-keeping, whilst this was frustrating and caused operational difficulties, the organisations were rarely worse off than if they had been without the young New Dealers in the first place. On top of all this, in the case of two shops, although the amount of money they obtained from the programme was nominal it was a direct contribution towards their primary mission to raise funds for their parent body. In essence, then, in all four cases there were a combination of factors that created a situation in which these organisations had little to lose and a significant amount to gain from the programme. And, indeed, they significantly advanced their missions throughout their engagement with the programme.

#### *7.1.2 Variable and unsuccessful outcomes*

Turning to the remaining 14 organisations that had variable and less successful outcomes with the programme (see Table 7.1), all but one (a shop) of the organisations delivered services to immediate tangible communities and in almost all cases these consisted of personal and care services. In the case of the shop, problems were mainly to do with the incompatibility of the programme's health and safety regulations and the way in which the shop operated, rather than with the young New Dealers themselves. In particular, this was to do with the need for a full-time staff to be present in the shop at all times. Leaving aside the shop, there were particular differences between these organisations and the 10 organisations previously discussed that experienced overall success with the programme. These differences contribute towards understanding why the 13 organisations compared with the 10 described above experienced less successful outcomes with programme. First, unlike the first group of five large service organisations, these organisations did not obtain significant additional amounts of money to hire extra staff.<sup>29</sup> Further, the 13 organisations did not have the internal resources to provide constant supervision and they did not have the variety of low-skilled manual work that would allow them to contain problems and simultaneously to maximize their benefits from this. For example, whilst some of these organisations

---

<sup>29</sup> Out of these 13 organisations, 2 are large service organisations that were unsuccessful in their bids to increase the amount of money they obtained; the remaining 11 did not have the option to bid for additional funds and instead received nominal, if any, amount of money from the programme.

could, if necessary, find work for the problematic young New Dealers (such as 'tidying the stationary cupboard'), this was superfluous and did not make significant contributions (directly and indirectly) towards advancing their missions. Instead, the work offered to the young New Dealers required more skills than, for example, lifting and shifting and steaming and sorting. Consequently, the organisations needed to provide higher levels of existing staff's time to supervise and to provide on-the job training to the young New Dealers; and, therefore, it took longer to gain net returns from this type of work. Further, because these organisations tended to deliver services of a more personal nature, the young New Dealers who lacked personal, social and work skills had the potential to (and did) impact on the organisations' communities and thereby their missions.

This stack of factors put these organisations in a vulnerable position in which they were very exposed to the problems arising with the young New Dealers and in which their level of success was dependent on the quality of the young New Dealers (in terms of their willingness to learn the skills and to do the work given to them). As a result of this, given the aims of the programme and the likelihood of being in receipt of, at best, a mixture of young New Dealers, these organisations were highly likely to experience precarious outcomes with the programme. Indeed, seven of the 13 organisations experienced variable levels of success that frequently lay at extreme ends of the spectrum. Depending on the quality of the young New Dealer, on some occasions these organisations experienced multiple benefits that contributed significantly towards advancing their missions. In contrast, however, on other occasions, these same organisations experienced multiple problems that presented obstacles from gaining such benefits and wasting the organisations' existing and already stretched resources. Even worse, these problems had more serious implications and had the capacity to destroy the very missions the organisations aimed to achieve. To use the example described in chapter six of one of the small branch organisation that took on young New Dealers to do play work: during one year, they experienced multiple benefits arising from the work of one of their young New Dealers who was committed to the work. The following year, however, another young New Dealer who was apathetic to and frequently did not turn up for work presented multiple difficulties that were detrimental to the organisation's mission. Subsequently, as described in detail elsewhere in this chapter, this led to operational disruptions and, more seriously, disappointment to the

children and their mothers; leading to a breakdown of trust between the organisation's staff and their community.

The remaining six of these 13 organisations were even less fortunate. In all but one of these six cases, the organisations did gain some benefits arising from the young New Dealers; however, the disruptions with the problematic young New Dealers far outweighed any of the benefits gained. Consequently, the organisations' overall engagement with the programme was an impediment towards achieving their mission. Not only did this lead to the organisations' existing already-stretched resources being wasted, worse still, the problems arising with the young New Dealers undermined the very work the organisations aimed to do. For example, the two large service organisations that took on relatively high numbers of young New Dealers with mixed abilities and problems experienced detrimental (direct and indirect) impacts to their missions. For instance, as described in chapter six, one of these organisations experienced several disruptions including a situation in which one of the young New Dealers misfiled an important document that was to be used for an imminent legal case. In the other case, again the organisation experienced several disruptions with problematic young New Dealers, including a situation in which the organisation's existing staff's physical safety was compromised.

This group of 13 organisations engaged with the standard six- and the enhanced 12-month programme. As noted in chapter five, the length of the New Deal placements was likely to influence the type of work offered to the young New Dealers in the first instance. As a result, this influenced the way in which the young New Dealers could potentially contribute towards the organisations' missions. Given this, the length of the placement was a contributory factor for the extent to which the organisations experienced levels of success. Nevertheless, it was not a determinant factor. Without the (internal and external) resources and without offering the variety of low-skilled manual work, the quality of the young New Dealers (in terms of their existing basic skills and their willingness to work) was the prevailing determinant factor for success. Indeed, in the cases in which the organisations engaged with the enhanced programme, if they were in receipt of 'very very good' young New Dealers, they could significantly advance their missions. Equally, however, if they were in receipt of 'very very bad' young New Dealers, these organisations could be in a potential position in which they

were under sufferance for as long as the full-term of the young New Dealers' placement.

For reference, the overall levels of success is broken down by the three types of organisation in Table 7.2. In this table I divide service organisations even further by those that operated on a relatively large scale (large service organisations) and those that operated on a smaller scale (smaller service organisations). To remind the reader, those organisations operating on a larger scale tended to be larger organisations that contracted with Agent X. The organisations that operated on a smaller scale tended to be smaller and contracted with Agent Y and Agent Z (see chapter 4).

Table 7.2 Overall levels of success by type of organisation

Outcome:	Type of organisation				Subtotal
	Shop	Community	Service (smaller)	Service larger)	
Success	3	0	1	6	10
Variable	0	3	4	0	7
Unsuccessful	1	1	3	2	7
Subtotal	4	4	8	8	
				Total:	24

24 IPPs  
(excludes the atypical organisations discussed earlier)

The main factors that contributed towards the organisations' overall levels of success is summarised in Table 7.3

Table 7.3 Summary of factors that contributed towards overall levels of success

Factors	How it works
£ and time	This combination works best: with sufficient amounts of money to hire staff to support and train the young New Dealers AND with the time to train up the young New Dealers, these organisations can offer a variety of types of work to that can significantly contribute (directly and indirectly) towards their missions
Without £: Low-skilled manual work	Without the additional resources to hire staff to support and train the young New Dealers, then: the organisations that can offer low-skilled manual work that can significantly contribute towards their mission are most likely to gain success
Without £ and without low skilled work: Existing qualities of the young New Dealer	Without the additional resources AND without low-skilled manual work that can significantly contribute, THEN: These organisations are largely reliant on the existing qualities of the young New Dealers for them to gain overall levels of success

## 7.2 Continued engagement with the programme

I now move on to whether or not the organisations continued with the programme at the time of my fieldwork. Of the 27 organisations, one organisation moved offices and was no longer eligible and three interviewees from organisations that had not received young New Dealers for some time said they thought the programme had stopped. Leaving these four organisations aside, 17 out of the 23 organisations continued with the programme. These are divided into two types: active and passive organisations. These terms are arbitrary and are used purely for analytical purposes: to distinguish the way in which they continued to take on young New Dealers and to understand the different factors that contributed to this. It does not capture the entirety of how these organisations operated with the scheme and should not be read as anything more than its intended use. All the organisations from these two types were willing to continue with the programme; however, as suggested in the terms used, they differed in the ways in which they did this. The 'active' organisations made it known to their labour supplier (Contract Agents) that they were available and willing to take on young New Dealers (10 organisations). In contrast, the passive organisations did nothing to promote their engagement with the scheme and to take on anymore more young New Dealers (7 organisations). The remaining six of the 23 organisations withdrew from the programme, the interviewees from these organisations talked about their organisations' staff's general unwillingness to take anymore young New Dealers. This is summarised in the table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Continued engagement with the NDYP programme

Continued with the programme	No.
Yes – active	10
Yes – passive	7
No	6
Total	23

23 IPPs

4 excluded: 1 was no long eligible and 3 did not know the NDYP was still going on

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, one might expect that whether or not the organisations continued was consequential to whether or not they gained overall success from the programme. However, the organisations' level of success was not



universally correlated to whether or not the organisations continued with the programme. There was the interplay of other factors, including: the organisations' need for additional labour; alternative sources of (free) labour; and anticipated levels of success. In the case of large service organisations, there were additional factors to do with the changes to the structural and operational aspects of the programme, in particular, to do with money and the length of the NDYP work placement. In this section, I examine the combination of factors that contribute towards the organisations' (lack of) willingness to continue with the programme. This provides an essential context to address the central question of the thesis; whether or not the organisations can sustain their engagement with the programme.

### *7.2.1 Active Organisations*

Turning first to the 10 active organisations, during my fieldwork several of them had young New Dealers and interviewees from the organisations that did not have young New Dealers at the time talked about recent contact with their labour supplier (the Contract Agents) to get some more of them. Importantly, these interviewees did not talk explicitly about adopting a selection criteria for young New Dealers. The interviewees from these organisations were optimistic about the programme and in most cases the programme was considered to be an important source of much needed labour: one interviewee said, 'they [the young New Dealers] are better than nothing' and another went as far as saying the programme was 'like a lifeline'. Indeed in several cases, whilst the interviewees talked about the benefits of volunteers over young New Dealers (such as commitment), several of them talked about the advantages of young New Dealers over volunteers, including: using fewer resources to recruit them and more regular and increased labour hours.

In all bar one of the 10 cases, their active approach towards gaining an unsorted selection of young New Dealers is to do with both the need for 'extra pairs of hands' and their (anticipated) levels of success. In the exceptional case, one of a few organisations that set up projects specifically for the young New Dealers, this is do with the latter factor; the (continued) ability to gain high levels of success. I have discussed this case in more detail in chapter five, briefly, this is a large service organisation that (still) obtained sufficient additional amounts of money to hire extra staff who could provide high levels of support and pastoral care to the young New Dealers. Unusually,

the organisation was able to do this using little, if any, of its own internal resources. On top of this, the work given to the young New Dealers was low-skilled manual work on a project that was not interconnected with other services provided by the organisation but contributed directly and indirectly towards the organisation's missions. This combination of circumstances meant that in spite of frequent and severe disruptions arising with the problematic young New Dealers, these disruptions did not impact on the organisation's existing staff and services. Further, any benefits arising from the work given to the young New Dealers contributed towards the delivery of new services that, in turn, contributed towards advancing the organisation's missions. The organisation's engagement with the programme was clearly a low risk activity with the potential to gain high levels of benefit. More over, and atypically, this was at no cost to the organisation. Essentially, then, in this case, the willingness to continue with the programme was to do with the ability to gain high levels of success at little, if any, cost to the organisation. Indeed, in comparison with the other organisations in this study, this organisation took on – and continued to take on – the highest number of young New Dealers.

Returning to the other nine organisations, in seven cases the willingness to continue is to do with both the need for additional labour and their success with the programme. They consist of a mixture of organisations: two are from the three atypical organisations discussed at the beginning of the chapter<sup>30</sup> and four are organisations that offered low-skilled manual work that allowed them to contain problems and maximise their benefits from this (three shops and one service organisation that provides furniture and environmental services). The remaining organisation is a large service organisation that still obtained sufficient additional amounts of money to hire extra staff. All seven of these organisations experienced constant overall levels of success from the programme. Further, in almost all these cases, this success consisted of benefits that contributed both directly and indirectly towards the organisations' missions. As discussed in chapter five, direct contributions were possible because of the type of work offered to the young New Dealers; and, in the case of the organisations offering complex and skilled work this was possible because they engaged with the enhanced

---

<sup>30</sup> The interviewee from the third atypical organisation said he thought the programme had ended.

12-month programme. Clearly, in these cases, the willingness to continue is because the work the young New Dealers undertook successfully (and significantly) filled gaps in the delivery of the organisations' existing services.

In the remaining two of the nine cases, again the willingness to continue was to do with the need for 'extra pairs of hands'. However, there was a slight variation; this is to do with their levels of success and their anticipated levels of success. These two organisations experienced variable levels of success: at times they experienced disruptions arising with the problematic young New Dealers that were detrimental to their missions; and, at other times they experienced multiple benefits arising from 'excellent' young New Dealers that significantly contributed both directly and indirectly towards the organisations' missions.

One of these cases is a community organisation and the other is a service organisation. They belonged to the subgroup discussed earlier that was particularly exposed to the problems arising with the young New Dealers and offered complex and skilled work to them. Nevertheless, these two cases were also able to gain significant benefits if they were in receipt of 'good' young New Dealers. Indeed, at times, they gained significant contributions that directly contributed towards their missions. Again, this was possible because they engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme; this allowed them sufficient time to train the young New Dealers and to benefit from this. This is crucial towards understanding the organisations' willingness to continue with the programme; although there were potentially high risks involved in taking on the young New Dealers, there was also the possibility (and the experience) of gaining high levels of benefits from the programme. Essentially, it was the potential of gaining high levels of benefits and the organisations' desperation for labour that contributes towards understanding their willingness to take on anymore young New Dealers.

#### *7.2.2 Passive Organisations*

Unlike most of the 10 organisations discussed above, in the case of the seven passive organisations, the programme was not a vital source of labour. At the time of my fieldwork, very few of these organisations were in receipt of young New Dealers and interviewees from the organisations that did not have young New Dealers did not talk about contact with their labour supplier for more. Indeed, other than registering their

details with their labour supplier (the Contract Agent), they did little else to gain anymore young New Dealers. Further, most of the interviewees from these organisations tended to talk about the advantages of alternative sources of free labour, such as volunteers and participants from other employment and skills training initiatives over young New Deal participants. These include: 'life-skills'; 'commitment'; initiative and 'not needing babysitting'. In a few cases there was also the advantage of additional amounts of money obtained from other employment and training skills programmes. Nevertheless, the organisations continued with the programme because they did not want to miss out on 'good' young New Dealers. However, in some cases, the willingness to take on even the good young New Dealers was dependent on the availability of other sources of free labour. For instance, as one interviewee said, "I always say never again" about recruiting young New Dealers; however, she also qualified that this was dependent on the availability of volunteers. In this case, volunteers tended to be law students and others with legal knowledge who were highly competent and committed to the organisation's missions; qualities that were not evident in the young New Dealers.

In these seven cases the way in which they continued with the programme can be understood in relation to a combination of factors: the need for labour; their lack of success; and anticipated levels of success. These organisations belonged to the group identified in the earlier section: organisations that did not have the external or internal resources to provide what proved to be necessary high levels of support and training to the young New Dealers; and, in all bar one case, offered skilled work in which it was difficult to contain problems arising with the young New Dealers. Nevertheless, they could still gain net benefits if they were in receipt of 'good' young New Dealers.

These seven organisations were clearly less optimistic about their engagement with the programme. This is to do with their (lack of) success and the resources they ploughed into the young New Dealers. First, most of these organisations experienced unsuccessful outcomes with the programme (4 organisations) in which they experienced frequent disruptions arising with problematic young New Dealers. This was a (direct and indirect) impediment towards the delivery of the organisations' missions; and, worse still, used up the organisations' already-stretched internal resources. Compounding this, several of the organisations – including all three that

experienced variable levels of success – offered administrative work (five out of seven organisations). This is particularly significant because, to recall from chapter six (section 3.2), according to the interviewees there was inadequate external training provisions for this type of work. Given the young New Dealers were already, as several of these (and other) interviewees put it, ‘high maintenance’, the organisations had the additional burden of compensating for this; using even more of their existing already-stretched resources. Clearly, in these cases, engagement with the programme was a high risk activity in which the organisations invested already-stretched internal resources that, at best, produced variable levels of success.

These circumstances clearly contribute towards understanding why these organisations were less optimistic about the programme as a source of labour. However, on the surface it is difficult to understand why they continued at all with the programme; and, indeed, begs the question, why would any of these organisations continue with what proved to be a high-risk and problem-laden activity they could ill-afford? There are three interconnected parts to the answer. First, these organisations were desperate for labour. Secondly, they anticipated that if they could get ‘very, very good’ young New Dealers they could gain benefits that could significantly contribute (mainly indirectly) towards their mission. Indeed, the interviewee from the organisation that did not gain any benefits at all said she did not want their organisation to miss out on the ‘superdupa’ young New Dealers. Thirdly, the answer lies in the approach with which they continued with the programme: the organisations tended to, as one interviewee put, ‘lie low’. As noted earlier, other than registering their details with their labour supplier they did little else to gain anymore young New Dealers. This approach was adopted in the hope that the young New Dealer participants who were interested in the organisations’ advertised posts would come forward. This can be understood as an indirect selection process; by the organisations not reminding their Contract Agents about their available New Deal posts they were hoping to receive the self-selected young New Dealers, rather than those who were ‘pushed’ into New Deal jobs. To recall from chapter six (section 3.1) one of the biggest obstacles for the organisations in this study was being in receipt of, as several interviewees put it, ‘conscripts’. In addition to this ‘lie-low’ approach, some of the interviewees said they had become more selective about the young New Dealers recruited for their posts; again, attempting (directly) to filter out the problematic young New Dealers. Like the three atypical organisations

discussed at the beginning of the chapter, these (direct and indirect) selection processes are likely to explain why several of these organisations were not in receipt of young New Dealers for some time.

### *7.2.3 Organisations that no longer engaged*

Turning to the remaining six organisations that were unwilling to take anymore young New Dealers and subsequently withdrew from the programme, this was not because the organisations did not need additional labour. On the contrary, like other organisations, they engaged with the programme primarily because they wanted and in some cases desperately needed 'extra pairs of hands' that could contribute directly and indirectly towards their missions. Instead, in these cases, the decision to withdraw was because the programme was not considered or anticipated to be a viable source of labour in which they could deliver the aims of the programme and benefit from this.

In five of the six cases, this was to do with money and in some cases the length of the programme. These five organisations belonged to the subgroup of large service organisations that contracted with Agent X. To recall from chapter four, this subgroup engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme and had additional amounts of money made available to them. On top of this, as part of their contracts, and unlike other organisations in the study, this subgroup took on higher numbers of young New Dealers and was expected to complete large amounts of administrative work, including paperwork about the young New Dealers' personal development. As discussed in chapter six (section 2.1), all the organisations from this subgroup experienced frequent and severe disruptions with the young New Dealers. Compounding this, in many of the cases, the paperwork was laborious and time consuming. In spite of these difficulties and whether or not the organisations offered specialised and skilled work, they were still able to gain overall levels of success if they obtained sufficient amounts of money from the programme to hire extra staff who could provide high levels of support and training to the young New Dealers. Given this, money is a crucial factor towards understanding whether or not the organisations were willing to continue with the programme. To illustrate, in two of the five cases, the organisations experienced unsuccessful outcomes from the programme because they did not obtain sufficient amounts of money to hire extra staff. Nevertheless, they were still prepared to continue if they could obtain increased amounts of money from the programme. Both of them,

discussed at the beginning of the chapter, these (direct and indirect) selection processes are likely to explain why several of these organisations were not in receipt of young New Dealers for some time.

### *7.2.3 Organisations that no longer engaged*

Turning to the remaining six organisations that were unwilling to take anymore young New Dealers and subsequently withdrew from the programme, this was not because the organisations did not need additional labour. On the contrary, like other organisations, they engaged with the programme primarily because they wanted and in some cases desperately needed 'extra pairs of hands' that could contribute directly and indirectly towards their missions. Instead, in these cases, the decision to withdraw was because the programme was not considered or anticipated to be a viable source of labour in which they could deliver the aims of the programme and benefit from this.

In five of the six cases, this was to do with money and in some cases the length of the programme. These five organisations belonged to the subgroup of large service organisations that contracted with Agent X. To recall from chapter four, this subgroup engaged with the enhanced 12-month programme and had additional amounts of money made available to them. On top of this, as part of their contracts, and unlike other organisations in the study, this subgroup took on higher numbers of young New Dealers and was expected to complete large amounts of administrative work, including paperwork about the young New Dealers' personal development. As discussed in chapter six (section 2.1), all the organisations from this subgroup experienced frequent and severe disruptions with the young New Dealers. Compounding this, in many of the cases, the paperwork was laborious and time consuming. In spite of these difficulties and whether or not the organisations offered specialised and skilled work, they were still able to gain overall levels of success if they obtained sufficient amounts of money from the programme to hire extra staff who could provide high levels of support and training to the young New Dealers. Given this, money is a crucial factor towards understanding whether or not the organisations were willing to continue with the programme. To illustrate, in two of the five cases, the organisations experienced unsuccessful outcomes from the programme because they did not obtain sufficient amounts of money to hire extra staff. Nevertheless, they were still prepared to continue if they could obtain increased amounts of money from the programme. Both of them,

however, were unsuccessful in their bids to gain increased amounts of money and, subsequently, withdrew from the programme.

To further support the importance of money as a determinant factor for continuation, the remaining three of these five organisations gained overall levels of success throughout most of their engagement with the programme. However, they belonged to the group of organisations discussed in the previous section that experienced fluid levels of success depending on the amounts of money obtained from the programme. As a result of this, they were highly sensitised to both the changes to the amounts of money obtained and the impact this had on their ability to gain overall levels of success from the programme. Consequently, when two of the three organisations were offered contracts that consisted of drastic reductions to the amounts of money, they anticipated this would not be sufficient for them to gain success and, subsequently, withdrew from the programme. In one of these cases, the reduced length of the programme from 12 to six-months was equally important; six months was not sufficient time to train the young New Dealers to do skilled carpentry work and for the organisation to benefit from this.

Interestingly, in both cases, the young New Dealers were amongst the organisations' beneficiaries. This highlights that being a beneficiary is not a sufficient reason for the organisations to continue with the programme. As noted earlier (and elsewhere in the thesis), without a doubt, the support given to the young New Dealer beneficiaries contributed towards advancing the organisations' missions (see chapter 5.3.1). Nevertheless, these (like other) young New Dealers were there primarily to be trained (the aims of the programme) and for the organisation to benefit from this.

In the third case, the Chief Executive Officer anticipated changes to both the amounts of money available and the length of the programme and, once again, anticipated this would have an impact on the organisations' ability to deliver the aims of the programme and for the organisation to benefit from this. As a result of this, the organisation withdrew prior to, but in anticipation of, changes to do with money and the length of the programme (chapter 6.3.4). This is a particularly poignant case. Not only does it contribute towards understanding the organisation's willingness to continue, but also highlights a wider underlying issues to do with the structural and operational aspects of the programme; in particular the instability of the programme. Indeed, the



interviewee from this third case talked about the importance of not becoming dependent on a volatile programme. To remind the reader, this was the interviewee who exclaimed, '[voluntary organisations were] at the mercy of the swipe of a ministerial pen.' The constant changes built into the programme increased uncertainties for the organisations. I return to this point in more detail in the next (and final) section where I discuss whether or not the organisations can sustain their engagement with the programme in the (near) future.

Turning to the remaining one of the six cases, this is a small branch service organisation that engaged with the standard six-month programme and offered administrative work to the young New Dealers. In this case, the organisation did not obtain external resources and did not have the internal capacity to train and support the young New Dealers. Further, the organisation did not have work available to give to the problematic young New Dealers that would enable them to contain problems and to gain maximum benefits from this. There was, however, work to minimise problems such as tidying the stationary cupboard and sorting out leaflets. Nevertheless, this work did not make any significant contribution towards the organisation's mission and was not the type of work the organisation originally anticipated giving to the young New Dealers. The organisation experienced constant unsuccessful outcomes with the programme and was clearly in a worse position for this; the organisation used existing already-stretched resources to support predominantly problematic young New Dealers who were an impediment towards the organisations' missions. As a result, the organisation was no longer willing to take on young New Dealers and withdrew from the programme.

A summary of the organisations' continued with the programme, is illustrated in Table 7.5. This includes information about: the organisations' overall levels of success with the programme, the type of work the organisations' offered (in terms of skills) and why they continued engagement with or withdrew engagement from the programme.

Table 7.5 Continuation with the programme summarised by the organisations' type of work and their overall level of success

Continued?	Outcome	Type of org	Type of work	Why continue or stop engagement with the programme?
Yes - Active	Success (8 organisations)	2 atypical organisations that did not experience any problems	Low and skilled work	Fortunate to only gain 'good' young New Dealers; but neither in receipt of young New Dealers for some time
		2 large service organisations	Variety of work (inc. low skilled)	Still got enough money and had a variety of low skilled work that could significantly contribute to their mission
	Variable (2 organisations)	3 shops 1 small service organisation	Low skilled work	Can gain quick return from work that significantly contributes to their mission
		1 community 1 small service org.	Skilled and personal work	Willing to risk because of the desperation of staff
Yes - passive	Variable (3 organisations)	2 small service 1 community organisation	all bar shop offered skilled and personal work	Not prepared too lose out on good young New Dealers, implicit and explicit selection of young New Dealers to reduce the likelihood of getting problematic young New Dealers
	Unsuccessful (4 organisations)	1 shop 2 small service organisations 1 community organisation		
No	Success (3 organisations)	3 large service organisations	Skilled work	Anticipated reduction in money available from the programme Reduction in money available and anticipated unsuccessful levels of outcomes
	Unsuccessful (3 organisations)	2 large service organisations 1 small service organisation	Skilled work	Unable to gain levels of success with the programme
Based on 24 organisations				

Table 7.5 provides a useful summary of the organisations that continued and did not continue engagement with the NDYP programme. Clearly, most of the organisations continued engagement (17 out of 23). They cut across the three types: shops, community and service organisations. Despite this, however, this variation, was not reflected in the types of work they offered to the young New Dealers; a concentration of low-skilled manual posts. To illustrate, in the case of the 10 that belonged to the subgroup of active organisations, six of them offered primarily low-skilled and unskilled manual work to the young New Dealers. Indeed, in total these six organisations offered more than 100 low-skilled manual posts at any one time; one of which offered an estimated 90 New Deal posts. In contrast, the remaining four of these 10 active organisations offered skilled work and at a much smaller scale, usually between one and two New Deal posts at any given time. Like these four, all bar one of the seven that belonged to the subgroup of passive organisations offered primarily skilled work; again, at a much smaller scale. Thus, although the majority of the organisations (10 of the 17) offered skilled work, most of them engaged on a small scale and offered an estimated total of 50 New Deal posts at any one time. In contrast, a small group of the organisations (7 out of the 17) offered more than 100 New Deal posts.

The pattern is largely due to the loss of the five large service organisations that withdrew from the programme. All five of them offered multiple and predominantly specialized and skilled work to the young New Dealers; they offered work that totalled to over 100 New Deal posts at any given time.

The skewed pattern towards low-skilled manual work is not incidental. To the contrary it is symptomatic of the programme's (eventual) failure to provide adequate resources to the organisations. For the voluntary organisations to offer skilled work to an unsorted selection of young New Dealers they needed sufficient external resources: money to buy in extra staff who could support and provide adequate on-the-job training to the young New Dealers. Indeed, as discussed earlier, even when presented with problematic young New Dealers the organisations that obtained sufficient amounts of money on the enhanced 12-month programme were able to offer specialised and skilled New Deal posts and gain net benefit from this. Without the external resources and the internal capacity, the organisations that could still gain net benefits (and continued)

were those that offered low-skilled manual work. Without the external resources and the internal capacity, the organisations that did not have low-skilled manual work with which they could contain problems and gain maximum benefits were most vulnerable to the exposure of unsorted selections of young New Dealers; disruptions arising from the problematic young New Dealers had the potential not only to distract the organisations from the delivery of but also to seriously damage their mission. In spite of this, several of them continued with the programme because they were desperate for additional labour and because they anticipated overall levels of success if fortunate enough to be in receipt of 'good' young New Dealers. However, as noted earlier many of them did not promote their engagement with the programme and were seldom used by their labour suppliers.

### **7.3 Sustained engagement with the programme**

Turning to the final section of this chapter, I move on to examine whether or not the 17 organisations that continued can sustain their engagement with the programme. This is different from whether or not they continued at the time of my fieldwork and instead is about whether or not they are likely to be able to take on unsorted selections of young New Dealers and maintain their engagement with the programme in the near future. I discuss this in two parts. First, I discuss whether or not the organisations can sustain their engagement if the programme remains unchanged. And, second, whether or not they can maintain engagement once the changes in operation at the time of my fieldwork are implemented to the programme.

#### *7.3.1 If the programme remains the same*

Turning first to whether or not the organisations can sustain engagement if the programme remains unchanged, from the findings discussed in the previous two sections of this chapter, I reach the conclusion that only six of the 17 organisations that continued with the programme are likely to be able to take on an unsorted selection of young New Dealers and sustain their engagement. In four of the six cases, this is because they offered low-skilled manual work in which they could contain most problems and still gain net benefits that could significantly (and directly) contribute towards their missions. In the other two cases this is because the organisations still gained sufficient amounts of money. This allowed them to (continue to) hire extra staff

to support and train the young New Dealers; therefore, they still had the capacity to deal with potential problems arising with the young New Dealers.

In contrast, however, the remaining 11 organisations are unlikely to be able to take on an unsorted mix of young New Dealers and to sustain engagement. This is because, as illustrated in the previous sections, they were, vulnerable to the potential problems arising with an unsorted selection of young New Dealers. They did not have the external resources or the internal capacity to provide high levels of support and training for the young New Dealers. Further, all bar one of them offered complex and skilled work in which they could not contain potential problems arising with the young New Dealers. Indeed, as discussed earlier, these organisations continued to engage at a high risk: their outcomes with the programme depended on the quality of the young New Dealers. On the one hand, this presented opportunities in which if in receipt of good young New Dealers they could gain net benefits and significantly advance their missions. On the other hand, it presented the risk in which the problems arising with young New Dealer could cause serious damage to their missions. This is a risk they could ill-afford as they operated on already-stretched resources to deliver their own existing missions. Indeed, as noted earlier, several of them adopted direct and indirect approaches in an attempt to filter out problematic young New Dealers. This had the potential to increase their ability to sustain engagement with the programme. Nevertheless, it did not guarantee they would not be in receipt of problematic young New Dealers. At best, whether or not they can maintain engagement is uncertain; depending on the quality of the young New Dealers placed with them. On the whole, however, they cannot sustain engagement with an unsorted selection of young New Dealers and if in receipt of problematic young New Dealers are likely (eventually) to withdraw from the programme.

On top of this, the labour suppliers were least likely to use this subgroup. In the main this is because the labour suppliers were more likely to be in receipt of multiply-disadvantaged New Deal participants (see chapter 6). Consequently, the New Deal candidates were unlikely to be of the calibre that would get through the organisations' selection processes. The organisations were not a sustainable option for the labour suppliers and for the programme in general.

### *7.3.2 If the programme changes*

Turning to the second question, whether or not the organisations can sustain engagement in the light of further changes to the programme?, to recall from chapter six (section 3.4) there were two major changes being implemented to the programme at the time of my fieldwork. These are (further) reductions to the amount of money made available to the organisations and a reduction to the length of the New Deal placements. In the case of the enhanced programme this was being reduced from 12 to six months. In the case of the standard programme, whether or not there were to be changes to the length of the programme was unclear, but it was anticipated this would be reduced from six months to 13 weeks.

Once again the most likely organisations to be able to take on unsorted selections of the young New Dealers and maintain their engagement is the subgroup of six organisations discussed above; even with the changes in place they are likely to still (continue to) gain overall levels of success and, therefore, sustain engagement with the truncated programme. To illustrate, four of the six cases did not obtain significant additional amounts of money from the programme in the first place and, thus, changes to the amounts of money did not impact on their overall levels of success. Further, these organisations offered low-skilled manual work with which they could gain quick returns. They are therefore likely to be able to (continue to) gain net benefits even from the truncated programme. Indeed, to support this finding, all four cases were already engaged with (and benefited from) other short-term employment and skill training initiatives. In the other two of the six cases, they are likely to sustain engagement because even with the changes in place they still obtained sufficient amounts of money from the programme. This allowed them to continue to hire extra staff to support and train the young New Dealers and to benefit from this. However, any further reduction to the amount of money is likely to impact on whether or not they can maintain their engagement with the programme in the future. Further, in spite of the amounts of money obtained, one of these two organisations still faced uncertainty about their future engagement; given the reduced length of the placement they were in the process of reviewing whether or not they could continue to offer New Deal posts that involved complex skilled work. In this context the other organisation remained relatively unaffected because they offered low-skilled manual work to the young New Dealers; they could continue to train and gain net returns from this same work.

Turning to the remaining subgroup of 11 organisations, like the four cases discussed earlier, the reduction in the amount of money did not impact on their overall levels of success because they obtained nominal, if any, additional amounts of money in the first place. In contrast, however, the reduction to the length of the placement is likely to impact on their ability to gain success and, therefore, has implications on whether or not they can sustain engagement with the programme. As noted earlier, they offered complex and skilled work in which they needed sufficient time to train the young New Dealers and to benefit from this; they are unlikely to gain net benefits from this same work on the truncated programme. Indeed, to support this, whether they continued engagement in the future is uncertain. Almost all the interviewees from this subgroup said they would consider offering different and more simplistic work or withdraw altogether from the programme. The interviewees from the organisations engaged with the enhanced programme tended to talk about offering more simplistic types of work instead of that originally offered and those from organisations with the standard six-month programme tended to talk about withdrawing altogether; they could not see the purpose in offering 13 week places either for their organisation or for the young New Dealers.

In addition to these changes, there was another reason why some of the organisations are likely to withdraw from the programme in the future. This is to do with the cessation of external training provisions for the young New Dealers. As noted in chapter six (section 3.3), several of the interviewees said the external training provision was not useful to their organisations. Nevertheless, in a few cases the interviewees said this training offered opportunities for the young New Dealers' personal development, including: skills-training and gaining qualifications. The interviewees who talked about this were from organisations in which the young New Dealers were amongst their beneficiaries. In these cases, to take away the external training meant the young New Dealers would not benefit from the programme.

Clearly, the findings show that few of the organisations are likely to be able to continue to gain net benefits and thus sustain engagement with the programme. This is the case whether the programme remained the same and even more so once the proposed changes were put into place. Those most likely to sustain engagement are the few

offering low-skilled manual work with which they could contain problems and gain significant benefits from this. For most, however, it is unlikely they can sustain engagement. At best, their overall levels of success were mixed and therefore presented risks to the organisations. Moreover and amplifying this risk, the outcomes are not predictable: as discussed earlier (and elsewhere) the organisations' past experiences were not a good guide to their present and future outcomes with the programme. This is due to the changeable factors that contributed towards their levels of success. Indeed, in most cases what was certain was the uncertainty of the outcomes from the programme and is likely to explain why so many talked about anticipated levels of success when discussing whether or not and how their organisations continued with the programme. These points are crucial: the vast uncertainties with which the organisations were faced expose a wider underlying problem to do with the stability of the programme – or rather, the instability of the programme. On one level this is to do with the factors associated with the young New Dealers and on another level this is to do with the perpetual changing aspects built into the programme.

The uncertainty of the programme clearly presented high levels of risk for the subgroup of 11 organisations discussed above. On the one hand it had the potential to advance their missions and on the other hand the disruptions arising with problematic young New Dealers had the potential cause serious damage to their missions. Given the organisations operated on already-stretched resources to delivery their own existing missions it is unlikely they could afford to continue with the programme; they risked investing their own resources in an activity with which they were not guaranteed net benefits and that could absorb their existing scarce resources. Indeed, many of them were reluctant to continue to take on unsorted selections of young New Dealers. Further, due to recent changes to the programme their future was uncertain; if they remained they are likely to provide more simplistic work than originally offered to help sustain their engagement with the truncated programme.

To conclude, the findings clearly show the organisations most able to sustain engagement are those that offered low-skilled manual work and those that still obtained sufficient amounts of money. However, even in the latter cases, there is evidence to indicate that some of the complex posts would be simplified or removed in line with the truncated programme. Given this, it is highly likely there will be further decreases in



skilled work and a further increased concentration of low-skilled manual work. Indeed, without structural changes to the programme to (re)introduce adequate resources and sufficient time, this is likely to be the case even if there is a fresh injection of voluntary organisation Individual Placement Providers.

My findings are summarised in the flow diagram in figure 2, illustrating which of the organisations are not likely to be able to sustain engagement with the programme when in receipt of an unsorted mix of young New Dealers. This of course becomes more complex when, for example, organisations offer different types of work at any given time.




Figure 2. Flow diagram on whether or not organisations are likely to sustain engagement

## **Conclusion**

Throughout this thesis I have examined whether or not voluntary organisation IPPs can viably engage with the NDYP programme by looking at the extent to which they are able to advance their missions, that is, gain overall net benefits and sustain these benefits over time. In this final chapter I summarise my main findings and discuss their policy implications in relation to the general issues that I raised at the start of my thesis about the role of the voluntary sector in public policy. I also discuss the policy implications of my findings for the NDYP programme more specifically, identifying key requirements for employment schemes of this type if they are to be viable.

As noted at the start of my thesis, the aim of the NDYP programme was to improve the employability skills of long-term unemployed young people. Unlike other partners that offered temporary employment opportunities (Individual Placement Providers), voluntary sector organisations were considered to have added-value whereby their engagement in the programme would bring about additional social benefits, albeit ill-defined.

In principle this public-voluntary-sector partnership seemed like a win-win situation: the government gets voluntary sector organisations to train the young New Dealers to help them become more employable and, in return, the voluntary organisations get a much needed free source of labour from which they can gain instrumental benefits to advance their missions and thereby benefit their communities, bringing about additional social benefits. Nevertheless, my research findings demonstrate that the seeming mutual benefits that could be gained from this match are not sufficient to explain whether or not the organisations were able to viably engage with and gain sustained success from the programme. In practice, despite almost all of the organisations in my study gaining a multitude of benefits, many of which contributed significantly (directly and indirectly) towards their missions (see chapter 5), in most cases they also experienced problems with the programme. At best, they found themselves in receipt of a mixture of young New Dealers who were 'unsorted' in the sense that they were not selected in terms of their suitability for the work they would undertake in the recipient organisation. Many of the young New Dealers lacked fundamental work, personal and social skills and in extreme, but not necessarily rare, cases had severe personal and social problems.

Training any new member of staff incurs costs. In the case of young New Dealers who did not have basic work, personal and social skills, they required extremely high levels of training, support and pastoral care that was far greater than the organisations had originally anticipated. As a result, they had not factored in such costs when they (initially) engaged with the programme and, consequently, many of the organisations found themselves doubly burdened: using their already stretched resources to deliver their own missions and to support young New Dealers. This was most likely to be the case for the organisations that offered work that required a level of skill but did not obtain sufficient additional amounts of money that would have enabled them to hire extra staff to provide what proved to be high levels of support to the young New Dealers. The majority of the organisations in my study found themselves in this situation.

Given these voluntary organisations did not have the internal or external resources to support problematic young New Dealers and nor did they have available any unskilled work for them that would contribute towards the organisations' missions, whether or not they gained net benefits from the programme was largely dependent on what I referred to in an earlier chapter as the young New Dealers' existing capital. In the majority of cases, then, the organisations experienced variable levels of success from the programme. On the one hand, if in receipt of a 'superdupa' young New Dealer they gained a multitude of benefits for their communities. On the other hand, if in receipt of a problematic young New Dealer, this was disruptive and sometimes the effects were directly detrimental towards their missions. This was a costly process in which problematic young New Dealers could adversely affect the delivery of the missions to other beneficiaries and would require extensive support and pastoral care to enable them to do the work given to them.

On top of this, the challenges arising from the problematic young New Dealers were exacerbated by structural and operational aspects of the programme, including the: disciplinary procedures, external training provisions and continual changes affecting the programme. For instance, as discussed in chapter six, in the case of disciplinary procedures the organisations did not have the autonomy to deal with persistently problematic young New Dealers. Instead, this tended to be the responsibility of the

Contract Agents. There were some cases in which problems arising with the young New Dealers were dealt with effectively, minimising the disruptions to the organisation IPPs. In most cases, however, organisations experienced two types of problem. On the one hand problematic young New Dealers were not dealt with quickly enough (consultation fatigue) and on the other hand the young New Dealers were dealt with harshly with little if any consultation with the organisations. Both types of action led to difficulties. In the former, problems were amplified and in the latter the organisations lost young New Dealers who could and did benefit the organisations, despite the disciplinary problems. As a result, their investment put into these young New Dealers was lost. This was at high cost to the organisations; they could ill-afford the lack of return on investing their already-stretched internal resources (see chapter 6.3.2).

In the case of external training provided to the young New Dealers, this did not always match the work that the young New Dealers did within the organisations. This would not have been a problem if the young New Dealers had had sufficient existing basic work skills. However, given that this was frequently not the case, the training did not contribute to bridging the gap between the young New Dealers' existing skills and the skills that they needed to do the work given to them. Again, the organisations were in a difficult position: if they were to gain any instrumental benefits from these young New Dealers they needed to compensate for the inadequate external training provisions. As such, in most cases, the organisations had to invest existing internal resources for this (see chapter 6.3.3). The organisations' existing resources were stretched to their limits; they did not have superfluous resources. Consequently, any investment in a young New Dealer involved high risk –whether the young New Dealer would eventually benefit the organisations was unpredictable and even if they did they might be removed if they breached the New Dealer guidelines.

In many cases it was clear that the organisations' past experiences with the programme were not reliable guides to their outcomes from their current or future engagement with the programme. In part, this is to do with the fluidity of the organisations' own life-cycle. In the main, however, this arose because of the structural and operational aspects of the programme in which the factors that contributed towards organisations experiencing benefits or problems were far from constant. On a micro level, this was because of the variability of the qualities of the young New Dealers. On a higher level,

this was because of the constantly changing nature of the programme (see chapter 6.3.4). The lack of stability in the programme meant that the organisations' experiences were not a useful guide to the extent to which they could viably engage and gain net benefits from the programme. Nevertheless, these experiences highlighted the uncertainties of the outcomes of their engagement. As such, decisions to continue or withdraw were based only on *conjectures* about anticipated future benefits. There is an important wider issue to draw out here which is that the instability of the programme itself was a key component to understanding the extent to which organisations could sustain engagement with the programme. This is because instability increased the risk that the organisations would not obtain a return from their investment. This is particularly poignant since the voluntary organisations often engaged with the programme using their already stretched resources and thus were unable and unwilling to engage with such a risk-ridden programme.

Clearly there were generic problems with the programme. These were to do with disruptions arising from problematic young New Dealers, which were amplified by structural and operational aspects of the programme. This is crucial towards understanding the organisations' ability to viably engage with the programme. Despite popular views that voluntary organisations want to help people, they did not engage with the programme for the purely altruistic purpose of helping young long-term unemployed people. On the contrary, albeit in many cases for charitable purposes, they primarily engaged to further their own missions: to gain an 'extra pair of hands' to help with their own existing work (see chapter 4.3). Even among those organisations with intentions to help the disadvantaged, many could not afford to engage with the programme. They simply did not have the internal resources to support an 'unsorted' mix of young New Dealers at the expense of their organisations' own missions.

Given that the organisations operate on already stretched resources, that being in receipt of a selection of unsorted young New Dealers is high maintenance and that the organisations engaged to benefit from the programme, the voluntary sector is *not* a cheap option. For the voluntary organisation IPPs to sustain engagement they needed significant additional resources and sufficient time to support the young New Dealers if they were to benefit from them. As discussed earlier in the thesis a large amount of money was set aside for the welfare-to-work schemes, particularly the NDYP (see

chapter 1.1). Nevertheless, the voluntary organisation IPPs were not guaranteed to be recipients of this money. The money made available to the programme was absorbed elsewhere within the complex layers of its structure. In my study, only a few of the IPPs gained significant additional amounts of money to hire extra staff to support the young New Dealers (and do the necessary paperwork). The majority, however, were in receipt of little (if any) money. For the organisations that were able to access additional money to hire staff to train the young New Dealers, this was being 'streamlined' over the years and by the end of my fieldwork only two of them obtained sufficient amounts of money, and even this was a significant reduction from previous years' engagement.

The inadequate (and eventual decline of) resources made available to the organisations from the programme is likely to explain the emerging pattern described in chapter four that showed that, at the time of my fieldwork, most of the young New Dealers were being placed in a smaller number of organisations than was available for placements, namely those that offered unskilled work such as: sorting, steaming and pricing donated goods and lifting and shifting furniture. As noted earlier and discussed in more detail in chapter seven, the organisations most able to benefit in these conditions are those that offered unskilled work that could contribute towards their missions: the training was less labour-intensive, the staff could provide the minimal training required through training on the job, and the organisation could gain quick returns from the work given to the young New Dealers. Moreover in most of these cases, if necessary, problematic young New Dealers could be placed elsewhere in the organisation to avoid disruptions to their existing staff and to their community and, yet, the organisations could still benefit from the work given to them.

My findings have implications for both the voluntary sector and for employment programmes of this type. For voluntary organisations that want to offer any level of skilled work, the inadequate resources offered, the constant streamlining, and the newly implemented truncated programme makes it an ill-resourced and unstable programme in which engagement is likely to be high risk; the outcome depending on the quality of the young New Dealer placed with them. They are highly likely to experience disruptions in which at best their already stretched resources are likely to be absorbed into delivering the aims of the NDYP programme and not on delivering their own missions.

These organisations can reduce the likelihood of disruptions arising by adopting selective approaches when recruiting the young New Dealers, as some did. However, by doing so (as described in chapter 7.2) they are unlikely to be used by the labour suppliers that have the unenviable task of finding work for this mixed group of young New Dealers. Further, there is no guarantee that they will not be in receipt of a problematic young New Dealer. If they chose to engage and take on unsorted young New Dealers, these risks are even higher. Without sufficient external resources, not only are they likely to absorb their own resources to support the young New Dealers, they run very high risks in which the problematic young New Dealers can be an impediment and damaging the very missions they wish to achieve both in the immediate and long term. This is the case even for those organisations in which the young New Dealers are part of the organisations' beneficiaries. This is because young New Dealers were primarily there to be trained as deliverers of the organisations' services rather than recipients of their services.

These findings are similar to those discussed at the beginning of my thesis where, for example, Morris (2001) found that voluntary organisations (unexpectedly) used their own resources to support their engagement with the programme and Scott et al. (2002) found that the cost of voluntary organisations' engagement was grossly underestimated by their Managing Agents (Contract Agents). On a wider scale, these findings resonate with other research on public-voluntary sector partnership that have shown that whilst such partnerships can lead to benefits, they are often fraught with problems whereby the powerful partner tends to dictate the conditions, set the agenda and are the source of funds and in which the least powerful partner tends to get distracted from delivering their own missions to deliver other aims and ends up using their resources to do this (see the introduction and chapter 2). This was clearly the case in the NDYP programme. In many cases, there was no guarantee that the voluntary organisations would gain any benefit from their engagement with the programme. There are possible serious consequences: as Morris (2001) notes in her study, voluntary organisations that are registered charities who use their resources for purposes other than their charitable aims could be compromising their legal status.



In this sense, the voluntary sector's partnership was a rhetorical exercise. Despite the government's enthusiasm for the sector's role to help tackle social exclusion and to promote social inclusion, and the government's recognition that the voluntary sector's characteristics should not be compromised in their engagement with public policy,<sup>31</sup> the inadequate resources assigned to the sector to engage with government programmes has brought about a familiar set of problems.

Turning to the implications of my findings for the programme itself, the failure to ensure that the voluntary organisation IPPs were able to sustain engagement is a missed opportunity. Despite having a list of organisation IPPs engaged with the programme that offered a variety of work to the young New Dealer, in reality towards the end of my fieldwork only a few organisations actively engaged. The initial variety (that still did not reflect the very varied sector as a whole) was narrowing to a handful that offered predominantly unskilled work. The organisations that remained actively engaged with the programme were predominantly those that offered unskilled manual work. This is because these organisations required few resources for training and little time to benefit from their engagement with the programme, and they could gain quick returns from the work the young New Dealers did.

There are some who may argue that unskilled manual work can help to break the cycle of unemployment: to get some of the more problematic young New Dealers into a work pattern is an achievement given they are contending with an existing chaotic life with multiple social and personal problems. Indeed, this was said by several interviewees irrespective of the type of work offered by their organisations to the young New Dealers. Nevertheless, to *only* be able to offer such work raises questions about the programme's ability to offer meaningful employment opportunities. Further, given the NDYP programme, as with other welfare-to-work schemes, was part of the government's wider vision to tackle social exclusion this raises questions about its effectiveness to do so. The government itself considers low skills to be one of the main

---

<sup>31</sup> See literature about Compacts on the National Council for Voluntary Organisation's website: <http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/compactadvocacy>

contributory factors to poverty and social exclusion (HM Treasury 2001; HM Treasury 2004).

The reduced engagement of organisations that initially joined the programme is also a missed opportunity. This is because it could have been possible for organisations to deliver the programme and advance their missions. The key requirements for this being: money and time. Further, it is a lost opportunity because my research indicates that in the earlier years of the programme some of the organisations were able to gain benefits. These were cases in which the NDYP VSO and the ETFO programme operated at its best: the organisations were given the time and the money to train and support the young New Dealers and thereby create opportunities for these young New Dealers to enter meaningful, non-subsidized work. In turn, there was sufficient time for the organisation to gain returns from the work given to the young New Dealers that contributed significantly (directly and indirectly) towards their missions and thereby to their communities.

Unfortunately, however, the programme has moved in the wrong direction. Without a drastic makeover to the structure and the operation of the NDYP programme, the existing pattern of work available to the young new Dealers is likely to remain. Or worse, this pattern is likely to be attenuated with an increased concentration of low and unskilled manual work available. As described in chapters [six and seven], this is because of changes being implemented to the programme at the time of my fieldwork, including a reduction in the amounts of money available to the larger service organisations and the reduction from 12 to six-months on the enhanced programme. Consequently, for those organisations still engaging with the programme, there were uncertainties about whether or not they would continue. What was certain, however, was that, should they continue, they would offer only work that involved far more simplistic tasks than previously.

To conclude, for the voluntary organisations to provide the opportunities of 'meaningful employment' and to increase the young New Dealers' employability skills (the primary aim of the programme), they needed sufficient and stable external resources. Once these resources are in place, the organisations can get on with delivering their missions and thereby deliver the second aim of the programme: social

benefits to their communities. Voluntary organisations are well placed to deliver both of these aims and some, initially at least, were successful in doing this. However, the streamlining of the programme and the reduction of resources led to a decline in the organisations' willingness to take on any - or unsorted selections - of young New Dealers. This led to decline in the types of work offered and a reduction in the variety of organisations engaging with the programme to a small subgroup that offered unskilled-manual work from which they could gain quick returns and continue to gain nets benefits that advanced their missions.

## Bibliography

6, P. (1997). *Holistic government*. London, Demos.

6, P. and D. Leat (1996). 'Inventing the British voluntary sector by committee: from Wolfenden to Deakin.' *Non-Profit Studies* 1(2): 33-46.

Alcock, P. and D. Scott (2002). 'Partnerships with the voluntary sector: can Compacts work?' In *Partnerships, new labour and the governance of welfare*. Edited by C. Glendinning, M. Powell and K. Rummery. Bristol, The Policy Press.

ALI (2002). Draft Guidance for Providers on the inspection of the New Deal 18-24, Adult Learning Inspectorate.

Balloch, S. and M. Taylor, Eds. (2001). *Partnership working*. Bristol, The Policy Press.

Barnes, M. and H. Sullivan (2002). 'Building capacity for collaboration in English Health Action Zones'. In *Partnerships, new labour and the governance of welfare*. Edited by C. Glendinning, M. Powell and K. Rummery. Bristol, The Policy Press.

Becker, H. (1996). 'The Epistemology of Qualitative Research'. In *Essays on Ethnography and Human Development*. Edited by R. Jessor, A. Colby and R. Schweder. Chicago, University of Chicago Press,.

Behrens, M. and K. Evans (2002). 'Taking Control of Their Lives? A comparison of the experiences of unemployed young adults (18-25) in England and the new Germany.' *Comparative Education* 38(1): 17-37.

Berger, P. L. and T. Luckmann. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise its the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City, New York, Anchor Books,.

Billis, D. (2000). 'Tackling social exclusion: the contribution of voluntary organisations'. In *Voluntary organisations and social policy: perspectives on change and choice*. Edited by M. Harris and C. Rochester. London, Palgrave. Macmillan.

Blair, T. (1996). *Speech to CPU Conference*, Cape Town.

Blair, T. (1998a). *Message from the Prime Minister in Great Britain*. Compact between the government and the volutnary sector in Wales, cm 4107, London: The Stationary Office.

Blair, T. (1998b). *The third way*. London, Fabian Society.

Blankenburg, F. (1995). *Methods of Impact Assessment Research Programme, Resource Pack and Discussion*. The Hague, Oxfam UK/I and Novib.

Blundell, R., M. Costas Dias, C. Meghir and V. Reenen (2001). *Evaluating the employment impact of a mandatory job search assistance program*. London, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

Bullen, E., J. Kenway and V. Hay (2000). 'New Labour, Social Exclusion and Education Risk Management: the case of 'gymslip mums'.' *British Educational Research Journal* 26(4): 441-456.

Burchardt, T., J. Le Grand and D. Piachaud (2002). 'Introduction'. In *Understanding Social Exclusion*. Edited by J. Hills, J. Le Grand and D. Piachaud. Oxford University Press.

Byrne, D. (2005). *Social Exclusion*. Open University Press.

CESI. (2002). 'New Deal for 25+ progress - September 2000.' 2003, from [http://www.cesi.org.uk/\\_newsite2002/newdeal/delunits/0009/0009ltjb.htm](http://www.cesi.org.uk/_newsite2002/newdeal/delunits/0009/0009ltjb.htm).

Clarke, K. (2006). 'Childhood, parenting and early intervention: a critical examination of the Sure Start national programme.' *Critical Social Policy* 26 (4): 699-721.

Craig, G. and M. Taylor (2002). 'Dangerous liaisons: local government and the voluntary and community sectors'. In *Partnerships, new labour and the governance of welfare*. Edited by C. Glendinning, M. Powell and K. Rummery. Bristol, The Policy Press.

Davies, J. K. (2001). 'Partnership working in health promotion: the potential role of social capital in health development'. In *Partnership Working. Policy and practice*. Edited by S. Balloch and M. Taylor. Bristol, The Policy Press.

Deacon, A. (2000). 'Learning from the US? The influence of American ideas upon 'new labour' thinking on welfare reform.' *Policy and Politics* 28(1): 5-18.

Deakin, N. (1995). 'The perils of partnership: the voluntary sector and the state, 1945-1992'. In *An introduction to the voluntary sector*. Edited by J. Davis Smith, C. Rochester and R. Hedley. London, Routledge.

Deakin, N. (2000). 'Public Policy, Social Policy and Voluntary Organisations'. In *Voluntary Organisations and Social Policy in Britain: perspectives on change and choice*. Edited by M. Harris and C. Rochester. Basingstoke, Palgrave.

Dewson, S. and J. Eccles (2001). *The New Deal for Young Unemployed People*. London, National Council for Voluntary Organisations.

DfEE (1997a). *Design of the New Deal for 18-24 year olds*. London, Department of Education and Employment.

DfEE (1997b). *New Deal - delivery through partnerships: national design consultation workshops*. London, Employment Service/Department of Education and Employment.

Dickson, M., S. Gewirtz, D. Halpin, S. Power and G. Whitty (2002). 'Education Action Zones'. In *Partnerships, new labour and the governance of welfare*. Edited by C. Glendinning, M. Powell and K. Rummery. Bristol, The Policy Press.

DTLGR (2002). Information on Regeneration for Community Organisations, Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions Special Grants Programme.

DWP (2002a). Changes to our service from April 2002, Department for Work and Pensions.

DWP. (2002b). 'DWP resource centre.' 2003, from <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2002/sda/a.htm>.

DWP. (2002c). 'Service Delivery Agreement for the Department of Work and Pensions.' 2003, from <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2002/sda/a.htm>.

DWP. (2003). 'DWP: About Us.' 2003, from <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/aboutus/index.htm>.

DWP (2006). A new deal for welfare: Empowering people to work, Department for Work and Pensions.

ES (2002b). Employment Service. Annual report 2001-2002. London, The Stationary Office.

Fieldhouse, E. A., V. Kalra and S. Alam (2002). 'How new is the New Deal? A qualitative study of the New Deal for young people on minority ethnic groups in Oldham.' *Local economy* 17(1): 50-64.

Flynn, P. and V. Hodgkinson (2001). *Measuring the Impact of the Nonprofit Sector*. New York, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.

FRC Group (2003). Our Social Report 2002/3. "We Do Good Things" Don't We? Liverpool, Furniture Resource Centre Group.

Giddens, A. (1997). *The Third Way*. London, Polity Press.

Glendinning, C., M. Powell and K. Rummery, Eds. (2002). *Partnerships, new labour and the governance of welfare*. Bristol, The Policy Press.

Halfpenny, P. and M. Reid (2002). 'Research on the voluntary sector: an overview.' *Policy and Politics* 30(4): 533-50.

Hayman, C. (1998). Opening the gateway. *People Management*, 4: 27.

Hills, J., J. Le Grand and D. Piachaud, Eds. (2002). *Understanding Social Exclusion*, Oxford University Press.

HM Treasury (2001). Towards full employment in a modern society. Norwich, HMSO.

HM Treasury (2002). The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector in Service Delivery. A Cross Cutting Review. London, H M Treasury.

HM Treasury (2004). Child Poverty Review. Norwich, H M Treasury.

Home Office (1990). Efficiency Scrutiny of Government Funding London, Home Office.

Home Office (1998). Getting it right together: Compact on relations between government and the voluntary and community sector in England. London, Stationery Office.

Hoogvelt, A. and A. France (2000). 'New Deal: The Experience and Views of Clients in One Pathfinder City (Sheffield).' *Local Economy* 15(2): 112-127.

Hyland, T. and D. Musson (2001). 'Evaluating Welfare to Work for young people.' *Education + Training* 43(1): 25-29.

Jacobs, K. and T. Manzi (2000). 'Performance indicators and social constructivism: conflict and control in housing management.' *Critical Social Policy* 20(1): 85-103.

Kendall, J. (2003). *The Voluntary Sector*. London and New York, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group.

Kendall, J. and M. Knapp (1995). 'A loose and baggy monster: boundaries, definitions and typologies'. In *An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector*. Edited by J. D. Smith. London, Routledge.

Kendall, J. and M. Knapp (1996). *The voluntary sector in the UK*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Kumleben, S. (2000). 'Playing the hand that's been dealt: voluntary organisations, volunteers and the New Deal.' *Voluntary Action* 2(3): 11-25.

Labour Party (1997). *Building the future together*. London, Labour Party.

Levitas, R. (2005). *The Inclusive Society?: Social Exclusion and New Labour*. Second Edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave, Macmillan.

Lewis, J. (1999a). 'Reviewing the Relationship Between the Voluntary Sector and the State in Britain in the 1990s.' *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 10(3): 255-270.

Lewis, J. (1999b). 'The voluntary sector and the state in twentieth century Britain'. In *Welfare policy in Britain: The road from 1945*. Edited by H. Fawcett. Basingstoke, Macmillan.

Millar, J. (2000). Keeping track of welfare reform: The New Deal Programmes. York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Milne, K. (1998). Jobs for the boys and girls. (Labor Party's New Deal program for young unemployed British). *New Statesman*. 127: 22.

Morris, D. (2001). Charities and the New Deal for Young People. Liverpool, Charity Law Unit, University of Liverpool.

NAO (2002). The New Deal for Young People. Report by the Comptroller and Audit General, National Audit Office.

Nativil, C., P. Sunley and R. Martin (2002). 'Localising welfare-to-work? Territorial flexibility and the new deal for young people.' *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 20(6): 911-932.

NCVO (1996). Meeting the challenge of change: Voluntary action into the 21st century (the Deakin Commission). London, National Council for Voluntary Organisations.

NCVO (1998). Voluntary Sector Involvement in the New Deal Pathfinder. London, National Council for Voluntary Organisations.

NCVO (2006a). The UK Voluntary Sector Almanac 2006. London, National Council for Voluntary Organisations.

NCVO (2006b). The UK Voluntary Sector Almanac 2006. The State of the Sector. London, National Council for Voluntary Organisations.

NEF (1998). Communities Count! A Step by Step Guide to Community Sustainability Indicators. London, New Economic Foundation.

NEF (2000). Prove it! Measuring the effect of neighbourhood renewal on local people. London, New Economic Foundation.

O'Connor, W., S. Bruce and J. Ritchie (2000). New Deal for Young People: National Follow-Through. Findings from a qualitative study amongst individuals, Department for Work and Pensions.

OECD, Ed. (1999). *The local dimension of welfare-to-work: an international survey*. Paris, OECD.

Ogbonna, E. and M. Noon (1999). 'A new deal or new disadvantage? British ethnic minorities and Government training.' *International Journal of Manpower* 20(3/4): 165-178.

Osborne, S. P. and K. Ross (2000). 'Regeneration: The Role and Impact of Local Development Agencies'. In *Voluntary Organisations and Social Policy in Britain: perspectives on change and choice*. Edited by M. Harris and C. Rochester. London, Palgrave. Macmillan.

Parsons, E. (2004). 'Charity shop managers in the UK: becoming more professional?' *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services* 11: 259-268.

Pearce, J., P. Raynard and S. Zadek (1996). Social Auditing for Small Organisations. The Workbook for Trainers and Practitioners. London, New Economics Foundation.



Percy-Smith, J. (2000). 'Introduction: the contours of social exclusion'. In *Policy Responses to Social Exclusion*. Edited by J. Percy-Smith. Buckingham, Open University Press.

Philpott, J. (1999). 'After the windfall: the New Deal at work.' *Economic Affairs* 19(3): 14-19.

Powell, M. and C. Glendinning (2002). 'Introduction'. In *Partnerships, new labour and the governance of welfare*. Edited by C. Glendinning, M. Powell and K. Rummery. Bristol, The Policy Press.

Putnam, R. (1993). 'Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy'. In. Edited by Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press.

Quarter, J., L. Mook and B. J. Richmond (2003). *What Counts: Social Accounting for Nonprofits nad Cooperatives*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall.

Richmond, B. J. (1996). Economic Impact of Community-Based Training: Social Audit Report of Five Ontario Sites. Final Report, Ontario Network of Employment Skills Training Projects.

Richmond, B. J., L. Mook and J. Quarter (2003). 'Social Accounting for Nonprofits. Two Models.' *Nonprofit Management & Leadership* 13(4): 308-324.

Riley, R. and M. White (2002). Macro Evaluation of the New Deal for Young People. London, Department for Work and Pensions.

Sanderson, I. (2004). 'Evaluating initiatives to address social exclusion'. In *Policy Responses to Social Exclusion towards inclusion?* Edited by J. Percy-Smith. Buckingham, Open University Press.

Scott, D., L. Russell, M. Faulkner and M. Nugent (2002). New Deal: High Stakes. An evaluation of the impact of New Deal for Young People on the Voluntary and Community Sectors in the City Pride areas of Manchester, Tameside, Salford and Trafford. Greater Manchester, Greater Manchester Centre for Voluntary Organisations.

SEU (1997). Social Exclusion Unit: purpose, work priorities and working methods. London, HMSO.

Simmonds, D. and D. Finn (2000). Improving the New Deal. Community & Environmental Employment across City Pride. Manchester, Salford, Tameside & Trafford, Manchester, Employment & Regeneration Partnership Ltd.

Spreckley, F. (2000). Social Audit Toolkit, Social Enterprise Partnership.

Stern, E. (1992). 'Evaluating Innovatory Programmes: An External Evaluator's View'. In *Managing Voluntary and Non-profit Enterprises*. Edited by J. Batsleer, C. Cornforth and R. Paton. Milton Keynes, Open University Press.

- Sunley, P., R. Martin and C. Nativel (2001). 'Mapping the New Deal: local disparities in the performance of Welfare-to-Work.' *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 26(4): 484-512.
- Tavistock Institute (1999a). A Review of Thirty New Deal Partnerships: Part of the Case Study Evaluation of New Deal for Young Unemployed People (NDYP). London, The Tavistock Institute.
- Tavistock Institute (1999b). Summary Report: A Review of Thirty New Deal Partnerships: Part of the Case Study Evaluation of New Deal for Young Unemployed People (NDYP). London, The Tavistock Institute.
- The UK Voluntary Sector Research Group (2003). Measuring Impact. Case Studies of impact assessment in small and medium-sized voluntary organisations. London, NCVO.
- Toupin, L. (2001). Social and Community Indicators for Evaluating Women's Work in Communities. Canada, Status of Women Canada.
- Training & Environment Network (1998). TEN Briefing. London, Training & Employment Network.
- United Kingdom Parliament. (2002, 20 March 2002). 'Select Committee on Work and Pensions, Appendix 13.' 2003, from <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmworpen>.
- Wainwright, S. (2000). Measuring Impact. A Guide to Resources. London, NCVO.
- Whithear, R. (1999). 'Charity shop volunteers: a 'no-cost' option?' *Voluntary Action: The Journal of the Institute for Volunteering Research* 1(3): 55-66.
- Woodfield, K., S. Bruce and J. Ritchie (2000). New Deal for Young People: The National Options. Sheffield, Employment Service.
- Yates, H., V. Jochum and D. Turton (2004). The Impact of Impact Assessment: the experience of rural voluntary and community organisations in evaluating change. London, NCVO.

## **Appendix A**

### **PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**

#### **Measuring and Evaluating the Social and Community Benefits of the New Deal for Young People, Voluntary Sector Option and Environmental Task Force Option.**

Thank interviewee for agreeing to interview

There are two parts to the interview. The first is about your organisation in general  
The second is about your organisations involvement in the New Deal for Young People  
employment initiative.

Say something about tape-recording – for memory and analysis purposes. All  
interviewees and organisations will be anonymised in the writing up stage...

## Appendix A

### PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

#### Section 1: About the Organisation

(Depth of questions depends on whether able to obtain existing literature about organisation)

Basic history of Organisation

Mission of Organisation

Activities/projects delivered by organisation

Who directly benefits from the organisation?

Prompt on type of benefits for individuals/groups

Does anyone else benefit as a result...

See how framework below fits/does not fit  
(do not provide framework at this stage)

Community Eg. Developing links/contacts	
Community Services	
Crime	
Health Mental Physical	
Education	
Environment	
Economic Eg. Employment	
	<b>Beneficiary/Community</b>

## **Appendix A**

### **PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**

#### **Section 2: About the organisation and the New Deal Programme**

History of involvement in New Deal – how/why got involved

- explore whether organisation delivers several of the programmes, or just the NDYP

How is the NDYP organised in your organisation

(prompt with who does contracting, monitoring, supervising placements)

How many placements has your organisation offered since its involvement in NDYP

May need to explore different programmes if applicable, but focus on NDYP

If applicable – explore nationally and local

Currently have filled placements – nationally/locally

What project(s) have/are New Dealers involved in

What type of work do New Dealers do– how does this compare with the work that paid staff and volunteers do?

(prompt)

## Appendix A

### PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Give framework to interviewee:

For the next question, I am going to ask you how New Dealers work/placements in your organisation **directly** add to the benefit of the community/beneficiaries, some of these may not be applicable (just say if they are not applicable)

For every one that interviewee says yes, ask how and how this compares with work of paid and unpaid staff...

Community Eg. Developing links/contacts	
Community Services	
Crime	
Health Mental Physical	
Education	
Environment	
Economic Eg. Employment	
	<b>Community/Beneficiary</b>

## Appendix A

### PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Have there been any difficulties in the providing New Deal Placements?

For each mentioned – ask if this is similar/different to those of other (new) people (paid and unpaid staff) entering the organisation/project

Have there been difficulties organizing the delivery of projects where New Deal placements are involved:

(for example: contracts..., monitoring, etc. not just about individual New Dealer)

Is this something that happens in other areas of the organisation?

Overall, what are the best/worse aspects of New Deal

For each mentioned – explore how this compares with paid staff/volunteers

Has your organisation been involved in previous employment initiatives – how does this compare with the New Deal?

Will your organisation consider continuing with the New Deal after this/these contract(s)?

## **Appendix A**

### **PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE**

Review Interview:

Thank for interview –

It would be helpful if I could quickly review the interview with you:

To remind you, section 1 was about your organisation and the second section was about the New Deal... were there any questions that you found difficult to answer – which ones, how, why...

Did you feel that there were questions that I didn't ask about the New Deal, that you feel are particularly important....



## Appendix A

### PILOT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Community Eg. Developing links/contacts	
Community Services	
Crime	
Health Mental Physical	
Education	
Environment	
Economic Eg. Employment	
	<b>Beneficiary/Community</b>